LiBRAK* 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORKIA 
DAVIS 


\ 


American  Campaigns 


By 

Matthew  Forney  Steele 

Major  Second  United  States  Cavalry 


IN  Two  VOLUMES 

VOLUME  I  —  TEXT 


WASHINGTON: 

UNITED  STATES  INFANTRY  ASSOCIATION 
1922 


LIBRARY 

y*iIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORKIA 
DAVIS 


WAR  DEPARTMENT 

Document  No.  324 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff 


riOHAL  CAPITAL  PRESS,  INC.,  WASHINGTON,   D.  C. 


FOREWORD. 

The  original  edition  of  this  work  was  first  privately  printed  in 
1909  under  authority  of  the  War  Department.  A  number  of 
copies  were  purchased  for  official  use  and  the  publisher  given 
authority  to  sell  such  copies  as  he  desired.  The  first  edition  was 
speedily  exhausted  and  a  reprint  was  made  in  1913.  Subse 
quently  the  expensive  color  plates  from  which  the  maps  were 
printed  were  greatly  damaged  by  fire  and  the  type  destroyed. 

In  the  preface  to  the  first  edition,  the  author  very  modestly 
apologized  for  the  supposed  shortcomings  of  his  efforts,  but  in 
spite  of  his  own  fears  as  to  lack  of  thoroughness  in  preparation 
the  work  has  become  standard  in  our  service. 

With  the  large  increase  in  personnel  of  the  services  in  the  last 
few  years,  the  demand  for  copies  of  the  book  soon  depleted  the 
publisher's  stock,  and  for  several  years  now  no  copies  have 
been  for  sale  except  an  occasional  second-hand  copy. 

"American  Campaigns"  has  been  prescribed  at  the  General 
Service  Schools,  the  Infantry  School  and  at  practically  all  other 
service  schools,  but  no  means  have  been  proposed  for  students 
to  obtain  copies. 

Realizing  the  situation  and  the  impracticability  of  reprinting 
from  the  original  type,  the  Infantry  Association  has  decided  to 
offer  this  new  edition,  but  without  change  in  text  or  form. 
Plates  have  been  reproduced  from  the  original  drawings, 
which  fortunately  had  been  preserved  in  the  Army  War  Col 
lege,  while  the  entire  text  is  printed  from  new  type. 

The  cost  of  printing  and  publishing  a  book  today  is  practically 
double  what  it  was  in  1909,  so  that  the  expense  involved  in  this 
undertaking  is  very  great.  If,  however,  this  contribution  of  the 
Infantry  Association  to  the  cause  of  military  education  in  the 
United  States  serves  a  useful  purpose,  the  Association  will  feel 
fully  repaid  for  the  time,  money  and  effort  necessary  to  see 
such  an  extensive  work  through  the  press. 

40  n 


PREFACE. 

These  volumes  represent  a  part  of  my  three  years'  work  as 
lecturer  in  military  history  at  the  Army  Service  Schools  at 
Fort  Leavenworth.  It  is  with  a  great  deal  of  reluctance  that 
I  have  consented  to  let  the  lectures  be  printed  in  their  present 
form,  for  no  one  can  know  better  than  I  how  far  they  fall 
short  of  being  a  finished  work.  No  doubt,  however,  I  should 
not  feel  entirely  satisfied  with  them  if  I  had  spent  twenty  years, 
instead  of  only  a  part  of  three,  upon  them. 

No  man  can  feel  that  he  has  thoroughly  mastered  any  cam 
paign  or  battle,  or  is  fully  equipped  to  lecture  upon  it,  until 
he  has  studied  everything  that  has  been  written  upon  it.  Hence 
I  do  not  feel  that  I  have  mastered  a  single  campaign  or  battle 
discussed  in  this  series,  because  I  have  not  had  time  to  study 
the  tenth  of  what  has  been  written  upon  any  one  qf  them. 
The  Rebellion  Records  have  virtually  been  a  closed  book  for 
me ;  I  have  hardly  dared  to  open  them,  lest  I  might  yield  to  the 
temptation  to  read  on,  from  one  report  to  another,  far  beyond 
the  time  I  have  had  to  spare.  Fortunately,  however,  this  great 
mine  of  fact — and  fiction — has  been  industriously  worked,  and 
its  contents  have  been  carefully  sifted  and  reduced,  by  such  skil 
ful  craftsmen  as  Mr.  John  Codman  Ropes,  General  E.  P.  Alex 
ander,  and  dozens  of  others,  who  have  given  many  years  of 
their  lives  to  the  task;  and  the  product  of  their  expert  labor 
has  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  students  having  less  time  to 
spare,  like  myself. 

There  is  so  much,  however,  I  could  do  to  improve  the  lec 
tures  and  make  them  more  valuable  and  acceptable,  that  I 
regret  I  cannot  put  one  more  year's  work  upon  them  before 
sending  them  forth;  but  they  cannot  wait  longer,  for  some 
work  of  this  kind  is  sadly  needed  by  the  students  at  the  Service 
Schools  in  connection  with  their  course  in  military  history. 
These  volumes  are  intended  to  occupy  a  space  not  filled  by 
any  other  single  work,  and,  until  something  better  shall  be 
provided,  they  must  answer  the  purpose. 

In  preparing  the  lectures  for  publication  I  have  been  assisted 
directly  or  indirectly  by  many  persons  without  whose  aid  I 
should  never  have  succeeded  at  all.  It  would  be  impossible 
even  to  name  them  all.  To  no  one  else  do  I  feel  so  much 
indebted  as  to  Captain  Edwin  T.  Cole,  6th  Infantry,  Senior 


vi  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Instructor,  Department  of  Engineering,  at  the  Service  Schools, 
under  whose  direction  and  supervision  the  maps  were  made. 
Indeed  I  believe  I  may  say  that  Captain  Cole  was  the  in 
itiator  of  the  whole  project.  The  volumes  are  the  outcome 
of  my  course  of  lectures,  which  were  illustrated  by  means  of 
the  stereopticon.  For  this  series  of  lectures  Captain  Cole  with 
his  own  hand  made  more  than  six  hundred  lantern-slides, 
nearly  all  of  which  had  troops  represented  upon  them  in  colors 
laid  on  by  hand  under  the  magnifying-glass.  In  the  prepara 
tion  of  the  maps,  Captain  Cole  was  assisted  by  Sergeant 
John  Howry,  Co.  D.,  1st  Battalion  of  Engineers,  a  skilful 
draftsman,  and  Sergeant  Frank  Arganbright,  Co.  A,  Signal 
Corps,  an  expert  photographer.  The  final  tracings  of  all  the 
maps  were  done  by  Mr.  W.  J.  Jacobi  and  Mr.  A.  B.  Williams, 
expert  draftsmen  in  the  Military  Information  Committee, 
Second  Section,  General  Staff,  U.  S.  Army.  For  the  excellence 
of  the  plates  I  am  indebted  to  the  personal  care  of  Mr.  W. 
Palmer  Hall,  of  The  Maurice  Joyce  Engraving  Co.,  and  for 
the  accurate  "registering"  of  the  color-plates  to  the  pains 
taking  of  Mr.  D.  S.  White  and  Mr.  William  E.  Browne, 
of  the  house  of  Byron  S.  Adams.  To  Mr.  S.  C.  Will 
iams,  clerk  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Service  Schools, 
I  am  particularly  obliged  for  the  speed  and  accuracy  with 
which  he  made  the  fair  copy  of  my  manuscript  for  the  printer. 
None  of  the  maps  were  drawn  originally  for  these  lectures; 
all  are  photographic  reproductions  of  either  official  maps  or 
maps  accompanying  works  that  have  been  consulted  in  the 
preparation  of  the  lectures.  For  the  privilege  of  repro 
ducing  the  maps  of  other  works  I  have  had  to  ask  several 
authors  and  almost  every  leading  publisher  in  the  country,  all 
of  whom,  both  authors  and  publishers,  have  been  kind  enough 
to  give  their  consent.  Since,  however,  the  maps  have  been 
taken  from  many  different  sources,  they  will  be  found  to  pos 
sess  no  sort  of  uniformity  in  method  or  in  quality.  Better  maps, 
no  doubt,  are  in  existence  than  many  of  those  reproduced,  but 
the  best  one  available  has  been  taken  in  every  case.  In  most 
cases  the  colored  blocks  and  lines  representing  troops  and 
routes  of  march  have  been  added  specially  for  the  lectures. 


PREFACE.  vii 

It  has  seldom  been  possible  to  represent  the  troops  to  a  scale, 
the  main  purpose  having  been  merely  to  suggest,  by  means  of 
blue  and  red  blocks,  the  relative  positions  of  hostile  troops  on 
a  battle-field  or  in  a  theater  of  operations. 

All  things  considered,  it  has  been  deemed  best  to  present 
the  maps  in  a  separate  volume  of  the  same  size  as  the  volume 
of  lectures,  and  to  limit  them  to  such  dimensions  that  none 
of  them  shall  require  folding;  but  in  reducing  some  of  them 
to  a  scale  small  enough  to  meet  these  requirements,  many  of 
the  geographic  names  have  been  made  rather  small  to  read 
with  the  naked  eye;  but  it  may  be  remarked,  in  passing, 
that  no  one  can  hope  to  keep  his  eyes  unimpaired  who  under 
takes  the  serious  study  of  military  history  without  the  aid  of  a 
reading-glass.  Many  of  the  names  and  details  of  the  originals 
not  mentioned  in  the  lectures  have  been  left  out  of  the  repro 
ductions  and  great  pains  have  been  taken  to  see  that  no  im 
portant  geographic  names  mentioned  in  the  lectures  should  be 
omitted  from  the  corresponding  maps. 

While  reference  is  made  in  foot-notes  throughout  the  text 
to  works  that  have  been  quoted  or  taken  as  authority,  I  must 
here  invite  the  attention  of  students  of  American  military  his 
tory  to  a  few  works  that  I  believe  will  be  of  special  interest 
to  them : 

For  the  study  of  the  colonial  period  of  our  history  Francis 
Parkman  has  left  an  immortal  work  in  his  series  of  volumes.* 
His  Montcahn  and  Wolfe  and  A  Half  Century  of  Conflict  are 
of  particular  interest  to  the  student  of  American  miR&iry 
history. 

Upon  the  Revolutionary  War,  The  American  Revolution, 
by  John  Fiske,f  is  too  well  known  to  require  any  recommen 
dation  from  me.  Its  popularity  is  due  largely  to  Mr.  Fiske's 
charming  style.  Sydney  George  Fisher's  True  History  of  the 
American  Revolution,  and  his  later  and  more  extensive  work, 
The  Struggle  for  American  Independence, $  are  invaluable 
to  the  American  who  wishes  to  get  an  unbiased  view  of  our 


*Published  by  Little,  Brown  and  Company,  Boston. 

fPublished  by  Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  Boston. 

JBoth  published  by  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company,  Philadelphia. 


viii  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

forefathers'  struggle  for  freedom.  The  author  breaks  out  of 
the  usual  rut  of  American  historians,  and  gives  us  a  view  of 
the  quarrel  from  the  Englishman's  side  as  well  as  from  the 
American's.  To  the  military  student  in  search  of  the  lessons 
of  the  Revolutionary  War  that  relate  to  his  own  chosen  pro 
fession,  Battles  of  the  American  Revolution,*  written  by  Gen 
eral-Henry  B.  Carrington,  soldier  and  student  of  the  science 
of  war,  makes  a  special  appeal. 

Excellent  accounts  of  the  War  of  1812  are  contained  in 
Henry  Adams's  History  of  the  United  States,^  and  A  History 
of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  by  John  Bach  McMaster. 

The  two  little  volumes  of  The  Great  Commander  Series^ — 
General  Taylor,  by  General  O.  O.  Howard,  and  General  Scott, 
by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright — taken  together,  give  a  very 
pleasing  and  instructive,  but  brief,  narrative  of  the  Mexican 
War ;  but  the  fullest  and  most  satisfactory  history  of  that  war, 
in  a  single  volume,  is  General  Cadmus  Wilcox's  History  of  the 
Mexican  War.§  This  work  is  based  upon  accounts  written 
from  both  American  and  Mexican  points  of  view. 

When  we  come  down  to  the  Civil  War,  a  mere  glance  at  the 
library  shelves  given  to  its  literature  makes  one  appreciate  to 
the  full  the  words  of  The  Preacher,  "Of  making  many  books 
there  is  no  end";  yet  there 'is  no  single  work  that  covers  the 
whole  war  concisely  and  in  a  way  to  satisfy  the  military  stu 
dent.  The  subject  is  so  vast  that,  thus  far,  no  person  that  has 
undertaken  it  has  lived  to  finish  his  task.  The  Comte  of  Paris, 
in  his  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America,^  brought  the 
narrative  in  full  detail  well  forward  into  the  year  1863.  This 
is  a  great  work. 

John  Codman  Ropes,  in  The  Story  of  the  Civil  War,\\  only 
lived  to  complete  Parts  I.  and  II.,  which  carry  the  story 
through  the  campaigns  of  1862;  but  I  am  informed  by  his 
publishers  that  Part  III.,  prepared  "from  the  data  which  Mr. 
Ropes  left  behind,"  will  soon  be  issued.  Could  Mr.  Ropes 
have  been  spared  to  finish  his  great  work  it  would  have  proved 
an  invaluable  boon  for  the  student  of  the  military  history  of 
that  great  conflict.  No  other  work  that  I  have  seen  reviews 


'Published  by  A.  S.  Barnes  and  Company,  New  York. 
fPublished  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  New  York. 
^Published  by  D.  Appleton  and  Company,  New  York. 
§Published  by  The  Church  Publishing  Company,  Washington. 
^Translation  published  by  Porter  and  Coates,  now  the  John  C.  Winston 
Company,  Philadelphia. 

|| Published  by  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York. 


PREFACE.  ix 

the  main  campaigns  of  1861  and  1862  as  scientifically  and  con 
vincingly  as  that  of  Mr.  Ropes.  And  withal  the  author's  writ 
ing  is  easy  and  delightful  to  read. 

In  his  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate*  General  E.  P. 
Alexander  has  written  an  absorbing  narrative  and  critical  review 
of  the  campaigns  that  he  himself  took  part  in,— which  include 
most  of  the  important  campaigns  of  the  Civil  War, — together 
with  a  brief  account  of  some  of  the  others.  It  is  a  most  scien 
tific  and  scholarly  criticism  of  the  operations.  The  only  cause 
of  quarrel  one  can  find  with  the  able  and  unprejudiced  author 
is  that  he  has  not  pointed  out  the  faults  of  his  enemies  as  plainly 
and  fully  as  he  has  pointed  out  those  of  his  friends.  Every 
military  student  must  be  thankful  to  General  Alexander  -for 
these  memoirs,  as  everyone  must:  lament  that  General  Stephen 
D.  Lee  did  not  find  time  to  publish  a  similar  memoir  of  the 
campaigns  that  he  bore  a  part  in.  Such  a  work  along  with 
General  Alexander's  would  have  made  almost  a  complete  critical 
review  of  the  great  campaigns  of  the  war. 

The  Battles  and  Leaders  of 'the  Civil  War,\  made  up  of  the 
great  series  of  war  papers  that  appeared  a  few  years  ago  in 
The  Century,  stands  unique  in  .the  world's  histories  of  war. 
It  covers  every  event  of  any  importance  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end  of  the  great  struggle.  Told  by  the  very  actors  them 
selves,  great  and  little,  these  narratives  have  for  the  American 
reader  an  interest  that  no  other  history  of  the  Civil  War  .could 
possess.  So  long  as  there  shall  be  Americans  to  read  the  story 
of  those  times  they  must  remain  grateful  to  The  Century  Com 
pany  for  these  volumes.  Precisely  the  right  moment  was 
chosen  by  the  company  for  carrying  out  the  great  work.  Had 
it  been  undertaken  earlier,  the  time  would  have  been  too  soon, 
for  the  vision  of  the  actors  would  still  have  been  blurred  by 
the  prejudice  of  section  and  the  smoke  of  battle;  had  it  been 
postponed  longer,  too  many  of  'the  actors  would  already  have 
passed  away. 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War*  is  another  excellent  history  of 
the  main  campaigns,  issued  in  a  series  of  small  handy  volumes, 
each  written  by  a  man  chosen  on  account  of  his  special  fitness. 
In  the  list  of  the  contributors  we  find  the  names  of  John  H. 
Nicolay,  General  Alexander  S.  Webb,  John  Codman  Ropes, 
General  Winthrop  Palfrey,  General  Abner  Doubleday,  General 
Henry  M.  Cist,  General  Jacob  D.  Cox,  Captain  Francis  V. 


*Published  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  New  York. 
fPublished  by  The  Century  Company,  New  York. 


x  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Greene,  Mr.  George  E.  Pond,  and  General  Andrew  A.  Hum 
phreys. 

The  bookshelves  of  the  young  American  officer  should  not 
long  be  without  the  last-named  four  works — The  Story  of 
the  Civil  War,  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  The  Battles 
and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  and  Campaigns  of  the  Civil 
War.  Having  first  read  these  carefully,  following  out  every 
movement  upon  the  map,  the  studjent  will  have  gained  a  gen 
eral  knowledge  and  appreciation  of  the  main  operations  of  the 
Civil  War;  then,  if  he  pleases,  he  can  find  interesting  and  in 
structive  biographies,  memoirs,  and  histories,  too  numerous  for 
me  to  attempt  to  list,  with  which  to  fill  in  the  details  of  cam 
paigns  and  battles.  Of  these  books,  one  of  the  most  valuable 
is  the  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  by  Thomas  B. 
Van  Home  and  Edward  Ruger.*  Few  histories  that  I  have 
seen  contain  so  many  excellent  maps  as  accompany  this 
volume. 

Of  our  war  with  Spain,  no  complete  history,  such  as  the  mili 
tary  student  desires,  has  as  yet  appeared.  Captain  Sargent's 
work,  The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de  Cuba$  treats  the  main 
part  of  the  operations  with  a  fulness  and  skill  that  place  it 
among  the  great  military  histories  that  have  been  written  in 
English,  and  put  its  author  in  the  class  with  Napier  and  Hen 
derson.  The  only  regret  one  can  have  in  laying  the  work  down 
is  that  its  author  did  not  include  in  it  a  review  of  the  operations 
in  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines. 

M.  F.  S. 
ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE, 

WASHINGTON,  September  23,  1909. 

^Published  by  Robert  Clarke  &  Company,  now  The  Robert  Clarke 
Company,  Cincinnati, 
f  Published  by  A.  C.  McClurg  and  Company,  Chicago. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  I. 

LECTURE 

I.     Colonial  Wars 1 

II.  The  Revolutionary  War — Northern  Campaigns     21 

III.  The  Revolutionary  War — Southern  Campaigns     42 

IV.  The  War  of  1812 56 

V.     The  Mexican  War — Taylor's  Campaign 81 

VI.     The  Mexican  War— Scott's  Campaign 105 

VII.     The  First  Battle  of  Bull  Run 127 

VIII.     Forts  Henry  and  Donelson 150 

IX.     The  Shiloh  Campaign 169 

X.     The  Peninsular  Campaign 191 

XI.     Jackson's  Valley  Campaign 217 

XII.     The  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run. . . . 239 

XIII.  The  Antietam  Campaign 260 

XIV.  The  Fredericksburg  Campaign 284 

XV.     Stones  River  Campaign 308 

XVI.     The  Battle  of  Chancellorsville 329 

XVII.  The  Campaign  of  Gettysburg— The  First  Day.   353 

XVIII.  The    Campaign    of    Gettysburg — Second    and 

Third  Days 371 

XIX.     The  Vicksburg  Campaign 394 

XX.     The  Chickamauga  Campaign 422 

XXI.     The  Battles  around  Chattanooga 445 

XXII.     The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness 466 

XXIII.  The  Battle  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  ...   488 

XXIV.  Siege  of  Petersburg 510 

XXV.     The  Campaign  of  Atlanta 535 

XXVI.     The  Campaign  of  Franklin  and  Nashville 555 

XXVII.     The  Spanish-American  War 588 

Appendix 629 

Index  .  .  .   673 


LECTURE  I. 
COLONIAL  WARS. 

(1*)  Almost  at  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century 
Canada  became  the  battle-ground  of  the  French  and  the  Brit 
ish.  The  territory  had  been  in  dispute  from  the  earliest 
discoveries. 

John  Cabot,  sailing  under  the  flag  of  Henry  VII.  of  England, 
in  1497,  gave  the  British  their  claim  to  this  part  of  America; 
but  he  only  touched  at  the  Island  of  Newfoundland.  The 
French  rested  their  claim  upon  the  discoveries  of  Verrazzano, 
who  planted  their  flag  on  the  St.  Lawrence  in  1524.  Jacques 
Cartier  followed,  in  1534,  and,  in  the  name  of  France  and  the 
Holy  Roman  Church,  carried  the  flag  and  the  cross  higher  up 
the  St.  Lawrence. 

In  1608  the  French,  under  Champlain,  established  a  trading 
post  at  Quebec,  which  soon  became  an  important  town.  In 
1629  Admiral  Kirk,  with  a  British  squadron,  entered  the  St. 
Lawrence  and  captured  Quebec ;  but  it  was  restored  to  France 
at  the  peace  of  St.  Germain-en-Laye,  in  1642. 

Before  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  French  had 
pushed  westward  as  far  as  Lake  Superior,  and,  under  the  direc 
tion  of  the  governor-general,  Count  de  Frontenac,  had,  by 
1680,  built  military  posts  at  Niagara,  Michilimackinac  and  in 
the  Illinois  country.  Later  Frontenac  directed  French  and 
Indian  attacks  against  the  English  frontier  of  New  England 
and  New  York,  and  the  English  posts  in  the  Hudson  Bay  coun 
try;  and,  in  1690,  repulsed  the  attack  of  Sir  William  Phips,  the 
first  royal  governor  of  Massachusetts,  who  had  sailed  with  a 
fleet  from  Boston.  A  land  force  under  General  Winthrop  of 
Massachusetts  was  to  have  cooperated  with  the  fleet  under 
Phips ;  but  it  marched  no  farther  than  Lake  Champlain.  From 
there  "Winthrop,  finding  it  impossible  to  do  anything  with  the 
disorderly  forces  of  the  main  body,  marched  them  back  to 
Albany."f  A  few  months  before,  Phips  had  sailed  with  a  fleet 
from  Boston,  and  captured  Port  Royal  (now  Annapolis,  Nova 
Scotia).  A  bloody  border  warfare,  known  in  our  history  as 
King  William's  War,  was  kept  up  until  the  year  1697. 

The  numerals  appearing  in  this  volume  refer  to  the  maps  numbered 
serially  in  the  volume  of  maps. 
fRossiter  Johnson,  The  Old  French  War. . 

1 


AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

QUEEN  ANNE'S  WAR. 

In  1702  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  known  in  Ameri 
can  history  as  Queen  Anne's  War,  broke  out,  and  was  the  occa 
sion  of  a  renewal  of  hostilities  between  the  French  and  English 
colonists.  At  length,  to  put  an  end  to  the  depredations  of  the 
French  and  Indians  along  their  frontier,  the  English  colonists 
resolved  to  capture  Canada  itself  by  a  combined  invasion  by 
land  and  sea.  The  mother-country  was  asked  for  aid,  and  she 
promised  to  send  a  fleet.  This  was  to  proceed  from  Boston, 
while  the  land  force,  composed  of  colonial  militia  and  Indian 
allies,  of  the  Five  Nations  [Iroquois],  was  to  march  northward, 
by  way  of  Lake  Champlain  and  the  Richelieu  River,  under  Col 
onel  Nicholson,  the  lieutenant-governor  of  New  York.  Nichol 
son  gathered  his  troops  together  and  established  a  camp  on  the 
upper  Hudson ;  and  militia  was  collected  and  drilled  for  months 
at  Boston,  pending  the  arrival  of  the  squadron  from  England. 
This  squadron  was  also  going  to  bring  several  regular  British 
regiments.  At  last,  late  in  the  autumn,  word  came  that  the 
squadron  and  regulars  could  not  be  sent— they  had  to  be  dis 
patched  to  the  Continent  of  Europe  instead.  Nicholson's  force 
on  the  upper  Hudson,  meanwhile,  tired  of  waiting  for  the  order 
to  advance,  had  dispersed. 

The  next  year,  however,  1710,  a  British  squadron  came  over 
and  escorted  Colonel  Nicholson,  with  some  1,500  provincial 
militia  and  400  British  marines,  to  Port  Royal.  Nicholson 
captured  the  town  and  changed  its  name  to  Annapolis  Royal,  in 
honor  of  Queen  Anne.  'Tort  Royal  had  twice  before  been 
taken  by  New  England  men — once  under  Major  Sedgwick  in 
1654,  and  again  under  Sir  William  Phips"  (as  we  have  seen) 
"in  the  last  war ;  and,  in  each  case,  it  had  been  restored  to 
France  by  treaty.  This  time  England  kept  what  she  had  got ; 
and  as  there  was  no  other  place  of  strength  in  the  province,  the 
capture  of  Port  Royal  meant  the  conquest  of  Acadia."* 

The  following  year,  1711,  the  British  government  undertook 
in  earnest  the  conquest  of  Canada.  Seven  veteran  regiments, 
five  of  which  came  from  Marlborough's  army,  were  sent  over, 
under  General  John  Hill ;  and  a  fleet,  under  Admiral  Sir  Hov- 
enden  Walker.  Hill,  known  at  court  as  "Ja°k  Hill,"  was  per 
fectly  incompetent ;  the  only  reason  for  his  appointment  was 
the  fact  that  he  was  a  brother  of  Lady  Abigail  Masham,  at  that 


*Parkman,  A  Half  Century  of  Conflict. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  3 

time  the  favorite  woman  of  Queen  Anne's  bed-chamber.  Ad 
miral  Walker  was  no  better  than  Hill. 

Besides  the  seven  regiments  of  regulars,  with  artillery,  about 
5,500  men,  there  were  some  800  marines  and  1,500  provincial 
militia.  The  fleet  with  this  force  was  to  sail  for  the  St.  Law 
rence  and  Quebec,  while  another  force  of  militia,  some  2,000, 
under  Colonel  Nicholson,  was  to  assemble  near  Lake  Champ- 
lain  and  move  against  Montreal. 

The  fleet  sailed  from  Boston,  with  its  army,  on  the  30th  of 
July ;  but  it  never  reached  Quebec.  In  the  lower  St.  Lawrence 
it  was  caught  in  a  gale,  several  of  the  transports  were  wrecked, 
and  nearly  900  soldiers  perished.  Discouraged  by  this  mishap, 
Walker  and  Hill,  both  of  whom  were  faint-hearted,  withdrew. 
The  British  fleet,  with  the  regulars,  sailed  back  to  England,  and 
the  American  militiamen  returned  in  their  transports  to  Boston. 

Report  of  the  disaster  and  return  was  dispatched  to  Colonel 
Nicholson,  whose  army  had  not  gone  beyond  Lake  Champlain. 
Parkman  says,  when  the  colonel  "heard  what  had  happened,  he 
was  beside  himself  with  rage,  tore  off  his  wig,  threw  it  on  the 
ground  and  stamped  upon  it,  crying  out  'Roguery !  Treachery !' 
When  his  fit  was  over,  he  did  all  that  was  now  left  for  him  to 
do — burned  the  wooden  forts  he  had  built,  marched  back  to 
Albany,  and  disbanded  his  army."  Thus  ended  the  second 
attempt  to  invade  Canada  by  land  and  sea,  and  the  monks  and 
nuns  at  Quebec  were,  no  doubt,  sure  that  Canada  had  been 
saved  from  the  heel  of  the  unbeliever  by  their  prayers.  This 
was  the  last  serious  effort  against  the  French  in  Canada  during 
Queen  Anne's  War,  which  closed  with  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht 
in  1713. 

After  this  treaty,  a  few  years  of  peace  followed  between 
France  and  England,  during  which  the  French  in  America 
gradually  "extended  their  dominion  in  the  great  West  and  the 
Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  forming  a  complete  cordon  of  settle 
ments  about  the  English,  who  now  saw  that  they  must  either 
break  the  chain,  or  content  themselves  with  the  limitation  of 
their  territory  to  the  east  of  the  Alleghanies."* 

Canada  was  linked  to  the  other  French  province,  Louisiana, 
by  a  chain  of  settlements  in  the  Mississippi  Valley ;  and,  toward 
the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  French  forts  occupied 
points  controlling  all  the  chief  waterways  between  these  two 
widely  separated  colonies.  "Niagara  held  the  passage  from 

^Historians'  History. 


4  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Lake  Ontario  to  Lake  Erie ;  Detroit  closed  the  entrance  to  Lake 
Huron,  and  Michilimackinac  guarded  the  point  where  Lake 
Huron  is  joined  by  Lakes  Michigan  and  Superior;  while  the 
Fort  called  La  Baye,  at  the  head  of  Green  Bay,  stopped  the  way 
to  the  Mississippi  by  Marquette's  old  route  of  the  Fox  River 
and  the  Wisconsin.  Another  route  to  the  Mississippi  was  con 
trolled  by  a  post  on  the  Maumee  to  watch  the  carrying-place 
between  that  river  and  the  Wabash,  and  by  another  on  the 
Wabash,  where  Vincennes  now  stands.  La  Salle's  route,  by 
way  of  the  Kankakee  and  the  Illinois,  was  barred  by  a  fort  on 
the  St.  Joseph;  and  even  if,  in  spite  of  these  obstructions,  an 
enemy  should  reach  the  Mississippi  by  any  of  the  northern 
affluents,  the  cannon  of  Fort  Chartres  would  prevent  him  from 
descending  it."* 

GEOGRAPHY. 

It  is  now  time  to  study  the  military  geography  of  Canada, 
before  taking  up  the  next  invasion.  We  shall  not  consider  its 
geography  of  to-day,  with  its  numerous  cities  and  its  great 
systems  of  railways  and  canals.  Canada  then,  as  now,  was 
contiguous  to  the  northern  frontier  of  New  England  and  New 
York ;  all  the  territory  north  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Great 
Lakes  was  acknowledged  to  belong  to  the  French.  From  the 
lakes  southward  the  territory  was  claimed  by  both  the  French 
and  the  English ;  and  the  boundary  between  Canada,  on  the  one 
side,  and  New  England  and  New  York,  on  the  other,  had  not 
been  fixed,  and  was  a  constant  cause  of  trouble  and  border  war. 

The  country  of  the  Iroquois  or  Five  Nationsf  and  the  Algon- 
quins  lay  between  the  frontiers  of  the  English  and  the  French 
settlements.  The  Algonquins  were  always  allies  of  the  French, 
and  the  Iroquois  were  generally  allies  of  the  English. 

Canada  was  then  a  vast  wilderness,  without  roads  or  routes 
of  travel,  except  its  waterways  and  such  trails  as  the  Indians 
had  made.  Quebec  and  Montreal  were  the  only  towns  in  the 
interior ;  and,  as  Quebec  was  the  capital,  besides  absolutely 
commanding  the  St.  Lawrence,  any  invasion  of  Canada  must 
have  this  town  for  its  main  objective.  And,  as  there  were  no 
roads,  any  invasion  of  Canada  must  confine  itself  mainly  to 

*Parkman,  A  Half  Century  of  Conflict. 

fThe  original  Five  Nations  were  the  Mohawks,  Oneidas,  Onondagas, 
Cayugas,  and  Senecas.  In  1713  the  Tuscaroras  from  North  Carolina 
joined  the  confederacy  and  formed  "The  Six  Nations." — Sloane. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  5 

water  routes.  The  first  of  such  routes,  in  importance,  was,  of 
course,  the  St.  Lawrence,  by  which  ships  could  ascend  right  to 
Montreal,  if  not  stopped  by  hostile  fleets  or  the  cannon  of 
Quebec. 

An  examination  of  the  map  shows  a  water-shed,  about  mid 
way  between  the  Atlantic  coast  of  New  England  and  the  St. 
Lawrence,  in  which  a  number  of  rivers  rise;  they  flow  toward 
the  Atlantic  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  respectively.  This  water 
shed  was  the  carrying-place  between  all  the  water  routes  con 
necting  these  parts  of  the  old  French  and  English  provinces, 
between  the  ocean  and  the  great  river. 

Starting  in  the  east,  first  we  see  the  St.  John  River,  whose 
head-waters  are  within  ten  miles  of  water  that  flows  to  the  St. 
Lawrence.  The  St.  John,  however,  could  never  be  available  as 
a  line  of  invasion,  because,  in  the  first  place,  its  mouth  and  the 
greater  part  of  its  course  lie  in  territory  always  acknowledged 
to  be  a  part  of  Canada.  Its  mouth  is  too  far  away  from  Bos 
ton,  or  any  other  base,  to  reach  by  land ;  and  it  does  not  com 
pare  to  the  St.  Lawrence  as  a  line  of  invasion  to  be  taken  by  a 
fleet.  Furthermore,  its  mouth  was  guarded  by  a  French  fort. 
The  next  river  is  the  Penobscot ;  but  its  head-waters  are  not  as 
near  the  Chaudiere,  or  any  other  stream  emptying  into  the  St. 
Lawrence,  as  are  the  head -waters  of  the  Kennebec.  Then 
comes  the  Connecticut  River,  with  the  St.  Francis  on  the  oppo 
site  side  of  the  carrying-place.  Next  and  last  is  the  Hudson, 
with  Lake  Champlain  and  the  Richelieu  River  on  the  St.  Law 
rence  slope.  This  was  the  shortest  and  easiest  route,  and  the 
one  usually  taken  by  the  Five  Nations,  on  their  incursions  into 
the  French  settlements  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  This  route,  how 
ever,  if  followed  to  the  mouth  of  the  Richelieu,  would  have 
Montreal  on  its  flank;  hence  an  expedition  by  this  line  should 
have  Montreal,  and  not  Quebec,  for  its  primary  objective. 

The  other  two  water  routes  by  which  Montreal  and  Quebec 
and  the  heart  of  Canada  could  be  approached  from  the  south, 
were :  first,  the  route  by  way  of  Lake  Ontario  and  down  the  St. 
Lawrence ;  and  second,  the  route  across  Lake  Huron  and  Geor 
gian  Bay,  and  thence  by  French  River,  Lake  Nipissing  and  the 
Ottawa  River.  These  two  routes  were,  of  course,  not  available 
in  the  early  days.  They  were  too  far  away  from  the  English 
settlements,  and  too  long,  and  they  were  perfectly  guarded  by 
French  forts.  Besides,  the  rapids  in  the  St.  Lawrence  above 
Montreal  were  a  serious  obstacle  to  the  passage  down  .this 
river. 


6  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

KING  GEORGE'S  WAR. 

"The  Peace  of  Utrecht  had  left  unsettled  the  perilous  ques 
tions  of  boundary  between  the  rival  powers  in  North  America, 
and  they  grew  more  perilous  every  day  .  .  .  yet  it  was,  as 
before,  a  European  and  not  an  American  quarrel  that"  was  to 
bring  the  colonists  to  blows  again.  "The  War  of  the  Austrian 
Succession  broke  out  in  1744.  When  Frederick  of.  Prussia 
seized  Silesia  and  began  that  bloody  conflict,  it  meant  that  packs 
of  howling  savages  would  again  spread  fire  and  carnage  along 
the  New  England  border."* 

This  was  known  in  America  as  King  George's  War.  Besides 
the  bloody  border  warfare,  its  principal  event  was  the  capture 
of  Louisburg  by  a  bold  expedition  of  New  England  militia, 
under  William  Pepper rell.  Next  to  Quebec,  Louisburg  was  the 
strongest  fortress  in  America.  It  was  also  a  French  naval  sta 
tion,  and,  situated  as  it  was  on  the  Island  of  Cape  Breton,  it 
commanded  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence. 

(2)  Pepperrell's  expedition,  about  4,000  strong,  sailed  out 
of  Massachusetts  Bay  on  the  24th  of  March,  1745,  and,  on  the 
2nd  of  May  the  first  troops  landed  near  Louisburg.  The  for 
tress  was  garrisoned  by  560  regular  soldiers  and  some  1,300  or 
1,400  militia.  The  New  Englanders  captured  an  outlying  bat 
tery  by  assault,  and  turned  its  guns  on  the  main  fort.  Then 
they  laid  siege  to  the  place.  On  the  17th  of  June  the  com 
mander  surrendered,  and  the  New  Englanders  took  possession. 
The  fortress  was  returned  to  the  French  by  the  Treaty  of  Aix- 
la-Chapelle,  which  terminated  the  war,  in  1748. 

FRENCH  AND  INDIAN  WAR. 

(1)  Eight  years  of  peace  followed,  during  which  the  Eng 
lish  strengthened  their  position  in  America  by  founding  the  for 
tified  city  of  Halifax,  in  1749;  and  the  French  established  a 
new  line  of  forts  closer  about  the  English  frontier  on  the  west. 

The  English  did  not  regard  these  encroachments  of  the 
French  with  complacence.  So,  late  in  1753,  Governor  Din- 
widdie  of  Virginia  dispatched  Major  George  Washington, 
Adjutant-General  of  the  Virginia  militia,  to  Fort  Le  Boeuf  to 
demand  of  the  French  commander,  that  the  French  should 
withdraw  from  Virginia  soil.  Early  in  1754  Washington  was 


*Parkman. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  7 

sent  back  to  the  country  of  the  Monongahela  River,  with  some 
militia  and  one  company  of  British  regulars,  to  oppose  the 
advance  of  the  French.  Here  he  came  into  contact  with  the 
French,  near  a  place  called  the  Great  Meadows.  This  was  the 
opening  of  the  French  and  Indian  War.  A  few  weeks  later, 
Washington  was  attacked  in  the  fort  which  he  had  built  and 
named  Fort  Necessity ;  he  was  compelled  to  surrender  to  supe 
rior  numbers,  but  was  allowed  to  march  out  with  the  honors 
of  war. 

In  February,  1755,  General  Braddock  arrived  in  Virginia 
with  two  regiments  of  British  regulars.  He  was  met  at  Alex 
andria  by  several  provincial  governors,  and  a  plan  of  cam 
paign  against  the  French  was  arranged.  The  French  were  to 
be  attacked  at  four  points  at  once,  by  independent  forces. 
Braddock  was  to  lead  his  two  regiments  and  a  force  of  militia 
against  Fort  Duquesne;  a  force  of  two  provincial  regiments 
was  to  attack  Niagara;  a  body  of  provincials  was  to  seize  the 
French  post  at  Crown  Point ;  and  the  fourth  column  was  to 
operate  in  Acadia. 

Braddock  marched  his  command  to  Fort  Cumberland,  where 
his  troops,  all  told,  numbered  some  2,200.  He  had  remarked 
to  Benjamin  Franklin,  "I  shall  hardly  need  to  stop  more  than 
three  or  four  days  at  Fort  Duquesne ;  then  I  shall  march  on  to 
Niagara,  and  from  there  to  Frontenac."  He  was  a  veteran 
British  soldier,  and  had  hardly  less  contempt  for  provincial 
troops  than  he  had  for  the  Indian  allies  of  the  French.  He 
paid  little  heed  to  the  advice  of  Colonel  Washington,  who  ac 
companied  his  expedition  as  an  aide-de-camp.*  With  1,373 
picked  men,  he  moved  against  Fort  Duquesne.  On  crossing 
the  Monongahela  River,  about  ten  miles  from  the  fort,  without 
a  single  scout  to  give  warning,  he  fell  into  an  ambuscade  set 
for  him  by  the  French  and  Indians;  and  in  the  dense  forest, 
his  command  was  cut  to  pieces  and  routed. 

(3),  (4)  This  happened  on  the  9th  of  July,  1755.  Out  of 
eighty-six  British  officers,  sixty-three  were  killed  or  disabled, 
Braddock  being  mortally  wounded;  and  only  459  of  the  rank 
and  file  came  off  unhurt.  On  the  other  side,  only  sixteen  white 
men,  and  about  thirty-five  Indians,  were  killed  or  wounded. 
(1)  The  British  fell  back  to  Fort  Cumberland,  whence  the 
commander  who  succeeded  Braddock  marched  his  regulars  to 
Philadelphia,  leaving  the  few  provincials  to  hold  the  fort  and 
defend  the  English  frontier. 

*Rossiter  Johnson. 


8  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  expedition  to  Acadia  was  entirely  successful,  and  re 
sulted  in  the  capture  of  the  French  forts  at  Beausejour  and 
St.  John. 

The  force  to  operate  against  Crown  Point  assembled  at 
Albany.  In  July,  1755,  there  were  present  about  3,000  provin 
cials  and  300  Indians  of  the  Six  Nations.  The  command  of 
the  enterprise  was  given  to  a  young  Irishman,  named  William 
Johnson,  who  "had  never  seen  service  and  knew  nothing  of 
war."*  His  chief  reputation  rested  upon  his  knowledge  of  the 
Indians  and  his  great  influence  among  them.  "While  the  Brit 
ish  colonists  were  preparing  to  attack  Crown  Point,  the  French 
of  Canada  were  preparing  to  defend  it."*  Baron  Dieskau,  with 
3,537  regulars,  Canadians,  and  Indians,  was  assigned  the  task 
of  defending  it.  He  led  his  command  up  the  Richelieu,  and 
embarked  it  in  boats  and  canoes  for  Crown  Point. 

Johnson's  main  body  moved  up  the  river  to  the  carrying- 
place  between  the  Hudson  and  Lake  George,  where  it  built  a 
fortified  storehouse,  and  called  it  Fort  Lyman,  after  one  of  its 
officers.  The  name  was  afterward  changed  to  Fort  Edward. 
Later  the  army  moved  to  the  head  of  Lake  George,  leaving  500 
men  to  garrison  Fort  Lyman. 

(5)  "While  Johnson  lay  at  Lake  George,  Dieskau  prepared 
to  surprise  him."  He  had  no  thought  of  waiting  at  Crown 
Point  to  be  attacked  by  a  "mob  of  countrymen,"  as  he  consid 
ered  Johnson's  ununi  formed  army.  So  he  issued-Jiis  order  for 
an  advance,  one  paragraph  of  which  directed,  that  "Indians  are 
not  to  amuse  themselves  by  taking  scalps  until  the  enemy  is 
entirely  defeated."*  Then  he  moved  upon  Ticonderoga,  which 
commanded  both  of  the  routes  by  which  Johnson  might 
advance. 

A  provincial  brought  in  by  Dieskau's  scouts  told  him  that 
Johnson's  army  had  fallen  back  to  Albany,  leaving  but  a  small 
garrison  at  Fort  Lyman.  Dieskau  resolved  to  capture  this 
garrison.  With  some  200  regulars,  700  Canadians,  and  600 
Indians,  he  embarked  in  canoes,  and  went  to  the  head  of 
South  Bay;  there  he  began  the  march  through  the  forest  for 
Fort  Lyman.  On  the  way  he  ran  upon  some  teams  from  the 
English  camp  at  the  head  of  Lake  George,  killed  some  of  the 
teamsters,  and  captured  two  of  them;  Some  fled  to  their  camp. 
The  two  prisoners  told  Dieskau  of  the  large  camp  of  his  enemy 

*Parkman. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  9 

at  the  head  of  Lake  George.  So  he  resolved  to  attack  the 
camp  with  his  little  force,  and  turned  in  that  direction.  Soon 
his  scouts  brought  in  word  that  a  column  of  English  troops 
was  approaching. 

Learning  of  the  advance  of  the  French  column  from  the 
teamsters  that  had  escaped  capture,  Johnson  sent  out  two  col 
umns,  of  500  men  each,  to  cut  it  off.  One  detachment  marched 
toward  Fort  Lyman,  and  the  other  toward  South  Bay.  It  was 
the  latter  which  was  now  reported  by  Dieskau's  scouts.  Dies- 
kau  prepared  an  ambush  for  the  column,  into  which  it  care 
lessly  walked.  Many  of  the  provincials  and  their  Indian  allies 
were  slain,  and  the  rest  hurried  back  to  their  camp.  Dieskau 
then  moved  against  the  camp,  defended  by  "between  1,600  and 
1,700  rustics"  and  a  lot  of  Indians,  and  assaulted  it.*  Dieskau 
was  wounded  and  captured,  and  his  force  was  repulsed  and  put 
to  flight.  "Of  the  provincial  soldiers,  he  remarked,  soon  after 
the  battle,  that  in  the  morning  they  fought  like  good  boys, 
about  noon  like  men,  and  in  the  afternoon  like  devils."* 

But  the  Crown  Point  expedition  was  at  an  end.  Johnson  did 
not  follow  up  his  success.  He  thought  only  of  holding  his 
position.  He  made  a  solid  breastwork  to  defend  his  camp,  and, 
as  reinforcements  arrived,  set  them  at  building  a  fort.  Within 
a  fortnight  his  enemy  was  intrenched  at  Ticonderoga  in  force 
enough  to  defy  him.  Finally,  as  winter  came  on,  a  small  gar 
rison  was  left  to  hold  the  fort,  which  Johnson  named  William 
Henry,  after  one  of  the  King's  grandsons,  and  the  rest  of  John 
son's  army  dispersed  to  their  homes. 

Johnson  had  shown  incompetence  from  first  to  last,  and  what 
success  he  had  gained,  was  due  to  General  Lyman.  Yet  he 
made  no  mention  of  Lyman  in  his  report,  but  took  all  the  credit 
to  himself; — so  Parliament  voted  him  5,000  pounds,  and  the 
King  made  him  a  baronet. 

NIAGARA  EXPEDITION. 

( 1 )  The  expedition  for  the  capture  of  Fort  Niagara  also 
assembled  at  Albany,  in  the  summer  of  1755.  It  was  about 
1,500  strong,  and  Governor  Shirley  of  Massachusetts  took  com 
mand  of  it  in  person.  It  marched  up  the  Mohawk  Valley  to 
Oswego.  There  Shirley  was  persuaded  that  it  would  not  do 
for  him  to  advance  against  Niagara,  leaving  the  French  garri- 

*Parkman. 


10  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

son  at  Fort  Frontenac  to  capture  Oswego  in  his  rear,  and  cut 
him  off  from  his  communications  and  supplies;  but  his  force 
was  not  strong  enough  to  attack  Frontenac.  So  the  expedition 
was  given  up  and  Shirley  returned  to  Albany. 

OPERATIONS  OF  1756. 

t 

In  the  summer  of  1756  England  and  France  formally  de 
clared  war  against  each  other.  General  Montcalm  was  sent 
over  to  command  the  French,  and  Earl  Loudon  was  made 
commander-in-chief  of  the  British  forces  in  America. 

In  August  Montcalm  took  a  force  across  Lake  Ontario,  while 
the  English  were  making  preparations  at  Albany,  and  captured 
the  little  garrison  at  Oswego.  He  destroyed  the  place  and 
returned  to  Montreal.  Montcalm  then  went  to  Fort  Ticon- 
deroga,  where  he  took  station  with  some  5.000  regulars  and 
Canadian  militia. 

Loudon  had  about  10,000  men  posted  from  Albany  to  Lake 
George.  Neither  army  took  the  offensive.  The  belligerents 
contented  themselves  with  scouting  and  minor  operations ;  and, 
as  winter  approached,  both  commanders  left  small  garrisons  at 
their  advanced  posts,  Forts  William  Henry  and  Ticonderoga, 
respectively,  and  withdrew  their  armies  into  winter  quarters, 
the  French  to  Canada,  and  the  British  regulars  to  New  York, 
Boston,  and  Philadelphia.  The  provincial  militiamen  returned 
to  their  firesides. 

OPERATIONS  OF  1757. 

The  campaign  was  to  be  opened  in  1757,  by  the  British,  with 
the  capture  of  Louisburg,  followed  by  an  advance  up  the  St. 
Lawrence  against  Quebec.  Accordingly,  a  squadron  sailed 
from  England  for  Halifax;  and  Loudon,  having  stripped  the 
New  York  frontier  of  all  its  best  troops,  embarked  at  New 
York  with  about  12,000  men. 

In  the  early  part  of  July  the  fleet  and  Loudon's  army  were 
at  Halifax;  and  all  was  ready  for  a  descent  upon  Louisburg, 
when  it  was  learned  that  a  strong  French  fleet  was  in  the  har 
bor  of  Louisburg,  and  the  garrison  of  that  fortress  had  been 
increased  to  7,000.  The  enterprise  was  therefore  abandoned, 
and  Loudon  sailed  back  to  New  York  with  his  army. 

But  Montcalm  had,  meantime,  taken  advantage  of  the  ab 
sence  of  Loudon's  army.  In  July  he  gathered  together  a  force 


COLONIAL  WARS.  11 

of  about  8,000  regulars,  Canadians,  and  Indians  at  Ticon- 
deroga,  for  a  movement  against  Fort  William  Henry.  (6)  In 
August  he  laid  siege  to  this  fort  and  compelled  its  commander 
to  surrender ;  while  the  British  General  Webb  rested  quietly  at 
Fort  Edward,  a  few  miles  away,  with  a  considerable  force,  but 
refused  to  march  to  the  assistance  of  the  garrison. 

(1)  The  honors  of  war  were  granted  in  the  term  of  capit 
ulation,  and  the  paroled  English  were  to  be  escorted  to  Fort 
Edward ;  but  Montcalm  and  his  officers  were  unable  to  restrain 
their  savages,  who  massacred  a  number  of  the  English.  The 
French  destroyed  the  fort  and  withdrew.  Had  Montcalm 
marched  on  to  Fort  Edward,  he  could  have  captured  it  without 
an  effort,  so  demoralized  with  fear  were  General  Webb  and  his 
provincials. 

OPERATIONS  OF  1758. 

The  war  kindled  in  the  American  forests  was  now  raging  in 
Europe,  where  it  came  to  be  known  as  the  Seven  Years'  War. 
England  was  joined  with  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia, 
against  nearly  all  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  had  suffered  many 
losses  and  disasters. 

Finally  the  great  Pitt  was  made  Premier  of  England,  and  he 
soon  brought  about  a  change,  as  much  by  putting  the  right  men 
in  command  of  British  armies  as  anything  else.  He  recalled 
London  from  America,  though,  against  his  judgment,  he  had, 
for  political  reasons,  to  leave  Abercrombie  in  command  there. 
His  first  move  in  America,  in  1758,  was  to  fit  out  a  fleet  and 
army  to  capture  Louisburg,  with  Quebec  as  the  ultimate  objec 
tive.  Delay  had  thwarted  last  year's  attempt  against  Louis- 
burg;  it  was  not  going  to  do  so  again.  So,  before  the  winter 
had  ended,  Admiral  Boscawen's  fleet  had  sailed.  So  active 
was  the  British  navy,  also,  around  the  coasts  of  France  that, 
"of  the  many  ships  fitted  out  this  year  for  the  succor  of  Canada 
and  Louisburg,  comparatively  few  reached  their  destination."* 

At  the  end  of  May  the  fleet,  and  the  army  of  11,000  British 
regulars,  were  at  Halifax.  General  Jeffrey  Amherst  was  in 
command  of  the  land  forces,  and  his  most  active  and  trusted 
lieutenant  was  General  James  Wolfe.  Both  had  distinguished 
themselves  on  the  Continent. 

(2)  Amherst's  army  sailed  for  Louisburg,  and  made  a 
landing,  in  the  early  days  of  June.  The  fleet  guarded  the 


*Parkman. 


12  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

entrance  to  the  harbor,  in  which  twelve  French  men-of-war 
were  shut  up.  The  army  invested  the  fortress,  and  after  con 
siderable  fighting,  in  which  Wolfe  greatly  distinguished  him 
self,  the  garrison  was  surrendered  as  prisoners  of  war,  on  the 
27th  of  July,  1758. 

(5)  Let  us  now  see  what  was  doing  on  the  New  York  fron 
tier  in  the  meantime.  The  year  before,  Loudon  had  asked  the 
colonies  for  4,000  men,  and  he  could  hardly  get  them ;  this  year, 
Pitt  asked  them  for  20,000,  and  they  responded  with  alacrity. 
And  now,  in  June,  Abercrombie  had  an  army  of  more  than 
15,000  men,  over  6,000  of  whom  were  British  regulars,  en 
camped  about  the  ruins  of  Fort  William  Henry,  at  the  head  of 
Lake  George.  It  was  the  largest  body  of  troops  that  had  ever 
been  assembled  on  the  American  continent.  Abercrombie  was 
in  command,  but  the  "soul  of  the  army"  was  young  Lord 
Howe,  whom  General  Wolfe  called  "the  best  soldier  in  the 
British  army."  He  was  a  brother  of  the  two  British  Howes  of 
the  Revolutionary  War. 

Montcalm  was  at  Ticonderoga,  with  only  3,600  soldiers  to 
defend  it.  On  the  morning  of  July  5  Abercrombie's  army  em 
barked  in  boats  for  Ticonderoga.  (7)  By  noon  on  the 
6th  the  army  had  landed  at  the  north  end  of  Lake  George, 
and  was  on  its  way  through  the  forest,  to  assault  the  French 
fort.  Lord  Howe  was  in  front  with  the  scouts,  and  was  killed 
almost  immediately.  And  "the  death  of  one  man  was  the  ruin 
of  15,000,"  says  Parkman.  At  any  rate  the  attack  on  the  fort, 
made  on  the  8th,  failed.  The  English  made  five  assaults 
against  a  strong  line  of  abatis,  and  were  repulsed  with  great 
slaughter ;  whereupon  Abercrombie  retreated  in  panic,  and 
took  to  his  boats.  So  disgusted  were  the  Americans  with  their 
British  general,  that  from  this  time  forth  they  called  him  "Mrs. 
Nabby  Crombie."* 

(1)  In  another  quarter  the  English  had  met  with  better 
success.  Colonel  John  Bradstreet  had  led  3,000  provincials, 
and  some  Indians,  up  the  Mohawk,  to  attempt  the  capture  of 
Fort  Frontenac.  From  Oswego,  they  crossed  the  lake,  and, 
on  the  25th  of  August,  captured  the  little  French  garrison  with 
nine  war-ships,  and  great  quantities  of  supplies.  They  de 
stroyed  the  fort  and  returned  to  Oswego. 

"Next  to  Louisburg,  this  was  the  heaviest  blow  that  the 
French  had  yet  received.  Their  command  of  Lake  Ontario 

*  Parkman. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  13 

was  gone.  New  France  was  cut  in  two ;  and,  unless  the  sev 
ered  parts  could  speedily  reunite,  all  the  posts  of  the  interior 
would  be  in  imminent  jeopardy.  If  Bradstreet  had  been  fol 
lowed  by  another  body  of  men,  to  reoccupy  and  rebuild  Os- 
wego,  thus  recovering  a  harbor  on  Lake  Ontario,  all  the  cap 
tured  French  vessels  could  have  been  brought  thither,  and  the 
command  of  this  inland  sea  assured  at  once.  Even  as  it  was, 
the  advantages  were  immense.  A  host  of  savage  warriors, 
thus  far  inclined -to  France,  or  wavering  between  the  two  bel 
ligerents,  stood  henceforth  neutral,  or  gave  themselves  to  Eng 
land;  while  Fort  Duquesne,  deprived  of  the  supplies  on  which 
it  depended,  could  make  but  faint  resistance  to  its  advancing 
enemy."* 

"Amherst,  with  five  regiments  from  Louisburg,  came,  early 
in  October,  to  join  Abercrombie  at  Lake  George" ;  but  the  gen 
erals  decided  that  it  was  too  late  to  make  another  effort  against 
Ticonderoga.  Soon  afterwards  the  two  opposing  armies  with 
drew,  each  to  its  winter  quarters. 

This  year,  1758,  saw  Fort  Duquesne  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  British.  Brigadier  John  Forbes  spent  the  whole  summer 
chopping  a  road  through  the  forests,  from  Fort  Cumberland, 
but  found,  when  he  finally  reached  the  fort,  in  November,  that 
the  French  garrison  had  already  abandoned  it.  The  abandon 
ment  had,  doubtless,  been  due  more  to  the  capture  of  Fort 
Frontenac,  and  the  destruction  of  the  French  depot  at  that 
point,  than  to  fear  of  Forbes's  provincials.  Forbes  took  pos 
session  of  the  place  and  changed  its  name  to  Fort  Pitt,  in 
honor  of  the  great  Premier.  Two  months  before,  in  Septem 
ber,  the  advanced  force  of  Forbes's  command,  under  Major 
Grant,  had  attacked  the  French  at  Fort  Duquesne  and  met  as 
disastrous  a  defeat  as  General  Braddock's.  An  important 
achievement  of  Forbes's  expedition  was  its  winning  to  the  side 
of  the  English  several  large  Indian  tribes  that  had  hitherto  been 
allies  of  the  French. 

"So  ended  the  campaign  of  1758.  The  center  of  the  French 
had  held  its  own  triumphantly  at  Ticonderoga;  but  their  left 
had  been  forced  back  by  the  capture  of  Louisburg,  and  their 
right  by  that  of  Fort  Duquesne;  while  their  entire  right  wing 
had  been  well-nigh  cut  off  by  the  destruction  of  Fort  Fron 
tenac.  The  outlook  was  dark.  Their  own  Indians  were  turn 
ing  against  them."* 

*Parkman. 


14  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

WOLFE. 

In  the  winter  of  1758  and  1759  Pitt  planned  an  expedition 
against  Quebec  which  was  destined  to  transfer  Canada  from 
the  French  to  the  British  crown.  General  Wolfe  was  placed  in 
command  of  it.  On  the  26th  of  June.  1759,  the  fleet  bearing 
Wolfe's  army  anchored  off  the  south  shore  of  the  Island  of 
Orleans,  just  below  Quebec,  and  the  army,  some  9,000  strong, 
went  into  camp  on  that  island. 

(8)  The  French  in  Canada  had  expected  this  movement, 
and  General  Montcalm  and  the  governor-general  had  taken 
such  steps  as  they  could  take  to  oppose  it;  but  they  received 
almost  no  assistance  from  France.  All  available  French 
troops  were  needed  on  the  Continent;  and  furthermore,  the 
British  navy  kept  such  close  watch  over  the  seas  that  France 
did  not  dare  start  a  fleet  of  troop-ships  for  America.  But  all 
the  Canadian  militia  were  called  out,  which,  with  the  available 
regulars,  gave  Montcalm  a  force  of  about  14,000  troops, 
besides  some  Indians,  for  the  defense  of  Quebec. 

Quebec,  called  the  "Gibraltar  of  America,"  has  one  of  the 
strongest  positions,  naturally,  in  the  world,  as  viewed  from  the 
front.  It  stands  upon  a  high  point  jutting  out  into  the  St. 
Lawrence,  which  here  suddenly  narrows  to  about  1,200  yards. 
At  the  foot  of  the  steep  bluff  leading  down  from  the  Upper 
City  lies  a  narrow  space  of  flat  ground  occupied  by  the  Lower 
City.  The  place  was  perfectly  protected  from  the  river  side  by- 
forts  and  cannon.  The  principal  defensive  work  was  the  stone 
citadel,  whose  artillery  swept  the  river-front.  Just  below  the 
town  is  the  St.  Charles  River,  unfordable.  Its  single  bridge 
was  defended  by  a  bridge-head,  and  its  mouth  was  obstructed 
by  a  boom  of  logs.  This  boom  was  guarded  by  a  battery  of 
heavy  guns,  resting  upon  three  sunken  ships;  and  there  were 
earthworks  along  the  shore  on  either  side.  Three  or  four 
miles  down  the  river  are  other  high  cliffs  extending  all  the 
way  to  the  Falls  of  Montmorenci.  Between  the  foot  of  this 
line  of  cliffs  and  the  river  lies  a  strand  two  or  three  hundred 
yards  wide. 

Montcalm  did  not  seriously  consider  the  probability  of  an 
attack  on  the  up-stream  side  of  the  city — he  did  not  suppose 
troops  could  be  passed  up  in  boats.  So  he  stretched  his  army, 
below  the  town,  from  the  St.  Charles  to  the  gorge  of  the 
Montmorenci.  Among  other  means,  the  French  had  prepared 
a  number  of  fire-ships  with  which  they  expected  to  destroy  the 


COLONIAL  WARS.  15 

British  ships.  These  were  set  on  fire  and  started  toward  the 
British  fleet ;  but  the  British  sailors  grappled  them  with  iron 
hooks,  and  pulled  them  ashore,  where  they  burned  without 
doing  any  damage. 

Wolfe  dispatched  a  detachment  to  seize  Point  Levi,  and  he 
posted  batteries  there  to  shell  Quebec.  On  the  8th  of  July  sev 
eral  British  frigates  stood  out  in  the  stream  and  bombarded  the 
part  of  the  French  lines  on  the  heights  just  above  the  Falls  of 
Montmorenci ;  and  that  night  3,000  British  soldiers  made  a 
landing  just  below  the  falls.  There  they  intrenched  them 
selves. 

On  the  18th  of  July  several  British  vessels  safely  ran  past 
the  batteries  at  Quebec,  and  destroyed  some  fire-ships  and  other 
crdft  above  the  town.  Now,  for  the  first  time,  Montcalm  be 
came  alarmed  about  the  defenses  at  the  upper  side  of  the  city, 
and  dispatched  a  thousand  or  more  men  from  his  main  line 
to  that  side.  On  the  other  hand,  an  English  detachment 
dragged  a  fleet  of  boats  over  Point  Levi,  and  made  ready  to 
embark  in  them  for  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river. 

Wolfe's  army  was  now  stretched  from  the -Falls  of  Mont 
morenci  to  a  point  beyond  Point  Levi,  and  occupied  four  de 
tached  camps,  no  two  of  which  could  assist  each  other  in  case 
of  attack.  Montcalm  lost  his  opportunity  in  not  taking  advan 
tage  of  this  condition.  But  the  French  stood  strictly  on  the 
defensive.  At  the  end  of  July  the  two  armies  were  still  watch 
ing  each  other  across  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Montmorenci, 
each  waiting  for  the  other  to  strike.  Wolfe  resolved  to  attack 
the  left  wing  of  the  French  in  front  and  flank. 

At  low  tide  the  mouth  of  the  Montmorenci  could  be  crossed 
on  the  bar.  During  the  day  chosen  to  make  the  attack,  feints 
were  made  along  the  right  of  the  French  line ;  but  they  failed  to 
deceive  Montcalm,  who  massed  his  troops  on  the  left.  The 
attack  was  made  toward  sunset,  when  the  tide  was  out ;  but  the 
British  were  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 

TlCONDEROGA    AND    CROWN    POINT. 

( 1 )  Pitt  had  directed  that  a  column  should  move  by  way  of 
Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point,  to  operate  in  conjunction  with 
Wolfe's  against  Montreal  and  Quebec.  General  Amherst  com 
manded  this  column.  Toward  the  end  of  June  [1759],  he  had 
reached  the  head  of  Lake  George,  with  11,000  men,  half  regu 
lars  and  half  provincials. 


16  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Amherst  was  very  cautious  and  methodical;  he  moved  so 
slowly,  and  spent  so  much  time  building  and  repairing  forts,  as 
he  went  along,  reconnoitering  roads  in  all  directions,  and  build 
ing  a  fleet  on  Lake  Champlain,  that,  although  the  French  aban 
doned  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point  without  an  effort  to  save 
them,  and  fell  back  to  Isle-aux-Noix,  cold  weather  had  come 
on  before  Amherst  was  ready  to  move  beyond  Crown  Point. 
Here  he  stopped  and  spent  the  rest  of  the  winter. 

During  the  same  time,  a  detachment  was  operating  against 
the  French  post  at  Niagara,  which  it  succeeded  in  capturing 
toward  the  end  of  the  summer.  "The  capture  of  Niagara  was 
an  important  stroke.  Thenceforth  Detroit,  Michilimackinac, 
Illinois,  and  all  the  other  French  interior  posts  were  severed 
from  Canada,  and  left  in  helpless  isolation/'* 

But  the  expedition  against  Niagara  was  none  the  less  a  mis 
take.  "If,  at  the  end  of  winter  [1758-9],  Amherst  had  begun, 
as  he  might  have  done,  the  building  of  armed  vessels  at  the 
head  of  Lake  Champlain,  he  would  have  had  a  navy  ready  to 
his  hand  before  August,  and  would  have  been  able  to  follow  the 
retreating  French  without  delay,  and  to  attack  them  at  Isle- 
aux-Noix,  before  they  had  finished  their  fortifications.  And  if, 
at  the  same  time,  he  had  directed  Prideaux,  instead  of  attack 
ing  Niagara,  to  cooperate  with  him  by  descending  the  St.  Law 
rence  to  Montreal,  the  prospect  was  good  that  the  two  armies 
would  have  united  at  that  place,  and  ended  the  campaign  by  the 
reduction  of  all  .Canada.  In  this  case  Niagara  and  all  the  west 
ern  posts  would  have  fallen  without  a  blow."* 

HEIGHTS  OF  ABRAHAM. 

(8)  After  his  repulse  at  the  Heights  of  Montmorenci, 
Wolfe  made  every  effort  to  induce  the  French  to  come  out  of 
their  intrenchments  and  fight  him  in  the  open;  but  without 
avail.  He  had  his  detachments  lay  waste  the  country,  devas 
tating  farms  and  destroying  villages — making  the  war  as  un 
comfortable  as  possible  for  the  Canadians.  But  all  their  ap 
peals  for  protection  could  not  make  Montcalm  budge  from  his 
position. 

Wolfe  was  desperate.  He  felt  that  he  must  do  something; 
but  the  French  position  was  so  strong,  he  could  find  no  point  to 
strike  with  any  hope  of  success.  To  make  matters  worse,  he 


*Parkman. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  17 

fell  desperately  ill.  While  still  confined  to  his  bed,  at  his  camp 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Montmorenci,  he  asked  his  three  briga 
dier-generals  to  confer  together  and  select  a  point  of  attack. 
They  suggested  attacking  the  upper  side  of  the  town,  and 
Wolfe  approved  their  suggestion.  Accordingly,  "with  every 
fair  wind,  ships  and  transports"  and  lighters  "passed  the  bat 
teries  of  Quebec"  to  the  upper  river,  and  twelve  hundred 
troops  marched  overland  to  embark  in  the  vessels. 

To  oppose  this  force,  Bougainville,  with  1,500  Frenchmen 
was  sent  to  Cap-Rouge,  about  eight  miles  above  Quebec.  The 
French  governor  had  made  the  mistake  of  running  his  frigates 
up  the  river,  and  taking  away  their  sailors  to  man  land  bat 
teries.  Had  these  frigates  been  available  now,  they  could  have 
destroyed  the  British  ships  one  at  a  time,  as  they  came  up 
stream. 

British  batteries  at  Point  Levi  continued  to  bombard  Que 
bec,  and  on  the  3rd  of  September  Wolfe  evacuated  his  camp  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Montmorenci.  Demonstrations  were  made 
against  the  French  position  at  Cap-Rouge,  and  also  belbw  the 
city,  at  Beauport ;  and  the  fleet  above  the  city  drifted  with  the 
tide  first  down  stream  and  then  up.  Meantime,  Wolfe  had  dis 
covered,  with  his  telescope,  a  trail  leading  up  to  the  heights 
above  the  town  from  Anse-du-Foulon,  about  two  miles  up 
stream  from  Quebec.  It  led  up  to  the  Plains  of  Abraham. 

Montcalm  had  little  fear  of  an  attempt  to  scale  these  heights. 
He  had  said  that  a  hundred  men  at  this  point  could  stop  an 
army;  and  so  they  could,  if  they  had  stayed  awake.  The 
French  were  greatly  perplexed  by  the  movements  of  Wolfe's 
troops  and  ships.  Winter  was  coming  on,  and  they  were  in 
hopes  it  all  meant  that  the  English  were  making  ready  to  sail 
away,  before  their  ships  got  caught  in  the  ice.  They  never 
theless  kept  watch  all  along  the  line.  Montcalm  believed  that, 
if  Wolfe  attacked  at  all,  he  would  attack  below  the  city;  so  he 
remained  himself  at  Beauport,  and  kept  the  bulk  of  his  force 
there. 

At  2  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  September  13  [1759],  the  land 
ing-boats  cast  off  with  Wolfe's  army;  and  after  twenty-four 
volunteers  had  surprised  and  captured,  or  put  to  flight,  the  com 
pany  of  Canadians  guarding  the  trail  leading  up  the  heights 
from  Anse-du-Foulon,  the  entire  British  force  was  put  ashore. 
Up  the  trail,  and  through  the  rocks  and  brush,  the  soldiers 
clambered  to  the  heights  above ;  by  six  o'clock  they  were  form 
ing  line  on  the  Plains  of  Abraham. 


18  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

'The  Plains  were  a  tract  of  grass,  tolerably  level  in  most 
parts,  patched  here  and  there  with  cornfields,  studded  with 
clumps  of  bushes,  and  forming  a  part  of  the  high  plateau  at 
the  eastern  end  of  which  Quebec  stood.  On  the  south,  it  was 
bounded  by  the  declivities  along  the  St.  Lawrence;  on  the 
north,  by  those  along  the  St.  Charles.  ...  At  the  place 
that  Wolfe  chose  for  his  battle-field,  the  plateau  was  less  than 
a  mile  wide."*  Quebec  was  hardly  a  mile  away,  but  the  view 
of  the  town  was  cut  off  by  a  wooded  hill,  called  Buttes-a- 
Neveu.  Upon  this  hill  the  first  French  soldiers  appeared  at 
about  six  o'clock. 

All  the  evening  before,  the  main  British  fleet  had  shelled  the 
French  camp  at  Beauport,  and  Montcalm  had  kept  his  troops 
on  the  alert  there  all  night,  fully  expecting  an  attack.  At  day 
break  he  heard  cannon-fire  above  the  town.  The  French  bat 
teries  up  the  river  were  firing  at  the  British  ships  in  that  quar 
ter.  Montcalm  mounted  his  horse  and  started  up  the  river. 
Suddenly  he  caught  sight  of  the  British  troops  on  the  Plains  of 
Abraham.  He  had  his  army  brought  forward. 

Wolfe's  army  was  in  line  waiting  to  be  attacked — he  knew 
now  that  the  French  must  come  out  and  try  to  drive  him  away. 

Montcalm's  army  was  slow  in  getting  up — due  mainly  to 
the  meddling  of  the  governor-general.  Finally  it  formed,  and 
skirmishing  began.  At  ten  o'clock,  the  French  charged  in 
three  columns.  "The  British  advanced  a  few  rods,  then  halted 
and  stood  still.  When  the  French  were  within  forty  yards," 
the  British  opened  on  them  with  volleys.  "The  advancing 
masses  stopped  short,  and  turned  into  a  frantic  mob,  shouting, 
cursing,  gesticulating."*  Then  the  British  charged,  driving 
the  French  in  rout  before  them.  Wolfe  led  the  charge,  and 
was  shot  three  times,  and  died  on  the  field ;  Montcalm  was  car 
ried  away  in  the  flight,  and  was  mortally  wounded. 

But  the  British  had  to  stop  their  pursuit,  because  the  French 
force  from  Cap-Rouge  was  coming  up  in  their  rear ;  they  had 
to  turn  and  repel  that  foe.  The  British  intrenched  themselves 
upon  the  battle-field.  They  could  not  assault  the  town,  which 
was  defended  by  a  wall  and  fortifications. 

In  this  battle  Wolfe  had  about  3,200  men  engaged,  and  Mont 
calm,  about  5,000.  The  British  had  succeeded  in  dragging  one 
cannon  up  the  heights;  the  French  had  but  two  on  the  field. 
The  British  loss  was  664 ;  the  French,  about  650.  In  the  num- 

*Parkman. 


COLONIAL  WARS.  19 

bers  engaged  the  combat  was  a  small  affair ;  but  in  its  results, 
it  was  one  of  the  world's  greatest  battles;  it  gave  Canada  to 
England. 

Wolfe  took  great  chances.  If  he  had  been  defeated,  he 
would  have  been  cut  off  and  captured  or  destroyed.  He  had 
no  line  of  retreat,  nor  way  of  escape.  He  fought  against  supe 
rior  numbers,  and,  albeit  his  British  regulars  were  better  sol 
diers  than  the  Canadians  composing  the  bulk  of  Montcalm's 
force,  if  Montcalm's  army  had  gone  into  the  fight  in  better 
shape,  and  the  detachment  from  Cap-Rouge,  2,000  men,  had 
got  up  sooner,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  British  could  have  been 
victorious. 

Montcalm  ought  to  have  waited  for  the  detachment  from 
Cap-Rouge,  before  assaulting.  Moreover,  there  were  other 
troops  at  Beauport,  and  in  the  city,  that  he  ought  to  have  had 
at  his  disposal;  they  were  withheld  by  the  governor.  Mont- 
calm  also  made  the  mistake  of  attacking  with  all  his  troops,  in 
stead  of  holding  some  in  reserve.  A  strong  reserve,  put  into 
the  fight  at  the  right  moment  and  place,  might  have  saved  the 
day. 

But  fortune  appears  to  have  been  on  the  side  of  the  British  in 
this  engagement.  In  the  first  place,  the  French  commander  at 
Cap-Rouge  had  given  orders  for  some  transports  to  slip  down 
to  Quebec,  keeping  close  to  the  shore,  that  night ;  and  sentinels 
all  along  the  shore  had  been  cautioned  not  to  fire  on  them,  and 
not  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  British  ships  to  them.  The 
transports  were  recalled,  but  the  sentinels  were  not  notified  of 
it.  This  circumstance  enabled  the  British  boats  to  go  along 
shore  without  being  fired  upon,  or  causing  the  French  camps 
to  be  alarmed.  Then  the  neglect  of  the  guard  at  the  trail  up 
the  heights  let  the  British  pass.  There  were  other  lucky 
circumstances  for  the  British. 

FALL  OF  QUEBEC. 

The  death  of  Montcalm  left  Vaudreuil,  the  dishonest,  incom 
petent  governor-general,  in  full  military,  as  well  as  civil,  au 
thority  in  Canada. 

He  had  his  routed  army  collected  at  Beauport.  Instead  of 
uniting  it  with  the  troops  from  Cap-Rouge,  and  attacking  the 
small  British  force  besieging  Quebec,  he  fled  with  his  com 
mand,  and  did  not  halt  till  he  had  reached  Jacques  Cartier, 
thirty  miles  up  the  river.  Here  he  was  met  by  General  Levis 


20  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

from  Montreal,  who  persuaded  him  to  march  back  to  the  relief 
of  the  beleaguered  city.  But  hardly  had  he  started  the  army 
back,  when  he  received  word  that  the  commandant  at  Quebec 
had  already  surrendered.  He  returned  to  Jacques  Cartier. 

The  British  navy  and  all  troops,  except  about  3,000,  sailed 
for  England.  General  Murray  was  left  to  command  the  gar 
rison  at  Quebec. 

During  the  following  winter  there  was  continual  petty  war 
fare  between  English  detachments  from  the  garrison  on  one 
side  and  French  and  Indians  on  the  other,  and  constant  rumors 
of  the  advance  of  the  French  army  from  Montreal,  to  attack 
the  garrison.  But  it  was  not  until  the  end  of  April,  1760,  that 
Levis  actually  appeared  with  his  army.  Murray  marched  his 
little  force  of  3,000  out  to  meet  his  enemy,  more  than  twice  as 
strong ;  attacked  him ;  lost  a  third  of  his  force ;  and  was  driven 
back  within  the  city  walls. 

Levis  laid  siege  to  the  town;  but  Murray  made  a  stout  de 
fense,  and  kept  him  at  bay,  until  a  British  fleet  appeared  in  the 
river.  The  fleet  destroyed  Levis's  store-ships,  which  forced 
the  French  to  raise  the  siege  and  retreat  to  Montreal. 

(1)  General  Amherst,  commander-in-chief  of  the  British 
forces  in  America,  now,  in  1760,  planned  a  combined  move 
ment  of  three  columns  for  the  capture  of  Montreal,  and  the 
completion  of  the  conquest  of  Canada.  Murray  was  to  move 
up  from  Quebec ;  Haviland,  with  a  column  from  Crown  Point, 
was  to  advance  by  way  of  the  Richelieu  River ;  and  he  himself, 
with  a  column,  was  to  march  down  the  St.  Lawrence. 

This  was  a  hazardous  combination,  as  it  gave  the  French 
forces,  watching  these  three  armies,  the  opportunity  to  unite 
and  fall  upon  each  column  separately.  But  the  French  failed 
to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity,  and  opposed  little  real 
resistance  to  the  advance  of  any  one  of  the  three  British 
columns. 

Early  in  September,  1760,  the  three  British  columns  had 
united  around  Montreal;  and  the  French  army,  under  Vau- 
dreuil,  was  invested  in  the  town.  On  the  morning  of  Septem 
ber  8  Vaudreuil  signed  articles  of  capitulation.  By  these 
articles  Canada  and  all  its  dependencies  passed  to  the  British 
Crown.  The  cession  was  confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris, 
signed  February  10,  1763. 


LECTURE  II. 
THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 

NORTHERN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(9)  However  interesting  the  causes  of  the  American  Revo 
lution  and  the  political  events  that  led  up  to  it  may  be  to  us,  we 
cannot,  for  lack  of  time,  consider  them  here  in  detail.  Suffice 
it  to  say  that  the  wrongs  were  not  all  on  one  side,  nor  the  rights 
all  on  the  other. 

All  had  gone  well  in  the  Colonies  up  to  the  close  of  the 
French  Wars  and  the  cession  by  France  to  England  of  Canada 
and  the  territory  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Mississippi 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1763.  The  colonies  had  furnished 
their  quotas  of  men  and  money  for  those  wars,  and  there  had 
been  no  disloyalty.  There  had  been  a  good  deal  of  hard  feel 
ing  on  account  of  the  contempt  shown  by  the  British  regulars 
for  their  allies  of  the  American  militia  in  the  French  and  In 
dian  Wars,  and  the  arrogance  of  the  British  officers ;  and  there 
had  been  much  discontent  and  complaint  on  account  of  the  bil 
leting  of  British  troops  upon  the  people.  But  there  had  been 
no  rupture.  In  all  those  wars,  however,  the  colonies  had  done 
about  as  they  pleased.  There  were  laws  for  their  government, 
but  so  necessary  had  been  their  good-will  and  support  to  the 
mother  country  during  the  wars  with  France,  that  the  laws 
which  did  not  please  them  had  practically  become  a  dead  letter. 

About  the  only  real  bond  that  tied  them  to  the  authority  of 
England,  was  the  colonial  governors ;  but  they  were  dependent 
upon  the  behest  of  the  colonial  legislatures  for  their  pay;  so 
their  vetoes  were  easily  bought  off.  Of  a  truth,  the  provincial 
legislatures  brought  the  governors  to  terms,  by  refusing  to  vote 
their  salaries.* 

There  were  customs  laws  and  various  other  laws  for  taxing 
the  colonists;  but  all  of  them  were  ignored.  Such  a  state  of 
things  England  was  obliged  to  tolerate  during  all  the  years 
during  which  she  had  the  French  on  her  hands  in  America. 


*Franklin's  Works. 

21 


22  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

But  after  the  Treaty  of  Paris  rid  her  of  this  restraint,  she  set 
about  treating  her  colonists  as  real  subjects. 

She  imposed  a  light  tax  in  the  shape  of  stamps  on  legal  docu 
ments  ;  but  it  was  received  with  such  denunciation  of  word  and 
deed  by  the  colonists  that  it  was  soon  repealed ;  not,  however, 
until  the  stamp  office  at  Boston  and  the  houses  of  the  stamp 
distributor  and  Governor  Hutchinson  had  been  destroyed  by 
mobs.*  She  undertook  to  collect  the  tariff;  but  smuggling 
went  on  openly  by  the  colonists.  There  was  a  tariff  of  a  shil 
ling  a  pound  on  tea  in  England;  while  the  colonists  smuggled 
theirs  in  free  from  Holland.  When  the  government  undertook 
to  thwart  them,  by  putting  a  duty  of  three  pence  on  the  tea,  to 
be  collected  from  the  East  India  Company  in  America,  in  lieu 
of  the  shilling  in  England,  the  colonists  refused  to  let  it  be  paid, 
and  forced  the  consignees  of  the  cargoes  to  resign.  From 
Philadelphia  and  New  York  the  ships  sailed  quietly  back  to 
England.  "In  Charleston  the  tea  was  landed,  but  was  seized  by 
the  collector  and  stored  in  damp  cellars,  where  it  rotted."f  At 
Boston  the  ships  were  surely  between  Scylla  and  Charybdis. 
Governor  Hutchinson  would  not  let  them  return  to  England; 
and  that  great  agitator,  Samuel  Adams,  got  up  a  mob  which 
threw  the  tea  overboard. 

Previous  to  this  event  British  troops  had  been  quartered  on 
the  people  of  Boston,  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  governor 
and  customs  officers  to  carry  out  the  law.  The  billeting  of 
troops  was  one  of  the  colonists'  chief  grievances.  The  people 
jeered  at  the  soldiers,  and  insulted  them,  on  all  occasions;  and 
finally  a  crowd  of  them  struck  a  soldier  with  a  missile.  This 
was  too  much  for  the  British  soldiers  to  submit  to.  The 
upshot  was,  that  five  or  six  of  Boston's  ruffians  were  killed. 

So  matters  went  from  bad  to  worse. 

All  this  while,  a  large  part  of  the  people  were  loyal  to  Eng 
land — probably  a  majoiiity ;  certainly  a  majority  of  the  better 
classes.  Even  John  Adams  admitted  that  one-third  of  the  peo 
ple  were  loyalists.  But  while  the  liberty-loving  pamphleteers 
were  writing  about  the  "rights  of  man,"  thousands  of  our  pa 
triotic  ancestors  were  subjecting  innocent,  but  loyal,  persons 
to  every  sort  of  indignity  and  torture.  Tar  and  feathers  were 
made  use  of,  but  there  were  other  methods,  one  of  which  was 
the  "water-cure."  The  water,  however,  was  strengthened  with 
tea;  no  doubt  without  sugar.  A  contemporary  English  en 
graving  illustrates  this  process.  A  loyalist,  clad  in  tar  and 


*Goldwin  Smith. 
fSloanc. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  23 

feathers,  is  having  tea  poured  down  his  throat  to  overflowing, 
by  five  patriots,  under  a  tree  labeled  "Liberty  Tree."  Above  his 
head  dangles  a  noose ;  and  in  the  back-ground  the  famous  Bos 
ton  Tea  Party  appears  on  a  ship,  casting  boxes  of  tea  over 
board.*  There  was  absolutely  no  freedom  of  press  or  tongue, 
save  for  those  that  expressed  opinions  against  the  government. 

Thousands  of  loyalists,  of  course,  quitted  the  country  and 
went  to  Canada  or  back  to  England.  A  Canadian  historian  has 
written  as  follows :  "It  is  but  truth  to  say  the  loyalists  (that  is 
the  Tories  of  the  American  Revolution)  were  the  makers  of 
Canada.  They  were  an  army  of  leaders.  The  most  influential 
judges,  the  most  distinguished  lawyers,  the  most  capable  and 
prominent  physicians,  the  most  highly  educated  clergy,  the 
members  of  the  council  of  various  colonies,  the  crown  officials, 
the  people  of  culture  and  social  distinction — these,  with  the 
faithful  few  whose  fortune  followed  theirs,  were  the  loyalists. 
Canada  owes  deep  gratitude  to  her  southern  kinsmen,  who  thus, 
from  Maine  to  Georgia,  picked  out  their  choicest  spirits,  and 
sent  them  forth  to  people  our  northern  wilds."f 

After  the  Tea  Party,  the  British  authorities  closed  the  port 
of  Boston  and  demanded  that  the  city  should  pay  for  the  tea. 
Closing  the  port  soon  threw  a  great  many  persons  out  of  em 
ployment,  and  caused  much  suffering  and  hardship  in  Boston. 
Food  and  supplies  had  to  be  contributed  from  all  parts  of  the 
colonies.  Then  came  the  Continental  Congress,  which  met  in 
Philadelphia,  and  passed  resolutions,  condemning  the  acts  of 
the  government ;  and  drew  up  a  petition,  and  a  bill  of  rights,  to 
present  to  the  King. 

Of  course,  the  colonists  got  much  encouragement  from  Eng 
land.  There  were  two  political  parties  there,  and  many  Amer 
icans  believed  that,  if  the  Whigs  could  get  into  power  and  stay 
in  long  enough,  their  grievances  would  all  be  redressed ;  just 
as  the  Philippine  insurgents  believed  that,  if  Mr.  Bryan  should 
be  elected,  "independencia"  would  be  granted  to  them  forth 
with.  There  are,  indeed,  many  points  of  likeness  between  the 
Philippine  Insurrection  and  our  own  Revolution;  but  there  is 
one  main  difference :  our  Revolution  succeeded.  Had  it  failed, 
it  would  be  in  the  world's  annals  merely  an  insurrection,  too, 
occupying  a  few  pages  in  British  history,  and  having  no  na 
tional  history  of  its  own. 

By  the  winter  of   1774,  civil  government  in  Massachusetts 


*See  The  True  History  of  the  American  Revolution. — Fisher. 
^Historians'  History. 


24  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

had  ceased.  "British  officials  were  driven  out  of  the  country 
by  terrorism  and  mob  violence.  The  rebels  had  organized  a 
government  of  their  own,  independent  of  General  Gage  and  the 
charter."  They  were  drilling  a  militia  of  their  own,  seizing 
arms,  ammunition,  and  artillery;  casting  cannon  balls,  and 
looking  for  blacksmiths  that  could  forge  musket-barrels.  Early 
in  1775  Parliament  declared  Massachusetts  in  rebellion,  and 
passed  the  Fisheries  Bill,  by  which  all  the  trade  of  the  New 
England  colonies  was  to  be  confined  by  force  to  Great  Britain 
and  the  British  West  Indies.  It  prohibited  the  New  England 
colonies  from  trading  with  one  another. 

Then  fell  that  19th  of  April,  1775,  when  the  first  gun  was 
fired  at  Lexington;  and  the  Revolutionary  War  was  on.  Gen 
eral  Gage  had  sent  out  800  soldiers  in  the  night,  from  Boston, 
for  the  purpose  of  seizing  a  lot  of  rebel  supplies  at  Concord,  as 
well  as  those  two  arch  rebels  John  Hancock  and  Sam.  Adams. 
But  Paul  Revere,  the  silver-smith  that  rode  the  galloping  horse, 
had  made  his  famous  midnight  ride  to  carry  the  news.  You 
all  know  the  upshot  of  it.  The  British  regulars  retreated  to 
Boston.  (10)  Then  the  patriot  farmers  shouldered  their 
fowling-pieces  or  muskets,  and  flocked  to  Boston;  and  soon 
General  Gage's  little  garrison  of  British  regulars  was  besieged 
by  a  motley  collection  of  rebels. 

(11)  On  May  10,  1775,  those  two  daring  spirits,  Benedict 
Arnold  and  Ethan  Allen,  had  the  temerity  to  attack  the  two 
British  forts  on  Lake  Champlain,  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point;  and  they  captured  them.  Later  in  this  same  month, 
General  Sir  William  Howe,  with  Generals  John  Burgoyne  and 
Henry  Clinton,  arrived  at  Boston  with  reinforcements,  which 
raised  General  Gage's  army  to  10,000. 

(10)  On  looking  over  to  Breed's  Hill,  on  the  morning  of 
June  17,  1775,  General  Gage  saw  that  it  was  occupied  by  a  rebel 
force  behind  breastworks.  It  was  Prescott  with  Israel  Put 
nam,  and  John  Stark,  and  about  1,500  Americans.  Gage  sent 
General  Howe  and  Pigott  over  with  about  2,500  red-coats  to 
make  the  usual  English  frontal  attack,  instead  of  shutting  the 
rebels  up  by  putting  troops  on  the  neck  of  land  connecting  the 
peninsula  upon  which  Breed's  Hill  stood  with  the  mainland. 
Howe  knew  better ;  but  he  obeyed  the  order  of  his  commander. 
After  several  desperate  assaults  by  the  British,  the  Americans 
were  driven  out,  for  lack  of  ammunition.  The  British  lost 
1,054  men.  This  was  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 

The  rebels  went  back  to  their  lines.     Here  George  Wash- 


-THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  25 

ington,  by  appointment  of  the  Continental  Congress,  which  was 
again  in  session  at  Philadelphia,  took  command  of  this  Conti 
nental  Army,  on  July  2,  1775.  It  was  like  many  another  insur 
gent  force — a  rabble  without  uniforms,  without  tents,  without 
supplies,  without  discipline.  Washington's  task  was  to  turn  it 
into  an  army,  and  the  only  requisite  he  was  to  have,  was  time. 
Of  time  there  was  plenty ;  for  no  fighting  took  place  within  the 
northern  colonies,  until  the  Battle  of  Long  Island,  more  than  a 
year  later,  August  27,  1776. 

In  the  summer  of  1775  the  Continental  Congress  passed  a 
resolution  raising  eight  companies  of  riflemen  in  Pennsylva 
nia,  two  in  Maryland,  and  two  in  Virginia,  which  were  added 
to  Washington's  army  at  Cambridge.  The  rifles  were  sup 
posed  to  be  able  to  kill  at  300  yards,  while  the  muskets  of  the 
British  were  hardly  dangerous  at  a  hundred  paces.  Washing 
ton's  army  never  numbered,  this  year,  more  than  16,000  men, 
and,  as  its  soldiers  came  and  went  about  as  they  pleased,  it  fell 
to  some  10,000  by  the  winter  of  1775-6;  and  there  were  weeks 
at  a  time  when  it  had  no  powder  except  what  was  in  the  pow 
der-horns  carried  by  the  men. 

At  length  Washington  got  a  few  cannon,  and,  on  the  night  of 
March  4,  1776,  posted  them  on  Dorchester  Heights;  a  few  days 
later  he  pushed  them  forward  to  Nooks  Hill.  Thereupon 
General  Howe,  who  had  succeeded  Gage,  evacuated  Boston, 
and  sailed  with  his  army  for  Halifax.  And  strangest  thing  of 
all,  he  left  there,  to  be  seized  by  the  rebels,  "more  than  200 
cannon,  tons  of  powder  and  lead,  thousands  of  muskets,  and  all 
sorts  of  miscellaneous  military  stores."*  It  was  not  until  the 
17th  of  March  that  he  sailed — twelve  days  after  Washington 
had  seized  the  heights.  He  certainly  had  time  to  destroy  those 
arms  and  supplies.  This  and  all  of  General  Howe's  subsequent 
conduct  cannot  fail  to  make  the  impartial  student  suspect  him. 
He  was  a  Whig,  and  all  the  Whigs  back  in  England  rejoiced 
when  he  withdrew  his  army  to  Halifax. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Whig  party  in  England  was 
opposed  to  the  war ;  its  members  did  as  much  by  their  speeches 
and  writings  to  encourage  the  Amercan  insurgents  in  their 
struggle  for  liberty,  as  we  saw  the  same  class  of  patriots  in  the 
United  States  do  for  the  Philippine  insurgents,  while  we  were 
struggling  with  them  in  the  tropic  bosque. 

Why  did  Howe  go  to  Halifax?  Five  months  before,  he  had 
declined  the  order  of  the  Ministry  to  take  his  army  to  Long 


*Fisher. 


26  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS.    - 

Island,  where  it  would  have  been  among  loyalists,  and  easily 
supplied,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  enough  shipping.  Jrle 
ought  now  to  have  sailed  for  Long  Island  or  Staten  Island. 
Such  a  movement  would  have  had  the  appearance  of  a  change 
of  base,  while  the  withdrawal  to  Halifax  was,  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Americans,  as  much  an  acknowledgment  of  defeat,  as  much 
a  retreat,  as  if  he  had  sailed  for  England.  So  much  did  it  en 
courage  the  colonists  that  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
followed  a  few  months  afterward. 

The  British  government  now  redoubled  its  efforts.  It  had 
a  plan  for  the  reduction  of  the  colonists. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

(9)  It  is  seen  from  the  map,  that  the  thirteen  original  colo 
nies  occupied  a  comparatively  narrow  strip  of  the  Atlantic 
coast,  1,000  miles  long.  There  were  about  fifteen  good  har 
bors.*  All  the  important  towns  were  on  the  seashore,  or  on 
large  waterways  not  far  inland.  Hudson  River,  and  Chesa 
peake  Bay  with  its  tributary  the  Susquehanna  River,  divided 
the  country  into  three  parts.  If  these  wraters  could  be  held  and 
guarded  by  the  British,  the  rebellion  would  be  split  in  three 
pieces.  There  were  few  roads  in  the  country,  and  those  few 
were  poor  and  lay  close  to  the  sea,  or  in  the  river  valleys.  So 
the  British  must  have  their  base  on  the  coast,  and  must  stay 
close  to  the  waterways.  Indeed,  they  never  got  many  miles 
away  from  the  seashore  and  the  main  river  valleys. 

PLANS  OF  THE  BRITISH. 

The  general  plan  which  the  British  Ministry  proposed,  but 
never  could  get  carried  out,  was  as  follows :  "To  occupy  such 
portion  of  the  territory  as  would  effectually  break  up  the  union 
of  the  patriots,  and  prevent  intercourse  among  them;  to  block 
ade  the  coast  and  prevent  supplies  from  entering  by  the  sea ;  to 
destroy  any  organized  armies  the  colonists  might  form;  and 
then  to  suppress  by  degrees  the  guerrilla  warfare  into  which  an 
unsuccessful  insurrection  usually  degenerates. 

"The  strategy"  of  the  British,  "as  it  gradually  unfolded  it 
self,  was,  first  of  all,  to  occupy  New  York  City,  and  make  that 
the  headquarters  of  British  control.  From  New  York  City  the 

*Maine  was  not  one  of  the  separate  thirteen  original  colonies,  but  was 
a  part  of  Massachusetts. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  27 

line  of  the  Hudson  Valley  all  the  way  to  Canada  must  be  se 
cured,  which  would  immediately  isolate  New  England,  the  hot 
bed  of  sedition,  from  the  other  colonies,  and  cut  off  not  merely 
the  interchange  of  ideas,  encouragement,  and  reinforcements  of 
troops;  but  also  the  provisions  and  supplies  which  New  Eng 
land  drew  from  the  more  fertile  agricultural  communities  to 
the  south. 

"In  New  England  itself  they  finally  decided  to  hold  only  one 
point,  Newport,  because  it  was  the  most  convenient  harbor 
south  of  Halifax  for  vessels  to  enter  and  take  shelter  in. 

"South  of  New  York  the  strategic  position  was  the  line  of 
Chesapeake  Bay,  with  strong  positions  in  Maryland  and  Vir 
ginia,  as  at  Alexandria  and  Annapolis,  with,  perhaps,  part  of 
the  Susquehanna  River.  This  line,  if  well  held,  would  isolate 
the  middle  from  the  southern  colonies  and  stop  communication. 
As  for  the  South,  the  best  method  of  controlling  it  was  found 
to  be  by  occupying  Charleston,  Georgetown,  and  two  or  three 
points  on  the  Santee  River  in  South  Carolina. 

"It  is  easy  to  see  that,  if  this  strategy  had  been  vigorously 
carried  out  with  sufficient  force,  aided  by  the  blockade  of  the 
coast,  there  was  every  probability  that  the  patriot  party  would 
soon  have  been  driven  to  mere  guerrillaism,  and  from  that  to  a 
retreat  beyond  the  Alleghanies.  . 

"As  the  war  developed,  only  part  of  the  British  plan  could  be 
carried  out.  Newport  was  held  during  most  of  the  war,  as  was 
also  New  York,  until  after  the  treaty  of  peace.  But  .  .  . 
the  vital  line  of  the  Hudson  to  Canada  could  not  be  secured. 
The  position  on  Chesapeake  Bay  was  not  seriously  attempted. 
It  would  have  required  a  larger  force  than  could  be  spared 
from  more  important  places."* 

AMERICAN  PLAN., 

The  plan  of  the  Americans  was  the  simple  defensive — to  op 
pose  the  British  as  best  they  could  at  every  point,  and  to  hold 
fast  the  line  of  the  Hudson.  About  the  only  offensive  move 
ment  made  by  them,  was  the  joint  expedition  of  Montgomery 
and  Arnold  to  Canada,  in  1775.  Montgomery  went  up  by  way 
of  Lake  Champlain  with  the  main  force,  and  Arnold  with  1,100 
men  marched  through  the  forests  of  Maine.  Montgomery 
defeated  a  British  force  under  Carleton  and  captured  Mont- 

*Fisher. 


28  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

real.  When  the  two  American  columns  joined  in  front  of 
Quebec,  "there  were  but  a  thousand  Americans  in  all,  for  at  the 
end  of  their  term  of  enlistment  Montgomery's  men  had  left  for 
home  in  troops."  They  nevertheless  invested  the  town.  Car- 
leton  held  the  citadel  with  1,600  men.  On  the  last  day  of  the 
year  the  Americans  attacked  the  town  and  were  repulsed. 
Montgomery  was  slain.  Arnold  with  the  remnant  of  the  force, 
some  800  men,  continued  the  siege.  It  did  not  much  incom 
mode  Carleton,  whose  men  -were  well  housed  and  well  fed ;  he 
patiently  allowed  the  winter's  cold  and  sickness  to  defeat  his 
courageous  foe.  In  the  following  spring  Washington  dis 
patched  eight  regiments  of  reinforcements ;  a  little  later  a  large 
reinforcement  of  British  also  arrived.  The  Americans  then 
began  a  retreat,  which  was  turned  into  a  rout  by  a  sortie  of  the 
enemy.  Early  in  July  the  remnant  of  the  Americans  were  back 
at  Crown  Point.* 

The  double  purpose  of  this  expedition  was  to  forestall  and 
prevent  an  advance  of  the  British  southward  through  the  Hud 
son  Valley,  and  to  incite  a  rebellion  against  the  British  among 
the  French  Canadians.  Neither  end  was  achieved. 

(12)  The  Americans  could  not  keep  the  British  from  get 
ting  possession  of  New  York  City ;  but,  by  holding  the  High 
land  Passes  and  the  forts  near  West  Point,  and  by  defeating 
and  capturing  Burgoyne's  army  when  it  came  down  from  Can 
ada,   they   effectually    "prevented   the   British    from    securing 
control  of  the  line  of  the  Hudson  Valley.    This  was  the  great 
contention  and  controlling  motive  of  the  first  three  years  of 
the  war."     "West  Point  and  the  Highland  Passes  constituted 
the  most  important  American  strategic  positions."f     If  Bene 
dict  Arnold's  treachery  had  succeeded  in  delivering  West  Point 
to  the  British,  the  war  might  have  ended  sooner  and  otherwise. 

OPERATIONS. 

(13)  After  the  withdrawal  of  Howe's  army  from  Boston  in 
March,  1775,  Washington  transferred  the  bulk  of  his  force, 
only  about  8,000  men,  to  New  York  City  and  its  vicinity,  which, 
it  was  believed,  would  be  Howe's  next  objective. 

Washington  was  unable  to  oppose  any  resistance  to  the  land 
ing  of  the  British;  and  by  June  28,  1776,  General  Howe  had 


*Sloane. 
tFisher. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  29 

landed  his  army  on  Staten  Island.  He  had  about  30,000 
troops,  supported  by  a  powerful  fleet  under  his  brother,  Ad 
miral  Howe.  Washington,  whose  army  now  numbered  some 
18,000  men,  knew  very  well  that  he  could  not  hold  New  York, 
and  he  ought  to  have  withdrawn  at  once  to  the  open.  But  the 
Continental  Congress  would  not  hear  to  the  withdrawal.  The 
city  was  commanded  by  Brooklyn  Heights,  and  the  only 
chance  Washington  had  of  holding  it,  was  to  put  his  whole 
force  on  Brooklyn  Heights.  But  he  divided  it,  keeping  part 
in  New  York,  and  placing  part  in  Brooklyn  under  General 
Putnam. 

(14)  On  August  22  Howe  took  15,000  or  20,000  troops  and 
forty  guns  over  from  Staten  Island,  landed  on  Long  Island, 
and,  after  reconnoitering  four  days,  made  a  skilful  turning 
movement  against  Putnam,  and  routed  him. 

The  British  fleet  was  to  have  pushed  up  the  East  River  to  co 
operate  with  the  army,  but  it  was  prevented  by  the  wind,  which 
was  from  the  northeast.  Washington  brought  reinforcements 
across  from  New  York  next  day.  Howe  made  no  effort  to 
push  his  victory,  and  Washington  succeeded  in  withdrawing 
his  force  back  to  the  New  York  side  of  East  River. 

Instead  of  following  up  his  advantage,  Howe  remained  on 
Long  Island  more  than  two  weeks.  Then  he  crossed  his  army 
over,  and  landed  it  about  where  Thirty-third  street  is  now, 
"and  drove  away  the  militia  posted  there  in  headlong  flight/'* 
Washington  withdrew  his  army  to  the  north  end  of  the  island 
and  took  a  position  on  Harlem  Heights.  Howe  took  posses 
sion  of  New  York  City.  On  the  16th  of  September  he  made  a 
frontal  attack  upon  Washington's  position  at  Harlem  Heights, 
and  was  repulsed. 

(13)  Howe  now  divided  his  army  into  three  parts.  The  first 
was  to  guard  the  intrenchments  of  New  York  City ;  the  second 
was  to  sail  up  North  River  and  prevent  Washington  from 
crossing  into  New  Jersey.  Howe  with  the  third  and  largest 
force  was  to  land  at  Throgs  Neck  and  cut  off  the  American  line 
of  supply,  which  had  its  base  in  Connecticut.  After  another 
long  and  unnecessary  delay,  Howe  landed  his  force  at  Throgs 
Neck,  on  the  16th  of  October.  Here  he  allowed  a  small  creek 
and  a  marsh  to  detain  him  six  days  longer ;  which  gave  Wash 
ington  time  to  withdraw  his  command  to  White  Plains.  Not 
until  October  the  28th  did  Howe  attack  this  position.  Three 


•  *Henry  Cabot  Lodge. 


30  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

days  later  Washington  withdrew  to  a  very  strong  position  at 
North  Castle,  a  short  way  from  White  Plains. 

On  November  5  Howe  transferred  his  camp  to  Dobbs  Ferry. 
He  was  there  in  position  to  move  up  the  Hudson,  to  unite  with 
a  force  under  Carleton  from  Canada ;  to  attack  Fort  Washing 
ton;  or  to  cross  the  river  and  move  against  Philadelphia,  the 
Continental  Capital.  His  real  purpose  was  to  draw  Washing 
ton  out  of  his  unassailable  position  at  North  Castle. 

To  meet  these  three  contingencies,  Washington  crossed  to 
the  west  side  of  the  Hudson  with  5,000  men;  he  sent  3,000  to 
Peekskill  and  West  Point,  to  build  forts  to  guard  the  river; 
and  left  7,000  under  General  Charles  Lee  at  North  Castle,  to 
cooperate  in  whatever  quarter  General  Howe's  next  move 
should  threaten.  At  the  same  time,  he  resolved  to  abandon 
Forts  Lee  and  Washington,  as  they  had  failed  to  stop  the  Brit 
ish  fleet  in  its  passage  up  the  river,  and  were  therefore  of  no 
further  use.  Congress,  however,  forbade  their  abandonment ; 
within  a  fortnight  both  were  captured  by  the  British.  General 
Greene  escaped  from  Fort  Lee,  with  his  little  garrison,  but  at 
Fort  Washington,  150  Americans  were  killed,  and  3,000  cap 
tured  by  the  troops  under  Howe. 

Washington  established  his  camp  at  Hackensack,  but,  appre 
ciating  how  unsafe  he  should  be  there,  between  the  Hackensack 
and  the  Passaic  Rivers,  in  case  a  large  force  should  come  down 
upon  him  from  the  north,  he  crossed  the  Passaic  River  on  the 
21st  of  November,  and  marched  to  Newark.  Here  he  stayed 
five  days,  urging  General  Charles  Lee  all  the  while  to  bring 
over  his  command.  Lee  made  one  excuse  and  another,  and 
delayed  until  December  1. 

On  November  28  General  Cornwallis,  with  5,000  troops,  ad 
vanced  on  Newark,  and  Washington  retreated  to  New  Bruns 
wick.  Cornwallis  pursued,  not  very  vigorously,  to  New 
Brunswick,  and  Washington  continued  his  retreat  to  Prince 
ton.  By  this  time  Washington  had  lost  so  many  men,  mainly 
by  expiration  of  their  terms  of  service,  that,  without  his  having 
risked  a  fight,  his  army  was  reduced  to  3,000. 

At  New  Brunswick  General  Howe  joined  Cornwallis  with 
reinforcements,  and  continued  the  pursuit  of  Washington  to 
Trenton.  Washington  crossed  the  Delaware,  but  was  pushed 
no  farther  by  Howe.  Howe  apparently  considered  Washing 
ton's  army  so  reduced  and  demoralized  as  to  be  unworthy  of 
further  pursuit.  It  had  ceased  to  exert  the  "power  of  attrac 
tion."  So  Howe  posted  his  army  in  comfortable  quarters 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  31 

along  a  very  extended  front,  with  its  center  at  Trenton,  and  its 
headquarters  twenty  miles  in  rear,  at  New  Brunswick ;  de 
tached  a  large  force  from  it  to  "take  possession  of  Newport 
as  a  convenient  station  for  British  ships  entering  Long  Island 
Sound";*  and  he  and  Cornwallis  repaired  to  New  York  City. 
Here  he  and  his  brother,  the  admiral,  issued  a  proclamation 
granting  pardon  to  all  citizens  that  would  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  British  Crown. 

Meantime  General  Charles  Lee  had  brought  his  command, 
now  reduced  to  about,  4,000,  across  to  Morristown,  and,  for 
tunately  for  the  army,  and  the  American  cause,  had  been  him 
self  captured  by  the  British;  and  General  Gates,  with  about 
3,000  Americans,  was  in  the  northern  part  of  New  Jersey. 
These  troops  all  joined  Washington  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Delaware,  raising  his  little  army  to  about  6,000  effectives. 

Seeing  how  carelessly  the  British  were  guarding  their  camps, 
Washington  determined  to  take  advantage  of  it.  He  planned 
to  cross  the  Delaware  in  three  columns  and  attack  the  enemy 
at  Burlington  and  Trenton.  The  column  led  by  himself  was 
the  only  one  that  got  across ;  on  Christmas  night  it  came  down 
upon  the  garrison  of  Hessians  at  Trenton,  surprising  them, 
and  capturing  1,000  of  them.  Washington  had  two  men 
killed,  four  wounded,  and  two  frozen  to  death.  He  now  occu 
pied  Trenton. 

The  victory  of  Trenton,  insignificant  as  it  was  in  point  of  the 
numbers  engaged,  was  a  very  important  one  for  Washington 
and  the  American  cause.  It  was  Washington's  first  victory;  it 
roused  the  waning  spirits  of  the  people,  and  hushed  the  epithet 
of  "Fabius  Cunctator"  which  Washington's  friends  had  applied 
to  him  in  apology,  and  his  enemies,  in  derision. 

Cornwallis  hastened  back  from  New  York,  and,  quickly  col 
lecting  7,000  or  8,000  troops  at  Princeton,  set  out  with  them  on 
the  2nd  of  January,  1777,  to  attack  Washington  at  Trenton. 
(15)  Washington  withdrew  to  the  south  side  of  the  Assanpink 
River,  and  kept  the  British  back  all  one  day.  Cornwallis 
planned  to  cross  the  next  morning  above  the  American  posi 
tion,  fall  upon  Washington's  right  flank,  and  force  him  back 
upon  the  Delaware.  But  in  the  night  Washington  slipped 
away  to  Princeton,  where  he  routed  three  regiments  moving 
out  to  reinforce  Cornwallis  at  Trenton.  (13)  Washington 
moved  on  to  Morristown,  where  he  established  his  headquar- 


*Fiske's  The  American  Revolution. 


32  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ters.  Here  he  was  on  the  flank  of  the  British  line  of  commu 
nications  with  New  York.  To  avoid  this  danger  Cornwallis 
withdrew  in  all  haste  to  New  Brunswick.  A  few  days  later 
Putnam  advanced  from  Philadelphia  and  occupied  Princeton. 
After  this  the  line  of  the  American  army  extended  from  Prince 
ton  to  the  Hudson  River,  and  the  British  were  confined,  in  New 
Jersey,  to  Paulus  Hook,  Perth  Amboy,  and  New  Brunswick. 

Washington  spent  the  rest  of  the  winter  in  trying  to  re 
organize  his  army  and  to  make  it  more  efficient. 

OPERATIONS  OF  1777. 

(9)  The  plans  of  the  British  Ministry  for  their  campaign 
in  1777  contemplated  a  concerted  movement  of.  three  columns, 
to  get  possession  of  the  Hudson  River  Valley.  Burgoyne,  with 
one  column,  was  to  move  down  from  Canada  by  way  of  Lake 
Champlain,  and  Howe's  column  was  to  move  up  from  New 
York  and  form  a  junction  with  him  at  Albany.  (11)  A  third 
column,  under  Colonel  St.  Leger,  was  to  move  up  the  St. 
Lawrence  to  Lake  Ontario,  land  at  Oswego,  and,  with  the 
assistance  of  Iroquois  Indians  and  loyalists  under  Sir  John 
Johnson,  capture  the  American  Fort  Stanwix,  and  move  down 
the  Mohawk  Valley  to  join  the  other  two  columns. 

Burgoyne  started  with  about  8,000  men  on  June  1,  and,  on 
July  1,  had  reached  Ticonderoga.  He  recaptured  this  fort, 
and,  leaving  a  garrison  in  it,  continued  south  with  the  rest  of 
his  column.  He  sent  1,000  of  his  German  contingent  to  cap 
ture  some  horses  and  supplies  that  the  Americans  had  col 
lected  at  Bennington;  but  the  detachment  was  attacked  and 
defeated,  and  most  of  them  captured,  by  the  Green  Mountain 
militia,  under  Colonel  John  Stark  of  Bunker  Hill  fame.  Mean 
time  St.  Leger's  mixed  command,  after  a  hand-to-hand  combat 
at  Oriskany  with  a  body  of  patriots  under  Nicholas  Herkimer, 
one  of  the  most  desperate  and  bloody  in  all  our  annals,  had  con 
tinued  the  siege  of  Fort  Stanwix.  But  Arnold  soon  came  up 
the  valley  with  a  relieving  force,  and,  with  wonderful  skill  and 
daring,  managed  to  disperse  the  allies  of  St.  Leger,  and  send 
him  and  his  British  soldiers  back  in  flight  to  Canada. 

The  American  forces  under  General  Schuyler  had  fallen  back 
before  Burgoyne,  and  on  August  19  were  stationed  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Hudson,  between  Stillwater,  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Mohawk;  while  Burgoyne's  were  camped  on  the  eastern  bank 
some  thirty  miles  higher  up,  from  Fort  Edward  down  to  the 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  33 

Battenkill.  For  three  weeks  no  movement  was  made  on  either 
side.  Burgoyne  was  waiting  for  Howe  and  St.  Leger  to  join 
him. 

"Burgoyne's  situation  was  now  becoming  critical.  Lincoln, 
with  a  strong  force  of  militia,  was  hovering  in  his  rear,  while 
the  main  army  before  him  was  gaining  numbers  day  by  day. 
Putnam  had  sent  up  reinforcements  from  the  Highlands ; 
Washington  had  sent  Morgan  with  500  sharpshooters;  and 
Arnold  was  hurrying  back  from  Fort  Stanwix.  Not  a  word 
had  come  from  Sir  William  Howe,  and  it  daily  grew  more 
difficult  to  get  provisions."* 

(16)  Schuyler  had  been  relieved  by  the  Continental  Con 
gress,  and  General  Gates  had,  by  underhand  scheming,  secured 
his  command.     Burgoyne  resolved  to  try  to  fight  his  way  out 
of  his  dilemma.     So  he  crossed  the  Hudson  on  the  13th  of 
September,  and  on  the  19th  moved  against  Gates's  army  in  a 
strongly  fortified  position  on  Bemis  Heights.    Arnold  met  him 
and  attacked  him  with  3,000  Americans  .at  Freeman's  Farm, 
while   Gates    remained   in   his   stronghold   with    11,000   more 
Americans.      If    Gates    had    sent    reinforcements,    as    Arnold 
begged  him  to  do,  the  Americans  would  probably  have  gained 
a  decisive  victory.     As  it  was,   Burgoyne  bivouacked  on  the 
battle-field. 

(17)  Burgoyne  renewed  the  attack  on  October  7,  and  tried 
to  turn  the  American  left ;  but  Morgan  fell  upon  his  right,  and 
Arnold  struck  his  center,  and  he  was  discomfited.     (11)    In  his 
attempt  to  retreat  Burgoyne  was  cut  off  and  surrounded  by 
Gates's  army,  which  now  numbered  more  than  20,000.     He 
surrendered  at  Saratoga  on  the  17th  of  October. 

HOWE'S  CAMPAIGN  AT  PHILADELPHIA. 

(13.)  •  Meantime  let  us  see  what  General  Howe  was  doing, 
whom  the  British  Ministry  expected  to  cooperate  with  Bur 
goyne  and  St.  Leger.  Howe's  orders  were  not  positive.  The 
Ministry  did  what  is  generally  the  proper  thing  to  do — left  him 
some  discretion.  It  was  not,  however,  best  in  this  case,  since 
Burgoyne  had  the  Ministry's  positive  order  to  form  a  junction 
with  Howe;  while  Howe  made  the  junction  impossible  by  mov 
ing  his  army  in  an  opposite  direction. 

Howe  started  on  June  12,  and  concentrated  18,000  men  at 

*Fiske. 


34  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

New  Brunswick,  for  a  movement  on  Philadelphia,  the  Ameri 
can  Capital.  Washington  moved  down  8,000  men  from  Mor- 
ristown,  and  took  up  a  strong  position  flanking  Howe's  line  of 
march.  Howe  then  wasted  more  than  two  weeks  maneuver 
ing,  instead  of  attacking  Washington;  then,  on  June  30,  he 
evacuated  New  Jersey,  and  withdrew  his  whole  army  to  Staten 
Island.  "Howe  next  embarked  his  men  on  ships,  but  kept  in 
the  vicinity  of  New  York,  making  a  number  of  feints,  first  up 
the  Hudson,  then  into  the  sound,  then  past  Sandy  Hook,  so 
that  people  might  doubt  whether  his  destination  were  Albany, 
Boston,  or  Philadelphia.  Washington  reasonably  supposed 
Howe  would  go  up  the  Hudson ;  so  he  moved  back  to  Morris- 
town,  sent  a  division  as  far  as  Pompton  to  cooperate  with  West 
Point,  and  finally  himself  went  to  Haverstraw,  sending  two 
divisions  across  the  river  to  Peekskill."* 

At  last  Howe  put  to  sea  with  18,000  men,  leaving  General 
Clinton  with  7,000  to  garrison  New  York,  and  to  assist  Bur- 
goyne,  "if  circumstances  warranted."  "Clinton  did  his  utmost. 
He  waited  for  some  1,700  reinforcements  that  were  to  arrive, 
and  then  started  up  the  Hudson  with  only  two  or  three  thou 
sand  men,  meeting  with  some  success."  But  he  was  too  late; 
and  his  little  command  was  too  small  to  have  saved  Burgoyne, 
even  if  he  had  been  able  to  join  him. 

When  Washington  was  assured  that  Howe  had  sailed  south 
ward,  he  marched  his  army  to  the  Delaware,  to  meet  him. 

(9)  Howe's  ships  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware 
River,  then  sailed  out  to  sea  again ;  and  Washington  was  again 
in  a  quandary,  whether  he  had  sailed  back  to  the  Hudson  or 
gone  to  Charleston.  In  either  case  Washington  could  do  no 
good  with  his  army  on  the  Delaware ;  so  he  was  about  to  start 
back  to  New  York,  to  look  after  Clinton,  when  Howe's  ships 
appeared  at  Elkton,  at  the  head  of  Chesapeake  Bay — thirteen 
miles  overland  from  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware,  where  they 
had  been  twenty- four  days  before.  Howe  could  have  landed 
and  marched  to  Elkton  unopposed,  and  saved  his  men  that 
voyage  of  twenty- four  days. 

(18)  Howe  now  started  toward  Philadelphia.  Washing 
ton  met  him  on  the  Brandywine,  and  posted  the  center  of  his 
line  at  Chadd's  Ford.  (19)  Howe  sent  Knyphausen  against 
this  point,  and  Cornwallis  turned  Washington's  right  flank. 
The  Americans  fell  back  to  Chester.  This  was  the  Battle  of 


*Lecture  by  Capt.  Clarke. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  35 

Brandywine,  September  11,  1777.  This  action  was  followed 
by  a  fortnight  of  skirmishing  and  maneuvering ;  and  Howe 
was  kept  out  of  Philadelphia  until  September  26.  (18)  Howe 
made  his  headquarters  at  Germantown,  and  Cornwallis  put  his 
in  Philadelphia. 

(20)  Howe  detached  a  considerable  force  to  aid  his  broth 
er's  fleet  in  reducing  Forts  Mifflin  and  Mercer,  which  guarded 
the  Delaware  below  Philadelphia.  His  camp  at  Germantown 
was  seven  miles  from  that  of  Cornwallis  in  Philadelphia. ' 
Washington  determined  to  take  advantage  of  the  situation  to 
attack  him  at  Germantown.  The  attack  was  made  early  in  the 
morning  of  October  the  4th,  and  might  have  succeeded,  but  for 
blunders  and  mishaps  due  mainly  to  a  dense  fog. 

(18)  Howe's  army  spent  the  winter  of  1777-8  in  Philadel 
phia  ;  and  Washington's,  at  Valley  Forge,  in  a  bend  of  the 
Schuylkill  River,  about  twenty-four  miles  above  Philadelphia. 
Howe  resigned,  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  took  command  of  the 
British  Army. 

The  capture  and  occupation  of  Philadelphia  by  the  British 
had  no  important  effect  on  the  war.  Philadelphia  was  the 
Continental  Capital;  but  the  Congress  had  fled  to  York, 
where  it  performed  its  functions  just  as  well,  and  just  as  ill,  as 
at  Philadelphia.  And  Philadelphia  was  a  poor  base  from  which 
to  operate.  Sir  Henry  Clinton  purposed  conducting  a  far  more 
vigorous  campaign  than  Howe  had  conducted.  He  deter 
mined,  therefore,  to  evacuate  Philadelphia  and  take  his  army 
back  to  New  York  City.  For  certain  reasons  he  decided  to 
march  it  across  New  Jersey,  rather  than  to  take  it  round 
by  water. 

(13)  Accordingly  he  evacuated  Philadelphia  June  18,  1778, 
with  10,000  to  15,000  men.  Washington's  army  marched  on  a 
road  farther  north,  converging  upon  the  road  taken  by  the  Brit 
ish.  Clinton's  only  desire  was  to  get  his  army  into  New  York ; 
and  Washington,  whose  army  was  about  the  size  of  Clinton's, 
did  not  feel  like  making  an  attack  without  an  excellent  chance 
of  victory.  (21)  At  Monmouth,  on  the  28th  of  June,  such  a 
chance  was  offered  him,  and  he  attacked ;  but,  owing  to  the 
treachery  or  cowardice  of  that  pusillanimous  deserter  from  the 
British  army,  General  Charles  Lee,  he  failed  to  win  a  victory. 
Lee  led  the  attack,  but  at  the  critical  moment,  with  everything 
in  his  favor,  he  fell  back.  Washington  came  up  in  time  to 
save  a  rout;  but  gained  nothing  by  the  battle.  The  fine  con 
duct  of  the  American  rank  and  file  in  the  battle  of  Monmouth 


36  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

bore  witness  to  the  benefits  of  the  drill  and  training  they  had 
received  at  Valley  Forge,  under  Baron  Steuben. 

(13)  Clinton  marched  his  army  to  Sandy  Hook,  and  there 
embarked  it  for  New  York.  Washington  marched  his  to  White 
Plains;  and  after  July  20,  1778,  the  two  hostile  armies  were 
right  where  they  had  started  from  in  1776. 

COMMENTS. 

V 

General  Howe's  conduct  of  the  operations  in  the  American 
Revolution  is  still  an  unsolved  mystery;  and  when  we  study 
that  war,  we  can  but  congratulate  ourselves  that  he,  and  not 
Sir  Henry  Clinton,  was  in  command  of  the  British  forces  for 
the  first  three  years ;  and  that  Lord  George  Germain  was  Colo 
nial  Secretary,  and  not  John  Chamberlain  of  the  next  century. 

Judged  by  the  reputation  he  had  already  won,  General  Howe 
was  probably  the  best  general  in  the  British  service.  He  had 
fought  with  Wolfe  in  Canada,  and  had  proved  himself  a  bril 
liant,  courageous,  and  active  soldier.  He  was  still  young  for 
his  rank,  being  not  yet  fifty  years  old.  So  his  inactivity,  his 
sloth,  his  apparent  timidity,  his  lack  of  persistence,  make  one 
marvel  for  an  explanation. 

When  he  took  command  at  Boston,  he  had  a  splendid  little 
army  of  10,000  British  regulars;  yet  he  sat  there  besieged  by 
a  motley  aggregation  of  undisciplined  Americans;  and,  in 
nearly  a  year,  made  not  a  single  effort  to  break  the  siege.  All 
the  while,  too,  he  had  full  command  of  the  sea.  He  knew  that 
Dorchester  Heights  and  Nooks  Hill  commanded  the  town,  yet 
he  never  occupied  them.  When  the  Americans  put  a  few  guns 
on  thetn,  after  months  of  waiting,  he  evacuated  the  town,  leav 
ing  the  Americans  a  large  number  of  cannon  and  muskets,  and 
vast  quantities  of  ammunition  and  supplies,  which  he  might 
just  as  easily  have  destroyed. 

Howe  was  a  good  tactician,  too — he  knew  how  to  fight  a 
battle.  We  saw  how  prettily  he  turned  Putnam's  flank  on  Long 
Island,  and  Washington's  at  Brandywine;  but  there  it  ended. 
He  never  pushed  his  victory.  He  could  easily  have  killed  or 
captured  every  American  soldier  on  Long  Island,  if  he  had 
tried;  and  possibly  have  ended  the  rebellion  then  and  there. 
But  he  gave  Washington  plenty  of  time  to  take  his  army  back 
across  the  East  River. 

General  Howe  constantly  exemplified  the  worst  fault  that  a 
soldier  or  an  army  can  have — the  fault  of  inactivity,  of  moving, 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  37 

and  doing  things,  slowly.  He  landed  on  Staten  Island,  June 
28,  with  his  whole  army ;  but  it  was  not  till  August  27  that  he 
attacked  the  Americans  on  Brooklyn  Heights.  Then  he  waited 
two  weeks  and  crossed  to  Manhattan  Island;  then  waited  till 
September  16,  before  attacking  Washington  at  Harlem 
Heights.  Then  he  rested  again,  till  the  16th  of  October,  to 
move  his  army  to  Throgs  Neck;  then,  till  October  28  before 
attacking  Washington  at  White  Plains.  When  Washington 
retreated  into  New  Jersey,  instead  of  pursuing  his  demoralized 
little  band  to  its  destruction,  Howe  followed  it  slowly  a  short 
way,  and  then  stopped  and  gave  it  time  to  recruit  and  reor 
ganize.  So  it  was  throughout  the  time  that  Howe  commanded 
the  British  troops.  He  made  no  attempt  to  do  anything  at  all 
during  the  winter  months  but  riot  in  the  fleshpots  and  friv 
olities  of  social  life  in  New  York  or  Philadelphia. 

The  explanation  of  it  all  may  be  that  General  Howe  did  not 
care  to  punish  the  Continental  army  too  severely.  He  kept 
hoping  all  the  while  that  the  colonists  would  come  to  their 
senses,  see  the  hopelessness  of  their  struggle,  and  lay  down 
their  arms.  He  and  Admiral  Howe  were  Whigs,  and  their 
sympathies  were  with  the  Colonies.  "As  a  member  of  Parlia 
ment  he  had  pledged  himself  to  his  constituents  not  to  fight 
against  the  Americans,  and  he  must  have  been  fettered  by  that 
pledge."*  In  America  the  brothers  published  proclamations 
offering  amnesty  to  all  who  would  lay  down  their  arms.  It 
is  too  much  to  say  that  he  was  unfaithful  to  the  trust  imposed 
upon  him,  although  the  evidence  certainly  points  to  that 
verdict. 

The  plan  of  capturing  the  line  of  the  Hudson  River,  in  1777, 
by  three  converging  columns  was  poor  strategy.  Especially 
so,  because  the  two  columns  from  Canada  had  such  long  lines 
of  march,  over  such  bad  roads,  and  through  country  in  which 
supplies  were  so  hard  to  get.  It  gave  the  Americans  an  oppor 
tunity  to  unite  their  forces  and  meet  the  columns  one  at  a 
time,  and  defeat  them  separately — the  advantage  of  "interior 
lines."  Yet,  considering  that  the  Americans  were  but  poorly 
organized  insurgents,  the  British  Ministry  was  probably  ex 
cusable  in  adopting  such  a  plan.  And  the  plan  probably 
would  have  succeeded,  if  General  Howe  had  marched  his 
army  up  from  New  York,  to  join  the  other  two,  as  he  was 
expected  to  do.  Instead  of  which,  he  took  his  army  to  Phila- 


*Goldwin  Smith. 


38  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

delphia,  and  let  Burgoyne  be  captured.  There  was  a  time 
when  Burgoyne  could  have  made  good  his  retreat  to  Canada; 
but  he  felt  he  must  push  on  to  form  a  junction  with  Howe, 
who,  he  supposed,  was  advancing  to  meet  him. 

No  doubt  the  object  of  St.  Leger's  expedition  was  to  get  the 
assistance  of  the  Indians  and  Sir  John  Johnson's  loyalists. 
But  it  cannot  be  seen  what  advantage  the  British  Ministry 
hoped  to  gain  by  two  converging  columns  with  independent 
lines  of  operation,  and  independent  bases  hundreds  of  miles 
apart, — the  columns  of  Burgoyne  and  Howe, — which  they 
would  not  have  gained  by  a  single  column,  equal  in  strength 
to  both  of  these,  advancing  up  the  Hudson  from  New  York. 
Burgoyne's  troops  might  better  have  been  sent  round  from 
Canada  to  New  York  by  water.  The  British  Ministry  was, 
doubtless,  influenced  by  the  fact  that  every  invasion  made  into 
New  York  in  the  past,  during  the  French  and  Indian  wars,  had 
gone  by  way  of  the  Richelieu  River  and  Lake  Champlain ;  but 
the  case  was  different  now,  in  that  the  British  held  New  York 
City  as  a  base,  while  the  French  never  had  done  so.  Another 
purpose  of  Burgoyne's  column  was,  of  course,  to  cover  Canada. 

The  British  Ministry  was  a  Tory  ministry,  but  so  large  a  part 
of  the  British  people  was  opposed  to  the  war  and  in  sympathy 
with  the  colonies,  that  the  Ministry  undoubtedly  wanted  to 
bring  about  peace  with  as  little  bloodshed,  and  as  much  con 
ciliation,  as  possible.  Otherwise  it  would  not  have  tolerated 
the  two  Whig  Howes  as  long  as  it  did.  It  is  certain,  in  fact, 
that  the  Ministry  instructed  General  Howe  as  to  the  manner 
of  conducting  the  operations,  enjoining  conciliatory  measures; 
just  as,  according  to  common  belief,  our  Administration  at 
Washington  enjoined  conciliatory  measures  upon  our  com 
mander  at  Manila,  in  his  early  dealings  with  the  Philippine  in 
surgents.  The  consequences  were  unfortunate  in  both  cases. 

The  lesson  the  British  Government  learned  by  the  war,  was, 
not  to  hold  out  the  sword  and  the  olive  branch  to  rebellious 
colonies  at  the  same  time.  The  sword  first  and  the  olive 
branch  afterwards, — this  has  been  the  British  policy  since ;  and 
we  have  seen  how  well  it  succeeded  in  the  South  African  War. 

The  lesson  that  the  American  people  might  have  learned, 
but  did  not,  is  the  impossibility  of  carrying  on  successfully, 
sustained  operations,  extending  over  many  months  of  time,  and 
many  miles  of  distance,  with  undisciplined,  short-term  militia. 
Washington's  complaints  of  his  militia  were  pathetic.  It  is  not 
so  much  the  strife  of  battle  that  tries  the  discipline  of  soldiers, 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  39 

as  it  is  the  fatigue  of  long,  hard  marches;  the  dreariness  of 
prolonged,  uncomfortable  encampments ;  the  disappointment  of 
defeat;  the  discouragement  and  hardship  of  retreat. 

Our  history  has  chosen  well  in  making  Washington  the  hero 
of  the  war  and  the  times.  It  was  only  his  unswerving  sense 
of  duty,  his  patience,  tact,  strength  of  purpose,  patriotism,  and 
tenacity,  that  held  his  little  army  together  during  those  trying 
years  of  defeat  and  constant  retreat.  Those  qualities  of  the 
man  and  the  commander  were  even  more  marked  in  Washing 
ton  than  were  his  brilliancy  and  skill  as  a  general.  Yet  he 
quickly  learned  strategy;  his  attack  at  Trenton,  and  his  escape 
from  Cornwallis  there,  afterwards,  and  his  combat  at  Prince 
ton,  and  his  occupation  of  Morristown  on  the  flank  of  the 
enemy's  line  of  communication,  were  after  the  manner  of 
Stonewall  Jackson.  They  were  brilliant  little  feats  of  strategy ; 
they  recovered  New  Jersey  from  the  British  and  revived  the 
hopes  of  the  people.  His  position  at  Morristown,  on  the  flank 
of  Howe's  line  of  operations  from  New  York  to  Philadelphia, 
also  thwarted  the  British  commander's  overland  advance 
against  the  Continental  Capital  in  June,  1777,  and  forced  him 
to  take  his  army  round  by  sea. 

It  is  not  hard,  however,  to  point  out  mistakes  made  by  Wash 
ington  ;  it  is  strange  that  he  made  no  more.  Where  is  the 
surgeon  that  can  perform  a  capital  operation  without  previous 
study,  and  training  in  a  hospital?  The  science  of  strategy  is 
more  complicated  than  that  of  surgery,  and  the  masters  of 
strategy  have  been  fewer  by  hundreds  than  the  masters  of  sur 
gery.  The  little  actual  experience  that  Washington  had  gained 
in  the  French  and  Indian  War,  was  no  more  than  the  experi 
ence  of  surgery  gained  by  the  nurse  in  a  hospital.  He  was  not 
a  student  of  military  history;  he  had  certainly  never  studied 
"again  and  again  the  campaigns  of  Alexander,  Hannibal, 
Caesar,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Turenne,  Eugene,  and  Frederick,-' 
like  Napoleon.  If  he  had,  he  would  not  have  divided  his  little 
army  between  New  York  and  Brooklyn,  thus  giving  Howe  the 
opportunity  to  beat  it  in  detail.  Nor  again  would  he  have  split 
his  army  into  pieces,  when  Howe,  rinding  it  impregnable  at 
North  Castle,  transferred  his  own  command  to  Dobbs  Ferry. 
Washington  ought  to  have  kept  his  force  intact  at  North 
Castle,  not  so  much  with  the  view  of  covering  his  line  of  com 
munication  with  Connecticut,  because  he  could  live  off  the 
country ;  but  because  his  strength  and  his  chance  of  beating  the 
enemy  depended  upon  his  keeping  his  troops  in  a  single  body 


40  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

under  his  own  immediate  command.  When  he  divided  his 
force,  and  led  a  part  of  it  across  the  Hudson  to  stand  between 
Howe  and  Philadelphia,  he  did  precisely  what  Howe  wanted 
him  to  do.  He  also  wholly  lost  control  of  the  larger  part  of  his 
army,  the  part  left  at  North  Castle  under  Lee,  and  he  saw  his 
own  detachment  become  so  reduced,  as  no  longer  to  attract 
Howe's  pursuit.  It  noway  barred  Howe's  march  to  Philadel 
phia,  if  he  had  wished  to  take  the  city  at  that  time.  What  it 
did,  incidentally,  was  to  lead  the  enemy  away  from  New  Eng 
land,  and  to  leave  that  favored  soil  free  from  the  ravages  of 
hostile  armies,  as  it  has  been  in  every  other  war  the  United 
States  have  waged.  But  Washington  did  not  lead  Howe's 
army  into  New  Jersey  on  purpose;  in  truth,  he  wholly  neg 
lected  to  make  use  of  what  von  der  Goltz  declares  to  be  the 
most  effective  lever  that  the  leader  of  a  retreating  army  has  to 
guide  matters  according  to  his  own  wishes;  namely,  "the 
power  of  attraction." 

Another  lesson  that  American  statesmen  might  have  learned 
from  the  Revolutionary  War,  is  how  not  to  finance  a  war. 
That  they  did  not  take  this  lesson  to  heart,  was  evidenced 
later,  in  the  Civil  War,  when  both  the  United  States  and  the 
Confederate  governments  followed  the  same  fiscal  method 
as  that  of  our  Revolutionary  fathers;  namely,  the  manu 
facture  of  paper  money.*  The  people  of  the  colonies,  as 
a  whole,  were  rich  and  prosperous;  yet  the  Continental  Con 
gress  was  too  weak  in  authority  or  in  courage  to  tax  them.  It 
preferred  to  borrow  all  it  could  from  France,  and  to  make 
paper  money  for  the  balance;  which  immediately  began  to  de 
preciate,  and  soon  became  a  byword  for  worthlessness.  Not 
to  be  worth  a  "continental"  was  not  to  be  worth  anything  at 
all.  With  such  currency  the  Government  paid  its  troops;  and 
to  this  cause  alone  most  of  Washington's  trouble  in  keeping 
his  ranks  filled  may  be  charged.  In  respect  of  its  finance,  the 
short-lived  insurgent  government  of  Aguinaldo  was  far  ahead 
of  that  of  our  forefathers  of  the  Revolution.  It  manufactured 
no  paper  promises-to-pay ;  but  paid  its  soldiers  in  silver  coin. 
Hence  there  was  never  a  time  when  there  were  not  thrice  as 
many  insurgent  soldiers  in  the  Philippine  bosque  as  there  were 
arms  for  them.  The  government  collected  its  revenue  from 

*In  this  respect  the  United  States  were  even  worse  than  the  Confed 
eracy,  for  they  not  only  manufactured  paper  money  with  nothing  behind 
it  but  the  hope  and  good  will  of  the  Government,  but  they  also  made  it  a 
legal  tender  for  all  private  and  nearly  all  public  debts. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  41 

the  people  according  to  their  means.  The  rich  were  made  to 
contribute  hard  cash.  Such  was  not  the  case  in  America  dur 
ing  the  Revolution. 

There  is  no  more  shameful  page  in  all  our  national  history 
than  the  page  that  relates  that  Washington  had  to  pledge  his 
own  fortune  to  sustain  his  barefooted  army  in  the  winter  of 
1776-77.  John  Stark  and  a  few  other  patriots  of  the  pocket, 
rather  than  of  the  lip,  followed  his  example;  and  Robert 
Morris  collected  five  hundred  dollars  from  his  friends,  and,  a 
few  days  later,  raised  fifty  thousand  dollars  in  cash,  by  a  house- 
to-house  inquest,  and  placed  it  at  the  disposal  of  the  comman- 
der-in-chief.* 

The  battle  of  Bennington  shows  how  well  the  American 
farmer,  without  any  previous  service  or  training,  can  fight, 
when  he  has  to  do  so  to  defend  his  own  hearthstone.  He  will 
not,  without  training  and  discipline,  fight  a  long  way  from 
home, — he  cannot  be  counted  upon  for  distant  and  enduring 
campaigns;  but  for  single  battles,  with  his  own  church  spires 
in  sight,  he  makes  a  dangerous  foe  to  meet. 

There  was  practically  no  American  navy  during  the  Revolu 
tionary  War ;  but  much  damage  was  done  to  British  commerce 
by  privateers  manned  by  "hardy  seamen  of  New  England," 
"and  Paul  Jones  in  his  Bonhomme  Richard  made  himself  the 
terror  of  the  English  coasts. "f 


"Sloane. 
fGoldwin  Smith. 


LECTURE  III. 
THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR. 

SOUTHERN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(13)  After  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne,  France  formed  an 
alliance  with  the  United  'States,  and  Frederick  the  Great  of 
Prussia  showed  his  friendliness  by  prohibiting  any  more  Hes 
sian  troops  from  entering  the  British  service.  In  June,  1779, 
Spain  declared  war  against  England,  and  in  December,  1780, 
England  declared  war  against  Holland. 

We  saw  in  the  last  lecture  that,  after  the  Battle  of  Mon- 
mouth,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  took  his  little  army  into  New  York 
City,  and  Washington  stationed  his  at  White  Plains.  This  was 
in  July,  1778.  New  York  and  Newport  were  now  the  only 
points  held  by  the  British  in  the  United  States. 

A  French  fleet  under  Count  d'Estaing,  and  a  force  of  4,000 
French  soldiers,  arrived  off  New  York  in  July  [1778].  A  plan 
was  formed  to  attack  Clinton  in  New  York,  but  some  of 
d'Estaing's  ships  were  of  too  deep  draft  to  pass  over  the  bar  at 
the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  the  project  had  to  be  abandoned. 
(9)  Later  on,  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack  upon  the 
British  at  Newport  was  undertaken ;  it  also  failed.  The  French 
fleet  then  sailed  for  the  West  Indies,  to  threaten  the  British 
possessions  there,  and  immediately  5,000  of  Clinton's  men  had 
to  be  withdrawn  and  sent  to  those  islands.  "In  the  autumn  of 
this  year,  1778,  Clinton  felt  himself  so  much  weakened,  that 
he  withdrew  the  garrison  from  Newport,  and  concentrated  his 
whole  force  in  New  York,  which  was  now  the  only  place  held 
by  the  British  in  the  rebellious  colonies."* 

We  have  seen  that  the  part  of  the  British  Ministry's  plan 
which  contemplated  splitting  the  rebellious  colonies  in  two  by 
taking  the  line  of  the  Hudson  Valley  and  holding  it,  failed 
through  General  Howe's  bad  management, — if  not  by  reason 
of  his  treachery,  certainly  by  reason  of  his  inefficiency.  Clinton 
was  not  left  with  troops  enough  to  renew  the  attempt.  The 
only  thing  he  could  do  was  to  hold  New  York  as  a  base,  and 

*Fisher. 
42 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  43 

from  there  to  send  out  raiding  expeditions  to  various  places 
on  the  American  coast. 

Outside  of  the  immediate  theater  of  operations,  the  Ameri 
cans,  up  to  this  time,  had  suffered  few  of  the  discomforts  of 
war.  It  mattered  not  much  materially  to  the  people  of  Vir 
ginia  and  the  Carolinas,  or  even  to  the  New  Englanders,  how 
many  months  the  war  kept  up,  so  long  as  it  was  confined  to 
New  Jersey.  The  British  had  already  attempted  once  to  make 
a  lodgment  in  the  South.  A  combined  sea  and  land  force  un 
der  Admiral  Parker  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  after  much  bun 
gling  and  delay,  had  attacked  Charleston,  toward  the  end  of 
June,  1776;  it  was  repulsed  by  the  South  Carolinians  under 
Moultrie  in  their  fort  on  Sullivan  Island.  After  this,  the 
southern  colonies  were  not  again  annoyed  by  the  presence  of 
their  enemy  until  the  autumn  of  1778. 

Clinton  believed  that  the  way  to  make  a  rebellious  people 
want  peace  was  to  make  the  war  uncomfortable  to  all  of  them. 
That  was  the  purpose  of  the  "wearing-out"  policy  he  now 
adopted.  If,  in  the  execution  of  his  policy,  his  agents  resorted 
to  cruelty  and  barbarity  in  many  instances,  it  must  be  admitted 
that,  in  their  treatment  of  the  loyalists,  the  patriots  set  them 
many  examples.  Yet  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  Clinton  had 
anything  to  do  with  the  terrible  massacre  of  Wyoming  Valley 
in  Northern  Pennsylvania,  which  occurred  in  July  of  this  year, 
1778.  This  was  committed  by  the  Tories  and  Indians  of  Cen 
tral  New  York.  Equally  atrocious  was  the  massacre  of 
Cherry  Valley,  a  village  in  Central  New  York,  in  November, 
1778.  This  deed  was  committed,  also,  by  Tories  and  Indians. 

In  pursuance  of  his  plan,  Clinton  dispatched  a  raiding  force 
to  the  coast  of  New  England,  and  another  to  Delaware  Bay, 
this  year  [1778].  (22)  "In  the  autumn,  he  sent  Colonel 
Campbell,  with  3,500  regulars,  to  Georgia,  where  he  easily 
defeated  the  1,200  militia  of  the  patriots,  and  took  Savannah 
and  Augusta.  At  the  same  time,  the  British  General  Prevost 
entered  Georgia  from  Florida;  so  Georgia  was  declared  to  be 
out  of  revolt."* 

"In  the  hope  of  checking  the  British  progress  in  the  South, 
General  Lincoln  was  sent  to  Charleston.  But  South  Carolina 
was  so  much  afraid  of  a  rising  among  her  slaves,  that  the  local 
militia  would  render  him  no  assistance.  He  obtained  2,000 
militia  from  North  Carolina,  and  at  the  end  of  February,  1779, 


*Fisher. 


44  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

sent  General  Ashe  with  1,500  men  to  invade  Georgia.  The 
British  retired  from  Augusta,  but  turned  on  Ashe  at  Briar 
Creek,  and  defeated  him."* 

In  April  [1779]  Lincoln  again  invaded  Georgia,  and  Prevost 
promptly  entered  South  Carolina,  and  devastated  it.  Prevost, 
however,  could  not  take  Charleston,  and  was  obliged  to  return 
to  Georgia.  .This  same  spring,  Clinton  sent  raiding  expedi 
tions  into  Virginia  and  Connecticut,  which  wrought  great  de 
struction  of  property. 

"All  these  severities,  heavy,  shocking,  merciless  blows/'  says 
Fisher,  "were  delivered  so  as  to  affect  the  business  and  social 
relations  of  large  districts  of  country.  They  were  delivered  in 
districts  which  had  heretofore  been  free  from  the  interference 
of  war,  and  where  the  people  were  enjoying  a  more  or  less 
profitable  trade.  They  told  severely  on  the  patriot  cause,  and 
Washington  was  powerless  against  them."  "It  is  difficult  for 
us  now  to  realize  the  deplorable  state  of  the  country ;  devastated 
and  ruined,  with  paper  currency  sunk  so  low  that  a  bushel  of 
corn  cost  one  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  and  a  suit  of  clothes 
two  thousand  dollars."* 

In  September  [1779]  Lincoln,  with  the  aid  of  d'Estaing's 
fleet,  laid  siege  to  Savannah,  and  assaulted  it.  He  was  re 
pulsed  with  heavy  loss.  In  December  Clinton  himself  sailed 
from  New  York  with  8,000  men.  He  landed  at  Savannah, 
and  getting  some  reinforcements  from  Prevost,  marched 
against  Charleston.  Lincoln,  who  commanded  Charleston, 
should  have  abandoned  it,  and  taken  to  the  open,  as  Washing 
ton  did  when  Howe  landed  at  New  York.  But  Lincoln  col 
lected  all  the  troops  he  could,  and  prepared  to  defend  the 
town.  There  was  very  little  fighting;  Clinton  laid  siege,  and 
Lincoln  surrendered  the  town,  May  12,  1780,  with  5,500  pris 
oners  and  a  great  lot  of  ordnance  and  supplies.  "Clinton  im 
mediately  sent  out  forces  which  reduced  the  whole  of  South 
Carolina  to  the  possession  of  the  British."* 

General  Cornwallis  was  left  by  Clinton  in  command  of  South 
Carolina,  and  "there  was  now,  for  a  long  time,  a  frightful  scene 
of  anarchy  and  confusion ;  with  the  British  and  loyalists  plun 
dering,  murdering,  and  confiscating;  the  patriots  retaliating  as 
best  they  could."  "It  was  at  this  time,  during  the  summer  of 
1780,  that  the  patriots,  who  would  not  take  the  oath  of  alle- 


>Fisher. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  45 

giance,  and  had  retreated  to  the  swamps  and  mountains  on  the 
interior,  maintained  under  Marion,  Sumter,  Pickens,  and  Wil 
liams,  that  partisan  warfare  which  became  so  famous.  Their 
attacking  parties  were  as  small  as  twenty  and  seldom  over  one 
hundred ;  but  the  suddenness  of  their  appearance,  the  fury  of 
their  attack,  and  the  swiftness  and  secrecy  of  their  flight  were 
appalling  to  European  soldiers."* 

In  June  General  Gates  was  appointed  to  take  command  of 
the  patriot  troops  in  the  South,  and  repaired  to  Charlotte.  He 
found  things  in  a  deplorable  state ;  there  was  lack  of  arms,  lack 
of  everything,  especially  lack  of  funds. 

Lord  Rawdon  was  in  command  of  the  British  garrison  at 
Camden,  which  Gates  made  his  objective.  Gates  had  the 
choice  of  two  roads  from  Charlotte  to  Camden,  one  of  which 
was  a  little  longer  than  the  other,  but  in  every  other  respect 
better  suited  to  the  march.  Against  the  advice  of  his  officers, 
Gates  took  the  shorter,  apparently  in  order  to  reach  his  objec 
tive  before  it  could  be  reinforced  from  Charleston. 

Rawdon's  command  was  much  smaller  than  Gates's,  but  he 
marched  it  out  fifteen  miles  to  meet  Gates,  and  posted  it  behind 
a  creek  blocking  the  way.  At  this  point  the  two  roads  were 
only  ten  miles  apart.  A  skilful  commander  might  have  occu 
pied  Rawdon's  attention  in  front,  and  made  a  turning  move 
ment  by  the  other  road ;  a  bold  commander  might,  with  Gates's 
preponderance  in  numbers,  have  crossed  the  creek  and  carried 
the  position  by  direct  attack.  Gates  did  neither;  he  wavered 
and  hesitated  for  two  days,  then  moved  slowly  across  to  the 
westerly  road,  and  took  up  a  position  at  Clermont. 

Meantime  Cornwallis  had  arrived  with  reinforcements.  The 
Americans,  however,  still  outnumbered  the  British.  There 
were  3,052  Americans,  only  1,400  of  whom  were  regulars,  to 
2,000  British.  Gates,  however,  had  not  learned  of  the  arrival 
of  Cornwallis,  and  he  detached  400  of  his  best  Maryland  regu 
lars  to  join  Sumter  in  cutting  the  British  line  of  communica 
tion  with  Charleston. 

(23)  At  ten  o'clock  at  night  the  two  little  armies  advanced 
toward  each  other,  each  hoping  to  take  the  other  by  surprise. 
The  result  was  the  Battle  of  Camden,  August  16,  1780,  on  a 
narrow  piece  of  ground  with  an  impassable  swamp  on  each 
flank.  Gates's  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  militia  threw 
down  their  arms,  and  fled  without  firing  a  shot.  "Within  fif- 


*Fisher. 


46'  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

teen  minutes,"  says  Fiske,  "the  whole  American  left  became  a 
mob  of  struggling  men,  smitten  with  mortal  panic,  and  hud 
dling  like  sheep  in  their  wild  flight,  while  Tarleton's  [British] 
cavalry  gave  chase  and  cut  them  down  by  scores."  The  Mary 
land  brigade  behaved  better ;  but  it  also  ^was  driven  from 
the  field.  The  patriots  were  badly  defeated.  (22)  General 
Gates  himself  escaped  to  Hillsboro,  riding  200  miles  in  four 
days. 

The  day  before  the  battle  Sumter  had  captured  a  British  sup 
ply  train  on  its  way  up  from  Charleston ;  but  on  the  18th  that 
active  cavalryman,  Tarleton,  routed  him  and  retook  the  train 
and  prisoners  that  he  had  captured,  and  captured  300  of  his 
men  besides. 

Cornwallis  stayed  nearly  a  month  at  Camden,  resting  his 
troops,  and  then  advanced  to  Charlotte.  Meantime  he  had  sent 
Major  Ferguson — "whom,  next  to  Tarleton,  he  considered  his 
best  partisan  officer" — on  a  raid  to  the  west.  Ferguson  soon 
found  himself  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  bands  of  guerrillas 
under  such  leaders  as  Williams,  and  Campbell,  and  Isaac 
Shelby,  and  John  Sevier.  He  was  brought  to  bay  at  Kings 
Mountain,  where  he  and  about  400  of  his  men  were  slain,  and 
more  than  700  were  captured.  Only  twenty  of  his  men  es 
caped.*  On  learning  the  news  of  this  disaster,  Cornwallis  fell 
back  to  Winnsborough  to  await  reinforcements.  "General 
Leslie  had  been  sent  by  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to  Virginia,  with 
3,000  men,  and  Cornwallis  ordered  this  force  to  join  him  with 
out  delay."* 

Meantime  Marion  and  Sumter  had  kept  up  an  active  partisan 
warfare,  and  the  latter  defeated  Tarleton  at  Blackstock  Hill,  on 
the  20th  November  [1780].  Reinforcements  from  the  North 
were  also  joining  the  American  forces,  which  had  assembled 
at  Charlotte.  Gates  was  relieved,  and  on  the  2nd  December 
General  Greene  arrived  at  Charlotte  and  took  command. 
Arnold,  who,  after  his  treason  and  escape,  was  now  in  the  Brit 
ish  service,  had  been  sent  to  Virginia  by  Clinton,  with  1,600 
men,  to  take  Leslie's  place ;  and  Steuben  was  in  command  of  the 
Americans  in  Virginia. 

Greene's  army  was  too  weak  to  risk  a  battle  with  Cornwal 
lis;  so  he  divided  it,  taking  1,100  men  himself  to  Cheraw  Hill, 
and  sending  900,  under  General  Morgan,  to  the  westward. 
Cornwallis  could  no  nothing  but  divide  his  army,  also.  If  he 

*Fiske. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  47 

should  march  his  whole  command  against  Greene,  Morgan 
would  capture  the  British  posts  in  the  west;  and  if  he  should 
march  his  whole  force  against  Morgan,  Greene  would  capture 
Charleston,  and  cut  him  off  from  the  coast.  "With  his  main 
body,  2,000  strong,  he  advanced  into  North  Carolina,  hoping 
to  draw  Greene  after  him;  while  he  sent  Tarleton,  with  the 
rest  of  his  army,  1,100  strong,  to  take  care  of  Morgan."* 
Morgan  fell  back  to  a  place  called  The  Cowpens,  a  sort  of 
"round-up"  place  for  cattle.  Here  he  was  attacked  by  Tar 
leton.  We  will  quote  the  description  of  the  battle  verbatim 
from  Fisher's  True  History  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Fiske's  description  is  pratically  the  same. 

(24)  Morgan  "placed  himself  with  the  river  in  his  imme 
diate  rear,  which,  if  he  were  defeated,  would  largely  cut  off  his 
retreat ;  but  he  did  this,  he  said,  to  prevent  his  militia  from  run 
ning  too  soon.  He  then  prepared  a  formation  which  seems  to 
have  been  entirely  original,  the  result  of  careful  thought  and 
thorough  knowledge  of  his  material. 

"He  placed  the  raw  militia  far  in  the  front  to  receive  the  first 
onset  of  the  British,  and  told  them  he  expected  them  to  fire  only 
two  volleys  at  killing  distance.  After  that  they  could  run ;  and 
he  showed  them  how  to  run  round  the  left  flank  of  the.  rest  of 
his  troops,  and  get  behind  the  main  body  of  them,  where  they 
could  reform  at  their  leisure  and  recover  themselves. 

"About  150  yards  behind  the  militia,  Morgan  placed  his 
picked  troops  on  a  slight  hill ;  1 50  yards  farther  back  he  placed 
his  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Washington. 

"Tarleton  attacked,  in  his  dashing,  eager  style,  at  sunrise. 
The  militia  received  him  better  than  was  expected,  and  retreated 
as  they  had  been  told.  The  British  instantly  spread  out  and 
rushed  at  the  second  line  of  Americans,  intending  to  flank  them 
[envelop  them]  on  both  sides.  The  second  line  avoided  this 
movement  by  falling  back  to  the  position  of  the  cavalry.  At 
the  same  time  the  cavalry  circled  round  and  attacked  the  Brit 
ish  right  flank;  and  the  militia,  having  been  reformed,  circled 
round  the  other  side  and  attacked  the  British  left.  The  second 
line  retreated  no  farther,  but,  after  delivering  their  fire  at  thirty 
yards,  charged  the  British." 

Tarleton  escaped,  but  he  lost  230  killed  and  wounded,  and 
600  prisoners.  Morgan's  loss  was  twelve  killed  and  sixty-one 
wounded. 


*Fiske. 


48  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(22)  Morgan  now  hastened  to  rejoin  Greene.  Cornwallis 
was  between  him  and  Greene,  but  Morgan  beat  Cornwallis  to 
the  fords  of  the  Catawba  River,  and,  after  that,  it  was  a  stern 
chase  for  Cornwallis. 

Greene  learned  of  Morgan's  victory  a  week  after  it  took 
place.  At  once  he  started  his  army  northward,  under  General 
Huger,  and  with  a  small  mounted  escort  set  out  himself  to  join 
Morgan,  in  order  to  conduct  his  column  to  a  junction  with 
Huger's.  He  found  Morgan  in  the  Catawba  Valley,  and  Corn 
wallis  pushing  him.  Cornwallis  had  no  cavalry  now  to  send 
after  Morgan, — Kings  Mountain  and  The  Cowpens  had  strip 
ped  him  of  all  his  cavalry.  But  he  kept  up  the  pursuit  as  best 
he  could,  and  had  destroyed  his  heavy  baggage  to  hasten  his 
march.  The  weather  had  been  rainy,  and  the  rivers  were  high 
and  unfordable;  but  Greene  dragged  some  boats  along  on 
wheels  to  use  in  crossing  the  swollen  streams. 

On  the  9th  February,  1781,  Greene  reached  Guilford  Court 
House  with  Morgan's  column,  and  there  rejoined  the  main 
column  under  Huger.  Here  Greene  had  expected  to  receive 
reinforcements  from  Virginia,  but  Arnold  had  kept  General 
Steuben  so  busy  in  Virginia  that  Steuben  was  unable  to  send 
reinforcements.  So  Greene  continued  his  retreat,  and  placed 
his  army  on  the  north  side  of  the  Dan  River,  in  Virginia,  which 
Cornwallis  had  no  means  of  crossing.  Cornwallis  then  turned 
back,  and  marched  to  Hillsboro,  where  he  issued  proclamations 
announcing  his  conquest  of  North  Carolina,  and  encouraging 
the  loyalists. 

Greene's  main  object  had  been  to  draw  Cornwallis  as  far 
away  from  his  base  as  possible,  and,  fearing  now  that  he  might 
return  to  it,  Greene  recrossed  the  Dan  into  North  Carolina. 
Then  Greene  played  with  Cornwallis  for  three  weeks,  leading 
him  hither  and  thither,  but  never  coming  to  battle  with  him. 
Greene  was  playing  for  time — until  his  reinforcements  could 
arrive.  At  last  they  came,  raising  his  force  to  about  4,500. 
Cornwallis  had  only  2,200.  Greene  came  to  a  stand  at  Guil 
ford  Court  House,  on  the  15th  of  March.  (25)  He  arranged 
his  lines  almost  exactly  like  Morgan's  at  The  Cowpens.  But 
Cornwallis  fought  better  and  more  carefully  than  Tarleton 
had  fought  at  The  Cowpens.  The  battle  was  stoutly  contested, 
and  the  losses  were  heavy  on  both  sides.  The  British  had  the 
advantage  of  the  fight,  but  both  sides  withdrew  from  the  field. 

(22)  Cornwallis  had  suffered  too  much  to  risk  another  en 
gagement.  He  retreated  to  Wilmington,  the  nearest  seaport. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  49 

starting  three  days  after  the  battle.  Greene  followed  him  as 
far  as  Ramsay's  Mills;  then,  supposing  that  Cornwallis  would 
embark  his  army  at  Wilmington  and  proceed  with  it  by  sea 
to  Charleston,  he  turned  south  to  strike  a  blow  in  South  Caro 
lina  and  Georgia,  before  Cornwallis  could  get  there.  He  pur 
posed  capturing  the  cantonments  by  which  the  British  had  held 
the  line  of  the  Santee  and  Congaree,  as  far  as  Ninety-Six. 

While  Greene  threatened  Camden,  Marion  attacked  and  cap 
tured  Fort  Watson,  on  the  23rd  of  April  [1781].  This  broke 
the  British  line  of  communication,  and  compelled  Lord  Rawdon 
to  come  out  of  Camden.  Greene  took  up  a  position  at  Hob- 
kirk's  Hill,  about  two  miles  north  of  Camden.  (26)  Lord 
Rawdon  attacked  him  there  on  the  25th  of  April.  The  2nd 
Maryland  regiment,  which  had  fought  splendidly  in  every  other 
battle  of  the  campaign,  behaved  badly  in  this  one,  and  lost  the 
victory  for  the  Americans.  Greene  was  driven  from  the  field. 
But  the  victory  was  of  little  value  to  Rawdon,  with  his  line  of 
supplies  cut  in  two  at  Fort  Watson.  (22)  Rawdon  retreated 
to  Monk's  Corners,  and  Greene  took  possession  of  Camden. 

Within  three  weeks  "Light  Horse  Harry"  Lee  and  Marion 
had  captured  Fort  Motte  and  Fort  Granby;  Sumter  had  taken 
Orangeburg;  and,  on  the  5th  of  June,  Augusta  surrendered  to 
Lee.  Ninety-Six  was  besieged  by  Greene,  but  held  out,  until 
Rawdon  got  reinforcements  from  Charleston,  and  marched  to 
its  relief.  But  it  was  impossible  for  Rawdon  to  hold  the  post, — 
he  could  not  keep  open  his  line  of  communication  with  Charles 
ton.  So  he  evacuated  the  place  on  the  29th  of  June, 
and  retreated  to  Orangeburg.  Greene  followed  him;  but  the 
weather  had  become  so  hot  that  neither  army  could  keep  up 
the  campaign.  Greene  withdrew  his  army  to  the  High  Hills 
of  Santee  to  rest,  and  then  the  two  armies  lay  watching  each 
other  until  after  the  middle  of  August.  Within  this  interval 
Rawdon  went  back  to  England  sick,  leaving  Colonel  Stuart  in 
command  of  the  British  forces  in  South  Carolina. 

On  the  22nd  of  August  Greene,  who  had  spent  the  time  re 
cruiting  his  army,  and  putting  it  in  as  effective  shape  as  prac 
ticable,  broke  camp,  and  advanced  secretly  towards  Orange 
burg.  Stuart  did  not  discover  his  advance,  until  he  was  close 
upon  Orangeburg.  Thereupon  Stuart  fell  back  and  took  up 
a  strong  position  at  Eutaw  Springs.  (27)  Greene  attacked 
him  on  the  8th  of  September  [1781].  The  British  were  driven 
back  from  their  first  position ;  but  they  took  up  a  second  line, 
supported  by  a  brick  house  and  a  palisaded  garden,  from  which 


50  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

they  could  not  be  driven  by  the  Americans.  (22)  The  next 
evening  the  British,  however,  abandoned  the  position,  and  re 
treated  hurriedly  to  Charleston,  with  Lee  and  Marion  pursuing 
them.  This  was  the  last  battle  in  the  Carolinas,  although  a  sort 
of  partisan  warfare  kept  up  for  another  year.  Under  the  pro 
tection  of  their  ships,  the  British  held  Charleston  till  the  end 
of  the  war. 

In  his  retreat,  after  the  battle  of  Guilford  Court  House,  Lord 
Cornwallis  reached  Wilmington  on  the  7th  of  April  [1781]. 
He  remained  there  a  little  over  two  weeks,  and  then,  instead  of 
transferring  his  army  by  sea  to  South  Carolina,  as  Greene  ex 
pected  and  as  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  British,  supposed  he  would,  he  marched  it  northward  into 
Virginia.  (28)  He  reached  Petersburg  on  the  20th  of  May, 
and  joined  his  forces  with  those  of  Arnold.  Arnold  himself 
returned  to  New  York. 

At  this  time  Lafayette  was  in  command  of  the  American 
troops  in  Virginia.  He  was  at  Richmond  with  about  3,000 
men.  Cornwallis  now  had  about  5,000  veterans  to  fight  this 
little  force.  He  moved  toward  Richmond,  and  Lafayette  fell 
back  toward  Fredericksburg.  Cornwallis  followed  him. 

On  the  4th  of  June  Lafayette  crossed  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's 
Ford,  and  Cornwallis  stopped  the  pursuit.  Cornwallis  prob 
ably  profited  by  the  lessons  Greene  had  taught  him  in  the  Caro 
linas,  and  did  not  purpose  letting  himself  be  drawn  too  far 
away  from  his  base  again.  But  he  sent  Tarleton  on  a  raid  to 
Charlottesville,  to  break  up  the  Virginia  legislature  in  session 
there,  and  to  capture,  if  possible,  Thomas  Jefferson,  whose 
home,  Monticello,  was  near  by.  Having  failed  to  capture  Jef 
ferson,  Tarleton  started  to  Albemarle,  in  order  to  destroy 
some  American  stores  collected  there. 

In  the  meantime  Lafayette  had  been  joined  by  1,000  Penn 
sylvania  regulars,  under  General  Wayne,  and  other  reinforce 
ments  ;  so  that  his  little  army  now  numbered  about  4,000.  With 
this  force,  Lafayette  placed  himself  between  Tarleton  and 
Albemarle;  and  Tarleton  started  back  eastward  to  rejoin  Corn 
wallis. 

Lafayette  now  felt  strong  enough  to  take  the  offensive, — at 
least  to  harass  Cornwallis;  so  he  moved  toward  him.  Corn 
wallis  turned  southwest  from  the  North  Anna  River,  and  was 
rejoined  by  Tarleton  at  the  Point  of  Forks.  Cornwallis  con 
tinued  his  retreat  through  Richmond  and  down  the  Yorktown 
Peninsula  to  Williamsburg.  Here  an  action  occurred  between 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  51 

parts  of  the  hostile  forces,  and  the  Americans  were  repulsed. 

The  operations  ended  in  the  first  week  of  August.  Corn- 
wallis  put  his  army  into  Yorktown,  so  as  to  be  close  to  sea  com 
munication  ;  Lafayette  occupied  Malvern  Hill,  near  the  James, 
to  watch  him.  Meantime  Lafayette's  army  had  been  reinforced 
by  Steuben  with  1,000  men;  so  that  Lafayette  now  had  about 
5,000  men.  Cornwallis  had  about  7,000  at  Yorktown. 

(29)  All  these  months,  since  the  summer  of  1778,  Wash 
ington  had  held  his  army  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York  City, 
keeping  guard  over  Clinton,  who  clung  to  the  city  as  a  base. 
Washington  had  with  him  Count  Rochambeau  and  four  or  five 
thousand  French  troops.  In  the  West  Indies  Count  de  Grasse 
had  a  strong  French  fleet  operating  against  the  English  in  those 
islands.  Washington  had  hoped,  and  planned,  to  wrest  New 
York  from  Clinton,  with  the  aid  of  Rochambeau's  troops  and 
the  French  fleet.  But  the  successes  of  Greene  and  Lafayette  in 
the  Carolinas  and  Virginia  drew  his  attention  to  that  quarter. 

Washington's  actions  were  all  to  depend  upon  the  French 
fleet.  De  Grasse  had  orders  from  France  to  cooperate  with 
Washington,  but  had  the  choice  of  sailing  either  for  the  Hud 
son,  or  the  Chesapeake.  "On  the  14th  of  August"  of  this  year 
[1781],  "a  message  came  from  Grasse  that  he  was  just  starting 
from  the  West  Indies  for  Chesapeake  Bay,  with  his  whole  fleet, 
and  hoped  that  whatever  the  armies  had  to  do,  might  be  done 
quickly,  as  he  should  be  obliged  to  return  to  the  West  Indies 
by  the  middle  of  October."  Washington  had  just  received 
word  from  Lafayette,  "that  Cornwallis  had  established  himself 
at  Yorktown,  where  he  had  deep  water  on  three  sides  of  him, 
and  a  narrow  neck  in  front."* 

Washington  determined  at  once  to  transfer  his  army  to  Vir 
ginia.  The  distance  was  more  than  400  miles.  He  maneuvered 
so  as  to  make  Clinton  think  he  was  going  to  attack  the  British 
in  New  York.  As  Clinton  had  got  wind  of  the  French  fleet's 
movement  toward  the  north,  he  was,  of  course,  looking  for  it  to 
appear  in  New  York  Harbor  and  cooperate  with  Washington 
against  him.  Clinton  was  completely  fooled. 

"On  the  19th  of  August  [1781],  five  days  after  receiving  the 
dispatch  from  Grasse,  Washington's  army  crossed  the  Hudson 
at  King's  Ferry,  and  began  its  march.  Lord  Stirling"  [Gen 
eral  William  Alexander]  "was  left  with  a  small  force  at  Sara 
toga,  and  General  Heath,  with  4,000  men,  remained  at  West 

*Fiske. 


52  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Point.  Washington  took  with  him  southward  2,000  Conti 
nentals  and  4,000  Frenchmen None  save  Washing 
ton  and  Rocha,mbeau  knew  whither  they  were  going.  So 
precious  was  the  secret/'  continues  Fiske,  "that  even  the  gen 
eral  officers  supposed,  until  New  Brunswick  was  passed,  that 
their  destination  was  Staten  Island.  So  rapid  was  the  move 
ment  that  however  much  the  men  might  have  begun  to  won 
der,  they  had  reached  Philadelphia  before  the  purpose  of  the 
expedition  was  distinctly  understood."* 

At  Chester,  Washington  received  word  that  de  Grasse  had 
arrived  in  Chesapeake  Bay.  By  the  5th  of  September,  the  army 
had  reached  the  head  of  Chesapeake  Bay.  Here  it  embarked 
and  had  arrived  near  Yorktown  by  the  18th. 

The  British  West  Indies  fleet  had  followed  the  French  fleet 
northward ;  but  had  lost  sight  of  it,  outsailed  it,  passed  it  with 
out  seeing  it;  then  it  scouted  Chesapeake  Bay,  before  the 
French  fleet  had  got  there,  and  finally  sailed  away  for  New 
York,  expecting  surely  to  find  de  Grasse  there.  This  fleet 
brought  Clinton,  and  Admiral  Graves  who  commanded  the 
British  fleet  at  New  York,  the  first  news  of  what  had  really 
happened.  So  Graves  started  with  his  fleet,  at  once,  for  the 
Chesapeake.  He  arrived  there  on  the  5th  of  September,  the 
very  day  on  which  Washington's  army  was  embarking  at  the 
head  of  the  Bay.* 

(30)  "Graves  found  the  French  fleet  blocking  the  entrance 
to  the  bay,  and  instantly  attacked  it."     After  a  fight  of  two 
hours,  in  which  about  700  men  were  killed  and  wounded  in 
the  two  fleets,  the  British  ships  withdrew.*     Three  thousand 
French  troops  had  landed  from  de  Grasse's  fleet  and  joined 
Lafayette.     With  his  army  thus  increased  to  about  8,000,  La 
fayette  felt  strong  enough  to  close  in  upon  Cornwallis  at  York- 
town.    (28)    Accordingly  he  moved  down  to  the  narrow  neck 
at  Williamsburg,  and,  on  the  merning  of  the  8th  of  September, 
had  Cornwallis  sealed  up  in  Yorktown, — the  very  morning  that 
Greene,  down  in  South  Carolina,  was  fighting  his  last  battle, 
at  Eutaw   Springs.     On  the   14th  of   September   Washington 
reached  Lafayette's  headquarters,  and  assumed  command;  by 
the  26th  the  entire  force  of  Continentals  and  French,  16,000 
strong,  was  assembled  at  Williamsburg. 

(31)  Washington   now   laid    siege   in  the   regular   way   to 
Yorktown.     On  the  night  of  the  15th  of  October  the  garrison 

*Fiske. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  53 

made  an  unsuccessful  sortie;  on  the  17th, — the  fourth  anni 
versary  of  Burgoyne's  surrender, — Cornwallis  had  a  white  flag 
raised.  On  the  19th  he  surrendered;  and  7,247  Englishmen 
marched  out  to  an  old  tune,  "The  World  Turned  Upside 
Down,"  and  laid  down  their  arms.*  This  practically  ended  the 
Revolutionary  War,  though  the  treaty  of  peace  was  not  signed 
until  1783. 

On  the  very  day  that  Cornwallis  surrendered,  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  having  received  naval  reinforcement,  sailed  from  New 
York,  with  thirty-five  ships  and  7,000  troops.  Five  days 
brought  him  to  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake,  where  he  learned 
that  he  was  too  late,  as  he  had  been  four  years  before,  when  he 
went  to  relieve  Burgoyne.* 

COMMENTS. 

General  Greene's  operations  in  the  Carolinas  were  more  bril 
liant,  from  a  strategic  point  of  view,  than  any  other  operations 
of  Americans  or  British  in  this  war.  True,  Washington's  sud 
den  and  secret  transfer  of  his  army  from  New  York  to  York- 
town  resembled  very  much,  on  a  small  scale,  Napoleon's  march 
from  the  English  Channel  to  Bavaria  in  the  Ulm  campaign  of 
1805.  Neither  movement  could  be  repeated  in  America  or 
Europe  to-day,  with  the  electric  telegraph  and  enterprising 
newspaper  reporters  to  contend  with;  though  they  might  be 
achieved  under  a  Japanese  or  Russian  censorship.  Both  de 
pended  upon  secrecy  and  swiftness  for  their  success;  which, 
after  preparedness — the  preparedness  that  can  only  be  at 
tained  in  time  of  peace — are  the  highest  essentials  of  strategy. 

If  Greene  had  failed  when  he  divided  his  little  army  in  front 
of  Cornwallis,  in  the  winter  of  1780-'81,  he  would  have  been 
condemned  by  the  critics  for  dividing  his  command  in  the  pres 
ence  of  the  enemy,  and  allowing  the  two  parts  of  it  to  be  de 
feated  in  detail.  But  General  Greene  was  right,  as  results 
proved.  Thgre  are  two  cases  in  which  it  is  safe  to  divide  one's 
force;  first,  when  either  part  of  the  divided  force  is  strong 
enough  to  defeat  the  enemy  by  itself ;  and  second,  when  each 
part  of  the  divided  force  is  so  small  that  it  has  no  intention  of 
fighting, — the  smaller  the  detachment  the  faster  it  can  get  out 
of  the  way  of  the  enemy.  This  was  General  Greene's  case. 
If  Cornwallis  had  kept  his  army  together,  it  would  never  have 

*Fiske. 


54  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

caught  either  Greene's  or  Morgan's  detachment.  Yet  by  divid 
ing  his  force,  Cornwallis  made  conditions  more  nearly  equal 
for  the  American  commanders,  and  gave  Morgan  his  chance 
at  The  Cowpens. 

Cornwallis  either  did  not  understand  and  appreciate  the  pol 
icy  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  or,  in  his  eagerness  to  win  victories 
and  laurels  for  himself,  he  wilfully  failed  to  carry  out  the 
wishes  of  his  chief.  A  long  and  bitter  controversy  was  after 
ward  carried  on  between  these  two  noblemen. 

With  "France  and  Holland  and  Spain  fighting  her  in  Eu 
rope  and  the  West  Indies,  and  Hyder-Ali  in  India,  and  all  the 
rest  of  Europe  unfriendly  and  threatening,  England  could  not 
furnish  Clinton  troops  enough  to  enable  him  to  conduct  the  war 
as  he  would  have  liked  to  conduct  it.  So  Clinton  knew  he 
could  not  destroy  the  organized  forces  of  the  Americans,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  so  garrison  the  conquered  territory  as  to  keep 
down  the  rebellion.  Hence  his  reason  for  adopting  a  "wear 
ing-out"  policy, — the  policy  by  which  he  purposed  holding  New 
York  as  a  principal  base,  and  establishing  one  or  two  smaller 
bases,  like  Charleston,  from  which  raids  could  go  out,  to  make 
it  uncomfortable  for  the  people  that  were  carrying  on,  or  en 
couraging,  the  rebellion.  He  did  not  intend  that  the  raiding 
expeditions  should  go  dangerously  far  from  their  landing 
places,  or  from  the  posts  held  in  the  interior,  like  Camden  and 
Ninety-Six.  As  for  example,  the  raiding  forces  sent  to  Con 
necticut  seldom  spent  the  night  on  shore;  but  they  wrought  a 
lot  of  destruction. 

Cornwallis  never  should  have  followed  Greene  up  into  north 
ern  North  Carolina;  but  Greene  showed  his  strategic  skill,  in 
drawing  his  adversary  farther  and  farther  away  from  his  base. 
General  Greene  put  the  "power  of  attraction"  of  his  little 
army  to  its  fullest  use.  Cornwallis  defeated  Greene  in  every 
fight,  but  gained  nothing  by  his  victories.  It  would  have  been 
better  for  the  British  cause,  if  Cornwallis  had  been  defeated, 
and  driven  back  to  Charleston  at  the  start ;  it  would  have  saved 
him  the  mortification,  and  England  the  misfortune,  of  York- 
town. 

A  remarkable  thing  about  Greene's  operations  is,  that,  al 
though  he  was  defeated  tactically  in  every  battle,  his  campaign 
was  a  strategic  success  from  start  to  finish;  and  it  resulted  in 
expelling  the  British  from  every  post  in  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia,  except  Charleston.  It  was.  also,  a  direct  factor  in 
the  capture  of  Yorktown. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR.  55 

Cornwallis  had  no  business  to  go  to  Virginia.  When  he  re 
treated  to  Wilmington,  he  should  have  gone  on  back  to  his 
base,  Charleston,  by  sea,  and  made  a  new  start.  His  move 
ment  to  Virginia  disappointed  and  offended  Sir  Henry 
Clinton.  No  plausible  reason  can  be  assigned  for  it,  except 
that  Cornwallis  thought  a  return  to  Charleston  would  be  an 
acknowledgment  of  defeat.  General  Greene  did  right  to  de 
sist  from  pursuing  him,  and  to  return  to  South  Carolina, 
whether  Cornwallis  went  to  Charleston,  as  Greene  expected 
him  to  do,  or  marched  to  Virginia,  which  was  the  last  thing 
Greene  thought  he  would  do. 

After  all  is  said,  it  was  the  presence  of  de  Grasse's  fleet  in 
the  Chesapeake  that  compassed  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis's 
army.  And  if  the  British  fleet  had  succeeded  in  gaining  a  de 
cisive  victory  over  the  French  fleet,  when  it  attacked  it  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Bay,  Washington's  march  to  Virginia  would 
have  been  in  vain, — more  than  likely  his  army  would  have  been 
sunk  or  captured  by  the  British  fleet  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  where 
it  would  have  been  caught  in  its  transports  without  naval  es 
cort  ;  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis  would  not  have  taken  place ; 
Clinton's  "wearing-out"  policy  would  have  gone  on;  the  war 
might  have  lasted  several  years  longer;  and — who  knows  but 
we  might  still  be  British  subjects  to-day? 

That  was  the  darkest  period  of  England's  history;  at  war 
with  America,  France,  Holland,  Spain,  and  her  subjects  in  In 
dia;  without  a  friend  in  all  Europe;  and,  worst  of  all,  with 
a  lot  of  men  at  home  that  were  worse  enemies  than  those  in 
foreign  lands.  Fiske  says,  and  seems  to  say  it  with  pride  rather 
than  contempt,  "There  were  many  people  in  England,  however, 
who  looked  upon  the  matter  differently  from  Lord  North.  This 
crushing  defeat  was  just  what  the  Duke  of  Richmond,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  had  publicly  declared  he  hoped  for. 
Charles  Fox  always  took  especial  delight  in  reading  about  de 
feats  of  invading  armies,  from  Marathon  and  Salamis  down 
ward;  and  over  the  news  of  Cornwallis's  surrender,  he  leaped 
from  his  chair  and  clapped  his  hands.  In  a  debate  in  Parlia 
ment  four  months  before,  the  youthful  William  Pitt  had  de 
nounced  the  American  War  as  most  accursed,  wicked,  bar 
barous,  cruel,  unnatural,  unjust,  and  diabolical."  Precisely  this 
kind  of  language  has  been  used  by  men  in  America  concern 
ing  our  war  in  the  Philippines;  and  all  such  men,  whether 
Englishmen  or  Americans,  deserve  a  place  in  the  same  pillory 
of  universal  scorn  as  that  occupied  by  Benedict  Arnold. 


LECTURE  IV. 
THE  WAR  OF  1812. 

(32)  On  the  18th  of  June,  1812,  Congress  declared  war 
against  Great  Britain. 

The  grounds  upon  which  the  declaration  was  made  were 
just  and  sufficient,  but  not  more  so  than  they  had  been  for  sev 
eral  years.  Nor  can  it  well  be  seen  by  a  careful  review  of  the 
case  that  there  was  much  less  cause  for  war  with  France  than 
there  w^s  for  war  with  England.  These  two  states  had  been 
engaged  in  hostilities  for  several  years.  The  British  Ministry 
by  their  "Orders  in  Council"  declared  the  coasts  of  France  and 
her  allies  and  colonies  in  a  state  of  blockade.  Napoleon  replied 
with  his  famous  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  declaring  a  blockade 
of  British  ports.  Neither  belligerent,  of  course,  was  able  to 
maintain  an  actual  blockade  of  such  extensive  coast  lines;  but 
each  seized  all  vessels  caught  violating  its  "paper  blockade." 
The  result  of  it  all  was  that  within  three  or  four  years  Ameri 
can  commerce  was  practically  driven  from  the  seas. 

A  former  Administration,  Mr.  Jefferson's,  undertook  to  re 
taliate  by  issuing  an  embargo,  prohibiting  American  vessels 
from  going  to  sea.  This  was  based  on  the  supposition  that 
Europe  could  not  subsist  without  American  products.  It  im 
posed  a  great  hardship  on  our  commerce,  of  course,  had 
no  effect  on  the  belligerents,  and  was  revoked  after  fourteen 
months.  The  same  thing  was  again  resorted  to  in  the  present 
Administration,  Madison's,  with  the  same  result.  Another 
grievance  against  Great  Britain  was  based  on  her  monstrous 
assumption  of  the  right  to  search  American  ships  for  British 
subjects.  In  fact,  this  complaint  was  given  first  place  in  the 
President's  message  to  Congress,  recommending  a  declaration 
of  war. 

But  all  these  outrages  had  gone  on  for  five  or  six  years,  and 
would  probably  have  been  tolerated  till  the  end,  if  President 
Madison  could  have  had  his  way, — for  he  was  as  pacific  and 
long-suffering  as  his  mentor,  Mr.  Jefferson.  But  a  squad  of 
younger  men,  led  by  Henry  Clay  and  John  C.  Calhoun,  had 
got  control  in  Congress.  They  compelled  the  decision  for  war. 

56 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  57 

PLANS. 

In  the  technical  sense  of  the  Word,  it  cannot  be  said  that 
either  the  British  or  the  Americans  had  any  plan  of  campaign. 
Sir  George  Prevost,  the  governor-general  of  Canada,  had  about 
4,500  regular  troops  at  his  disposal,  and  the  British  army  was 
too  busy  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  to  spare  any  more  men 
for  service  in  America.  So  all  Prevost  could  hope  to  do  was 
to  defend  Canada.  He  counted,  also,  upon  assistance  from  the 
powerful  Indian  tribes  along  the  outer  edge  of  our  ^western 
settlements.  The  famous  chief  Tecumthe  [or  Tecumseh]  was 
keeping  track  with  the  quarrel  going  on  between  the  British 
and  Americans,  and  was  ready  to  take  advantage  of  it.  He 
had  gone  from  Michigan  to  Alabama,  urging  the  tribes  to  unite 
against  the  Americans. 

The  standing  army  of  the  United  States  at  this  time  "was 
only  6,744  strong,  notwithstanding  that  Congress  had  six 
months  before  passed  a  bill  increasing  it  to  35,000."*  Still  our 
statesmen  had  no  thought  of  .anything  but  an  offensive  cam 
paign.  Canada  was  to  be  invaded  and  conquered  at  once. 
Mr.  Jefferson,  who  was  a  man  of  peace  and  detested  a  stand 
ing  army,  wrote  from  Monticello,  his  Virginia  home:  "The 
acquisition  of  Canada  this  year,  as  far  as  the  neighborhood  of 
Quebec,  will  be  a  mere  matter  of  marching,  and  will  give  us 
experience  for  the  attack  of  Halifax  the  next,  and  the  final  ex 
pulsion  of  England  from  the  American  Continent/'f — a  proph 
ecy  that  showed  no  less  ignorance  of  the  science  of  war  than 
of  the  horoscope.  We  never  acquired  any  part  of  Canada ;  and 
England  has  not  yet  been  expelled,  from  the  American  Con 
tinent.  This,  however,  was  the  general  opinion  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  plan  of  campaign  adopted  by  the  War  Depart 
ment  proposed,  "that  a  main  army  should  advance  by  way  of 
Lake  Champlain  upon  Montreal,  while  three  columns,  com 
posed  chiefly  of  militia,  should  enter  Canada  from  Detroit, 
Niagara  and  Sacketts  Harbor."  The  details  of  the  plan  were 
not  settled;  nor  was  the  time  fixed  for  the  combined  move 
ment.  J  After  overrunning  Upper  Canada,  the  President  ex 
pected  these  columns  to  unite  on  the  St.  Lawrence  and  advance 
to  the  capture  of  Montreal. § 


*Upton's  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States. 
•^History  of  the  United  States,  by  Henry  Adams. 
JAdams. 

§/4  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  by  John  Bach  Mc- 
Master. 


58  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

At  that  time  the  American  frontier  was  guarded  by  garri 
sons  at  the  following  widely  separated  points:  Plattsburg, 
Sacketts  Harbor,  Fort  Niagara,  Detroit,  Fort  Dearborn  [Chi 
cago],  and  Fort  Mackinac  at  the  junction  of  Lakes  Huron 
and  Michigan. 

On  the  Canadian  side  of  the  line  were  the  garrisons  of  Mont 
real  in  Lower  Canada;  Kingston  opposite  Sacketts  Harbor; 
Forts  Erie  and  George  opposite  Buffalo  and  Fort  Niagara ;  and 
Fort  Maiden  at  the  mouth  of  the  Detroit  River.  The  British 
had  possession  of  the  lakes, — that  is  to  say,  they  had  small  fleets 
on  them, — which  enabled  them  to  concentrate  troops  promptly 
at  different  points ;  while  the  Americans  must  march  overland, 
and,  in  some  cases,  cut  their  roads  through  the  forests,  and 
build  them  through  the  swamps. 

OPERATIONS. 

(33)  Governor  Hull  of  Michigan  Territory,  who  had  been 
an  officer  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  was  to  command  the  col 
umn  that  was  to  advance  by  way  of  Detroit.     In  April  and 
May,  1812,  he  had  assembled  at  Dayton,*  Ohio,  a  force  consist 
ing  of  the  4th  U.  S.  Infantry  (300  effectives),  three  regiments 
of  Ohio  militia  infantry,  and  one  troop  of  Ohio  dragoons, — 
about  1,600  men  in  all.     Two  regiments  of  Michigan  militia 
were  to  join  at  Detroit. 

Detroit  was  200  miles  to  the  north,  and  Hull's  troops  had  to 
"cut  a  road  through  the  ^forest,  build  bridges  and  construct 
causeways  .  .  .  but  they  made  good  pr ogress,  "f  The 
march  was  begun  on  the  1st  of  June  [1812],  and  Detroit  was 
reached  on  the  5th  of  July.  On  the  way  Hull  received  word  of 
the  declaration  of  war,  which  Congress  had  made  on  the  18th 
of  June;  but  the  British  commander  at  Maiden  had  also  re 
ceived  the  news.  On  reaching  the  Miami  or  Maumee  River, 
General  Hull  forwarded  his  personal  baggage,  hospital  stores, 
and  a  trunk  containing  his  orders  and  muster-rolls,  to  Detroit 
by  a  schooner, — all  of  which  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  British, 
who  seized  the  schooner  as  it  was  passing  Maiden. 

(34)  On  July  12  General  Hull  crossed  the  Detroit  River. 


*In  Southwestern  Ohio. 
fAdams. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  59 

The  British  militia  guarding  the  river  retired  behind  the  Can 
ard  River,  twelve  miles  below,  without  firing  a  shot.  Hull 
occupied  Sandwich,  was  well  received  by  the  inhabitants,  and 
issued  a  proclamation  calling  upon  the  people  to  give  their  alle 
giance  to  the  United  States.  This  proclamation  had  some  ef 
fect  for  a  time.  The  people  seemed  inclined  toward  the  United 
States.  Several  hundred  sought  the  protection  of  Hull's 
troops,  and  the  Canadian  militia  deserted  by  scores.  So  Gen 
eral  Hull  conceived  the  notion  that  he  was  going  to  have  a 
bloodless  conquest  of  Canada.  Besides  his  militia,  however, 
the  British  commander  at  Fort  Maiden  had  280  regulars  and 
about  230  Indians,  with  whom  to  contest  the  conquest.  The 
left  flank  of  his  position  was  covered  and  supported  by  a  fleet. 
Hull  called  a  council  of  war,  which  decided  against  storming 
Maiden,  and  advised  delay.  A  few  days  later  Hull  wrote  Mr. 
Eustis,  the  Secretary  of  War :  "It  is  in  the  power  of  this  army 
to  take  Maiden  by  storm,  but  it  would  be  attended,  in  my  opin 
ion,  with  too  great  a  sacrifice  under  the  present  circumstances/' 
In  the  same  letter  he  said,  "If  Maiden  was  in  our  possession, 
I  could  march  this  army  to  Niagara  or  York  [Toronto]  in  a 
very  short  time."* 

But  every  day's  delay  lessened  Hull's  chances  of  success. 
The  Ohio  militiamen  were  clamoring  for  a  fight.  Nothing  is 
so  trying  to  raw  troops  as  lying  idle  in  camp.  "Detachments 
scoured  the  country,  meeting  at  first  little  resistance,  one  de 
tachment  even  crossing  the  Canard  River.  But  on  the  19th  and 
24th  of  July,  strong  detachments  were  driven  back  with  loss, 
and  the  outlook  became  suddenly  threatening."* 

Thenceforward  every  day  brought  Hull  fatal  news.  His 
army  lost  respect  for  him  in  consequence  of  his  failure  to  at 
tack  Maiden ;  the  British  strengthened  the  defenses  of  Maiden, 
and,  on  August  8,  received  sixty  fresh  men  of  the  41st  Regi 
ment,  under  Colonel  Proctor  from  Niagara."*  (32)  But 
worse  than  all  this,  on  the  3rd  of  August  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Mackinac  arrived  at  Detroit  as  prisoners  of  war  on  parole, 
announcing  that  Mackinac  had  capitulated  to  a  force  of  Brit 
ish  and  savages,  and  that  a  horde  of  Indians  from  the  North 
west  were  on  their  way  to  fall  upon  Detroit.*  A  day  or  two 
later  a  party  of  Indians  under  Tecumthe  crossed  the  river,  and 
routed  a  detachment  of  the  Ohio  regiment  on  its  way  to  pro- 


*Adams. 


60  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

tect  a  train  of  supplies  coming  up  from  Ohio.  Hull  decided  at 
once  to  recross  the  river,  which  he  succeeded  in  doing  on  the 
night  of  August  the  8th  without  interference  from  the  enemy. 

(34)  At  this  time  Detroit  contained  about  800  inhabitants, 
within  gunshot  of  the  British  shore.  The  fort  was  a  square  in- 
closure  of  about  two  acres,  surrounded  by  an  embankment,  a 
dry.  ditch,  and  a  double  row  of  palisades.  It  did  not  command 
the  river,  but  was  capable  of  withstanding  a  siege  as  long  as  its 
supplies  would  hold  out.*  (33)  It  was  200  miles  from  any 
American  station  from  which  reinforcements  or  supplies  could 
come;  and  its  only  road  of  communication  lay  for  sixty  miles 
along  the  shore  of  Lake  Erie,  where  a  British  fleet  on  one  side, 
and  bands  of  savages  on  the  other,  could  always  make  it  impass 
able.  The  road  was  also  within  easy  striking  distance  of  the 
British  garrison  at  Maiden. 

Hull  appreciated  the  danger  of  his  position  at  Fort  Detroit, 
and  wanted  to  retreat  behind  the  Maumee  without  delay.  But 
Colonel  Cass  informed  him,  "that,  if  this  were  done,  every  man 
of  the  Ohio  militia  would  refuse  to  obey,  and  would  desert 
their  general.  .  .  .  Hull  considered  that  this  report  obliged 
him  to  remain"  at  Detroit.f 

He  ordered  out  a  body  of  600  men,  including  the  4th  U.  S. 
Infantry,  to  restore  his  communication  with  Ohio  and  to  fetch 
some  supplies  stopped  at  the  Raisin  River.  Fourteen  miles 
south  of  Detroit,  the  detachment  encountered  a  force  of  about 
200  British  and  twenty-five  Indians,  and  routed  it.  But  the 
detachment  did  not  push  on  to  the  Raisin  River  after  the  sup 
plies  ;  the  next  day  it  marched  back  to  Detroit. 

"The  next  four  days  were  thrown  away  by  the  Americans. 
August  13  the  British  began  to  establish  a  battery  on  the  Cana 
dian  side  of  the  river  to  bombard  Detroit.  Within  the  Ameri 
can  lines  the  army  was  in  secret  mutiny.  Hull's  vacillations 
and  evident  alarm  disorganized  his  force.  The  Ohio  colonels 
were  ready  to  remove  him  from  his  command,  which  they  of 
fered  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Miller  of  the  4th  U.  S.  Infantry; 
but  Colonel  Miller  declined  this  manner  of  promotion,  and  Hull 
retained  control. "f 

On  the  14th  of  August  Hull  sent  two  Ohio  colonels,  Mc- 
Arthur  and  Cass,  with  their  best  men,  about  350,  to  make  an 
other  effort,  by  a  long  and  circuitous  route,  to  bring  up  the  sup- 


*Lecture  by  Lieutenant  Chapman. 
fAdams. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  61 

pli^s,  which  were  still  at  the  Raisin  River,  thirty-five  miles 
south.  (34)  The  next  day  [August  15,  1812],  the  British 
General  Brock,  who  had  arrived  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  with 
reinforcements,  at  Maiden,  and  had  taken  command  of  the  gar 
rison,  sent  a  summons  to  Hull  to  surrender.  After  some  delay 
Hull  declined,  and  then  sent  orders  recalling  McArthur's 
detachment. 

As  soon  as  Hull's  reply  reached  the  British  lines,  two  British 
armed  vessels  moved  up  the  river  near  Sandwich,  while  a  bat 
tery  opened  fire  on  the  town  and  fort  from  the  Canadian  shore. 
"The  fire  was  returned,  but  no  energetic  measures  were  taken 
to  prepare  either  for  an  assault  or  a  siege."*  During  the  night 
Tecumthe  and  600  Indians  crossed  the  river,  some  two  miles 
below,  and  filled  the  woods,  cutting  the  communication  between 
McArthur's  detachment  and  the  fort. 

A  little  before  daylight  of  August  16,  Brock  himself,  with 
330  regulars  and  400  militia,  carrying  with  them  five  little  can 
non,  crossed  the  river  to  storm  the  fort.  General  Hull  had 
about  1,000  soldiers  within  the  fort,  and  McArthur's  detach 
ment  was  only  a  few  miles  away.  General  Brock  and  his  little 
detachment  ought  to  have  been  killed  or  captured  to  a  man. 
But  they  were  not.  As  Brock  came  up  the  slope  to  reconnoiter 
the  fort,  he  saw  a  white  flag  displayed.  Within  an  hour  Hull 
had  surrendered,  not  only  the  fort  and  its  garrison,  but  Mc 
Arthur's  detachment  and  the  small  force  guarding  the  supplies 
at  the  River  Raisin.  Hull  was  afterward  tried  by  court- 
martial  for  treason  and  cowardice,  convicted  of  cowardice, 
sentenced  to  be  shot,  but  pardoned  by  President  Madison. 

General  Brock  sent  the  American  regulars  that  he  captured, 
about  300  officers  and  men  of  the  4th  Infantry,  down  Lake 
Erie  to  British  prisons;  but  he  showed  his  contempt  for  our 
militia,  2,000  prisoners,  by  giving  them  leave  to  return  to  their 
homes. 

(33)  The  day  before  this,  August  15,  an  overwhelming 
body  of  Indians  massacred  the  little  American  garrison  of  Fort 
Dearborn;  "and  with  it  the  last  vestige  of  American  authority 
on  the  western  lakes  disappeared.  Thenceforward  the  line  of 
the  Wabash  and  the  Maumee  became  the  military  boundary  of 
the  United  States  in  the  Northwest,  and  the  country  felt  pain 
ful  doubt  whether  even  that  line  could  be  defended."* 

•  .  -         '       \ 

*Adams. 


62  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EAST. 

(32)  In  the  meantime  what  were  the  other  columns  of  in 
vasion  proposed  in  the  War  Department's  plan  of  campaign 
doing  ? 

General  Henry  Dearborn,  who  had  been  called  from  the 
position  of  collector  of  the  port  at  Boston  to  the  highest  com 
missioned  office  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States, 
was  to  have  charge  of  the  operations  in  the  east.  But  so  slow 
did  the  recruitment  and  mobilization  proceed,  through  the  in 
capacity  and  neglect  of  Congress  and  the  War  Department  and 
General  Dearborn,  and  the  opposition  of  the  governors  of  some 
of  the  New  England  States,  that  October  had  arrived  before  a 
single  offensive  movement  had  been  made  by  Americans  in 
that  quarter.  In  fact,  Dearborn  had,  in  August,  without  any 
authority  from  Washington,  concluded  an  armistice  with  Pre- 
vost,  the  governor-general  of  Canada,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
his  orders  "were  plain,  distinct  and  positive.  He  was  to  sup 
port  Hull  by  a  vigorous  offensive  movement  on  Canada  at 
Niagara.  He  knew  that  Hull  was  in  Canada.  He  knew  that 
every  available  British  soldier  in  Canada  was  hurrying  toward 
Hull.  He  knew  that  time  was  precious."  Yet  he  gladly 
agreed  to  a  suspension  of  arms  in  his  front.* 

This  long  delay  had  enabled  the  British  General  Brock  to 
transfer  troops  from  the  Niagara  frontier  to  Detroit,  and  to 
achieve  the  overthrow  of  General  Hull;  then  to  bring  them 
back  to  Niagara  in  time  to  meet  any  offensive  movement  there. 
With  less  than  2,000  men,  this  active  commander  now  guarded 
nearly  forty  miles  of  front  along  the  Niagara  River. 

(35)  On  the  opposite  side,  with  his  headquarters  at  Lewis- 
ton,  Major-General  Stephen  Van  Rensselaer  of  the  New  York 
militia,  commanded  the  American  forces,  about  5,000  strong, 
including  the  13th  U.  S.  Infantry.  Queenstown  was  held  by 
two  companies  of  British  regulars  and  a  few  militia,  about 
300  in  all. 

.  On  the  night  of  October  10  General  Van  Rensselaer  tried  to 
cross  the  river  to  attack  Queenstown,  but  "was  prevented  by 
some  blunder  with  regard  to  the  boats."f  On  the  night  of  the 
13th  the  effort  was  repeated,  and  a  force  of  regulars  and  vol 
unteers  was  landed  on  the  Canadian  shore.  The  Americans 

*McMaster. 
fAdams. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  63 

got  possession  of  Queenstown  Heights;  but  British  reinforce 
ments  arrived  from  Fort  George  and  Chippewa,  and  the 
Americans  were  finally  driven  off  the  Heights,  and  forced  to 
surrender ;  while  a  large  force  of  militia  stood  upon  the  oppo 
site  bank,  overcome  with  fear,  and  refused  to  cross  to  the  aid 
of  their  countrymen.*  Among  the  British  killed  was  General 
Brock,  and  among  the  American  prisoners  was  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Winfield  Scott  of  the  2nd  U.  S.  Artillery.  Ninety 
Americans  were  killed,  and  "not  less  than  900  surrendered,  in 
cluding  skulkers  and  militiamen  who  never  reached  the 
Heights."f 

General  Van  Rensselaer,  disgusted  at  the  behavior  of  his  mi 
litia,  sent  in  his  resignation  the  next  day,  and  was  succeeded  by 
General  Alexander  Smyth,  an  Irish  brigadier-general  of  the 
regular  army.  Smyth  announced  his  assumption  of  the  com 
mand  by  issuing  several  bombastic  orders,  which  make  very 
amusing  reading  to-day. 

(36)  Smyth  planned-  to  cross  the  Niagara  River  at  Black 
Rock,  on  the  night  of  November  28,  and  issued  the  order  ac 
cordingly  to  his  army.     Among  the  paragraphs  of  this  order 
we  find  this  amusing  detail:     "At  twenty  yards'  distance,  the 
soldiers  will  be  ordered  to  trail  arms,  advance  with  shouts,  fire 
at  five  paces  distance,  and  charge  bayonets.     The  soldiers  will 
be  silent  above  all  things."f 

A  party  of  regulars  and  sailors  crossed  the  river  and  spiked 
the  enemy's  guns.  But  the  main  force  did  not  finish  embark 
ing  before  the  afternoon ;  so  the  general  ordered  them  to  disem 
bark  and  dine.  The  army  was  furious.  .  Two  days  later, 
Smyth  issued  another  order  to  embark.  He  would  not  cross 
with  less  than  3,000  men,  and  only  enough  of  his  militia  vol 
unteered  to  raise  his  force  to  1,500.  The  expedition  was, 
therefore,  again  recalled.  So  enraged  were  the  militia  of 
Smyth's  army  now,  that  they  threatened  his. life.  The  general 
had  to  pitch  his  tent  in  the  midst  of  the  camp  of  the  regulars 
for  protection.  The  militia  went  home,  and  Smyth  took  leave 
of  absence.  Three  months  later  he  was  dropped  from  the  rolls 
of  the  army.$ 

(37)  All  this  time  General  Dearborn,  who  was  to  command 
in  person  the  main  expedition  against  Montreal,  which  was  to 


*McMaster. 
fAdams. 
JMcMaster.    Adams. 


64  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

advance  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain,  had  made  no  move.  On 
the  19th  of  November  he  marched  his  army  to  the  Canadian 
boundary, — twenty  miles.  There  his  militia  refused  to  go  any 
farther,  and  he  marched  his  army  back  to  Plattsburg. 

(33)  "Meantime  the  people  of  the  United  States  demanded 
that  the  lost  territory  of  Michigan  should  be  regained.  A  force 
of  Kentucky  militia  was  assembled  at  Fort  Harrison*  with  a 
view  to  crushing  the  strength  of  the  Indian  tribes  and  thus  re 
opening  the  way  to  Detroit.  General  Hopkins  was  placed  in 
command.  Four  days  out  from  Fort  Harrison,  the  command 
became  frightened  by  a  prairie  fire,  and,  abandoning  their  gen 
eral,"  retraced  their  steps  and  dispersed  to  their  homes.f 

Another  army  was  organized  under  General  William  Henry 
Harrison  to  retake  Detroit.  It  consisted  of  about  10,000  mili 
tia  from  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Virginia,  Ohio,  and  Pennsylva 
nia.  Harrison,  who  afterwards  became  President,  had  gained 
a  national  fame  as  a  general  by  his  victory  over  the  Indians  at 
the  battle  of  Tippecanoe,  in  the  autumn  of  1811.  His  army 
was  to  march  in  three  columns  and  concentrate  at  the  rapids 
of  the  Miami  River — one  column  from  Newport,  Kentucky; 
one  from  Urbana,  Ohio;  and  the  third  from  Erie,  Pennsylva 
nia.  The  Kentucky  column  mutinied  when  a  few  days  out, 
and  was  kept  in  service  only  by  the  personal  entreaties  of  Gen 
eral  Harrison.  The  troops  from  Urbana  had  a  slight  skir 
mish  with  the  Indians  and  then,  in  defiance  of  orders,  returned 
to  their  homes.  The  third  column  never  got  started  until  the 
following  year.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  mutinous  con 
duct  of  the  troops  was  occasioned  chiefly  by  the  hardships  they 
had  to  suffer  for  lack  of  clothing,  subsistence,  and  transport.* 
Thus  ended  the  land  operations  of  the  year  1812. 

TROOPS  ENGAGED. 

"The  militia  called  into  service  during  the  year  1812  num 
bered  49,187,  of  whom  208  were  from  Massachusetts,  and  none 
from  Connecticut.  Adding  15,000  regulars,  we  find  that  the 
total  strength  of  the  troops  that  drew  Government  pay  during 
the  year  1812  was  not  less  than  65,000."  As  the  regulars  were 
nearly  all  newly  enlisted  and  without  any  training,  they  were 
.  little  better  than  the  militia.J 

The  British  regular  force  in  Canada  did  not  number  4,500; 


*In  Western  Indiana. 

tUpton. 

JMcMaster. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  65 

but  they  were  trained  soldiers.  The  Canadian  militia  was  no 
better  than  our  own,  and  the  Indian  allies  could  not  be  counted 
upon. 

OPERATIONS  OF  1813. 

During  the  winter  of  1812-'13,  Congress  passed  laws  increas 
ing  the  regular  army  to  forty-four  regiments  of  infantry,  four 
regiments  of  artillery,  two  regiments  of  dragoons,  one  regiment 
of  rifles,  and  the  corps  of  engineers :  Aggregate  strength, 
57,351.  But  the  aggregate  strength  of  the  regular  army  for 
this  year  never  actually  rose  above  19,036.*  . 

In  December,  1812,  General  Harrison  had  pushed  forward  a 
detachment  of  about  1,300  men,  under  General  Winchester,  to 
the  Miami  Rapids.  The  detachment  was  composed  of  the  Ken 
tucky  militia  regiments  and  the  17th  U.  S.  Infantry.  At 
Frenchtown,  on  the  Raisin  River,  the  enemy  had  a  garrison  of 
about  fifty  Canadian  militia  and  200  Indians.  A  part  of  Win 
chester's  detachment  captured  the  village,  without  much  loss, 
and  Winchester  occupied  it.  No  outposts  were  placed,  although 
they  were  recommended  to  the  commanding-general  by  his 
subordinate  officers.  The  result  was,  that  on  the  night  of 
January  21  [1813],  General  Proctor,  with  about  500  British 
regulars  and  600  Indians,  from  Brownstown  and  Maiden,  sur 
prised  the  garrison,  killed  397  of  them,  wounded  twenty-seven, 
and  captured  General  Winchester  and  522  men. 

Meantime  General  Harrison  had  moved  to  the  Miami  Rap 
ids,  with  the  rest  of  his  force;  and  General  Proctor,  fearing 
Harrison  would  move  against  him,  abandoned  his  wounded 
prisoners  and  hurried  away  to  his  intrenchments  at  Maiden. 
Then  Harrison,  fearing  that  Proctor  would  return  against  him, 
burnt  his  post  at  Miami  Rapids  and  hastened  back  to  the  Por 
tage  or  Carrying  River.  A  week  later  Harrison  went  back  to 
the  Rapids,  where  he  spent  several  months  having  Fort  Meigs 
built,  and  collecting  troops  and  supplies. 

Toward  the  end  of  April  Proctor  brought  over  a  force  of 
about  1,000  whites  and  1,200  Indians,  and  laid  siege  to  Fort 
Meigs.  On  the  5th  of  May  Brigadier-General  Green  Clay  ar 
rived  with  1,200  Kentucky  militia  to  relieve  the  beleaguered 
garrison.  He  surprised  the  enemy,  captured  his  guns,  and  al 
most  won  a  victory.  But  the  British  and  Indians  soon  made 
a  counter-attack,  and  either  captured  or  massacred  nearly  the 

*Upton. 


66  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

whole  body  "under  the  eyes  of  Harrison  at  Fort  Meigs."* 
Proctor's  Indians  dispersed  within  the  next  day  or  two,  and  on 
the  9th  of  May  Proctor  abandoned  the  siege,  and,  unmolested 
by  Harrison,  withdrew  to  Maiden. 

In  July  Proctor  returned  with  a  much  larger  force  of  Brit 
ish  and  Indians  to  the  siege  of  Fort  Meigs,  which  had  been  left 
under  command  of  General  Clay.  "Failing  to  coax  the  Ken 
tucky  commander  out  of  the  fort  to  fight,  Proctor  left  his  In 
dians  to  continue  the  siege,  while  he  moved  with  his  white 
troops  against  Fort  Stephenson  on  the  lower  Sandusky.  This 
post  was  garrisoned  by  160  men  of  the  17th  U.  S.  Infantry 
under  young  Major  Croghan.  On  August  2  Proctor  assaulted 
the  post,  but  was  severely  repulsed. "f  Immediately  after 
wards  Proctor  raised  the  siege  at  Fort  Meigs  and  fell  back  to 
Canada. 

The  Administration  at  last  awakened  to  an  appreciation  of 
the  impracticability  of  recovering  the  territory  lost  in  the  West, 
and  of  invading  Canada  from  that  quarter,  without  the  posses 
sion  of  Lake  Erie  and  the  cooperation  of  an  American  fleet. 
So  the  Secretary  of  War,  now  General  Armstrong,  who  had 
succeeded  Mr.  Eustis,  had  ordered  General  Harrison  to  main 
tain  a  strict  defensive,  guarding  the  line  of  the  Maumee,  until  a 
fleet  should  be  built  on  Lake  Erie.  This  was  accomplished, 
and  possession  of  the  lake  was  achieved  by  Commodore  Perry's 
victory  on  the  10th  of  September. 

On  September  12  Harrison,  at  Seneca,  on  the  Sandusky 
River,  received  Perry's  famous  dispatch:  "We  have  met  the 
enemy  and  they  are  ours."  This  meant  that  it  was  now  Har 
rison's  turn  to  act.  Harrison's  army  consisted  of  about  2,500 
regulars,  3,000  Kentucky  volunteer  infantry,  and  Colonel  Rich 
ard  M.  Johnson's  mounted  Kentucky  regiment.  While  the 
mounted  regiment  marched  to  Detroit,  Harrison  transferred 
his  infantry  by  water  to  a.  point  about  three  miles  below 
Maiden. 

Proctor,  believing  that  he  could  not  maintain  himself  at  Mai 
den  with  Lake  Erie  in  possession  of  the  American  navy,  fell 
back  by  the  road  up  the  Thames  River.  The  Americans  pur 
sued,  and  on  the  5th  of  October  overtook  the  enemy  near  the 
Moravian  Town,  where  the  engagement  known  as  the  battle  of 
the  Thames  was  fought.  Colonel  Johnson's  regiment  alone 

*Adams. 

fLecture  by  Lieutenant  Chapman. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  67 

fought  the  battle  on  the  American  side;  it  was  enough.  Part 
of  the  regiment  mounted,  charged  the  British  lines  in  front, 
and  broke  through  them;  while  the  rest  of  the  regiment,  dis 
mounted,  turned  the  enemy's  right,  and  completed  the  victory.* 
The  British  were  routed,  losing  twelve  killed,  twenty-two 
wounded,  and  600  captured.  Tecumthe  was  among  the  slain, 
and,  as  a  result  of  the  battle,  the  Indians  deserted  the  British 
cause. 

The  United  States  had  regained  the  lost  territory  of  Mich 
igan,  with  the  exception  of  Fort  Mackinac,  which  remained  in 
possession  of  the  British  till  the  restoration  of  peace.  After 
this  victory  the  militia  and  volunteers  were  discharged ;  regular 
garrisons  were  left  at  Detroit  and  other  frontier  posts;  and 
Harrison,  with  about  1,300  regulars,  moved  by  the  Lake  to 
Sacketts  Harbor. 

(32)  The  plan  of  campaign  proposed  by  the  War  Depart 
ment  for  the  operations  in  the  east  this  year  [1913]  contem 
plated,  first,  the  capture  of  Kingston  and  Fort  Prescott,  which 
controlled  the  upper  St.  Lawrence  River,  and  then  the  main  ex 
pedition  against  Montreal.  The  possession  of  the  St.  Law 
rence  by  the  United  States  would  sever  Upper  from  Lower 
Canada;  for  it  was  the  only  line  of  communication  between 
the  two. 

General  Dearborn  commanded  the  American  forces  about 
Lake  Ontario,  some  7,000  men,  regulars  and  militia.  The  Brit 
ish  forces  on  the  opposite  shore  numbered  about  1,800  regulars 
and  500  militia. 

General  Dearborn  did  not  follow  the  exact  plan  as  proposed 
by  the  Secretray  of  War.  On  the  27th  of  April  he  crossed  the 
Lake  with  about  1,700  men,  and  captured  York,  now  Toronto, 
driving  away  the  small  British  garrison,  and  burning  the  Par 
liament  House. f  A  month  later,  on  May  27,  his  forces 
captured  Fort  George,  after  a  sharp  engagement,  driving 
the  British  garrison  toward  Hamilton  at  the  head  of  Lake 
Ontario. 

Dearborn,  who  personally  had  remained  on  shipboard  during 
the  engagement,  sent  General  Winder  with  about  1.000  men  in 
pursuit.  Winder  halted  and  sent  back  for  reinforcements,  and 
General  Chandler  marched  out  with  another  thousand  men,  and 
himself  took  command  of  the  united  forces.  He  pushed  on  to 


*McMaster. 

fFrancis  A.  Walker,  The  Making  of  the  Nation. 


68  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Stony  Creek,  where  he  camped  without  outposts,  within  ten 
miles  of  the  British  position  at  Hamilton. 

In  the  night,  the  British  commander,  Vincent,  surprised  his 
camp  and  attacked  it  with  about  700  men.  Great  confusion  en 
sued,  with  considerable  loss  on  each  side.  Both  American 
generals,  Chandler  and  Winder,  were  captured;  and  the  two 
hostile  forces  retreated  in  opposite  directions,  leaving  their 
dead  unburied.  Two  days  afterwards,  June  8,  the  Americans 
were  back  at  Fort  George. 

On  the  jnorning  of  June  24,  Colonel  Boerstler,  with  some  540 
men  of  the  14th  U.  S.  Infantry  and  two  field-pieces,  marched 
from  Fort  George  to  Beaver  Dam,  about  seventeen  miles,  to 
destroy  a  store-house.  He  found  himself  surrounded  by  In 
dians  and  tried  to  retreat ;  but  a  British  lieutenant  with  a  squad 
of  soldiers  barred  his  way.  Becoming  utterly  demoralized, 
Colonel  Boerstler  surrendered  his  540  men  to  the  British  lieu 
tenant,  who  had  only  260  Indians,  militia,  and  regulars. 

The  withdrawal  of  troops  for  the  expedition  against  York 
and  Fort  George  left  Sacketts  Harbor  with  a  very  weak  gar 
rison.  The  possession  of  this  place  was  of  as  much  impor 
tance  to  the  British  as  the  capture  of  Kingston  would  have  been 
to  the  Americans.  So  on  the  night  of  May  26,  Sir  George  Pre- 
vost  himself  embarked  about  800  regulars  at  Kingston  for  its 
capture.  The  expedition  landed  next  morning,  and  was  met  on 
the  beach  by  General  Jacob  Brown,  with  a  line  of  American 
militia  in  front,  backed  up  by  a  line  of  regulars.  "The  militia 
instantly  fled.  The  regulars  fell  back  to  the  barrack  and  the 
block-house,  and  there  checked  the  British  advance."  Prevost 
then  retreated  to  his  vessels  leaving  a  third  of  his  force  killed, 
wounded  or  missing.* 

Kingston  and  the  St.  Lawrence  River  were  still  in  the  pos 
session  of  the  British ;  so  was  Lake  Ontario ;  and  General  Dear 
born's  operations  had  really  accomplished  very  little.  He  was 
now  replaced  by  General  James  Wilkinson;  and  Major-General 
Wade  Hampton  was  placed  in  command  of  the  forces  at  Lake 
Champlain,  some  5,000  regulars.  Hampton  was  under  Wilkin 
son's  command ;  but  these  two  generals  mutually  despised  each 
other,  and  Hampton  ignored  Wilkinson's  orders  and  refused 
to  serve  under  him.  "The  Secretary  [of  War]  pacified  Hamp 
ton  as  well  as  he  could,  consented  that  all  orders  and  reports 
should  go  out  from  and  be  made  to  the  Department  of  War/' 


*McMaster. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  69 

and  moved  that  department  from  Washington  to  Sacketts 
Harbor.*  This  enraged  General  Wilkinson. 

After  more  than  a  month  of  ludicrous  and  unseemly  wrang 
ling  between  the  Secretary  and  the  General  over  a  plan  of  oper 
ations,  it  was  finally  decided  that  Wilkinson  with  some  8,000 
regulars  should  move  down  the  St.  Lawrence,  form  a  junction 
with  Hampton,  and  march  the  combined  force  against 
Montreal. 

Embarking  his  men  in  bateaux,  Wilkinson  sailed  down  the 
St.  Lawrence  on  the  17th  of  October.  Twelve  hundred  men 
under  General  McComb  were  placed  on  the  north  bank  to 
march  as  a  flank-guard  abreast  of  the  flotilla.  A  brigade  under 
General  Brown,  also  on  the  north  bank,  marched  as  advance- 
guard.  British  gunboats  and  800  troops  from  Kingston  set  out 
in  pursuit.  On  November  11,  at  Christler's  Farm,  the  troops 
attacked  the  American  rear.  General  Boyd  was  landed,  with 
three  brigades,  to  drive  back  the  enemy,  but  was  defeated; 
2,000  American  regulars,  commanded  by  regular  officers,  re 
tired  before  800  British.  The  next  day  Wilkinson  took  his 
command  to  the  south  bank,  and  fled  with  it  to  French  Mills, 
where  it  went  into  winter  quarters. 

(37)  Meantime  General  Hampton  had,  toward  the  end  of 
September,  moved  his  force  to  Chateaugay.  He  had  about 
4,000  effectives.  On  October  22  he  started  down  the  Chateau- 
gay  River  and  marched  as  far  as  Spears.  Here  he  found  him 
self  opposed  by  the  British,  and,  judging  rightly  from  letters 
received  from  the  Secretary  of  War  and  from  General 
Wilkinson,  that  the  combined  movement  against  Montreal  had 
been  suspended  for  the  winter,  he  marched  his  command  back 
to  Plattsburg. 

(35)  A  garrison  of  500  New  York  militia  had  been  left  at 
Fort  George  under  General  McClure.  Learning  that  Colonel 
Vincent  with  a  force  of  British  was  advancing  against  them,  the 
militia  refused  to  serve  any  longer ;  so  McClure  burned  the 
town  of  Newark  near  the  fort,  set  fire  to  Queenstown,  and 
withdrew  to  the  American  side.  Then  the  militia  returned  to 
their  homes.  (36)  On  the  18th  of  December  a  British  de 
tachment  retaliated  by  burning  Buffalo,  Black  Rock,  and  other 
towns,  and  destroying  all  public  and  private  property  along  the 
frontier  for  thirty  miles.  Fort  Niagara  was  captured  by  sur 
prise,  and  held  by  the  enemy  until  peace  was  restored. 

*McMaster. 


70  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(38)  In  April  of  this  year  the  British  Rear- Admiral  Cock- 
burn,  "with  a  few  boats  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  ter 
rorized  the  shores  of  the  Upper  Chesapeake."  Cockburn  was 
opposed  by  only  a  few  militia;  so  he  plundered  farms  and 
burned  villages  in  real  buccaneer  fashion.*  Admiral  Warren, 
also,  undertook  to  capture  Norfolk  in  June  by  a  land  attack, 
but  was  repulsed. 

TROOPS  EMPLOYED  IN  1813. 

General  Upton  in  his  valuable  book,  The  Military  Policy  of 
the  United  States,  says:  "The  false  economy  of  making,  in 
time  of  peace,  no  preparation  for  war,  was  made  increasingly 
apparent  by  our  experience  in  the  foregoing  campaigns. 

"Exclusive  of  volunteers  and  rangers,  in  reference  to  whom 
data  for  the  campaign  is  wanting,  the  number  of  troops  called 
out  during  the  year  [1813]  numbered: 

Regulars 19,036 

Militia.  130,112 


Total. 149,148 

"The  only  compensation  was  the  destruction  of  Proctor's 
force  of  800  regulars,  a  feat  that  would  have  been  impossible 
but  for  the  victory  of  Commodore  Perry  on  Lake  Erie."f 

CAMPAIGN  OF  1814. 

In  the  first  months  of  1814  Congress  passed  bills  increasing 
the  regular  army  to  62,733  men ;  but  by  the  following  Septem 
ber  enlistments  had  brought  its  numbers  up  to  only  some  38,000. 
There  was,  however,  a  marked  improvement  in  the  qual 
ity  of  the  troops.  "The  regular  troops  at  Buffalo  passed  the 
winter  and  spring  of  1814  in  drilling  and  improving  their  disci 
pline.  .  .  .  Brigade  commanders,  like  Scott,  personally 
taught  their  officers  the  elements  of  squad  drill,  so  that  they  in 
turn  might  more  thoroughly  instruct  their  men."f 

(32)  In  February,  1814,  General  Brown  was  ordered  to 
Sacketts  Harbor  with  2,000  men,  from  French  Mills,  and  Gen- 


*Adams. 
fUpton. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  71 

eral  Wilkinson  fell  back  to  Plattsburg  with  the  rest  of  his 
army.  At  this  time  there  were  some  8,000  British  troops  at 
Montreal  and  in  posts  along  the  River  Richelieu  [Sorel].  (37) 
Two  hundred  occupied  an  advanced  post  in  a  stone  mill  at  La- 
colle  Creek.  On  March  30  Wilkinson  led  4,000  men  with  two 
field-guns  against  this  mill.  He  was  unable  to  batter  down  the 
walls  with  his  cannon,  and,  after  losing  200  of  his  men  by  the 
fire  from  the  building,  he  gave  up  the  attempt  and  returned  to 
his  station.  This  was  General  Wilkinson's  last  military  ex 
ploit.  On  the  1st  of  May  General  Izard  took  command  of  the 
army  at  Lake  Champlain. 

(32)  The  war  in  Europe  was  at  an  end,  and  in  July  four 
teen  of  the  best  regiments  of  Wellington's  army  sailed  for  Can 
ada.  The  British  still  had  possession  of  Lake  Ontario,  the 
American  fleet  being  practically  blockaded  at  Sacketts  Harbor. 
So  General  Brown  determined  to  cross  the  Niagara  River  and 
operate  against  the  British  in  that  quarter.  Brown's  army  con 
sisted  of  two  small  regular  brigades  under  Winfield  Scott,  now 
a  brigadier-general,  and  Ripley;  a  volunteer  militia  brigade, 
including  some  600  Indians,  under  General  Peter  B.  Porter; 
and  a  battalion  of  artillery  under  Major  Hindman:  in  all  about 
3,500  men  for  duty.  On  their  side  of  the  river  the  British 
had  some  4,000  effectives  under  General  Riall. 

(36)  On  the  3rd  of  July  Brown  crossed  the  river  and  cap 
tured  Fort  Erie.  He  then  moved  down  the  river  toward  the 
other  British  posts.  (39)  On  the  5th  of  July  Porter's  bri 
gade  was  in  the  lead,  and  met  the  British  just  beyond  Street's 
Creek.  The  brigade,  after  a  short  fight,  "broke  and  fell  back 
in  confusion" ;  but  Scott  came  on  with  his  brigade,  and  the 
"British  line  broke  and  crumbled  away."  Henry  Adams  says 
in  his  history :  "The  battle  of  Chippewa  was  the  only  occa 
sion  during  the  war  when  equal  bodies  of  regular  troops  met 
face  to  face,  in  extended  lines  on  an  open  plain  in  broad  day 
light,  without  advantage  of  position;  and  never  again  after 
that  combat  was  an  army  of  American  regulars  beaten  by 
British  troops."*  Had  the  historian  looked  farther  ahead  in 
our  annals,  he  might  have  added,  "nor  by  any  other  troops." 
(35)  Brown  pursued  the  British  beyond  Queenstown,  where 
he  remained  more  than  a  fortnight ;  then,  learning  that  British 
reinforcements  were  arriving,  he  fell  back  to  Chippewa,  July 
24.  Then  Scott's  brigade  moved  forward  to  reconnoiter,  and 

*Adams. 


72  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

encountered  the  British  at  Lundy's  Lane,  at  5  p.  m.,  July  25. 
(40)  This  brought  on  the  battle  of  Lundy's  Lane,  which 
lasted  till  ten  o'clock  at  night.  (41)  The  British  were  driven 
back  from  their  first  position,  but  the  Americans  withdrew 
from  the  field  at  the  end  of  the  engagement.  In  this  com 
bat  the  British  numbered  3,045  and  the  Americans  less  than 
2,000.  The  losses  were  743  killed  and  wounded  on  the  Amer 
ican  side,  and  643  on  the  British.  Generals  Brown  and  Scott 
were  both  badly  wounded.* 

(36)  The  army  fell  back  to  Fort  Erie.  The  British  did  not 
pursue  at  once, — this  battle  and  that  of  Chippewa  had  increased 
their  respect  for  American  soldiery.  (42)  At  length,  on  the 
15th  of  August,  after  elaborate  preparation  with  siege  artil 
lery,  the  British  assaulted  the  American  position  at  Fort  Erie, 
and  were  severely  repulsed.  On  the  17th  of  September  the 
Americans  made  a  sortie,  which  was  so  far  successful  that  the 
British  fell  back  on  the  21st  toward  Chippewa. 

(32)  Meantime  a  British  fleet  ascended  the  Sorel  River 
into  Lake  Champlain ;  and  Sir  George  Prevost,  with  up 
wards  of  11,000  of  Wellington's  veterans,  advanced  from  Mon 
treal  against  Plattsburg,  held  by  a  small,  but  well  intrenched, 
garrison.  (43)  On  September  11  the  British  attacked  at 
Plattsburg  by  land  and  water.  The  American  navy  saved  the 
army.  Lieutenant  Macdonough  practically  captured  or  de 
stroyed  the  British  fleet;  and  the  next  day  Prevost  retreated  to 
Canada. 

(44)  From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Washington  City 
had  been  left  to  the  protection  of  Providence.  Not  a  thing 
had  been  done  for  its  defense.  Finally,  in  July  of  this  year, 
1814,  Brigadier-General  Winder,  "to  please  the  governor  of 
Maryland,"  was  charged  with  the  command  and  defense  of 
the  city.* 

On  August  18  word  reached  Washington  that  a  British  fleet 
was  at  the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent  River,  and  troops  were 
landing  at  Benedict  about  forty  miles  from  the  Capital.  Mr. 
Monroe,  the  Secretary  of  State,  mounted  a  horse  and  rode  off 
to  reconnoiter  the  enemy.  General  Winder  gathered  together 
some  2,000  men,  including  about  300  regulars  of  different  regi 
ments,  and  marched  them  out  to  Woodyard,  where  he  was 
joined  by  Mr.  Monroe. 

Meantime  General  Robert  Ross  was  leisurely  marching  his 


*  Adams. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  73 

5,000  red-coats  toward  Washington.  Winder's  army  at  Wood- 
yard  watched  them  go  by,  but  did  not  molest  them.  Then 
Winder  fell  back  to  Old  Fields,  where  he  stayed  till  the  Brit 
ish  appraoched;  then  he  retreated  across  the  Navy  Yard 
bridge.  The  President  and  all  the  cabinet  had  joined  him; 
and  when  they  found  for  sure  that  the  British  had  taken  the 
Bladensburg  road,  they  all  hurried  with  the  army  to  that 
point.  Mr.  Monroe  was  in  the  lead. 

(45)  Other  militia  troops  had  assembled  at  Bladensburg, 
also;  so  there  were  nigh  to  7,000  Americans  on  the  ground  on 
August  24.  The  head  of  the  British  column  deployed,  and  ad 
vanced  straight  against  the  Americans,  who  stood  their  ground 
and  received  it  with  fire.  But  when  the  next  British  regiment 
crossed  the  little  stream,  and  threatened  to  turn  its  left,  the 
American  line  broke.  Some  of  the  Americans  retired  in  order, 
"but  the  mass,  struck  by  panic,  streamed  westward  toward 
Georgetown  and  Rockville."  The  only  redeeming  feature  of 
the  whole  affair  was  the  conduct  of  Captain  Joshua  Barney  and 
his  four  hundred  sailors  and  marines.  Barney  had  commanded 
a  gunboat  flotilla  in  the  Chesapeake,  and  had  been  obliged  to 
destroy  it  to  save  it  from  the  British  fleet.  With  his  sailors  he 
trailed  along  behind  Winder's  army  without  any  orders,  and 
took  his  place  in  the  battle.  And  his  men  stood  their  ground 
till  they  were  overwhelmed  in  front,  and  enveloped  in  flank. 
But  this  time  the  navy  was  not  strong  enough  to  save  the  army. 

(44)  General  Winder  and  his  army  never  stopped  in  their 
flight  until  they  had  gone  sixteen  miles  beyond  Washington. 
The  British  marched  into  Washington,  burned  the  Capitol,  the 
White  House,  and  other  public  buildings;  "and,"  the  historian 
states,  "from  the  distant  hills  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  the 
flying  President  and  Cabinet  caught  glimpses  of  the  ruin  their 
incompetence  had  caused."* 

The  British  marched  back  to  their  ships  and  sailed  for  Balti 
more.  They  landed  near  North  Point,  and  the  fleet  pushed 
into  Patapsco  River  to  shell  the  city.  Baltimore  had  made 
ready  for  a  stouter  defense  than  Washington's.  A  brigade  of 
militia  met  the  invaders  and  delayed  them  some  time,  killing 
General  Ross;  and  two  days  later,  September  14,  the  British 
withdrew  to  their  transports  without  having  assaulted  the 
American  intrenchments. 


*Adams. 


74  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

OPERATIONS  AT  NEW  ORLEANS. 

The  British  troops  that  captured  Washington  sailed  for  Ja 
maica,  where  they  were  reinforced  by  other  veteran  regiments. 
Sir  Edward  Pakenham,  "the  brother-in-law  of  Wellington,  and 
the  ablest  of  his  lieutenants/'*  then  took  command  of  the  whole 
force  and  embarked  it  for  the  capture  of  New  Orleans.  (46) 
He  entered  Lake  Borgne,  an  arm  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and 
landed  his  troops  near  the  head  of  Bayou  Mazant,  about  ten 
miles  east  of  New  Orleans. 

General  Andrew  Jackson  was  in  command  at  New  Orleans, 
and  had  got  together  a  force  of  about  5,000  men,  mostly  militia. 
(47)  On  the  evening  of  December  24  Jackson  with  part  of 
his  force  surprised  the  advanced  troops  of  the  enemy  in  their 
camp  at  the  Villere  plantation,  and,  aided  by  the  guns  of  the 
Carolina,  in  the  Mississippi,  attacked  them.  A  confused  com 
bat  took  place  in  the  fog  and  darkness,  and  the  Americans 
were  repulsed.  Jackson  then  placed  his  command  behind  a 
strong  field-work,  stretching  across  a  space  about  a  thousand 
yards  wide,  between  the  river  on  one  side  and  a  cypress  brake 
on  the  other.  A  canal  flowed  along  the  front  of  the  work. 

On  the  1st  of  January,  1815,  the  British  batteries  opened  fire 
upon  the  American  position.  Their  fire  was  immediately  re 
turned,  and  by  noon  they  had  been  silenced.  Pakenham  then 
waited  for  more  of  his  troops  to  come  up,  and,  on  the  8th  of 
January,  assaulted  the  American  line  with  more  than  5,000  of 
the  best  British  veterans.  "Behind  the  -line,"  says  McMaster, 
"were  gathered  as  motley  an  array  of  men  as  ever  at  any  time 
fought  under  one  banner.  On  the  extreme  right,  just  where 
the  line  joined  the  levee,  were  some  regulars,  a  company  of 
New  Orleans  Rifles,  some  dragoons  grouped  about  a  howitzer, 
some  sailors  from  the  Carolina  who  served  a  small  battery,  and 
a  battalion  of  Louisiana  Creoles  resplendent  in  gay  uniforms. 
In  the  midst  of  the  battalion  were  Dominique  You  and  Beluche, 
with  the  swarthy  crews  of  their  pirate  ships  serving  two 
twenty-fours.  Then  came  a  battalion  of  free  negroes,  more 
sailors  with  a  thirty-two  pound  gun,  a  battalion  of  San  Domin- 
gans,  more  regulars,  some  old  French  soldiers  under  one  of 
Napoleon's  gunners  named  Flaujeac  tending  a  brass  gun,  a 
long  line  of  Carroll's  Tennesseeans  in  brown  homespun  hunting 
shirts,  some  more  sailors,  some  more  regulars  with  a  long  brass 


*McMaster. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  75 

culverin,  then  John  Adair  and  his  Kentuckians,  and  last  of  all, 
standing  knee-deep  in  the  water  of  the  swamp,  Coffee's  Ten- 
nesseeans." 

Jackson  had  altogether  about  5,700  men  of  whom  "barely 
one-third  fired  a  gun."  The  British  were  repulsed  with  a  loss 
of  about  2,000  men  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  General 
Pakenham  was  among  the  slain.*  The  American  loss  was 
seven  killed  and  six  wounded. f  There  was  some  fighting  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  river  in  which  the  British  were  suc 
cessful. 

This  was  the  last  battle  of  the  war,  and  it  was  fought  after 
the  treaty  of  peace  had  been  signed  at  Ghent,  December  24, 
1814.  This  treaty  merely  ended  hostilities.  Not  a  question 
upon  which  the  war  had  been  based  was  settled.  The  question 
of  blockade  ceased  with  the  war  in  Europe;  and  the  impress 
ment  of  American  seamen,  though  not  mentioned  in  the  treaty, 
was  discontinued,  as  it  would  have  been  without  the  war. 

COMMENTS. 

The  achievements  of  our  navy  during  the  War  of  1812  were 
such  that  they  will  always  be  a  subject  of  just  pride  to  us;  but 
the  management  and  behavior  of  our  land-forces  were  in  many 
cases  so  unhappy,  so  discreditable,  so  bad,  so  burlesque,  that  a 
contemplation  of  them  arouses  in  us  mingled  feelings  of  disap 
pointment,  shame,  disgust,  and  amusement. 

The  war  was,  nevertheless,  full  of  lessons  for  the  military 
student,  but  especially  for  the  American  citizen — the  man 
that  votes  and  makes  the  legislators  that  make  the  laws.  He  is 
the  one  primarily  responsible ;  for  all  the  failures  of  this  war, 
like  the  failure  to  end  the  Civil  War  in  a  single  month,  fifty 
years  later,  were  due  to  lack  of  preparedness, — to  bad  legis 
lation. 

George  Washington  by  sad  practical  experience  had  learned 
the  hopelessness  of  trying  to  conduct  war  with  men  that  had 
been  taught  nothing  about  the  business  of  war.  Raw  militia 
were  the  burden  of  his  complaint  from  the  beginning  to  the  end 
of  the  Revolutionary  .War ;  and  in  his  very  last  message  he 
admonished  the  people  that  "timely  disbursements  to  prepare 
for  danger,  frequently  prevent  much  greater  disbursements  to 
repel  it."  But  Mr.  Jefferson,  who  never  saw  a  battle,  and  dur- 


*Adams. 
fUpton. 


76  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ing  whose  administration  our  regular  army  was  reduced  almost 
to  zero,  said,  in  his  last  message,  while  war  with  England  was 
threatening:  "For  a  people  who  are  free  and  who  mean  to 
remain  so,  a  well-organized  and  armed  militia  is  their  best 
security."* 

The  lesson  that  the  War  of  1812  held  out  above  all  others, 
was  that  our  militia  furnished  no  security  at  all,  and  that  a 
reliance  upon  it  only  resulted  in  a  vast  expense  to  the  Gov 
ernment  and  an  immortal  national  shame.  The  men  that  went 
out  with  our  militia  regiments  certainly  had  as  much  natural 
courage  as  any  other  Americans — all  they  lacked  was  military 
training  and  educated  leaders.  They  were  just  as  good  in  bat 
tle  as  regulars  with  no  more  training;  as  was  shown  by  the 
equally  bad  behavior  of  newly-enlisted  regulars  under  newly- 
appointed  officers,  on  several  occasions. 

As  we  all  know,  it  is  the  discipline  that  is  instilled  into  sol 
diers  in  garrison  and  camp  and  march,  under  qualified  officers, 
which  counts  in  campaign,  far  above  mere  excellence  in  the 
manual  of  arms  and  the  movements  of  the  drill-book.  These 
latter  are  useful  mainly  as  an  aid  to  discipline.  The  value 
and  importance  of  training  is  shown  by  a  comparison  of  the 
conduct  of  Scott's  and  Ripley's  brigades,  at  Chippewa  and 
Lundy's  Lane,  with  that  of  our  troops  in  other  battles  of  the 
War  of  1812. 

The  disadvantage  of  short  terms  of  enlistment,  which  re 
sulted  in  the  discharge  of  men,  and  the  melting  away  of  whole 
regiments,  just  about  the  time  when  they  became  fit  for  cam 
paign,  early  became  apparent ;  and  the  term  was  changed  from 
one  to  five  years  for  the  regular  troops. 

The  difficulty  of  recruiting  the  regular  regiments  in  time  of 
hostilities  was  shown  in  this  as  in  all  our  later  conflicts;  and 
the  importance  of  maintaining  a  standing  army  of  a  size  pro 
portionate  to  our  needs  and  to  the  population  of  the  country,  to 
serve  as  a  training  school  for  officers,  and  as  a  nucleus  and  a 
first  line,  in  case  of  war,  was  made  very  evident. 

General  Upton  says  that  with  a  standing  "army  of  15,000 
men,  so  organized  as  to  have  been  capable  of  expansion  by  the 
aid  of  voluntary  enlistments  and  obligatory  service  to  double  or 
triple  its  numbers,  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  Canada 
would  have  been  ours,  and  the  war  brought  to  a  close  on  a 
single  campaign." 

The  Administration  was,  during  the  first  two  years,  greatly 

*Upton. 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  77 

at  a  loss  for  higher  commanders.  The  trade  of  a  general  has 
to  be  learned ;  and  our  army  was  so  small  in  1812  that  it 
contained  no  officers  that  had  had  any  experience  in  command 
ing  considerable  bodies  of  men.  So  the  Administration  was 
forced  to  select  its  generals  from  among  the  territorial  gover 
nors  and  other  civil  officials,  like  Hull  and  Dearborn,  some  of 
whom  had  seen  a  little  service  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  more 
than  thirty  years  before.  Not  until  they  had  gone  through  two 
years  of  training  in  the  actual  school  of  war,  the  best  of  all  mili 
tary  schools,  were  Jacob  Brown  and  Andrew  Jackson  and 
Winfield  Scott  able  to  show  that  they  knew  how  to  command 
men  in  battle  and  campaign.  The  chief  qualities  of  these  gen 
erals,  the  qualities  that  achieved  success,  were  their  energy, 
activity,  and  readiness  to  fight. 

In  its  prosecution  of  the  war  the  Administration  was  greatly 
hampered  by  the  opposition  of  the  New  England  States.  The 
governors  of  some  of  those  States  refused  to  let  their  militia 
leave  the  States,  and  took  so  little  pains  to  enforce  the  laws 
of  war,  that  the  British  army  in  Canada  was  fed  and  supplied 
by  New  Englanders,  and  paid  with  money  furnished  by  New 
England  banks.  The  British  army  also  purchased  supplies  in 
New  York.* 

From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  war,  there  were  called 
out  on  the  American  side  56,032  regulars  and  471,622  militia 
and  volunteers;  while  "the  largest  force  of  British  regulars 
opposed  to  us  was  16,500"f;  and  the  British  regulars  were 
probably  never  at  any  one  time  aided  by  more  than  800  Cana 
dian  militia  and  2,500  Indians. 

When  we  remember  that  the  British  government  sent  up 
wards  of  450,000  troops  to  South  Africa  rather  than  submit  to 
defeat  there,  we  must  congratulate  ourselves  that  England  had 
her  hands  full  with  her  war  on  the  Continent  of  Europe;  that 
the  American  war  was  no  more  in  favor  in  England  than  it 
was  in  America;  that  the  British  really  had  no  cause  to  fight 
us,  except  to  keep  us  out  of  Canada;  and  that  the  causes  for 
which  we  were  fighting  ceased  with  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
between  Napoleon  and  the  British  government. 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS. 
Of  strategy  and  tactics  there  was  not  an  example  worthy  of 


*  Adams. 
fUpton. 


78  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

emulation  shown  by  either  Americans  or  British  in  any  cam 
paign  of  the  entire  war ;  unless  it  was  in  General  Brock's  oper 
ations.  The  campaigns  are  valuable  as  professional  studies 
only  on  account  of  their  blunders ;  and  these  are  so  apparent,  it 
should  seem  that  no  officer  that  has  passed  the  primer  of  his 
military  education  could  be  guilty  of  repeating  them. 

In  1812  we  saw  an  invasion  of  Canada  planned  for  three 
separate  columns  between  which  there  could  be  no  cooperation 
nor  concert  of  action.  Each  moved,  or  tried  to  move,  without 
any  regard  to  the  others.  So  the  British  met  them,  and  re 
pelled  them  one  at  a  time,  and  with  the  same  troops. 

General  Hull's  invasion  of  Canada  by  way  of  Detroit,  while 
Lake  Erie  was  still  controlled  by  a  British  fleet,  was  doomed 
to  failure  from  the  start.  His  only  line  of  communication  was 
by  a  road  200  miles  long,  exposed  to  attack  from  the  British  at 
Maiden,  exposed  for  many  miles  along  the  lake-shore  to  fire 
from  the  British  fleet,  and  passing  through  more  than  a  hun 
dred  miles  of  forest  and  swamp,  filled  with  hostile  Indians. 
The  chances  of  keeping  a  wagon-train  going  and  coming  with 
supplies  along  such  a  route,  were  very  slim. 

General  Wilkinson's  line  of  communication,  also,  was  in  peril 
when  he  moved  his  army  down  the  St.  Lawrence  with  Kings 
ton  still  in  possession  of  the  British  in  his  rear.  The  Secretary 
of  War  saw  the  importance  of  the  capture  of  Kingston,  and 
urged  it;  but  both  General  Dearborn  and  General  Wilkinson, 
and  later,  also,  General  Brown,  were  dissuaded  by  Commodore 
Chauncey,  who  commanded  the  American  fleet  on  Lake  Onta 
rio,  from  undertaking  the  capture.  Then  Chauncey,  who  was 
to  guard  the  entrance  to  the  St.  Lawrence  with  his  fleet,  per 
formed,  his  duty  so  badly  as  to  allow  the  British  gunboats  to 
slip  by  him  and  fall  upon  the  rear  of  Wilkinson's  flotilla. 

The  disasters  at  the  Raisin  River  and  Stony  Creek  were  both 
due  to  the  failure  of  the  American  commanders  to  secure  their 
camps  by  outposts. 

Even  where  our  troops  achieved  victory,  their  success  was 
not  due  to  good  tactics,  but  rather  to  valor,  marksmanship,  good 
discipline,  or  courageous  leading.  At  Chippewa  Scott  "tempted 
destruction  by  quitting  his  secure  position  behind  Street's 
Creek,"  and  marching  his  little  command  across  the  bridge 
•over  the  creek  with  the  British  twenty-four  pounders  playing 
on  it.  Again  at  Lundy's  Lane  Scott  charged  a  British  force 
about  twice  the  strength  of  his  own,  when  he  was  only  out  on 
a  reconnaissance,  and  might  better  have  fallen  back,  or  taken 


THE  WAR  OF  1812.  79 

up  a  defensive  position  and  waited  for  Ripley's  brigade  to 
come  to  his  assistance.  Still  the  fault  of  attacking  superior 
numbers,  and  attacking  vigorously,  as  General  Scott  always 
did,  is  one  seldom  to  be  censured  in  a  leader.  Scott,  like  all 
courageous,  dashing  leaders,  had  the  quality  of  inspiring  his 
men  with  something  of  his  own  spirit. 

In  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  in 
all  history,  General  Jackson,  although  two-thirds  of  his  troops 
had  not  fired  a  shot,  failed  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the 
British  by  a  counter-attack.  This,  however,  was  probably  not 
practicable  with  raw,  undisciplined,  heterogeneous  troops,  such 
as  his  were. 

In  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  the  British  government  had 
no  thought  of  taking  the  offensive.  With  its  army  engaged  in 
Europe,  it  only  undertook  to  defend  Canada,  and  to  blockade 
the  American  coast  from  New  York  to  Georgia.  To  maintain 
the  friendship  of  New  England,  the  ports  of  that  section  were 
not  subjected  to  the  blockade.  But  in  1814,  with  its  armies  set 
free,  Great  Britain  began  a  more  vigorous  campaign. 

The  expedition  of  Prevost  against  Plattsburg  was  under 
taken  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  off  the  Eastern  States  from 
the  rest  of  the  Union,  with  the  hope  of  regaining  them  for  the 
British  crown  in  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  avowed  objects  of 
the  expedition  to  New  Orleans  were  two :  "first,  the  command 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  so  as  to  deprive  the  back  settle 
ments  of  America  of  their  communication  with  the  sea;  sec 
ond,  'to  occupy  some  important  and  valuable  possession  by  the 
restoration  of  which  we  may  improve  the  conditions  of  peace, 
or  which  may  entitle  us  to  exact  its  cession  as  the  price  of 
peace/  "*  The  purpose  of  General  Ross's  expedition,  as  shown 
by  his  instructions,  was  "to  effect  a  diversion  on  the  coasts  of 
the  United  States  in  favor  of  the  army  employed  in  the  defense 
of  Upper  and  Lower  Canada"  .  '.  .  and  not  "for  any  ex 
tended  operation  at  a  distance  from  the  coast."  This  explains 
why  Ross  did  not  follow  up  General  Winder's  fleeting  militia 
at  Washington.* 

The  capture  of  Washington  rather  than  Baltimore  or  some 
other  city,  had  no  strategic  significance,  and  might  not  have 
been  undertaken  at  all,  had  not  its  defenseless  condition  invited 
capture.  Being  the  capital  of  the  country,  its  capture  was  of 
some  political  importance,  and  was  very  humiliating  to  Ameri- 

*Adams. 


80  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

can  pride.  The  excuse  for  the  destruction  of  the  public  build 
ings,  as  well  as  for  other  burning  and  plundering  done  by  the 
British,  was,  to  quote  from  their  instructions,  to  make  the 
Americans  "sensible  of  the  impropriety  as  well  as  of  the  inhu 
manity  of  the  system  they  have  adopted."  This  referred  to  the 
destruction  of  villages  and  buildings  by  American  militia  in 
Canada.* 


*Adams. 


LECTURE  V. 
THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

TAYLOR'S  CAMPAIGN. 

(48)  This  war  grew  out  of  the  annexation  of  Texas  and 
our  dispute  with  Mexico  over  the  boundary  line.  Texas  had 
achieved  her  independence  of  Mexico  in  1836,  and  in  less  than 
a  year  her  sovereignty  was  acknowledged  by  our  Government. 
Soon  afterwards  Texas  applied  for  annexation  to  the  United 
States,  and  a  bill  to  that  effect,  after  much  discussion  in  Con 
gress,  finally  passed  in  March,  1845. 

As  had  been  anticipated,  Mexico  showed  her  resentment  of 
this  act,  by  recalling  her  minister  at  once   from  Washington, 
and  terminating  further  diplomatic  intercourse  with  the  United 
States.    On  account  of  this  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Mexican 
government,  and  hostile  demonstrations  and  rumors  along  the 
Rio  Grande,   Colonel   Zachary    Taylor,    6th.   Infantry,  U.   S. 
Army,'  acting  under  orders  from  the  War  Department,  estab 
lished  a  large  camp  of  troops  at  Corpus  Christi,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Nueces  River,  in  the  autumn  of  1845.    The  first  troops 
to  arrive  were  eight  companies  of  the  3rd  Infantry,  which  Gen 
eral  Taylor  took  with  him  by  transport  from  New  Orleans.    By 
the  end  of  October  General  Taylor's  command  consisted  of  the 
following  regiments : 
2nd  Dragoons, 
1st,  2nd,  3rd,  4th  Artillery, 
3rd,  4th,  5th,  7th,  8th  Infantry. 
Aggregate,  3,554  officers  and  men. 

This  was  the  entire  regular  army  of  the  United  States,  as  it 
then  existed,  with  the  exception  of  one  regiment  of  dragoons 
and  three  of  infantry.  The  weakest  of  the  regiments  contained 
only  169  rank  and  file,  and  the  strongest  only  375.*  The 
Mexican  forces,  including  state  troops  and  rural  guards,  were 
estimated  at  about  30,000;  but  a  revolution  led  by  General 
Paredes  had  just  overthrown  the  government.  The  changes 

*Upton. 

81 


82  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

among  the  higher  officers,  and  the  jealousies  and  confusion, 
occasioned  by  this  event,  greatly  hindered  the  mobilization  and 
hampered  the  operations  of  the  Mexicans. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

The  territory  between  the  Nueces  River  and  the  Rio  Grande, 
about  130  miles  wide  along  the  coast,  was  in  dispute.  Texas 
claimed  the  Rio  Grande  as  her  boundary,  but  as  yet  had  exer 
cised  no  jurisdiction  south  of  Corpus  Christi.  For  several 
hundred  miles  back  from  the  coast  this  country  was  low  and 
flat,  covered  with  prairie  grass,  chaparral  [thickets  of  mez- 
quite],  and  cactus  flats  in  irregular  patches  of  greater  or  less 
area.  There  were  also  many  marshes  and  lagoons,  especially 
near  the  coast.  There  were  trains  and  roads'  practicable  for 
troops  and  artillery  in  almost  any  direction.  Along  the  coast 
were  several  low  islands;  the  principal  one,  Padre  Island, 
stretching  from  the  mouth  of  the  Nueces  to  that  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  formed  a  perfect  barrier  separating  the  main  coast 
from  the  Gulf*  of  Mexico  between  these  two  points ;  and  with 
out  the  mouths  of  these  two  rivers  there  were  sandbars  over 
which  only  lighters  and  boats  of  light  draft  could  pass.  Similar 
craft  could  navigate  Laguna  de  la  Madre,  the  narrow  passage 
between  Padre  Island  and  the  mainland. 

South  of  the  Rio  Grande  the  Gulf  coast  and  the  country  are 
of  similar  character  westward  to  the  slopes  of  the  Sierra  Madre 
— a  part  of  the  great  mountain-chain  that  forms  the  back 
bone  of  the  continent, — the  great  divide  between  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  slopes.  But  the  country  is  more  densely  covered 
with  trees  and  vegetation;  and  the  climate  is  hotter,  un- 
healthier,  more  unbearable.  This  is  the  Tierra  Caliente.  It 
generally  contains  plenty  of  water  and  grass,  but  in  no  other 
respect  is  it  fit  for  the  march  of  troops.  The  mountain-slopes 
lead  up  to  the  high  interior  table-land,  which  falls  away  gradu 
ally  from  a  general  elevation  of  about  7,500  feet  at  the  City  of 
Mexico,  to  about  4,000  feet  above  sea-level  at  El  Paso. 

The  main  road  southward  to  this  table-land  broke  into  the 
mountains  at  Monterey;  and  at  Saltillo,  seventy  miles  farther 
southward,  came  out  upon  the  high  plateau.  From  Saltillo  on 
to  San  Luis  Potosi,  some  300  miles,  the  country  was  so  dry  and 
barren  as  almost  to  be  a  desert.  There  was  not  a  running 
stream  between  those  points.  From  San  Luis  Potosi  south- 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  83 

ward  the  country  was  excellent  in  every  way — fertile,  cool, 
well-watered,  thickly  settled,  and  traversed  by  good  roads. 
There  were  two  roads  from  Camargo  to  Monterey,  and  another 
which,  starting  at  San  Antonio,  Texas,  crossed  the  Rio  Grande 
at  Laredo,  and,  passing  through  Monclova,  joined  the  road 
through  Monterey  at  Saltillo.  From  there  the  direct  road  to 
the  City  of  Mexico  led  southward  through  San  Luis  Potosi. 

PLANS. 

General  Taylor's  instructions  were,  "to  defend  Te.xas  from 
invasion  .  .  .  and  should  Mexico  invade  it  ... 
[to]  employ  all  his  forces  to  repulse  the  invaders,  and  drive  all 
Mexican  troops  beyond  the  Rio  Grande/'  Further  instruc 
tions  from  the  Secretary  of  War  said,  "The  assembling 
of  a  large  Mexican  army  on  the  borders  of  Texas,  and 
crossing  the  Rio  Grande  with  a  considerable  force,  will  be  re 
garded  by  the  Executive  here  as  an  invasion  of  the  United 
States  and  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  An  attempt  to 
cross  the  river  with  such  a  force  will  also  be  considered  in  the 
same  light.  ...  In  case  of  war  .  .  .  your  main  object  will 
be  the  protection  of  Texas ;  but  the  pursuit  of  this  object  will 
not  necessarily  confine  your  action  within  the  territory  of 
Texas."*  Taylor  was  also  authorized  to  call  on  Texas  and 
several  other  near  States,  for  volunteers,  if  he  should  need 
them.  He  was  not,  however,  to  call  for  volunteers  until  inva 
sion  actually  took  place,  hence  was  to  have  no  opportunity  to 
train  them  in  his  winter  camp  at  Corpus  Christi.  He  spent  the 
time,  however,  in  training  and  drilling  his  regulars.  They  had 
never  been  assembled  in  large  bodies  before,  but  "four-fifths 
of  his  officers  had  received  the  benefits  of  professional  training 
at  the  Military  Academy,  or  in  the  Florida  war."* 

Mexico's  plan  was  to  assemble  as  large  a  force  as  practicable 
at  Matamoros,  and  drive  all  American  troops  beyond  the 
Nueces. 

OPERATIONS. 

(49)  Better  to  carry  out  his  instructions,  General  Taylor 
marched  his  little  army  to  the  Rio  Grande,  and  at  the  end  of 
March,  1846,  established  a  camp  opposite  Matamoros,  and  a 
depot  of  supplies  at  Point  Isabel,  nine  miles  to  the  northeast  on 

*Upton. 


'  84  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  coast.  On  his  way  he  was  met  by  a  Mexican  delegation 
sent  to  protest  against  his  invasion  of  Mexican  territory;  and 
he  himself  issued  a  proclamation  announcing  the  purpose  of  his 
occcupation,  and  promising  protection  to  the  people. 

Meantime  a  Mexican  army  estimated  at  6,000  had  assembled 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Rio  Grande,  at  Matamoros,  under 
General  Ampudia.  On  the  12th  of  April  Ampudia  sent  Gen 
eral  Taylor  an  order  to  break  up  his  camp  within  twenty-four 
hours  and  withdraw  to  the  Nueces  River,  or  accept  war  as  the 
alternative.  Ampudia  was  superseded  in  command  within  a 
few  days  by  General  Arista,  who  was  as  eager  for  action  as 
Ampudia.* 

(50)  On  the  24th  of  April  Arista  ordered  a  considerable 
detachment  under  General  Torrejon  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande  at 
La  Palangana,  six  miles  above  Matamoros.  The  next  day  this 
detachment  encountered  a  small  reconnoitering  party  of  the  2nd 
Dragoons,  under  Captain  Thornton,  and  killed  one  officer  and 
sixteen  men,  and  captured  the  rest.  The  entire  American  loss, 
killed  and  captured,  was  four  officers  and  fifty-nine  dragoons. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  the  war.  General  Taylor  at  once 
asked  the  governors  of  Texas  and  Louisiana  each  for  four 
regiments  of  volunteers.  The  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  was 
blockaded  by  an  American  revenue  cutter  and  the  brig  Law 
rence,  to  prevent  supplies  from  entering  by  water  for  Arista's 
army. 

On  April  30  General  Arista,  leaving  General  Mejia  in  com 
mand  at  Matamoros,  marched  the  bulk  of  his  army  to  Longo- 
refio,  about  five  miles  below  Matamoros,  where  he  expected  to 
cross  the  river,  in  order  to  cut  off  the  communications  of  the 
American  army  with  its  base  of  supplies  at  Point  Isabel.  A 
scarcity  of  boats  caused  a  delay  of  twenty-four  hours  in  his 
passage. 

General  Taylor  had  caused  his  camp  to  be  fortified  and  pre 
pared  for  defense.  Anxious  about  the  safety  of  his  base  of 
supplies,  he  left  Major  Jacob  Brown  with  the  7th  Infantry  and 
two  batteries  at  this  camp,  and  started  himself  with  the  rest  of 
his  force,  on  the  afternoon  of  May  1,  for  Point  Isabel,  arriving 
there  the  next  day  at  noon. 

Arista's  delay  in  crossing  had  prevented  his  capturing  the 
depot  at  Point  Isabel,  or  getting  between  Taylor's  army  and 
that  place.  But  he  was  anxious  for  a  battle  with  the  little 
American  army.  So  he  marched  to  Palo  Alto,  on  the  road  be- 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  85 

tween  Taylor's  camp  and  Point  Isabel;  and  to  hasten  General 
Taylor's  return,  he  dispatched  orders  to  General  Mejia  to  open 
with  artillery  on  the  American  camp,  and  sent  General  Am- 
pudia  with  four  cannon  and  a  considerable  force  to  attack  it 
on  the  northern  bank  of  the  river.  Ampudia  opened  fire  upon 
the  camp  on  the  morning  of  May  5,  and  kept  it  up  until  mid 
night  of  the  7th,  when  he  was  recalled  by  Arista  to  aid  him 
against  Taylor,  who  had  started  back  from  Point  Isabel  to  the 
relief  of  Major  Brown's  garrison. 

(51)  At  about  noon  on  May  8  Taylor  found  Arista's  army 
in  line  of  battle  near  Palo  Alto.  The  right  of  the  Mexican  line 
rested  on  a  sort  of  low  ridge,  about  3,000  yards  to  the  east  of 
Taylor's  road;  the  left  reached  to  the  road,  which  passed  along 
the  edge  of  a  swampy  chaparral.  The  right  of  the  line  was  cov 
ered  by  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  the  left  by  eight  squadrons. 
The  guns  were  in  the  intervals  between  the  infantry  regiments. 
The  line  faced  nearly  north  and  had  a  clear  field  of  fire  over  a 
stretch  of  prairie  with  several  swampy  places  in  it.  The  left 
of  the  line  rested  on  a  marsh,  and  there  were  two  large  marshes 
immediately  in  rear  of  the  line. 

The  left  of  the  Mexican  line  was  the  weaker,  and  the  chapar 
ral  on  that  flank  offered  some  cover  for  the  Americans.  So 
General  Taylor  made  his  main  attack  against  that  flank.  Cap 
tain  May's  squadron  covered  the  left  of  Taylor's  line,  while 
Captain  Ker's  squadron  guarded  the  exposed  right,  and  the 
rear  where  the  train  was  parking.  As  with  the  Mexican  line, 
the  artillery  was  posted  between  the  infantry  regiments. 

Taylor's  line  advanced  in  regimental  columns  until  the  Mexi 
can  artillery  opened  upon  it.  Thereupon  it  deployed.  The 
Mexican  cavalry  under  General  Torrejon  now  moved  through 
the  chaparral  to  attack  the  right  and  rear  of  the  American 
line ;  but  it  was  repulsed  by  the  5th  Infantry,  which  was  on  the 
right  flank,  and  a  section  of  artillery.  The  Mexican  left  was 
now  drawn  back.  Taylor  changed  the  direction  of  his  line  to 
conform  to  the  new  position  of  the  enemy.  There  was  now 
about  an  hour's  cessation  of  the  battle. 

May's  squadron  was  sent  round  against  the  Mexican  left 
flank ;  but  finding  itself  greatly  outnumbered  it  did  not  charge, 
but  withdrew  to  the  rear. 

Just  before  dark  Arista  massed  his  troops  in  his  right  wing 
and  moved  them  against  the  American  left  flank  and  rear, 
sending  Torrejon  again  with  his  cavalry  against  the  American 
right.  The  main  attack  was  repulsed  by  Duncan's  battery, 


86  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

supported  by  the  8th  Infantry  and  Ker's  squadron  of  cavalry. 
The  cavalry  attack  was  also  repulsed.  At  this  moment  there 
was  great  confusion  in  the  Mexican  line,  and,  if  the  Americans 
had  followed  up  their  success  by  a  vigorous  counter-attack, 
the  Mexicans  would  probably  have  been  routed.*  It  was  now 
dark  and  the  Mexicans  retired  into  the  chaparral  in  rear  of 
their  position ;  the  Americans  bivouacked  on  the  battle-field. 

Although  General  Taylor  took  the  offensive  in  this  battle  and 
advanced  to  the  attack,  he  found  himself  outnumbered  by- 
Arista's  army,  especially  in  cavalry,  and  was  immediately 
thrown  upon  the  defensive.  General  Wilcox  in  his  account 
says:  "The  action  of  May  8  on  the  plains  of  Palo  Alto  was, 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  forces,  defensive  and  mainly 
of  artillery  against  Mexican  artillery  and  cavalry  supported 
by  infantry."f 

One  incident  occurred  in  the  combat  that  might  happen, 
with  like  effects,  even  in  our  day  of  long-range  magazine  fire: 
the  prairie  grass  was  set  on  fire  by  bursting  shells,  and  the 
smoke  for  a  time  concealed  the  movements  of  the  hostile  armies 
from  each  other. 

At  Palo  Alto  the  Americans  numbered  2,288,  and  the  Mexi 
cans  were  estimated  at  about  6,000.  The  Mexican  account  of 
the  combat  gives  the  number  of  the  Mexicans  as  only  3,000. 

At  dawn  the  next  morning  the  hostile  armies  were  in  sight  of 
each  other,  but  by  sunrise  the  Mexicans  had  begun  a  retreat 
for  Matamoros.  The  American  army,  with  its  front  well  cov 
ered  by  scouts,  took  up  the  pursuit.  About  three  miles  from 
the  battle-field  of  the  day  before,  Arista  in  his  retreat  came 
upon  what  he  conceived  to  be  a  very  strong  position.  Here  he 
decided  to  halt  his  army.  (52)  He  placed  his  line  in  a  re- 
saca,  or  narrow  shallow  swale,  which  crossed  the  road  in  the 
midst  of  a  thick  chaparral  and  ended  in  a  pool  of  water  at  each 
end.  Arista  appears  not  to  have  believed  that  the  Americans 
would  seriously  attack  him  in  this  position;  he  had  his  tent 
pitched  and  was  busy  writing,  when  General  Taylor  opened 
fire  on  his  line,  and  began  the  battle  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 
Some  Mexican  artillery  in  and  near  the  road  on  both  sides  of 
the  swale  could  not  be  driven  back;  so  Captain  May  was  or 
dered  to  charge  it  with  his  squadron.  On  account  of  the  dense 
growth  May  could  only  move  in  the  road,  and  had  to  charge  in 


*The   Other   Side,   a   Mexican    account    of    the    war,    translated    and 
edited  by  Colonel  Albert  C.  Ramsay,  U.  S.  Army. 
•^History  of  the  Mexican  War,  by  General  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  87 

! 

column  of  fours.  He  captured  seven  guns  and  a  Mexican  gen 
eral.  He  was  driven  from  the  battery  by  Mexican  infantry, 
but  the  guns  were  soon  retaken  by  American  infantry.  The 
action  in  the  chaparral  lasted  for  some  time,  but  the  Mexicans 
were  finally  routed.  (50)  They  dispersed  and  fled,  never 
stopping  till  they  had  crossed  the  Rio  Grande. 

Ker's  dragoons,  Duncan's  battery,  and  the  3rd  Infantry  fol 
lowed  in  pursuit.  The  Mexican  account  states  that  if  Taylor 
had  pursued  with  his  whole  available  force,  and  followed  the 
fugitives  across  the  river,  "it  is  undoubted  that  he  would  have 
completely  destroyed  them  and  taken  Matamoros  without  op 
position."*  But  Taylor  had  no  means  of  crossing  the  river. 
The  Mexican  batteries  at  Matamoros  opened  on  the  pursuers, 
and  the  American  guns  in  Fort  Brown  (as  the  fort  built  oppo 
site  Matamoros  was  afterwards  named,  in  honor  of  Major 
Jacob  Brown,  who  was  killed  there  during  the  siege  and  at 
tack  by  the  Mexicans)  "were  directed  upon  the  mass  of  fleeing 
Mexicans  while  crossing  at  the  upper  ferry."f 

The  losses  of  the  Americans  in  the  two  engagements  were 
170  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  estimated  loss  of  the  Mexi 
cans,  1,000.$  Arista's  baggage  and  all  sorts  of  plunder  were 
abandoned  to  the  Americans. 

The  next  day,  May  10,  the  American  army  was  again  assem 
bled  opposite  Matamoros.  •  Several  days  were  spent  by  its  com 
mander  in  arranging  with  Commodore  Connor,  who  commanded 
the  American  squadron  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  for  the 
proper  defense  of  the  American  base  at  Point  Isabel,  and  for 
the  complete  opening  and  holding  of  the  river 

On  his  way  back  to  Fort  Brown  from  Point  Isabel  Taylor 
received  word  that  Mexican  reinforcements  were  coming  into 
Matamoros,  and  that  Barita  and  other  points  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Rio  Grande  were  being  fortified ;  so  he  dispatched  a  de 
tachment  of  300  volunteers,  several  regiments  of  which  had 
joined  the  army,  to  Brazos,  there  to  be  ferried  across  by  the 
navy.  The  detachment  seized  Barita  on  the  17th  of  May. 
The  same  day  Arista  sent  Taylor  a  written  request  for  an 
armistice,  until  the  two  governments  could  arrange  terms. 
The  request  was  promptly  declined.  The  next  day,  May  18, 
Taylor  crossed  his  army  in  boats  and  launches  to  the  Mexican 

*The  Other  Side. 

fWilcox. 

jUpton. 


88  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

side,  and  took  possession  of  Matamoros,  without  any  resist 
ance. 

(49)  Arista  had  withdrawn  his  army  toward  Linares,  150 
miles  southwest,  whence  it  could  march  promptly  to  Monterey 
or  Victoria,  according  to  the  direction  the  enemy  should  take.* 
Taylor  started  all  of  his  cavalry,  regular  and  volunteer,  in  pur 
suit  on  the  19th.  It  followed  the  enemy  sixty  or  seventy  miles, 
but  was  then  forced  to  return  by  the  lack  of  water  for  men  and 
animals.  After  a  march  of  great  hardship,  due  to  scarcity  of 
food  and  water,  Arista's  dispirited  army  reached  Linares  on  the 
28th  of  May.  Arista  was  relieved  from  command  and  ordered 
before  a  court-martial. 

The  victories  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma  gave  the 
Americans  control  of  the  Rio  Grande;  but  for  lack  of  troops, 
especially  cavalry,  and  more  so  for  lack  of  land  and  water 
transportation,  Taylor  was  unable  to  follow  up  the  Mexican 
army.  He  had  made  timely  requisition  for  boats  and  wagons ; 
yet,  for  want  of  them,  his  army  had  to  lie  idle  for  three  months. 
He  reestablished  his  camp  opposite  Matamoros. 

The  Sierra  Madre  range  was  to  be  the  new  line  of  defense 
for  the  Mexicans,  and  Monterey  was  selected  as  General  Tay 
lor's  first  objective.  Camargo  was  the  natural  place  for  his 
advanced  or  secondary  base,  because  the  road  from  that  point 
to  Monterey  was  shorter  than  that  from  any  point  farther  down 
the  Rio  Grande ;  and,  more  important  still,  it  lay  in  the  valley 
of  the  San  Juan  River,  where  plenty  of  water  and  wood  could 
be  found.  The  depot  at  Camargo  could  be  supplied  by  water 
transport  from  the  base  at  Point  Isabel,  and  the  route  all  the 
way  down  the  river  was  practicable  for  artillery  and  wagons 
on  both  banks. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MONTEREY. 

Toward  the  middle  of  August  Taylor  had  his  invading  force 
gathered  together  at  Camargo.  For  lack  of  transportation  he 
had  been  obliged  to  leave  some  6,000  volunteers  at  Fort  Brown, 
but  still  had  about  6,000  men  with  him.  He  organized  them 
into  two  divisions  of  regulars  under  Generals  Worth  and 
Twiggs,  and  one  of  volunteers  under  General  Butler.  He 
established  another  depot  at  Cerralvo,  connected  with  Camargo 
by  two  roads,  each  about  seventy-five  miles  long. 


*The  Other  Side. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  89 

With  its  cavalry  in  advance,  the  American  army  began  its 
march  from  Camargo  on  August  19,  the  rear  division,  the  vol 
unteers,  not  leaving  till  September  6.  By  the  13th  of  Septem 
ber  the  entire  army  was  concentrated  at  Cerralvo.  The  march 
was  resumed  on  the  18th.  The  Mexican  cavalry,  which  had 
now  shown  itself,  fell  back  before  the  American  squadrons, 
and,  on  the  night  of  the  19th  of  September,  the  American  army 
bivouacked  at  Walnut  Springs,  three  miles  from  Monterey. 
The  Mexican  army,  now  again  commanded  by  General  Am- 
pudia,  had  anticipated  the  movement  against  Monterey,  and 
had  itself  moved  thither  and  prepared  the  town  for  defense. 

(53)  Monterey  is  inclosed  on  the  west  and  south  by  high 
ridges  of  the  Sierra  Madre  through  which  the  San  Juan  River 
breaks.  The  river  here  flows  eastward  and  then  turns  toward 
the  northeast.  The  town  lies  in  the  bend  thus  formed. 
Through  the  northern  edge  of  the  town  runs  a  smaller  stream, 
branch  of  the  San  Juan,  spanned  by  a  fortified  stone  bridge. 
Beyond  this  stream  to  thQ  northward  the  ground  rises  in  gen 
tler  slopes  than  those  south  of  the  town.  The  defensive  works 
consisted  of  the  masonry  citadel,  1,500  yards  north  of  the  main 
plaza  and  close  to  the  Camargo  road,  and  several  small  forts 
and  buildings  on  other  sides  of  the  city.  On  the  east  were  two 
small  forts  and  a  stone  tannery  prepared  for  defense.  On  the 
west,  covering  the  roads  entering  from  that  side,  three  or  four 
small  forts  occupied  commanding  points,  and  a  stone  building, 
the  Bishop's  Palace,  stood  upon  a  very  prominent  isolated  hill. 
South  of  the  town  the  gorge  of  the  river  was  impassable,  and 
no  roads  entered  from  that  side.  The  stone  wall  of  the  ceme 
tery  in  the  western  edge  of  the  town,  and  the  stone  parapets 
around  the  flat  roofs  of  the  houses,  also  gave  excellent  protec 
tion  for  the  defenders. 

The  line  of  communication  of  the  Mexican  garrison  was  the 
Saltillo  road,  leading  from  the  western  side  of  the  town.  Gen 
eral  Taylor's  attack  had  for  its  main  purpose  to  get  possession 
of  this  road.  The  "main  attack"  was  therefore  to  be  made  by  a 
turning  movement  of  General  Worth's  division  against  the 
works  on  the  west,  while  the  "secondary  attack"  would  be  made 
against  the  north  and  east  of  the  town,  by  Twiggs's  regular  and 
Butler's  volunteer  divisions. 

Worth  started  out  on  his  turning  movement  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  20th  of  September.  The  next  morning  he  was  received 
with  a  charge  of  cavalry  west  of  the  hill  upon  which  the  Bish 
op's  Palace  stood.  Thus  the  battle  of  Monterey  began.  The 


90  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Mexican  cavalry  was  repulsed.  The  battle  lasted  until  the 
evening  of  the  23rd.  The  Americans  took  one  work  after 
another,  until  they  were  in  possession  of  all  except  the  citadel ; 
this  stronghold  held  out  to  the  last.  At  length,  after  much 
fighting  in  the  streets  and  from  the  housetops,  the  Mexicans 
were  driven  in  about  the  main  plaza;  and  at  3  a.  m.,  on  the 
24th  of  September,  General  Ampudia  sent  a  note  to  Taylor 
proposing  terms  of  surrender.  The  battle  was,  thereupon,  sus 
pended  ;  and,  after  some  hours  of  conference,  terms  were 
agreed  upon.  "The  terms  were,  briefly,  the  Mexican  army  to 
retire,  the  infantry  and  cavalry  carrying  their  arms  V  tff*^  the 
artillery  to  retain  one  battery  not  to  exceed  six  pieces  .  . 
the  Mexican  flag,  when  struck  at  the  citadel,  to  be  saluted  by 
its  own  battery."* 

(49)  "In  addition,  it  was  agreed  that  the  Mexican  armed 
forces  should  retire  within  seven  days  beyond  the  line  Rinco- 
nado-Linares-San  Fernando,  and  that  the  forces  of  the  United 
States  were  not  to  advance  beyond  this  same  line  before  the 
expiration  of  eight  weeks,  or  until  the  orders  of  the  respective 
governments  be  received." 

In  this  battle  the  aggregate  strength  of  the  American  army 
was  6,650;  that  of  the  Mexicans  about  10,000.*  The  American 
losses  were  488  killed  and  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  Mexicans 
is  not  accurately  known. 

(48)  The  Mexican  army  retreated  to  San  Luis  Potosi, 
where  General  Santa  Anna  took  command  of  it,  and  set  about 
reorganizing  it.  Santa  Anna,  with  the  connivance  of  the 
American  authorities,  had  lately  returned  from  exile.  He  was 
immediately  elected  President  of  the  Republic,  and  he  person 
ally  conducted  all  the  subsequent  operations  against  the  invaders 
of  his  country. 

The  Administration  at  Washington  disapproved  the  armis 
tice  granted  at  the  surrender  of  Monterey,  and  ordered  Taylor 
to  resume  hostilities  at  once;  but  the  order  reached  Taylor  in 
time  to  shorten  the  armistice  by  only  about  a  week.  Accord 
ingly  General  Worth's  division  was  started  forward  on  the  13th 
of  November  to  take  and  hold  Saltillo.  The  place  was  occupied 
without  opposition. 

Saltillo  was  strategically  an  important  point.  As  we  have 
seen,  it  was  where  the  road  to  the  capital  passed  from  the 
mountains  into  the  high  central  table-land ;  there,  also,  a  road 


*Wilcox. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  91 

came  in  from  Parras,  a  town  a  hundred  miles  farther  west, 
where  there  was  another  American  column,  under  General 
Wool.  Parras  was  situated  in  a  very  fertile  region,  from 
which  General  Taylor  could  draw  provisions  for  his  troops. 
Furthermore,  Saltillo  was  the  capital  of  Coahuila,  which  gave 
it  a  political  importance.  General  Taylor  did  not  contemplate 
any  farther  advance  toward  the  City  of  Mexico  along  this  line. 

General  Wool's  column,  about  2,000  strong,  had  marched  in 
dependently  from  San  Antonio,  Texas,  by  way  of  Monclova. 
It  had  met  no  opposition  and  had  now,  at  Parras,  come  under 
Taylor's  command. 

The  Administration  at  Washington  was  desirous  of  having 
the  State  of  Tamaulipas  occupied  as  a  means  of  making  the 
Mexican  government  and  people  want  peace.  Accordingly 
the  important  port  of  Tampico,  from  which  Santa  Anna  had 
withdrawn  its  garrison*  was  taken  by  Commodore  Perry  about 
the  middle  of  November ;  and  General  Taylor  marched  an  ex 
pedition  from  Monterey  to  Victoria,  the  capital  of  the  State. 
A  detachment  under  General  Shields  was  sent  down  from  the 
Rio  Grande  to  garrison  Tampico,  and  the  port  was  afterwards 
used  as  a  base  for  the  fleet  and  army  in  the  operations  against 
Vera  Cruz. 

In  December  Santa  Anna,  taking  advantage  of  Taylor's 
movement  against  Victoria,  threatened  to  advance  against 
Worth  at  Saltillo.  General  Wool,  therefore,  moved  his  com 
mand  from  Parras  and  joined  Worth.  Santa  Anna  remained 
at  Potosi. 

On  the  4th  of  January,  1847,  General  Taylor  was  at  Vic 
toria  with  Twiggs's  division  of  regulars  from  Monterey  and 
Patterson's  division  of  volunteers,  which  had  marched  down 
from  Camargo.  A  few  days  later  Taylor  received  orders  de 
taching  from  his  command  to  General  Scott's  expedition  against 
Mexico  City,  all  of  his  regulars,  except  four  batteries  of 
artillery  and  two  squadrons  of  dragoons,  and  all  of  his  vol 
unteers,  except  some  4,000  at  the  front,  and  a  few  thousands 
guarding  his  line  of  communications.  With  so  small  a  force 
Taylor  could  hope  to  do  no  more  than  hold  the  advanced  posi 
tion  of  Saltillo  or  Monterey.  General  Worth  had  been  taken 
from  him,  but  Wool  was  left  in  cpmmand  at  Saltillo.  Gen 
eral  Taylor  arrived  at  Saltillo,  and  resumed  command  there 
February  2. 

Several  small  detachments  sent  forward  by  Wool  to  recon- 
noiter  had  been  attacked,  and  some  of  them  captured.  (54)  "To 


92  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

restore  confidence  among  the  volunteers,  shaken  by  the  late 
captures,"  Taylor  moved  the  bulk  of  his  little  force,  February 
5,  eighteen  miles  farther  south  to  Agua  Nueva. 

Santa  Anna  got  possession  of  General  Scott's  dispatch  to 
Taylor  detailing  all  the  plans  for  the  expedition  against  Vera 
Cruz,  including  the  reduction  of  Taylor's  forces;  so  Santa 
Anna  resolved  to  march  his  army  from  San  Luis  Potosi  to  de 
stroy  Taylor's  weak  force.  Egged  on  by  the  press  of  the 
capital  city,  he  started  on  his  march  of  300  miles  before  he 
had  provided  adequate  subsistence  and  clothing  for  his  army. 
The  march  was  begun  on  the  28th  of  January,  and  the  troops 
suffered  almost  every  hardship  incident  to  campaigning — 
heat,  cold,  rain,  snow,  hunger,  thirst,  rags,  bare  feet,  sickness. 
Before  the  end  of  the  journey,  the  army  had  lost  a  fifth  of  its 
number  by  death,  sickness,  straggling,  and  desertion.  On  the 
morning  of  February  21,  May  brought  in  the  news  that  Santa 
Anna's  army  was  advancing  rapidly. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BUENA  VISTA. 

Back  on  the  road  some  thirteen  miles,  near  the  hacienda  of 
Buena  Vista,  was  an  excellent  defensive  position  at  the  north 
ern  end  of  a  narrow  defile,  or  angostura.  Here  Taylor  re 
solved  to  stand  for  battle  with  the  enemy.  Leaving  his  vol 
unteer  cavalry  as  a  rear-guard  to  forward  the  stores  and  burn 
such  as  it  should  not  have  time  to  move,  Taylor  withdrew  at 
once  to  Buena  Vista.  As  soon  as  Santa  Anna  learned  of  the 
withdrawal  and  the  burning  of  stores,  he  was  convinced  that 
the  Americans  had  begun  a  precipitate  retreat.  His  chief  con 
cern  was  to  overtake  them  and  bring  them  to  battle. 

(55)  The  road  back  to  Buena  Vista  and  Saltillo  passed 
through  the  angostura.  Along  the  western  side  of  the  road 
was  a  small  stream  flowing  between  banks  twenty  feet  high  and 
almost  vertical.  It  could  be  crossed  at  a  few  points  only. 
High  mountain  ridges  rose  on  each  side  of  the  defile.  On  the 
western  side  the  space  between  the  foot  of  the  mountain-slope 
and  the  stream  was  so  cut  up  by  deep  gulches  as  to  be  impassa 
ble  for  any  troops.  On  the  eastern  side,  between  the  stream 
and  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  was  a  flat  plateau  forty  or  fifty 
feet  above  the  roadway,  cut  into  narrow  tables  by  ravines  run 
ning  from  the  foot  of  the  mountain-slope  down  to  the  valley 
of  the  stream.  Most  of  the  ravines  could  be  crossed  by  in 
fantry,  but  with  difficulty. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  93 

It  was  on  these  narrow  tables,  and  around  the  heads  of  the 
ravines,  that  the  main  part  of  the  fighting  at  Buena  Vista  was 
done.  One  of  the  tables  was  from  one  to  three  thousand  feet 
wide,  and  the  point  in  which  it  terminated  came  down  so  close 
to  the  bank  of  the  stream  as  barely  to  leave  space  wide  enough 
for  a  wagon  to  pass.  At  this  narrow  point  of  the  road  five 
guns  of  Captain  Washington's  battery  were  placed  behind  an 
embankment.  They  were  supported  by  the  3rd  Indiana  regi 
ment  posted  on  a  hill  between  the  two  branches  of  the  road 
back  of  the  defile.  From  there  the  American  line  of  battle  ex 
tended  up  the  middle  of  this  table  some  3,000  yards.  Lieu 
tenant  O'Brien  had  the  other  three  guns  of  Washington's  bat 
tery  at  the  left  of  the  infantry  line,  and  still  farther  to  the  left 
the  volunteer  cavalry  and  riflemen  were  guarding  the  flanks  on 
the  mountain-slopes.  Bragg's  battery  with  a  regiment  of  in 
fantry  took  position  on  a  table  to  the  right  [west]  of  the 
angostura. 

Santa  Anna's  army  came  up  the  next  day,  February  22,  and 
finding  the  Americans  in  position  for  battle,  made  its  disposi 
tions  for  attack.  General  Ampudia,  with  a  brigade  of  light 
troops,  pushed  out  to  the  right  of  the  Mexicans,  and  driving 
back  the  dismounted  American  cavalry  and  riflemen  in  that 
quarter,  took  up  a  position  on  the  mountainside.  Two  divi 
sions,  Lombardini's  and  Pacheco's,  were  formed  abreast  of  each 
other  to  the  right  [east]  of  the  road,  with  Ortega's  to  their 
right  and  rear  in  reserve.  Mejia's  brigade  got  across  the  stream 
and  took  position  to  the  left  [west]  of  the  road.  Blanco's 
column  formed  in  the  road. 

The  Mexican  army  was  strong  in  cavalry.  So  General 
Mifion's  cavalry  division  had  been  detached  to  make  a  swift 
turning  movement  by  the  mountain  roads  to  the  east,  in  order 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Taylor's  army.  The  rest  of  the  cav 
alry  was  in  three  bodies,  one  supporting  each  flank,  and  the 
reserve  under  Andrade  behind  the  center  of  the  litie.  The 
artillery  was  posted  in  two  strong  bodies  behind  the  wings  of 
the  army.  These  were  about  the  positions  of  the  two  hostile 
forces,  when  the  battle  opened  in  earnest,  at  dawn  on  the  morn 
ing  of  February  23. 

Fearful  of  the  capture  of  his  supplies  by  Mifion's  cavalry, 
Taylor,  taking  Jefferson  Davis's  regiment  of  Mississippi  Rifles 
and  May's  squadron  of  dragoons,  went  back  to  Saltillo,  six 
miles  away,  on  the  evening  of  the  22nd,  and  was  there  when 
the  battle  began  at  dawn  on  the  23rd. 


94  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Ampudia  opened  the  fight  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Ameri 
can  position ;  his  purpose  was  to  turn  that  flank.  Soon  the 
divisions  of  Lombardini  and  Pacheco  advanced  against  the 
American  left  flank,  and  Blanco's  moved  by  the  road  against 
the  right.  This  division  soon  came  under  such  destructive 
fire  from  the  batteries  of  Washington  and  Bragg,  and  their 
supports,  that  it  was  ordered  by  Santa  Anna  to  halt  under 
shelter  of  the  ground.  Mejia's  brigade  crossed  to  the  east  of 
the  road.  Pacheco's  division,  composed  of  recruits,  almost 
immediately  broke  and  fled  from  the  field ;  but  the  rest  of  the 
Mexican  forces  pushed  forward. 

An  Indiana  regiment  supporting  O'Brien's  guns  was  the 
first  part  of  the  American  line  to  break;  and  soon  the  whole 
line  was  forced  back.  Finally  the  American  left  was  turned 
and  the  Mexican  cavalry  was  in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing  regi 
ments.  At  this  crisis  Taylor  returned  from  Saltillo  with  May's 
cavalry  and  all  but  two  companies  of  Davis's  Rifles.  This  regi 
ment  was  deployed  to  the  left  of  Buena  Vista,  and  with  rein 
forcements  that  were  hastened  to  it,  it  succeeded  in  checking 
the  enveloping  Mexicans.  But  the  battle  kept  up  till  dark. 

The  Americans  were  so  greatly  outnumbered  by  the  Mexi 
cans,  and  they  had  to  defend  a  position  so  much  too  extensive 
for  their  strength,  that  their  regiments,  batteries,  and  squad 
rons  were  kept  shifting  their  positions  all  day  long.  They 
would  be  driven  back  from  one  point,  only  to  reform  and  take 
up  a  new  position.  Bragg's  battery  was  posted  first  on  the 
right  flank,  then  it  had  to  be  withdrawn  and  sent  to  the  ha 
cienda.  Later  on  it  went  into  position  in  support  of  Davis's 
Rifles,  and  wherever  else  it  could  do  the  most  good.  And  so 
with  the  other  batteries. 

Finally,  the  Mexican  reserve,  Ortega's  division,  advanced 
upon  the  broad  plateau,  along  which  the  main  position  of  the 
Americans  had  rested  in  the  morning.  American  troops  were 
hurried  to  this  quarter  from  other  parts  of  the  field  as  quickly 
as  possible.  At  last  Bragg's  battery,  General  Taylor  states  in  his 
report,  "without  infantry  to  support  it,  and  at  the  imminent 
risk  of  losing  its  guns,  came  rapidly  into  action,  the  Mexican 
line  being  but  a  few  yards  from  the  muzzles  of  the  pieces.  The 
first  discharge  of  cannister  caused  the  enemy  to  hesitate,  the 
second  and  third  drove  him  back  in  disorder  and  saved  the 
day."* 


*Wilcox. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  95 

This  ended  the  battle.  The  Mexicans  withdrew  from  the 
field  and  fell  back  to  Agua  Nueva.  Meanwhile,  Minon's  cav 
alry  had  attacked  at  Saltillo,  but  had  been  driven  off  by  the 
guard  of  mixed  troops  at  that  point. 

In  the  Battle  of  Buena  Vista  the  strength  of  General  Tay 
lor's  army  was  4,757  men  and  sixteen  guns.  All  the  troops 
were  volunteers,  except  the  artillery  and  two  squadrons  of 
dragoons.  The  American  loss  in  the  two  days'  engagement 
was  756,  of  which  number  267  were  killed,  456  wounded,  and 
23  missing.* 

Santa  Anna  started  from  San  Luis  Potosi  with  some  18,000 
rank  and  file,  but  the  hardships  of  his  long  march  had  been 
such  that  it  is  probable  he  had  no  more  than  14,000  to  put  into 
the  battle.  His  loss  was  between  1,500  and  2,000  men,  294 
of  whom  were  prisoners. 

General  Taylor  was  in  no  condition,  of  course,  to  pursue 
Santa  Anna's  army.  "He  fell  back  to  Monterey,"  says  Wilcox, 
"where  he  remained  for  some  months  keeping  open  communi 
cations  with  the  Rio  Grande,  superintending  the  forwarding 
of  troops  to  reinforce  Scott,  and  gaining  the  encomiums  of  the 
Mexican  authorities  by  his  wise  and  conciliatory  civil  adminis 
tration."* 

In  all  the  annals  of  American  warfare,  no  other  such  vic 
tory  as  that  of  Buena  Vista  can  be  pointed  out.  Upon  ground 
unprepared  for  defense,  with  its  left  flank  practically  in  the 
air, — the  space  was  so  much  too  wide  for  the  force  defending 
it  that  the  heights  on  the  left  could  not  be  properly  guarded, — 
this  little  body  of  well-trained  volunteers  successfully  resisted 
from  daylight  till  dark  the  assaults  of  an  enemy  of  three  times 
its  own  strength ;  and  at  last  repulsed  him  and  kept  the  field. 

COMMENTS. 

With  the  question  of  the  right  or  wrong  of  this  war,  from  a 
political  or  a  moral  point  of  view,  we  are  not  concerned — we 
leave  that  to  "Hosea  Biglow"  and  Mr.  Folk's  Cabinet.  Only 
as  a  military  study  furnished  by  the  history  of  our  own  country 
does  the  war  concern  us  here. 

In  the  strategy  of  General  Taylor's  campaign  and  the  tactics 
of  his  battles,  there  is  little  fault  to  find.  In  the  first  opera- 

*Wilcox. 


96  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

tions,  those  north  of  the  Rio  Grande,  the  student  cannot  help 
feeling,  however,  that  the  general  was  not  quite  as  bold  and 
aggressive  as  he  ought  to  have  been;  that  he  was  more  taken 
up  with  defending  his  own  base  of  supplies,  and  holding  his 
intrenched  camp  opposite  Matamoros,  than  with  destroying  the 
forces  of  the  enemy  that  had  crossed  the  Rio  Grande. 

It  would  appear  that  when  Taylor  learned  on  May  1  that  the 
Mexican  army  was  crossing  the  river  at  Longoreno,  five  miles 
below  his  camp,  he  should  have  marched  all  of  his  available 
force  promptly  against  it,  instead  of  withdrawing  to  his  base. 
His  surest  way  to  protect  his  base  was  to  destroy  the  enemy; 
and  this  he  would  undoubtedly  have  done,  if  he  had  attacked 
vigorously  while  the  enemy  was  in  the  act  of  crossing,  or  im 
mediately  afterwards.  The  Mexican  army  had  only  two  boats, 
and  made  its  passage  very  slowly.  Taylor's  dragoons  ought 
to  have  kept  him  perfectly  informed  as  to  the  progress  of  the 
passage — the  point  of  passage  was  less  than  a  half-hour's 
gallop  from  the  American  camp. 

In  the  combat  of  Palo  Alto,  also,  there  was  the  appearance 
of  over-caution  on  the  part  of  the  American  commander — it 
is  evident  that  he  believed  himself  greatly  outnumbered.  The 
Mexican  account  gives  Arista  only  3,000  men  in  the  engage 
ment;  this  number  is  probably  nearly  right.  Taylor  had  2,288. 
If  our  troops  had  not  been  content  with  repulsing  the  enemy 
and  holding  their  ground,  but  had  made  a  counter-attack  at  the 
right  moment,  they  would  have  routed  the  enemy.  After  de 
feating  the  Mexicans  at  Resaca  de  la  Palma  all  available  troops 
ought  to  have  taken  part  in  the  pursuit.  But  only  a  regiment 
'of  infantry,  a  squadron,  and  a  battery  followed  the  fugitives; 
the  rest  of  the  American  army  bivouacked  on  the  battle-field. 
Judged  by  the  sum  of  their  success,  however,  General  Taylor's 
operations  in  those  few  days  were  well-nigh  faultless.  They 
could  hardly  have  achieved  more. 

Strategically,  the  campaign  on  the  part  of  the  Americans  was 
a  defensive-offensive  campaign.  General  Taylor  was  told  by 
the  Administration  that  he  was  to  defend  Texas,  in  case  of  war, 
and  was  not  to  begin  the  hostilities.  But  in  case  the  Mexicans 
resorted  to  hostile  acts,  then  he  was  not  necessarily  to  confine 
his  action  within  the  territory  of  Texas.  And  we  have  seen 
how  Taylor  waited  till  the  Mexicans  crossed  the  Rio  Grande, 
then,  after  the  first  two  engagements,  pushed  the  campaign  as 
hard  and  as  fast  and  as  far  as  the  means  at  his  command  would 
permit. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  97 

There  was  delay,  weeks  and  months  of  it,  of  which  an  army 
better  prepared  than  that  of  Mexico  would  have  taken  advan 
tage  ;  but  from  beginning  to  end  there  was  never  a  day  of  delay 
for  which  General  Taylor  or  his  subordinates  were  responsible. 
The  system  of  supply  in  our  service  was  centralized  in  Wash 
ington,  and  there  was  no  electric  telegraph  and  no  railway  mail. 
Every  requisition  for  a  wagon  or  a  steamboat  had  to  go  back  by 
the  slow  postal  means  of  the  time,  and  the  army  at  the  front 
had  to  sit  and  wait. 

When  an  army  is  equipped  in  all  of  its  details  beforehand; 
when  the  system  is  such  that  supplies  and  means  of  transpor 
tation  can  be  quickly  obtained ;  when,  in  other  words,  the 
fighting  machine  is  ready  for  work,  before  it  takes  the  field, 
like  the  Japanese  army  in  its  war  with  Russia,  the  question  of 
logistics  is  subordinate  to  the  question  of  successful  strategy 
and  tactics.  In  such  cases  the  general  has  merely  to  decide 
at  the  outset  of  his  campaign  what  is  to  be  his  objective;  and 
with  each  change  in  his  operations,  where  is  the  best  place  to 
put  his  army  in  his  next  move,  just  as  in  a  game  of  chess ;  and 
whether  the  route  is  practicable,  and  how  long  it  will  take  to 
march  his  troops  thither ;  and  whether  he  can  whip  the  enemy 
when  he  gets  there.  .  He  must,  of  course,  in  every  case,  leave 
adequate  forces  to  guard  his  depots  and  line  of  communica 
tion;  but  the  mere  means  of  transportation,  the  wagon-trains, 
and  boats,  and  pack-trains,  he  does  not  need  to  worry  about — 
he  knows  that  they  will  be  looked  after  by  the  proper  staff  de 
partment.  The  plan  of  his  campaign  must  not  be  arranged  to 
fit  his  means  of  transportation ;  they  will  be  arranged  to  fit  his. 
plan  of  campaign. 

With  General  Taylor's  campaign  it  was  just  the  reverse  of 
all  this ;  every  movement  was  at  the  mercy  of  boats,  or  wagons 
and  mules.  (48)  After  the  rout  of  Arista's  army  at  Resaca 
de  la  Palma,  for  lack  of  a  pontoon-train  Taylor  had  to  sit  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  watch  the  scattered  Mexi 
can  force  gather  itself  together  again,  and,  unmolested,  march 
out  of  Matamoros  in  a  quiet  and  orderly  manner,  taking  all  of 
its  stores  and  property  with  it.  Yet  General  Taylor  had  fore 
seen  his  need  of  pontoons,  and  had  made  timely  requisition  for 
them. 

He  had  to  wait  three  months  in  his  camp  opposite  Mata 
moros,  and  then  leave  6,000  troops,  half  of  his  army,  behind, 
for  want  of  transportation  to  keep  them  supplied  with  food. 
And  again  at  Monterey,  his  main  reason  for  granting  Ampudia 


98  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

an  armistice  of  eight  weeks,  was  simply  that  he  did  not  have 
enough  wagons  and  pack-mules  to  carry  food  for  his  army,  if 
he  stretched  his  line  of  communications  with  his  base  at  Ca- 
rriargo  any  farther  at  that  time. 

From  every  consideration,  Monterey  was  General  Taylor's 
first  proper  objective,  after  he  got  possession  of  the  line  of  the 
Rio  Grande  to  serve  as  his  base  of  operations.  Monterey  is  the 
capital  of  the  province  of  Nuevo  Leon,  and  it  was  the  largest, 
most  important  city  in  the  northern  part  of  Mexico.  It  was 
on  the  main  road  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  City  of  Mexico — 
the  road  that  passed  through  the  important  capital  towns, 
Saltillo  and  San  Luis  Potosi.  It  was  the  northern  gateway 
of  this  route  through  the  Sierra  Madre  Mountains.  These 
mountains  formed  a  barrier  between  the  lowlands  of  the  north 
east  and  the  table-lands  of  the  central  region,  impassable  ex 
cept  at  a  few  places.  Monterey  was  also  in  a  healthful  region, 
whereas  all  the  towns  in  the  lowlands  toward  the  coast  were 
subject  to  yellow-fever  and  other  diseases.  When  one  con 
siders  that  the  losses  in  an  army  are  always  greater  from  dis 
ease  than  from  battle,  the  importance  of  selecting,  if  possible, 
a  healthful  region  and  season  for  a  campaign  is  apparent. 

And  after  the  choice  of  Monterey  for  an  objective,  Camargo 
was  the  best  place  for  the  base.  It  was  180  miles  from  the 
main  base,  Point  Isabel,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande ;  but  a 
navigable  river  or  other  body  of  water  is  always  the  best  and 
easiest  line  of  communication,  and  a  few  leagues  more  or  less 
make  little  difference.  Camargo  was  not  only  nearer  to  Mon 
terey  than  any  other  point  of  the  river,  but  there  were  two 
roads,  both  good  enough,  connecting  the  two  points;  and  both 
roads  lay  in  the  valleys  of  streams,  and  were  therefore  well 
supplied  with  water  and  wood,  two  items  of  chief  considera 
tion  when  campaigning  in  Mexico. 

While  an  advance  on  Monterey  threatened  the  interior  of 
Mexico,  and  even  the  City  of  Mexico,  General  Taylor  neyer 
designed  to  go  beyond  Saltillo.  "To  seize  the  Rio  Grande, 
to  conquer  the  northern  states  of  Mexico  and  to  hold  them 
tenaciously,  at  least  as  far  as  the  Sierra  Madre  Mountains,  was 
General  Taylor's  real  work."*  It  was  hoped  that  this  might 
make  Mexico  willing  to  agree  to  peace  upon  our  terms. 

After  Taylor  reached  Saltillo,  the  Administration  wanted 
him  to  push  on  to  San  Luis  Potosi ;  but  General  Taylor  knew 
what  a  perilous  task  it  would  be  to  march  an  army  across  the 

^General  Taylor,  by  General  O.  O.  Howard. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  99 

300  miles  of  desert  between  Saltillo  and  that  town.  Without 
fighting  a  battle  Santa  Anna  lost  4,000  men  out  of  18,000  in 
his  march  from  San  Luis  to  Saltillo.  So  Taylor  advised  the 
Administration  that,  if  it  were  necessary  to  capture  the  Mexi 
can  capital  in  order  to  conquer  peace,  it  should  be  done  by  the 
way  of  Vera  Cruz — the  very  campaign  that  General  Scott  had 
already  proposed. 

The  topographical  difficulties  of  a  land  campaign  from  the 
Rio  Grande  to  the  City  of  Mexico  would  be  somewhat  less  to 
day,  by  reason  of  the  railways  leading  southward  from  the  Rio 
Grande ;  but  a  railway  can  never  serve  as  a  "line  of  operations" 
— it  can  never  take  the  place  of  a  wagon  road,  with  water  at 
camping  places,  for  an  army  to  advance  by.  It  can  only  be 
used  as  a  "line  of  communication,"  by  which  an  army  at  the 
front  will  draw  its  supplies  and  reinforcements  from  its  base, 
and  send  back  its  prisoners  and  sick  and  wounded.  Even  for 
these  purposes,  a  long  line  of  railway,  like  that  from  the  Rio 
Grande  to  the  City  of  Mexico,  passing  through  the  enemy's 
country,  requires  so  many  troops  to  defend  it,  that  it  is  probable 
that  even  to-day,  if  we  undertook  to  capture  the  Mexican  cap 
ital,  we  should  follow  the  same  route  that  General  Scott  fol 
lowed,  and  that  Cortez  had  followed  before  him.  We  shall  see 
in  our  study  of  the  South  African  War  that  Lord  Roberts,  with 
more  than  200,000  soldiers  in  the  field,  could  only  muster  a 
force  of  30,000  to  lead  against  Pretoria.  The  rest  were 
mostly  guarding  his  railway  communications,  a  thousand  miles 
long. 

Mexico's  lack  of  an  adequate  navy  simplified  Taylor's  cam 
paign,  as  well  as  the  later  one  under  General  Scott.  In  fact, 
if  Mexico  had  possessed  a  navy  strong  enough  to  hold  control 
of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  to  prevent  Taylor  from  landing 
supplies  at  Corpus  Christi,  and  afterwards  at  Point  Isabel,  it  is 
not  seen  how  Taylor  could  have  supplied  his  army,  or  made 
his  invasion  of  Mexico.  To-day,  however,  there  would  be  no 
difficulty  in  transporting  stores  to  the  Rio  Grande  by  railways. 

So  in  this,  as  in  many  other  American  campaigns,  the  army 
was  dependent  upon  the  cooperation  of  the  navy.  Not  only 
did  the  navy  guard  the  army's  transports ;  it  blocked  the  mouth 
of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  cut  off  the  supplies  of  the  Mexican 
army  at  Matamoros,  and  it  captured  the  City  of  Tampico. 

When  he  had  to  take  away  so  many  of  Taylor's  veteran 
troops  for  his  own  campaign,  General  Scott  advised  Taylor  to 
fall  back  to  Monterey;  in  the  light  of  history  it  is  not  certain, 
but  this  was  the  best  thing  Taylor  could  have  done.  He  had  to 


100  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

fall  back  anyway  a  little  later.  Taylor's  reasons  for  holding 
Saltillo  have  already  been  stated — its  strategic  position  at  the 
junction  of  the  roads  from  Monclova,  Monterey,  Linares,  Par- 
ras  and  San  Luis  Potosi ;  the  fertile  country  to  the  west  of  it, 
from  which  the  Americans  might  have  got  supplies  and  the 
Mexicans  would  have  got  them,  via  Saltillo ;  the  disheartening 
effect  of  a  retrograde  movement  upon  his  army,  etc.  But,  in 
looking  back  at  it,  the  chief  objection  we  can  find  to  such  a 
movement  is,  that  it  would  have  robbed  our  history  of  Buena 
Vista,  a  victory  of  which  we  have  as  just  cause  to  be  proud  as 
of  any  other  in  our  history. 

President  Polk  disapproved  the  liberal  terms  granted  by 
Taylor  to  Ampudia  at  the  surrender  of  Monterey.  General 
Taylor  gives  the  following  reasons  for  granting  the  terms : 
first,  his  army  was  too  small  to  invest  the  town  and  prevent 
Ampudia's  troops  from  escaping  with  x their  arms  by  some  of 
the  mountain  trails,  and  reasons  of  humanity  urged  a  suspen 
sion  of  the  assaults ;  second,  as  to  the  eight  weeks'  armistice, 
Taylor,  as  stated  before,  was  unable  to  go  farther  for  lack  of 
transportation.  General  Taylor  gave  other  reasons.  The  mil 
itary  student  will  prefer  to  accept  the  judgment  of  General 
Taylor  and  his  officers  on  the  ground,  rather  than  that  of  Presi 
dent  Polk  and  his  advisers  two  thousand  miles  away  at  Wash 
ington. 

At  Palo  Alto  Taylor's  line  of  battle  was  formed  nearly  paral 
lel  to  the  road  he  was  marching  on— his  line  of  communica 
tion  with  his  base  at  Point  Isabel.  Could  the  Mexicans  have 
driven  him  back,  or  turned  his  left  flank,  they  might  have  cap 
tured  his  wagon-train  and  cut  him  off  from  his  base.  Of 
course,  with  so  small  a  force,  this  was  not  as  serious  a  con 
sideration  as  it  would  be  with  a  great  army.  Taylor  undoubt 
edly  fought  the  battle  in  that  way,  because  the  chaparral  west 
of  the  road  gave  him  some  cover  through  which  to  approach 
the  Mexican  left  flank.  An  attack  directly  from  the  front,  or 
against  the  Mexican  right,  would  have  had  to  be  made  over 
the  open  prairie  without  any  sort  of  cover.  Had  Taylor  been 
defeated  in  this  combat,  he  would  probably  have  lost  his 
depot  at  Point  Isabel,  and  his  field-work  and  garrison  at  Fort 
Brown. 

The  effect  of  this  victory  and  that  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma  was 
very  important.  By  these  triumphs  Mexican  authority  was 
wholly  and  forever  expelled  from  the  soil  of  Texas;  and  the 
American  troops  gained  a  morale  and  prestige  that  they  never 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  101 

have  lost  to  this  day.  Up  to  that  time  American  troops  had  sel 
dom  known  what  it  was  to  go  after  an  enemy  and  defeat  him. 
All  their  offensive  campaigns — unless  we  except  Yorktown, 
where  they  had  the  moral  and  physical  support  of  the  French 
—had  been  failures.  All  their  strategic  successes  had  been 
achieved  in  retreats,  and  nearly  all  their  tactical  victories  had 
been  gained  by  standing  on  the  defensive. 

At  Resaca  de  la  Palma  Arista's  army  fought  with  the  Rio 
Grande  at  its  back;  under  like  conditions  a  large  army  would 
have  been  captured.  This  little  force,  with  no  impedimenta,  was 
able  to  scatter  and  cross  wherever  the  men  could  find  boats. 
Many  were  drowned.  We  have  seen  that  Taylor  could  not 
cross  the  river  and  complete  the  rout  and  dispersion  of  his 
enemy  for  lack  of  a  pontoon-train. 

Arista  did  well  to  abandon  Matamoros  and  retreat.  Had  he 
kept  his  army  shut  up  in  that  town,  he  would  surely  have  lost 
it  soon  or  late,  as  every  general  does  that  allows  his  army  to 
be  invested  in  a  town;  as  Ampudia  did  with  this  same  army 
a  few  months  later  at  Monterey. 

General  Taylor  risked  a  great  deal  at  the  battle  of  Buena 
Vista.  The  chances  of  victory  appeared  very  slender,  and  the 
consequences  of  defeat  would  have  been  very  serious  for  the 
United  States.  General  Wilcox  says  in  his  history  of  the 
Mexican  War :  "Had  Santa  Anna  been  successful  at  Buena 
Vista  there  is  hardly  a  doubt,  under  the  excitement  that  would 
have  prevailed  in  Washington,  that  a  garrison  would  have  been 
left  at  Vera  Cruz  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  the  vomito  [yellow- 
fever],  General  Scott  with  his  remaining  forces  ordered  to  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  the  war  prolonged  another  year."  While  we 
do  not  believe  Santa  Anna  would  have  "taken  and  sacked  New 
Orleans,"  as  he  boasted  he  would,  or  even  that  he  would  ever 
have  got  across  the  Rio  Grande,  he  might  have  thrown  the 
Americans  back  to  that  line,  and  set  the  war  back  where  it 
was  nearly  a  year  before,  with  the  best  general  the  Mexicans 
had  and  the  prestige  of  victory  on  the  Mexican  side. 

If  Taylor's  army  had  fallen  back  to  Monterey,  or  farther, 
without  making  a  decisive  stand,  it  is  hard  to  say  what  might 
have  been  the  outcome.  If  in  such  case  Santa  Anna  had  con 
tinued  to  pursue,  and  could  have  been  long  enough  detained 
in  the  north,  it  would  have  made  General  Scott's  advance 
against  the  capital  easier. 

On  the  part  of  Santa  Anna,  Buena  Vista  was  a  mistake 
strategically  and  tactically.  He  was  cognizant  of  General 


102  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Scott's  plan  for  a  campaign  against  Vera  Cruz  and  the  City  of 
Mexico ;  he  should  have  moved  his  army  southward  to  oppose 
Scott's  landing,  and  the  taking  of  Vera  Cruz  But  he  had  or 
ganized  an  army  of  some  20,000  officers  and  men,  all  eager  to 
meet  the  invaders  of  their  country;  he  was  urged  forward  by 
an  ignorant  and  nagging  press  at  the  capital ;  and  he  could  not 
resist  the  temptation  to  throw  his  overwhelming  numbers 
against  the  handful  of  Americans  left  with  Taylor;  he  and 
every  officer  and  man  of  his  army  felt  sure  of  destroying  Tay 
lor's  little  army,  or  of  driving  it  in  flight  beyond  the  Rio 
Grande  and  reconquering  their  lost  territory. 

But  he  ought  to  have  appreciated  the  difficulties  and  perils 
of  the  long  march  before  him.  In  his  journey  from  San  Luis 
Potosi  to  the  field  of  Buena  Vista  and  return,  he  lost  four  times 
as  many  men  as  he  lost  in  the  battle;  he  brought  back  to  San 
Luis  a  ragged  and  demoralized  remnant,  less  than  half  the  men 
he  had  led  away;*  and  he  left  the  way  clear  for  Scott  to  land 
his  army  and  march  it  to  the  capital  practically  unopposed.  Of 
this  opportunity,  however,  General  Scott  was  unaware.  Noth 
ing  short  of  the  direst  necessity,  or  the  sure  prospect  of  de 
cisive  results,  should  ever  tempt  a  commander  to  lead  his  army 
across  such  a  dry  and  barren  waste  as  the  300  miles  from  San 
Luis  Potosi  to  Saltillo. 

The  main  tactical  mistake  of  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista  con 
sisted  in  a  lack  of  order  and  concert  in  the  attack.  After  the 
American  line  was  driven  back  and  turned,  it  seems  almost 
certain  that,  if  the  entire  Mexican  force  had  closed  in  together 
on  the  defenders,  it  could  not  have  failed  to  defeat  and  capture 
them.  But  by  Santa  Anna's  bringing  into  the  battle  first  one 
column  and  then  another  against  different  points  of  the  posi 
tion,  Taylor  was  enabled  to  shift  regiments  and  batteries  so  as 
always  to  check  the  attacks. 

Never  has  the  advantage  of  drill  and  training  and  discipline 
under  educated  officers  been  better  exemplified  than  in  the  bat 
tles  of  this  campaign.  In  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca 
de  la  Palma,  the  American  soldiers  were  all  trained  regulars. 
In  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  they  were  all  volunteers  except 
the  artillery  and  two  squadrons  of  dragoons.  It  is  true  that 
this  victory  could  not  have  been  won  without  the  regular  bat 
teries  which  did  such  fine  work;  but  with  the  exception  of  one 
or  two  regiments,  no  troops  ever  fought  better  than  those  vol- 

+The  Other  Side. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  103 

unteers.  But  they  had  all  been  in  camp  at  Fort  Brown  and  Ca- 
margo  drilling,  and  in  campaign  serving"  with  regular  troops, 
for  nearly  a  year;  and  in  this  battle,  the  regiments  that  ac 
quitted  themselves  the  best  were  under  officers  like  Colonel 
Jefferson  Davis  and  Henry  Clay,  Jr.,  who  had  received  a  mili 
tary  training  in  the  regular  army.  Without  question  the  best 
purpose  of  our  small  standing  army  in  time  of  peace,  is  to  edu 
cate  officers  against  a  time  of  war ;  and  it  is  to  be  regretted,  as 
has  been  pointed  out  by  an  American  general  in  a  magazine 
article,*  that  more  of  the  wealthy  young  men  of  the  country 
do  not  seek  commissions  in  the  army,  and  serve  with  it  a 
term  of  years,  merely  to  fit  themselves  to  command  troops  in 
case  of  war. 

There  is  no  difference  between  American  volunteers  and 
American  regulars — they  are  both  volunteers;  but  there  is  a 
difference  between  trained  soldiers  and  untrained  soldiers; 
between  discipline  and  indiscipline;  between  a  knowledge  of 
how  to  take  care  of  one's  self  in  campaign  and  a  lack  of  such 
knowledge;  between  soldiers  rightly  trained  and  soldiers 
wrongly  trained. 

In  this  campaign  there  was  the  same  deplorable  mixing  of 
personal  and  party  politics  with  field  operations  that  we  have 
had  in  all  our  wars,  and  that  we  shall  doubtless  have  in  every 
future  war.  The  Administration  actually  made  arrangements 
to  send  General  Patterson  (a  politician  without  any  military  ex 
perience)  in  command  of  an  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz,  with 
two  other  politicians,  Generals  Pillow  and  Shields,  as  his  divi 
sion  commanders,  while  General  Scott  and  other  professional 
soldiers,  who  had  given  their  lives  to  the  study  of  arms,  were 
to  sit  still  and  look  on !  And  after  Scott  had  finally  been  given 
command  of  the  expedition  against  Mexico  City,  and  while 
Taylor  was  still  in  command  of  the  army  in  the  north,  the  Ad 
ministration  introduced  a  bill  in  Congress  to  create  the  office  of 
lieutenant-general,  in  order  to  place  Senator  Benton,  of  the 
right  party,  but  of  no  military  experience  whatever,  in  com 
mand  of  both  of  these  veteran  major-generals,  who  were  of  the 
wrong  political  party.  Fortunately,  Congress  refused  to  perpe 
trate  such  an  outrage  upon  the  country  and  the  honorable  pro 
fession  of  arms;  and  left  the  pages  of  our  history  free  from 
that  blot. 

In  this  war,  also,  as  in  the  War  of  1812,  and  in  every  other 

'General  W.  H.  Carter. 


104  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

war  that  we  have  entered  into,  a  large  part  of  the  people  were 
opposed  to  it,  and  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  talked,  and 
wrote,  and  worked  against  it  and  against  the  interests  of  the 
Government.  This  is  deplorable;  but  so  long  as  we  are  hu 
man,  and  so  long  as  the  country  is  vast  in  area  and  interests, 
we  must  expect  it. 


LECTURE  VI. 
THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

SCOTT'S  CAMPAIGN. 

(48)  From  the  opening  of  hostilities  with  Mexico  in  the 
spring  of  1846,  Major-General  Winfield  Scott,  Commanding 
General  of  the  United  States  Army,  had  asked  to  be  allowed 
to  command  the  forces  in  the  field  in  Mexico.  But  not  until 
November,  1846,  after  the  news  had  reached  Washington  that 
Ampudia  had  surrendered  to  General  Taylor  at  Monterey,  did 
President  Polk,  after  much  vacillation  and  with  much  reluc 
tance,  give  his  consent  for  General  Scott  to  go  to  Mexico  to 
conduct  a  campaign  in  person. 

PLAN. 

General  Scott's  plan  was  to  capture  Vera  Cruz,  and,  with 
this  port  as  his  base,  to  march  his  army  to  the  City  of  Mexico. 
Fifteen  thousand  troops  he  estimated  to  be  the  smallest  number 
with  which  he  could  hope  for  success  in  such  a  campaign,  5,000 
of  which  must  be  regulars.  To  make  up  his  army,  he  took 
from  General  Taylor  4,000  regular  and  4,000  volunteer  infan 
try,  two  light  batteries,  500  regular  and  500  volunteer  cav 
alry.  This  left  Taylor  with  a  command  of  only  some  7,000 
men,  with  which  he  was  expected  to  act  strictly  on  the  defen 
sive.  The  rest  of  the  complement  of  15,000  troops  that  Gen 
eral  Scott  counted  upon  were  to  be  volunteers  raised  imme 
diately  in  the  States.  Congress,  however,  failed  to  authorize 
these  volunteers  until  the  end  of  February,  1847. 

Owing  to  the  recurrence  of  yellow-fever  on  the  coast  of  Mex 
ico,  Scott  felt  that  he  must  be  at  Vera  Cruz  with  his  army  by 
the  1st  of  February;  and  he  made  all  of  his  plans  accordingly. 
He  arranged  with  Commodore  Connor,  who  commanded  the 
American  fleet  in  Mexican  waters,  for  his  cooperation ;  he  sub 
mitted,  in  full  time,  requisitions  for  transports,  lighters,  land 
transportation,  siege  trains,  and  everything  that  he  should 
need;  he  selected  the  Island  of  Lobos  as  the  place  where  he 
should  assemble  his  army. 

105 


106  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

There  were  all  sorts  of  delays,  for  which  Scott  was  no  way 
to  blame;  and  the  end  of  February  was  at  hand.  Only  13,000 
troops  were  present,  and  there  was  shortage  of  transports, 
lighters,  and  all  materiel.  But  the  expedition  could  not  wait;  if 
it  were  delayed  any  longer,  it  would  have  to  be  put  off  till  the 
next  fall  or  winter. 

OPERATIONS. 

So  on  the  2nd  of  March,  the  order  was  given  to  weigh  anchor 
at  Lobos ;  and  by  the  7th,  the  fleet  had  cast  anchor  again  at  An 
ton  Lizardo,  eighteen  miles  southeast  of  Vera  Cruz.  "Scott 
was  at  this  time  ignorant  of  the  movement  of  General  Santa 
Anna  toward  Monterey,  and  expected  on  landing  or  attempt 
ing  to  land,  to  be  met  by  a  formidable  force  of  the  enemy" ;  so 
every  precaution  was  taken.*  (56)  Having  selected  the  place 
for  landing,  well  without  the  range  of  guns  in  the  city  and  the 
castle  of  San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  he  had  the  fleet  moved  up  on 
March  9,  and  anchored  "in  front  of  it.  The  naval  guns  shelled 
the  beach,  and  the  sand  hills  beyond,  and  the  sailors  landed  the 
troops  with  surf -boats.  No  Mexican  troops  appeared,  and  by 
10  p.  m.  the  entire  force  had  landed  without  an  accident. 

Scott's  army,  at  this  time,  was  organized  in  two  regular  divi 
sions,  under  Generals  Worth  and  Twiggs,  respectively,  and 
a  volunteer  division  under  General  Patterson.  The  cavalry 
and  artillery,  and  the  company  of  engineers,  were  not  attached 
to  the  divisions,  but  remained  under  the  direct  orders  of  the 
commanding-general. 

A  complete  line  of  investment  was  immediately  established, 
extending  from  shore  to  shore  on  either  side  of  Vera  Cruz ;  and 
batteries  were  set  up  to  shell  the  city.  Owing  to  delay  in  get 
ting  the  siege  materiel  ashore,  the  batteries  were  not  ready  to 
begin  work  until  the  afternoon  of  the  22nd  [March].  General 
Scott  then  called  upon  the  Mexican  commander  to  surrender 
the  town  and  the  fort  [San  Juan  de  Ulloa].  The  Mexican  com 
mander  declined  to  surrender,  and  the  batteries  opened  fire. 
The  guns  of  the  town  and  fort  returned  the  fire.  The  bom 
bardment  was  kept  up  until  the  26th,  when  Scott  received  a 
proposal  of  surrender  from  the  Mexican  commander ;  terms 
were  agreed  upon  the  next  day.  The  city  and  fort,  5,000  pris- 

*General  Scott,  by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  107 

oners,  and  400  guns  were  turned  over  to  the  Americans.    Gen 
eral  Scott's  loss  was  sixty-seven  killed  and  wounded. 

In  this  investment  the  navy  not  only  bombarded  the  enemy's 
works  from  the  sea,  but  also  set  up  a  battery  in  line  on  land, 
which  did  effective  work.  During  the  siege  the  only  interfer 
ence  with  the  Americans  from  the  outside  was  occasioned  by  a 
considerable  cavalry  force,  which  hovered  around,  and  had  to 
be  chased  away  two  or  three  times. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

(57)  From  Vera  Cruz  two  roads  led  westward  across  the 
Tierra  Caliente,  up  through  the  mountains,  to  the  Plateau  of 
Anahuac,  as  the  great  interior  table-land  is  called,  and  on,  to 
the  Valley  of  Mexico,  and  the  capital  city  at  the  lowest  point 
of  this  bowl-shaped  valley.  The  two  roads,  however,  came 
together  at  El  Final,  east  of  Puebla.  The  northernmost  of  these 
roads  passed  through  the  towns  of  Jalapa,  Perote,  and  Puebla, 
and  was  almost  the  identical  route  that  Cortez  took  in  1519. 
This  road  was,  in  1847,  the  main  post-road,  the  better  of  the 
two,  and,  therefore,  the  one  selected  by  General  Scott.  The 
other  road  passed  through  Orizaba.  The  French  followed  this 
road  in  their  invasion  of  Mexico  in  1863.  . 

The  road  chosen  crossed  the  Tierra  Caliente  to  the  foot-hills 
at  Plan  del  Rio,  about  thirty  miles  from  Vera  Cruz.  There  it 
began  the  ascent  of  the  mountains  to  the  great  Plateau ;  thence 
it  led  on  to  the  City  of  Mexico,  more  than  200  miles  from 
Vera  Cruz.  Many  strong  defensive  positions  there  were  be 
tween  the  Plan  del  Rio  and  the  Valley  of  Mexico. 

As  far  as  Jalapa  the  road  lay  in  the  Tierra  Caliente ;  but  from 
there  on,  to  the  capital,  the  country  crossed  possessed  as  fine  a 
climate  for  campaigning  as  any  in  the  world;  but  there  was  a 
scarcity  of  water  from  Jalapa  to  the  Valley  of  Mexico. 
Toward  the  Valley  of  Mexico,  the  country  became  more  fertile 
and  thickly  settled,  and  subsistence  supplies  in  abundance  could 
be  obtained  for  an  army. 

The  topography  was  tff  such  character  much  of  the  way  from 
Vera  Cruz  to  the  capital  that  troops  could  march  only  on  the 
roads.  In  the  Tierra  Caliente  there  was  high  grass  and  dense 
vegetation ;  over  the  mountains  the  road  was  shut  in  the  passes ; 
in  the  Valley  of  Mexico  all  roads  rested  upon  causeways. 

There  were  five  lakes  in  the  Valley  of  Mexico,  the  remains  of 
a  single  large  ancient  lake  which  had  been  gradually  drying  up 


108  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

for  ages.  Lake  Chalco,  which  existed  at  the  time  of  Scott's 
campaign,  is  dry  to-day.  There  were  no  impassable  rivers  be 
tween  Vera  Cruz  and  Mexico,  behind  which  an  army  could 
take  a  defensive  position.  The  chief  natural  obstacles  in 
Scott's  way  were  the  mountains  with  their  impassable  heights 
and  gorges,  and  the  lakes  and  marshes  around  the  capital  city. 

OPERATIONS  AFTER  VERA  CRUZ. 

After  the  fall  of  Vera  Cruz  the  army  was  still  short  of  trans 
portation.  Several  expeditions  were,  therefore,  sent  out  into 
the  interior  for  the  purpose  of  finding  markets  in  which  to  pur 
chase  horses  and  mules.  By  this  means  General  Scott  eked  out 
his  transportation  enough  to  enable  him  to  start  his  army  on 
the  road  to  the  interior  before  the  return  of  yellow-fever. 
Twiggs's  division  started  for  Jalapa  on  the  8th  of  April,  and 
was  followed  on  the  9th  by  part  of  Patterson's  volunteer  divi 
sion.  Two  batteries  were  attached  to  Twiggs's  division  and 
one  to  Patterson's.  Worth's  division,  and  part  of  Patterson's, 
had  to  remain  for  the  present  at  Vera  Cruz,  for  want  of  trans 
portation. 

(48)  After  his  defeat  at  Buena  Vista  (February  22-23), 
Santa  Anna  fell  back  with  his  army  to  San  Luis  Potosi,  where 
he  arrived  after  a  march  of  great  hardship  with  less  than 
10,000  effectives.*  After  resting  here  four  days,  he  resumed 
the  march  to  the  capital  with  two  brigades. 

A  new  revolution  had,  meantime,  broken  out  in  the  City  of 
Mexico,  and,  when  Santa  Anna  arrived  there,  he  found  armed 
partisans  confronting  each  other  in  the  streets.  (57)  He 
managed  to  compose  the  dissensions,  and  on  the  2nd  of  April 
set  out  for  Cerro  Gordo,  a  strong  position  on  the  road  to  Vera 
Cruz,  where  he  purposed  stopping  the  progress  of  Scott's  army. 
A  part  of  the  troops  he  had  commanded  at  Buena  Vista,  some 
5,600.  had  already  turned  toward  the  same  point;  the  rest  re 
mained  for  the  present  at  San  Luis  Potosi.  From  the  capital 
Santa  Anna  took  the  National  Guards  of  that  city.f  Cerro 
Gordo  [Big  or  Fat  Hill]  is  on  the  Jalapa- Vera  Cruz  road, 
some  twenty  or  twenty-five  miles  east  of  Jalapa,  at  the  foot  of 
the  Sierra  Madre — the  last  step  from  the  great  Plateau  of 
Anahuac  to  the  Tierra  Caliente. 

(58)   Here  the  road  from  Vera  Cruz  crosses  a  small  river 

*Wilcox. 

fT/tf  Other  Side. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  109 

and  a  narrow  stretch  of  level  ground,  the  Plan  del  Rio ;  then  it 
zigzags  upwards  and  to  the  west,  following  the  easiest  grade 
from  one  bench  to  the  next.  To  the  right  of  the  road,  as  one 
goes  west,  are  first  rugged  cliffs  and  then  an  impassable  ravine. 
Between  the  ravine  and  the  road  are  two  prominent  wooded 
knolls,  Atalaya  and  Telegrafo,  a  few  hundred  yards  beyond 
which  the  road  passes  the  Cerro  Gordo  Ranch.  From  the  Plan 
del  Rio  to  this  ranch,  and  probably  farther  westward,  the 
stream  flows  in  an  impassable  gorge ;  and  about  midway  of  the 
distance  is  a  commanding  table.  On  this  table  the  right  of  the 
Mexican  line  rested.  The  left  was  on  Telegrafo,  and  the  re 
serve  was  at  the  ranch. 

The  position  as  occupied  was  strengthened  with  parapets, 
trenches,  palisades,  and  abatis ;  and  the  trees  were  cleared  away 
from  the  field  of  fire  in  front.  Artillery  was  so  placed  as  to 
command  the  road  and  sweep  all  the  approaches  to  the  position. 

(57)  Owing  to  the  ferocious  heat  and  deep  sand,  the  march 
of  Scott's  army  across  the  Tierra  Caliente,  from  Vera  Cruz  to 
Plan  del  Rio,  was  very  hard  and  trying.     Twiggs's  division, 
which  started  on  the  8th  of  April,  did  not  reach  Plan  del  Rio 
until  the.  evening  of  the  llth.     Twiggs  had  been  informed  on 
the  way -that  Santa  Anna  was  at  Jalapa  with  troops,  and  he 
expected  to  meet  him  at  Cerro  Gordo. 

As  soon  as  General  Scott  received  report  that  the  divisions 
of  Twiggs  and  Patterson  had  found  the  enemy  in  force  at 
Cerro  Gordo,  he  hastened  forward  from  Vera  Cruz  himself, 
and  joined  the  troops  at  the  front  on  April  14.  Having  gotten 
more  transportation,  General  Worth,  also,  marched  his  division 
forward,  and  had  reached  the  camp  of  the  other  divisions  at 
Plan  del  Rio,  by  the  evening  of  April  17. 

(58)  Meantime   the   American   engineer    officers    had    been 
reconnoitering  the  Mexican  position.     They  reported  that  the 
position,  though  fortified  and  very  strong  in  front,  could  be 
turned  by  its  left  and  struck  in  rear ;  and  that  the  intrench- 
ments  on  Telegrafo  could  be  carried   by  assault.     Telegrafo 
was  the  key  to  the  position. 

On  the  17th  Twiggs's  division  followed  the  route  picked  out 
by  the  engineers;  and,  after  an  action  in  which  it  lost  ninety- 
seven  officers  and  men,  it  got  possession  of  Atalaya.  General 
Scott  thereupon  issued  an  order  for  a  general  attack,  for  the 
morning  of  the  18th.  Worth's  division  of  regulars  with 
Shields's  brigade  of  volunteers  was  to  follow  up  and  support 
the  "main  attack"  against  the  Mexican  left  and  rear;  and  Pil- 


110  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

low's  brigade  of  volunteers  was  to  make  the  "secondary  at 
tack"  against  the  front.  The  main  attack  carried  Telegrafo. 
put  the  left  of  the  Mexican  line  to  flight,  and  got  possession  of 
the  Jalapa  road.  Seeing  escape  impossible,  the  entire  right  of 
the  Mexican  line  then  surrendered.  The  American  cavalry 
pursued  the  routed  Mexicans,  but  was  not  fleet  enough  to  do 
them  much  damage. 

General  Scott  reported  his  strength  at  this  battle  as  8,500. 
and  his  killed  and  wounded,  thirty-three  officers  and  398  en 
listed  men.  He  estimated  the  Mexican  strength  at  12,000,  and 
the  losses  1,000  to  1,200  killed  and  wounded,  and  3,000  cap 
tured.  The  prisoners,  like  those  taken  at  Vera  Cruz,  were,  for 
lack  of  means  to  care  for  them,  paroled. 

(57)  Without  escort,  almost  without  companions,  Santa 
Anna  escaped  by  difficult  mountain  trails  to  Orizaba.  The 
Mexican  cavalry  was  -the  only  part  of  the  defeated  troops  that 
quitted  the  field  in  a  body ;  the  infantry  dispersed  and  fled  with 
out  organization  or  command.  The  cavalry  went  to  San  An 
dres.  Many  of  the  other  troops  found  their  way  to  Orizaba, 
and  after  some  days  Santa  Anna  succeeded  in  organizing  a 
force  of  4,000  men.  Then  he  moved  this  force  and  the  cavalry 
to  Puebla.* 

Without  delay  the  American  army  moved  to  Jalapa.  Here, 
on  April  27,  Scott  received  word  that  the  reinforcements  in 
tended  for  him  had  been  diverted  to  Taylor,  on  the  Rio  Grande 
frontier,  by  order  of  the  War  Department.  The  term  of  the 
one-year  volunteers  had  nearly  expired ;  they  were  clamoring 
to  be  discharged  in  order  to  be  able  to  pass  through  the  Tierra 
Caliente  before  the  return  of  yellow-fever.  As  General  Scott 
knew  that  he  could  not  complete  his  campaign  before  their  term 
would  expire,  he  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  wait  for  reinforce 
ments;  so  he  discharged  the  one-year  volunteers  at  Jalapa  on 
the  4th  of  May  and  let  them  go  home. 

With  the  remainder  of  his  army,  Scott  resumed  the  march  to 
Puebla.  Santa  Anna  sent  his  cavalry  forward  for  the  purpose 
of  surprising  or  ambushing  the  American  advance;  but  the 
Mexican  cavalry  was  itself  taken  by  surprise,  and  was  glad  to 
make  its  escape.  Without  making  further  resistance,  Santa 
Anna  evacuated  Puebla  and  retreated  to  the  City  of  Mexico. 
Worth's  division  took  possession  of  Puebla  on  the  15th  of 
Mav.* 


*T.hc  Other  Side. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  Ill 

The  American  army  remained  at  this  place  three  months, 
awaiting  reinforcements.  Its  numbers  fell  as  low  as  5,820 
effectives.  At  last  reinforcements  were  received  sufficient  to 
raise  the  aggregate  to  12,776  men,  of  whom  more  than  3,000 
were  sick.  The  army  was  now  organized  into  two  regular 
divisions  under  Worth  and  Twiggs,  and  two  volunteer  divi 
sions  under  Pillow  and  Ouitman. 

It  was  known  that  another  Mexican  army  had  in  the  mean 
time  been  organized  to  defend  the  capital  city.  This  army 
was  believed  to  be  30,000  strong ;  it  actually  numbered  not  more 
than  20,000.*  Scott's  army  was  now  150  or  more  miles  from 
Vera  Cruz,  and  the  road  was  beset  by  guerrillas.  With  so  small 
a  force  Scott  could  not  proceed  farther  and,  at  the  same  time, 
guard  so  long  a  line  of  communication.  Abandoning  his  com 
munications,  therefore — cutting  loose  from  his  base — and  leav 
ing  his  sick  and  convalescent  at  Puebla,  he  resumed  the  march 
for  the  City  of  Mexico  on  the  7th  of  August;  by  the  12th  his 
leading  division,  without  encountering  any  serious  resistance, 
had  arrived  at  Ayotla,  in  the  Valley  of  Mexico. 

(59)  After  the  authorities  at  the  Mexican  capital  became 
convinced  that  General  Scott  was  going  to  continue  his  advance 
on  that  city,  and  that  there  was  no  longer  any  hope  of  check 
ing  him  on  the  way,  they  displayed  great  energy  in  preparing 
for  the  defense  of  the  city.  The  foundries  and  powder-mills 
were  worked  to  their  utmost  capacity  in  the  manufacture  of 
arms  and  powder ;  the  part  of  the  Army  of  the  North  which 
had  remained  at  San  Luis  Potosi  to  watch  for  the  Americans 
in  that  direction  was  now  ordered  to  Guadalupe ;  the  various 
states  were  asked  for  troops,  but  only  a  few  responded;  the 
best  men  of  all  ages  and  classes  of  the  capital  enrolled  them 
selves  in  the  ranks  of  the  National  Guard;  and  field-works 
were  built  covering  all  the  approaches  to  the  southern  side  of 
the  city.  It  was  rightly  supposed  that  the  invaders  would  not 
advance  by  the  northern  shore  of  Lake  Texcuco.  The  follow 
ing  points  were  fortified:  El  Penon,  Mexicalcingo,  San  An 
tonio,  and  the  convent  and  bridge  of  Churubusco;  while  on 
the  southwest  the  fortress  of  Chapultepec  stood  at  the  junc 
tion  of  two  of  the  main  causeways  leading  into  the  city,  and 
from  its  high  position  commanded  with  its  artillery  all  space 
within  range.  All  of  the  garitas  (points  at  which  the  cause 
ways  entered  the  city)  were  fortified. 

It  was  confidently  believed  that  the  Americans  would  try  to 


*The  Other  Side. 


112  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

force  an  entrance  into  the  city  by  way  of  El  Penon ;  so  the  Na 
tional  Guard  was  posted  at  that  strong  position  to  block  their 
way;  while  the  Army  of  the  North,  now  under  General  Va 
lencia,  took  station  at  Texcuco  for  the  purpose  of  falling  upon 
their  flank  and  rear  and  completing  their  destruction.* 

The  Valley  of  Mexico,  surrounded  by  mountains,  is  more 
than  7,500  feet  above  sea-level,  and  is  about  eighteen  Spanish 
leagues  long  from  north  to  south,  by  twelve  wide.  It  is  very 
fertile,  and,  besides  the  capital  city,  contains  numerous  smaller 
towns.  The  valley  is  nearly  level,  the  City  of  Mexico  being 
near  its  lowest  point.  The  lakes  overflow,  and  submerge  the 
valley  more  or  less  every  year;  all  the  roads  within  the  valley 
are  built  upon  causeways  protected  by  ditches  on  either  side. 
The  country,  so  far  as  the  roads  are  concerned,  is  probably 
very  like  that  with  which  we  are  so  well  acquainted  in  the  rice 
fields  of  the  Philippines.  At  the  time  of  the  American  invasion 
it  was  not  practicable  for  troops  to  march  across  country  in 
any  direction. 

(60)  The  main  road  from  Ayotla  lay  between  the  foot  of 
the  strongly  fortified  hill,  El  Penon,  and  Lake  Texcuco.  The 
roads  around  Lake  Texcuco,  which  enter  the  city  from  the 
north,  were  not  reconnoitered,  probably  not  considered,  on 
account  of  their  length  and  roundabout  direction.  The  way 
around  the  south  side  of  Lakes  Chalco  and  Xochimilco  was,  at 
first,  supposed  to  be  impracticable ;  but  by  reconnaissance  it  was 
later  found  to  be  practicable.  This  route  had  the  advantage  of 
passing  through  ground  firm  enough  for  troops  to  maneuver 
upon,  but,  at  the  same  time,  very  rocky  and  rugged. 

Reversing  the  order  of  march,  therefore,  Worth's  division, 
which  had  been  in  rear,  was  started,  on  the  15th  of  August,  by 
this  southern  road  for  San  Augustin.  Twiggs's  division, 
which  had  been  in  the  lead,  and  was  camped  at  Ayotla,  was  held 
there  for  a  time,  in  order  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  an  ad 
vance  by  way  of  El  Penon.  The  Mexicans,  however,  gained 
a  knowledge  of  the  movement  on  the  16th  [August]  ;  and  on 
the  17th  the  bulk  of  the  National  Guards  at  El  Penon,  and 
Valencia's  Army  of  the  North  at  Texcuco,  were  withdrawn. 
The  National  Guards  were  placed  at  Churubusco;  on  the  19th 
two  of  their  battalions  advanced  to  San  Antonio.  Valencia 
marched  first  to  San  Angel,  and  then,  contrary  to  Santa  Anna's 
orders,  put  his  command  into  an  isolated  position  upon  an  open 

*Thc  Other  Side. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  113 

ridge  just  north  of  Contreras  and  west  of  the  southern  end 
of  the  Pedregal,  a  large  space  covered  with  volcanic  rocks.  He 
placed  a  part  of  his  troops,  also,  several  hundred  yards  in  front 
of  his  main  position,  at  the  ranch  of  Padierna.  Valencia  was 
planning  to  fall  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Americans,  as 
they  moved  on  the  capital  by  way  of  San  Antonio. 

The  American  army  reached  San  Augustin  on  .the  17th  of 
August,  and  occupied  it  without  serious  opposition.  This  place 
then  became  the  base  of  operations.  The  engineers  discovered 
the  position  of  Valencia's  army ;  they  also  ascertained  by  recon 
naissance  that  a  road  could  be  made  over  the  Pedregal,  by 
which  Valencia's  position  could  be  turned,  his  rear  attacked, 
and  his  line  of  retreat  to  the  main  army  and  the  capital  cut  off. 
On  the  18th  of  August  Worth's  division  moved  forward  to 
San  Antonio,  and  on  the  19th  masked  that  place.  .(61)  On 
this  day  the  divisions  of  Twiggs  and  Pillow  advanced  against 
Valencia's  position.  While  part  of  this  force  attacked  and  cap 
tured  the  advanced  post  at  Padierna,  driving  back  the  enemy 
from  there,  three  brigades,  under  General  Persifor  F.  Smith, 
made  their  wav  across  the  Pedregal  to  the  wood  around 
San  Geronimo,  less  than  2,000  yards  to  the  left  and  rear  of 
Valencia's  main  position.  Here  Smith's  detachment  was 
wholly  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  American  army,  and 
his  rear  was  exposed  to  attack  from  the  direction  of  San  Angel. 
Santa  Anna,  in  fact,  hurried  forward  a  brigade,  which  ap 
peared  on  the  Hill  of  Toro,  1,500  yards  north  of  Geronimo,  at 
5  p.  m. ;  but  before  it  made  any  movement  of  attack,  it  received 
orders  from  Santa  Anna  to  retire  to  San  Angel,  where  he 
himself  spent  the  night  with  other  troops.  The  only  assault 
upon  Smith  at  San  Geronimo  was  made  by  Valencia's  cavalry, 
which  was  easily  repulsed. 

That  evening  the  Americans  vacated  the  ranch  of  Padierna, 
which  was  reoccupied  by  the  Mexicans.  During  the  night 
General  Scott  sent  Shields's  brigade  to  reinforce  Smith.  Santa 
Anna  sent  an  order  to  Valencia  directing  him  to  withdraw  to 
Coyoacan.  (60)  Valencia  refused  to  obey  the  order,  and 
held  his  position. 

(61)  Leaving  Shields  to  hold  Geronimo,  protect  his  rear, 
and  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat,  Smith  moved  forward  the  rest 
of  his  detachment  before  daybreak  on  the  20th,  and  fell  upon 
the  rear  of  Valencia's  position.  Scott  had  ordered  Worth  and 
Quitman  to  support  this  attack  by  assaulting  the  front  of  the 
position.  This  "secondary  attack"  was  quite  unnecessary,  for 


114  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Smith's  assault  took  the  enemy  by  surprise  and  put  him  to 
flight.  The  victory  was  complete. 

While  the  Americans  were  thus  routing  Valencia's  command, 
Santa  Anna  was  at  San  Angel,  less  than  three  miles  distant 
from  the  battle-field,  with  three  brigades.  He  started  forward 
with  part  of  his  force,  but  was  almost  immediately  met  by 
Valencia's  flying  troops.  Thereupon  he  turned  about  and 
hastened  toward  the  city,  sending  orders  for  all  the  Mexican 
troops  to  concentrate  upon  the  inner  line  of  defense  at  the 
garitas  of  the  capital.* 

In  this  engagement,  which  Americans  call  the  battle  of  Con- 
treras,  and  the  Mexicans  call  the  battle  of  Padierna,  the  Amer 
icans  engaged  numbered  4,500;  the  Mexicans,  4,000.  The 
Americans  lost  fewer  than  100  men ;  the  Mexicans  lost  700 
killed,  813  prisoners.! 

(60)  The  Americans  pursued  to  Coyoacan  and  Churu- 
busco.  Pillow's  division  from  Coyoacan  turned  toward  San 
Antonio,  to  attack  the  rear  of  the  Mexicans  at  that  point,  while 
Worth's  division  attacked  them  from  the  direction  of  San  Au- 
gustin.  (62)  One  of  Worth's  brigades  [Clarke]  also  made 
a  turning  movement  to  the  left,  through  the  edge  of  the  Pedre- 
gal.  Pursuant  to  Santa  Anna's  orders  the  two  Mexican  bat 
talions  at  San  Antonio  fell  back  toward  Churubusco  without 
making  any  serious  resistance.  In  their  retreat  they  were 
attacked  in  flank  by  Clarke's  brigade,  and  scattered  through 
the  marshes  in  every  direction.  The  divisions  of  Worth  and 
Pillow  pushed  on  by  the  San  Antonio  causeway  to  Churubusco. 
In  passing,  Santa  Anna  had  given  orders  that  this  point  must 
be  held  at  all  risk.* 

Meantime  Twiggs's  division,  with  part  of  Quitman's,  had 
continued  the  pursuit  from  Contreras  through  Coyoacan  to 
Churubusco.  Here  they  had  engaged  a  Mexican  force 
strongly  posted  in  and  about  the  Convent  of  San  Pablo,  on  the 
west  side  of  the  town.  Worth  and  Pillow,  without  stopping 
to  reconnoiter,  attacked  the  Mexicans  at  the  bridge-head  at  the 
Churubusco  River.  The  brigades  of  Shields  and  Pierce  were 
sent  across  fields  to  the  left,  and  north  of  the  Churubusco 
River,  to  get  in  rear  of  the  Mexicans ;  and  Major  Sumner  was 


*The  Other  Side. 

fWright.  Wilcox.  The  Other  Side.  La  Battalia  de  Padierna,  by 
Teniente-Coronel  Miguel  Ruelas,  in  Revista  del  Ejercito  y  Marina, 
Tomo  IV.,  Num.  21. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  115 

sent  with  a  detachment  of  mounted  rifles  and  dragoons  to 
their  support. 

(60)  At  last  the  Mexicans  gave  way  and  fled  in  great  con 
fusion  down  the  causeway  to  the  San  Antonio  garita.  The 
Americans  pursued  until  Worth  gave  the  command  to  halt; 
Colonel  Harney,  not  receiving  the  command,  did  not  stop  his 
dragoons  until  they  had  ridden  up  to  the  muzzles  of  the  Mexi 
can  cannon  at  the  fortified  garita. 

The  garrison  in  the  convent  of  San  Pablo  held  out  for  three 
hours.  It  made  a  stout  and  gallant  defense,  but  was  at  last 
forced  to  surrender.  Among  the  prisoners,  none  had  fought 
more  desperately  than  the  San  Patricio  companies — deserters, 
mostly  Irishmen,  from  the  American  army. 

Referring  to  the  work  of  this  20th  of  August,  General  Scott 
says  in  his  report:  "After  so  many  victories,  we  might  with 
but  little  additional  loss  have  occupied  the  capital  the  same 
evening."  But  he  thought  the  attainment  of  peace  would  be 
favored  by  his  remaining  outside  of  the  capital  for  the  present, 
and  granting  an  armistice  until  terms  of  peace  could  be  con 
sidered  by  Mr.  Trist,  American  peace  commissioner,  accom 
panying  his  army,  and  representatives  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment.*  The  Mexican  account  confirms  General  Scott's  opin 
ion  of  the  American  successes,  in  the  following  words:  "The 
unfortunate  day  of  the  20th  of  August  had  terminated;  the 
loud  sound  of  cannon  even  yet  rang  in  the  ears  of  the  Mexi 
cans;  the  sanguinary  battles  of  Padierna  and  Churubusco  had 
passed;  and  the  invading  army  triumphed  at  the  gates  of  the 
city.  The  spirits  were  worn  out;  the  remnant  of  our  troops 
demoralized  and  lost;  confusion  and  disorder  had  overcome  all 
classes  of  society."f 

On  the  23rd  of  August  an  armistice  was  agreed  to,  which 
"was  to  continue  as  long  as  the  commissioners  of  the  two  gov 
ernments"  should  "be  engaged  in  negotiations;  or  until  the 
commander  of  either  army"  should  "give  formal  notice  to  the 
other  of  its  cessation,"  and  forty-eight  hours  thereafter.* 

General  Scott  established  his  headquarters,  with  Worth's 
division,  at  Tacubaya ;  Ouitman's  division  remained  at  San 
Augustin,  Twiggs's  at  San  Angel,  and  Pillow's  at  Mixcoac. 
The  head  and  tail  of  the  army  were  within  eight  miles  of  each 
other. 

*Wilcox. 

Other  Side. 


116  AMERICAN   CAMPAIGNS. 

The  peace  commissioners  came  to  no  agreement,  and  the 
Mexican  army  had  violated  several  of  the  terms  of  the  armi 
stice.  So,  on  September  6,  Scott  notified  the  Mexican  com 
mander  that  the  armistice  would  cease.  On  the  8th  September 
the  army  closed  up.  Ouitman  moved  up  to  Coyoacan  from 
San  Augustin ;  one  of  Twiggs's  brigades  took  post  on  the  Nino 
Perdido  causeway,  to  threaten  the  city  in  that  direction;  one 
of  Pillow's  brigades  occupied  the  San  Borja  hacienda,  the 
other  joined  Worth  at  Tacubaya,  and  took  part  in  the  battle 
of  Molino  del  Rey,  fought  that  day.  Mixcoac  was  to  be  the 
general  depot.* 

All  the  southern  and  western  garitas  of  the  city  were  strongly 
fortified,  and  defended  by  artillery ;  and  outside  of  the  city 
there  were  strong  garrisons  and  defensive  works  at  the  Castle 
of  Chapultepec,  Molino  del  Rey,  and  the  Casa  de  Mata.  Santa 
Anna's  cavalry,  4,000  strong,  was  at  the  hacienda  of  Morales, 
two  miles  west  of  Chapultepec. 

(63)  The  Molino  del  Rey  consisted  of  a  huge  pile  of  stone 
buildings,  200  yards  long,  in  a  part  of  which  cannon  and  pow 
der  had  formerly  been  made.  Some  three  hundred  yards  west 
of  it  was  a  four-sided  bastioned  fort,  inside  of  which  was  the 
Casa  de  Mata,  a  large  building  used  for  the  storage  of  powder. 
Southward  the  ground  rose  in  a  gentle  slope  to  Tacubaya.  and 
a  short  distance  west  there  was  a  deep  ravine.  "The  well-forti 
fied  castle  of  Chapultepec,"  the  national  military  academy,  "on 
a  height  in  rear,  commanded  these  buildings  and  the  ground 
beyond ,  toward  Tacubaya . ' ' :! 

"General  Scott  had  received  a  credible  report  that  there  was 
a  cannon  foundry  in  the  Molino  del  Rey,  and  a  large  quantity 
of  powder  in  the  Casa  Mata."*  He  determined,  therefore  to 
attack  and  destroy  the  buildings,  and  assigned  the  task  to  Gen 
eral  Worth  with  his  own  division,  one  of  Pillow's  brigades,  270 
horsemen  under  Major  Sumner,  and  five  guns.  The  assault 
was  set  for  the  morning  of  September  8. 

Santa  Anna  got  pessession  of  General  Scott's  order  for  this 
attack,  and  spent  the  7th  in  arranging  to  meet  it.  He  placed 
five  brigades  of  infantry  with  artillery  in  and  about  the  build 
ings  to  receive  the  assault,  and  stationed  his  cavalrv.  4.000 
horsemen,  under  General  Alvarez,  in  position  to  charge  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  assaulting  columns  and  destroy  them.t 


*Wilcox. 

Other  Side. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  117 

At  the  first  light  of  day  the  American  guns  opened  on  the 
buildings,  and  the  assaulting  columns  soon  moved  out.  The 
battle  lasted  two  hours,  at  the  end  of  which  the  Americans 
stood  in  possession  of  the  buildings.  The  defenders  that  es 
caped  death  and  capture  took  refuge  under  the  guns  of  Chapul- 
tepec.*  Eight  hundred  were  taken  prisoners.  Worth  had 
only  3,100  men;  he  lost  116  killed  and  671  wounded.  There 
must  have  been  14,000  Mexican  troops  in  the  engagement,  or 
within  supporting  distance,  but  they  lacked  a  single  directing 
head ;  Santa  Anna  was  in  the  city,  and  there  was  no  single 
commander  directing  the  defense.  It  was  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  victories  ever  gained  by  American  troops,  but  the 
percentage  of  their  loss  was  frightful.  Santa  Anna  published 
a  proclamation,  and  sent  it  abroad  in  the  land,  announcing  that 
the  Mexicans  had  gained  the  victory,  and  that  he  had  led  them 
in  person.f 

During  the  engagement  General  Alvarez  and  his  cavalry  sat 
idle  in  their  saddles.  He  claimed  to  be  unable  to  cross  the 
ravine  between  him  and  Worth's  assaulting  columns.  Sumner 
led  his  little  band  of  American  horsemen  across  the  same  ravine 
to  the  side  of  Alvarez ;  they  were  not  charged  by  the  Mexican 
cavalry. f  Alvarez  was  probably  kept  at  bay  by  the  American 
artillery. 

(64)  Chapultepec  was  the  next  stronghold  to  be  attacked. 
This  stone  castle  stands  on  "an  isolated  mound  rising  150  feet 
above  the  valley;  nearly  precipitous  on  the  northern,  eastern, 
and  part  of  the  southern  side,  it  declines  gradually  on  the  west 
to  a  cypress  grove  separating  it  from  Molino  del  Rey."  The 
grounds  were  inclosed  by  a  high  wall  on  the  southern  side,  and 
on  the  northern  side  by  the  San  Cosme  Aqueduct.  The  castle 
commanded  two  of  the  causeways  leading  into  the  City  of 
Mexico  about  two  miles  east  of  it.  The  position  was  de 
fended  with  cannon.* 

To  mislead  the  Mexicans  as  to  the  objective  of  the  attack,  a 
feint  was  made  against  the  southern  garitas.  On  the  9th  Sep 
tember  a  battery  and  a  brigade  took  position  at  the  Hermitage 
on  the  Nino  Perdido  causeway;  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
Uth  Quitman  and  Pillow  marched  their  divisions  to  Piedad. 
After  dark  these  divisions  were  withdrawn  to  Tacubaya;  for 


*Wilcox. 

Other  Side. 


118  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

they  were  designated  to  make  the  assault  on  Chapultepec. 
Twiggs's  division  remained  on  the  causeways  south  of  the  city 
to  keep  up  the  demonstration ;  and  the  battery  at  the  Hermitage 
shelled  the  Candelaria  and  San  Antonio  garitas. 

(65)  Batteries  were  placed,  and  they  shelled  the  fortress  of 
Chapultepec  all  day  of  the  12th  September.    The  bombardment 
was  resumed  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  followed  by  "two  col 
umns  of  attack,  one  led  by  Quitman  against  the  southern  face 
of  the  castle,  advancing  along  the  road  leading  from  Tacubaya ; 
the  other  under  General  Pillow"  from  Molino  del  Rey  through 
the  cypress  grove,  against  the  western  side.    Each  division  was 
accompanied  by  a  storming  party  some  250  strong,  with  ladders 
and  pick-axes  and  crow-bars.    The  assault  was  successful,  and 
the  commander  of  the  stronghold  surrendered  after  a  gallant 
defense,  in  which  the  young  cadets  of  the  Mexican  National 
Military  Academy  bore  a  conspicuous  part. 

About  7,500  Americans  took  part  in  the  attack  of  Chapul 
tepec.  The  Mexicans  claim  they  had  only  800  muskets  in  the 
grounds;  but  from  the  outside  they  had  some  4,000  infantry 
aiding  the  defense,  and  the  same  number  of  cavalry.  This 
infantry,  however,  did  very  little,  and  the  cavalry  nothing 
whatever. 

(66)  "The  pursuit,  with  a  short  pause  at  Chapultepec,  was 
pressed  vigorously  on  the  two  causeways  leading  into  the  city. 
The  more  direct  of  these,  the  one  followed  by  Quitman,  led  to 
the  Garita  de  Belen,  about  two  miles  distant.     Worth"   (who 
had  supported  Pillow)   "advanced  over  the  other  and  longer, 
which  entered  the  city  through  the  San  Cosme  Garita.     These 
roads  were  broad,  level  avenues.    In  the  center  of  each  was  an 
aqueduct  consisting  of  an  open  stone  trough,  resting  upon  arches 
springing  from  stone  piers,  and  right  and  left  of  the  causeways 
were  ditches  filled  with  water."* 

The  columns  on  both  roads  met  with  stout  resistance;  but 
neither  was  stopped  till  it  had  entered  the  capital.  Quitman's 
column  passed  the  Belen  Garita  at  1.20  p.  m.,  and  pushed  a 
short  way  into  the  city ;  but  the  fire  from  the  houses  and  streets 
was  so  severe,  the  column  was  driven  back  to  the  gate,  and 
remained  there  during  the  night.  Worth  passed  the  San 
Cosme  Garita  and  halted  in  front  of  the  convent  of  San  Fer 
nando  for  the  night. 


*Wilcox. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  119 

(60)  During  the  night  the  city  was  evacuated  by  Mexican 
troops.  Santa  Anna  went  to  Guadalupe.  (66)  "At  dawn 
of  the  14th  September  a  white  flag  was  sent  from  the  Citadel 
to  the  Belen  Gate,  the  bearers  of  which  requested  General 
Quitman  to  take  possession."*  Thereupon  Quitman  marched 
his  command  to  the  Grand  Plaza.  About  8  a.  m.  General 
Scott,  accompanied  by  his  staff  and  an  escort  of  cavalry,  rode 
into  the  Plaza.  He  appointed  General  Quitman  military  gov 
ernor  of  the  City  of  Mexico. 

Soon  after  General  Scott's  arrival  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  shots  were  fired  at  the  American  troops  from  the  houses 
and  the  streets,  by  inhabitants  and  straggling  soldiers.  It  was 
necessary  to  clear  the  streets  with  artillery  and  musketry,  many 
houses  had  to  be  entered,  and  armed  bands  were  killed  or  cap 
tured.  This  disturbance  kept  up  much  of  that  and  the  next 
day,  and  quiet  was  not  wholly  restored  until  the  16th. 

(57)  On  the  night  of  September  16,  at  Guadalupe,  Santa 
Anna  resigned  the  Presidency  of  Mexico  and  the  chief  com 
mand  of  the  army,  and,  with  1,500  volunteer  cavalry  and  three 
or  four  pieces  of  artillery,  set  out  for  Puebla  to  capture  the 
American  garrison  there.  He  laid  siege  to  the  garrison's  little 
stronghold,  Cuartel  de  San  Jose,  and  summoned  the  com 
mander  to  surrender.  This  was  refused,  and,  a  few  days  later, 
Santa  Anna  raised  the  siege,  and  marched  away  to  El  Pinal, 
where  he  expected  to  capture  an  American  train.  He  en 
countered  an  American  force  under  General  Joe  Lane,  and  was 
defeated.  The  next  day  he  received  an  order  directing  him  to 
turn  over  his  command  and  await  a  trial  by  court-martial. 
After  various  ups  and  downs  Santa  Anna  died  in  the  City  of 
Mexico,  in  1876,  poor  and  neglected. 

"A  provisional  government  was  established"  by  General 
Scott  and  "expeditions  were  sent  against  numerous  guerrilla 
bands  which  still  carried  on  their  operations  in  rear  of  the 

army In  all  these  expeditions,  the  Americans  were 

successful ;  but  in  many  severe  losses  were  incurred. "f 

(60)  Scott's  campaign  was  over;  but  it  was  not  until  Feb 
ruary  2,  1848,  that  the  treaty  of  peace  was  concluded  at  Guada 
lupe  Hidalgo.  (48)  Ratifications  were  exchanged  at  Quere- 
taro,  May  30,  1848 ;  peace  was  proclaimed  July  4,  1848 ;  and  on 
August  1  the  last  American  soldier  quitted  Vera  Cruz. 


*Wilcox. 

f  Lecture  of  Lieutenant  Haight,  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 


120  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

THE  NAVY. 

The  cooperation  of  the  American  navy  throughout  the  Mexi 
can  War  was  most  effective.  Not  only  did  it  escort  the  trans 
ports  of  the  armies  of  both  Taylor  and  Scott,  guard  their  bases 
from  the  side  of  the  sea,  put  Scott's  army  ashore  at  Vera  Cruz, 
and  join  in  the  siege  of  that  city;  but  it  also  maintained  an  ef 
fectual  blockade  of  the  Mexican  coasts  on  the  Gulf  and  on  the 
Pacific  sides,  and,  besides  Tampico,  captured  several  other  im 
portant  coast  towns. 

COMMENTS. 

General  Patterson  and  others  were  provoked  at  General 
Scott  because  he  would  not  capture  Vera  Cruz  by  storm.  But 
Scott  preferred  the  more  sensible,  certain,  humane,  and  scien 
tific,  if  less  spectacular,  method  of  siege,  which  succeeded  with 
the  loss  of  sixty-seven  men  killed  and  wounded.  After  recon 
naissance  had  been  made,  General  Scott  said  to  his  chief  en 
gineer:  "Vera  Cruz  must  be  taken  with  a  loss  of  not  to  ex 
ceed  100  men;  for  every  one  over  that  number  I  shall  regard 
myself  as  his  murderer."  His  chief  concern  was  to  get  on 
into  the  highlands  in  the  interior  before  the  yellow-fever  ap 
peared.  If  the  place  could  not  have  been  taken  by  siege  in 
time  for  this,  Scott  would  have  carried  it  by  storm.  "The 
capture  of  Vera  Cruz  was  an  affair,  in  the  main,  of  the  staff 
and  the  artillery.  The  engineers  located  and  constructed  the 
batteries  with  such  good  judgment  and  care,  that  there  were 
few  casualties."* 

If  General  Scott  had  had  the  transports  and  siege  material 
at  hand  that  he  had  asked  for,  and  had  a  right  to  expect,  he 
could  have  begun  the  bombardment  of  Vera  Cruz  at  least  a 
week  earlier;  that  is,  on  the  15th  instead  of  the  22nd  March. 
By  the  20th  the  city  would  have  fallen,  and  by  the  22nd,  if  he 
had,  also,  had  the  necessary  land  transportation,  he  could  have 
been  on  his  way  to  the  City  of  Mexico — before  Santa  Anna 
would  have  had  time  to  return  from  his  defeat  at  Buena  Vista 
[February  23]  and  to  organize  an  army  with  which  to  meet  him 
at  Cerro  Gordo.  With  all  his  energy  and  exertion,  Santa  Anna 
did  not  have  all  his  army  at  Cerro  Gordo  until  the  12th  of 
April;  but  Scott  was  not  ready  to  attack  him  before  the  17th. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Robles,  the  Mexican  engineer  that  forti- 

*Wilcox. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  121 

fied  Cerro  Gordo,  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  that  the  position  was 
only  suitable  for  "harassing  an  invading  army," — that  is,  for 
righting  a  delaying  action,  a  rear-guard  action, — and  not  for 
fighting  a  defensive  battle  with  the  hope  of  winning  a  decisive 
victory.  He  reported  that  the  position  could  be  turned  pre 
cisely  as  it  was  afterwards  turned  by  the  Americans.  He  "ad 
vised  that  the  main  defense  be  made  at  Corral  Falso,  six  or 
eight  miles  in  rear."  But  Santa  Anna  insisted  upon  fortifying 
Cerro  Gordo.  It  was  here  that  the  patriots  had  made  a  famous 
stand  against  the  Spanish  in  the  War  for  Independence.*  Nor 
did  Santa  Anna  make  any  provision  against  the  turning  move 
ment.  Even  after  the  Americans  had  got  possession  of  the 
hill,  Atalaya,  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  he  persisted  in  be 
lieving  that  the  main  attack  would  be  made  against  his  right 
and  front,  and  he  made  his  dispositions  accordingly. 

"All  of  Santa  Anna's  army,  except  one  brigade  of  National 
Guards,  had  reached  Cerro  Gordo  by  April  12,  while  one  half 
of  the  American  regular  force  did  not  leave  Vera  Cruz  until  the 
13th,  and  Quitman's  brigade  of  volunteers  not  until  the  15th. 
It  cannot  be  supposed  that  the  Mexican  commander  was  igno 
rant  of  the  condition  of  the  hostile  army  in  his  immediate  front. 
He  should  therefore  have  attacked  it  within  a  day  or  two  after 
he  reached  Cerro  Gordo;  his  failure  to  do  so  can  be  explained 
only  upon  one  of  two  suppositions :  first  [he  believed]  the 
position  held  by  him  could  not  be  forced,  and  his  enemy  with 
inferior  numbers  must  fight  in  order  to  escape  from  the  Tierra 
Caliente;  second,  if  the  enemy  delayed  his  advance  awaiting  re 
inforcements,  he  would  certainly  be  scourged  by  yellow- fever, 
and,  with  his  thinned  ranks,  be  easily  captured  or  dispersed. 

"A  want  of  adequate  transportation,  and  a  desire  to  get  his 
army  away  from  the  seacoast  before  the  fever  appeared,  com 
pelled  General  Scott  to  march  with  his  various  detachments  on 
separate  days,  at  the  risk  of  being  attacked  in  detail."* 

By  the  victory  of  Cerro  Gordo  the  road  to  the  Mexican  capi 
tal  was  opened  to  the  American  army,  and  Santa  Anna's  army 
was  so  badly  routed,  demoralized,  and  dispersed  that,  "had 
General  Scott  been  provided  with  the  requisite  force  and  trans 
portation,"  he  might  have  pushed  on  to  the  capital  and  speedily 
terminated  the  war.  But  with  the  discharge  of  seven  regi 
ments  (the  one-year  men)  at  Jalapa,  and  with  no  reinforce 
ments,  Scott  was  forced  to  wait  with  his  army  three  months  at 


*Wilcox. 


122  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Puebla.  He  wrote  to  the  War  Department:  "With  the  addi 
tion  of  ten  or  twelve  thousand  new  levies  in  April  and  May, 
asked  for,  and  until  very  recently  expected,  or  even  with  the 
addition  of  two  or  three  thousand  new  troops,  destined  for  this 
army,  but  suddenly,  by  order  of  the  War  Department,  directed 
to  the  Rio  Grande  frontier,  I  might,  notwithstanding  the 
unavoidable  discharge  of  the  volunteers — seven  regiments  and 
two  independent  companies — advance  with  confidence  upon  the 
enemy's  capital."* 

For  General  Scott  to  cut  loose  from  his  base, — abandon  his 
line  of  communication  with  Vera  Cruz, — and  set  out  with  an 
army  of  10,000  soldiers  from  Puebla  to  try  to  overcome  an 
army  of  30,000  and  capture  the  capital,  seems  like  a  very 
hazardous  undertaking.  When  the  news  of  it  reached  Eu 
rope,  Wellington  said:  "Scott  is  lost.  He  has  been  carried 
away  by  success.  He  can't  take  the  city,  and  he  can't  fall 
back  upon  his  base."f  It  is  seldom  that  a  commander  is  justi 
fied  in  taking  such  a  risk,  and  if  General  Scott  had  failed,  mili 
tary  critics  would  have  condemned  him  for  rashness.  General 
Wilcox  says  in  his  history  of  the  war :  "The  defeat  of  Santa 
Anna  and  the  capture  of  the  Mexican  capital  were  due  to 
Scott's  skill  and  good  judgment,  aided  by  an  able,  educated, 
and  scientific  staff,  and  by  an  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry 
force  whose  fighting  qualities"  are  rarely  equalled. 

A  distinctive  feature  of  this  campaign  was  the  work  of  the 
younger  engineer  officers,  Lee,  Beauregard,  Tower,  Mason, 
McClellan,  and  others,  in  reconnoitering  routes  and  positions, 
selecting  the  places  for  lines  and  guns,  constructing  batteries, 
guiding  columns  of  troops,  watching  for  vulnerable  points  in 
the  enemy's  line.  General  Scott  placed  great  reliance  upon 
these  officers.  Not  a  route  was  taken,  nor  an  attack  ordered, 
until  they  had  made  their  reconnaissance  and  report.  The 
only  attack  made  in  the  campaign  without  reconnaissance  be 
forehand  by  the  engineer  officers,  was  Worth's  impetuous  as 
sault  of  the  bridge-head  at  Churubusco.  Truly  did  the  Mili 
tary  Academy  repay  its  cost  to  the  Nation  with  the  work  of 
these  young  graduates  in  this  single  campaign. 

(60)  It  does  not  appear  that  Santa  Anna  considered  the 
probability  of  Scott's  advancing  on  the  capital  by  the  road 
south  of  Lakes  Xochimilco  and  Chalco.  No  doubt  he  was 
fooled  by  the  appearance  of  the  army  at  Ayotla,  and  by  the  ap- 

*Wilcox. 
fWright. 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR,  123 

pearance  of  reconnoitering  parties  on  the  road  by  El  Pefion, 
and,  also,  on  the  road  from  Los  Reyes  to  Mexicalcingo,  which 
was  fortified.  But  on  the  road  actually  taken  by  the  Ameri 
cans,  no  real  resistance  was  offered,  and  no  preparation  for 
defense  had  been  made  south  and  east  of  San  Antonio.  The 
road  from  San  Augustin  to  the  southern  end  of  Lake  Chalco 
presents  every  advantage  for  defense,  and  ought  to  have  been 
fortified  and  defended  by  the  Mexicans.  The  instant,  how 
ever,  that  Scott  reversed  his  army  and  started  it  southward 
round  Lake  Chalco,  Santa  Anna  saw  through  the  movement, 
and  accordingly  issued  orders  this  same  day,  August  15,  for 
his  army  to  concentrate  on  the  causeways  south  of  the  capital, 
from  Mexicalcingo  to  San  Angel. 

General  Valencia's  division  was  ordered  to  hold  San  Angel; 
but  this  general  moved  forward  and  occupied  the  advanced 
position  at  Contreras.  This  position  was  from  every  point  of 
view  untenable.  Not  only  could  it  be  turned  easily,  and 
attacked  in  rear  (as  was  done),  but  Valencia  would  have  been 
just  as  bad  off,  if  Scott  had  only  left  a  containing  force  to 
occupy  his  attention  in  front,  while  he  forced  a  way  forward 
over  the  San  Antonio  causeway,  and  from  there  crossed  over 
to  the  San  Angel  road.  This  would  have  cut  Valencia  off 
from  his  communications.  Taking  position,  then,  at  Contre 
ras  was  Valencia's  strategic  mistake.  He  made  an  equally 
bad  tactical  blunder,  in  putting  a  part  of  his  force  in  front  at 
Padierna — an  advanced  post  beyond  the  support  of  his  main 
position. 

General  Grant  says  in  his  Memoirs:  "Both  the  strategy  and 
tactics  displayed  by  General  Scott  in  the  various  engagements 
of  August  20,  1847,  were  faultless,  as  I  look  upon  them  now 
after  the  lapse  of  so  many  years" — Contreras,  San  Antonio, 
and  Churubusco.  Strategically,  Molino  del  Rey  and  Chapul- 
tepec  may  have  been  mistakes;  they,  cleared  the  way  for  an 
entry  into  the  city,  but  they  were  very  costly  victories.  Possi 
bly,  Scott  could  have  forced  the  San  Antonio  Garita  at  less  cost 
than  storming  Chapultepec.  This  was  the  opinion  of  all  his 
generals  except  Pillow,  and  of  all  his  engineer  officers  except 
Beauregard. 

General  Scott  was  greatly  handicapped  in  the  carrying-out 
of  his  campaign,  by  a  lack  of  funds  and  supplies,  as  well  as  by 
the  delay  and  scarcity  of  his  reinforcements.  During  his  long, 
enforced  wait  at  Puebla,  no  funds  nor  supplies  had  been  re 
ceived.  Four  months'  pay  was  due  the  troops.  Mexicans 


124  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

were  employed  to  make  shoes  and  clothing  for  the  army,  and 
food  and  forage  had  to  be  got  from  the  country ;  and  the  sub 
sistence  and  quartermaster's  departments  had  to  make  all  pur 
chases  on  credit. 

This  campaign,  like  Taylor's,  exemplified  the  benefits  and 
importance  of  drill,  discipline,  and  training.  Advantage  was 
taken  of  the  long  stay  at  Puebla,  and  wherever  opportunity 
offered,  for  instruction  in  these  matters. 

Possibly  the  best  incident  of  the  Mexican  War,  from  the 
military  point  of  view  of  the  Nation,  was  the  absence  of  the 
militia — George  Washington's  abomination  and  Thomas  Jef 
ferson's  bulwark  of  freedom.  No  attempt  was  made  to  test 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  militia  by  ordering  them  beyond 
the  Rio  Grande.  Trained  volunteers  were  employed  in  their 
stead,  and  a  larger  proportion  of  regulars ;  and  we  have  seen  a 
different  sort  of  fighting  from  that  of  the  shame  of  1812.  Of 
a  truth,  for  courageous,  hard,  sustained  fighting,  as  shown  by 
the  percentage  of  loss,  and  the  victories  gained  over  superior 
numbers  in  strong  positions,  there  is  no  page  of  our  history  so 
notable,  and  none  so  inspiring,  as  that  which  tells  of  the  bat 
tles  around  the  City  of  Mexico.  If  a  single  American  regi 
ment  or  company  ran  away  from  any  engagement  in  Scott's 
campaign,  the  historians  have  failed  to  record  it. 

The  invasion  and  conquest  of  Mexico  by  an  army  so  small 
as  General  Scott's  and  so  hampered  by  lack  of  support  from 
its  own  government,  was  made  possible  only  by  the  circum 
stances  existing  in  Mexico.  The  foremost  of  these  circum 
stances  were  the  weakness  of  the  central  national  government 
and  the  political  dissensions  within  the  republic.  A  state  torn 
by  internal  dissensions  is  in  the  worst  condition  to  repel 
invasion. 

It  is  almost  impossible  for  an  American  student  of  to-day  to 
get  a  clear  apprehension  of  the  Mexican  political  potpourri 
of  that  day.  And  it  is  not  worth  while.  Out  of  the  muddle 
of  Moderados,  Puros,  Polkos,  Clericals,  and  the  rest,  about  the 
only  notion  that  we  can  gather,  is  that  there  was  a  political 
party  for  every  man  strong  enough  to  have  a  temporary  fol 
lowing.  The  consequences  of  it  all  were  revolutions;  and 
more  revolutions.  There  were  two  or  three  during  the  war 
with  the  United  States.  The  Republic  of  Mexico  was  a  union 
of  states,  like  the  United  States;  but  the  central  government 
was  so  unstable  and  weak  as  to  have  no  real  authority,  and 
very  little  real  influence,  over  the  state  governments.  Govern- 


THE  MEXICAN  WAR.  125 

ors  of  states  were  asked  for  troops  to  defend  the  national 
capital  when  the  invaders  were  at  its  gates ;  almost  none  of 
them  responded.  That  the  Republic  out  of  all  its  thousands 
of  population  could  muster  an  army  of  only  20,000  men  to 
defend  its  ancient  and  beautiful  capital,  seems  as  pitiable,  and 
as  absurd,  as  our  own  failure  to  defend  Washington  City 
against  a  handful  of  British  in  the  War  of  1812. 

The  Mexican  army  suffered  not  so  much  from  a  lack  of  com 
manders  as  from  the  lack  of  a  commander.  All  things  consid 
ered,  Santa  Anna  appears  to  have  been  its  best ;  yet  his  opera 
tions  all  show  the  want  of  an  understanding  of  strategy  and 
tactics.  He  even  seems  to  have  lacked  the  common  quality 
of  personal  courage.  Attention  has  already  been  pointed  to 
the  strategical  mistake  he  made  in  taking  his  army  to  Buena 
Vista  rather  than  to  Vera  Cruz;  of  a  piece  with  it,  was  his 
withdrawal  of  the  garrison  from  Tampico.  This  virtually 
gave  that  important  port  to  the  American  navy ;  and  it  became 
the  base  of  operations  against  Vera  Cruz. 

This  was  a  conflict  in  which  nothing  but  the  taking  of  the 
national  capital  would  have  made  the  weaker  nation  accept 
the  terms  of  peace  proposed  by  the  stronger.  It  was  not 
enough  to  destroy  the  organized  armed  bodies;  it  was  not 
enough  to  blockade  the  coast,  capture  important  seaports,  and 
occupy  a  large  part  of  the  territory.  From  prehistoric  times 
Mexico  City  had  been  the  capital  of  Mexico ;  it  was  the  metrop 
olis  as  well  as  the  political  capital.  The  pride  of  the  nation 
was  centered  in  that  city,  and  the  leaders  of  the  people,  the  men 
who  were  able  to  make  a  treaty  of  peace  that  would  be  binding 
on  the  nation,  were  there. 

The  capture  of  Vera  Cruz  was  the  first  step  toward  the  cap 
ture  of  the  City  of  Mexico.  Its  defense  should,  therefore, 
have  been  the  first  consideration  of  the  government  and  the 
commander-in-chief.  But  it  was  neglected  by  both.  No  ade 
quate  preparation  had  been  made  for  its  defense ;  there  was  no 
army  at  hand  to  guard  it  from  without;  and  it  was  not  pro 
vided  with  forts,  or  garrison,  or  armament,  or  supplies,  to  with 
stand  a  siege. 

One  of  the  most  serious  strategic  mistakes  made  by  Santa 
Anna  was  his  withdrawal  from  Orizaba  to  the  capital,  after 
reorganizing  his  beaten  army  at  Orizaba.  This  town  stood 
upon  the  flank  of  General  Scott's  line  of  operations,  and  within 
easy  striking  distance  of  it.  Scott  could  not  have  dared  to 
push  on  to  the  capital,  or  even  as  far  as  Puebla,  so  long  as 


126  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Santa  Anna  remained  at  Orizaba.  As  the  American  com 
mander  had  not  troops  enough  to  spare  a  force  to  mask  or 
"contain"  Santa  Anna's  army  in  its  flank  position,  he  would 
have  been  obliged  to  make  his  whole  force  against  it  to  dis 
lodge  it,  before  he  could  have  gone  on  toward  the  Valley  of 
Mexico.  At  Orizaba  Santa  Anna  would  have  had  the  same 
advantage  over  the  Americans  that  Washington  had  over  the 
British  in  his  flank  position  at  Morristown. 

In  conclusion  I  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  the  remarks 
made  by  Daniel  Webster  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
about  General  Scott:  "A  man,"  said  he,  "who  has  performed 
the  most  brilliant  campaign  on  recent  military  record;  a  man 
who  has  warred  against  the  enemy,  warred  against  the  climate, 
warred  against  a  thousand  unpropitious  circumstances;  and 
has  carried  the  flag  of  his  country  to  the  capital  of  the  enemy — 
honorably,  proudly,  humanely — to  his  own  permanent  honor 
and  the  great  military  credit  of  his  country.  And  where  is 
he?  At  Pueblo — at  Pueblo  undergoing  an  inquiry  before  his 
inferiors  in  rank,  and  other  persons  without  military  rank, 
while  the  high  powers  he  has  exercised  and  executed  with  so 
much  distinction  are  transferred  to  another." 

Yes,  such  was  General  Scott's  reward — an  order  from  Presi 
dent  Polk  relieving  him  from  command  of  his  army,  and  send 
ing  him  before  a  court  of  inquiry.  The  occasion  of  this  in 
dignity  was  the  insubordination  of  one  of  Scott's  regular  gen 
erals  and  the  vainglory  of  one  of  his  volunteer  generals. 
Mexican  history  gloatingly  says:  "The  conqueror  of  Mexico 
found  himself  brought  like  a  criminal  before  a  military  tribunal. 
.  ^  .  .  We  believe  this  step  was  a  measure  of  profound  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  Cabinet  of  the  United  States.  When  General 
Taylor  had  at  one  time  acquired  sufficient  popularity  by  his 
campaigns  in  the  north,  General  Scott  was  put  forward  as  his 
rival;  and  when  Scott  had  caused  the  renown  of  old  General 
Taylor  to  be  forgotten,  the  executive  wished  the  people  of  the 
United  States  to  forget  both  these  leaders,  in  order  that  the 
military  spirit  should  never  prevail,  which  is  so  prejudicial  to 
countries  governed  by  the  federal  system."*  But  the  Mexican 
historians  saw  only  half-way  through  the  motives  of  Mr.  Polk's 
Cabinet. 


*The  Other  Side. 


LECTURE  VII. 
THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

(67)  It  is  not  our  purpose  to  attempt  to  trace  the  causes 
of  our  great  Civil  War — they  are  even  yet  more  matters  of 
controversy  than  of  exact  history.  We  are  concerned  merely 
with  its  military  history.  We  want  to  learn  the  lessons  of  our 
trade  from  its  campaigns,  and  to  do  so  to  the  best  advantage 
we  must  forget  the  sectional  prejudice  we  may  have  imbibed 
in  our  childhood ;  indeed  we  must  forget,  if  we  have  not  already 
done  so,  much  of  the  fiction  we  were  taught,  under  the  guise  of 
history,  in  the  school-rooms  of  our  youth.  We  must  strive  to 
get  at  the  exact  truth  of  events,  and  then  study  coldly, 
critically,  comparatively,  not  only  the  faults  and  mistakes  of 
opposing  commanders  and  troops,  but  also  their  examples  of 
skill  and  excellence.  We  want  to  appreciate,  if  we  can,  the 
causes  of  success  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  failure  on  the  other, 
in  every  case. 

As  students  of  American  history  we  may  have  a  personal 
leaning  towards  the  soldiers  of  one  side  or  the  other,  towards 
the  famous  leaders  of  one  side  or  the  other ;  better  still,  we  may 
have  a  national  pride  in  the  great  deeds  and  qualities  of  the 
actors  on  both  sides,  or  we  may  deplore  their  shortcomings ; 
but  as  students  of  military  history,  a  branch  of  our  professional 
education,  a  chief  means  of  learning  the  business  of  war,  we 
must  study  the  work  of  Grant  and  Lee,  of  Jackson  and  Sheri 
dan,  of  Sherman  and  Johnston,  and  of  the  rest,  merely  as  the 
work  of  characters  in  history ;  just  as  we  shall  study  the  work 
of  von  Moltke  and  Benedek,  of  Roberts  and  Cronje,  of  Oyama 
and  Kuropatkin. 

To  arrive  at  a  right  estimate  or  appreciation  of  this  conflict, 
one  thing  must  be  kept  always  in  mind;  namely,  that  while 
politically  it  was  a  civil  war,  from  a  purely  military  point  of 
view  it  was  as  much  a  war  between  two  hostile  nations  as  was 
the  war  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  or  the  war 
between  France  and  Germany  in  1870-71.  In  other  civil  wars 
the  people  of  a  nation  have  been  divided  among  themselves,  and 
not  by  geographic  lines.  The  cleavage  has  usually  been  be- 

127 


128  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

tween  social  classes,  political  factions,  or  religious  sects;  but  in 
this  war  the  inhabitants  oi  two  geographic  sections  were  op 
posed  to  each  other  almost  to  a  unit, — as  solidly  as  any  two 
distinct  hostile  nations  speaking  different  languages.  How 
ever  otherwise  the  matter  may  have  been  viewed  by  the  people 
of  the  North,  the  people  of  the  South,  almost  as  a  whole,  be 
lieved  themselves  to  be  defending  their  soil  against  an  invader, 
rather  than  struggling  merely  to  defend,  or  to  achieve,  rights 
from  governmental  oppression. 

South  Carolina,  whose  statesmen  had  for  long  been  threaten 
ing  separation  from  the  United  States,  was  the  first  State  to 
pass  an  ordinance  of  secession.  This  happened  on  the  20th  of 
December,  1860,  and,  unfortunately,  Mr.  Buchanan,  and  not 
Andrew  Jackson,  was  President  of  the  United  States.  Bu 
chanan  did  not  believe  that  a  State  had  the  right  to  secede; 
nor  yet  did  he  believe  that  the  G9vernment  had  the  right  to 
coerce  a  State.  So  South  Carolina  was  not  opposed. 

By  the  1st  of  February,  1861,  Georgia  and  the  five  States 
bordering  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  had  also  withdrawn  from  the 
Union  without  opposition.  The  seceding  States  "took  posses 
sion  of  the  public  property  within  their  borders,  such  as  mints, 
arsenals,  and  forts,  with  the  exception  of  three  or  four  forts 
along  the  seacoast.  General  Twiggs,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  Department  of  Texas,  to  his  immortal  shame  surrendered 
all  the  posts  in  Texas,  with  their  garrisons  and  equipment,  to 
a  regiment  of  Texas  militia.  Among  the  forts  not  given  up  to 
the  seceding  States  was  Fort  Sumter  in  the  harbor  of  Charles 
ton,  South  Carolina. 

In  February,  1861,  representatives  of  the  seceding  States  met 
at  Montgomery,  Alabama,  and  organized  a  provisional  govern 
ment.  Jefferson  Davis  was  chosen  provisional  President  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America.  On  the  4th  of  March,  1861, 
Abraham  Lincoln  succeeded  Buchanan  as  President  of  the 
United  States.  The  new  Administration  took  no  immediate 
steps  to  reduce  the  seceded  States ;  and  for  a  time  matters  went 
on  in  about  the  same  way  as  under  Buchanan's  Administration. 
In  fact,  the  Government  had  no  means  at  hand  with  which  to 
coerce  the  recalcitrant  States.  The  United  States  marshals 
and  other  civil  officers  refused,  and  were  powerless,  to  act ;  the 
army  was  only  about  16,000  strong,  and  was,  for  the  most 
part,  in  the  far  West.  "The  navy  consisted  of  six  screw- frig 
ates,  only  one  of  which  was  in  commission,  of  five  steam 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  129 

sloops,  some  twenty  sailing  vessels,  and  a  few  gunboats."*  In 
the  States  remaining  in  the  Union  public  opinion  concerning 
the  right  of  States  to  secede,  and  the  right  of  the  Government 
to  coerce  a  seceding  State,  had  not  as  yet  crystallized  into  such 
shape  as  to  warrant  the  President  in  taking  the  extreme  step 
of  calling  out  the  militia. 

Meantime,  Major  Anderson  with  his  little  garrison  at  Fort 
Sumter  was  besieged  by  an  armed  Confederate  force  under 
General  Beauregard,  and  his  provisions  were  running  low.  In 
January  reinforcements  and  supplies  had  been  dispatched  to 
him  in  a  steamer  called  Star  of  the  West;  but  the  vessel  had 
been  fired  upon  and  stopped  by  Confederate  guns  at  Fort 
Moultrie.  Confederate  commissioners  spent  several  weeks  at 
Washington  negotiating  for  the  delivery  of  the  fort ;  about  the 
1st  of  April  they  obtained  from  the  President  an  agreement 
"that  he  would  not  change  the  military  status  at  Charleston 
without  giving  notice."f  Just  a  week  later  a  messenger  from 
Mr.  Lincoln  notified  the  Confederate  authorities  at  Charleston 
that  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  "supply  Fort  Sumter  with 
provisions  only."  Thereupon  "Beauregard  was  instructed  to 
demand  the  evacuation  of  Sumter,  and,  in  case  of  refusal,  to 
reduce  it."f 

The  demand  was  made  on  the  afternoon  of  the  llth  of  April, 
and  promptly  refused.  At  half -past  four  o'clock  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  12th  the  first  shot  was  fired  at  Fort  Sumter.  It  was 
the  first  shot  of  the  war.  At  noon  on  Sunday,  the  14th,  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  were  hauled  down,  and  the  fort  was  evacu 
ated. 

The  next  day,  the  15th  of  April,  President  Lincoln  issued  a 
proclamation  calling  forth  75,000  militia,  and  stating  that  their 
"first  service"  would  "probably  be  to  repossess  the  forts,  places, 
and  property  which  have  been  seized  from  the  Union."  The 
term  of  service  of  this  levy  was  for  three  months  only. 

All  of  the  Free  States  responded  enthusiastically  to  the 
President's  call ;  the  governors  of  the  Slave  States  that  still 
adhered  to  the  Union  refused.  These  States  immediately  took 
up  the  question  of  secession,  with  the  result  that  Virginia, 
North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas  joined  the  Confed 
eracy.  In  the  other  border  States  a  desperate  struggle  took 
place  between  Secession  and  Union.  Kentucky  undertook  to 

*Henderson's  Life  of  Stonewall  Jackson. 
fScribner's  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War — Nicolay. 


130  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

remain  neutral,  but  soon  found  her  neutrality  violated  by  both 
the  Confederacy  and  the  United  States.  Missouri  was  held  in 
the  Union  mainly  by 'means  of  the  activity  and  judgment  of 
General  Lyon,-  then  a  captain  in  the  2nd  U.  S.  Infantry.  A 
good  deal  of  fighting  took  place  in  that  State  in  May  and  June, 
1861.  The  Union  victory  at  Boonville,  on  the  17th  of  June, 
"decided  the  fate  of  the  State  in  favor  of  the  Union."  In 
Maryland  there  was  a  very  strong  sentiment  in  favor  of  Seces 
sion.  It  exhibited  itself  in  an  assault  made  by  a  mob  in  Balti 
more  upon  a  Massachusetts  regiment  passing  through  that  city, 
on  the  19th  of  April.  The  State  was  kept  in  the  Union.  In 
the  mountainous  counties  of  western  Virginia  the  people  were 
almost  solidly  for  the  Union.  They  repudiated  the  secession  of 
Virginia  and  set  up  the  loyal  State  of  West  Virginia.  The 
Governor  of  Virginia  dispatched  troops  thither  to  overawe 
them ;  but  the  troops  were  defeated  and  put  to  rout  by  Union 
forces  under  General  McClellan  in  a  "brief  and  brilliant  cam 
paign."  The  actions  at  Rich  Mountain  and  Carrick's  Ford,  on 
the  llth  and  13th  of  July,  "settled  forever  the  fate  of  West 
Virginia." 

While  these  hostilities  were  going  on  in  Missouri  and  West 
Virginia,  and  Kentucky  was  trying  to  stand  neutral,  it  was 
evident  from  the  start  that  the  main  campaign  would  be  car 
ried  on  in  Virginia  or  Maryland.  This  was  determined  pri 
marily  by  the  position  of  Washington,  the  capital  of  the  United 
States,  and  secondarily  by  the  position  of  Richmond,  the  capital 
of  the  Confederacy.  Whether  the  battle-ground  would  be  in 
Virginia  or  in  Maryland  depended  upon  whether  the  Federal 
forces  or  the  Confederates  should  take  the  offensive. 

The  safety  of  Washington  was  the  first  consideration  of  the 
Federal  Government;  to  this  end  the  new  troops  and  some 
regulars  were  hurried  to  that  point.  The  South  hastened  its 
raw  levies  to  Virginia,  and  established  its  main  camp  at  Ma- 
nassas  Junction,  under  General  Beauregard. 

On  the  24th  of  May,  the  day  after  the  people  of  Virginia  by 
their  votes  ratified  the  ordinance  of  secession,  columns  of  Fed 
eral  troops  crossed  the  Potomac  and,  without  opposition,  seized 
Alexandria  and  Arlington  Heights.  They  established  a  camp 
on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  intrenched  the  line  from 
the  Chain  Bridge,  above  Washington,  to  Alexandria,  below  it. 
General  Scott,  then  in  command  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  hero  of  two  wars,  and  the  only  man  in  America  that  had 
ever  actually  commanded  as  many  as  5,000  soldiers,  was  too  old 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  131 

actively  to  take  command.  So  Brevet-Major  McDowell,  an 
officer  of  the  Adjutant  General's  Department,  on  duty  at  the 
War  Department,  whose  highest  rank  of  command  had  been 
lieutenant  of  artillery,  was  made  a  brigadier-general,  and  given 
command  of  the  forces  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac. 
McDowell  and  Beauregard  had  been  classmates  at  West  Point ; 
Beauregard  had  been  an  officer  of  the  U.  S.  Engineers. 

Washington  being  now  prepared  for  defense  against  direct 
attack,  the  Northern  newspapers  and  public  began  to  cry  out 
for  a  movement  against  the  Confederate  force  at  Manassas. 
General  Scott  did  not  believe  the  three-month  levies  could  be 
counted  upon  for  an  offensive  campaign.  On  the  3rd  of  May 
President  Lincoln  had  made  a  second  call  for  troops,  42,034 
three-year  volunteers,  22,714  men  for  the  regular  army,  and 
18,000  for  the  navy.  General  Scott  wanted  to  wait  until  the 
men  of  this  second  levy  could  be  trained  and  made  ready  for 
the  field.  "But  the  Northern  public,  as  the  violent  language  of 
the  newspapers  clearly  showed,  was  determined  not  to  lose  the 
services  of  the  three-months  men  before  proving  how  much 
they  could  do;  and  .  .  .  the  Administration  was  finally 
induced  to  overrule  the  judgment  of  the  lieutenant-general,  and 
to  order  him  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements  for  an 
advance."* 

Besides  the  armies  under  McDowell  and  Beauregard  there 
were  several  other  hostile  forces  in  this  theater.  Near  Win 
chester,  in  the  lower  Shenandoah  Valley,  a  Confederate  force, 
about  12,000  strong,  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  con 
fronted  a  Union  force,  about  18,000  strong,  under  General 
Patterson.  This  was  the  same  General  Patterson  that  we  met 
in  the  Mexican  War.  He  was  now  nearly  seventy  years  old, 
and  had  lately  been  appointed  a  major-general  of  volunteers 
from  civil  life,  and  given  this  important  command.  At  Aquia 
Creek,  about  thirty  miles  southeast  of  Manassas,  there  was  a 
Confederate  force  of  some  3,000  men  and  six  guns,  under  Gen 
eral  Holmes.  Threatening  Richmond  from  the  southeast,  a 
Federal  force  under  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  at  Fort  Mon 
roe,  was  opposed  by  Confederates  under  Generals  Huger  and 
Magruder.  In  the  mountains  of  western  Virginia  five  or  six 
thousand  Confederates  were  guarding  the  passes  against  the 
advance  of  the  victorious  Federals  from  West  Virginia.  There 
were  also  Confederate  troops  at  Richmond,  and  Beauregard 


*The  Story  of  the  Civil  War—  Ropes. 


132  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

had  a  detachment  near  Leesburg,  thirty  miles  away,  watching 
the  crossings  of  the  Potomac. 

None  of  the  Union  forces,  except  his  immediate  command, 
were  under  McDowell's  control ;  and  none  of  the  Confederates, 
except  those  at  Leesburg  and  Manassas,  were  under  Beaure- 
gard's  command.  President  Davis,  with  General  Lee  as  his 
military  adviser,  undertook  personally  to  command  all  the  Con 
federate  detachments  from  Richmond;  while  General  Scott, 
under  President  Lincoln,  directed  the  Federal  forces  from 
Washington. 

The  strategic  importance  of  Manassas  was  due  to  the  roads 
and  railways  converging  and  passing  near  there.  An  advance 
against  Richmond  by  way  of  the  Chesapeake  Bay  was  not,  as 
yet,  seriously  feared,  as  it  would  require  stronger  naval  co 
operation  than  the  little  navy  of  the  United  States  was  then 
equal  to.  Any  advance  of  Union  forces  was  expected  to  be 
made  .overland  from  Washington;  and  Manassas  lay  directly 
between  the  two  main  roads  leading  from  that  city  to  Rich 
mond — one  by  way  of  Alexandria  and  Fredericksburg ;  the 
other  by  way  of  Warrenton,  and  thence  through  Culpeper 
[Fairfax]  or  Fredericksburg.  The  main  line  of  railway  from 
Washington  to  the  Southern  States,  and  also  to  Richmond,  was 
joined  at  Manassas  by  a  shorter  line  from  the  lower  Shenan- 
doah  Valley.  This  branch  line,  it  was  foreseen,  could  be  used 
quickly  to  unite  the  armies  of  Beauregard  and  Johnston,  in  the 
direction  either  of  Manassas  or  Winchester,  as  circumstances 
required.  It  was  also  the  line  by  which  Johnston's  army  com 
municated  with  the  Confederate  base  at  Richmond.  Beaure- 
gard's  position  at  Manassas  guarded  this  line. 

Occoquan  Creek  covered  the  right  flank  of  the  Confederate 
position  at  Manassas,  and  Bull  Run  ran  in  front  of  it.  (70) 
This  stream,  although  it  had  many  regular  crossings,  and  could 
probably  have  been  forded  at  many  other  points  during  the 
summer,  was,  nevertheless,' a  "formidable  obstacle"  to  cross  in 
the  face  of  a  hostile  army.  Its  banks  were  generally  high 
and  wooded.  It  was  more  difficult  below  the  Stone  Bridge  (on 
Warrenton  Pike)  than  it  was  above  that  point.  (67)  There 
was  little  danger  of  an  overland  movement  against  Richmond 
to  the  east  of  the  Alexandria-Fredericksburg  road,  on  account 
of  the  difficult  streams  that  would  have  to  be  crossed;  still 
Holmes's  command  at  Aquia  had  an  eye  on  that  region.  Nor 
did  the  Shenandoah  Valley  offer  a  good  route.  The  roads  up 
that  valley  from  the  Potomac  led  rather  away  from  the  direc- 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  133 

tion  of  Richmond,  and  the  valley  was  closed  on  the  east  by  the 
Blue  Ridge  Mountains,  which  could  be  crossed  only  at  a  few 
passes,  or  "gaps"  as  they  are  called  there.  These  gaps  could 
easily  be  guarded  by -the  Confederates,  and  could  be  used  by 
them  to  fall  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  any  hostile  column  that 
might  pass  up  the  Valley.  The  Shenandoah  Valley  offered  a 
better  route  for  a  Confederate  invasion  of  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  was  later  made  use  of  by 
General  Lee  for  that  purpose.  The  position  of  Johnston's 
'army,  besides  menacing  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway,  the 
main  line  of  communication  between  Washington  and  the 
West,  threatened  such  an  invasion,  and  also  guarded  the  Val 
ley  against  a  hostile  advance.  In  fact  the  main  purpose  of 
Johnston's  force  and  Patterson's,  at  that  time,  appears  to  have 
been  to  keep  each  other  from  doing  anything.  We  shall  see 
hereafter  which  force  succeeded. 

In  reluctant  response  to  the  cry  of  the  people  and  the  press 
for  a  forwa-rd  movement,  General  Scott  called  upon  McDowell 
to  submit  a  plan  of  operations.  This  McDowell  did  on  the 
24th  of  June.  The  plan  proposed  "to  turn  the  enemy's  position 
and  force  him  out  of  it  by  seizing  or  threatening  his  communi 
cations."*  The  plan  counted  upon  Patterson  and  Butler  to 
"contain"  the  Confederates  in  their  fronts,  and  estimated  that 
Beauregard  would  still  receive  reinforcements  enough  to  raise 
his  army  to  about  35,000.  So  McDowell  reckoned  that  he 
must  have  "a  force  of  30,000  of  all  arms,  with  a  reserve  of 
10,000." 

His  plan  was  approved,  and  he  was  ordered  "to  carry  it  into 
effect  July  the  8th."  Owing,  however,  to  delays,  it  was  not 
until  the  16th  July  that  his  army  was  raised  to  the  strength 
agreed  upon.  Not  until  about  this  time  was  his  army  organ 
ized  into  brigades.  As  finally  organized  it  consisted  of  five 
infantry  divisions.  The  First  Division,  under  Tyler,  contained 
four  brigades  under  Keyes,  Schenck,  W.  T.  Sherman,  and 
Richardson ;  the  Second  Division,  under  Hunter,  contained  two 
brigades  under  Andrew  Porter  and  Burnside ;  the  Third  Di 
vision,  under  Heintzelman,  contained  three  brigades  under 
Franklin,  Willcox  and  Howard;  the  Fourth  Division,  under 
Runyon,  contained  nine  regiments  not  brigaded;  and  the  Fifth 
Division,  under  Dixon  S.  Miles,  contained  two  brigades  under 
Blenker  and  Davies.  There  were  forty-nine  guns  and  seven 
troops  of  regular  cavalry.  Eight  companies  of  infantry,  under 

^Battles  and  Leaders — Fry. 


134  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Major  Sykes,  and  seven  of  the  batteries  were  also  of  the  regu 
lar  army;  and  there  was  one  small  battalion  of  marines.  The 
army  aggregated  about  35,000  men.  Runyon's  division  was 
held  back  to  guard  the  road  in  rear  of  the  army,  and  took  no 
part  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run. 

General  Fry  in  his  account  of  the  battle  says:  "Northern 
enthusiasm  was  unbounded.  'On  to  Richmond'  was  the  war- 
cry.  Public  sentiment  was  irresistible,  and  in  response  to  it 
the  army  advanced.  It  was  a  glorious  spectacle.  The  various 
regiments  were  brilliantly  uniformed  according  to  the  aesthetic' 
taste  of  peace,  and  the  silken  banners  they  flung  to  the  breeze 
were  unsoiled  and  untorn."* 

Through  his  spies  in  Washington  Beauregard  was  informed 
of  the  contemplated  advance ;  he  reported  it  to  Richmond.  On 
the  17th  of  July  he  wired  that  McDowell's  army  had  started. 
By  telegraph  President  Davis  immediately  ordered  Johnston 
and  Holmes  to  reinforce  Beauregard  with  their  effective 
forces;  and  he  sent  him  troops  from  Richmond.  • 

Johnston  had  taken  command  of  the  Confederate  force  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  at  Harper's  Ferry;  but  he  soon  had  seen 
that  this  place  was  in  a  pocket,  surrounded  by  hills  and  com 
manded  by  Maryland  Heights  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Poto 
mac,  and  that  it  was  untenable.  He,  therefore,  withdrew  his 
command  to  Winchester.  Then  Patterson  crossed  the  Poto 
mac,  and,  after  a  good  deal  of  indecisive  moving  about,  and 
the  receipt  of  many  telegrams  from  General  Scott  urging  the 
necessity  of  his  preventing  Johnston  from  quitting  the  Valley 
and  going  to  Beauregard's  aid,  he  advanced  as  far  as  Bunker 
Hill,  within  nine  miles  of  Winchester.  He  was  deceived  in  the 
size  of  Johnston's  force,  and  believed  it  to  be  35,000  strong  ;f 
it  was,  in  truth,  not  more  than 'two-thirds  the  strength  of  his 
own. 

(68)  On  the  17th  of  July  Patterson  withdrew  to  Charles- 
town;  the  next  day  Johnston  started  his  army,  about  9,000 
effectives,  by  way  of  Ashby's  Gap  to  Piedmont.  Here  he  placed 
his  infantry  in  railway  cars;  and  by  the  afternoon  of  the  20th 
had  joined  Beauregard  with  the  bulk  of  his  army.  The  move 
ment  had  been  so  completely  masked  by  Stuart  with  his  little 
command  of  cavalry  that  it  was  not  suspected  by  Patterson 
until  July  the  20th.$ 


*B.  &  L. 

fPatterson's  telegram  to  General  Scott,  July  18. 

jlmboden  in  B.  &  L.    Nicolay  in  Scribner's  Series. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  135 

Beauregard  had  withdrawn  his  detachment  from  Leesburg. 
His  army,  called  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  consisted  of  six 
and  a  half  brigades,  and  he  had  thus  disposed  them  behind 
Bull  Run :  (69)  At  Union  Mills  Ford,  about  six  miles  in  a 
straight  line  from  the  Stone  Bridge,  Swell's  brigade;  at  Mc 
Lean's  Ford,  D.  R.  Jones's  brigade;  at  Blackburn's  Ford, 
Lonjgstreet's  brigade;  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  Bonham's  brigade. 
Evans's  half -brigade  held  the  Stone  Bridge  on  Warrenton 
Pike;  and  Cocke's  brigade  covered  the  fords  between  the 
Stone  Bridge  and  Bonham's  left.  Early's  brigade  was  placed 
as  a  support  in  rear ;  as  were,  also,  Holmes's,  when  it  came  up, 
and  the  brigades  of  Jackson,  Bee,  and  Bartow,  of  Johnston's 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah.*  It  is  evident  from  these  disposi 
tions  that  Beauregard  expected  McDowell  to  try  to  cross  the 
creek  by  the  fords  to  the  east  of  the  Stone  Bridge;  this  was 
McDowell's  original  purpose,  but  he  decided  later  that  .the 
creek  and  the  close  country  in  that  quarter  were  too  difficult. 
General  Johnston  ranked  Beauregard,  and  upon  his  arrival  on 
the  ground  fell  into  command  of  the  Confederate  forces.  He, 
however,  approved  all  of  Beauregard's  arrangements,  and  vir 
tually  waived  his  right  of  command. 

(68)  Meantime  the  Union  army  was  on  its  way  from  Alex 
andria.    It  had  started  on  the  afternoon  of  July  the  16th.    On 
the  morning  of  the  18th  it  was  concentrated  at  Centreville, 
about  twenty  miles  from  the  Potomac  and  four  miles  east  of 
the   Stone   Bridge.      The   Confederate   outposts   and   advance 
detachments  had  fallen  back  before  it. 

(69)  From  Centreville  the  Warrenton  Turnpike  leads  al 
most  west;  and  there  were  earthen  roads  leading  to  all  the 
fords  of  Bull  Run  held  by  the  Confederates,  as  well  as  to  other 
crossings  farther  to  the  east.     The  distance  from  Centreville 
to  Union  Mills  Fords,  the  right  of  Beauregard's  line,  was  about 
six   miles.     Centreville   is   on   an   elevation   from   which   the 
ground  slopes  in  all  directions.     Between  the  town  and  Bull 
Run  the  country  is  cut  up  by  small  streams,  and  covered  with 
farms  and  thick  woods.    The  woods  furnished  good  cover  for 
troops.     McDowell  had  to  wait  at  Centrevile  for  his  trains  to 
come  up.    On  the  morning  of  the  18th  he  ordered  Tyler,  whose 
division  was  in  the  lead,  to  "observe  well  the  roads  to  Bull  Run 
and  to  Warrenton.     Do  not,"   his  order  read,   "bring  on  an 
engagement,  but  keep  up  the  impression  that  we  are  moving 
on  Manassas." 

*Beauregard  in  B.  &  L. 


136  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(70)  Tyler  moved  out  on  the  road  to  Mitchell's  and  Black 
burn's  Fords.  At  the  stream  he  encountered  Bonham's  and 
Longstreet's  brigades  reinforced  by  Early's.  He  opened  fire 
on  the  Confederates  with  artillery,  and  sent  forward  two  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  two  field-pieces 
into  the  thick  woods  along  the  creek.  The  Confederates  on  the 
other  bank  returned  the  fire  of  these  troops  at  short  range,  and 
drove  them  back  in  disorder.  This  first  affair,  small  as  it  was, 
greatly  encouraged  the  Confederates,  and  had  a  depressing 
effect  upon  McDowell's  army.  "The  regiment  which  suffered 
most  was  completely  demoralized."* 

(69)  Tyler's  experience  on  the  18th  confirmed  McDowell 
in  his  opinion,  that  with  his  raw  troops — their  average  length 
of  service  was  sixty  days — he  could  not  force  a  crossing  of 
Bull  Run  in  front  of  Beauregard's  army.  The  19th  and  20th 
he  spent  at  Centreville  completing  the  concentration  of  his 
"loosely  organized  force, "f  while  his  engineers  examined  the 
position  of  the  enemy,  and  the  stream  and  adjacent  country. 
The  reports  of  the  engineers  decided  him  to  turn  Beauregard's 
left,  and  then,  "if  possible,  destroy  the  railway  connecting  him 
with  Johnston  in  the  Valley."  He  was  not  then  aware  that 
Johnston  had  already  joined  Beauregard. 

Miles's  division,  with  Richardson's  brigade  of  Tyler's  divi 
sion  and  a  strong  force  of  artillery,  was  to  remain  in  reserve 
at  Centreville,  and  to  threaten  Blackburn's  Ford.  The  rest  of 
Tyler's  division,  which  was  in  advance  on  the  turnpike,  was  to 
march  at  2.30  a.  m.,  on  the  21st  of  July,  and  make  the  "sec 
ondary  attack"  at  daybreak,  by  way  of  the  Stone  Bridge.  It 
was  to  be  accompanied  by  four  batteries  of  artillery  of  the 
regular  army.  Hunter's  division,  followed  by  Heintzelman's, 
was  to  march  on  the  pike  to  a  point  two  miles  west  of  Centre 
ville,  there  to  take  a  road  through  the  woods  to  the  right,  cross 
Bull  Run  at  Sudley  Springs,  and  move  down  upon  the  flank 
and  rear  of  the  enemy.  Five  batteries,  twenty-four  guns  in  all, 
were  to  go  with  this  column,  the  whole  under  General  McDow 
ell's  personal  command.  This  "main  attack,"  together  with 
Tyler's,  was  expected  to  force  the  left  of  Beauregard's  army 
away  from  the  Stone  Bridge.  Then  Tyler  was  to  cross  and 
join  in  the  main  attack. 

No  resistance  was  anticipated  at  Sudley  Springs,  and  none 


*Fry  in  B.  &  L. 
fRopes.  . 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  137 

was  encountered.  But  this  ford  was  not  reached  until 
after  nine  o'clock,  instead  of  at  seven  as  was  calculated.  The 
turning  column  had  been  blocked  on  the  pike  for  two  or 
three  hours  by  Tyler's  division,  which  was  slow  in  getting 
started. 

(71)  Tyler's  first  gun  was  fired  about  half  after  five 
o'clock ;  but  his  attack  was  pushed  with  so  little  vigor,  and  the 
turning  movement  was  so  long  delayed,  that  Evans,  who  com 
manded  the  Confederates  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  suspected  that 
Tyler's  was  not  the  main  attack.  His  suspicions  were  con 
firmed  by  a  courier  from  a  picket  at  Sudley  Springs,  and  by  a 
"wig-wag"  message  from  Beauregard's  signal-officer,  Captain 
E.  P.  Alexander.*  (69)  Leaving  four  of  his  companies  and 
two  pieces  of  artillery  to  defend  the  bridge,  and  sending  word 
to  Cocke,  the  nearest  brigade  commander  on  his  right,  Evans 
marched  the  rest  of  his  command — eleven  companies  and  two 
guns* — to  the  left  and  rear,  and  took  up  a  position  on  high 
ground  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  north  of  Warrenton  Pike. 
(71 )  His  left  rested  on  the  Manassas-Sudley  road.  Here 
Evans's  command  was  met  by  Burnside's  brigade  at  the  head 
of  Hunter's  division  about  ten  o'clock. 

(69)  When  Beauregard  learned  through  his  scouts,  before 
daybreak,  that  the  Federals  were  advancing  on  Warrenton 
Pike,  not  suspecting  that  they  purposed  turning  his  flank  by 
way  of  Sudley  Springs,  but  supposing  they  meant  to  attack  him 
by  way  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  he  issued  orders,  at  half  after  five 
o'clock,  for  the  left  of  his  line,  Evans  and  Cocke,  to  hold  the 
bridge,  and  for  his  center  and  right  to  "advance  and  vigorously 
attack  the  Federal  left  and  rear  at  Centreville."f  About  seven 
o'clock  he  ordered  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imboden's  and 
Walton's  batteries,  to  the  left  to  support  Cocke ;  he  also  started 
Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades,  under  Bee's  command,  to  support 
the  left. 

The  order  to  Ewell  somehow  miscarried ;  and,  as  his  bri 
gade  was  to  lead  in  the  movement  on  Centreville,  none  of  the 
others  advanced.  By  half -past  ten  Beauregard  received  word 
that  his  center  and  right  had  not  advanced.  By  that  time  "the 
firing  on  the  left  began  to  increase  so  intensely  as  to  indicate 
a  severe  attack"  in  that  quarter.  Beauregard  appears  not  yet 
to  have  suspected  that  the  enemy  had  actually  turned  his  left; 

*  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate — E.  P.  Alexander, 
fBeauregard  in  B.  &  L. 


138  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

but  judging  "that  they  were  making  too  much  progress  against 
his  left  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  for  his  movement  against  Centre- 
ville  to  succeed,"  he  ordered  "Ewell,  Jones,  and  Longstreet  to 
make  a  strong  demonstration  all  along  their  front  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Run."  He  ordered  the  brigades  of  Holmes  and 
Early,  and  two  of  Bonham's  regiments,  and  six  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  "to  move  swiftly  to  the  left."  He  and  General  Johnston 
"set  out  at  full  speed  for  the  point  of  conflict."* 

(71)  Upon  finding  Evans  blocking  his  path,  Burnside  had 
promptly  formed  a  regiment  in  line  of  battle  and  attacked. f 
Evans  repulsed  this  attack  and  pursued  his  assailants.     Other 
regiments  came  forward  one  after  another  and  were  repulsed. J 
Then   Porter's  brigade   came  up  to   support   Burnside.      But 
Evans  maintained  his  position  alone  for  more  than  an  hour. 
Then  Bee,  with  his  own  and  Bartow's  brigades,  came  forward 
and  formed  on  his  line;  and  Imboden's  battery  from  Henry 
House  Hill  lent  its  aid. 

The  leading  regiments  of  Heintzelman's  division  had  come 
up  and  prolonged  the  Federal  line  to  the  right.  Part  of  both 
hostile  lines  was  in  the  wood  and  part  in  the  open  fields.  At 
some  points  the  lines  were  within  a  hundred  yards  of  each 
other.  For  another  hour  or  more  the  Confederates  held  their 
ground.  Meantime  Sherman's  brigade  of  Tyler's  division  had 
crossed  the  Run  by  a  ford  a  mile  or  more  above  the  Stone 
Bridge,  and  formed  on  the  left  of  the  Union  line.  Thus  en 
veloped  on  their  right,  and  having  suffered  severely,  the  Con 
federates  at  last  gave  way,  and  fled  in  confusion  across  Young's 
Branch. 

(72)  In  the  angle  south  of  the  turnpike  is  the  end  of  a 
commanding  ridge  called  the  Henry  House  Hill,  generally  level 
on  top,  and  some  200  yards  across.     The  direction  of  the  pla 
teau  is  oblique  to  both  the  turnpike  and  the  road  which  inter 
sect  here  at  right-angles.     Gentle  slopes  led  down  from  it  to 
the  valley  of  Young's  Branch;  but  they  were  cut  up  by  little 
ravines,  and  partly  covered  with  patches  of  young  pines.    Upon 
the  northwestern  brow  of  the  plateau  stood  the  Henry  House; 
and  600  yards  northeast  of  it,  on  a  projecting  spur,  was  the 
Robinson   House   surrounded   by   dense   trees   and   shrubbery. 
Neither  of  these  houses  had  any  defensive  strength.     Around 
the  eastern  and  southeastern  borders  of  the  plateau  was  a  thick 

*Beauregard  in  B.  &  L. 
fFry  in  B.  &  L. 
^Alexander. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  139 

fringe  of  young  pines,*  which  merged  into  a  dense  oak  wood. 
This  wood  was  considerable  in  extent,  and  lay  on  both  sides 
of  the  Manassas-Sudley  road. 

In  the  edge  of  the  pines  along  the  eastern  brow  of  the  pla 
teau  Jackson,  who  had  marched  to  the  sound  of  the  firing,  had 
formed  his  brigade  just  in  time  to  support  Imboden's  battery, 
which,  badly  cut  to  pieces,  was  withdrawing  from  the  fight. 
The  routed  infantry  of  Bee  and  Bar  tow  and  Evans  also  rallied 
on  Jackson's  line.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Bee  reanimated 
his  own  men  by  pointing  to  Jackson's  brigade,  "standing,"  as 
he  said,  "like  a  stone  wall."  Bee  died  that  day,  but  his  words 
will  live  forever. 

Beauregard  and  Johnston  were  now  on  the  ground.  Beau- 
regard  took  personal  charge  of  the  troops,  and  Johnston  rode 
back  to  headquarters  at  the  Lewis  house  for  the  purpose  of 
hastening  forward  such  reinforcements  as  he  thought  it  safe  to 
withdraw  from  the  fords. 

It  was  now  about  two  o'clock.  General  McDowell  was  pres 
ent  in  direct  command  of  the  Federal  lines.  He  determined  to 
follow  up  the  routed  Confederates  and  assault  them  on  the 
Henry  House  Hill.  He  had  allowed  Burnside  to  withdraw  his 
brigade  on  the  plea  of  fatigue;  but  he  still  had  available  for 
the  attack  the  brigades  of  Porter,  Franklin,  Willcox,  and 
Sherman,  a  squadron  of  regular  cavalry,  and  four  batteries  of 
artillery.  Tyler,  with  Keyes's  brigade  of  his  division,  had 
crossed  at  the  ford  taken  by  Sherman ;  but,  after  a  feeble  ad 
vance  up  the  slope  towards  the  Robinson  House,  he  "marched 
down  Young's  Branch,  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  took  no 
further  part  in  the  engagement."f  Schenck's  brigade  and 
Tyler's  artillery  were  still  on  the  other  side  of  Bull  Run.  How 
ard's  brigade,  which  had  been  left  back  on  the  road  to  guard 
the  rear  of  the  turning  column,  had  not  come  up.J  McDowell 
had  10,000  or  11,000  men  with  whom  to  assault  the  hill;  Beau- 
regard  had  6,500  infantry  on  the  spot,  thirteen  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  and  Stuart's  squadron  of  cavalry,  with  which  to  defend  it. 

The  Federals  advanced  across  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch, 
and  up  the  northern  and  western  slopes  of  the  hill.  There  they 
encountered  the  fire  of  the  Confederates.  They  pushed  out  be 
yond  the  Henry  House,  and  the  fighting  on  the  plateau  became 
fierce.  The  Union  batteries  of  Ricketts  and  Griffin,  with  the 


*Beauregard  in  B. 
fFry  in  B.  &  L. 
JAlexander. 


140  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Fire  Zouaves  for  support,  were  sent  forward  and  planted  near 
the  Henry  House,  within  musket-shot  of  the  woods  to  the 
south.  Stuart  with  his  squadron  was  guarding  the  Confed 
erate  left.  Filing  through  the  fences  on  Bald  Hill  he  charged 
the  Zouaves.*  At  about  the  same  time  the  33rd  Virginia  in 
fantry  charged  from  the  woods  at  the  south.  This  regiment 
was  taken  for  Union  troops  by  the  artillery  commander ;  before 
it  was  recognized  it  had  opened  fire  at  close  range,  shooting 
down  two  officers,  about  forty  men,  and  seventy-five  horses, 
and  hastening  the  flight  of  the  Zouaves.  Only  three  guns  of 
the  batteries  escaped.  But  Federal  regiments  kept  on  coming 
forward  one  after  another,  renewing  their  line  and  extending  it 
to  the  right,  up  and  beyond  the  Manassas-Sudley  road.  The 
33rd  Virginia  was  driven  back,  and  the  captured  batteries 
were  recovered. 

The  battle  surged  backward  and  forward  across  the  plateau ; 
the  two  batteries  were  taken  and  retaken  again  and  again.  The 
Confederates  would  advance  into  the  open,  only  to  be  driven 
back  to  the  cover  of  the  pines,  but  there  the  Union  line  would 
be  stopped  again.  Howard's  brigade  joined  in  the  contest 
about  3  p.  m.,  but  without  materially  changing  the  situation. 
The  struggle  on  the  plateau  kept  up  without  a  decision  till  near 
four  o'clock;  then  the  Confederates  received  reinforcements, 
which  turned  the  day  to  their  account.  Early's  brigade,  which 
had  come  up  from  the  lower  fords,  and  Kirby  Smith's  brigade 
of  Johnston's  army,  had  arrived  on  the  field.  Kirby  Smith's 
had  reached  Manassas  by  the  cars,  and  marched  at  once  to 
the  battle.  These  fresh  troops,  and  with  them  a  battery,  came 
into  the  engagement  far  out  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line, 
thus  enveloping  the  right  flank  of  the  Federals.  Beauregard 
pressed  his  enemy  in  front.  The  effect  was  decisive.  The  Fed 
eral  soldiers,  without  any  show  of  panic,  simply  broke  ranks 
and  started  home  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  their  officers  to 
stop  them.  The  troops,  for  the  most  part,  retired  by  the  roads 
over  which  they  had  come.  Sykes's  battalion  of  infantry  and 
Palmer's  squadron  of  cavalry,  both  of  the  regular  army, 
stanchly  covered  the  rear. 

By  six  o'clock  there  was  not  a  Union  soldier,  but  the  dead, 
the  wounded,  and  the  captives,  on  the  south  side  of  Bull  Run. 
"There  was  no  panic,  in  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word, 
until  the  retiring  soldiers,  guns,  wagons,  congressmen,  and 


*Ropes.    Henderson.    Beauregard  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  141 

carriages  were  fired  upon  on  the  road  east  of  Bull  Run.  Then 
the  panic  began."  (69)  A  Confederate  battery  had  got  a  posi 
tion  commanding  the  bridge  over  Cub  Run  on  the  turnpike. 
A  wagon  was  upset  on  this  bridge,  blocking  the  way  for  other 
vehicles ;  this  caused  utter  confusion.* 

Stuart  pursued  with  his  squadron  by  the  Sudley  Springs 
road ;  Rad ford's  squadron  crossed  at  Ball's  Ford  and  struck 
the  fleeing  masses  on  Warrenton  Pike.  But  neither  of  these 
cavalry  forces  was  strong  enough  to  do  decisive  harm.  In 
fact,  no  effective  pursuit  was  made  by  the  Confederates.  The 
brigades  of  Holmes  and  Ewell  had  reached  the  scene,  and 
might  have  been  sent  in  pursuit ;  but  just  then  Beauregard  re 
ceived  a  false  report  that  a  large  Union  force  was  moving 
against  his  depot  at  Manassas.  So  he  sent  these  two  brigades 
in  that  direction. t  On  the  Confederate  right  Longstreet  had 
four  regiments,  and  Bonham  had  three,  which  had  not  fired  a 
shot.  About  half  after  five  these  generals  received  orders  to 
advance  upon  Centreville  and  cut  off  the  Union  retreat  by  way 
of  the  Stone  Bridge.  Through  Longstreet's  "superfluous  cau- 
.tion,"  and  Bonham's  whimsical  stickling  for  the  right  of 
seniority,  and  then  his  hesitancy  in  assuming  its  responsibili 
ties,  this  order  was  practically  "ignored  and  disobeyed" ;  and 
the  Union  army  got  away.  "Never  did  an  enemy  make  a 
cleaner  escape,  out  of  such  an  exposed  position,  after  such  an 
utter  rout,"  says  General  Alexander. J 

Miles's  Federal  division  in  reserve  at  Centreville,  and  Rich 
ardson's  brigade  near  the  lower  fords,  behaved  well;  and  they 
formed  a  "steady  and  trustworthy  rear-guard  to  the  army  after 
it  had  passed  Centreville"  in  its  retreat.§ 

"When  McDowell  left  the  battle-field  his  intention  and  or 
ders  were  to  rally  at  Centreville. "j[  He  reached  that  place  by 
sunset,  but  he  knew  before  then  that  "the  mass  of  the  army  was 
completely  demoralized."*  "The  battalion  of  regular  infantry 
under  Major  Sykes,"  says  Ropes,  "was  wholly  unaffected  by 
the  general  demoralization.'^  Rhodes  says  "The  battalion  of 
regular  infantry  alone  obeyed  commands.  It  covered  the  vol- 


*Fry  in  B.  &  L. 
fBeauregard  in  B.  &  L. 
^Alexander. 
§  Ropes. 

flNicolay. 


142  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

unteers'  retreat,  which  became  a  rout  and  then  a  panic."*  The 
beaten  troops  never  stopped  until  they  reached  the  Potomac 
that  night.  The  soldiers  of  Hunter's  and  Heintzelman's  divi 
sions,  undisciplined  and  unseasoned,  had  fought  a  battle  and 
marched  forty-five  miles  in  less  than  thirty-six  hours.f 

The  Federal  loss  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  or,  as  it  is  called 
at  the  South,  the  battle  of  Manassas,  was  as  follows:  killed, 
460;  wounded,  1,124;  captured  or  missing,  1,312;  total,  2,896. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  as  follows:  killed,  387;  wounded, 
1,582;  captured  or  missing,  13  ;  total,  1,982.  Among  the  casual 
ties  on  the  Federal  side  Hunter,  Heintzelman  and  Willcox 
were  wounded;  on  the  Confederate  side  Bee  and  Bartow  were 
killed  ;  Jackson  and  Kirby  Smith  wounded. 

The  Confederates,  now  under  command  of  Johnston,  set  up 
their  camps  and  intrenched  them  on  the  heights  at  Centreville. 
Soon  they  pushed  their  outposts  almost  to  the  bank  of  the 
Potomac,  "flaunting  their  flag  within  view  of  the  capital  of 
the  Nation/'J 

COMMENTS. 

As  an  example  of  political  strategy,  seldom  has  a  greater 
mistake  been  made  in  history  than  that  made  by  the  Confed 
erate  government  when  it  ordered  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter.  Up  to  that  time  the  opinion  and  the  sentiment  of 
the  Northern  States  were  divided  along  party  lines  upon  the 
question  of  a  State's  right  to  secede,  and  the  Government's 
right  to  coerce  a  seceded  State. 

Four  months  had  passed  since  the  first  State  had  withdrawn 
from  the  Union,  more  than  a  month  of  which  was  under  Mr. 
Lincoln's  Administration;  yet  no  active  step  had  be^i  taken 
by  the  Government  to  reduce  the  seceding  States.  The  longer 
secession  were  allowed  to  stand  unpunished  the  sooner  it 
would  come  to  be  recognized  as  an  accomplished  fact.  If  the 
United  States  were  not  going  to  do  anything  to  suppress  the 
rebellion,  foreign  governments  would  not  long  withhold  their 
recognition.  The  right  policy  of  the  seceded  States  was  cer 
tainly  to  keep  at  peace  with  the  Union  as  long  as  possible. 
Sooner  or  later  even  the  people  of  the  other  States  would  have 


^History  of  the  U.  S.—J.  F.  Rhodes. 

tFry  in  B.  &  L. 

JSwinton. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  143 

become  used  to  a  Southern  Confederacy.  There  is  strength 
in  the  status  quo. 

But  everything  changed  in  an  instant  with  the  firing  on 
Fort  Sumter.  That  the  flag  of  the  country  and  a  helpless  little 
garrison  within  a  fort  belonging  to  the  Nation  should  be  fired 
upon,  and  the  commander  made  to  surrender  simply  because 
the  Government  was  going  to  send  him  food  for  his  men,  was 
regarded  as  such  a  National  insult  and  outrage  that  it  com 
pletely  overshadowed  every  other  sentiment  and  feeling  in  the 
Northern  States.  It  welded  the  people  into  a  solid  mass 
against  the  Confederacy  and  aroused  among  them  an  enthu 
siasm  that  expressed  itself  in  the  alacrity  with  which  the  Presi 
dent's  call  for  volunteers  was  answered. 

That  was  the  hour  of  all  others  in  the  history  of  the  Nation 
when  all  loyal  persons  must  have  wished  that  Washington's 
injunction,  to  prepare  for  war  in  time  of  peace,  had  been 
heeded.  About  30,000  disciplined  soldiers  within  call,  and  a 
navy  strong  enough  effectually  to  close  the  Southern  ports, 
would  have  done  in  a  few  months,  at  small  cost  of  life  and 
treasure,  what  it  took  four  years,  thousands  of  lives,  and  un 
counted  billions  of  dollars  to  do.  It  may  be  asked  if  some  of 
the  soldiers  and  ships  might  not  have  gone  over  to  the  seceding 
States;  the  answer  is,  no.  Enlisted  men  could  not  resign,  and 
virtually  none  deserted  to  "go  South."  In  the  navy  compara 
tively  few  officers  resigned. 

In  the  hasty  mobilization  and  organization  of  its  raw  troops 
the  Confederate  government  exhibited  a  better  military  system 
than  the  Government  at  Washington  did.  This  was  to  be  ex 
pected,  for  Mr.  Davis  was  himself  an  educated  soldier.  A 
graduate  of  the  Military  Academy,  he  had  served  seven  years 
in  the  regular  army,  first  in  the  infantry  and  then  in  the 
dragoons;  he  had  commanded  a  volunteer  regiment  in  Taylor's 
campaign  in  Mexico ;  and  had  then  served  as  Secretary  of 
War;  while  Mr.  Lincoln  had  practically  had  no  experience  of 
military  affairs.  Davis  was  officially,  probably  personally,  ac 
quainted  with  most  of  the  higher  officers  of  the  "Old  Army"; 
he  was,  accordingly,  able  to  make  good  selections  for  command 
at  the  start,  from  those  that  resigned  to  "go  South."  Hence 
we  find  that  there  were  more  Confederate  than  Union  officers 
in  the  first  battle  who  afterwards  became  distinguished.* 

Mr.  Davis  had  the  trained  soldier's  horror  of  committing  the 

*Lecture  by  Major  Swift. 


144  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

lives  of  men,  and  the  fortunes  of  the  army  and  the  country,  in 
war,  to  the  charge  of  men  that  knew  nothing  whatever  of 
soldiering  and  the  business  of  war.  Hence  he  intrusted  no 
important  commands  to  such  men  as  Butler  and  Banks;  able 
politicians,  no  doubt,  but  perfectly  incompetent  as  commanders 
of  troops.  No  citizen  soldier,  without  previous  military  educa 
tion  or  training,  was  given  a  higher  command  than  a  brigade  in 
the  Southern  army  until  he  had  learned  to  command  by  actual 
practice  and  had  proved  his  fitness. 

McDowell's  army  of  35,000  was  the  largest  field  army  that 
had  ever  been  assembled  on  the  Continent;  yet  it  was  not 
organized  into  higher  units  than  a  regiment,  until  just  before 
it  started  on  its  forward  movement.  It  was  then  organized 
into  five  divisions,  thirteen  brigades;  but  only  three  of  the 
divisions,  and  none  of  the  brigades,  were  commanded  by 
general-officers.  The  rest  were  commanded  by  field-officers. 
The  staffs  were  all  incomplete.  The  Confederate  army,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  composed  of  eleven  brigades,  seven  of  which 
were  commanded  by  general-officers.  The  brigade-commanders 
had  fairly  complete  staffs.* 

Serious  or  prolonged  hostilities  were  not  anticipated  by  either 
of  the  governments.  Mr.  Davis  ordered  10,000  small-arms, 
only,  in  Europe  at  the  start;  while  Mr.  Lincoln's  first  call  for 
volunteers  was  for  three  months'  service.  Such  a  short  term 
proved  disastrous.  We  have  seen  that  it  was  the  main  reason 
for  hurrying  McDowell  forward,  before  his  army  was  fit  to 
take  the  field.  One  of  the  regiments  and  a  battery  claimed  their 
discharge  on  the  very  day  of  the  battle,  and  "marched  to  the 
rear  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon." 

(67)  The  critics  are  not  wholly  agreed  as  to  where  to 
place  the  blame  for  Patterson's  mismanagement  in  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley.  General  Scott  plainly  made  known  to  Patterson 
that  his  duty  was  to  detain  Johnston  in  the  Valley  while  Mc 
Dowell  moved  against  Beauregard.  He  also  indicated  his  be 
lief  that  Patterson  outnumbered  Johnston  and  should  attack 
him.  He,  however,  left  Patterson  to  choose  his  own  way.  If 
Patterson  had  understood  the  business  of  command  he  would 
have  needed  no  further  instructions.  The  mistake  General 
Scott  made,  was  in  not  withdrawing;  Patterson's  force  and 
joining  it  to  McDowell's  before  letting  the  advance  against 
Beauregard  begin.  The  military  mistake  the  President  made, 

*Lecture  by  Major  Swift. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  145 

however  necessary  it  may  have  been  politically,  was  in  not  re 
lieving  Patterson.  Reinforced  by  Patterson's  12,000  or  15,000 
effectives,  McDowell  would  almost  surely  have  won  the  day 
at  Bull  Run. 

(69)  McDowell's  staying  at  Centreville,  the  19th  and  20th 
of  July,  was  fatal.  Had  he  made  his  attack  on  the  19th,  he 
would  have  caught  Beauregard's'  army  before  the  arrival  of 
Holmes,  or  Johnston,  or  the  troops  from  Richmond.  The 
brigades  of  Jackson,  Bee,  and  Bartow,  of  Johnston's  army, 
composed  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  force  on  Henry  House 
Hill,  and  did  the  bulk  of  the  fighting;  and  Kirby  Smith's  brig 
ade  arrived  in  time  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  day.  Stuart's 
cavalry  and  Imboden's  battery,  which  played  a  decisive  part 
on  the  Confederate  side,  also  belonged  to  Johnston's  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah. 

We  have  seen  that  McDowell's  plan  of  attack  was  based 
upon  two  false  premises;  namely,  that  McDowell  would  have 
Beauregard's  army  alone  to  deal  with;  and  that,  by  getting 
possession  of  the  Manassas  Gap  railway  in  Beauregard's  rear, 
he  would  place  his  army  between  those  of  Beauregard  and 
Johnston. 

Believing,  as  he  did,  that  Bull  Run  could  be  crossed  only  at 
the  Stone  Bridge  and  a  few  fords,  all  but  one  of  which  were 
held  by  the  enemy,  McDowell's  plan  involved  the  risk  of 
having  his  army  split  in  two  by  a  formidable  obstacle.  The 
success  of  his  project  depended  upon  his  rolling  up  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy  and  clearing  the  way  for  his  own  wings  to 
unite  by  way  of  the  Stone  Bridge.  Suppose  that  he  had  suc 
ceeded  in  this ;  his  plan  further  involved  the  hazard  of  forming 
his  line  of  battle  parallel  to  Warrenton  Pike,  his  line  of  retreat ; 
or  with  his  back  to  the  stream ;  or  with  its  face  to  the  rear.  But 
a  general  must  always  take  some  risk.  As  the  battle  was 
actually  fought  the  Union  line  faced  approximately  to  the  rear. 

(71)  Evans's  action  in  quitting  the  Stone  Bridge  with  the 
larger  part  of  his  command,  and  placing  it  across  the  path  of 
the  Union  turning  column,  showed  quick  decision  and  soldierly 
qualities.  He  would  have  shown  better  judgment,  however,  if 
he  had  placed  his  troops  on  the  Henry  House  Hill  at  first, 
instead  of  waiting  to  be  driven  back  to  it. 

As  has  so  often  happened  in  combined  movements  the  at 
tacks  of  the  different  Union  columns  were  not  well  timed. 
Tyler's  "secondary  attack"  at  the  bridge  began  before  six 
o'clock ;  while  the  turning  column  did  not  reach  Sudley  Springs 


146  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Ford  till  nine.  It  was  expected  to  be  there  about  seven.  This 
discrepancy  gave  Beauregard  time  to  dispatch  the  brigades 
of  Jackson,  Bee,  and  Bartow  to  the  left  of  his  line,  and  caused 
the  battle  to  be  fought  on  the  Henry  House  Hill.  Otherwise 
Evans's  unaided  troops  would  quickly  have  been  driven  off, 
and  the  way  would  have  been  cleared  for  Tyler's  division  to 
cross  the  bridge ;  and  the  battle  might  have  taken  place  farther 
south  on  the  Manassas-Sudley  road;  possibly  on  the  timbered 
hills  near  New  Market. 

(69)  The  tardiness  of  the  turning  column  was  due  to  two 
causes.  First,  the  arrangements  for  starting  from  Centreville 
were  not  properly  made.  Tyler's  division,  which  was  to  have 
the  right  of  way,  was  not  camped  all  together.  Two  brigades 
were  west  of  the  village,  and  one  was  two  miles  back  on  the 
road,  east  of  the  village.  It  was  this  rear  brigade  that 
blocked  the  way  and  caused  the  delay.  It  ought  to  have 
bivouacked  with  the  rest  of  the  division,  west  of  the  village. 
Second,  the  road  round  by  Sudley  Springs  was  found  to  be 
much  longer  than  had  been  expected. 

(71)  In  the  attack  Heintzelman's  division  deployed  on  the 
right  of  Hunter's,  and  prolonged  the  Federal  line  down  and 
west  of  the  Manassas-Sudley  road.  The  effect  of  this  was  to 
carry  the  line  farther  and  farther  from  the  Stone  Bridge,  by 
which  Tyler's  division  was  expected  to  join.  Two  of  Tyler's 
brigades  actually  came  into  the  field  by  a  ford;  but  his  other 
brigade,  and  his  batteries,  did  not  cross  at  all.  The  extension 
to  the  right  also  threw  the  right  flank  "in  the  air" ;  and  faced 
the  line  almost  to  the  original  rear,  with  its  back  towards  the 
railway  by  which  it  was  known  that  Johnston's  army  might 
approach.  McDowell  ought  to  have  put  in  Heintzelman's 
division  on  the  left  of  Hunter's,  and  developed  his  line  towards 
Bull  Run.* 

The  attack  was  badly  made  from  every  tactical  point  of  view. 
Instead  of  setting  up  his  headquarters  somewhere  in  rear,  and 
directing  his  army  as  a  whole,  McDowell  was  at  the  very  front, 
in  the  thick  of  the  battle,  scarcely  exercising  any  influence  on 
the  action  beyond  the  sound  of  his  voice.  Instead  of  com 
manding  the  army  he  simply  led  the  few  regiments  close  at 
hand.  Brigades  and  regiments  followed  one  after  another 
into  the  fight  without  any  sort  of  order  or  concert  of  action. 
The  continued  extension  to  the  right  was  made  not  with  any 


*Major  Swift's  Lecture. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  147 

well-formed  purpose  of  enveloping  the  Confederate  left;  appar 
ently  the  line  deployed  in  that  direction  simply  because,  topo 
graphically,  it  was  the  line  of  lease  resistance.  The  assaults 
were  all  straight  to  the  front ;  there  was  no  real  effort  to  make 
a  flank  attack.  (69)  McDowell  did  not  summon  his  reserves 
from  Centreville,  only  four  miles  distant — nearer  to  the  Henry 
House  Hill  than  any  of  Beauregard's  brigades,  except  Cocke's, 
were,  at  the  beginning  of  the  day.  He  did  not  call  Schenck's 
brigade  and  the  batteries  with  it  across  the  Run,  though  the 
way  over  the  Stone  Bridge  was  open.  He  never  ordered  back 
into  the  line  Burnside's  brigade,  which  had  withdrawn  before 
noon  to  rest.  He  did  not  put  Howard's  brigade  into  the  line 
until  after  three  o'clock.  (72)  He  lost  all  touch  with  Tyler, 
and  let  him  keep  Keyes's  brigade  idle  under  cover  of  Young's 
Branch  throughout  the  engagement.  Beauregard  was  con 
stantly  in  fear  of  attack  on  his  right  flank  by  Tyler ;  that  is 
what  ought  to  have  taken  place.* 

Beauregard,  too,  played  the  role  more  of  a  leader  of  troops 
than  of  an  army  commander ;  but,  fortunately  for  his  side,  he 
had  an  able  assistant  in  General  Johnston,  who  directed  his  re 
inforcements  from  the  rear. 

Out  of  McDowell's  army  of  35,000  men  only  18,500  crossed 
Bull  Run ;  of  these  the  brigades  of  Burnside  and  Keyes  took  no 
part  at  the  critical  time.  Beauregard  had  nearly  32,000  ef 
fectives  available,  but  put  only  18,000  into  the  battle.  This 
was  bad  management  on  the  part  of  both  of  these  generals.f 
In  fact,  a  careful  study  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  points  the 
student  to  only  two  general-officers  who  displayed  a  knowledge 
of  the  tactical  handling  of  their  commands,  or  of  the  tactical 
employment  of  the  ground.  Those  two  were  Sherman  on  the 
Union  side,  and  Stonewall  Jackson  on  the  Confederate  side. 
Sherman  found  a  ford  and  led  his  brigade  across  it,  and  against 
the  flank  of  Bee's  line;  Jackson,  instead  of  putting  his  line  on 
the  edge  of  Henry  House  Hill  towards  the  enemy,  put  it  in 
the  fringe  of  pines  on  the  edge  of  the  open  plateau  farthest 
from  the  enemy.  The  choice  of  this  strong  position,  and 
McDowell's  failure  to  take  it  in  fiVnk,  enabled  the  Confederates 
to  hold  out  against  greatly  superior  numbers  for  nearly  four 
hours,  and  made  their  victory  possible.  But  the  student  must 
not  wonder  that  only  two  of  the  generals  knew  their  business ; 
he  should  rather  wonder  that  there  were  as  many  as  two.  A 


*Major  Swift's  Lecture. 
£.  &  L. 


148  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

man  can  learn  how  to  command  bodies  of  men  only  by  com 
manding  them.  He  must  study  the  theory — learn  how  others 
have  commanded — then  himself  have  practice.  Until  that  21st 
of  July  not  a  general  upon  the  field  had  ever  commanded  as 
many  as  500  men  in  battle,  or  in  peace  maneuver. 

Only  Stonewall  Jackson,  too,  of  all  the  Confederate  gener 
als,  appears  fully  to  have  appreciated  the  importance  of  pur 
suing  and  destroying  the  beaten  enemy.  "Give  me  5,000  fresh 
men,  and  I  will  be  in  Washington  City  to-morrow  morning," 
he  cried  to  President  Davis.  But  Mr.  Davis  and  Generals 
Johnson  and  Beauregard  were  content  to  spend  the  three 
hours  of  daylight  after  the  battle  riding  about  the  battle-field, 
strewn  with  its  dead  and  wounded,  instead  of  bending  every 
effort  to  organize  a  prompt  and  vigorous  pursuit  with  every 
available  man.* 

The  army  of  McDowell  ought  to  have  contained  a  brigade 
of  cavalry ;  it  had  only  seven  little  troops,  and  they  were  mostly 
split  up  into  small  details.  The  Confederates  had  1,800  horse 
men,  but  they,  also,  were  frittered  away  upon  orderly  duty,  at 
the  rate  of  at  least  two  troops  to  each  brigade  of  infantry. 
With  the  exception  of  Stuart's  charge  on  the  Fire  Zouaves, 
and  Rad ford's  on  the  fugitives  at  Cub  Run,  the  performance 
of  the  cavalry  in  this  battle  was  insignificant.  If  Beauregard's 
cavalry  had  been  doing  its  proper  duty  before  the  battle,  recon- 
noitering,  and  covering  the  flanks  and  front  of  his  army,  it 
would  have  given  him  timely  warning  of  the  Federal  turning 
movement.  Indeed  it  might  have  delayed  that  movement  sev 
eral  hours  north  of  Sudley  Springs.  If,  at  the  same  time,  the 
Federal  column  had  been  preceded  by  a  mounted  force,  as  it 
should  have  been,  a  cavalry  combat  would  have  taken  place 
before  the  column  reached  the  ford.  Instead  of  being  out  on 
one  of  the  flanks  of  Beauregard's  army,  Stuart's  squadron, 
before  the  battle,  was  guarding  a  piece  of  the  creek  between 
two  infantry  brigades,  opposite  a  dense  wood,  where  there  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  a  ford. 

This  was  the  first  military  campaign  in  which  railways 
played  a  conspicuous  part.  Not  only  were  they  used  by  both 
sides  in  concentrating  their  forces  before  the  battle;  but  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railway  also  brought  Confederate  troops  to 
the  field  during  the  battle;  and  this  circumstance  gave  vic 
tory  to  the  Southern  arms. 

*Alexander. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  149 

In  his  critical  and  informing  Memoirs  General  Alexander 
directs  attention  to  two  examples  of  the  wrong  method  of 
issuing  orders,  in  connection  with  this  campaign,  and  their  se 
rious  consequences,  which  serve  as  lessons  to  the  student  of 
the  military  art.  The  first  was  President  Davis*  telegram  to 
Johnston  directing  him  to  take  his  army  to  aid  Beauregard 
at  Manassas.  Johnston  did  the  right  thing ;  but  the  two  words, 
"if  practicable,"  in  the  telegram — a  phrase  which  should  never 
appear  in  any  military  order — were  the  subject  of  a  contro 
versy  that  never  ceased  until  both  Mr.  Davis  and  General 
Johnston  were  dead.  The  other  was  the  order  directing  the 
brigades  of  the  Confederate  right  wing  to  advance  on  Centre- 
ville.  This  order  was  not  understood  alike  by  the  com 
manders  that  received  it,  and  was  not  received  at  all  by  the 
commander  that  was  to  begin  the  movement.  So  the  move 
ment  was  not  made.  The  dunce  that  General  Sedgwick  kept 
to  read  his  orders,  before  he  issued  them,  for  the  purpose  of 
seeing  whether  they  were  understandable,  was  an  important 
member  of  his  staff. 


LECTURE  VIII. 
FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 

(73)  When  the  Southern  States  seceded  and  organized  the 
Confederacy,  Kentucky,  as  stated  in  the  last  lecture,  wavered 
between  Union  and  Secession.  The  governor  was  for  Se 
cession,  but  the  legislature  was  for  the  Union.  So  the  State, 
which  had  been  brought  up  in  the  school  of  compromise  by  her 
greatest  statesman,  Henry  Clay,  compromised  in  this  instance 
by  undertaking  to  remain  neutral. 

For  a  time  the  United  States  and  the  Confederacy  appeared 
tacitly  to  recognize  the  neutrality  of  her  soil,  while  both  re 
cruited  regiments  among  her  people.  The  first  violation  of  her 
neutrality  was  done  by  General  Leonidas  Polk,  who,  with  a 
Confederate  force,  occupied  Columbus  on  the  3rd  of  Septem 
ber,  1861.  Thereupon  General  Grant,  with  a  National  force, 
occupied  Paducah  on  the  5th  of  September.*  Henceforth  Ken 
tucky's  neutrality  was  not  regarded. 

As  it  was  well  known  that  a  large  part  of  the  population  of 
Kentucky  was  in  favor  of  Secession,  the  Confederate  author 
ities  were  very  loath  to  let  go  any  part  of  the  State ;  so  General 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was,  in  September,  1861,  placed  in 
command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  West,  whose  task 
was  to  hold  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  the  Mississippi 
River.  He  made  Bowling  Green  his  headquarters,  and  issued 
a  proclamation  saying  in  effect  that  he  would  respect  Ken 
tucky's  neutrality  and  withdraw  his  army  from  her  soil  as  soon 
as  he  should  be  assured  that  the  Union  commanders  would  do 
likewise.*  His  line  stretched  from  Columbus  to  Cumberland 
Gap.  At  Columbus,  which  was  fortified,  General  Polk  had, 
in  January,  1862,  12,000  effectives  ;f  and  in  the  intrenched 
camp  at  Bowling  Green  there  were  about  22,000  effectives.* 
General  Tilghman  garrisoned  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  with 
5,000  or  6,000  men.  At  Cumberland  Gap  there  was  a  forti 
fied  Confederate  camp.  Below  Columbus  the  Mississippi  was 
guarded  by  two  or  three  garrisoned  forts. 

Opposed  to  Johnston's  Confederate  forces  General  Buell  had 

*Life  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston — W.  Preston  Johnston. 
fLetter  from  Polk  to  Johnston,  dated  January  11,  1862. 

150 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  151 

a  "Onion  army  of  some  45,000,  with  headquarters  at  Louisville. 
General  Halleck  was  in  chief  command  in  Missouri ;  his  head 
quarters  were  at  St.  Louis,  and  his  territorial  department  in 
cluded  that  part  of  Kentucky  west  of  the  Cumberland  River. 
The  commands  of  these  two  generals  were  independent  of  each 
other.  At  Cairo  there  was,  also,  a  strong  Union  fleet  of  iron 
clad  gunboats,  under  Commodore  Foote. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

The  geographical  features  of  most  importance  from  a  strate 
gical  point  of  view  in  all  this  region  were:  first,  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland  Rivers.  The  Tennessee  was  navigable  from 
its  mouth,  through  western  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  into 
the  northern  part  of  Alabama  as  far  as  the  Muscle  Shoals. 
The  Cumberland  was  navigable  as  far  up  as  beyond  Nashville. 

In  the  east  were  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  which  could  be 
crossed  only  at  certain  passes,  the  most  important  of  which  was 
Cumberland  Gap.  The  East  Tennessee  and  Georgia  Railway 
ran  up  through  the  valley  of  these  mountains  into  Vir 
ginia;  it  was  one  of  the  main  lines  of  communication  between 
the  Confederate  army  operating  in  that  State  and  the  Gulf 
States.  At  Chattanooga  it  connected  with  the  Georgia  Cen 
tral  Railway,  which  led  into  the  heart  of  Georgia ;  and  with  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston,  which  passed  through  Northern  Ala 
bama  and  Mississippi  to  Memphis.  From  Louisville  the  Louis 
ville  and  Nashville  line  went  southward  through  Bowling 
Green,  100  miles,  to  Nashville,  seventy  miles  farther.  From 
Bowling  Green  the  Memphis  and  Ohio  passed  through  Clarks- 
ville,  sixty  miles,  and  Paris  and  Humboldt,  to  Memphis,  250 
miles.  From  Paris  there  was  a  branch  to  Columbus,  making 
Columbus,  the  left  of  Johnston's  line,  about  170  miles  by  rail 
from  Bowling  Green,  which  was,  in  fact,  the  right  of  the  line. 
There  was  a  double  line  directly  from  Humboldt  into  Missis 
sippi.  From  Nashville  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  line  led  into 
Alabama;  and  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  connected  Nash 
ville  with  the  railway  center  at  Chattanooga. 

So  long  as  Johnston  could  hold  his  line  from  Bowling  Green 
to  Columbus,  he  not  only  blocked  the  Cumberland,  the  Ten 
nessee,  and  the  Mississippi  Rivers  against  the  advance  of 
Union  forces,  but  he  also  guarded  this  entire  system  of 
railways. 

There  were  some  metaled  pikes  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee ; 


152  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

but  the  highways  were  mainly  the  ordinary  country  earthen 
roads,  good  enough  in  summer,  hut  well-nigh  impassable  with 
mud  in  winter  and  spring. 

Fort  Henry  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  and  Fort 
Donelson  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  stood  at  points 
where  these  rivers  were  not  more  than  eleven  miles  apart.  Bet 
ter  positions  could  have  been  chosen  for  forts  to  guard  the 
passage  of  these  streams,  lower  down,  probably  at  the  point 
where  the  rivers  come  nearest  together;  but  the  forts  were 
built,  or  begun,  at  the  time  when  Kentucky's  neutrality  held 
good ;  so  they  had  to  be  kept  within  the  limits  of  Tennessee.* 

PLANS. 

We  have  seen  that  Buell  and  Halleck  were  entirely  independ 
ent  in  their  commands,  each  of  the  other.  Each  reported 
directly  to  General  McClellan,  who  was  now  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  all  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States,  with  his  head 
quarters  on  the  Potomac,  500  miles,  as  the  crow  flies,  from 
Louisville. 

The  plan  proposed  by  Buell  for  the  opening  campaign  of 
1862,  in  this  theater,  was  that  Halleck  should  move  up  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers  with  20,000  men  supported 
by  the  ironclad  fleet ;  while  he,  at  the  same  time,  moved  south 
ward  along  the  railway  on  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville.  He 
contended  that  this  combined  movement  would  compel  John 
ston  to  fall  back.  Halleck  did  not  favor  this  plan,  but  wanted 
Buell's  army  placed  under  his  command,  so  that  he  might  leave 
merely  a  containing  force  from  Buell's  army  in  front  of 
Bowling  Green,  and  combine  the  bulk  of  Buell's  troops  with 
his  own  and  form  an  army  of  60,000,  for  a  movement  up  the 
Cumberland  River.  McClellan  would  not  give  his  approval  to 
either  of  these  plans,  but  kept  urging  Buell  to  lead  his  army 
into  East  Tennessee,  in  order  to  get  possession  of  the  East 
Tennessee  and  Georgia  Railway,  and  to  encourage  and  support 
the  inhabitants  of  that  mountain  region,  who  were  strongly 
loyal  in  sentiment. 

The  President  had  still  another  and  different  plan,  which  he 
outlined  to  General  Buell  in  a  letter  dated  Executive  Mansion, 
January  13,  1862.  The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  Presi 
dent's  letter :  "I  state  my  general  idea  of  this  war  to 
be  that  we  have  the  greater  numbers,  and  the  enemy 

*W.  Preston  Johnston. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  153 

has  the  greater  facility  of  concentrating  forces  upon 
points  of  collision;  that  we  must  fail  unless  we  can  find 
some  way  of  making  our  advantage  an  overmatch  for  his; 
and  that  this  can  only  he  done  by  menacing  him  with  superior 
forces  at  different  points  at  the  same  time,  so  that  we  can 
safely  attack  one  or  both,  if  he  makes  no  changes;  and  if 
he  weakens  one  to  strengthen  the  other,  forbear  to  attack  the 
strengthened  one,  but  seize  and  hold  the  weakened  one,  gaining 
so  much.  To  illustrate :  Suppose  last  summer,  when  Win 
chester  ran  away  to  reinforce  Manassas,  we  had  forborne  to 
attack  Manassas,  but  had  seized  and  held  Winchester."  And 
the  President  thought  so  well  of  this  plan  that,  while  he  for 
bore  to  order  it,  he  had  a  copy  of  this  letter  sent  to  General 
Halleck.  The  student  may  guess  how  long  it  would  have 
taken  Napoleon  or  Stonewall  Jackson  to  destroy  Buell's  de 
tachments  in  detail,  if  either  of  those  masters  of  the  art  of  war 
had  been  in  Johnston's  place,  and  Buell  had  adopted  the  Presi 
dent's  project. 

Johnston  had  a  difficult  problem.  He  had  only  about  43,000 
available  troops,  and  they  were  badly  armed.  Many  carried 
flint-locks,  fowling-pieces,  or  squirrel-rifles.*  Johnston  "had 
at  any  rate,  so  long  as  his  communications  remained  unbroken, 
the  advantage  of  interior  lines;  he  could  rapidly  concentrate 
his  forces.  .  .  .  He  knew  that  the  Federal  iron-clad  fleet 
was  superior  to  any  force  that  the  Confederates  could  muster 
on  the  three  rivers.  He  knew,  in  fact,  that  he  could  not  main 
tain  himself  against  well  directed  attacks,  and  that  his  only 
chance  lay  in  the  possibility  that  his  adversaries  would  make 
mistakes  of  which  he  could  take  advantage.  His  attitude  was 
strictly  defensive.  He  did  not  at  this  time  [January  and  Feb 
ruary,  1862]  fear  any  sudden  movement  of  the  enemy  by  land, 
for  the  roads  were  in  very  had  condition;  although,  as  he  well 
knew,  he  could  be  flanked  out  of  his  camp  at  Bowling  Green." 
What  he  feared,  however,  at  any  minute,  was  that  the  Federal 
fleet  might  ascend  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee  Rivers, 
or  one  of  them,  and  attack  his  forts.  He  expected  them  to 
ascend  the  Cumberland  first.f 

OPERATIONS. 
There  were  some  skirmishes  and  minor  affairs  in  Kentucky 


*W.  Preston  Johnston.    B.  &  L. — Captain  Jesse  Taylor. 
fRopes. 


154  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

in  December  and  January,  the  most  important  of  which  was 
the  battle  of  Mill  Springs.  Here  General  Thomas,  with  a 
division  of  Buell's  army,  defeated  a  force  of  Confederates  un 
der  Generals  Crittenden  and  Zollicoffer,  and  drove  it  back  into 
the  mountains  at  Cumberland  Gap,  on  the  19th  of  January. 
No  important  movement  was  made,  however,  until  February. 

On  January  29  Halleck  received  a  telegram  from  McClellan, 
telling  him  that  a  deserter  had  reported  that  Beauregard  was 
under  orders  to  leave  Manassas  for  the  line  of  Columbus  and 
Bowling  Green  with  fifteen  regiments.  On  the  1st  of  Feb 
ruary,  without  awaiting  further  instructions  from  Washington, 
or  arranging  for  any  cooperation  on  Buell's  part,  Halleck 
ordered  General  Grant,  with  17,000  men  and  Commodore 
Foote's  iron-clads,  to  ascend  the  Tennessee,  and  attack  Fort 
Henry;  in  order,  as  he  explained,  to  "anticipate  the  arrival  of 
Beauregard's  forces."*  The  expedition  started  February  2. 
There  were  not  boats  enough  to  carry  the  whole  force  at 
once,  so  General  McClernand's  division,  escorted  by  the  iron 
clads,  went  up  the  river  first,  and  landed  about  nine  miles  below 
Fort  Henry.  General  Grant  followed  with  the  rest  of  the 
troops.  (74)  On  the  5th  of  February  Grant  moved  his  army 
by  boats  up  to  a  point  about  four  miles  below  Fort  Henry. 

Fort  Henry  was  a  regular  bastioned  work,  armed  with 
seventeen  cannon,  and  enclosing  a  space  of  about  ten  acres. 
It  was  in  a  bend  of  the  river,  so  that  twelve  of  its  guns  had  a 
perfect  sweep  of  the  water.  But  this  was  its  only  advantage. 
It  was  so  low  that,  at  this  time,  the  base  of  its  flagstaff  stood  in 
two  feet  of  water.  Its  guns  were  at  the  water-level,  which 
not  only  deprived  them  of  the  advantage  of  a  plunging  fire, 
but  made  them  an  easy  target  for  the  Union  gunboats.  The 
fort  was  not  only  surrounded  by  higher  ground  on  its  own  side 
of  the  river,  but  was  perfectly  commanded  by  the  high  ground 
on  the  opposite  bank.  To  offset  this  disadvantage  the  Con 
federates  had  built  Fort  Heiman  on  the  high  ground  across 
the  river. 

There  were  two  roads  leading  across  to  the  town  of  Dover 
and  Fort  Donelson,  eleven  miles  east  on  the  Cumberland.  The 
intervening  country  was  cut  up  by  creeks  and  marshes,  hills 
and  ravines ;  and  was  thickly  wooded.  It  had  been  raining  for 
some  time,  and  all  the  waters  were  high;  the  creeks,  insignifi 
cant  in  dry  weather,  were  now  impassable  near  their  mouths. 

*Ropes. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  155 

General  Tilghman  had  at  this  time  about  2,500  men  in  the 
two  forts  on  the  Tennessee ;  but,  as  soon  as  the  Union  army  and 
fleet  made  their  appearance,  he  knew  that  he  could  not  hold  out 
against  them ;  so  he  withdrew  the  garrison  from  Fort  Heiman, 
and,  on  the  night  of  the  5th  of  February,  made  ready  to  with 
draw  his  whole  force  to  Fort  Donelson.  The  next  morning 
he  started  all  the  garrison  for  that  fort,  except  seventy  men. 
These  he  kept  at  Fort  Henry  under  his  own  command,  to 
serve  the  guns,  and  hold  the  fort,  until  the  infantry  should  be 
safe  on  the  way.* 

General  Grant  did  not  expect  to  assault  Fort  Henry  with  his 
troops ;  he  expected  the  fleet  to  reduce  it.  But  he  hoped  to  put 
his  troops  on  the  roads  in  rear  of  the  fort  to  cut  off  the  retreat 
of  the  garrison.  The  fleet  consisted  of  four  iron-clads  and 
three  wooden  gunboats.  At  11  a.  m.,  on  the  6th  of  February, 
the  fleet  and  the  land  force  moved  out.  The  fleet  opened  fire 
on  the  fort  when  within  a  mile  of  it;  two  hours  afterwards 
Tilghman,  who  had  remained  in  it,  had  his  colors  lowered,  and 
a  white  flag  run  up.  The  Union  army,  however,  was  so  much 
delayed  by  the  high  water  in  the  creeks,  and  the  mud  in  the 
roads,  that  it  was  not  in  time  to  cut  off  the  main  garrison, 
which  made  good  its  retreat  to  Donelson.  Not  knowing  that 
Fort  Heiman  had  been  abandoned,  General  Grant  had  sent  one 
brigade  up  the  west  side  of  the  river. 

(73)  "Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry  two  of  the 
gunboats  proceeded  up  the  river  and  destroyed  the  bridge  of 
the  Memphis  and  Ohio  Railway.  Then  they  continued  on  up 
the  river,  as  far  as  the  Muscle  Shoals,  destroying  large  quan 
tities  of  supplies  on  the  way,  and  several  Confederate  trans 
port-steamers  ;  and  spreading  alarm  throughout  the  whole 
region."f 

As  soon  as  General  Johnston  learned  of  the  fall  of  Fort 
Henry  he  was  convinced  that  Fort  Donelson  must  also  yield 
to  the  National  river-fleet;  this  would  open  the  Cumberland 
River  as  far  up  as  Nashville  and  cut  his  communications  in 
rear  of  him.  (75)  He  made  haste,  therefore,  to  evacuate 
Bowling  Green.  He  sent  12,000  men  under  General  Floyd  to 
Fort  Donelson,  which,  with  some  reinforcements  from  Colum 
bus,  raised  the  garrison  of  that  fort  to  about  15,000.  With 
the  rest  of  his  army,  some  14,000,  Johnston  retreated  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Cumberland.  He  reached  Nashville  on  the 

*B.  &  L. — Captain  Jesse  Taylor. 
fRopes. 


156  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

16th  of  February.  The  reinforcements  began  arriving  for  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Donelson  on  the  9th  of  February;  by  the 
13th  all  had  arrived. 

We  have  seen  that  Fort  Henry  surrendered  on  the  6th  of 
February.  General  Grant  appreciated  the  importance  of  mov 
ing  promptly  against  Fort  Donelson  before  it  could  be  rein 
forced  ;  he  would  have  liked  to  move  at  once.  But  it  continued 
to  rain,  and  the  roads  were  so  bad  that  his  artillery  and  wagons 
could  not  move.  Moreover,  he  did  not  "feel  justified"  in  at 
tacking  the  place  without  the  cooperation  of  the  fleet  which, 
besides  having  to  go  back  down  the  Tennessee,  and  up  the 
Cumberland,  had  to  stop  to  have  some  damages  repaired.  So 
it  was  not  until  February  12  that  Grant's  army  moved.  "On 
that  day  he  started  with  the  divisions  of  McClernand  and 
C.  F.  Smith.  Another  division,  which  had  just  arrived  under 
Lew  Wallace,  which  included  one  brigade  sent  by  Buell,  went 
around  by  water.  Before  night  the  neighborhood  of  the  fort 
was  reached  by  McClernand  and  Smith,  and  the  troops  had 
taken  up  a  position  surrounding  the  work."* 

(76)  Fort  Donelson  was  a  larger  and  more  elaborate  work 
than  Fort  Henry.  The  main  fort  was  an  irregular,  bastioned 
parapet,  inclosing  a  space  of  about  100  acres,  nearly  500  yards 
long  in  its  greatest  length.  It  stood  100  feet  above  the  river, 
at  the  eastern  end  of  a  ridge  which  narrowed  down  to  a  mere 
neck  just  west  of  the  work.  Except  right  at  this  neck  the 
ground  sloped  from  the  site  on  all  sides — to  Hickman  Creek 
and  its  branch  on  the  north;  to  the  river  on  the  east;  and  to 
Indian  Creek  and  its  branch  on  the  south.  Hickman  Creek 
was  unfordable,  and  formed  a  perfect  barrier  on  that  side.  On 
the  river  side  there  were  two  water  batteries  fifty  or  sixty  feet 
above  water-level,  and  perfectly  commanding  the  river  down 
stream.  Six  or  seven  hundred  yards  westward  from  the  main 
work  was  another  ridge,  cut  through  in  two  or  three  places  by 
forks  of  Indian  Creek,  and  curving  from  Hickman  Creek 
around  to  an  unfordable  creek  south  of  Dover.  On  the  irregu 
lar  crest  of  this  ridge  a  line  of  intrenchments  had  been  made, 
and  strengthened  with  abatis.  These  intrenchments  were 
manned  by  infantry,  and  several  batteries  occupied  command 
ing  points  within  them.  Floyd  was  the  senior  Confederate 
officer  present ;  the  next  in  rank,  General  Pillow, — the  same 
that  we  met  in  the  Mexican  war, — commanded  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  line;  and  General  Buckner  commanded  the  right. 

*Ropes. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  157 

Six  or  seven  hundred  yards  beyond  the  ridge  occupied  by  the 
Confederate  line,  and  approximately  parallel  to  it,  was  another 
ridge.  Upon  this  ridge  Grant's  army  took  position  on  the  eve 
ning  of  the  12th  of  April — McClernand's  division  on  the  right 
and  Smith's  on  the  left.  Grant  had  given  his  division-com 
manders  orders  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement.  He  expected 
the  gunboats  to  reduce  the  fort.  Notwithstanding  this  Mc- 
Clernand  ordered  one  of  his  brigades,  on  the  13th,  to  attack  the 
batteries  near  the  center  of  the  Confederate  line,  which  had 
been  annoying  him.*  The  brigade  charged  up  to  the  abatis 
two  or  three  times,  but  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  During 
the  day  of  the  13th  Lew  Wallace's  division- arrived  and  took 
position  in  line  between  McClernand's  and  Smith's.  The  divi 
sions  were  all  closed  up  and  the  line  was  extended  farther 
round  to  the  right.  General  Grant  now  had  some  25,000  troops 
in  line. 

There  was  no  righting  on  the  land  side  upon  the  14th  of  Feb 
ruary  ;  but  Commodore  Foote's  fleet  attacked  the  fort  from  the 
river.  The  gunboats  found  no  such  easy  task  as  the  reduction 
of  Fort  Henry.  The  Confederate  guns  were  better  placed, 
and  they  were  served  more  skilfully  and  more  effectively. 
"Two  of  the  iron-clads,  the  St.  Louis,  which  carried  the  Com 
modore,  and  the  Louisville,  had  their  steerage  apparatus  shot 
away,  and  helplessly  drifted  down  the  river,  out  of  action.  The 
other  two  were  so  greatly  damaged  between  wind  and  water  as 
to  be  compelled  to  withdraw.  The  two  wooden  vessels  neces 
sarily  followed  suit.  The  whole  was  rendered  unserv 
iceable,  and  Foote  himself  was  badly  wounded.  It  was  nec 
essary  to  send  the  disabled  gunboats  to  Cairo  to  be  repaired, 
and  further  operations  by  water  were  accordingly  indefinitely 
postponed."!  The  Confederate  "batteries  were  uninjured  and 
not  a  man  in  them  killed''^  during  the  bombardment  by  the 
gunboats. 

General  Grant  had  "expected  that  the  fleet  would  reduce  the 
fort,  and  that  in  this  case  the  garrison  and  supporting  troops 
would  soon  be  compelled  to  surrender  to  the  United  States 
forces  which  surrounded  them.  But  after  he  had  witnessed 
the  repulse  of  the  fleet  he  felt  that  a  speedy  victory  was  not  to 
be  expected.  He  looked  forward  to  a  protracted  siege.  The 
enemy's  works  appeared  to  him  too  strong  to  be  assaulted  suc- 


*Grant's  Memoirs. 

fRopes. 

JMajor  Gilmer's  report. 


158  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

cessfully  by  the  raw  troops  at  his  disposal.  It  seemed  not  un 
likely  that  siege-operations  might  be  required.  Moreover,  'the 
weather  had  turned  intensely  cold ;  the  men  were  without  tents, 
and  could  not  keep  up  fires  where  most  of  them  had  to  stay/ 
in  full  range  of  the  enemy's  guns.  The  sun  went  down/  says 
General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs,  'on  the  night  of  the  14th  of 
February,  1862,  leaving  the  army  confronting  Fort  Donelson 
anything  but  comforted  over  its  prospects/  "* 

But  the  Confederate  generals  inside  of  the  intrenchments 
had  much  graver  cause  for  worry  than  General  Grant  had  on 
the  outside.  They  saw  themselves  entirely  cut  off  and  sur 
rounded  on  the  land  side  by  an  army  which  they  supposed  was 
even  far  greater  than  it  really  was  and  hourly  increasing; 
while  in  the  river  was  a  powerful  fleet  of  iron-clads  which 
they  expected  to  see  return  any  minute  and  resume  the  bom 
bardment.  That  night,  the  14th  of  February,  these  generals 
held  a  council  of  war,  and  decided  that  their  only  chance  lay  in 
making  a  sortie  on  the  south  side  and  getting  possession  of  the 
road  via  Charlotte  to  Nashville.  Accordingly,  it  was  arranged 
that  Pillow's  troops,  which  occupied  the  left  of  the  line,  should 
make  the  "main  attack"  against  the  Federal  right.  Buckner 
was  to  withdraw  all  of  his  troops  from  the  intrenchments  on 
the  right,  and  to  support  Pillow.  A  single  regiment,  450  men, 
enough  only  to  keep  up  a  show  of  resistance,  was  assigned  to 
the  right  of  the  line.  After  Pillow,  assisted  by  Buckner,  had 
broken  through  the  Union  line,  and  forced  it  back  off  the 
Charlotte  Road,  Buckner  was  to  throw  his  command  across  the 
Wynn's  Ferry  Road,  and  act  as  rear-guard,  while  the  rest  of 
the  garrison  made  its  escape. 

It  was  midnight  when  the  council  of  war  had  reached  its 
decision.  The  commanders  began  at  once  moving  their  troops 
into  position ;  and  during  the  rest  of  the  night  there  was  march 
ing  of  regiments  and  rumbling  of  wagons  and  cannon  in  the 
Confederate  camp;  but  the  Union  troops  paid  no  attention  to 
the  noises.  It  was  a  dark,  bitterly  cold  night,  and  every  person 
in  both  camps  was  shivering  and  miserable — this  may  account 
for  the  apparent  disregard  of  the  noise  in  the  Confederate 
camp. 

(77)  At  daybreak  Pillow's  division,  supported  on  its  left 
by  Forrest's  regiment  of  horsemen,  moved  to  the  assault.  A 
little  later  Buckner  came  up  on  Pillow's  right.  The  battle 

*Ropes. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  159 

lasted  all  morning.  Finally  Pillow's  infantry,  supported  by 
two  batteries,  broke  McClernand's  line,  and,  at  the  same  time 
Forrest,  who  had  worked  round  through  the  underbrush, 
charged  it  in  flank  and  rear.  The  Federal  right  was  thus 
forced  off  the  Charlotte  Road,  and  back  through  the  woods 
along  the  Wynn's  Ferry  Road,  in  confusion.*  Before  noon 
the  way  to  Nashville  was  open  for  the  Confederates;  Pillow 
had  possession  of  the  whole  of  the  ground  occupied  at  dawn 
by  McClernand's  troops,  and  with  it  a  Union  battery.  300 
prisoners  and  5,000  small  arms;f  and  he  had  sent  off  a  dis 
patch  to  General  Johnston,  announcing  that  he  had  won  a 
great  victory. 

Buckner  was  in  position  to  cover  the  withdrawal.  "Ten 
fresh  Confederate  regiments,  over  3,000  men,  had  not  fired  a 
musket."J  It  was  the  crisis  of  the  battle;  perhaps  the  crisis 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  At  that  moment  the  Confed 
erate  troops  at  Donelson  needed  what  they  did  not  have,  a 
man  in  command  of  them  that  knew  something  about  the 
business  of  war.  In  truth,  they  had  no  commander.  General 
Floyd's  seniority  had  forced  the  mockery  of  command  upon 
him;  but  he  did  not  command  in  fact.  He  listened  first  to 
Buckner's  timid  counsel  and  then  to  Pillow's  rash  advice, 
and  ended  by  doing  nothing  that  was  right.  At  this 
crisis  either  one  of  two  things  would  have  been  right : 
to  have  gone  ahead  with  the  plan  agreed  upon,  and  marched 
to  Nashville  by  the  road  that  was  open ;  or  to  have  thrown 
every  man  into  the  line  and  completed  the  victory  so  well 
begun.  Floyd  did  neither.  Pillow  had  just  noticed  a  move 
ment  of  the  enemy  to  ward 'the  breastworks  on  the  right,  Buck 
ner's  old  place,  now  held  by  a  single  regiment.  He  ordered 
Buckner  to  return  to  the  works  and  defend  them.  Buckner 
refused  and  went  to  Floyd.  Floyd  sustained  him  and  went  to 
Pillow.  Then  Floyd  changed  his  mind  and  agreed  with 
Pillow.  He  ended  by  ordering  his  whole  victorious  left  wing 
to  return  to  the  trenches. 

About  his  time  General  Grant  arrived  on  the  scene.  He 
had  been  absent  during  the  morning,  conferring  with  Commo 
dore  Foote  on  his  gunboat.  Foote,  it  will  be  remembered,  had 
been  wounded;  he  was  unable  to  go  ashore  to  see  Grant. 
Grant  immediately  gave  orders  that  the  ground  lost  on  the 


*Wyeth's  Life  of  Forrest.    B.  &  L.— W.  Preston  Johnston. 
t#.  6-  L.— Lew  Wallace.     W.  Preston  Johnston. 
$W.  Preston  Johnston. 


160  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

right  of  the  Union  line  must  be  regained.  Then  he  dispatched 
the  following  note  to  Commodore  Foote :  "If  all  the  gunboats 
that  can,  will  immediately  make  their  appearance  to  the  enemy, 
it  may  secure  us  a  victory.  Otherwise,  all  may  be  defeated.  A 
terrible  conflict  ensued  in  my  absence,  which  has  demoralized 
a  portion  of  my  command,  and  I  think  the  enemy  is  much  more 
so.  If  the  gunboats  do  not  show  themselves  it  will  reassure  the 
enemy  and  still  further  demoralize  our  troops.  I  must  order 
a  charge  to  save  appearances.  I  do  not  expect  the  gunboats 
to  go  into  action,  but  to  make  appearance,  and  to  throw  a  few 
shells  at  long  range."* 

This  note  shows  how  uneasy  General  Grant  was ;  it  shows 
how  serious  the  situation  appeared  to  him.  But  he  was  too 
cool  and  self-possessed  a  soldier  to  display  his  anxiety  to  his 
subordinates.  He  gave  his  orders  in  his  usual  quiet  tone.  He 
rode  over  to  General  Smith,  who  had  held  his  division  out  of 
the  engagement,  awaiting  orders.  Grant  ordered  him  to  charge 
the  works  in  front  of  him.  It  was  the  movement  in  Smith's 
division  that  Pillow  had  seen.  Buckner's  division  was  now  on 
its  way  to  resume  its  place  in  those  trenches,  but  it  did  not 
arrive  in  time.  Smith's  division  had  broken  through  the 
abatis  and  was  in  possession  of  the  works.  Buckner  was  in 
time,  however,  to  help  check  Smith's  further  advance,  and  to 
force  him  back  to  the  trenches  he  had  captured. 

(78)  Meantime  McClernand's  division,  reinforced  by  part 
of  Lew  Wallace's,  had  followed  up  the  retiring  Confederates. 
All  of  the  ground  previously  held  by  McClernand's  division 
was  not,  however,  reoccupied;  one  of  the  roads  from  Dover 
to  Nashville,  the  one  nearest  the  river,  was  still  left  open.f 
General  Floyd  did  not  take  advantage  of  this  road  to  save 
his  army.  That  night  he  held  another  council  of  war ;  its  deci 
sion  was  to  surrender.  Floyd  had  been  Secretary  of  War  of 
the  United  States,  and  was  at  this  time  under  indictment  at 
Washington.  So  he  declared  that,  personally,  he  did  not  dare 
surrender.  Pillow,  the  next  in  command,  said  "there  were  no 
two  persons  in  the  Confederacy  whom  the  Yankees  would 
rather  capture  than  himself  and  General  Floyd. "J  So  he,  also, 
must  escape.  Thus  these  two  political  generals  both  aban 
doned  the  troops  intrusted  to  their  charge,  and  made  good 


*  Ropes. 
fWyeth. 
%B.  &  L. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  161 

their  escape  in  boats  up  the  Cumberland,  leaving  General  Buck- 
ner  to  surrender  the  army  and  fort  to  General  Grant.* 

One  other  commander  made  his  escape,  but  he  took  his  whole 
command  with  him.  That  was  Forrest,  than  whom  the  world 
has  seen  no  more  daring  leader  of  cavalry.  He  marched  his 
regiment  out  by  way  of  the  muddy  river-road,  fording  a  creek 
up  to  his  saddle-skirts.  There  were  some  infantrymen,  also, 
bold  enough  to  accompany  him ;  and  not  a  man  was  lost. 

"About  11,500  men  and  forty  guns  were  the  fruits  of  this 
great  victory. "f  Let  us  now  see  what  were  its  strategical  con 
sequences.  (75)  As  soon  as  Buell  learned  that  Fort  Henry 
had  been  captured,  and  that  Johnston  had  evacuated  Bowling 
Green,  he  dispatched  Nelson's  division  to  reinforce  Grant, 
and  made  ready  to  follow  Johnston  with  the  rest  of  his  army. 
On  February  16,  the  very  day  on  which  Donelson  was  sur 
rendered,  and  the  day  on  which  Johnston,  with  the  part  of  his 
army  retained  by  himself,  reached  Nashville,  the  advance  of 
Buell's  army  reached  Bowling  Green. 

(79)  From  Nashville  Johnston  fell  back  to  Murfreesboro. 
Buell  advanced  to  Nashville,  where  he  arrived  on  the  24th  of 
February.  He  found  the  town  already  occupied  by  the  divi 
sion  [Nelson's]  that  he  had  sent  round  by  boat  to  reinforce 
Grant;  it  had  come  up  the  Cumberland  River  from  Donelson, 
where  it  was  no  longer  needed.  Buell  now  had  some  50,000 
troops,  and  Grant,  who  had  been  further  reinforced,  had,  back 
at  Donelson,  about  40,000;  while  Johnston  at  Murfreesboro 
could  not  muster  more  than  20,000.  Buell  thought  Johnston's 
army  had  been  reinforced  to  a  much  larger  number. 

McClellan  ordered  Halleck  to  move  against  Nashville,  and 
Grant  was  anxious  to  advance ;  but  General  Halleck  was  afraid 
that  Beauregard,  at  Columbus,  had  a  great  army,  and  that  he 
was  about  to  move  into  Illinois  or  Missouri  with  it.  So  Hal 
leck  recalled  Foote's  fleet  to  the  Ohio,  and  held  Grant's  army 
at  Donelson  doing  nothing  for  ten  days.  The  Confederates  had 
no  thought,  however,  of  making  any  offensive  movement  up 
the  Mississippi ;  they  had  neither  the  troops  nor  the  morale, 
at  this  time,  in  this  quarter,  for  offensive  operations.  On  the 
contrary,  they  abandoned  Columbus  on  the  2nd  of  March. 


*Floyd  took  with  him  the  Virginia  troops  of  his  own  brigade. 
fRopes. 


162  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

COMMENTS. 

(73)  On  the  National  side  this  campaign  was  an  example 
of  what  the  text-books  on  strategy  call  "strategic  penetration." 
The  two  wings  of  the  Confederate  army  were  at  Bowling 
Green  and  Columbus,  170  miles  apart,  or  less  than  one  day,  in 
point  of  time,  by  rail.  The  capture  of  Henry  and  Donelson, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  railway  bridge  over  the  Tennessee, 
and  the  occupation  of  Clarksville  by  the  Union  forces,  effect 
ually  broke  the  line  of  communication  between  the  two  wings 
of  Johnston's  army,  and  left  Grant's  army  the  choice  of  turn 
ing  against  either  wing  separately. 

Grant's  proper  course,  as  we  see  it  now,  plainly  was  to  move 
up  the  Cumberland  River,  and,  uniting  with  Buell's  force,  fol 
low  Johnston  to  Murfreesboro,  and  destroy  him  there,  if  he 
stood  to  fight;  or  to  pursue  him  to  his  destruction,  if  he  con 
tinued  to  retreat.  Grant  wanted  to  move  his  army,  now  rein 
forced  to  40,000,  up  the  Cumberland;  but  we  have  seen  that 
Halleck  held  him  fast  at  Donelson.  Halleck's  alleged  reason 
was  the  fear  that  Beauregard  was  about  to  make  an  offensive 
move  into  his  territory,  against  Cairo  and  Paducah. 

The  incident  illustrates  the  mistake  of  having  two  armies 
with  independent  commanders  in  the  same  theater  of  opera 
tions;  but  this  was  evident  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 
campaign.  If  there  had  been  a  single  head — a  single  com 
mander  on  the  ground — directing  the  operations  of  Buell's  and 
Halleck's  forces,  compelling  them  to  cooperate  constantly 
against  a  single  objective,  Johnston's  army,  it  can  hardly  be 
seen  how  that  army  could  have  escaped  destruction.  In  this 
regard,  only,  the,  Confederates  had  greatly  the  advantage ;  their 
forces  in  this  theater  of  operations  were  all  under  the  command 
of  one  man,  and  he  was  not  hampered  by  any  dictation  or  even 
suggestions  from  his  President  or  war  department  hundreds 
of  miles  away  from  the  spot. 

Johnston's  chief  trouble  was  a  lack  of  men  and  arms;  his 
only  chance  lay  in  the  errors  that  his  opponents  might  com 
mit.  Yet,  when  his  opponents  did  commit  an  error  and  give 
him  the  chance,  he  failed  to  take  the  proper  advantage  of  it. 
It  looks  as  if  Grant's  movement  against  Henry  and  Donelson, 
with  only  15,000  troops,  was  an  error — an  unnecessary  hazard 
for  him  to  take  without  the  prearranged  cooperation  of  Buell's 
forces.  And  there  was  no  such  prearranged  cooperation. 
Halleck  sent  forward  Grant  and  Foote  without  consent  from 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  163 

Washington  or  arrangement  with  Buell.  Although  he  had 
corresponded  with  McClellan  and  Buell  about  such  an  opera 
tion,  no  agreement  or  arrangement  of  plan  had  been  made. 
Halleck  seems  simply  to  have  taken  for  granted  that  when 
Grant's  forces  became  committed  to  the  movement,  reinforce 
ments  would  be  dispatched  to  him  by  Buell. 

This  movement  gave  Johnston  his  only  chance.  To  rein 
force  Grant  Buell  had  to  send  troops  round  by  the  Ohio  River ; 
while  Johnston  had  the  short  line  of  the  railway  and  also  the 
wagon  roads.  Johnston  ought  to  have  left  the  smallest  contain 
ing  force  in  front  of  Buell  that  could  hold  him,  or  delay  him 
for  a  few  days  or  hours,  and  himself  marched  all  the  rest  of  his 
army  against  Grant.  And  he  ought  not,  of  course,  to  have 
shut  himself  up  at  Donelson,  but  attacked  Grant's  army  from 
the  outside.  Instead  of  doing  this  he  sent  an  incompetent  gen 
eral,  Floyd,  with  12,000  men  to  Donelson,  and  fell  back  himself 
with  14,000  to  Nashville. 

General  Grant  had  no  thought  of  assaulting  Fort  Donelson. 
He  at  first  thought  Commodore  Foote's  guns  would  be  able 
to  reduce  it;  but  after  they  failed  he  made  up  his  mind  to  a 
regular  siege.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  agreement  that  he  and 
Foote  came  to  at  their  conference  on  Foote's  boat,  on  the  14th 
of  February.  But  at  that  very  time  the  Confederates  them 
selves  were  bringing  the  matter  to  a  crisis  by  making  a  sortie 
against  the  right  of  Grant's  line. 

In  all  of  the  operations  of  the  Civil  War  it  would  be  hard 
to  find  another  example  of  such  crass  incapacity  as  was  dis 
played  by  the  Confederate  commanders  at  Fort  Donelson.  It 
was  so  bad  as  almost  to  persuade  an  unbeliever  that  it  was  one 
of  the  means  of  Providence  to  preserve  the  Union.  Not  one, 
but  several  opportunities  offered,  from  the  time  when  General 
Grant  landed  his  first  troops  below  Fort  Henry,  to  the  time 
when  General  Buckner  surrendered  at  Fort  Donelson,  which, 
if  made  use  of  by  a  bold  and  skilful  general,  might  have  resulted 
in  a  Confederate  success.  « 

After  all  the  labor  spent  upon  Forts  Henry  and  Heiman 
General  Tilghman  abandoned  them,  virtually  without  an  effort 
to  save  them,  at  the  first  appearance  of  the  enemy.  This  was 
wise;  it  saved  his  garrisons  from  capture,  and  only  proved  the 
unwisdom  of  placing  those  forts  where  they  were.  Tilghman 
was  quick  and  shrewd  enough  to  send  his  little  command  away 
from  Fort  Henry  before  General  Grant's  forces  had  cut  off  its 
retreat.  This  was  the  most  sensible  thing  that  appears  to  have 


164  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

been  done  by  any  of  the  three  generals  that  successively  fell 
into  the  chief  command  of  the  Confederate  troops  in  these 
operations. 

After  Tilghman's  surrender  Pillow  succeeded  to  the  com 
mand  at  Fort  Donelson.  He  allowed  the  Federal  troops  to 
march  from  Fort  Henry  to  Fort  Donelson  on  the  12th  of  Feb 
ruary,  practically  without  offering  them  any  resistance.  For 
rest's  cavalry  alone  met  them  on  the  way,  while  the  rest  of 
Pillow's  command  stayed  within  the  field-works.  A  skilful 
and  aggressive  leader  like  A.  P.  Hill,  or  Sheridan,  or  Stone 
wall  Jackson,  would  surely  have  taken  advantage  of  the  thick 
woods  to  strike  the  Federal  columns  in  flank  on  their  way 
across  country. 

Early  on  the  13th  Floyd  arrived  with  reinforcements  and 
took  command  by  virtue  of  his  rank.  Lew  Wallace's  Union 
division  had  not  yet  landed.  Floyd's  command  was  then  about 
equal  in  number  to  the  Federals  in  line,  and  he  had  every 
advantage  of  position.  If  he  had  attacked  the  Union  line 
boldly  that  day  he  would  have  had  an  excellent  chance  of 
winning  a  victory.  We  have  already  seen  how  he  wavered  in 
his  decisions  on  the  15th,  and  thus  gained  nothing  by  the  vic 
tory  Pillow  had  won  from  McClernand's  division ;  and  how  he 
neglected  to  lead  his  forces  out  that  night  by  the  road  that 
Forrest  took. 

Pillow,  at  the  council  on  the  night  of  February  15,  wanted  to 
continue  the  fight  within  the  works ;  Buckner  advised  a  capitu 
lation.  We  know  the  outcome.  General  Grant  reported  that 
large  quantities  of  provisions  were  found  within  the  fort;  and 
one  of  the  boats  by  which  Floyd  and  Pillow  escaped  had 
brought  a  large  supply  of  ammunition  for  the  beleaguered 
army.  With  plenty  of  food  and  ammunition  there  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  any  adequate  excuse  for  surrendering  at 
that  time.  Under  some  governments  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buck 
ner  would  have  been  tried  for  their  lives  by  military  court. 
With  the  Union  gunboats  aw^y  for  repairs,  and  with  two 
steamers  in  their  possession,  the  Confederate  commanders,  by 
good  management,  ought  to  have  been  able  to  withdraw  the 
bulk  of  their  garrison  and  materiel  to  safety  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river.  . 

While  at  the  outset  of  the  operations  Johnston  had  the  ad 
vantage  of  interior  lines,  and  could  have  concentrated  his  army 
at  any  point  near  the  railway  from  Bowling  Green  to  Colum 
bus  more  quickly  than  Halleck  and  Buell  could  have  united 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  165 

theirs  at  any  point,  as  soon  as  Grant  penetrated  his  front  at 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  got  possession  of  this  railway, 
the  case  was  exactly  reversed.  From  that  moment  Grant  and 
Buell  could  have  united  their  forces  at  any  point  in  the  theater 
of  operations  more  quickly  than  Johnston  could  have  assembled 
his  divided  army  at  the  same  point.  After  that  the  strategical 
advantages  were  wholly  on  the  side  of  the  National  forces,  if 
their  commanders  had  chosen  to  make  use  of  them. 

Manifestly  Johnston  could  not  remain  at  Bowling  Green 
after  the  Union  forces  got  possession  of  the  Cumberland  River 
in  his  rear;  for  with  the  Cumberland  in  their  possession  these 
forces  would  only  have  had  to  move  up  to  Nashville  to  cut 
Johnston's  communications.  It  was  the  fear  of  such  a  predica 
ment  that  made  Johnston  quit  Bowling  Green  and  fall  back  to 
Nashville  as  son  as  Foote's  fleet  had  reduced  Fort  Henry. 
Johnston,  like  Grant,  believed  Foote's  gunboats  would  also  be 
able  to  reduce  Donelson.  The  query  suggests  itself,  then, 
Why  did  Johnston  order  Floyd  to  take  his  detachment  to  Fort 
Donelson?  The  answer  is,  Johnston  did  not  expect  Floyd  to 
shut  his  army  up  within  field-works,  to  be  besieged.  Fort 
Donelson  was  only  a  little  bastioned  work,  less  than  500  yards 
in  its  longest  dimension.  It  was  this  work  that  Johnston  ex 
pected  Foote's  gunboats  to  knock  down.  The  troops  ordered 
thither  were  expected  to  oppose  General  Grant's  army  outside 
of  the  fort.  General  Johnston  never  supposed  that  they  would 
place  their  backs  to  the  river  and  build  a  trap  of  breastworks 
around  themselves.  "He  wished  Donelson  defended  if  possi 
ble,  but  he  did  not  wish  the  army  to  be  sacrificed  in  the  at 
tempt."  One  of  his  last  telegrams  to  Floyd  said:  "If  you 
lose  the  fort  bring  your  troops  to  Nashville  if  possible."*  It 
is  almost  certain  that  a  general  of  ordinary  ability  would  have 
found  it  "possible."  The  defense  of  Fort  Donelson  proper 
ought  to  have  been  left  to  its  own  little  garrison.  The  army 
assembled  there  ought  to  have  maneuvered  to  draw  Grant's 
army  away  from  the  fort.  If  it  made  breastworks  it  ought  to 
have  placed  them  so  as  to  cover  its  line  of  retreat,  the  Wynn's 
Ferry-Charlotte  road.  General  Pillow  was  responsible  for 
the  position  of  the  Confederate  field-works;  they  were  built 
while  he  was  in  command — after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry.  The 
mistake  General  Johnston  made  was  in  not  going  to  Donelson 


*W.  Preston  Johnston. 


166  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

himself ;  not  Floyd,  nor  Pillow,  nor  Buckner,  was  equal  to  the 
emergency. 

The  terrible  state  of  the  roads  in  the  theater  had  an  impor 
tant  bearing  upon  the  operations;  it  rendered  the  sudden  and 
swift  movement  of  troops  next  to  impossible;  it  had  much  to 
do  with  keeping  Buell's  army  from  attempting  any  aggressive 
movement  against  Johnston  while  Johnston  was  still  at  Bowl 
ing  Green. 

A  thing  which  had  a  deterrent  influence  upon  the  command 
ers  in  the  campaign, — which  always  has  such  an  influence  if  an 
adequate  system  for  securing  information  is  not  employed, — 
was  their  ignorance  with  regard  to  the  strength  and  condition 
of  the  opposing  forces.  Halleck  would  not  let  Grant  advance 
on  Nashville,  after  the  capture  of  Donelson,  because  he  feared 
that  Beauregard  was  moving  into  his  territory  with  a  great 
force — which  was  not  the  case ;  and,  after  Buell  reached  Nash 
ville  with  his  first  division,  he  was  so  afraid  Johnston  would 
return  with  an  overwhelming  army  and  crush  him  that  he 
called  on  General  Smith,  of  Grant's  army,  to  move  his  divi 
sion  up  from  Clarksville  to  reinforce  him  at  Nashville;  while 
Johnston  with  a  paltry  20,000  was  glad  enough  to  be  left  alone 
at  Murfreesboro.  Previous  to  this  Buell  had  telegraphed  to 
McClellan  that  Johnston  had  "50,000  if  not  60,000  men" ;  when 
in  fact  he  had  no  more  than  40,000.  And  about  the  13th  of 
February  Halleck  wrote  Buell  that  it  was  reported  that  40,000 
Confederates  were  at  Dover  and  Clarksville;  while  in  reality 
Floyd  and  Pillow  had  only  15,000  to  18,000.  And  after  the 
fall  of  Donelson  Halleck  was  afraid  that  Grant  was  going  to  be 
attacked  by  a  large  force  from  Nashville;  whereas  there  was 
no  Confederate  force  at  Nashville,  except  Johnston's  14,000, 
which  arrived  that  day  [16th  of  February]  in  full  retreat  from 
Bowling  Green.  General  Halleck  throughout  the  campaign 
exemplified  a  remark  made  by  General  Sherman  in  a  marginal 
note  in  an  old  copy  of  Soady's  Lessons  of  War;  viz.,  "Generals 
in  chief  command  generally  worry  more  about  things  which 
never  happen  than  about  real  catastrophes." 

Except  the  work  of  Forrest's  regiment  at  Fort  Donelson, 
the  role  played  by  cavalry  in  this  campaign  was  insignificant. 
Yet  Halleck  and  Buell  and  Johnston  all  had  cavalry ;  but  it  was 
volunteers,  lately  raised,  and  neither  officers  nor  men  had  yet 
learned  the  strategic  duty  of  "security  and  information,"  cer 
tainly  one  of  the  most  important  functions  of  modern  cavalry. 
Even  Forrest,  up  to  this  time,  had  done  no  more  than  forage 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  167 

and  fight.  Terry's  Texas  Rangers  and  John  Morgan,  who 
soon  became  famous,  were  also  with  Johnston's  army.  An 
efficient  cavalry  in  front  of  Buell's  army,  and  in  touch  with 
Johnston's,  would  have  relieved  General  Buell  of  his  unneces 
sary  apprehensions.  General  Grant  had  cavalry  with  his  forces 
at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  but  it  did  practically  nothing.* 
How  the  Union  cavalry  reached  the  forts  does  not  appear — 
whether  it  marched,  or  was  carried  by  the  transports.  If  a 
regiment  of  independent  cavalry  had  been  pushed  forward  from 
Paducah,  and  another  one  from  Smithland,  to  cover  the  flanks 
of  Grant's  army,  in  its  passage  up  the  rivers,  and  to  gain  touch 
with  Johnston's,  they  would  have  saved  General  Halleck  a  great 
deal  of  worry  over  imaginary  Confederate  columns. 

This  was  the  first  instance  in  the  Civil  War,  and  the  only 
successful  instance  in  any  modern  campaign,  in  which  a  river, 
independently  of  roads,  was  used  as  a  line  of  operations.  While 
navigable  rivers  make  the  best  kind  of  lines  of  communication 
the  ease  with  which  transports  can  be  harassed  by  the  enemy 
on  shore  renders  their  employment  as  lines  of  operation  very 
exceptional. 

It  is  as  much  the  province  of  strategy  to  dishearten  the  hos 
tile  people — to  make  them  appreciate  the  hopelessness  of  con 
tinuing  the  war — to  make  them  crave  peace — as  it  is  to  defeat 
and  destroy  their  armies;  indeed,  this  is  the  only  reason  for 
defeating  their  armies.  It  is  probable  that  no  other  single 
victory,  except  Gettysburg,  had  as  disheartening  an  effect  upon 
the  people  of  the  South  as  the  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson.  Ropes,  who  is  the  best  critic  that  has  reviewed  the 
campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,  says :  "The  effect  of  the  capture  of 
Fort  Henry  on  the  people  of  the  whole  country,  North  and 
South,  was  electrical.  It  was  the  first  great  success  won  by  the 
Union  arms  within  the  limits  of  the  Confederacy."  And  of 
Donelson :  "The  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  was  not  a  great 
affair  judged  by  the  number  of  the  slain;  but  judged  by  its 
moral  and  strategical  results  it  was  Qiie  of  the  turning  points 
of  the  war.  Following  so  soon  as  it  did  after  the  loss  of  Fort 
Henry,  the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  threw  the 
Southwest  into  a  state  of  excitement,  not  to  say  of  panic,  hardly 
to  be  described. 

"In  the  North  exultation,  confident  expectation,  rising  al 
most  to  the  dangerous  point  of  underestimating  the  remaining 


*U.  S.  Cavalry  Journal,  Vol.  XVII,  No.  62,  Prize  Essay  by  Captain 
Edwin  R.  Stuart,  U.  S.  Corps  of  Engineers. 


168  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

resources  and  the  enduring  valor  of  the  South,  were  the  feel 
ings  of  the  hour.  And  no  one  can  wonder  at  it.  The  whole 
system  of  the  Confederate  defense  in  the  West  had  been  broken 
up.  It  seemed  well  within  the  limits  of  possibility  to  follow  up 
Sidney  Johnston  until  he  should  be  forced  to  surrender  with 
what  was  left  of  his  army.  Chattanooga,  the  key  of  East 
Tennessee,  apparently  lay  open  to  the  invading  Federal  armies 
on  one  flank,  and  Vicksburg,  the  only  strong  post  on  the  lower 
Mississippi,  lay  seemingly  unprotected  on  the  other.  Of  the 
Confederate  army  of  the  West,  part  had  been  captured,  part 
was  retreating  before  the  large  and  well-appointed  army  of 
Buell,  and  part  was  shut  up  in  fortified  works  on  the  left  (or 
eastern)  bank  of  the  upper  Mississippi,  whose  capture  was  only 
a  question  of  time,  now  that  by  the  fall  of  the  forts  on  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers  they  were  cut  off  from 
support  and  supplies." 


LECTURE  IX. 
THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN. 

(80)  At  the  end  of  the  campaign  of  Forts  Henry  and  Don- 
elson  we  left  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  with  the  remnant 
of  his  army,  at  Murf reesboro ;  Buell's  army,  50,000  strong,  was 
concentrating  at  Nashville;  and  Grant  had  40,000  troops  at 
the  two  captured  forts.  Beauregard,  with  his  headquarters  at 
Jackson,  was  in  immediate  command  of  Johnston's  troops  be 
tween  the  Mississippi  and  the  Tennessee.  The  bulk  of  these, 
some  17,000,  were  at  Columbus  under  Polk.  Other  small  gar 
risons  held  the  Confederate  posts  along  the  Mississippi  as  far 
down  as  Memphis ;  and  there  were  detachments  at  Corinth  and 
luka,  with  outposts  watching  the  Tenneesee  River.  Threaten 
ing  Columbus  and  the  posts  along  the  Mississippi,  General  Pope 
had  a  command  of  about  25,000  Federals  at  Commerce,  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Mississippi;  and  Generals  Van  Dorn  and 
McCullough  had  some  20,000  Confederates  in  northern  Ar 
kansas,  opposed  to  a  Union  force  under  General  Curtis. 

Grant's  troops  had  destroyed  the  railway  bridge  above  Fort 
Henry,  and  the  Federal  gunboats  controlled  the  Tennessee 
River  as  far  up  as  the  Muscle  Shoals.  Johnston's  army  was 
thus  cut  in  two;  the  two  wings  could  unite  only  somewhere 
south  of  the  Tennessee  River.  Beauregard  appreciated  the 
siuation,  and  urged  Johnston  to  assemble  his  scattered  troops 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Corinth.  He  and  Johnston  made  every 
exertion  to  increase  the  strength  of  their  forces,  and  the  Con 
federate  government  at  Richmond  seconded  their  efforts. 
Bragg  with  a  force  of  about  10,000  men  was  ordered  from 
Pensacola  to  Corinth ;  as  was,  also,  Van  Dorn  from  Arkansas. 
Troops  were  sent  thither,  also,  from  New  Orleans  and  other 
places. 

(81)  On  the  28th  of  February,  1862,  Johnston  began  his 
march  from  Murf  reesboro  to  Corinth,  b.y  way  of  Decatur,  Ala., 
where  a  bridge  spanned  the  Tennessee.  He  had  with  him 
about  17,000  men  organized  in  three  small  divisions,  with  a 
"reserve"  under  General  Breckinridge.  His  command  in 
cluded  several  regiments  of  cavalry.  On  the  2nd  of  March 
Polk  evacuated  Columbus,  and  withdrew  the  greater  part  of 

169 


170  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

his  garrison  to  the  railway  junction  at  Humboldt.  About  7,000 
men  under  McCown  were  left  in  the  works  at  New  Madrid 
and  Island  No.  10  to  guard  the  Mississippi,  which  was  still  held 
by  the  Confederates  from  this  point  to  Vicksburg. 

Buell,  foreseeing  that  Johnston  would  undertake  to  reunite 
the  separated  wings  of  his  army  by  way  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railway  south  of  the  Tennessee  River,  believed  that 
his  army  and  Halleck's  should  join  at  some  point  on  the  north 
bank  of  that  river,  between  Savannah  and  Florence,  and  from 
thence  seize  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railway.  His  ob 
ject  was  to  unite  his  own  and  Halleck's  forces  under  cover  of 
the  Tennessee,  then  to  cross  the  river  and  defeat  Johnston's 
main  army;  he  believed  this  would  cause  the  abandonment  of 
the  posts  up  the  Mississippi,*  and  the  opening  of  that  river. 
Halleck,  on  the  other  hand,  gave  no  thought  to  Johnston's 
main  army  at  first.  His  mind  always  turned  to  strategic  points 
rather  than  to  the  hostile  army.  Memphis  was  the  objective 
upon  which  his  thoughts  now  fixed. f  Before  forming  any  plan 
for  its  capture  he  seemed  to  have  designed  first  to  destroy 
its  railway  connections  with  the  Confederate  post  at  Columbus 
and  with  the  east. 

Accordingly  he  issued  orders  on  the  1st  of  March  for  Grant, 
with  a  force  of  35,000  troops,  to  move  up  the  Tennessee  in 
transports.  Owing  to  a  misunderstanding  between  Grant  and 
Halleck  Grant  was  later  ordered  to  remain  at  Fort  Henry; 
and  the  expedition  was  commanded  by  General  C.  F.  Smith. 
Halleck's  instructions  to  Smith  stated :  "The  main  object  of 
this  expedition  will  be  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over  Bear 
Creek,  near  Eastport,  Miss.,  and  also  the  connections  at 
Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt.  .  .  .  Having  accom 
plished  these  objects,  or  such  of  them  as  may  be  practicable, 
you  will  return  to  Danville,  and  move  on  Paris."f 

The  expedition  soon  got  off,  and,  by  the  llth  of  March, 
the  flotilla  of  more  than  eighty  transports  began  arriving 
at  Savannah,  where  the  depot  was  to  be  established.  The 
force  was  organized  in  five  divisions,  under  Generals  McCler- 
nand,  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  Hurlbut,  W.  T.  Sherman,  and  Pren- 
tiss.  A  sixth  division  commanded  by  Lew  Wallace  arrived 
later,  and  was  put  into  camp  at  Crump's  Landing.! 


*  Ropes. 

tScribner's  Series,  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth — M.  F.  Force. 

jSix  miles  below  Pittsburg  Landing. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  171 

A  detachment  was  sent  over  to  tear  up  a  part  of  the 
railway  track  from  Jackson  to  Corinth,  and  on  the  14th  Sher 
man's  division  went  by  boats  up  to  Eastport  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  the  bridge  over  Bear  Creek.  Sherman  was  pre 
vented  from  carrying  out  his  purpose  by  a  very  heavy  rain, 
which  flooded  the  country  and  made  the  small  streams  impassa 
ble.  In  the  meanwhile  Halleck  learned  of  the  evacuation  of 
Columbus  by  the  Confederates.  Then,  for  the  first  time,  it 
seems  to  have  occurred  to  him  to  make  the  movements  up  the 
Tennessee  his  main  operation,  of  which  the  object  should  be  to 
get  between  the  wings  of  Johnston's  army.  He  had  not  yet 
determined  whether  to  assail  these  separate  wings  in  detail,  or 
both  at  once.  In  correspondence  with  Buell  he  wrote :  "Why 
not  come  over  and  operate  with  me  to  cut  Johnston's  line  with 
Memphis,  Randolph,  and  New  Madrid?  .  .  .  Come  over 
to  Savannah  or  Florence,  and  we  can  do  it.  We  can  then  oper 
ate  on  Decatur  or  Memphis,  or  both,  as  may  appear  best."* 
His  mind  still  dwelt  upon  places,  strategic  points,  as  objectives, 
rather  than  upon  the  hostile  army.  This  was  the  fulfilment  of 
Halleck's  notion  of  strategy. 

On  the  llth  of  March  President  Lincoln  placed  all  of  the 
territory  from  Knoxville  as  far  west  as  the  Missouri  River,  and 
all  the  Union  troops  therein,  under  the  command  of  Halleck. 
This  command  included  Buell's  army.  Thereupon  Halleck  or 
dered  Buell  to  march  his  army  to  Savannah.  The  Confederate 
forces  were  massing  at  Corinth,  twenty-two  miles  in  a  straight 
line  from  Savannah,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Tennessee. 
Already  about  23,000  Confederates  were  there,  or  "within  easy 
marches  of  Corinth,"  not  including  the  troops  that  Polk  had 
withdrawn  from  Columbus.  They  had  not  yet  arrived. 

General  Johnston  reached  Corinth  on  the  22nd  of  March; 
by  the  end  of  the  month  all  of  the  Confederate  troops  that  took 
part  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  some  40,000,  were  concentrated 
about  Corinth.  Van  Dorn's  command,  from  Arkansas,  did  not 
arrive  in  time  for  the  battle.  Johnston  organized  his  forces, 
designated  the  "Army  of  the  Mississippi,"  into  three  corps, 
under  the  command,  respectively,  of  Major-Generals  Polk, 
Bragg,  and  Hardee,  with  a  reserve  of  two  brigades  under 
Major-General  Breckinridge.  Beauregard  was  to  be  "second 
in  command,"  and  Bragg,  besides  commanding  a  corps,  was 
appointed  Chief  of  Staff  by  Johnston. 

*Force. 


172  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Instead  of  camping  his  army  at  Savannah,  General  Smith, 
with  the  authority  of  Halleck,  had  selected  a  place  nine  miles 
higher  up-stream,  and  on  the  opposite  bank,  known  as  Pitts- 
burg  Landing.  Here  this  Union  army  was  in  camp,  awaiting 
the  arrival  of  Buell's  forces.  General  Smith  having  gone  on 
sick  report,  on  account  of  an  injury  from  which  his  death  re 
sulted  a  short  while  afterwards,  Grant  was  restored  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  army,  and  rejoined  it  on  the  17th  of  March.  He 
made  his  headquarters  at  Savannah,  instead  of  at  Pittsburg 
Landing. 

(82)  The  ground  upon  which  the  Union  camps  stood,  and 
upon  which  the  battle  of  Shiloh  took  place,  was  twenty-two 
miles  by  road  northeast  of  Corinth.  It  was  an  irregular  tri 
angle,  with  sides  three  or  four  miles  long,  bounded  on  the  east 
by  the  Tennessee,  which  here  flows  due  north ;  on  the  north 
west  by  Snake  Creek  and  its  branch,  Owl  Creek;  and  on  the 
south  by  Lick  Creek  and  its  branch,  Locust  Grove  Creek,  a 
small  brook  in  a  considerable  ravine. 

The  highest  ground  was  a  ridge  lying  north  of  Locust  Grove 
Creek,  and  extending  on  towards  the  west.  Its  top  was  200 
feet  above  the  river,  and  its  northern  slopes  fell  gradually  to 
the  level  of  the  camps,  100  feet  lower.  In  the  hollows  of  these 
slopes  the  branches  of  Owl  Creek  found  their  headwaters. 
The  most  important  of  these  branches  was  Tillman  [Tilghman] 
Creek,  whose  deep  hollow,  running  north,  a  mile  and  a  quarter 
from  the  river,  divided  the  space  into  two  main  plateaus.  These 
plateaus  were  broken  into  smaller  tables  and  undulations  by  the 
surface  drains  and  ravines  of  the  smaller  water-courses.  At 
the  time  of  the  battle  the  ground  generally  was  in  forest, 
partly  open,  but  partly  impassable  for  horsemen,  with,  here 
and  there,  clearings  of  twenty  to  eighty  acres. 

Several  roads  traversed  the  battle-field.  One,  the  Hamburg- 
Savannah  Road,  usually  spoken  of  as  the  River  Road,  led  from 
Crump's  Landing,  six  miles  down-stream,  and,  crossing  Snake 
Creek  by  a  bridge,  continued  on  southward  along  the  eastern 
plateau.  At  the  eastern  end  of  the  ridge  north  of  Locust 
Grove  Creek  it  forked  with  the  Purdy-Hamburg  Road.  This 
road,  coming  in  from  Purdy  by  a  bridge  over  Owl  Creek,  con 
tinued  southeasterly  along  the  high  ground,  and,  crossing  Lick 
Creek  a  mile  from  its  mouth,  led  to  Hamburg,  three  or  four 
miles  farther  up  the  river. 

Pittsburg  Landing  was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  above  the 
mouth  of  Snake  Creek.  From  this  landing  two  roads  led  to 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  173 

Corinth.  One,  called  the  Eastern  Corinth  Road,  followed  the 
backbone  of  the  ridge  beyond  the  headwaters  of  Locust  Grove 
Creek,  and  joined  the  Bark  Road;  the  other,  a  mile  farther 
west,  ran  nearly  parallel  to  the  Eastern  Corinth  Road  for  about 
four  miles,  and  was  known  as  the  Western  Corinth  Road. 
There  were  other  by-roads  and  trails  through  the  timber. 
Shiloh  Church,  the  little  log  meeting-house  that  gave  its  name 
to  the  battle,  stood  above  the  bank  of  Oak  Creek,*  at  the  fork 
of  the  Western  Corinth  Road  and  the  Purdy  Road. 

(83)  On  this  ground  the  Union  army  was  encamped  by 
divisions.  One  of  Sherman's  brigades  was  on  the  extreme 
right- front,  along  the  Purdy  Road,  and  guarding  the  bridge 
over  Owl  Creek.  Two  others  were  astride  the  Western  Corinth 
Road  just  at  Shiloh  Church,  and  behind  the  ravine  of  Oak 
Creek.  Stuart's  brigade  of  this  division  was  on  the  extreme 
left-front,  at  the  junction  of  the  Purdy-Hamburg  Road  and 
the  River  Road,  near  the  end  of  the  ridge  above  Locust  Grove 
Creek. 

Prentiss's  camp  occupied  the  middle- front  and  was  across 
the  Eastern  Corinth  Road.  McClernand's  formed  an  angle  at 
the  junction  of  the  Hamburg- Purdy  Road  with  the  Western 
Road.  It  was  about  500  yards  behind  the  left  of  Sherman's 
tents.  Hurlbut's  camp  was  a  mile  and  a  half  behind  that  of 
Prentiss,  at  the  junction  of  the  River  Road  and  the  Eastern 
Road.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  was  in  the  angle  of  these  two  roads, 
a  mile  in  rear  of  Hurlbut's.  Lew  Wallace's  division  was  still 
camped  at  Crump's  Landing. 

Although  it  was  known  that  Johnston  was  assembling  an 
army  at  Corinth,  where  it  was  estimated  that  there  were  already 
50,000  to  80,000  Confederates,  no  works  of  any  kind  were 
thrown  up  about  the  Federal  position;  nor  was  any  line  of 
defense  or  plan  of  action  in  case  of  attack  arranged.  The 
various  camps  were  established  with  reference  to  the  conve 
nience  of  the  different  commands,  and  without  any  system. 
There  were  no  cavalry  outposts  between  the  camps  and  Cor 
inth.  "Probably  there  never  was  an  army  encamped  in  an 
enemy's  country  with  so  little  regard  to  the  manifest  risks 
which  are  inseparable  from  such  a  situation. "f  True,  the 
5th  Ohio  Cavalry  often  reconnoitered  some  miles  to  the  front, 
and  frequently  encountered  parties  of  hostile  cavalry. J 


*On  map  as  Shiloh  Branch. 

fRopes. 

JForce. 


174  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Johnston  and  Beauregard  appreciated  the  faultiness,  strateg 
ical  and  tactical,  of  the  position  of  Grant's  army,  in  a  pocket 
between  Snake  Creek  and  Lick  Creek,  with  an  impassable  river 
behind  it.*  The  position  could  have  been  made  impregnable 
by  earthworks  in  one  night  ;f  but  the  Confederate  command 
ers  were  aware  that  it  had  not  been  intrenched.  They  re 
solved  to  attack  Grant's  exposed  army  before  Buell's  should 
join  it.*  They  hoped  to  move  on  the  1st  of  April;  but,  owing 
to  delay  in  Johnston's  arrival,  and  in  the  organization  of  the 
forces,  due  mainly  to  the  inexperience  of  officers  and  men,  the 
army  did  not  begin  its  advance  until  the  afternoon  of  the  3rd. 
It  had,  then,  to  go  without  Van  Dorn's  command,  20,000 
strong,  which  was  delayed  in  Arkansas  by  high  water.J 

(84)  The  order  for  the  march  directed  that  it  should  begin 
at  noon ;  the  army  was  to  be  in  position,  deployed  for  attack, 
at  7  a.  m.  the  5th.  The  distance  to  march  was  only  about 
eighteen  miles,  but  there  were  only  two  narrow  earthen  roads, 
through  dense  forests.  Many  of  the  troops  were  raw ;  Bragg's 
corps  had  never  made  a  march  before.  There  was  misunder 
standing  and  delay  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  journey.  The 
heads  of  the  two  main  columns  did  not  start  until  late  in  the 
afternoon.  On  the  4th  the  march  was  slow  and  confused.  In 
stead  of  reaching  the  position  from  which  the  attack  was  to 
be  launched,  at  the  hour  appointed,  7  a.  m.  April  the  5th,  it 
was  4  p.  m.  before  the  army  was  deployed.  It  was  then  too 
late  in  the  day  to  begin  the  attack,  which  was  postponed  to 
daybreak  of  the  6th. 

(83)  Johnston's  army  was  now  within  two  miles  of  Shiloh 
Church,  Sherman's  headquarters.  A  body  of  Confederate  cav 
alry  had  foolishly  pushed  forward  so  boldly  that  it  ought  to 
have  warned  the  Federal  commanders  that  there  was  a  strong 
force  close  behind  it.  §  Yet  no  warning  was  taken  by  the  Fed 
erals.  Saturday,  the  5th,  the  Union  cavalry  and  artillery  spent 
the  day  moving  their  camps,  in  obedience  to  an  order  changing 
their  assignments. 

The  advanced  Confederate  cavalry  had  already  been  encoun 
tered  by  small  exploring  parties  of  Union  troops.  On  the  3rd, 
also,  Buckland's  brigade,  sent  out  by  Sherman,  had  met  Con 
federate  cavalry  six  miles  from  the  Union  camp,  and  had  then 


*B.  &  L. 

fSherman's  Memoirs. 
JRbman's  Beauregard. 
§#.  6-  L.— Beauregard. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN:  175 

» 

returned  to  camp.  The  next  day,  the  4th,  a  picket  of  the 
same  brigade  was  captured  by  this  cavalry,  and  later  in  the  day 
Major  Lockett  and  a  party,  sent  to  rescue  the  picket,  were  also 
captured.  Two  of  Sherman's  brigade-commanders,  Buckland 
and  Hildebrand,  visited  their  outposts  on  Saturday,  the  5th, 
and  saw  parties  of  hostile  cavalry  hovering  in  the  woods  be 
yond.  Some  of  the  sentinels  claimed  that  they  had  seen  in 
fantry.  Numbers  of  rabbits  and  squirrels  were  noticed  scud 
ding  from  the  woods  in  front  of  the  camps.  This  was  all 
reported  to  Sherman,  but  he  had  no  cavalry  to  send  out  to 
reconnoiter — due  to  the  exchange  of  the  regiments  then  taking 
place. 

Saturday  afternoon  Prentiss,  in  consequence  of  reports  from 
his  outposts,  sent  out  three  companies  to  reconnoiter.  They 
marched  three  miles,  but,  taking  the  wrong  direction,  passed 
along  in  front  of  Sherman's  outposts  instead  of  encountering 
the  Confederate  line,  which  was  less  than  two  miles  in  front. 
McClernand,  and  McPherson,  then  chief  engineer  of  this  army, 
the  same  day  rode  with  an  escort  of  cavalry  towards  Hamburg. 
They  saw  a  few  hostile  scouts. 

(84)  Patrols  from  Lew  Wallace's  division  at  Crump's 
Landing  developed  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  at  Purdy 
and  Bethel.  It  was  Cheatham's  division  at  those  points  mak 
ing  ready  to  march  to  the  Confederate  assembly  for  battle. 
Informed  of  this,  General  Grant  rather  looked  for  an  assault 
on  Lew  Wallace's  camp,  and  gave  orders  for  supporting 
Wallace  in  such  an  event.  Saturday  Sherman  wrote  Grant: 
"All  is  quiet  along  my  line  now.  .  .  .  The  enemy  has  cav 
alry  in  our  front,  and  I  think  there  are  two  regiments  of  in 
fantry  and  one  battery  of  artillery  about  six  miles  out.  ... 
I  have  no  doubt  that  nothing  will  occur  to-day  more  than  some 
picket-firing.  The  enemy  is  saucy,  but  got  the  worst  of  it 
yesterday,  and  will  not  press  our  pickets  far.  I  will  not  be 
drawn  out  far,  unless  with  certainty  of  advantage ;  and  I  do  not 
apprehend  anything  like  an  attack  on  our  position."  On  the 
same  day  Grant,  in  reporting  events  by  wire  to  Halleck,  said: 
"I  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (general  one) 
being  made  upon  us,  but  will  be  prepared  should  such  a  thing- 
take  place.  General  Nelson's  division  has  arrived.  The  other 
two  of  Buell's  column  will  arrive  to-morrow  or  next  day. 
It  is  my  present  intention  to  send  them  to  Hamburg.  .  .  . 
From  that  point  to  Corinth  the  road  is  good,  and  a  junction 
can  be  formed  with  the  troops  from  Pittsburg  at  almost  any 


176  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

point."  Earlier  in  the  day  Grant  had  telegraphed :  "The  main 
force  of  the  enemy  is  at  Corinth,  with  troops  at  different  points 
east.  Small  garrisons  are  also  at  Bethel,  Jackson,  and  Hum- 
boldt.  .  .  .  The  number  of  the  enemy  at  Corinth,  and  within 
supporting  distance  of  it,  cannot  be  far  from  80,000." 

General  Halleck  expected  to  take  command,  in  person,  of  the 
combined  forces  of  Grant  and  Buell  in  a  few  days,  and  move 
them  on  Corinth.* 

(83)  Johnston's  army  bivouacked  in  order  of  battle  the 
night  of  April  5,  1862.  It  was  formed  in  three  lines,  with 
Hardee's  corps  and  one  brigade  of  Bragg's  in  the  first  line,  the 
rest  of  Bragg's  corps  in  the  second  line,  and  Folk's  corps  and 
Breckinridge's  division  in  the  third  line.f 

About  3  a.  m.  on  Sunday,  the  6th  of  April,  three  companies 
of  the  25th  Missouri  started  out  from  Prentiss's  division  upon 
a  reconnaissance.  They  struck  the  Confederate  outposts  in 
front  of  Sherman's  camp  at  a  quarter  after  five  o'clock.  Be 
fore  six  the  Confederate  lines  began  to  advance;  by  half  after 
six  they  had  reached  the  line  of  the  Union  outposts,  a  mile  in 
front  of  the  camps.  (85)  At  six  o'clock  the  21st  Missouri, 
from  Prentiss's  division,  moved  to  the  front.  It  encountered 
the  Confederate  line  about  a  half-mile  from  camp,  and  was 
driven  back. 

The  direction  of  Johnston's  advance  brought  Hardee's  line 
first  against  the  right  of  Prentiss's  division  and  the  left  of 
Sherman's.  These  divisions  formed  for  battle  as  soon  as  they 
were  warned  of  the  attack  upon  their  outposts.  They  were 
composed  of  raw  troops  that  had  never  been  under  fire  before. 
After  a  short  stand  Sherman's  left  regiment  broke  and  fled 
to  the  rear.  A  little  later  the  other  two  regiments  of  his  left 
brigade,  Hildebrand's,  did  likewise. 

(86)  The  first  and  second  lines  of  the  Confederates,  strug 
gling  through  the  thick  woods,  were  soon  commingled.     They 
became  engaged  along  their  whole  front.    At  half  after  seven 
o'clock  Beauregard- ordered  Polk  and  Breckinridge,  of  the  third 
line,  to  hasten  forward,  Polk  to  the  left  and  Breckinridge  to 
the  right.f 

(87)  McClernand  formed  his  division  on  the  left  of  Sher 
man,  and  Hurlbut  sent  one  of  his  brigades  to  their  aid.     Hurl- 
but  moved  his  other  two  brigades  toward  the  gap  between  the 
left  of  Prentiss  and  the  right  of  Stuart. 

*Force. 

ffl.  &  L.— Beauregard. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  177 

The  division  of  Prentiss,  which  had  formed  line  of  battle  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  in  front  of  its  camp,  was  the  first  whole  divi 
sion  of  the  Union  line  to  give  way.  (88)  About  nine  o'clock 
it  broke  and  fell  back  in  confusion.  Prentiss  rallied  about 
1,000  of  his  men  upon  a  line  that  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  and  Hurl- 
but  were  forming,  with  parts  of  their  divisions,  in  a  strong 
position  in  rear.  "Its  peculiar  feature  consisted  in  a  wood  in 
the  center,  with  a  thick  undergrowth,  flanked  on  either  side  by 
open  fields,  and  with  open,  but  sheltering,  woods  in  front  and 
rear."  The  Confederates  gave  this  place  the  name  of  "Hor 
nets'  Nest."* 

At  8.30  a.  m.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  had  moved  his  division  from 
its  camp,  sending  two  regiments  to  help  Stuart,  on  the  left; 
one  to  Sherman;  and  two  to  guard  the  Snake  Creek  bridge. 
Two  brigades  he  was  forming  on  the  right  of  the  line  at  the 
Hornets'  Nest.  Hurlbut  was  forming  on  his  left.  Prentiss 
rallied  his  men  on  the  center  of  their  line,  and  took  position  on 
the  summit  of  a  slope  covered  by  a  dense  thicket.  His  right 
was  near  the  Eastern  Corinth  Road,  and  his  line  was  partly  in 
an  old  sunken  road  running  northwest.f 

(89)  Between  ten  and  eleven  o'clock  Sherman's  division, 
hard-pressed  by  the  enemy,  and  now  reduced  to  two  brigades, 
badly  broken  and  disordered,  fell  back  to  a  new  position  in  rear 
of  the  Purdy  road.     Soon  afterwards  McClernand's  division, 
both  of  whose  flanks  were  now  uncovered  and  enveloped,  also 
fell  back.     It  formed  a  new  line  between  Sherman's  left  and 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  right.     Hurlbut  was  also  pushed  back. 

(90)  About  noon  a  strong  brigade   from  the  Confederate 
third  line  turned  Sherman's  right,  while  two  other  brigades 
pressed    his    front.      Sherman's    battered    regiments    made    a 
stout  fight;  but  they  were  gradually  forced  to  the  left  and 
rear.f      (91)    About    four    o'clock,    during   a    lull,    Sherman 
moved  his  shattered  command  still  farther  in  the  same  direc 
tion,  and  took  a  position  covering  the  River  Road,  by  which 
Lew  Wallace  was  expected  to  bring  his  division  into  the  battle. 
In  like  manner  McClernand's  division  had  been  outflanked  and 
beaten  back  step  by  step.     It  made  its  ninth  and  final  stand 
with  its  right  joining  the  remnant  of  Sherman's  division. 

At  three  o'clock,  or  thereabouts,  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Union  line,  which  had  been  pressed  back  from  one  position  to 
another,  was  finally  enveloped  and  forced  to  give  way  alto- 

*B.  &  L.— Buell. 
fForce. 


178  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

gather.  This  exposed  Hurlbut's  left  flank  to  an  overwhelming 
force  of  the  enemy,  under  the  personal  command  of  General 
Bragg.  Hurlbut  and  Prentiss  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  had  suc 
cessfully  held  their  ground  at  the  Hornets'  Nest  for  five  hours. 
One  body  of  Confederates  after  another  had  assaulted  them, 
only  to  be  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Divisions  and  brigades 
from  every  one  of  the  Confederate  corps  had  striven  in  vain  to 
carry  the  position.  General  Johnston,  personally,  had  led  one 
of  the  regiments  in  its  assault;  and  it  was  in  the  open  ground 
on  the  east  flank  of  the  Hornets'  Nest  that  he  received  the 
wound  from  which  he  died  at  half  after  two  o'clock. 

Seeing  his  flank  turned  and  his  rear  about  to  be  assailed 
Hurlbut  withdrew  his  troops.  (92)  As  the  last  of  his  regi 
ments  were  retiring,  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  under 
Hardee,  which  had  driven  back  Sherman  and  McClernand, 
was  swinging  round  from  the  north.  It  joined  flanks  with 
Bragg's  line  from  the  south,  and  these  two  bodies  were  now 
forming  a  circle  of  fire  round  Wallace  and  Prentiss,  at  the 
Hornets'  Nest.  At  this  juncture  Wallace  faced  his  regiments 
about.  He  was  killed ;  but  two  of  his  regiments  charged  to 
the  rear,  and,  cutting  their  way  through  the  enemy,  marched  to 
the  landing.  Prentiss,  with  the  fragments  of  his  own  and  Wal 
lace's  divisions,  made  a  desperate  stand.  It  was  hopeless; 
after  nearly  an  hour  more  of  fierce  struggle  he  surrendered 
with  2,200  men  to  overwhelming  numbers.* 

(93)  Seeing  the  Union  lines  drifting  back,  Colonel  Webster 
of  Grant's  staff  had  collected  all  of  the  available  artillery,  about 
forty  or  fifty  pieces,  including  some  siege  guns,  at  a  command 
ing  positi9n,  on  the  north  side  of  the  ravine  at  the  head  of 
Dill's  Branch,  about  a  half-mile  from  the  landing.  Hurlbut, 
after  his  withdrawal  from  the  line  at  the  Hornets'  Nest,  rallied 
his  troops  behind  these  guns.  Other  detachments  joined  him 
there,  making  altogether  a  force  of  some  4,000  men.  Two 
Federal  gunboats  at  the  mouth  of  the  creek  lent  their  .aid,  also ; 
but  the  muzzles  of  their  guns  had  to  be  raised  so  high  to  clear 
the  bluff  that  most  of  the  shells  fell  far  away  in  the  woods. 

Bragg  tried  to  gather  together  a  force  in  order  to  assault 
this  position.  In  the  confusion  incident  to  Prentiss's  surrender 
at  the  Hornets'  Nest  he  could  muster  only  two  brigades,  those 
of  Jackson  and  Chalmers.  These  moved  into  the  ravine  in  front 
of  Hurlbut's  line.  Meantime  Beauregard,  who  was  now  in 

*  Force. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  179 

chief  command  of  the  Confederates,  had  sent  out  the  order, 
from  his  position  at  Shiloh  Church,  to  suspend  the  attack. 
Jackson's  brigade  received  the  order  before  it  advanced,  and 
did  not  assault;  Chalmers  charged  with  his  brigade  alone,  and 
was  repulsed.  Thus  ended,  at  dusk,  the  first  chapter  in  the 
bloody  battle  of  Shiloh. 

(84)  Nelson's  division  of  Buell's  army,  for  lack  of  a  guide 
to  show  it  the  way,  and  on  account  of  the  bad  road,  had  taken 
all  day  to  march  from  Savannah.  One,  only,  of  his  brigades, 
Ammen's,  was  ferried  across  the  river  just  in  time  to  see  the 
end;  it  had  two  men  killed  and  one  wounded.  (93)  It  went 
into  position  near  Colonel  Webster's  guns ;  the  rest  of  the  divi 
sion  formed  there  as  it  arrived,  and  the  division  bivouacked 
there. 

Hurlbut's  troops,  with  some  men  of  the  divisions  of  W.  H.  L. 
Wallace  and  Prentiss,  bivouacked*  about  the  position  they  held 
at  the  end  of  the  battle.  McClernand's  shattered  division  was 
on  their  right;  and  Sherman's  command,  which,  he  says  in  his 
report,  "had  become  decidedly  of  a  mixed  character,"*  pro 
longed  the  line  of  bivouac  to  the  right,  on  the  River  Road. 
Lew  Wallace's  division,  which  had  taken  the  wrong  road  from 
Crump's  Landing  in  the  morning,  finally  arrived  about  dark, 
and  bivouacked  along  the  River  Road  on  Sherman's  right. 
Crittenden's  division  of  Buell's  army  joined  during  the  night; 
and  by  five  o'clock  Monday  morning  McCook  had,  also,  arrived 
with  a  brigade  of  his  division.  Buell  had  come  in  the  after 
noon.  Two  other  divisions  of  his  army  were  far  behind. 
Wood's  arrived  before  the  close  of  the  second  day's  fight,  but 
took  little  part  in  it;  Thomas's  did  not  reach  the  field  at  all 
during  the  engagement. f  Mitchel's  division  had  gone  toward 
Florence. 

(81)  In  obedience  to  General  Halleck's  orders  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio  [Buell]  had  started  from  Nashville  for  Savannah 
on  the  16th  of  March.  At  Columbia,  on  the  way,  the  bridge 
over  Duck  River  was  found  in  flames,  and  the  river  very  high. 
The  bridge  had  to  be  rebuilt.  This  delayed  the  column  at 
Columbia  until  the  30th.  The  distance  from  Nashville  to 
Savannah  is  about  135  miles;  it  took  Buell's  leading  division 
twenty- two  days  to  march  it.  The  journey  might  have  been 
made  in  less  time,  in  spite  of  the  burnt  bridge,  the  high  water, 


*Sherman. 
t5.  &  L. 


180  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  the  bad  roads;  but  Halleck  had  given  Buell  no  word  to 
make  haste.  On  April  4  Nelson,  who  commanded  the  leading 
division,  was  notified  by  General  Grant  "that  he  need  not 
hasten  his  march,  as  he  would  not  be  put  across  the  river  before 
the  following  Tuesday  [the  8th]."* 

(83)  The  Confederates  spent  the  night  of  April  the  6th  in 
the  abandoned  camps  of  Sherman,  McClernand,  and  Prentiss, 
annoyed    by    shells    from    the    Union    gunboats,    which    were 
thrown  among  them  at  intervals  of  fifteen  minutes  during  the 
whole    night.      The    organizations    were    hopelessly    scattered 
and  mixed. 

(84)  General   Grant  was  at  breakfast  at    Savannah,   nine 
miles  by  water  from  Pittsburg,  when  he  first  heard  the  guns 
in  the  battle  of  Shiloh.    He  sent  word  at  once  to  Nelson,  who 
had  arrived  at  that  point  with  his  division,  to  march  it  imme 
diately  to  the  point  opposite  Pittsburg  Landing;  then  he  hur 
ried  up  the  river  in  his  boat.     On  his  way  he   stopped   at 
Crump's  Landing  to  warn  Lew  Wallace  to  be  ready  to  move; 
from  Pittsburg  he  dispatched  an  order  to  Wa41ace  to  march 
his  division  to  the  battle.     He  then  rode  out  to  the  front,  and 
"visited"  his  various  division  commanders.     He  saw  Prentiss 
at  the  Hornets'   Nest,  and  ordered  him  to  hold   his  position 
there  at  all  hazards.     We  have  seen  how  Prentiss  obeyed  the 
order. 

Buell  and  Grant  met,  and  talked  together  a  little  while,  on 
Grant's  boat,  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  soon  after  Buell's  arrival. 
Grant  was  the  senior  by  recent  promotion  in  the  volunteers  (as 
a  reward  for  his  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson)  ;  but 
he  assumed  no  command  over  Buell,  and  gave  him  no  orders. 
In  fact,  the  two  commanders  do  not  appear  to  have  arranged 
any  concerted  plan  of  action.  Buell  states  that  he  determined 
on  the  evening  of  the  6th  to  attack  the  Confederates  at  day 
break  on  the  7th  with  his  own  forces.  Grant  did  not,  until  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  issue  any  order  for  his  troops  to  advance. 

On  this  day  Beauregard's  shattered  army  was  no  match  for 
its  foe.  Every  Confederate  regiment  had  been  engaged  the  day 
before,  and  the  losses  had  been  heavy  in  officers  and  men; 
about  8,000  had  fallen,  killed  or  wounded.  Not  many  more 
than  20,000  stood  in  ranks  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  April. 
Opposed  to  these  there  were  25,000  fresh  troops,  Buell's  forces 
and  Lew  Wallace's  division,  besides  the  fragments  of  Grant's 

*B.  &  L.— Buell. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  181 

other  divisions,  perhaps  7,000  men,  who  had  defended  them 
selves  so  stanchly  the  day  before.* 

(83)  The  second  day's  engagement  was  brought  on  by  the 
movement  of  Nelson's  division  along  the  River  Road  in  line 
of  battle.  It  encountered  the  Confederates  a  little  in  advance 
of  Hurlbut's  old  camp,  at  5.20  a.  m.f  Crittenden's  division 
formed  on  Nelson's  right,  and  McCook's,  on  Crittenden's  right. 
Grant's  army  was  on  the  right  of  Buell's,  with  the  remnants  of 
the  divisions  of  Hurlbut,  McClernand,  and  Sherman,  in  order 
from  left  to  right,  and  Lew  Wallace's  fresh  division  on  the 
extreme  right! 

Generals  Hardee,  Breckinridge,  Polk,  and  Bragg  took  charge 
of  the  portions  of  the  mixed  Confederate  line,  in  the  order 
named,  from  right  to  left.  The  line  was  forced  back  step  by 
step,  but  had  not  receded  as  far  as  Shiloh  Church  by  half  after 
two  o'clock.  Beauregard  still  had  his  headquarters  in  the 
church,  from  whence,  about  that  hour,  he  dispatched  his  aides 
to  his  several  lieutenants  with  orders  to  withdraw. 

A  covering  force  of  some  2,000  men  was  gathered  together 
and  posted  on  Tiigh  ground  within  sight  of  the  church.  By 
four  o'clock  the  -entire  Confederate  army,  all  that  was  left  of 
it,  had  retired  beyond  this  force,  and  not  a  single  Federal  sol 
dier  was  in  pursuit.  Breckinridge  commanded  the  Confed 
erate  rear-guard,  "with  Forrest's  regiment  between  him  and  the 
enemy."  That  night  the  rear-guard  bivouacked  not  more  than 
two  miles  from  Shiloh.  The  next  day  [the  8th]  Wood's  divi 
sion,  and  Sherman  with  two  brigades  and  the  4th  Illinois  Cav 
alry,  went  in  pursuit.  Towards  evening  they  came  upon  the 
camp  of  the  Confederate  rear-guard  a  few  miles  from  the 
battle-field.  Forrest  charged  them,  putting  the  Federal  skir 
mishers  to  flight,  throwing  the  cavalry  into  confusion,  and 
effectually  putting  an  end  to  the  pursuit. §  After  this  Breckin- 


*Ropes. 

t#.  &  L.— Buell. 

$£.  &  L.— Grant. 

§In  his  report  to  General  Grant  Sherman  says:  "The  enemy's  cav 
alry  came  down  boldly  at  a  charge,  led  by  General  Forrest  in  person, 
breaking  through  our  line  of  skirmishers;  when  the  regiment  of  in 
fantry,  without  cause,  broke,  threw  away  their  muskets,  and  fled.  .  .  . 
As  the  regiment  of  infantry  broke,  Dickey's  cavalry  began  to  discharge 
their  carbines  and  fell  into  disorder.  .  .  .  The  check  sustained  by 
us  at  the  fallen  timber  delayed  our  advance,  so  that  night  came  upon 
us  before  the  wounded  were  provided  for  and  the  dead  buried ;  and  our 
troops  being  fagged  out  by  three  days'  hard  fighting,  exposure,  and 
privation,  I  ordered  them  back  to  their  camps,  where  they  now  are." 
Wyeth's  Life  of  Forrest.  Sherman's  Memoirs. 


182  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ridge's  detachment  rested  undisturbed  within  six  miles  of  the 
battle-field,  while  Beauregard's  main  body  retreated  to  Corinth. 

Grant's  troops,  from  the  private  soldiers  up  to  the  highest 
commanders,  appeared  to  be  content  with  having  recovered 
their  camps;  and  Buell  says  that  "in  some  way  that  idea  ob 
structed  the  reorganization  of  his  line,  until  a  further  advance 
that  day  became  inpracticable."*  General  Grant  says  that  the 
roads  were  so  bad  from  the  heavy  rains  of  the  night  before  and 
the  wheels  of  the  Confederate  artillery,  and  the  men  were  so 
worn-out,  some  from  two  days  of  battle,  others  from  marching 
and  fighting,  he  had  not  the  heart  to  send  them  in  pursuit.f 

In  the  battle  of  Shiloh  General  Grant  states  that  his  effec 
tive  strength  in  the  first  day's  action  was  33,000  men;  for  the 
second  day's  battle  Lew  Wallace  had  joined  with  5,000  and 
Buell  with  20,000  fresh  troops.  The  Union  loss  for  the  two 
days  was  1,754  killed,  8,408  wounded,  and  2,885  captured  or 
missing;  a  total  of  13,047.  The  effective  strength  of  the  Con 
federate  army  was  between  38,000  and  40,000  men.  Its  loss 
was  1,728  killed,  8,012  wounded,  and  959  missing;  a  total  of 
10,699.  The  Federal  loss  was  more  than  twenty- four  per  cent, 
of  their  effective  strength;  the  Confederate  more  than  twenty- 
six  per  cent. 

(81)  The  defeat  at  Shiloh  was  not  the  only  Confederate 
disaster  in  the  west  on  the  7th  of  April.  On  the  same  day 
Island  No.  10,  with  about  7,000  men,  surrendered  to  the  com 
bined  land  and  naval  forces  under  General  Pope  and  Com 
modore  Foote.  Pope  was  thereupon  ordered  to  move  his 
army  against  Fort  Pillow;  but  before  he  had  well  begun  oper 
ations  against  this  post  he  was  ordered  to  transfer  his  army  to 
Pittsburg  Landing. 

COMMENTS. 

The  campaign  and  battle  of  Shiloh  are  the  hardest  of  all  the 
campaigns  and  battles  of  the  Civil  War  for  the  student  to 
solve — to  sift  the  truth  from ;  the  hardest  of  them  all  in  which 
to  place  the  little  credit  that  can  be  found  in  the  generalship  on 
either  side  upon  the  proper  commanders;  the  hardest  of  them 
all  in  which  to  fix  the  blame  for  mistakes.  It  is  not  hard  for 
the  student  to  find  abundant  faults;  it  is  only  hard  for  him  to 
fix  the  responsibility  for  them.  And  this  all  arises  from  the 


*B.  &  L.— Buell. 
f£.  &  L.— Grant. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  183 

fact  that  the  generals  on  each  side  have  fought  more  bitterly 
with  the  pen,  among  themselves,  since  the  great  battle,  than 
they  fought,  side  by  side,  against  their  common  foe,  during 
the  battle.  Grant  and  Buell  have  contradicted  each  other  in 
essential  particulars  on  one  side;  on  the  other  Beauregard  and 
the  friends  of  Johnston  have  carried  on  a  bitter  controversy. 
About  all  the  student  can  do  is  to  follow  the  actual  operations 
as  nearly  as  possible  and  determine  for  himself  wherein  they 
were  right  and  wherein  they  were  wrong,  without  trying  to 
place  credit  or  blame  upon  individuals. 

Napoleon's  Twenty-seventh  Maxim  says :  "When  an  army  is 
driven  from  a  first  position  the  retreating  columns  should 
always  rally  sufficiently  in  rear,  to  prevent  any  interruption 
from  the  enemy.  The  greatest  disaster  that  can  happen  is  when 
the  columns  are  attacked  in  detail."  This  maxim  fitted  the 
case  of  Johnston's  army  after  it  was  split  in  two  by  the  fall  of 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  and  the  loss  of  the  direct  line  of 
communication  between  its  wings.  If  General  Johnston  fully 
appreciated  the  importance  of  reuniting  the  wings  of  his  army 
"sufficiently  in  rear,"  and  as  quickly  as  possible,  he  certainly 
did  not  show  his  appreciation  by  prompt  action.  There  was 
no  way  for  him  to  bring  his  two  separated  wings  together 
except  to  retreat  with  his  own  (the  right  wing)  to  the  south 
of  the  Tennessee  River.  He  reached  Murfreesboro  in  his  re 
treat  from  Nashville  about  the  20th  of  February,  but  he  did 
not  start  from  there  for  Corinth  until  trie  28th  of  February.  In 
tarrying  for  more  than  a  week  at  Murfreesboro,  Johnston,  no 
doubt,  was  influenced  by  the  state  of  the  public  mind.  Already 
he  had  lost  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Tennessee  and  the 
Cumberland  Rivers,  his  hold  upon  Kentucky,  and  the  impor 
tant  town  of  Nashville.  To  retreat  farther  was  to  surrender 
the  whole  of  Middle  Tennessee  to  the  enemy.  The  newspapers 
of  the  South  were  all  decrying  him  as  a  failure,  and  State 
delegations  were  demanding  his  removal. 

After  leaving  Murfreesboro  Johnston's  army  made  the 
march  to  Corinth,  by  way  of  Decatur,  as  rapidly  as  practi 
cable  under  the  circumstances.  The  roads  were  terribly  bad, 
and  the  streams  all  swollen;  the  distance  was  something  less 
than  250  miles,  and  the  head  of  the  column  reached  Corinth  on 
the  18th  of  March,  having  averaged  about  fourteen  miles  a 
day. 

For  eight  or  ten  days  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  Gen 
eral  Halleck  does  not  appear  to  have  had  in  mind  any  definite 


184  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  comprehensive  plan  of  operations.  "I  must  have  com 
mand  of  the  armies  in  the  West,"  he  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  on  the  19th  and  20th  of  February — meaning  Buell's 
army  in  particular — "and  I  will  split  secession  in  twain  in  one 
month."*  How  he  meant  to  go  about  it  does  not  appear. 
It  is  plain,  however,  that  he  had  no  thought  of  destroying 
Johnston's  main  army;  it  is  probable  that  the  principal  thing 
he  had  in  mind  was  to  reduce  the  Confederate  forts  on  the 
Mississippi,  and  open  that  river  to  navigation.  He  virtually 
did  nothing  until  about  the  1st  of  March,  when  he  dispatched 
the  force  up  the  Tennessee  under  C.  F.  Smith,  to  break  up  the 
railway  junctions,  then  to  return  by  water  to  Danville — a 
sort  of  steamboat  raid. 

This  led  to  the  selection  of  Pittsburg  as  the  camp  of  Grant's 
army.  Merely  as  a  temporary  base  from  which  to  make  raids 
against  neighboring  railway  points,  this  place  was  good 
enough  so  long  as  it  was  known  that  the  enemy  was  not  in 
force  within  striking  distance.  Even  then  it  ought  to  have 
been  protected  with  field-works.  Soon,  however,  several  things 
happened  to  change  matters,  and  to  shape  General  Halleck's 
plans.  It  became  known  that  the  Confederates  had  evacuated 
Columbus,  and  moved  its  large  garrison  southward  on  the 
railway,  and  that  Johnston  was  concentrating  his  scattered 
forces  at  Corinth;  and,  on  the  llth  of  March,  Halleck  was 
placed  in  supreme  command  of  all  the  Union  forces  in  this 
theater.  Then  the  plan  of  moving  against  Johnston  at  Corinth 
took  form  with  Halleck,  and  he  ordered  Buell  to  move  to 
Savannah.  Although  he  believed,  however,  that  Johnston  had 
already  assembled  from  50,000  to  80,000  troops  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Corinth,  he  did  not  enjoin  Buell  to  march  speedily ; 
nor  did  he  order  Grant  to  quit  his  exposed  position  at  Pitts- 
burg.  He  did,  however,  order  him  to  intrench. 

Nor  did  the  peril  of  their  camps  at  Pittsburg  appeal  to  Gen 
eral  Grant,  or  to  any  of  his  subordinate  commanders.  That 
they  did  not  fortify  their  position  may  be  condoned;  "hiding 
behind  earthworks"  had  not  yet  become  the  fashion."  For 
a  commander  to  intrench  his  camp  in  the  open,  at  this  time, 
would  perhaps  have  been  regarded  as  showing  timidity;  yet 
the  Confederates  had  already  set  Grant  and  his  generals  the 
example  at  Donelson,  and  taught  them  the  defensive  strength 
of  field-works.  The  Confederate  generals  at  Corinth  were 
apparently  just  as  careless  about  the  protection  of  their  camps. 

*Ropes. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  185 

But  that  Grant  kept  his  troops  at  Pittsburg  Landing  at  all, 
and  that  his  service  of  "security  and  information"  was  per 
formed  so  inadequately,  passes  one's  understanding.  Even 
though  neither  side  had,  as  yet,  learned  how  to  use  its  cavalry 
in  this  kind  of  work,  one  cannot  understand  how  Johnston's 
entire  army  could  bivouac  within  two  miles  of  Sherman's  head 
quarters  without  having  its  presence  discovered,  or  even  sus 
pected,  by  that  general. 

The  wisdom  of  President  Lincoln's  order  placing  a  single 
general,  albeit  the  choice  fell  upon  General  Halleck,  in  com 
mand  of  this  whole  theater  of  operations,  was  amply  verified  in 
the  campaign.  It  brought  Buell  with  his  army  to  the  field  of 
Shiloh  in  time  to  turn  a  Union  defeat  into  victory;  possibly 
in  time  to  save  Grant's  army  from  capture.  After  Shiloh  it 
enabled  Halleck  promptly  to  assemble  there  a  splendid  army 
of  100,000  troops,  nearly  every  man  of  which  had  been  tried 
by  the  fire  of  battle. 

In  leaving  Pope,  however,  with  his  five  divisions,  some  25,- 
000  men,  to  operate  against  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10, 
after  he  had  resolved  to  concentrate  against  the  Confederates 
at  Corinth,  Halleck  made  a  mistake.  A  small  "containing" 
force  might  have  been  left  to  watch  the  Confederates  at  those 
points ;  but  Pope,  with  his  main  body,  ought  to  have  been  has 
tened  to  a  junction  with  Grant  and  Buell.  A  commander 
should  have  only  one  main  objective  at  a  time,  and  he  should 
direct  all  of  his  troops,  all  of  his  operations,  with  reference 
to  that  single  objective.  Johnston's  army  assembling  at  Cor 
inth  was,  or  ought  to  have  been,  Halleck's  single  objective 
for  the  time.  To  overtake  that  army  and  destroy  it  ought  to 
have  been  Halleck's  first  single  purpose.  "When  you  have 
resolved  to  fight  a  battle,  collect  your  whole  force."*  Halleck 
had  the  three  armies  of  Grant,  Pope,  and  Buell  within  the 
theater;  he  ought  to  have  let  go  all  other  objectives  for  the 
time,  and  concentrated  those  three  armies  for  battle  with  John 
ston.  Every  company  left  operating  against  the  Confederate 
posts  on  the  Mississippi  which  did  not  keep  an  equivalent 
force  of  Confederates  from  joining  Johnston's  main  body  was 
a  company  wrongly  employed.  Pope's  army  ought  to  have 
taken  part  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 

Nor  would  the  Confederate  detachments  in  those  two  for 
ward  and  isolated  posts  have  had  any  chance  of  holding  out 
after  the  main  Confederate  army  had  fallen  back  to  Corinth. 


"Napoleon's  Maxim  XXIX. 


186  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

As  the  little  force  of  7,000  or  8,000  men,  however,  "contained" 
more  than  thrice  their  number  of  the  enemy,  Pope's  army,  the 
sacrifice  would  have  been  amply  justified  if  it  had  resulted  in 
a  Confederate  victory  at  Shiloh. 

(84)  On  the  3rd  of  April,  just  before  the  movement  on 
Shiloh,  the  main  body  of  Johnston's  army  was  at  Corinth,  with 
two  bad  roads  to  march  by;  one  division  was  at  Burnsville,  a 
railway  station  fifteen  miles  to  the  east;  another  division  was 
at  Bethel,  a  station  twenty  miles  to  the  north.  These  columns 
were  to  converge  near  Mickey's,  a  road-center  about  eight 
miles  from  Pittsburg  Landing.  Owing  to  poor  maps,  bad 
roads,  and  inexperience  and  inefficiency  on  the  part  of  officers 
and  men,  the  concentration  was  made  so  slowly  that  the 
attack  planned  for  daylight  of  the  5th  could  not  take  place 
until  the  6th.  This  not  only  lessened  the  chances  of  taking  the 
Union  army  unawares  but  also  enabled  Buell  to  reach  the 
ground  in  time  to  defeat  the  Confederates  on  the  7th.  This 
incident  illustrates,  alike,  the  importance  of  good  maps;  the 
importance  of  carefully  reckoning  with  the  elements  of  time, 
distance,  the  condition  of  the  roads,  and  the  quality  of  the 
troops,  in  combining  movements;  and  the  obligation  that 
rests  upon  every  subordinate  commander,  from  the  second  in 
command  down  to  the  platoon-commanders,  to  carry  out  his 
part  of  the  plan  in  spite  of  all  hindrances. 

By  their  defeat  at  Shiloh  the  Confederates  were  thrown  back 
upon  Corinth,  losing  all  hold  upon  Tennessee  west  of  the  moun 
tains,  except  two  or  three  forts  on  the  Mississippi,  which  were 
soon  wrested  from  them;  the  South  experienced  the  severest 
blow  it  had  as  yet  received ;  the  way  was  opened  for  Halleck  to 
assemble  100,000  troops,  without  any  interference;  and  the  op 
portunity  was  made  for  him,  if  he  had  possessed  the  will  and 
the  ability  to  avail  himself  of  it,  to  crush  the  remnant  of  Beau- 
"regard's  beaten  army  within  a  few  days,  and  to  "split  secession 
in  twain  in  one  month,"  as  he  had  promised  to  do. 

So  much  for  the  strategy  of  the  campaign.  We  have  not 
enough  time  and  space  within  an  hour's  lecture  to  devote  to 
the  tactics  of  the  engagement.  Hours  might  easily  be  spent  in 
pointing  out  faults  and  mistakes;  but  probably  no  other  great 
battle  of  the  Civil  War  furnished  fewer  examples  of  good  tac 
tics  for  the  student  to  emulate  than  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  espe 
cially  the  first  day's  action. 

The  first  and  most  glaring  fault  to  be  noticed  is  that  neither 
hostile  army  on  that  day  was  commanded  in  fact.  The  two 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  187 

armies  fought  without  head.  To  this  circumstance  all  the 
other  errors  and  shortcomings  may  properly  be  charged.  Gen 
eral  Grant  was  not  on  the  field  at  all  until  several  hours  after 
the  engagement  began,  and  neither  he  nor  General  Johnston 
established  headquarters  from  which  to  direct  or  control  his 
forces.  Grant  "visited"  his  several  division  commanders,  and 
gave  them  some  verbal  orders ;  but  the  different  positions  were 
taken  up  without  any  direction  from  him.  Hurlbut  and  W.  H. 
L.  Wallace  had  sent  forward  reinforcements  from  their  respect 
ive  divisions,  as  they  judged  best,  and  had  moved  forward  to 
form  their  line  before  General  Grant  arrived.  General  John 
ston  went  immediately  into  the  thick  of  the  battle,  and  "was 
killed  doing  the  work  of  a  brigadier."*  At  one  time  General 
Johnston,  Commander-in-Chief ;  General  Breckinridge,  Ex- 
Vice-President  of  the  United  States;  and  Governor  Harris  of 
Tennessee  were  all  three  found  leading  a  single  regiment  for 
ward,  f  General  Grant  and  General  Johnston,  as  army  com 
manders,  exerted  very  little  influence  upon  the  character  of  the 
tactics  in  this  great  battle. 

(83)  Johnston  and  Beauregard  had  planned  to  make  their 
"main  attack"  against  the  Union  left,  with  a  view  to  driving  the 
army  back  upon  Snake  Creek  and  Owl  Creek.  The  onset, 
however,  developed  into  a  simple  frontal  attack  all  along  the 
line.  "The  front  of  attack,  which  was  at  first  less  than  2,000 
yards  in  length,  in  three  hours  extended  from  the  Tennessee 
River,  on  the  east,  to  Owl  Creek,  on  the  west,  nearly  four 
miles.  .  .  .  The  attack  was  turning  both  flanks,  and  break 
ing  the  center,  all  at  once — a  procedure  only  to  be  used  by  an 
overwhelming  force.  The  Federals,  instead  of  being  driven 
down  the  river,  as  the  intention  was,  were  driven  to  the  land 
ing,  where  their  gunboats  and  supplies  were."* 

The  Union  army,  which  should  have  been  in  a  "position  in 
readiness,"  "was  scattered  about  in  isolated  camps.  .  .  . 
There  was  no  defensive  line,  no  point  of  assembly,  no  proper 
outposts,  no  one  to  give  orders  in  the  absence  of  the  regular 
commander,  whose  headquarters  were  nine  miles  away.  The 
greenest  troops  (the  divisions  of  Prentiss  and  Sherman)  were 
in  the  most  exposed  positions.  Sherman  had  three  brigades 
on  the  right,  and  one  on  the  left,  with  an  interval  of  several' 
miles  between  them."* 

"The  Confederate  formation  shows  the  mistake  of  using  ex- 


*  Lecture  by  Major  Swift. 
1  Force. 


188  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

tended  lines  instead  of  deep  formations  for  attack.  The  long 
lines,  moving  forward,  spread  out  to  right  and  left.  Gaps  in 
the  forward  line  were  filled  by  portions  of  the  lines  coming  up 
from  the  rear.  Corps,  divisions,  and  brigades  were  soon  mixed 
in  hopeless  confusion.  Attacks  were  made  and  lost  before  sup 
porting  troops  came  up,  and  the  action  degenerated  into  a  series 
of  isolated  combats,  which  were  without  a  general  plan,  and 
ineffective.  No  one  knew  from  whom  to  take  orders.  One 
regiment  received  orders  from  three  different  corps-comman 
ders  within  a  short  time.  As  a  result  may  aimless  and  con 
flicting  orders  were  issued  which  unnecessarily  exhausted  and 
discouraged  the  troops.  The  highest  commanders,  including 
the  adjutant-general,  went  into  the  fight,  and  devoted  them 
selves  to  urging  the  troops  forward,  without  any  plan  or  sys 
tem.  By  1 1  a.  m.  there  was  not  a  reserve  on  the  field.  Instead 
of  feeding  the  fight  with  their  own  troops,  the  corps-comman 
ders  finally  sought  various  parts  of  the  field,  and  took  com 
mand  without  regard  to  the  order  of  battle.  Bragg  may  be 
found  at  the  center,  at  the  right,  and  then  at  the  left.  .  .  « 
Beauregard  remained  near  Shiloh,  without  a  reserve,  and  un 
able  to  exercise  any  influence  on  the  battle."* 

On  the  Federal  side  the  tactics  were,  if  possible,  worse. 
With  no  prearranged  plan,  there  was  want  of  cohesion  and 
concert  of  action  between  the  various  units.  Regiments  were 
rarely  overcome  in  front,  but  each  one  fell  back  because  the 
regiment  on  its  right  or  left  had  done  so,  and  exposed  its  flank. 
Then  it  continued  its  backward  movement,  in  turn  exposing  the 
flank  of  its  neighbor,  which  then  must  needs,  also,  fall  back. 
Once  in  operation  this  process  repeated  itself  indefinitely. 
The  reserves  were  not  judiciously  used  to  counteract  partial 
reverses,  and  to  preserve  the  front  of  battle. f 

The  straggling,  or  rather  skulking,  on  the  Confederate  side, 
and  the  fleeing  to  the  rear  on  the  Union  side,  were  frightful 
among  the  raw  troops.  On  the  Union  side  crowds  of  terror- 
stricken  fugitives,  estimated  all  the  way  from  5,000  to  15,000, 
huddled  under  the  bluffs  at  the  riverside  jj  at  the  close  of*  the 
day  Grant  had  no  more  than  4,000  men  in  line.  On  the  Con 
federate  side  it  was  hardly  any  better.  "The  victorious  troops 
had  been  demoralized  by  reckless  attacks,  which  were  never 
supported,  and  thousands  of  them  immediately  gave  up  the  bat- 

*Major  Swift. 
t£.  &  L.— Buell. 
JRopes. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN.  189 

tie  to  pillage  the  camps."*  It  is  probable  that  "the  debris  of 
the  army  surging  back  upon"  Beauregard  at  Shiloh,  two  miles 
in  rear,  influenced  him  to  order  the  attack  to  cease.f  He  has 
been  much  blamed  for  that  order ;  but  it  is  not  at  all  likely  that 
he  could  have  carried  the  last  position  taken  by  his  enemy  that 
evening.  Bragg  had  only  got  together  two  brigades  for  the 
attack,  and  one  of  them  had  no  ammunition.  Furthermore, 
Nelson's  Federal  division  was  just  arriving,  and  night  was  at 
hand. 

In  his  own  account  of  the  engagement  General  Beauregard 
intimates  that  he  was  aware  that  Buell's  army  was  arriving.^ 
If  such  was  the  case,  he  made  a  mistake  in  remaining  on  the 
field  that  night.  There  was  no  chance  for  his  depleted  army 
after  Buell  arrived ;  he  ought  to  have  withdrawn  it  as  quickly, 
and  with  as  little  loss,  as  possible.  All  of  his  stubborn  resist 
ance  on  the  second  day  was  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life.  Nothing 
was  to  be  gained  by  continuing  the  battle  against  overwhelm 
ing  numbers  of  fresh  troops. 

The  character  of  the  battle-field,  in  general  thickly  covered 
with  forest,  was  not  favorable  for  the  employment  of  artillery 
or  cavalry.  The  artillery,  however,  in  spite  of  the  woods, 
played  an  important  part  in  the  battle.  We  find  batteries  giv 
ing  strong  help  at  every  point  of  attack  and  defense.  Guns 
were  lost  on  both  sides;  some  were  taken  and  retaken.  The 
last  stand  of  the  Federals,  on  Sunday  evening,  was  made  near 
a  line  of  guns  hastily  collected.  Those  guns  played  a  con 
spicuous  part  in  the  last  act  of  this  day  of  battle.  One  battery 
only  disgraced  itself,  the  13th  Ohio  Battery.  When  the  first 
Confederate  shell  fell  among  them  the  men  deserted  their  guns 
and  fled  incontinently.  "The  13th  was  blotted  out,  and  on 
Ohio's  roster  its  place  remained  a  blank  throughout  the  war."§ 

The  Union  cavalry  does  not  appear  to  have  done  anything 
during  the  battle ;  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates  Forrest's 
horsemen  charged  a  battery,  capturing  some  of  its  guns ;  swept 
through  the  shattered  Union  left,  cutting  off  the  troops  of 
Prentiss;  and,  on  the  second  day,  covered  the  withdrawal  of 
the  beaten  army,  forming  the  very  last  line  of  the  rear-guard. |f 
On  the  8th  they  boldly  charged  Sherman's  column  and  put  an 
end  to  the  Union  pursuit. 


*Major  Swift. 

f£.  &  L.—W.  Preston  Johnston. 

$B.  &  L—  Beauregard. 

§Force. 

HWyeth. 


190  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

"The  first  day  at  Shiloh  shows,  better  than  any  other  in  our 
history,"  Major  Swift  thinks,  "the  kind  of  work  performed 
by  a  raw  army  before  it  has  had  experience  and  discipline." 
Speaking  of  the  throng  of  scared  fugitives  back  at  the  landing, 
General  Grant  says :  "Most  of  these  men  afterwards  proved 
themselves  as  gallant  as  any  of  those  who  saved  the  battle 
from  which  they  had  deserted."*  That  is  to  say  that  with 
training  and  service  they  afterwards  became  good  soldiers. 


*B.  &  L—  Grant. 


LECTURE  X. 
THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 

(94)  The  Peninsular  Campaign  and  Stonewall  Jackson's 
operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1862  were  so  closely 
related  that,  to  comprehend  the  strategy  of  either,  it  is  neces 
sary  to  study  them  together.  As  we  shall  take  the  Valley 
Campaign  in  our  next  lecture,  we  will  only  refer  to  it  in  this 
one  as  occasion  may  require. 

On  the  22nd  of  July,  1861,  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  the  President  called  General  McClellan  from  the  scene  of 
his  victories  in  West  Virginia  to  the  command  of  all  the  Fed 
eral  forces  in  and  about  Washington.  It  would  not  have 
been  possible  for  the  President  to  select  another  man  whose 
appointment  would  have  been  so  acceptable  to  the  people,  the 
newspaper  press,  and  the  army.  Up  to  this  time  McClellan 
had  achieved  success  in  every  place  that  he  had  occupied  in 
life.  He  was  graduated  second  in  the  class  of  1846  at  West 
Point — the  class  in  which  Stonewall  Jackson  was  graduated 
seventeenth  and  George  E.  Pickett  fifty-ninth.  As  an  engi 
neer  with  Scott's  army  in  Mexico  he  distinguished  himself  for 
efficiency,  and  won  brevets  for  gallantry.  He  was  selected 
as  one  of  the  Government's  observers  in  the  Crimean  War, 
and  his  report  on  the  campaign  was  published  by  special  act 
of  Congress.  He  was  appointed  a  captain  in  the  4th  Cavalry 
[then  the  1st]  when  it  was  organized  in  1855.  Two  years 
later  he  resigned,  and  at- the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  a  rail 
way  president.  At  the  time  of  his  appointment  to  command 
the  troops  at  Washington  the  eyes  of  the  whole  country  were 
centered  upon  him.  He  was  the  only  Union  general  that  had 
as  yet  scored  complete  success.  His  operations  in  West  Vir 
ginia  had  been  pronounced  "brief  and  brilliant."  The  rest  of 
his  military  career  you  will  follow  in  our  lectures.  He  was 
a  man  of  fine  soldierly  appearance  and  engaging  manner,  thirty- 
five  years  of  age. 

The  people  of  the  South  were  greatly  elated  over  their  vic 
tory  at  Bull  Run;  the  people  of  the  North  were  humiliated 
rather  than  disheartened  by  their  defeat.  They  learned  from 
it  that  the  Southern  States  were  not  to  be  kept  in  the  Union 
without  a  tremendous  struggle;  and  they  determined  at  once 

191 


192  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

to  make  the  struggle.  "The  very  day  of  the  battle  the  House 
of  Representatives  voted  for  the  enlistment  of  500,000  volun 
teers."*  Troops  immediately  began  pouring  into  Washington, 
and  by  the  middle  of  October  more  than  100,000  new  men  had 
arrived. 

McQellan's  immediate  task  was  to  organize  this  mass  of 
recruits  into  the  form  of  an  army  and  to  have  them  drilled  and 
trained  into  soldiers.  For  such  work  "he  had  a  genius,  and  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  he  created,  bore  the  impress  of 
his  genius  throughout  its  entire  service,  even  to  its  last  cam 
paign  under  General  Grant  in  1865.  At  first  the  people,  the 
newspapers,  and  the  President  and  his  advisers  had  perfect 
confidence  in  McClellan,  and  they  left  him  entirely  untram- 
meled  in  his  work.  This  condition  lasted  for  about  three 
months;  then  they  all  began  to  lose  confidence  in  him. 

On  the  1st  of  November  General  Scott  was  retired,  and 
McClellan  was  promoted  to  succeed  him  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  all  the  land  forces.  He  then  wrought  out  a  scheme 
in  which  all  the  armies  were  to  bear  a  part,  and  undertook  to 
command  them  all  from  Washington.  We  have  seen  how 
poorly  his  long-distance  command  succeeded  in  the  West.  A 
part  of  this  general  scheme  consisted  of  a  series  of  expeditions 
by  sea,  with  the  assistance  of  the  navy,  against  points  along  the 
Southern  coast.  These  expeditions  met  with  complete  success, 
and  by  May  of  1862  most  of  the  important  seaports  of  the 
South,  among  them  New  Orleans,  and  with  it  the  Mississippi 
River  as  far  up  as  Port  Hudson,  were  occupied  by  garrisons 
of  Union  troops.  These  successes  greatly  lessened  the  task  of 
blockading  the  coast. 

Meantime  the  Confederate  army  under  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
stayed  in  its  trenches  at  Centreville,  and  no  active  steps  were 
taken  by  McClellan  to  destroy  or  dislodge  it.  This  inaction  was 
what  aroused  the  distrust  of  the  people  and  the  Administration 
in  the  commanding  general.  Other  things  happened  to  aggra 
vate  their  distrust.  About  the  1st  of  October  the  Confed 
erates  were  allowed  to  set  up  batteries  on  the  lower  Potomac, 
which  closed  the  navigation  of  the  river  and  sealed  up  Wash 
ington  as  a  port.  McClellan  never  could  be  persuaded  by  the 
President  or  public  opinion  to  destroy  those  batteries.  They 
remained  until  Johnston  retired  from  Centreville.  Then  befell 
the  unfortunate  affair  at  Ball's  Bluff,  on  the  21st  of  October, 
still  further  to  increase  the  impatience  of  the  public  with 

*  Ropes.  - 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  193 

McClellan's  management  of  the  army.  At  Ball's  Bluff,  near 
Leesburg,  a  small  Union  force  was  ferried  across  the  Potomac, 
and  through  bad  management  was  destroyed.  Colonel  Baker, 
who  had  lately  resigned  his  seat  in  the  Senate,  was  slain,  and 
nearly  all  the  men  in  the  detachment  were  killed,  drowned,  or 
captured. 

At  this  time  McClellan's  army  was  more  than  twice  as* strong 
as  Johnston's,  but  the  Union  commander  was  led  by  the  reports 
of  his  secret-service  department  to  believe  that  the  Confederate 
army  was  twice  as  large  as  it  really  was.*  McClellan  at  first 
expected  to  move  against  Johnston's  army  at  Centreville  as 
soon  as  he  could  feel  that  his  own  army  was  in  condition  to 
take  the  offensive  against  it.  This  was  the  plan  of  campaign 
always  favored  by  the  President.  But  toward  the  end  of 
November  McClellan  conceived  the  project  of  making  Rich 
mond  his  objective.* 

His  plan  was  to  transport  his  army  as  secretly  as  possible 
by  water  to  Urbana  on  the  lower  Rappahannock ;  from  there  to 
make  a  dash  overland,  about  fifty  miles,  and  capture  the  Con 
federate  capital,  before  Johnston  could  march  his  army  from 
Centreville  to  its  protection.  Washington  was  by  this  time 
thoroughly  fortified,  and  McClellan  purposed  leaving  a  small 
force  to  defend  the  works;  but  he  believed  that  his  movement 
against  Richmond  would  induce  Johnston  to  march  the  Con 
federate  army  to  that  quarter  immediately.  The  President 
and  his  advisers  did  not  favor  this  plan  or  any  other  that  pro 
posed  removing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  between  the 
main  Confederate  army  and  Washington. 

But  winter  was  now  at  hand,  and  the  roads  in  Virginia  had 
become  so  bad  that  McClellan  did  not  believe  it  practicable  to 
march  a  large  army  over  them.  To  make  matters  worse 
McClellan  took  typhoid  fever,  and  was  ill  for  several  weeks 
during  December  and  January.  So  the  army  remained  in  its 
camps  at  Washington ;  the  people  became  more  and  more 
impatient;  the  newspapers  demanded  an  advance;  and  the 
President  was  in  despair. 

Finally  President  Lincoln,  who  stood  as  a  buffer  between  the 
insistent  public  and  the  newspapers  on  one  side,  and  the  inac 
tive  army  under  McClellan  on  the  other,  issued  the  first  of  his 
famous  "war  orders."  It  directed  that  the  army  should  ad 
vance  against  the  force  under  Johnston  on  or  before  the  22nd 
of  February — Washington's  birthday  was  chosen  doubtless 

*Ropes. 


194  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

for  reasons  of  sentiment.  This  order  was  not  carried  into 
effect.  The  President  issued  two  other  "war  orders"  with  his 
own  hand.  None  of  them  had  any  influence  on  the  operations 
of  the  army,  and  they  are  interesting  mainly  as  curiosities  of 
military  literature.  Their  real  purpose  was  probably  more 
to  allay  the  popular  impatience  than  anything  else.*  After 
much  correspondence  and  the  exchange  of  several  "memo 
randums"  between  the  President  and  General  McClellan,  and 
many  conferences  and  councils  of  war,  the  movement  by  way 
of  Urbana  was  finally  decided  upon  about  the  8th  of  March. 
(95)  The  very  next  day  Johnston,  who  must  have  got 
secret  information  of  this  decision,  withdrew  his  forces  from 
Centreville  and  the  Potomac,  and  by  the  llth  of  March  was  in 
position  south  of  the  Rappahannock  with  his  right  at  Freder- 
icksburg  and  his  left  at  Culpeper  Court  House. f  This  move 
ment  placed  the  Confederate  army  virtually  as  near  Richmond 
as  the  Union  army  would  be  at  Urbana,  and  thus  destroyed 
the  chief  advantage  of  the  movement  by  way  of  Urbana.  It 
was  therefore  decided  to  transfer  the  Union  army  by  water  to 
Fort  Monroe,  and  make  that  fortress  the  first  base  of  opera 
tions.  Fort  Monroe  was  in  the  possession  of  a  Federal 
garrison.J 

In  order,  however,  first  to  "give  the  troops  a  little  expe 
rience  on  the  march  and  in  bivouac,  get  rid  of  extra  baggage, 
and  test  the  working  of  the  staff -departments,"  McClellan 
marched  his  army  out  to  Johnston's  abandoned  camps  at  Cen 
treville  and  back  to  Alexandria.^  As  soon  as  McClellan 
moved  into  the  field  the  President  issued  an  order  relieving 
him  from  duty  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  forces,  and 
restricting  his  command  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  This 
army  was  now  organized  in  four  corps  of  three  divisions  each, 
as  follows:  First  Corps,  McDowell — divisions,  Franklin, 
McCall,  and  King;  Second  Corps,  Sumner — divisions,  Rich 
ardson,  Blenker,  and  Sedgwick;  Third  Corps,  Heintzelman — 
divisions,  Porter,  Hooker,  and  Kearny;  Fourth  Corps,  Keyes 
— divisions,  Couch,  W.  F.  Smith,  and  Casey.§  The  reserve 
artillery  under  General  Hunt,  a  brigade  of  regular  infantry 
under  Sykes,  and  the  cavalry  under  Philip  St.  George  Cooke, 
were  attached  to  army  headquarters.^ 


*J.  F.  Rhodes's  History  of  the  U.  S. 

fLongstreet's  From  Manassas  to  Appomattox. 

$5.  &  L.— McClellan. 

§The  force  under  Banks  along  the  upper  Potomac  with  headquarters 
at  Frederick  City,  Maryland,  at  this  time  formed  the  Fifth  Corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.       *  195 

The  embarkation  for  Fort  Monroe  began  at  Alexandria  orr 
the  17th  of  March.  On  account  of  Stonewall  Jackson's  activ 
ity  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  of  which  we  shall  hear  more 
in  the  next  lecture,  the  President  held  back  the  First  Corps 
[McDowell]  for  the  safety  of  Washington.  He  also  withdrew 
Blenker's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  and  dispatched  it  to 
Fremont  in  West  Virginia.  Other  troops  that  McClellan 
had  expected  to  have  were  also  withheld ;  so  that  when  he  had 
got  his  army  well  started  on  his  campaign,  McClellan  found 
himself  in  command  of  only  92,000  men,  instead  of  155,000, 
the  number  he  had  counted  upon.*  He  was  later  reinforced 
to  105,000  men. 

(96)  Furthermore,  in  his  contemplated  advance  up  the 
Peninsula  from  Fort  Monroe,  McClellan  had  counted  upon 
the  active  cooperation  of  the  navy  in  the  York  and  the  James 
rivers.  In  this  expectation  he  was  also  for  a  time  disap 
pointed.  The  Confederates  had  batteries  at  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester  Point  which  the  navy  could  neither  risk  to  attack 
nor  to  pass;  and  Norfolk,  at  the  mouth  of  the  James,  was  in 
possession  of  a  Confederate  garrison,  and  harbored  the  ram 
Merritnac,  effectually  closing  that  river  to  the  Union  vessels. 

On  the  8th  of  March  the  Merrimac  had  steamed  out  of  har 
bor  and  sunk  two  Federal  frigates  in  Hampton  Roads.  The 
next  day  the  ram  engaged  the  Monitor,  and  was  forced  to  re 
turn  to  Norfolk  in  a  damaged  condition.  It  was  not,  however, 
destroyed,  and  all  that  the  Federal  navy  could  promise  McClel 
lan  was  to  protect  the  ships  bearing  troops  to  Fort  Monroe. 

The  Peninsula,  lying  between  the  York  and  the  James 
rivers,  less  than  six  miles  wide  at  its  narrowest  part,  "is  a  low, 
level,  and  marshy  region/'f  Fort  Monroe  was  about  seventy 
miles  from  Richmond,  and  the  only  formidable  natural  obstacle 
on  the  way,  known  to  McClellan,  was  the  Chickahominy  River 
and  adjacent  swamps.  The  York  River,  formed  by  the  junc 
tion  of  the  Mattapony  and  the  Pamunkey,  was  navigable  up 
to  this  junction.  Here  stood  West  Point,  the  eastern  terminus 
of  the  Richmond  and  York  River  Railway.  Richmond  was  at 
the  head  of  navigation,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James.  The 
highways  of  the  Peninsula  were  all  earthen  roads. 

McClellan  knew  that  the  works  at  Yorktown,  some  twenty- 
five  miles  up  the  Peninsula,  were  held  by  Magruder  with 


*B.  6-  L.— McClellan. 

t 'International  Encyclopedia. 


196  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

10,000  to  15,000  Confederates,  and  that  the  enemy  had  several 
other  intrenched  positions  along  the  way.  He  also  knew  that 
Johnston's  main  army  would  be  able  to  march  promptly  to  this 
quarter,  and  that  the  Confederate  force  at  Norfolk  was  8,000 
or  10,000  strong.  Without  awaiting  the  arrival  of  his  whole 
army,  therefore,  he  "determined,"  he  says,  "to  move  at  once 
with  the  force  in  hand,  and  endeavor  to  seize  a  point — near  the 
Halfway  House — between  Yorktown  and  Williamsburg,  where 
the  Peninsula  is  reduced  to  a  narrow  neck,  and  thus  cut  off 
the  retreat  of  the  Yorktown  garrison,  and  prevent  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements."* 

The  movement  began  on  the  4th  of  April  in  two  columns, 
the  Third  Corps  [Heintzelman]  on  the  road  to  the  right;  the 
Fourth  Corps  [Keyes]  on  the  road  to  the  left.  On  the  after 
noon  of  the  5th  both  columns  had  been  stopped,  the  right  by 
the  works  in  front  of  Yorktown ;  the  left  at  Lee's  Mills,  where 
the  Warwick  River  was  found  to  be  unfordable  and  strongly 
intrenched.  In  fact  this  river,  instead  of  coming  down  from 
the  north  to  Lee's  Mills,  as  McClellan  had  supposed  it  did,  was 
found  to  run  athwart  the  Peninsula  from  the  fortifications  at 
Yorktown  to  the  James.*  By  means  of  several  dams  Magru- 
der  had  rendered  the  Warwick  unfordable  throughout  almost 
its  whole  length,  and,  with  his  field-works,  had  made  a  formi 
dable  and  continuous  line  of  defense  about  thirteen  miles  long, 
entirely  across  the  Peninsula.  (97)  McClellan  concluded 
that  the  line  could  not  be  carried  by  assault.  He  brought  up 
the  Second  Corps  [Sumner],  and  prepared  to  carry  it  by  a 
regular  siege.  At  this  juncture  he  was  on  the  point  of  order 
ing  the  First  Corps  [McDowell],  30,000  strong,  to  move 
against  Gloucester,  when  he  learned  by  telegraph  that  this 
corps  had  been  detained  near  Washington. f 

As  soon  as  he  found  out  what  McClellan's  line  of  operation 
was  to  be,  President  Davis,  after  consultation  with  Johnston, 
ordered  that  general  to  march  his  army  to  the  Peninsula.  This 
army  joined  the  force  under  Magruder  a  few  days  after  the 
Union  army  arrived  in  front  of  his  position.  Johnston  took 
command  of  the  combined  Confederate  forces. 

Heavy  ordnance  was  shipped  to  McClellan,  and  the  siege- 
works  were  pushed  with  great  energy.  Everything  would  be 
ready,  and  the  batteries  were  to  open  fire  on  the  5th  of  May — 
just  a  month  after  the  line  was  reached  by  the  head  of  the 


*5.  &  L.— McClellan. 
fRopes. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  197 

Union  columns.  "It  was  confidently  expected  that  the  Confed 
erates  could  not  possibly  sustain  for  more  than  a  few  hours  the 
terrible  fire  of  the  Union  siege-guns  and  mortars."*  Johnston 
had  no  intention  of  awaiting  this  fire;  on  the  night  of  the  3rd 
of  May  he  withdrew  his  army  from  the  works  and  started  for 
Richmond.  The  army  marched  by  the  two  roads  that  con 
verged  at  Williamsburg.  Stuart  with  his  cavalry  covered  the 
rear  of  both  columns. 

All  the  available  Federal  cavalry,  under  General  Stoneman, 
took  up  the  pursuit  at  once.  It  had  four  batteries  of  horse- 
artillery  with  it,  and  was  supported  by  Hooker's  division  [Third 
Corps]  and  Smith's  division  [Fourth  Corps].  (98)  The 
Union  cavalry  overtook  Stuart's  squadrons  within  eight  miles 
of  Yorktown  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  and  pushed  them 
on  toward  Williamsburg.  About  two  miles  in  front  of  this 
town  Magruder,  in  anticipation  of  a  retirement  from  York- 
town,  had  constructed  a  strong  line  of  defense.  Fort  Magru 
der,  near  the  center,  was  connected  with  deep  creeks  on  either 
side  by  a  string  of  redoubts. 

Longstreets's  division  formed  the  rear-guard  of  the  Confed 
erate  army;  it  took  post  on  this  line  to  hold  back  the  Federals 
until  the  trains  could  get  well  on  their  way.  The  roads  were 
so  deep  with  mud,  caused  by  several  days  of  heavy  rain,  that 
the  trains  moved  very  slowly.  The  next  day,  May  the  5th,  the 
Federals  engaged  Longstreet  in  a  battle  that  lasted  nearly 
all  day.  Longstreet  was  reinforced  by  D.  H.  Hill's  division. 
Hooker,  on  the  Union  left,  opened  the  battle  with  an  attack  on 
Fort  Magruder.  The  Confederates  reinforced  that  part  of 
their  line  and  repulsed  Hooker.  They  then  made  several 
counter-attacks  upon  him,  and  strove  to  envelop  his  flank. 
Hooker's  division  suffered  severely,  but  stood  its  ground,  until 
Kearny's  division  [Third  Corps],  which  had  been  delayed  by 
the  mud,  came  up  to  its  relief  late  in  the  afternoon. 

Smith's  Union  division,  over  on  the  Yorktown  road,  had  not 
engaged  the  enemy  during  the  morning.  About  noon  Han 
cock's  brigade  of  this  division  advanced  by  a  wide  circuit  to 
the  north,  nearly  to  the  York  River,  crossed  the  creek  by  an  old 
bridge,  and  seized  two  redoubts  which  the  Confederates  had 
not  occupied.  They  were  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  Long- 
street's  position.  D.  H.  Hill  undertook  to  dislodge  Hancock, 
but  was  repulsed.  That  night  Longstreet  withdrew,  and 
marched  to  rejoin  the  main  army,  having  held  back  the  Union 

*  Ropes. 


198  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

army  long  enough  to  secure  the  trains.  The  Union  losses  at 
the  battle  of  Williamsburg  were  2,283,  of  which  1,575  occurred 
in  Hooker's  division.*  Longstreet  lost  l,565.f 

General  McClellan  was  not  present  at  this  battle  until  near 
the  close  of  the  day.  Franklin's  division  of  the  First  Corps 
[McDowell]  had,  upon  his  urgent  request  for  reinforcements, 
been  dispatched  to  him  from  Washington,  and  he  was  back  at 
Yorktown  embarking  it  for  West  Point.  From  this  point 
McClellan  purposed  that  a  column  should  move  against  John 
ston's  retreating  army  and  trains ;  but  Johnston  had  anticipated 
such  a  movement,  and  had  sent  G.  W.  Smith's  division  to  op 
pose  it.  Smith  attacked  Franklin  and  drove  him  back,  and  the 
"Confederates  passed  on  unhindered  toward  Richmond. "J 

The  left  wing  and  center  of  the  Union  army  followed  the 
Confederates  very  leisurely.  The  right  wing  moved  by  water 
to  White  House  on  the  Pamunkey,  where  McClellan  estab 
lished  his  headquarters  on  the  16th  of  May.J 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Confederates  from  the  Yorktown  line 
left  Gloucester  and  Norfolk  isolated  and  liable  to  be  cut  off 
and  captured  any  day ;  so  they  were  both  evacuated  imme 
diately.  As  the  Merrimac  in  Norfolk  harbor  was  of  too  great 
draft  to  be  taken  up  the  James,  and,  of  course,  could  not  go  to 
sea  with  no  port  to  put  back  into,  it  was  destroyed  by  the  Con 
federates.  The  James  was  now  clear  for  the  Union  fleet- to  a 
point  within  seven  or  eight  miles  of  Richmond.  At  that  point 
obstructions  had  been  placed  in  the  river,  and  a  Confederate 
fort  stood  upon  Drewry's  Bluff,  on  the  right  bank.  On  the 
15th  of  May  a  fleet  of  iron-clads  under  Commodore  Rodgers 
attempted  to  reduce  this  fort  and  pass  it;  but  the  fleet  was 
defeated  after  an  action  of  four  hours.J  The  York,  of  course, 
was  open  to  its  head. 

Up  to  these  points  the  Union  navy  now  had  undisputed  con 
trol  of  these  two  navigable  rivers  and  the  adjacent  seas. 
McClellan  had  established  his  base  at  White  House,  twenty- 
two  or  twenty-three  miles  from  Richmond,  and  was  receiving 
supplies  there  by  water  from  Washington  and  New  York.  On 
the  withdrawal  of  Johnston  from  the  Rappahannock,  McDow 
ell  with  the  First  Corps,  30,000  strong,  had  advanced  to  that 
line,  and  was  now  opposite  Fredericksburg  scarcely  sixty  miles 
from  White  House.  Stonewall  Jackson  having  withdrawn 


*B.  &  L. 

fLongstreet. 

JRopes. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  199 

his  little  detachment  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  Shield's  divi 
sion  of  Banks's  corps  was,  on  the  1st  of  May,  ordered  to  quit 
the  Valley  and  join  McDowell  at  Fredericksburg.  McDowell 
was  now  only  awaiting  the  arrival  of  this  division,  when  he 
should  march  his  command  to  join  McClellan  in  order  to  assist 
in  the  capture  of  Richmond.  A  Confederate  detachment  un 
der  General  J.  R.  Anderson,  9,000  strong,  was  in  front  of 
McDowell  at  Hanover  Junction.* 

The  Confederate  authorities  at  this  time  were  "well  aware 
that  McClellan's  army,  apart  from  McDowell's  corps,  out 
numbered  that  of  Johnston  nearly  three  to  two,"  Johnston's 
"being  only  about  50,000  strong."f  It  looked  to  them  as  if 
Richmond  could  hardly  be  saved,  and  "preparations  were  made 
for  the  instant  removal  of  the  military  papers"  from  that  city. 
The  real  danger  would  come  with  the  movement  of  McDowell's 
corps  upon  Richmond  and  the  flank  of  Johnston's  army. 
Something  must,  therefore,  be  done  to  divert  this  corps 

General  Lee  was  now  at  President  Davis's  side,  as  his  mili 
tary  adviser,  and  was  in  general  charge  of  the  military  opera 
tions  of  the  Confederacy.  He  had  been  in  correspondence 
with  Jackson  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  a  plan  to  draw 
McDowell  and  the  attention  of  Washington  towards  the  Valley 
of  the  Shenandoah.  As  the  result  Jackson  was  reinforced  by 
Ewell's  division,  and,  about  the  1st  of  May,  he  began  a 'series 
of  rapid  movements  that  caused  the  President,  on  the  24th 
of  May,  to  order  McDowell,  "laying  aside  for  the  present  the 
movement  on  Richmond,  to  put  20,000  men  in  motion  at  once 
for  the  Shenandoah. "$ 

From  White  House  McClellan  had  resumed  his  advance 
against  Richmond  on  the  17th  of  May.  He  had  reorganized 
the  troops  under  his  immediate  command  into  five  corps,  mak 
ing  some  changes  in  the  arrangement  of  the  divisions.  The 
Fifth  Corps,  under  Fitz-John  Porter,  consisted  of  the  divi 
sions  of  Morell,  McCall,  and  Sykes ;  the  Sixth  Corps,  under 
Franklin,  of  the  divisions  of  Slocum  and  W.  F.  Smith.  These 
were  the  two  newly  formed  corps. 

(99)  Johnston  had  withdrawn  to  the  south  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  and  McClellan  encountered  little  opposition  to 
his  advance.  He  moved  very  leisurely,  however,  and  it  was 
not  till  the  20th  of  May  that  his  columns  reached  the  Chicka- 


*Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate. — E.  P.  Alexander. 

fRopes. 

^Rebellion  Records,  XVIII-219. 


200  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

hominy,  only  about  twelve  miles  from  White  House.  By  the 
25th  the  Third  and  Fourth  Corps  [Heintzelman  and  Keyes] 
had  crossed  at  Bottom's  Bridge  and  taken  position  on  the  south 
side  of  the  stream.  The  other  three  corps  stayed  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  extending  from  the  railway  to  the 
Mechanicsville  Road.  This  position  astride  the  Chickahominy 
was  taken  when  McClellan  expected  to  be  joined  on  his  right 
by  McDowell's  corps  from  Fredericksburg.  But  the  position 
was  retained  even  after  McClellan  was  advised  that  McDowell 
should  not  join  him. 

The  Chickahominy  was  ordinarily  an  insignificant  stream, 
but  it  flowed  through  a  marshy  bottom,  and  was  liable  to  be 
turned  into  a  formidable  obstacle  by  a  heavy  rain.  Trestle- 
bridges  were  built  to  facilitate  communication  between  the  two 
parts  of  the  army,  but  they  might  at  any  time  be  carried  away 
by  high  water.  In  fact,  the  Union  army  was  in  a  hazardous 
situation. 

The  army's  line  of  communications  was  the  Richmond  and 
York  River  Railway.  In  order  to  make  this  line  secure  from 
attack,  and  to  clear  his  right  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy, 
McClellan  dispatched  Porter,  on  the  27th  of  May,  against  An 
derson's  Confederate  detachment,  which  was  supposed  to  be  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Hanover  Court  House.  Porter  de 
feated  this  detachment,  or  a  part  of  it,  and  drove  it  toward 
Richmond. 

Johnston's  army  was  now  within  the  intrenchments  around 
Richmond,  facing  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy.  It  was  about 
63,000  strong,  having  received  some  reinforcements,  and  was 
organized  in  four  strong  divisions  under  Longstreet,  D.  H. 
Hill,  Magruder,  and  Gustavus  W.  Smith,  and  two  small  divi 
sions  under  A.  P.  Hill  and  Huger,  and  Stuart's  cavalry.* 

Johnston  determined  to  take  advantage  of  McClellan's 
faulty  position  to  attack  his  left  wing  south  of  the  Chicka 
hominy;  he  issued  the  order  for  his  troops  to  be  in  position  to 
make  the  attack  at  daybreak  on  the  31st  of  May.  On  this  day 
the  stations  of  the  Federal  corps  were  as  follows:  the 
Fourth  Corps  [Keyes]  was  near  Seven  Pines  and  Fair  Oaks 
Station,  about  seven  miles  from  Richmond ;  Kearny's  division 
of  the  Third  Corps  [Heintzelman]  was  about  four  miles  far 
ther  east,  near  Bottom's  Bridge;  Hooker's  division  was  three 
miles  south  of  this  point,  guarding  the  bridge  over  White  Oak 
Swamp  Creek;  the  other  three  corps  were  on  the  north  bank 

*B.  &  L. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  201 

of  the  Chickahominy,  Sedgwick's  division  of  the  Second  Corps 
[Sumner]  being  at  the  Grapevine  or  Upper  Bridge,  and  Rich 
ardson's  at  the  Lower  Bridge.  Franklin's  corps  [the  Sixth"! 
was  on  the  right  of  Sumner's,  and  Porter's  [the  Fifth]  pro-' 
longed  the  line  to  Mechanicsville.  The  entire  line  was  nearly 
fifteen  miles  long. 

The  country  between  the  Chickahominy  and  White  Oak 
Swamp  was  a  low  wooded  marsh,  with  here  and  there  a  patch 
of  clearing.  It  was  difficult  for  infantry  and  impracticable 
for  cavalry.  A  heavy  rain  fell  the  night  of  the  30th.  of  May, 
making  the  roads  almost  impassable,  raising  the  Chickahominy, 
and  rendering  the  bridges  unsafe  for  passage. 

Johnston's  plan  of  attack  was  simple,  and  ought  to  have  been 
effective.  The  attack  was  to  fall  first  upon  the  troops  at  Seven 
Pines  and  Fair  Oaks.  Longstreet's  division  was  to  move  by 
the  Nine-mile  Road,  D.  H.  Hill's  by  the  Williamsburg  Road, 
and  Huger's  by  the  Charles  City  Road.  G.  W.  Smith's  divi 
sion  was  to  remain  at  the  road-fork  near  Old  Tavern,  to  guard 
the  left  flank  of  the  main  attack  against  troops  from  the  other 
side  of  the  Chickahominy,  or  otherwise  to  support  the  main 
attack.  Magruder  and  A.  P.  Hill  were  to  remain  in  position, 
guarding  the  Chickahominy  north  of  Richmond,  but  ready  to 
join  in  the  battle  if  summoned. 

Longstreet  was  to  command  the  main  attack.  He  appears 
to  have  mistaken  his  orders,  which  were  given  verbally;  in 
stead  of  marching  his  own  division  by  the  Nine-mile  Road  he 
got  part  of  it  on  the  Charles  City  Road  in  front  of  Huger,  and 
part  on  the  Williamsburg  Road  in  rear  of  D.  H.  Hill.  Instead 
of  attacking  at  daybreak  it  was  1  p.  m.  before  the  attack  was 
made;  then  D.  H.  Hill's  division  attacked  alone.  A  severe 
battle  ensued,  and  Hill  gained  some  advantage.  After  several 
hours  Kearny  came  up  with  his  division,  and  for  a  time  the 
Union  line  of  battle  was  reestablished.  Then  one  of  Long- 
street's  brigade  reinforced  Hill,  and  the  Federal  line  was 
driven  back;  the  battle  on  the  Williamsburg  Road  closed  at 
about  half-past  six,  and  the  troops  bivouacked  there,  a  mile  and 
a  half  east  of  Seven  Pines.* 

Huger's  division  and  six  of  Longstreet's  brigades  had 
scarcely  fired  a  shot.  There  had,  however,  been  other  fighting 
at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  About  2.30  p.  m.  Sumner,  with 
Sedgwick's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  and  a  battery,  started 
to  Keyes's  assistance  by  way  of  the  Grapevine  Bridge.  The 

*Ropes. 


202  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

bridge  was  so  rickety,  due  to  the  high  water,  and  the  road  so 
deep  in  mire,  that  it  was  near  five  o'clock  when  Sumner  reached 
the  neighborhood  of  Fair  Oaks.  About  this  time  G.  W.  Smith's 
division,  under  command  of  Whiting,  was  on  its  way  to  rein 
force  D.  H.  Hill.  Its  commander  had  no  suspicion  of  Sum- 
ner's  approach,  when  suddenly  he  received  cannon  fire  from 
the  north  or  northeast.  Whiting  turned  and  made  fierce  at 
tacks  in  the  direction  of  the  fire;  he  was  repulsed  with  heavy 
loss.  Sumner  then  made  a  gallant  and  successful  charge, 
which  left  his  troops  masters  of  the  field. 

Late  in  the  evening  General  Johnston  was  severely  wounded, 
and  G.  W.  Smith,  the  next  in  rank,  assumed  command  of  the 
Confederate  army.  Between  one  and  two  o'clock  that  night 
he  ordered  Longstreet  to  renew  the  attack  "as  soon  after  day 
break  as  practicable,  and  to  fight  north  rather  than  attempt  to 
force  his  way  any  farther  toward  Bottom's  Bridge."*  Long- 
street  failed  almost  wholly  to  carry  out  this  order.  Two  of  his 
brigades  attacked  Richardson's  division  of  the  Second  Corps, 
which  had  crossed  the  river  the  evening  before ;  they  were 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  This  was  all  that  came  of  Long- 
street's  attack.  In  fact,  for  several  hours  Longstreet  sup 
posed  the  enemy  was  attacking  him.  At  10  a.  m.  he  wrote  to 
Smith,  'Can  you  reinforce  me?  The  entire  army  seems  to  be 
opposed  to  me.  .  .  .  If  I  can't  get  help,  I  fear  I  must  fall 
back."*  This  all  shows  how  little  a  commander  in  battle  may 
know  about  his  own  troops  when  he  is  not  connected  with 
them  by  field-telegraph  or  telephone.  No  part  of  the  Union 
army  made  any  attack  that  day.  General  McClellan  arrived  on 
the  ground  early  in  the  forenoon,  but  gave  no  orders  for  an 
attack.f 

About  2  p.  m.  [June  1]  General  Lee  arrived  at  Smith's  head 
quarters,  and,  in  compliance  with  an  order  from  President 
Davis,  assumed  command  of  the  Confederate  army.  In  the 
night  he  withdrew  the  troops  to  their  former  positions  close  to 
Richmond.f  General  Smith,  on  account  of  sickness,  retired 
temporarily  from  active  duty,  and  Whiting  took  command  per 
manently  of  his  division. 

The  Confederate  losses  in  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  aggre 
gated  6,134;  the  Union  5,031.$  For  the  Confederates  the 
operation  was  a  complete  failure,  and  it  left  them  in  a  very 
dispirited  condition.  Lee  immediately  set  them  to  work 

*B.  &  L.—G.  W.  Smith. 

fRopes. 

%B.  &  L. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  203 

strengthening  their  line  of  defenses  in  front  of  Richmond; 
within  a  fortnight  their  spirits  revived  with  "the  sense  of  safety 
it  gave  them."* 

(100)  Meanwhile  Lee  was  considering  an  offensive  move 
ment.  All  of  the  Union  army  except  the  Fifth  Corps  [Porter] 
was  now  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  close  up  to  the 
Confederate  works.  The  Union  lines  were  intrenched.  Mc- 
Call's  division  held  the  right  of  Porter's  line,  with  two  bri 
gades  under  Reynolds  strongly  intrenched  on  the  east  bank 
of  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  The  divisions  of  Morell  and  Sykes 
were  covering  the  bridges,  several  of  which  had  been  built. 
The  extreme  right  was  guarded  by  the  cavalry  from  Meadow 
Bridge  to  the  Pamunkey. 

Lee's  project  was  to  overwhelm  Porter's  corps  and  seize 
McClellan's  communications,  and  his  base  at  White  House, 
while  the  First  Corps  [McDowell]  was  over  toward  the  Shen- 
andoah,  whither  it  had  been  sent  against  Jackson.  Prepara 
tory  to  the  movement  Stuart  was  sent  to  reconnoiter  the  rear 
of  the  Union  position.  Starting  out  toward  Hanover  Court 
House  on  the  12th  of  June  with  1,000  troopers,  Stuart  made 
a  daring  and  successful  raid,  completely  encircling  the  Union 
army,  gaining  valuable  information  of  its  dispositions,  and 
destroying  large  quantities  of  its  property.  He  marched 
nearly  150  miles,  crossed  the  Chickahominy  fifteen  miles  below 
Bottom's  Bridge  and  rejoined  Lee  at  Richmond  by  way  of 
the  James  River  Road  on  the  15th.  He  captured  a  good  many 
prisoners,  and  lost  but  one  man.f  By  turning  this  reconnais 
sance  into  a  raid,  however,  and  riding  entirely  round  the  Union 
army,  Stuart  "seriously  alarmed  McClellan  for  his  rear,"  and 
probably  caused  him  to  have  his  transports  at  White  House 
loaded  and  ready  to  start  with  his  supplies  fcr  Harrison's 
Landing,  when  the  occasion  befel  a  few  days  later. $ 

Lee's  army  had  been  reinforced  by  some  17,000  troops 
brought  up  from  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas ;  but  Lee  designed 
also,  to  have  the  assistance  of  Stonewall  Jackson  with  his  corps 
from  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Jackson  had  finished  a  success 
ful  campaign  against  the  three  separate  commands  of  Fre 
mont,  Banks,  and  Shields,  and  was  now  resting  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Staunton.  To  mask  his  purpose  and  mislead  the 
enemy,  Lee  dispatched  Whiting  with  his  division  and  Lawton's 
brigade  to  Staunton,  apparently  to  reinforce  Jackson  for  fur- 


*Memoirs  of  R.  E.  Lee — Long. 
fLong.    B.  &  L.— Robins. 
^Alexander. 


204  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ther  operations  in  that  quarter.  No  sooner  had  Whiting  joined 
him  than  Jackson,  according  to  previous  arrangement  with 
Lee,  started  east  with  his  whole  command.  So  secretly  did  he 
move  his  troops,  partly  by  marching,  partly  by  cars  on  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  Railway,  and  so  skilfully  did  he  deceive  the 
enemy,  that  he  was  .upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  Porter's  corps 
before  the  Federals  had  any  knowledge  of  his  intention  or 
whereabouts.  Wednesday  night,  the  25th  of  June,  Jackson 
had  his  corps  assembled  at  Ashland,  on  the  railway  fifteen  miles 
north  of  Richmond. 

Lee's  order  for  the  attack  directed  Jackson  to  start  at  3  a.  m., 
June  the  26th,  "turning  Beaver  Dam  Creek  and  taking  the  di 
rection  toward  Old  Cold  Harbor;"  A.  P.  Hill  to  cross  the 
Chickahominy  near  Meadow  Bridge  as  soon  as  he  "discovered" 
Jackson's  movement,  and  drive  the  enemy's  outposts  from  Me 
chanicsville ;  Longstreet  then  to  cross  at  the  Mechanicsville 
Bridge  and  support  A.  P.  Hill;  D.  H.  Hill  to  follow  Long- 
street  and  support  Jackson.  Magruder  with  his  own  division 
and  Huger's  was  to  stay  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chicka 
hominy,  and  to  keep  up  such  a  demonstration  as  to  make  the 
Federals  believe  the  whole  Confederate  army  was  taking  the 
offensive  in  that  quarter.  Magruder  played  his  role  with 
skill,  and  was  entirely  successful. 

On  the  north  side  Jackson's  corps,  or  "division"  as  Lee  des 
ignated  it  in  his  order,  was  to  lead  in  the  movement ;  but  Jack 
son's  march  had  been  slow,  hindered  by  felled  timber  in  his 
road,  and  he  had  failed  to  carry  out  his  part  of  the  pro 
gramme.*  Three  o'clock  p.  m.  arrived,  but  not  a  sign  of  Jack 
son.  A.  P.  Hill  waited  no  longer.  He  crossed  the  river,  put 
the  few  Federals  at  Mechanicsville  to  flight,  and  came  upon 
Reynolds's  string  position  on  the  opposite  side  of  Beaver  Dam 
Creek.  (101)  D.  H.  Hill's  division  crossed  the  river,  and 
one  of  his  brigades  went  to  A.  P.  Hill's  assistance;  but  the 
Confederates  met  "a  bloody  and  disastrous  repulse."* 

(100)  Jackson  did  not  reach  the  Federal  position  at  all  that 
day,  but  warning  of  his  approach  was  brought  to  Porter  by  the 
Union  cavalry.  By  General  McClellan's  orders  Porter  with 
drew  his  troops  from  Beaver  Dam  Creek  before  sunrise  on  the 
27th  [June]  to  a  new  position  east  of  Powhite  Creek.  Here 
the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill"  was  fought  on  this  day.  (102) 
Porter's  line  was  formed  with  convex  front  along  the  high 
wooded  bank  of  a  little  stream,  with  its  extremities  in  the  val- 

*5.  &  L.—D.  H.  Hill. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  205 

ley  of  the  Chickahominy.  Its  right  flank  was  its  weakest  part. 
The  line  had  four  bridges  behind  it.  The  ground  in  rear  was 
cleared,  but  with  undulations,  fences,  and  ditches  it  afforded 
cover  for  both  artillery  and  infantry.  In  front  of  the  line, 
from  New  Cold  Harbor  road  to  the  right,  was  a  swamp  ob 
structed  with  felled  timber  and  choked  with  underbrush.*  The 
line  was,  as  occupied,  about  3,500  yards  long.  There  were 
fine  positions  for  the  artillery.  Morell's  division  was  put  on 
the  left;  Sykes's  on  the  right;  McCall's  in  rear,  in  reserve. 
"General  Cooke's  cavalry  was  placed  under  the  hills  in  the 
valley  of  the  Chickahominy  to  guard  the  left  flank."  Stone- 
man  was  far  out  on  the  right  with  the  rest  of  the  cavalry, 
probably  cut  off  by  Jackson's  command. f 

(100)  A.  P.  Hill's  division  followed  the  Federals  in  their 
retreat  from  Beaver  Dam  Creek;  D.  H.  Hill's  took  the  Be- 
thesda  Church  road,  with  the  view  of  joining  Jackson.  Long- 
street  was  to  support  A.  P.  Hill.  (102)  At  two  o'clock  A.  P. 
Hill  struck  Porter's  main  line  across  New  Cold  Harbor  road, 
and  assaulted  it  furiously.  About  the  same  hour  Jackson  and 
D.  H.  Hill  moved  against  the  right  of  the  line  by  the  .Old  Cold 
Harbor  road.  At  four  o'clock  Longstreet  joined  the  battle  on 
A.  P.  Hill's  right,  and  about  the  same  time  Slocum's  division 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  [Franklin]  came  to  Porter's  aid  from  the 
other  side  of  the  river. 

The  Confederates  assaulted  again  and  again ;  finally,  near 
dark,  in  a  general  attack  they  broke  the  Union  line;  but  the 
darkness  put  an  end  to  the  engagement.  Twenty-eight  hun 
dred  Union  prisoners  were  taken,  and  twenty  guns  were 
captured  or  abandoned.  During  the  night  Porter  withdrew 
his  troops  to  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  destroying 
the  bridges  behind  him.  In  this  battle  Porter  had  about 
30,000  men  and  twenty  batteries  of  artillery;  Lee  had  perhaps 
65,000  men  and  nineteeen  batteries.^  The  Federal  loss  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing  was  6,837 ;  the  Confederates  must 
have  lost  at  least  6,000  in  killed  and  wounded. § 

(100)  Magruder  with  his  25,000  men  had  succeeded  in 
containing  60,000  Federals  on  the  south  side  of  the  river ;  Mc- 
Clellan  from  the  offensive  was  forced  into  the  defensive;  and 
his  line  of  communication  with  White  House  was  in  Lee's 
possession.  But  Lee  was  not  to  reap  any  advantage  from  this 


+B.  &•  L.— D.  H.  Hill. 
f£.  &  L.— Porter. 
$B.  &  L. 
§Ropes. 


206  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

fact,  for  McClellan  had  already  considered  the  plan  of  chang 
ing  his  base  to  Harrison's  Landing  on  the  James  River,  and 
had  taken  some  steps  to  that  end.  He  was  now  forced  to  make 
the  change,  and  he  set  about  it  at  once.  It  was  a  gigantic  un 
dertaking,  for  he  had  only  one  narrow  road  to  move  by,  and  a 
great  swamp  and  creek  to  cross,  with,  besides  his  combatant 
strength,  a  train  of  5,000  wagons  and  a  herd  of  2,500  beeves. 
The  bulk  of  the  stores  at  White  House  were  moved  by  water. 

(103)  Reyes's  corps  was  sent  at  once  to  take  up  a  position 
south  of  White  Oak  Swamp  to  cover  the  flank  of  the  column  on 
the  side  toward  Richmond  in  that  quarter;  the  Second,  Third, 
and  Sixth  Corps  [Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Franklin]  re 
mained  north  of  the  Swamp  to  resist  the  direct  pursuit  of  the 
enemy;  and  the  Fifth  Corps  [Porter]  marched  toward  Mal- 
vern  Hill  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  seizing  that  strong  posi 
tion. 

Lee  could  not  at  first  tell  which  way  McClellan  would  re 
treat,  or  whether  he  would  not  rather  make  an  effort  to  re 
cover  his  lost  communications.  So  Lee  did  practically  nothing 
with  his  army  on  the  28th,  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Gaines's 
Mill,  but  send  Stuart  toward  White  House  to  break  up  the 
railway,  and  Ewell  toward  Despatch  Station  to  see  if  the 
enemy  "showed  any  disposition  to  cross  the  stream  and  retreat 
down  the  Peninsula"* ;  and  have  Magruder  watch  for  Federal 
movements  south  of  the  stream. 

Magruder -reported  that  the  Federals  remained  quiet  in  their 
works  that  day ;  yet,  by  the  morning  of  the  29th,  Lee  was  con 
vinced  that  McClellan  was  making  for  the  James.  He  set  his 
own  troops  in  motion  at  once  with  the  purpose  of  cutting  off 
the  retreat  or  turning  it  into  a  rout.  Magruder  and  Huger 
were  to  push  forward  on  the  Williamsburg  and  the  Charles 
City  roads;  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  were  to  cross  by  New 
Bridge  and  hasten  toward  the  James  to  strike  the  flank  of  the 
retreating  column  south  of  White  Oak  Swamp;  Jackson  with 
his  own  and  D.  H.  Hill's  troops,  nearly  25,000  men,  was  to  fol 
low  the  "shortest  and  most  direct  route,"  that  by  the  Grapevine 
Bridge  "across  which  Porter  had  retreated."  He  was  "to 
press  directly  upon  McClellan's  rear  with  his  whole  force."* 

Magruder  came  upon  Sumner  with  his  own  and  part  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  [Franklin]  at  Savage's  Station,  and  in  the  after 
noon  engaged  him.  (104)  Every  minute  Magruder  expected 

*Alexander. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  207 

to  see  Jackson  fall  upon  Sumner's  flank  from  the  direction  of 
the  Grapevine  Bridge.  But  Jackson  had  found  the  bridge  de 
stroyed,  and  wasted  hours  rebuilding  it,  though  he  might  have 
crossed  his  army  by  a  ford  close  to  the  bridge.*  So  Magruder 
was  left  without  aid ;  his  attacks  were  all  repulsed,  and  toward 
dark  the  Federal  rear-guard  resumed  its  march. 

(103)  The  morning  of  the  30th  June  found  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  with  all  its  artillery  and  trains  south  of  White 
Oak  Swamp.  The  bridge  over  White  Oak  Swamp  Creek  had 
been  destroyed  after  the  troops  had  passed,  and  Franklin  with 
two  divisions  stood  guarding  the  creek  against  the  pursuit  of 
the  enemy.  The  road  toward  the  James  was  blocked  with  the 
trains ;  to  give  them  time  to  reach  the  river  in  safety  the  Union 
army  had  to  take  up  a  defensive  position,  covering  the  outlets 
of  the  Charles  City,  Darbytown,  and  New  Market  roads.  All 
of  these  roads  come  together  near  Glendale.  Five  divisions 
took  a  position  near  this  point,  while  the  Fifth  Corps  [Porter], 
supported  by  the  Fourth  [Keyes],  stood  at  right  angles  to  the 
James,  covering  Malvern  Hill. 

(105)  About  noon  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill  arrived  at  the 
broken-down  bridge  in  front  of  Franklin;  at  the  same  time 
Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  arrived  by  the  Darbytown  Road  near 
the  crossroads.  Huger  was  making  slow  progress  on  the 
Charles  City  Road,  which  had  been  obstructed  by  the  Federals. 
He  did  not  get  through  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle.  An 
other  small  Confederate  column,  under  Holmes,  marched  by 
the  New  Market  Road  and  made  a  feeble  artillery  attack  upon 
the  Union  trains  passing  over  Malvern  Hill;  but  Holmes's 
guns  were  silenced  and  his  whole  division  was  put  to  flight  by 
artillery  fire  alone.  Magruder  stayed  back,  moving  to  support 
first  Longstreet,  then  Holmes,  then  Longstreet  again,  and  never 
getting  into  the  battle  at  all. 

Lee  expected  his  whole  army  to  take  part  in  this  battle,  vari 
ously  known  as  the  battle  of  Frayser's  [Fraser's]  Farm,  Nel 
son's  Farm,  Glendale,  and  Charles  City  Crossroads ;  but  Jack 
son,  for  some  unaccountable  reason,  contented  himself  with 
simply  shelling  Franklin's  position.  He  made  little  effort  to 
cross  at  the  bridge,  and  none  whatever  to  cross  at  any  one  of 
five  fords  in  the  neighborhood.*  He  held  his  own  and  D.  H. 
Hill's  troops  all  day  north  of  White  Oak  Swamp  Creek. 
Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  attacked  and  fought  the  battle  with- 

*Alexander. 


208  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

out  assistance;  and  instead  of  making  a  simultaneous  attack 
with  their  whole  force,  they  let  their  brigades  go  into  the  battle 
piecemeal.  The  fight  was  desperate  and  lasted  until  long  after 
dark.*  The  Union  line  was  broken  once,  but  was  soon  re 
established  by  reinforcements.  "No  strategical  advantage  was 
gained  by  the  Confederates,  nor  did  they  inflict  a  greater  loss 
of  men  than  they  suffered. "f 

(106)  That  night  the  whole  Federal  army  unmolested  fell 
back  to  the  position  already  selected  at  Malvern  Hill.  During 
the  morning,  July  the  1st,  the  Union  line  of  battle  was  formed.  - 
The  position  was  very  strong  naturally.  One  flank  was  pro 
tected  by  Western  Run  and  the  other  by  Turkey  Run  and  the 
gunboats  on  the  James.  It  was  on  a  commanding  plateau 
whose  approaches  were  all  swept  by  artillery.  Immediately  in 
front  of  the  Federal  line  was  an  open  space,  300  to  400  yards 
wide,  and  beyond  this  space,  toward  the  Confederates,  the 
ground  was  "broken  and  thickly  wooded,  and  was  traversed 
nearly  throughout  by  a  swamp,  passable  at  but  few  places  and 
difficult  at  those/'J 

Lee  expected  to  mass  his  artillery  in  two  great  batteries  at 
positions  from  which  they  could  bring  convergent  and  enfilade 
fire  upon  the  Union  batteries  and  lines  of  battle.  A  charge  of 
heavy  columns  was  to  follow.  But  owing  to  defects  of  the 
artillery  organization,  the  inefficiency  of  the  staff,  and  igno 
rance  of  the  ground,  the  artillery  attack  amounted  to  nothing. 
The  reserve  artillery,  four  battalions  containing  the  best  guns, 
did  not  fire  a  shot;  and  the  division  batteries  came  into  action 
separately,  and  were  quickly  overwhelmed  by  the  concentrated 
fire  of  the  enemy.  "This  inefficient  artillery  service  so  dis 
couraged  the  prospects  of  an  assault  that  before  three  o'clock 
Lee  abandoned  his  intention  to  assault."  But  later,  being 
misled  by  a  shifting  of  troops  in  the  Federal  line,  he  thought 
the  Federals  were  withdrawing,  and  gave  the  order  to  assault. 
Then  followed  an  untimely  and  piecemeal  attack.*  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill  were  held  in  reserve,  and  took  no  part  in  the 
engagement.  At  four  o'clock  D.  H.  Hill  opened  the  battle  by 
assaulting  the  center  of  the  line.  His  division  was  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.  Jackson  sent  two  divisions  to  Hill's  assist 
ance,  but  they  were  too  late.  Finally  Huger,  supported  by 
Magruder,  assaulted  farther  toward  the  Union  left.  They 


*Alexander. 
fRopes. 
JLee's  Report. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  209 

also  were  repulsed.  "There  were  other  isolated,  useless,  and 
unsuccessful  attempts,  each  resulting  in  a  bloody  repulse.  The 
failure  of  the  Confederates  was  complete"* ;  but  the  Union 
army  made  no  counter-attack.  The  action  lasted  till  dark.  The 
Confederates  lost  more  than  5,000  men  killed  and  wounded ; 
the  Federals  lost  about  one-third  as  many. 

(103)  The  next  day,  July  2,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  fell 
back  to  Harrison's  Landing,  where  it  fortified  itself.  Lee 
rested  his  army  on  the  2nd,  and  on  the  3rd  advanced  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Harrison's  Landing.  A  reconnaissance  of 
the  Federal  position  convinced  him  of  the  uselessness  of  mak 
ing  another  attack,  and  "he  returned  to  his  former  camp  near 
Richmond  to  rest,  recruit,  and  reorganize  his  army."f 

For  these  "Seven  Days'  Battles"  McClellan  had  at  the  out 
set  105,000  men,  and  Lee  had  80,000  to  90,000  effectives.  The 
Federal  losses  in  the  seven  days'  operations  were  1,734  killed, 
8,062  wounded,  and  6,053  captured  or  missing;  a  total  of 
15,849.  The  Confederate  losses  were  3,286  killed,  15,909 
wounded,  and  940  captured  or  missing;  a  total  of  20,1354 

COMMENTS. 

One  can  but  sympathize,  with  General  McClellan  in  his  de 
termination  to  have  his  army  properly  organized,  equipped,  and 
trained  before  starting  out  on  an  offensive  campaign  against 
an  army  that  had  the  prestige  of  victory  on  its  side.  We  do 
not  need  to  go  further  than  our  own  War  of  .1812  to  be  con 
vinced  that  however  well  raw  untrained  troops  may  do  on  the 
defensive,  they  are  utterly  unfit  for  offensive  campaigns  and 
battles.  The  disastrous  outcome  of  Bull  Run  was  a  further 
lesson  fresh  in  the  mind  of  McClellan.  He  did  not  want  to 
repeat  McDowell's  failure. 

But  the  American  people,  the  newspapers,  and  the  politicians 
never  have  learned  this  lesson  of  war ;  and  they  are  the  masters. 
The  President  and  the  Commanding  General  are  but  their  serv 
ants;  they  must  do  their  will,  or  they  must  fool  them  into  the 
belief  that  they  are  doing  their  will.  President  Lincoln  was 
more  to  be  pitied  than  General  McClellan — his  position  be 
tween  the  impatient  public  and  his  immovable  general  was  one 
that  none  but  the  strongest  character  combined  with  the 


*Ropes. 
fLong. 
$5.  &  L. 


210  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

finest  tact  and  the  loftiest  sense  of  public  duty  could  support. 

General  McClellan  lacked  political  tact,  without  which  an 
American  commander-in-chief  can  seldom  succeed;  because  to 
succeed  the  commander-in-chief  must  have  the  support  of  the 
Administration,  and  he  cannot  keep  that  support  unless  he  has 
the  favor  of  the  people  and  the  newspapers.  We  saw  how 
General  Scott  was  fettered  in  his  Mexican  Campaign  by  the 
lack  of  proper  support  from  Washington,  and  the  reward  he 
received  for  his  brilliant  victories,  won  in  spite  of  the  antago 
nism  of  the  Administration. 

(94)  Although  General  McClellan  may  not  have  believed 
that  his  great  army  was  ready  to  advance  before  April,  1862, 
there  were,  nevertheless,  several  things  he  might  have  done, 
during  those  long  months  of  waiting,  simply  to  appease  the 
public  mind  and  to  relieve  the  President.  He  ought  to  have 
captured  Norfolk  and  broken  up  the  Confederate  batteries 
along  the  Potomac.  He  could  easily  have  done  those  things 
without  any  risk  of  failure.  It  would  have  pleased  the  people 
and  the  press  and  kept  their  support ;  and  it  would  have  had  a 
depressing  effect  upon  the  South.  It  would  have  been,  in  a 
sense,  good  strategy. 

In  the  light  of  history  there  is  little  doubt,  now,  that  McClel 
lan  could  have  marched  out  in  November,  1861,  and  destroyed 
Johnston's  army,  if  it  had  stood  to  fight.  The  Union  army  at 
that  time  was  nearly  three  times  as  strong  as  Johnston's;  it 
was  better  organized,  equipped,  and  supplied,  and  had  received 
three  months  of  drill  and  training.  But  Johnston  would  not 
have  accepted  battle;  it  is  almost  certain  that  he  would  have 
fallen  back  behind  the  Rappahannock  without  fighting.  This 
would  completely  have  restored  McClellan's  prestige  with  the 
country.  But  General  McClellan  was,  during  the  whole  period 
of  his  command,  the  victim  of  a  tendency  of  timid  and  cautious 
generals  to  overestimate  the  strength  of  the  enemy.  He  ap 
pears  to  have  relied  wholly  upon  his  secret-service  depart 
ment  for  information ;  and  the  reports  furnished  by  this  depart 
ment  usually  doubled  the  strength  of  the  Confederates.  Just 
before  the  operations  around  Richmond,  for  example,  this 
department  informed  McClellan  that  Johnston's  army  num 
bered  180,000.  McClellan  took  counsel  of  his  fear. 

With  all  his  caution,  however,  the  Union  commander  took 
some  risks  at  which  a  less  careful,  but  more  experienced,  com 
mander  would  have  balked.  When  he  proposed  his  move 
ment  by  way  of  Urbana  or  Fort  Monroe  he  believed  that 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  211 

Johnston  had  more  than  100,000  men  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Manassas  and  Centreville;  yet  he  purposed  withdrawing  the 
bulk  of  the  Federal  army  from  Washington  and  transferring  it 
by  water  to  the  Peninsula,  reckoning  that  Johnston  would 
forthwith  march  his  whole  force  to  the  relief  of  Richmond.* 
But  if  Johnston  had  really  commanded  any  such  number  of 
men  he  probably  would  have  done  nothing  of  the  kind.  The 
capture  of  Washington  at  this  time,  in  its  effect  upon  the  North 
and  upon  foreign  nations,  would  have  far  outweighed  the  loss 
of  Richmond.  It  would  probably  have  caused  the  Confed 
eracy  to  be  recognized  abroad,  and  might  have  brought  the 
fleets  of  England  and  France  to  reopen  the  Southern  ports  to 
their  trade.  If  Johnston's  army,  small  as  it  was,  had  promptly 
crossed  the  Potomac  above  Washington,  upon  the  departure  of 
McClellan's  army  for  Fort  Monroe,  this  army  would  have  been 
speedily  recalled  for  the  defense  of  the  Capital.  But  if  John 
ston  had  commanded  an  army  of  the  size  supposed  by  Mc- 
Clellan  he  would  not  have  waited  until  April,  1862,  for  the 
Union  army  to  take  the  offensive ;  the  Confederate  generals 
were  eager  to  cross  the  Potomac  in  October  to  cut  off  Wash 
ington's  communications  with  Baltimore  and  the  West,  in 
order  to  force  McClellan  to  come  out  with  his  untrained  troops 
and  fight;  they  asked  the  Confederate  President  only  to  rein 
force  the  army  at  Centreville  to  60,000  for  the  purpose,  by 
withdrawing  troops  from  the  Southern  coast.  Johnston's 
army  then  actually  numbered  only  some  40,000.  Mr.  Davis 
could  not  see  his  way  to  comply  with  the  request — the  govern 
ors  of  the  coast  States  insisted  upon  holding  troops  for  their 
local  defense.  Some  of  the  Southern  governors  gave  Mr. 
Davis  as  much  trouble  as  the  Northern  press  and  public  gave 
Mr.  Lincoln. 

General  McClellan  also  took  a  very  grave  risk  in  transfer 
ring  his  army  by  water  to  Fort  Monroe  and  making  that  place 
his  base  while  the  Merrimac  was  yet  afloat  at  Norfolk.  One 
has  but  to  consider  how  defenseless  troop-ships  are  at  sea  with 
out  adequate  naval  protection,  how  nearly  a  match  the  Merri 
mac  was  for  the  Monitor,  and  how  helpless  other  ships  of  the 
Union  fleet  had  proved  against  the  Confederate  ram  to  appre 
ciate  the  risk  thus  taken  by  McClellan  and  permitted  by  the 
Washington  authorities.  The  importance  of  having  complete 
command  of  the  sea  before  committing  troops  to  it  in  trans- 


*B.  &  L.— McClellan. 


212  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ports  is  so  great  that  it  should  never  be  disregarded  by  gen 
erals  and  governments  responsible  for  the  lives  of  thousands  of 
soldiers.  "I  have,"  wrote  McClellan  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  "such  a  living  faith  in  the  gallant  little  Monitor  that  I 
feel  that  we  can  trust  her"* ;  but  the  floridity  of  his  language  in 
itself  suggests  a  suspicion  that  he  was  not  entirely  confident. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  General  McClellan  had  grievous  dis 
appointments  to  contend  with ;  but  he  brought  them  upon  him 
self  by  allowing  himself  to  expect  more  than  it  was  possible 
for  him  to  have.  He  expected,  for  instance,  in  his  movement 
up  the  Peninsula,  to  have  the  Union  fleet  upon  both  of  his 
flanks;  but  at  that  time  the  James  was  closed  by  Norfolk  and 
the  Merrimac,  and  the  York  by  the  batteries  at  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester  Point.  His  failure  to  receive  McDowell  and  the 
entire  First  Corps,  even  though  he  did  receive  two  of  its  divi 
sions  and  other  reinforcements,  seemed  to  paralyze  his  ener 
gies.  Until  he  began  his  flank  movement  from  the  Chicka- 
hominy  to  the  James  he  appeared  to  be  playing  merely  a 
"waiting  game."  There  was  no  determined  aggressiveness 
in  any  of  his  operations,  such  as  must  characterize  every  suc 
cessful  offensive  campaign. 

General  McClellan,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  United 
States  Army,  had  exhibited  a  rare  genius  for  organization  and 
administration;  but  as  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  he  had  done  nothing  in  strategic  conception  or  perform 
ance  up  to  this  time  to  commend  or  to  emulate.  Every  move 
ment  he  had  ordered  had  been  foreseen  and  forestalled  by  his 
opponent.  He  expected  to  put  his  army  at  Urbana  before 
Johnston  discovered  his  intention ;  but  Johnston  got  wind  of 
his  plan  and  withdrew  closer  to  McClellan's  objective,  Rich 
mond,  before  the  movement  began.  At  Fort  Monroe  McClellan 
was  exactly  as  far  from  Richmond,  in  an  air-line,  as  Johnston's 
left  flank  was  at  Culpeper,  and  twenty  miles  farther  than  John 
ston's  right  was  at  Fredericksburg.  McClellan  knew  that  York- 
town  was  occupied,  but  he  expected  the  garrison  to  sit  still 
and  let  him  march  a  column  to  its  rear  and  cut  off  its  retreat 
with  Richmond. f  Then,  after  the  fall  of  Yorktown,  he  shipped 
two  or  three  divisions  to  West  Point  with  orders  to  move 
against  Johnston's  flank  in  his  retreat  to  Richmond.  But 
Johnston  anticipated  this  project,  and  had  a  larger  force  at 
hand  ready  to  drive  back  the  Union  detachment. 


*Ropes. 

t£.  &  L.— McClellan. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  213 

McClellan  was  methodical  and  cautious  and  dependent  upon 
the  science  of  engineering  at  times  when  he  should  have  relied 
upon  vigor  and  activity  and  battle.  This  was  notably  the  cast 
at  Yorktown,  where  he  spent  a  month  carrying  by  siege  a  line 
that  he  should  have  assaulted  at  its  weakest  point,  and  car 
ried,  the  day  he  encountered  it,  before  Johnston  arrived  with 
his  whole  army  to  reinforce  Magruder.  Failing  this,  the  Con 
federate  line  could  have  been  "contained"  by  20,000  men  in 
trenched,  and  outflanked  by  the  rest  of  the  army  moving  by 
way  of  Mob  jack  Bay  and  thence  overland  to  West  Point.  Or 
a  force  might  have  landed  on  the  other  side  of  York  River 
and  captured  Gloucester  Point,  which  was  open  to  attack 'from 
the  rear.  This  would  have  opened  the  York  River  to  the  Fed 
eral  fleet  and  made  the  Yorktown  line  untenable. 

McClellan  had  his  army  at  White  House  and  his  base  estab 
lished  there  on  the  16th  of  May;  from  then  to  the  31st  of  May 
he  practically  did  nothing  toward  the  destruction  of  Johnston's 
army  or  the  capture  of  Richmond  but  put  his  army  in  a  dan 
gerous  position  astride  the  Chickahominy.  He  spent  those 
fifteen  precious  days  apparently  waiting,  hoping,  for  McDow 
ell  ;  while  the  Confederates  were  strengthening  their  works 
round  Richmond  and  receiving  reinforcements.  After  the  battle 
of  Fair  Oaks  came  another  long  useless  wait,  until  the  Con 
federates  again  took  the  offensive  on  the  26th  of  June. 

McClellan  has  been  severely  criticized  for  placing  his  army 
astraddle  the  Chickahominy.  His  own  excuse  was  that  he  had 
to  reach  out  toward  Fredericksburg  in  expectation  of  Mc 
Dowell  ;  but  he  kept  his  army  there  after  he  had  learned  that 
McDowell  was  not  going  to  join  him.  So  long  as  McClellan 
kept  his  base  at  White  House  it  is  hard  to  say  what  was  the 
best  position  in  which  to  hold  his  army.  He  knew  he  should 
have  to  fight  a  battle  in  front  of  Richmond  before  he  could 
capture  that  city.  If  he  had  held  his  army  on  the  north  side 
of  the  stream  and  let  the  Confederates  defend  the  south  bank 
he  would  have  had  the  task  of  forcing  a  difficult  river  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy;  if  he  had  brought  his  whole  army  to  the 
south  bank  he  would  completely  have  uncovered  his  commu 
nications,  and,  in  the  expected  battle,  would  have  had  the  river 
at  his  back.  In  truth,  the  mistake  that  McClellan  made  con 
sisted  not  in  dividing  his  army  by  the  Chickahominy,  but  in 
failing  to  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  strong  bridges.  With 
all  his  skill  as  an  engineer,  and  all  his  care  and  caution,  .his 


214  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

mistake  in  this  case  was  that  of  an  engineer  rather  than  that 
of  an  army-commander. 

The  very  minute,  however,  that  McClellan  learned  that  Mc 
Dowell  was  not  going  to  join  him  he  ought  to  have  issued  an 
order  for  the  change  of  base  to  the  James.  This  change  would 
have  enabled  him  to  move  against  Richmond  or  the  Confed 
erate  army  without  having  his  communications  beyond  the 
Chickahominy  to  worry  about.  Or  he  could  have  operated  by 
way  of  Petersburg  south  of  the  James,  as  General  Grant  did 
two  years  later.  Petersburg,  the  back-gate  to  Richmond, 
could  have  been  seized  at  this  time  without  an  effort;  it  took 
Gra'nt  nearly  ten  months  to  capture  it.  If  this  change  had 
been  made  voluntarily  by  McClellan,  before  he  was  attacked 
by  Lee  at  Gaines's  Mill,  it  would  not  have  had  the  appearance 
of  a  retreat  before  a  victorious  army ;  as  it  happened,  it  actually 
had  that  appearance.  The  people  South  and  North,  the  Union 
army  and  the  Confederate  army,  believed  that  McClellan  was 
beaten  and  driven  back  to  Harrison's  Landing.  Such  was  not 
the  case  at  all.  McClellan  had  already  considered  the  change, 
and  had  made  some  arrangements  for  it ;  as  soon  as  he  lost  his 
communications  with  White  House  he  began  the  movement. 
He  was  not  driven;  he  was  pursued — the  shade  of  difference 
in  the  meaning  of  the  terms  is  certainly  very  thin. 

Considering  the  immense  train,  the  difficulties  of  the  road, 
and  the  aggressiveness  of  the  enemy,  the  change  of  base  was 
masterly  made.  From  the  time  when  the  army  quit  the  Chicka 
hominy  until  it  reached  Harrison's  Landing  the  critic  will  have 
a  hard  task  to  pick  a  flaw  in  either  the  strategy  or  the  tactics  of 
its  operations.  It  took  every  advantage  of  streams,  woods, 
and  ground,  and  carried  off  its  trains  intact ;  and  it  inflicted  a 
heavier  loss  in  men  than  it  suffered.  After  it  had  reached 
Harrison's  Landing  it  was  in  a  better  position  to  operate 
against  Richmond  than  it  had  ever  been  before.  Materially 
Lee  had  gained  nothing ;  he  had  failed  to  cut  off  or  destroy  a 
single  Federal  regiment ;  but  he  had  won  vast  prestige  for  him 
self  and  his  army. 

In  all  the  operations  in  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond  the 
plans  of  Johnston  and  Lee  were  bold  and  excellent.  With  a 
smaller  army  than  their  opponent's  they  did  not  hesitate  to 
take  the  offensive;  and  their  plans  would  have  succeeded  but 
for  the  inefficiency  of  their  lieutenants.  To  be  sure,  Johnston 
Icfst  a  victory  at  Fair  Oaks,  partly  by  issuing  a  verbal  instead 
of  a  written  order,  but  mainly  by  Longstreet's  mistakes  and 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  215 

tardiness.  At  Beaver  Dam  Creek  A.  P.  Hill  suffered  heavy 
and  needless  loss  by  attacking  before  Jackson's  arrival.  And 
this  premature  attack  was,  in  point  of  time,  the  second  of 
the  chief  causes  of  Lee's  failure  to  destroy  McClellan's  army. 
If  Hill  had  awaited  Jackson's  initiative,  as  Lee's  order  directed, 
and  in  spite  of  Jackson's  unaccountable  delay,  Porter  would 
not  have  withdrawn  his  troops  from  Beaver  Dam  Creek  to  the 
strong  position  at  Gaines's  Mill  by  daybreak  of  the  27th  June; 
and  Lee's  project  of  turning  the  Union  right  with  Jackson's 
corps  on  the  26th  would  have  been  effected  on  the  27th. 

The  first  chief  cause  of  Lee's  failure  to  destroy  McClellan's 
army  was  Jackson's  tardiness  on  the  26th  of  June.  Whatever 
excuses  may  be  made  for  Jackson  the  fact  stands  that  he  failed 
to  reach  the  ground  on  that  day  that  he  had  agreed  to  reach; 
that  Lee  counted  upon  his  reaching.  He  failed  to  turn  the 
Union  line  behind  Beaver  Dam  Creek  and  take  it  in  reverse. 
He  halted  and  bivouacked  at  5  p.  m.  when,  according  to  his 
own  report,  he  was  within  hearing  of  the  desperate  battle 
A.  P.  Hill  fought  till  dark.*  Jackson  bivouacked  only  three 
miles  from  that  battle.  At  Gaines's  Mill  Jackson  was  late,  and 
he  withdrew  D.  H.  Hill's  division  from  the  battle  at  the  critical 
moment ;  at  Savage's  Station  Jackson  did  not  arrive  at  all ;  and 
at  White  Oaks  Swamp  Creek,  during  the  battle  of  Glendale,  he 
made  no  apparent  effort  to  force  a  passage  and  get  into  the 
action.  At  Malvern  Hill  "he  took  no  initiative,"  and  gave 
scant  aid  to  the  unfortunate  assault.  "Malvern  Hill  should 
not  have  been  attacked;  only  the  enemy  observed  and  held  by 
Longstreet,  while  Jackson  got  a  position  which  they  would  be 
forced  to  assault"  in  order  to  reach  Harrison's  Landing.* 

On  the  whole  the  Peninsular  Campaign  was,  on  the  part  of 
the  Confederates,  a  campaign  of  good  plans  and  bad  execution. 
The  chief  blame  rests  upon  Stonewall  Jackson.  In  all  these 
operations  the  "Jackson  of  the  Chickahominy,"  as  General 
Alexander  aptly  puts  the  terms,  was  a  different  man  from  the 
"Jackson  of  the  Valley."  Of  all  those  that  marvel  at  Jackson's 
brilliant  work  before  and  after  the  Seven  Days'  Campaign 
there  is  none  to  offer  a  reasonable  excuse  for  his  utter  failure 
in  this  campaign.  On  the  part  of  the  Federals  it  was  a  campaign 
of  neglected  opportunities.  Perhaps  McClellan's  best  oppor 
tunity  fell  to  him  on  the  day  of  Gaines's  Mill.  All  that  day  Ma- 
gruder  with  only  25,000  men  kept  up  a  "clatter"  in  front  of 
Richmond;  while  McClellan  had  60,000  south  of  the  Chicka- 

*Alexander. 


216  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

hominy,  but  made  no  effort  to  take  the  city.    He  and  his  com 
manders  were  completely  fooled  by  Magruder. 

In  this  campaign  the  great  benefit  of  systematic  training 
was  again  made  manifest.  At  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run  two 
mobs  confronted -each  other;  the  regular  artillery  and  Sykes's 
battalion  of  regular  infantry  and  Palmer's  squadron  of  regu 
lar  cavalry  were  the  only  troops  in  the  battle  that  acted  like  sol 
diers.  In,  the  Peninsular  Campaign,  on  the  contrary,  the  rank 
and  file  of  both  armies  fought  and  marched  like  veterans,  and 
the  best  of  veterans.  A  year  of  service  and  training  had  made 
the  difference. 


LECTURE  XI, 
JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN. 

(107)  The  region  known  as  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  or  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  played  an  important  part  in  the  Civil  War 
from  the  beginning  almost  to  the  end.  Indeed  Lee's  little  army 
was  hastening  toward  that  region  in  its  very  last  march,  and, 
if  it  had  not  been  headed  off  by  Sheridan's  cavalry  at  Appo- 
mattox,  the  last  hostile  action  on  Virginia  soil,  like  the  first,* 
might  have  taken  place  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

As  already  noted,  the  situation  of  Richmond  and  Washing 
ton  foreordered  that  Virginia,  rather  than  Kentucky  or  other 
border  State,  should  become  the  principal  theater  of  opera 
tions,  and  the  mountain  region  of  the  Shenandoah  formed  a 
strong  natural  barrier  covering  its  left  flank.  All  things  com 
bined  to  make  the  Valley  the  best  line  of  communications  with 
Virginia  and  the  base  at  Richmond,  for  a  Confederate  army 
invading  the  North  in  this  theater  of  the  war ;  twice  it  was  used 
for  this  purpose  by  Lee.  Thus,  the  general  direction  of  this 
Valley  was  northeast,  and  the  Potomac,  more  easily  forded 
here  than  farther  east,  crossed  it  within  fifty  miles  of  Wash 
ington.  On  its  eastern  or  exposed  flank  it  was  covered  by  the 
Blue  Ridge  Mountains  south  of  the  Potomac,  and  South 
Mountain  north  of  this  river.  These  mountains  could  be 
crossed  only  at  certain  passes,  or  gaps,  through  most  of  which 
there  were  good  roads.  The  Valley  was  connected  with  Rich 
mond,  the  Confederate  base,  by  two  systems  of  railway,  one 
leading  out  of  it  by  way  of  Strasburg  and  Manassas  Gap,  the 
other  by  way  of  Staunton  and  Rockfish  Gap.  (We  saw  the 
strategical  use  that  was  made  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railway 
in  the  Bull  Run  Campaign.)  A  good  system  of  roads  con 
nected  all  the  towns  and  villages  in  the  region.  The  main 
thoroughfare  was  the  Valley  Turnpike,  stretching  from  Staun 
ton  near  the  head  of  the  Valley,  to  Martinsburg  at  its  lower 
end,  a  distance  of  120  miles;  and  passing  through  Harrison- 
burg,  New  Market,  Woodstock,  Strasburg,  and  Winchester. 
The  main  Valleys  of  the  Shenandoah,  averaging  about  twenty 


*"The  first"  has  reference  to  the  capture  of   the  U.   S.  arsenal  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  April  18,  1861. 

217 


218  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

miles  in  width,  is  closed  on  its  western  side  by  the  Alleghenies, 
a  more  difficult  chain  of  mountains  than  the  Blue  Ridge. 

The  Shenandoah  River,  which  drains  the  Valley  into  the 
Potomac,  is  formed  by  -its  North  and  South  Forks,  which  flow 
parallel  to  each  other  for  forty  or  fifty  miles.  In  their  parallel 
course  the  two  branches  are  only  about  eight  miles  apart,  but 
they  are  separated  by  an  isolated  ridge,  called  Massanutten 
Mountain,  as  high  as  the  Blue  Ridge.  At  Strasburg  this  ridge 
drops  suddenly  to  the  level  of  the  Valley,  and  the  North  Fork 
of  the  Shenandoah  sweeps  round  its  base  and  joins  the  South 
Fork  at  Front  Royal.  The  Shenandoah  thus  formed  flows 
along  the  very  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  the  Potomac,  into 
which  it  discharges  its  waters  at  Harper's  Ferry.  The  Valley 
between  the  western  foot  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the  South 
Fork,  at  the  foot  of  Massanutten  Mountain,  is  known  as  Luray 
or  Page  Valley.  The  mountains  were  all  covered  with  forests, 
and  the  valleys  were  well  watered  and  very  fertile;  indeed  the 
region  was  often  spoken  of  as  the  "granary  of  Virginia" ;  and 
from  the  fields  and  herds  of  its  well-to-do  farmers  it  furnished 
a  large  part  of  the  subsistence  of  the  Confederate  army.  In 
the  northern  section  were  some  families  of  Union  sentiment, 
but  a  large  majority  of  the  inhabitants  were  intensely  Southern 
in  their  feelings. 

While  the  great  valley  between  the  Alleghenies  and  the  Blue 
Ridge  was  peculiarly  well  suited  to  be  the  route  of  invasion 
from  Virginia  into  the  North,  the  reverse  was  not  the  case. 
As  was  pointed  out  in  the  lecture  on  Bull  Run,  the  mountain 
ranges  and  valleys  led  to  the  southwest,  away  from,  rather 
than  toward,  Richmond ;  and  an  invasion  by  that  line  would 
have  involved  a  very  long  line  of  communication  through  a 
very  hostile  country.  So  the  Valley  was  never  used  by  the 
Federals  as  a  main  route  of  invasion.  From  the  start,  how 
ever,  it  was  occupied  and  guarded  by  Federal  troops  for  the 
double  purpose  of  preventing  incursions  by  way  of  it  into 
Northern  territory,  and  to  protect  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
way,  and  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  both  of  which 
crossed  the  Valley  and  were  main  highways  of  traffic  between 
the  East  and  the  West.  The  destruction  of  this  railway  and 
canal  was  among  the  first  operations  of  the  Confederates  in  the 
Valley.  As  early  as  April,  1861,  Stonewall  Jackson,  who  then 
held  Harper's  Ferry  with  a  small  force  of  Virginia  militia,  had 
seized  a  large  number  of  the  railway's  cars,  and,  after  running 
them  back  by  steam  to  Winchester,  had  hauled  them  by  horses 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  219 

from  there  to  Strasburg.  In  June  of  this  year  Joseph  E.  John 
ston,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
had  the  railway  bridge  and  machine  shops  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  the  shops  and  rolling-stock  at  Martinsburg  destroyed,  at 
the  time  of  his  withdrawal  to  Winchester.* 

Soon  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  Jackson  was  promoted  to 
major-general,  and  about  the  first  of  November  he  took  com 
mand  of  the  Valley  District  with  headquarters  at  Winchester. 
His  command  at  first  consisted  of  only  a  weak  body  of  militia ; 
but  he  was  soon  reinforced  with  his  own  old  brigade  ["Stone 
wall  Brigade"],  and,  about  Christmas,  with  6,000  poorly  dis 
ciplined  troops  under  Loring.  These  reinforcements,  with 
Ashby's  cavalry,  raised  the  strength  of  his  command  to  about 
10,000.  It  constituted  the  left  wing  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia;  the  right  wing  was  commanded  by  Holmes  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  while  the  center  was  under  the  immediate  command 
of  Joseph  E.  Johnston  at  Centreville.  Jackson  was  connected 
with  the  main  army  at  Centreville  by  a  detachment  under 
D.  H.  Hill  at  Leesburg. 

Johnston's  orders  tb  Jackson  directed  him  to  watch  the 
enemy,  and  keep  his  communications  with  Manassas  open,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  join  the  main  army  promptly,  in  case  McClellan 
advanced.  Ashby's  cavalry  patrolled  the  frontier,  and  kept 
itself  busy  breaking  up  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal  and 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway. 

General  Banks  commanded  the  Union  troops  in  this  region. 
The  headquarters  of  his  corps, f  which  was  18,000  strong,  were 
at  Frederick  City;  but  his  charge  extended  seventy-five  miles 
farther  west,  to  Cumberland.  General  Kelly  garrisoned  Rom- 
ney  with  5,000  Federals.  This  town  was  thirty-five  miles  north 
west  of  Winchester  by  a  good  road.  The  garrison  at  Romney 
in  its  isolation  was  too  much  of  a  temptation  for  Jackson  to 
resist.  So  he  marched  his  little  army  out  in  the  snows  of  Jan 
uary  with  the  hope  of  surprising  and  capturing  that  body  as 
well  as  a  Federal  detachment  at  the  village  of  Bath.  Both  Fed 
eral  detachments  escaped ;  but  Jackson  captured  a  considerable 
quantity  of  stores,  damaged  the  railway  and  canal  near  Bath, 
and  took  possession  of  Romney,  severing  connection  between 
Banks's  command  and  General  Rosecrans's  scattered  troops  in 
West  Virginia. 

^Henderson. 

j"At  this  time  Banks's  command  constituted  the  Fifth  Corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 


220  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Jackson  had  hoped  that  his  taking  the  offensive  would  induce 
McClellan  to  believe  that  he  had  a  large  detachment  from  John 
ston's  army,  and  would  tempt  the  Union  commander  to  move 
out  to  attack  Johnston;  in  which  case  Jackson  expected  to 
hasten  with  his  command  by  way  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railway 
and  repeat  the  strategy  of  Bull  Run.  But  we  know  that  Mc 
Clellan  was  not  tempted.  In  fact,  Jackson's  operation,  attended 
by  great  hardships,  amounted  to  nothing  in  the  end.  He  left 
Loring  with  his  troops  to  garrison  Romney ;  but  this  officer  and 
his  ill-disciplined  command  were  so  dissatisfied  with  their  quar 
ters  that  Loring  appealed  directly  to  the  Confederate  Secretary 
of  War  and  got  his  command  ordered  back  to  Winchester. 
Jackson  was  so  outraged  by  this  action  of  the  -Secretary  of 
War  that  he  indignantly  sent  in  his  resignation.  Through  the 
offices  of  General  Johnston  and  the  governor  of  Virginia,  how 
ever,  he  was  prevailed  upon  to  retain  his  command.  He  had 
taught  the  Confederate  war  department  a  lesson  in  military 
ethics  and  usage  that  it  did  not  soon  forget.  After  the  with 
drawal  of  Loring  from  Romney  that  place  was  reoccupied 
by  the  Federals.  Loring  and  his  trooj^  were  detached  from 
Jackson,  and  for  a  month  the  Confederates  at  Winchester  en 
joyed  a  rest. 

By  the  end  of  February  Banks  had  crossed  the  Potomac  by 
a  pontoon-bridge  at  Harper's  Ferry.  With  about  23,000  men,* 
including  3,000  cavalry,  and  accompanied  by  eighty  pieces  of 
artillery,  he  threatened  Winchester.  There  Jackson  had  3,600 
infantry,  twenty-seven  guns,  and  Ashby's  600  horsemen.  On 
the  7th  of  March  D.  H.  Hill,  by  Johnston's  orders,  fell  back 
from  Leesburg;  two  days  later  Johnston  withdrew  from  Cen- 
treville  toward  the  Rappahannock.  Jackson  was  thus  left  iso 
lated  in  his  advanced  position  at  Winchester. 

We  have  seen  that  McClellan  upon  Johnston's  withdrawal 
advanced  his  army  to  Centreville ;  he  ordered  Banks  to  advance 
at  the  same  time.  Banks's  leading  division  occupied  Winchester 
on  the  12th  of  March,  Jackson  having  withdrawn  the  evening 
before.  Jackson  fell  back  to  Strasburg,  eighteen  miles  farther 
south.  On  the  17th  [March]  Banks  started  Shields  with 
11,000  men  in  pursuit.  Leaving  Ashby  with  his  cavalry  to 
cover  his  rear  and  hold  the  enemy  back,  Jackson  retreated  to 
Mount  Jackson,  a  strong  position  twenty-five  miles  farther 
south.  Shields  pursued  as  far  as  Woodstock  with  his  main 
force,  sending  his  cavalry  on  after  Ashby  toward  Mount  Jack- 

*Ropes. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  221 

son.  The  cavalry  returned  the  next  day  [March  19],  reporting 
that  Jackson  had  fled  from  the  Valley,  leaving  only  a  small 
force  under  Ashby  for  observation.  With  this  information 
Shields  marched  back  to  Winchester. 

In  accordance  with  his  orders  Banks,  having  rid  the  Valley 
of  Jackson,  as  he  supposed,  left  Shields  with  his  division  at 
Winchester  to  guard  the  Valley,  and  marched  the  rest  of  his 
troops  to  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge  in  order  to  cooperate 
with  McClellan's  movement  to  the  Peninsula.*  This  was  pre 
cisely  what  Jackson  was  to  prevent.  His  instructions  from 
Johnston  were  "to  endeavor  to  employ  the  invaders  in  the  Val 
ley  without  exposing  himself  to  the  danger  of  defeat,  by  keep 
ing  so  near  the  enemy  as  to  prevent  his  making  any  consider 
able  detachment  to  reinforce  McClellan,  but  not  so  near  that  he 
might  be  compelled  to  fight,  "f 

On  the  evening  of  the  21st  [March]  Ashby  reported  to  Jack 
son  that  the  enemy  was  withdrawing  to  the  east.  Other  infor 
mation  confirmed  the  report.  On  the  22nd  Ashby  struck 
Shields's  outposts  about  a  mile  south  of  Winchester  and  had  a 
skirmish  with  them.  Ashby  learned  by  the  action  that  besides 
cavalry  there  were  infantry  and  a  battery  of  the  enemy  present ; 
but  he  was  wholly  wrong  in  his  estimate  of  the  force.  He  re 
ported  only  four  regiments  of  infantry,  besides  the  artillery  and 
cavalry;  the  rest  of  Shields's  division  was,  however,  concealed 
close  in  rear,  9,000  strong  all  told. 

On  receiving  Ashby's  report  Jackson  hurried  forward  from 
his  camp  at  Woodstock,  and  after  a  march  of  thirty-six  miles 
reached  Kernstown,  the  position  of  the  Federal  outposts,  at  1 
p.  m.  on  the  second  day,  the  23rd.  (108)  Ashby  still  con 
fronted  the  enemy;  but  Kimball's  Federal  brigade,  supported 
by  Sullivan's,  was  forcing  him  back.  The  Federal  line,  facing 
south,  occupied  a  position  on  a  rise  of  ground  behind  a  brook. 
Its  right  rested  on  the  Valley  Road.  Three  quarters  of  a  mile 
to  the  right  and  rear  was  a  piece  of  high  ground  covered  with 
timber.  (109)  Leaving  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  assist  Ashby 
in  holding  the  line  in  front,  Jackson  moved  his  other  three  bri 
gades  under  cover  to  this  ground.  But  here  he  was  met  by 
Tyler's  Federal  brigade.  With  attacks  and  counter-attacks  the 
action  in  this  part  of  the  field  raged  severely  but  indecisively 
for  an  hour.  Then  Kimball,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Union  forces,  Shields  having  been  wounded  in  the  forenoon, 

^Henderson.    B.  &  L. — Imboden.     Kimball. 
fjohnston's  Narrative. 


222  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

moved  his  own  brigade  to  Tyler's  support.  Jackson  was 
finally  defeated  and  toward  dark  driven  from  the  field. 

(107)  The  Federal  pursuit  was  checked,  and  Jackson's 
weary  infantry  bivouacked  within  three  miles  of  the  battle-field. 
Ashby's  cavalry  stopped  within  a  mile  of  it.  Jackson  con 
tinued  his  retreat  in  good  order  to  Mount  Jackson.  His  tac 
tical  failure  was  a  strategical  success,  but  it  is  not  probable  that 
he5  as  he  marched  his  tired  and  beaten  soldiers  back  from 
Kernstown,  appreciated  the  far-reaching  effect  of  his  strategy. 

Shields  could  not  believe  that  Jackson  would  have  dared  to 
attack  him  unless  Jackson  had  been  expecting  reinforcements. 
So  Shields  sent  post-haste  to  Banks  for  assistance.  Banks  re 
turned  with  his  other  division,  and  with  his  whole  corps  fol 
lowed  as  far  as  Strasburg,  where  he  halted  to  wait  for  supplies. 
Thus,  as  Johnston  had  directed,  Jackson  had  kept  Banks  from 
going  to  cooperate  with  McClellan.  But  that  was  the  least  of 
the  consequences  of  Jackson's  operation.  It  drew  the  atten 
tion  of  the  authorities  at  Washington  again  to  the  line  of  the 
upper  Potomac,  and  to  the  defense  of  Washington.  It  de 
cided  the  President  to  withdraw  Blenker's  division  from  Mc 
Clellan  and  dispatch  it  by  way  of  Strasburg,  where  it  could 
be  stopped  by  Banks  if  needed,  to  Fremont,  who  was  now  in 
command  of  the  Union  forces  in  West  Virginia ;  and  it  also 
decided  the  President  to  withhold  the  First  Corps  [McDowell], 
nearly  40,000  men,  from  McClellan.  We  saw  in  the  lecture  on 
the  Peninsular  Campaign  how  all  of  this  upset  McClellan's 
plans. 

But  that  was  not  all.  At  the  same  time  the  President  broke 
up  the  Department  of  the  Potomac,  McClellan's  territorial 
command,  leaving  McClellan  in  charge  of  the  operations  in  the 
"paltry  triangle,"  only,  south  of  the  Rappahannock  River.  Mc 
Dowell  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Department  of  the 
Rappahannock,  and  charged  with  the  defense  of  Washington. 
Banks  was  to  command  the  Department  of  the  Shenandoah 
and  Fremont  the  Mountain  Department,  which  included  West 
Virginia  and  part  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  These  com 
manders  were  all  independent  one  of  another,  and  reported  di 
rectly  to  Washington.  In  the  words  of  General  McClellan, 
"instead  of  one  directing  head  controlling  operations  which 
should  have  been  inseparable,  the  region  from  the  Alleghenies 
to  the  sea  was  parceled  out  among  four  independent  com 
manders."*  In  this  remark,  however,  General  McClellan  was 


*B.  &  L.— McClellan. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  223 

in  error :  there  was  to  be  only  one  head,  but  that  head  was  Mr. 
Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  whose  contempt  for  all  sound 
principles  and  usages  of  war  appears  to  have  been  exceeded 
only  by  his  ignorance  of  them. 

Though  urged  by  telegrams  from  McClellan  at  Washington 
to  "push  Jackson  hard"  Banks  stayed  at  Strasburg  until  April  1. 
His  outposts,  meantime  were  at  Tom's  Brook,  five  miles 
south  of  Strasburg;  but  never  a  cavalryman  crossed  the  brook 
to  gain  information  of  Jackson.  Ashby's  horsemen,  backed  by 
a  brigade  of  Confederate  infantry  at  Woodstock,  patrolled  the 
south  bank  of  Tom's  Brook.  Although  Banks  believed  that 
Jackson  had  15,000  men,  and  the  Union  cavalry  was  so  poor  as 
to  furnish  him  practically  no  information  of  the  enemy,  it  was 
not  these  facts  alone  that  made  him  hesitate  to  follow  Jackson 
farther  south.  He  was  aware  that  Johnston  had  already  fallen 
back  from  Centreville,  and  he  had  information  that  Johnston's 
left  was  at  Gordonsville,  three  or  four  days'  march  from  Mount 
Jackson.  He  also  knew  that  McClellan  was  not  pushing  John 
ston,  but  was  embarking  his  army  at  Alexandria  for  Fort  Mon 
roe.  On  the  26th  of  March  he  wired  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  Longstreet  and  Jackson  were  going  to  join  forces  at  New 
Market.  Within  the  next  few  days  he  learned  that  Jackson 
had  received  no  reinforcements;  yet  it  was  not  until  the  2nd 
of  April  that  he  crossed  Tom's  Brook  and  started  southward. 
He  advanced  no  farther  than  Woodstock,  where  he  went  into 
camp. 

The  real  cause  of  Banks's  halt  now  was  Massanutten  Moun 
tain.  This  ridge  was  impassable  (save  by  a  few  hunters' 
trails)  except  by  the  New  Market-Luray  road.  Banks  was 
afraid  that,  if  he  got  too  far  from  Strasburg,  Jackson,  or  Ash 
by's  cavalry,  covered  by  this  barrier,  would  slip  down  through 
the  Luray  Valley  and  intercept  his  communications  at  Stras 
burg  or  Front  Royal.  It  did  not  occur  to  him  boldly  to  ad 
vance  against  Jackson's  little  force,  and  himself  get  possession 
of  the  crossroads  at  New  Market,  and  the  Luray  Valley  road, 
also.  After  counting  out  the  troops  guarding  his  communica 
tions,  he  had  now  some  15,000;  Jackson,  although  he  had  re 
ceived  some  recruits,  had  no  more  than  6,000. 

Finally,  on  the  17th  of  April,  Banks  struck  camp  at  Wood 
stock  and  started  south.  Meantime  McClellan  had  begun  his 
campaign  on  the  Peninsula,  and  Johnston  had  marched  thither 
to  oppose  him,  leaving  Ewell  with  8,000  men  on  the  upper 
Rappahannock  to  cooperate  with  Jackson.  For  fear  that 
Banks  should  cross  the  Massanutten  Mountain  and  get  between 


224  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

him  and  Ewell,  Jackson  made  a  forced  march  by  way  of  Har- 
risonburg  and  Conrad's  Store,*  and  secured  a  strong  position 
near  Swift  Run  Gap.  Banks  advanced  very  cautiously,  and  by 
the  26th  [April]  had  his  main  force  at  New  Market,  with  a 
strong  garrison  at  Harrisonburg. 

At  Swift  Run  Gap  Jackson  was  in  communication  with 
Ewell,  who  was  at  Gordonsville,  and  with  Richmond.  So  long 
as  he  could  hold  the  bridge  at  Conrad's  Store,  which  he  had 
guarded  by  a  strong  detachment,  his  flank  position  at  this  gap 
also  kept  Banks  from  advancing  on  Staunton. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on  General  Fremont  had 
worked  out  an  extensive  but  visionary  plan  of  operations  for 
the  troops  in  his  department.  His  project  was  to  collect  his 
detachments,  scattered  through  the  mountains  of  West  Vir 
ginia,  and  march  them  by  way  of  McDowell  to  capture  Staun 
ton;  then  to  carry  out  the  President's  devoutly  cherished  wish 
of  relieving  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  East  Tennessee,  by  march 
ing  to  Knoxville.f  In  pursuance  of  this  plan  General  Milroy 
had  advanced  with  a  small  force  from  Monterey  to  McDowell, 
and  other  detachments  occupied  Franklin  and  Moorefield. 
Guarding  the  passes  of  the  Alleghenies,  General  Edward  John 
son  had  two  Confederate  brigades  in  the  Shenandoah  Moun 
tains,  about  3,000  men.  Finding  himself  threatened  in  rear  by 
Banks's  advance  to  New  Market  and  Harrisonburg;  on  his 
right  flank  by  Fremont  at  Moorefield ;  and  in  front  by  the  de 
tachments  at  McDowell  and  Franklin,  Johnson  fell  back  to 
West  View,  seven  miles  west  of  Staunton. 

In  the  lecture  on  the  Peninsular  Campaign  we  saw  that,  after 
Jackson's  retreat  up  the  Valley,  Shields  was  ordered  to  take  his 
division  from  the  Valley  and  join  McDowell  with  it  at  Freder- 
icksburg;  that  McDowell  was  only  awaiting  the  arrival  of  this 
division,  when  he  should  move  the  combined  force  to  unite  with 
McClellan  in  front  of  Richmond ;  and  that  General  Lee,  Mr. 
Davis's  miltary  adviser  at  the  time,  had  corresponded  with 
Jackson  with  a  view  to  arranging  a  plan  to  divert  McDowell 
toward  the  Valley.  Accordingly  Ewell  was  ordered  to  report 
to  Jackson  with  his  division,  and  Jackson  was  also  authorized 
to  use  Edward  Johnson's  command.  The  details  of  the  enter 
prise  were  left  for  Jackson  to  work  out.  The  troops  at  his 
disposal  now  numbered  17,000  or  18,000. 

Jackson  decided  first  to  strike  Milroy's  detachment,  the  most 


*Conrad's  Store  was  on  the  South  Fork  nearly  east  of  Harrisonburg. 
It  was  connected  with  Harrisonburg  by  a  road. 
f£.  6-  L.— Cox 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  225 

exposed  part  of  Fremont's  command,  thus  widening  the  dis 
tance  between  Fremont  and  Banks;  and  then  to  turn  against 
Banks.  To  march  by  way  of  Conrad's  Store  and  the  valley 
roads  to  Staunton  and  McDowell  would  expose  his  flank  to' 
Banks,  and,  also,  divulge  the  direction  and  object  of  his  move 
ment.  So  Jackson  chose  a  different  route.  To  mask  his 
movement  Ashby,  on  the  29th  and  30th  of  April,  drove  back  the 
Federal  cavalry,  and  made  feints  toward  Harrisonburg.  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th  Jackson,  leaving  Ewell's  division  at 
Swift  Run  Gap  to  fall  upon  Banks's  rear,  in  case  Banks  should 
move  toward  Staunton,  set  out  with  his  own  troops  by  the 
muddy  valley  road  to  Port  Republic,  From  there  he  marched 
over  the  mountains  to  Medium's  River  Station,  five  or  six  miles 
west  of  Charlottesville,  leaving  friend  and  foe  to  suppose  that 
he  was  going  to  take  the  cars  and  unite  with  Joseph  E.  John 
ston  ;  whether  to  oppose  McClellan,  to  attack  McDowell  at 
Fredericksburg,  or  to  move  against  Washington,  no  one 
could  tell. 

At  Medium's  he  did  take  the  cars,  trains  of  which  were 
standing  ready  for  him;  but,  instead  of  going  east,  the  trains 
went  west  to  Staunton.  From  there  Jackson  marched  on  west, 
picking  up  Edward  Johnson's  division  on  the  way.  Late  in 
the  afternoon  of  May  7  Johnson's  division,  which  was  in  the 
lead,  came  upon  the  Union  outposts  and  drove  them  into  Mc 
Dowell.  Milroy  had  already  learned  of  the  enemy's  approach, 
and  had  asked  for  assistance.  This  brought  Schenck  with  his 
brigade  from  Franklin.  The  brigade  made  the  march  of  thirty- 
four  miles  in  twenty-three  hours. 

(110)  In  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  Johnson's  divison,  still 
in  the  lead,  reached  the  top  of  Sitlington's  Hill  in  the  Bull 
Pasture  Mountains,  from  which  the  Union  camp  at  McDowell 
could  be  seen.  The  camp  was  in  a  hard  place  to  attack;  the 
only  approach  for  Jackson  was  by  the  turnpike  that,  passing 
through  the  mountain  defile,  crossed  the  Bull  Pasture  River  by 
a  bridge  at  its  outlet.  Jackson  -halted  his  command  and  sent 
out  parties  to  look  for  a  trail  by  which  to  cross  the  stream  and 
turn  the  Union  position.  But  Schenck,  who  was  the  senior 
officer  at  McDowell,  did  not  wait  to  be  attacked.  He  crossed 
his  little  command,  2,500  strong,  climbed  the  rocky  mountain 
side,  and  attacked  the  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy.  (Ill) 
The  Federals  were  repulsed ;  but  it  was  not  till  nine  o'clock  at 
night  that  they  gave  up  the  fight  and  withdrew.  The  Con 
federates  made  no  counter-attack,  and  were  content  to  bivouac 
on  the  ground.  (112)  The  next  day  they  took  up  the  pur- 


226  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

suit;  but  the  enemy  had  set  the  woods  on  fire,  and  the  flames 
and  blinding  smoke  made  pursuit  very  difficult.  By  the 
12th  Jackson  had  driven  the  enemy  to  Franklin.  He  then 
turned  back  toward  the  Valley,  and  took  the  road  to  Harri- 
sonburg,  leaving  Ashby  in  front  of  Fremont  to  screen  the 
movement. 

On  the  17th  [May]  Jackson  halted  at  Mount  Solon,  twelve 
miles  southwest  of  Harrisonburg.  Banks  had  fallen  back  to 
Strasburg  and  was  now  completely  cut  off  from  Fremont,*  who 
could  join  him  only  by  long  roundabout  trails.  On  the  20th 
[May]  Jackson  was  at  New  Market,  having  been  joined  on  the 
way  by  one  of  Ewell's  brigades.  Ewell  with  the  rest  of  his 
division  was  at  Luray.  Ashby's  scouts  were  as  far  forward  as 
Woodstock,  and  everything  indicated  that  Jackson  was  moving 
on  Strasburg  by  the  Valley  Pike.  Shields's  division  had  been 
detached  from  Banks  and  sent  to  General  McDowell ;  so  Banks 
now  had  only  8,000  men.  He  had  placed  1,000  of  these  under 
Colonel  Kenly  at  Front  Royal,  twelve  miles  east  of  Strasburg, 
to  guard  the  Manassas  Gap  Railway,  and  was  himself  in 
trenched  with  the  rest  at  Strasburg.  There  he  expected  to  be 
attacked  by  Jackson,  but  he  entertained  no  serious  fear. 

(107)  Back  in  Washington,  at  this  time,  where  Mr.  Stanton 
was  personally  directing  the  operations  between  the  Alleghe- 
nies  and  the  Atlantic,  everything  appeared  to  be  working  out 
right.  Jackson's  victory  at  McDowell  was  considered  a  minor 
affair,  and  all  fear  of  his  crossing  the  Potomac  and  moving  on 
Washington  was  at  rest.  General  McDowell  was  under  orders 
to  start  from  Fredericksburg  for  the  Peninsula  on  the  26th  of 
May,  and  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  were  going 
to  review  his  army  before  its  departure.* 

(112)  On  the  21st  [May]  Jackson  started  northward  with 
his  little  army  at  New  Market,  and  every  man  supposed  that 
Strasburg  was  to  be  the  first  objective.  But  suddenly  the  head 
of  the  column  was  turned  to  the  right  and  took  the  road  across 
the  Massanutten  to  Luray.  In  the  camp  here  the  men  were 
in  the  same  quandary — "Was  'Old  Jack'  going  to  march  across 
Blue  Ridge  to  Warrenton  or  Culpeper ;  or  was  he  going  down 
Luray  Valley?"  they  asked  one  another. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22nd  he  took  the  road  down  the 
valley.  The  next  day  his  battalions  suddenly  burst  out  of  the 
forest  upon  Kenly's  detachment  at  Front  Royal.  Kenly's  little 
command  fought  like  heroes;  but  Jackson  had  planned  so  well 


*Henderson. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  227 

that  Ashby's  cavalry  had  the  roads  blocked  and  the  telegraph 
lines  cut  on  both  sides.  Kenly  had  no  road  left  open  but  the 
one  to  Winchester;  setting  fire  to  the  bridges  over  the  two 
forks  of  the  Shenandoah  he  retired  by  that  road.  Soon  he  was 
overtaken  and  charged  by  Colonel  Flournoy  and  250  Virginian 
horsemen.  Kenly  was  cut  down  with  a  saber,  and  his  com 
mand  dispersed  in  flight.  Flournoy  led  back  600  prisoners  and 
a  section  of  artillery  as  prize  of  battle.  In  addition  the  Fed 
erals  lost  thirty-two  killed  and  122  wounded.  The  Confed 
erates  had  eleven  killed  and  fifteen  wounded.* 

It  was  after  midnight  before  Banks  at  Strasburg  could  be 
made  to  believe  that  the  attack  at  Front  Royal  meant  anything 
more  than  a  raid.  He  thought  that  Jackson  with  the  bulk  of 
his  army  was  still  at  Harrisonburg.  When  urged  by  his  best 
officer,  General  Gordon,  to  retreat  before  he  should  be  cut  off, 
he  replied,  "By  God,  sir,  I  will  not  retreat !  We  have  more  to 
fear,  sir,  from  the  opinions  of  our  friends  than  the  bayonets  of 
our  enemies !"  None  the  less  the  next  morning,  the  24th  [May] 
he  put  his  command  in  motion  for  Winchester. 

Jackson  could  not  be  sure  whether  Banks  would  stay  at 
Strasburg,  retreat  to  Winchester,  or,  letting  Jackson  get  the 
bulk  of  his  troops  on  the  north  side  of  the  North  Fork,  would 
make  a  dash  for  Manassas  Gap  by  the  road  along  the  south 
bank.  To  find  out  he  sent  Ashby  toward  Strasburg,  and  other 
columns  on  all  the  roads  leading  toward  Winchester  and  the 
Valley  Turnpike.  One  of  the  columns  took  six  hours,  how 
ever,  to  march  seven  miles,  and  when  it  reached  Middletown 
Banks's  main  body  had  passed.  From  here  on  to  Winchester, 
which  was  reached  late  at  night,  Jackson's  own  division  kept 
up  a  fight  with  the  Federal  rear-guard.  But  Ashby's  cavalry 
wasted  valuable  time  in  looting  the  Union  train;  and  Gordon 
managed  the  rear-guard  so  skilfully  that  Banks  made  good  his 
retreat. 

The  next  morning,  May  25,  Banks  made  a  useless  stand  at 
Winchester,  "determined/*  he  said  in  his  report,  "to  test  the 
substance  and  strength  of  the  enemy  by  actual  collision."! 
Jackson  attacked  him  skilfully  with  Ewell's  division  on  the 
Front  Royal  road,  by  which  it  had  marched,  and  with  his  own 
division  by  the  Valley  Turnpike;  while  a  column  turned  the 
Union  right.  Thus  surrounded  by  overwhelming  numbers, 
Banks  gave  way  and  retreated  to  Martinsburg;  before  mid 
night  he  was  across  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport. 


^Henderson. 
#.  &  L. 


228  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Jackson's  infantry  pursued  for  five  or  six  miles;  then  it  had 
to  halt  through  sheer  fatigue.  Ashby's  cavalry  had  gone  off 
toward  Berry ville  to  head  off  the  retreat,  if  Banks  should  take 
the  road  by  way  of  Snicker's  Gap ;  the  commander  of  the  cav 
alry  attached  to  Ewell's  division,  a  young  pedant,  refused  to 
receive  an  order  direct  from  Jackson,  submitted  by  an  aide. 
He  said  his  orders  must  come  through  his  immediate  com 
mander,  General  Ewell.  So  Jackson  had  no  cavalry  to  turn 
Banks's  retreat  into  rout.  He  mounted  some  gunners  on  artil 
lery  horses;  but  they  made  a  poor  substitute  for  cavalry. 
"Never,"  states  Jackson  in  his  report,  "have  I  seen  an  oppor 
tunity  when  it  was  in  the  power  of  cavalry  to  reap  a  richer 
harvest  of  the  fruits  of  victory."* 

Already  the  orders  referred  to  in  our  Peninsular  lecture  had 
gone  from  Washington  to  General  McDowell,  directing  him  to 
suspend  his  movement  on  Richmond  and  send  20,000  men  to 
the  Shenandoah;  and  to  Fremont,  who  was  at  Franklin,  "to 
move  against  Jackson  at  Harrisonburg."  The  strategy  of 
Jackson's  operations  had  thus  wholly  succeeded.  But  this  was 
not  all.  Banks's  retreat  and  expulsion  from  the  Valley  re- 
-newed  the  fear  at  Washington  that  Jackson  would  cross  the 
Potomac  and  swoop  down  upon  that  city.  It  was  even  be 
lieved  at  Washington  that  the  enemy  was  making  a  general 
movement  northward.  The  President  issued  an  urgent  call 
for  more  troops,  and  Mr.  Stanton  wrote  the  governor  of  Mas 
sachusetts,  "There  is  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  in  great  force 
are  marching  on  Washington."*  Troops  were  hurried  to  Har 
per's  Ferry,  and  McClellan  was  warned  that  he  might  have  to 
take  his  army  back  to  Washington. 

Jackson  let  his  worn-out  troops  rest  for  two  days  near  Win 
chester,  then  moved  them  toward  the  Potomac  to  increase  the 
fear  at  the  North.  By  the  29th  the  bulk  of  his  command  was 
concentrated  at  Halltown,  within  three  miles  of  Har.per's 
Ferry. 

McClellan  and  McDowell  both  protested  against  the  transfer 
of  McDowell's  troops  to  the  Valley.  It  broke  up  McClellan's 
plan,  and  they  knew  that  Washington  was  in  no  danger,  and 
that  the  troops  could  hardly  reach  the  Valley  in  time  to  cut  off 
Jackson's  retreat.  They  also  knew  that  Fremont's  advance 
into  the  Valley  was  enough,  alone,  to  induce  Jackson  to  fall 
back.  But  Mr.  Stanton  was  directing  this  campaign;  it  was 
he  that  was  pitted  against  Lee  and  Jackson  in  the  game  of 

*Henderson. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  229 

strategy.  •  He  would  listen  to  no  advice  nor  protests  from  Mc 
Dowell  and  McClellan,  and  by  his  obstinacy  and  his  ignorance 
of  the  science  of  war  he  probably  set  back  the  fall  of  Rich 
mond  and  the  Confederacy  just  three  years. 

On  the  evening  of  May  the  29th  Jackson  learned  that  Fre 
mont's  army  was  on  its  way  from  Moorefield  to  Strasburg. 
The  next  day  he  heard  of  McDowell's  movement  toward  Front 
Royal.  This  same  day,  May  30,  he  moved  his  main  body  back 
toward  Winchester,  leaving  the  Stonewall  Brigade  to  hold  in 
check  the  troops  of  Banks  and  Saxton,  about  15,000  men. 
Arriving  at  Winchester  by  cars  ahead  of  his  army,  Jackson 
learned  that  Shields,  commanding  the  van  of  McDowell's  army, 
had  captured  Front  Royal.  Fremont  was  at  Wardensville, 
twenty-five  miles  west  of  the  Valley  Turnpike.  Winchester  is 
eighteen  miles  from  Strasburg;  but  the  head  of  Jackson's  col 
umn  was  seven  miles  farther  back  on  the  pike;  and  his  rear 
guard,  the  Stonewall  Brigade,  was  nigh  twenty  miles  north 
east  of  Winchester. 

Fremont  had  15,000  men,  Banks  and  Saxton  had  15,000,  and 
Shields  had  10,000;  and  10,000  more  were  a  few  miles  behind 
Shields,— altogether  50,000  troops.  Jackson  had  15,000  Con 
federates  with  2,000  prisoners  and  a  double  train  of  wagons 
seven  miles  long.  His  only  line  of  retreat  was  the  Valley 
Turnpike  through  Strasburg.  He  was  in  a  trap,  but  Shields 
and  Fremont  were  not  the  men  to  close  its  door  upon  him. 
These  two  generals  were  not  in  communication  with  each  other. 
The  Washington  authorities  kept  each  informed  as  well  as  pos 
sible  of  the  other's  movements.  Neither  knew  exactly  where 
the  other  was.  Both  had  learned  what  manner  of  man  Jackson 
was,  and  both  were  correspondingly  cautious.  Fremont  was 
checked  by  Ashby's  cavalry,  and  halted  at  Cedar  Creek,  six 
miles  west  of  Strasburg.  Shields  was  kept  back  by  the  demon 
stration  of  a  small  brigade  from  Strasburg. 

Jackson  made  all  haste.  The  evening  of  the  31st  of  May  his 
main  body  bivouacked  at  Strasburg ;  the  Stonewall  Brigade  had 
reached  Newtown,  after  a  march  of  thirty-five  miles.  The 
next  morning,  June  1,  Swell's  division  relieved  Ashby's  cav 
alry  at  Cedar  Creek,  and  kept  Fremont  back  until  the  trains 
and  the  Stonewall  Brigade  had  passed.-  By  noon  Jackson's 
whole  command  had  left  Strasburg  behind.  That  night  it 
bivouacked  at  Woodstock  guarded  by  Ashby's  cavalry,  which 
took  its  post  along  Tom's  Brook. 

The  forces  of  Fremont  and  McDowell  did  not  get  into  direct 


230  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

communication  with  each  other  until  the  2nd  of  June.  As  soon 
as  it  was  discovered  that  Jackson  had  passed  Strasburg  and  re 
treated  southward  both  columns  took  up  the  pursuit.  Mc 
Dowell  had  ordered  Shields  to  Luray  on  the  afternoon  of 
June  1,  and  that  night  Shields's  advance-guard  was  ten  miles 
south  of  Front  Royal.  Fremont,  preceded  by  Bayard's  cav 
alry  brigade,  took  the  Valley  Pike  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
Massanuttens,  and  hastened  to  Woodstock. 

Jackson  had  anticipated  these  movements,  and  had  sent  de 
tachments  to  destroy  the  three  bridges  on  the  South  Fork  to 
the  north  of  Port  Republic.  He  sent  another  detachment  to 
hold  the  bridge  at  Port  Republic  for  the  retreat  of  his  own 
army.  To  make  matters  worse  for  the  pursuit  heavy  rains 
had  made  the  road  in  the  Luray  Valley  well-nigh  impassable, 
and  had  raised  the  river  so  much  that  it  was  impossible  to 
construct  temporary  bridges  quickly  enough  to  be  of  use.  So 
Fremont  and  Shields  could  not  possibly  unite  their  forces  by 
any  route  except  the  Harrisonburg-Port  Republic  road.  At 
Luray  Shields  Tieard  the  sound  of  cannon  on  the  other  side 
of  the  mountain,  and  conjectured  that  Fremont  was  engaged; 
but  he  could  not  go  to  his  assistance. 

Over  on  that  side  of  the  Massanuttens  Bayard's  cavalry 
caught  up  with  Ashby's  between  Strasburg  and  Woodstock  on 
the  2nd  of  June,  and  sent  it  flying  up  the  Valley.  "Many  pris 
oners  were  taken,  and  the  pursuit  was  only  checked  by  a  party 
of  infantry  stragglers,  whom  Ashby  had  succeeded  in  rallying 
across  the  road."*  The  skirmishing  was  kept  up  all  the  next 
day.  On  the  4th  [June]  the  Confederates  crossed  the  North 
Fork  and  burnt  the  bridge.  The  difficulty  of  throwing  a  pon 
toon-bridge  across  the  swollen  river  stopped  the  pursuit  until 
the  morning  of  the  5th,  and  gave  Jackson  a  lead  of  twenty-four 
hours.  Contact  was  not  regained  until  the  6th.  In  a  desper 
ate  skirmish  on  this  day  Ashby  was  shot  through  the  heart. 
Then  fell  the  cavalry  leader  who  first  in  this  war,  or  in  any  war 
since  Napoleon's  time,  used  his  squadrons  right;  and  Stone 
wall  Jackson  taught  him  how.  The  death  of  no  other  man, 
save  Jackson  only,  could  have  caused  so  great  a  loss  to  the 
Army  of  the  Valley. 

"On  the  6th  and  7th  [June]  the  Confederate  infantry  rested 
on  the  banks  of  Mill  Creek  near  Cross  Keys.  The  cavalry  on 
either  flank  of  the  Massanuttens  watched  Fremont's  camps  at 
Harrisonburg  and  the  slow  advance  of  Shields ;"  and  from  one 

*Henderson. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  231 

of  the  mountain  peaks  a  signal  party  kept  an  eye  upon  the 
roads  converging  on  the  Confederate  position.*  On  the 
7th  there  was  not  so  much  as  a  skirmish.  Fremont's  pur 
suit  had  been  checked  the  day  before,  and  he  was  uncertain 
in  what  direction  Jackson's  main  body  had  retreated.  Shields, 
meanwhile,  had  the  main  body  of  his  troops  at  Columbia 
Bridge,  and  had  begun  building  a  new  bridge.  Late  in  the  day 
he  learned  from  one  of  his  patrols,  which  had  managed  to  com 
municate  with  Fremont,  that  Jackson  was  retreating,*  and  he 
set  out  at  once  for  Port  Republic.  His  only  fear  was  that  he 
might  not  reach  there  in  time  to  catch  Jackson's  troops.  His 
instructions  to  his  advance-guard  commander  show  his  elation 
and  anxiety:  "The  enemy  has  flung  away  everything,"  said 
he,  "and  their  stragglers  fill  the  mountain.  They  need  only  a 
movement  on  their  flank  to  panic-strike  them  and  break  them 
into  fragments.  No  man  has  had  such  a  chance  since  the  war 
commenced."* 

Owing  to  the  bad  condition  of  the  road  his  command  was 
already  split  into  several  distinct  fractions,  although  McDowell 
had  cautioned  him  to  keep  it  together  and  not  to  let  Jackson 
defeat  it  in  detail.  His  leading  brigade  was  south  of  Conrad's 
Store ;  a  second  was  some  miles  in  rear ;  and  two  had  been 
stopped  at  Luray,  in  consequence  of  a  report  that  Longstreet 
with  8,000  Confederates  was  crossing  the  Blue  Ridge  by 
Thornton's  Gap. 

The  night  of  June  7  the  hostile  forces  were  thus  situated : 
Shields's  command  was  stretched  out  over  twenty-five  miles  of 
road  in  Luray  Valley;  Fremont  was  at  Harrisonburg ;  Ewell's 
Confederate  division  was  near  Cross  Keys ;  and  Jackson's  main 
body  was  near  Port  Republic.*  Jackson  might  easily  have 
escaped  with  his  army  on  the  7th  by  way  of  Port  Republic, 
burning  the  bridge  behind  him,  and  Brown's  Gap;  but  he  had 
other  designs  in  mind.  He  wanted  to  defeat  Fremont  and 
Shields  separately.  His  plan  was  to  hold  Fremont  back  at 
Cross  Keys  with  Ewell's  division,  overwhelm  Shields  with  his 
main  body,  then  fall  upon  Fremont  with  his  entire  force.  He 
knew  that  Fremont's  command  was  much  the  stronger  of  the 
two  Federal  columns. 

(113)  Ewell  placed  his  troops  along  a  wooded  height  be 
hind  the  insignificant  brook  known  as  Mill  Creek.  Trimble's 
brigade  held  the  right  of  his  line.  Before  9  a.  m.  on  the  8th 
June  his  outposts  were  driven  in;  and  by  ten  o'clock  the  Fed- 

*Henderson. 


232  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

eral  artillery  had  opened  from  the  heights  on  the  other  side  of 
the  brook.  Fremont's  force  greatly  outnumbered  EwelPs  in 
every  arm ;  but  the  Federal  commander  supposed  he  had  Jack 
son's  entire  army  in  front  of  him,  and  he  did  not  know  where 
Shields  was.  He  had  heard  nothing  from  that  general  for 
three  or  four  days.  In  his  uncertainty  Fremont  made  his  at 
tack  in  a  timid,  half-hearted  fashion.  Of  twenty-four  regi 
ments  present  on  the  field  he  sent  forward  five,  only,  to  the 
assault.  These  assailed  the  Confederate  right  and  were  re 
pulsed.  The  action  along  the  rest  of  the  line  was  not  serious. 
Milroy  and  Schenck,  who  fought  so  well  at  McDowell,  had 
started  to  assault  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  but  were 
recalled  by  Fremont.  (114)  The  two  hostile  lines  bivouacked 
that  night  within  sight  of  each  other.  This  action  is  known 
as  the  battle  of  Cross  Keys. 

(112)  Earlier  the  same  day  Shields's  advanced  cavalry, 
through  the  failure  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  to  guard  the 
road  in  the  valley  of  the  South  Fork,  got  into  Port  Republic, 
and  came  near  capturing  the  Confederate  trains  and  Stonewall 
Jackson  himself.  It  was,  however,  driven  off. 

Before  six  o'clock  the  next  morning,  June  9,  Jackson's  army, 
except  part  of  Ewell's  division,  was  crossing  the  streams  at 
Port  Republic  on  its  way  to  attack  Shields.  (115)  Less 
than  two  miles  down  the  river  two  Federal  brigades  under 
Tyler  were  found  in  position.  Tyler's  right  rested  on  the  river 
and  his  left  on  a  ravine.  Here  the  battle  of  Port  Republic 
took  place.  The  Stonewall  Brigade  assaulted  the  Union  line 
in  front  and  engaged  it  in  a  fierce  action.  The  battle  lasted  for 
four  or  five  hours.  Jackson  concluded  that  he  should  not  be 
able  to  defeat  Tyler,  then  return  to  the  other  side  and  over 
whelm  Fremont;  so  he  ordered  all  of  Ewell's  troops  to  the 
right  bank,  and  had -the  bridge  at  Port  Republic  burnt.  Finally 
"Dick"  Taylor's  brigade  of  Swell's  division,  having  succeeded 
in  turning  the  Federal  left,  and  the  rest  of  Ewell's  division  hav 
ing  come  to  reinforce  the  Confederate  line,  Tyler  was  forced  to 
quit  the  field.  He  was  pursued  nearly  to  Conrad's  Store. 
There  he  met  Shields,  who  was  hurrying  with  the  rest  of  his 
division  to  the  sound  of  the  battle.  Shields  formed  line  and 
stopped  the  pursuit. 

(112)  Before  midnight  Jackson's  entire  army  was  in 
bivouac  at  Brown's  Gap,  and  the  Valley  Campaign  was  at  an 
end.  Here  Jackson's  army  was  in  direct  communication  with 
Richmond;  here  it  remained  until  June  the  17th,  when  it  set 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  233 

out  upon  its  swift  and  secret  journey  to  the  Chickahominy. 
Jackson's  counter-stroke  at  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic 
again  upset  the  plans  of  President  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stanton, 
and  caused  them  to  reverse  their  orders.  Two  days  before  the 
battle  of  Cross  Keys  the  division  of  McDowell's  corps  left  at 
Fredericksburg  had  been  dispatched  to  McClellan  by  water ; 
and  on  the  very  day  of  that  battle,  the  8th  June,  McDowell  was 
ordered  to  join  McClellan  as  speedily  as  possible  with  the  rest 
of  his  corps.  The  same  day  Fremont  was  ordered  by  telegraph 
to  halt  at  Harrisonburg.  Before  these  orders  reached  their 
destination  Fremont  and  Shields  had  both  been  defeated. 
Thereupon  McDowell's  order  was  revoked,  arid  he  was  directed 
to  leave  Shields's  division  at  Luray  and  his  other  division  at 
Front  Royal.  Fremont,  feeling  himself  too  exposed  at  Har 
risonburg,  fell  back  to  Mount  Jackson. 

COMMENTS. 

(107)  The  operations  carried  on  during  this  summer  of 
1862  in  the  theater  between  the  Alleghenies  and  Chesapeake 
Bay,  considered  as  a  whole,  present  as  fine  an  example  as  is  to 
be  found  in  the  history  of  warfare,  of  the  strategical  advantage 
of  interior  lines  intelligently  employed,  over  exterior  lines  un- 
intelligently  employed.  We  shall  see  later,  in  our  studies  of 
von  Moltke's  campaigns,  how  the  case  may  be  reversed;  how 
exterior  lines  with  separate  lines  of  operation  may  be  turned 
to  profit  by  a  master  of  the  art  of  war. 

The  Federal  armies  occupied  the  perimeter  of  an  irregular 
curve  reaching  from  the  James  River  below  Richmond  round 
through  Fredericksburg,  Manassas,  Harper's  Ferry,  and  up 
the  valley  of  the  South  Branch  of  the  Potomac.  This  line  was 
not  rigid,  it  is  true ;  it  oscillated  more  or  less  in  consonance 
with  Stonewall  Jackson's  movements.  Upon  the  line  there 
were  McClellan's  army,  nearly  100,000  strong;  McDowell's 
corps,  30,000  to  40,000;  the  troops  within  the  defenses  of 
Washington,  20,000  to  30,000;  Banks's  army,  15,000  to  20,000; 
and  Fremont's,  15,000, — in  all,  more  than  200,000  soldiers. 
Opposed  to  this  force,  on  the  inside  of  the  curve,  the  Confeder 
ates  numbered,  all  told,  hardly  more  than  100,000  at  any  time. 
If  these  widely  scattered  Union  forces  had  all  been  collected 
into  two  or  three  armies,  under  a  single  head,  and  moved  in 
intelligent  combination  against  a  single  objective,  the  main 
Confederate  army  or  Richmond,  what  chance  of  escape  would 


234  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

there  have  been  for  this  army  or  the  Confederate  capital? 
It  should  seem  that  it  would  have  required  no  great  knowl 
edge  of  the  principles  of  strategy  to  unite  those  Union  armies 
and  crush  their  weak  foe ;  but  it  was  Mr.  Stanton's  lack  of  just 
that  much  military  knowledge  that  enabled  Lee  and  Jackson 
to  keep  the  Federal  armies  apart;  that  enabled  them  first  to 
defeat  Fremont  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  then  Banks,  then  Fre 
mont  and  Shields  on  opposite  sides  of  the  rivers  at  Port  Re 
public;  then,  finally,  to  throw  every  man  against  McClellan 
astride  the  Chickahominy. 

The  Valley  Campaign  was,  from  beginning  to  end,  only  sec 
ondary  to  the  campaign  in  eastern  Virginia.  It  was  only  a 
strategic  diversion ;  but  of  such  no  finer  study  can  be  found  in 
modern  war.  If  McDowell  with  his  30,000  to  40,000  troops 
had  joined  the  Union  army  on  the  Chickahominy  Richmond 
must  inevitably  have  fallen,  and  with  it,  in  all  human  probabil 
ity,  the  Confederacy.  "Three  times  was  McDowell  to  have 
marched  to  join  McClellan :  first,  at  the  beginning  of  April 
[1862],  when  he  was  held  back  by  Kernstown;  second,  on  May 
26,  when  he  was  held  back  by  Front  Royal  and  Winchester ; 
third,  on  June  25,  when  he  was  held  back  by  Jackson's  disap 
pearance  after  Port  Republic."* 

Johnston  and  Lee  must  be  credited  with  conceiving  the  idea 
of  making  a  diversion  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  favor  of  the 
Confederate  main  army.  It  was  Johnston  that  sent  Jackson  to 
the  Valley  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  and  left  him  there,  when  he 
withdrew  the  main  Confederate,  army  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Centreville  in  the  spring  of  1862.  He  gave  Jackson  orders 
"to  endeavor  to  employ  the  invaders  in  the  Valley,  without  ex 
posing  himself  to  the  danger  of  defeat,  by  keeping  so  near  the 
enemy  as  to  prevent  his  making  any  considerable  detachment 
to  reinforce  McClellan."f  These  instructions  were  noway  so 
definite  or  positive  as  those  given  to  Patterson  by  General 
Scott  a  few  months  earlier,  directing  him  to  prevent  Johnston 
from  quitting  the  Valley  to  go  to  Beauregard's  help  at  Manas- 
sas;  yet,  how  differently  the  two  generals  carried  out  their  in 
structions!  Johnston  went  to  Beauregard's  aid  just  in  the  nick 
of  time;  Banks  not  only  never  left  the  Valley,  except  when 
Jackson  chose  to  drive  him  out  of  it,  but  other  Federal  troops 
had  to  be  sent  -into  the  Valley  more  than  once. 

"To  Lee  belongs  still  further  credit.     From  the  moment  he 


*Henderson. 
fjohnston's  Narrative. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  235 

assumed  command  we  find  the -Con  federate  operations  directed 
on  a  definite  and  well-directed  plan ;  a  defensive  attitude  around 
Richmond,  a  vigorous  offensive  in  the  Valley,  leading  to  the 
dispersion  of  the  enemy,  and  a  Confederate  concentration  on 
the  Chickahominy.  .  .  .  From  Lee,  too,  came  the  sugges 
tion  that  a  blow  should  be  struck  at  Banks;  that  he  should  be 
driven  to  the  Potomac ;  and  that  the  North  should  be  threatened 
with  invasion."  He  sent  Ewell  with  8,000  men  to  Jackson; 
later  he  dispatched  Whiting  to  him  with  7,000  men  from  Rich 
mond,  in  order  to  deceive  the  enemy,  just  before  Jackson  set 
out  on  his  movement  to  Richmond.*  This  was  all  good 
strategy ;  but  neither  Johnston  nor  Lee  had  anything  to  do  with 
Jackson's  method  of  carrying  out  their  general  instructions. 
The  plan  of  operations  in  the  Valley,  and  its  execution,  were 
Jackson's  own  work.  And  those  operations  considered  by 
themselves,  apart  from  their  relation  to  the  main  campaign  in 
Virginia,  are  foill  of  fine  lessons  in  strategy  and  tactics.  Lord 
Wolseley,  late  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  British  army,  has 
published  his  opinion  of  them :  "These  brilliant  successes,"  he 
wrote,  "appear  to  me  models  of  the  kind,  both  in  conception 
and  execution.  They  should  be  closely  studied  by  all  officers 
who  wish  to  learn  the  art  and  science  of  war."f 

When  the  Civil  War  broke  out  there  was  not  a  man  of  suit 
able  age  in  America  who  was  qualified  by  experience  to  com 
mand  a  brigade  in  the  field.  Those,  like  General  Scott,  who 
had  commanded  considerable  numbers  of  men,  and  had  proved 
themselves  fit,  were  too  old.  Nobody  else  had  ever  com 
manded  more  than  a  few  hundreds.  There  had  been  no  peace 
maneuvers  to  educate  generals.  Some  had  studied  a  few  text 
books  on  the  military  art,  and  one  at  least,  General  Halleck, 
had  even  published  such  a  text-book.  Yet,  if  we  judge  by 
their  early  performances  in  this  war,  we  must  conclude  that 
only  a  few  seem  to  have  profited  by  their  studies.  Jackson 
was  preeminent  among  that  few. 

One  of  his  staff  officers  says  Jackson  always  carried  three 
books  in  his  saddle-pockets :  the  Bible,  Webster's  Dictionary, 
and  Napoleon's  Maxims.  He  took  as  the  model  of  his  re 
ports  Joshua's  account  of  the  battle  with  the  Amalekites.* 
Cromwell  also  carried  a  Bible,  and  Marlborough  was  weak  in 
spelling.  Jackson  had  seriously  and  intelligently  studied 

^Henderson. 

American  Review,  Vol.  149,  No.  2,  p.  166. 


236  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Napoleon's  campaigns;  and  there  is  no  doubt  at  all  that  he 
made  Napoleon's  methods  his  models.  One  cannot  follow  his 
operations  in  the  Valley  without  being  constantly  reminded  of 
two  of  Napoleon's  most  brilliant  campaigns ;  to-wit,  his  Italian 
campaign  of  1796,  but  more  particularly  his  campaign  against 
Bliicher  and  Schwarzenburg  in  1814.  In  both  of  those  cam 
paigns  Napoleon,  like  Jackson,  commanded  comparatively  small 
forces ;  and  like  Jackson  he  kept  his  enemy  in  two  or  more 
bodies,  and  defeated  them  in  detail. 

Jackson  himself  had  some  maxims  that  are  as  worthy  of 
a  place  in  the  student's  note-book  as  Napoleon's  were  worthy 
of  room  in  Jackson's  saddle-pockets.  Here  are  a  few  of  them : 

1.  "Always  mystify,  mislead,  and  surprise  the  enemy  if  pos 
sible; 

2.  "When  you  strike  him  and  overcome  him  never  give  up 
the  pursuit  as  long  as  your  men  have  strength  to  follow;  for 
an  enemy  routed,  if  hotly  pursued,  becomes  panic-stricken,  and 
can  be  destroyed  by  half  their  number ; 

3.  "Never  fight  against  heavy  odds  if  by  any  possible  ma 
neuvering  you  can  hurl  your  whole  force  on  only  a  part,  and 
that  the  weakest  part,  of  your  enemy,  and  crush  it;* 

4.  "To  move  swiftly,  strike  vigorously,  and   secure  all  the 
fruits  of  victory  is  the  secret  of  successful  war ; 

5.  "A  defensive  campaign  can  only  be  made  successful  by 
taking  the   aggressive   at   the   proper   time.      Napoleon   never 
waited  for  his  adversary  to  become  fully  prepared,  but  struck 
him  the  first  blow; 

6.  "I  had  rather  lose  one  man  in  marching  than  five  in  bat 
tle,  "f     This  maxim  had  reference  to  ,the  teriffic  marching  he 
exacted  of  his  "foot-cavalry,"  as  his  infantry  was  sometimes 
styled,  in  order  to  gain  advantage  in  battle.    Often  his  men  fell 
out  by  scores ;  "but  the  marches  which  strewed  the  wayside 
with  the  footsore  and  the  weaklings  won  his  battles."f 

There  was  no  other  series  of  operations  in  the  Civil  War, 
covering  the  same  length  of  time,  that  presented  on  the  one 
hand  as  many  brilliant  features,  and  on  the  other  as  many  ex 
amples  of  blunders  to  be  avoided,  as  the  operations  in  and 
ab«ut  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  from  the  time  when  Jack 
son  left  the  neighborhood  of  Swift  Run  Gap,  April  30,  1862, 
up  to  the  time  when  he  disappeared  into  the  mountains  at 
Brown's  Gap  on  the  night  of  June  9.  By  making  demonstra- 

*B.  &  L.— Imboden. 
fHenderson. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  237 

tions  with  his  cavalry  against  Bank's  detachment  at  Harrison- 
burg  and  New  Market,  on  the  29th  and  30th  of  April,  then 
marching  in  the  mud  a  few  miles  up  Luray  Valley,  then  cross 
ing  Blue  Ridge  to  the  railway  at  Medium's  River  Station, 
Jackson  completely  mystified  and  misled  the  enemy,  and  fell 
upon  Milroy  and  Schenck  at  McDowell  before  Banks  or  Fre 
mont,  or  Stanton  at  Washington,  had  any  notion  where  he  was. 

Banks  fell  back  to  Strasburg,  and  Milroy  and  Schenck  were 
driven  back  upon  Fremont  at  Franklin.  Then  Jackson  re 
turned  to  the  Valley;  and  his  movement  was  so  thoroughly 
screened  by  Ashby's  cavalry  that  Fremont  thought  he  was  still 
in  his  front;  and  Banks  had  no  idea  where  he  was  until  he 
had  flung  his  army  across  the  Massanuttens,  united  it  with 
Ewell,  and  hurled  the  combined  force  upon  Kenly,  over 
whelming  him  at  Front  Royal. 

Then  he  chased  Banks  beyond  the  Potomac  and  threatened 
to  cross  that  river,  thus  throwing  Washington  and  the  whole 
North  into  a  panic.  This  induced  Mr.  Stanton  to  order  Mc 
Dowell  and  Fremont  to  Strasburg  in  order  to  cut  off  his  re 
treat.  Although  Fremont  had  got  within  twenty-five  miles, 
and  Shields  within  twelve  miles  of  Strasburg  when  the  head 
of  Jackson's  army  was  twenty-five  miles  and  his  rear-guard 
fifty  miles  from  that  town,  Jackson  managed,  with  swift  march 
ing  and  the  uncertainty  and  hesitation  of  Fremont  and  Shields, 
to  slip  between  them,  and  make  good  his  escape,  without  the 
loss  of  a  regiment,  or  a  wagon  of  his  seven-mile  train  of  cap 
tured  stores  and  munitions. 

From  Front  Royal  McDowell  made  the  mistake  of  sending 
only  one  division,  Shields's,  up  Luray  Valley  to  cut  off  Jack 
son's  retreat  or  fall  upon  his  flank ;  and  Shields  made  the  mis 
take  of  stringing  his  division  out  for  twenty-five  miles  on  the 
road.  Jackson  was  quick  to  take  advantage  of  those  blunders. 
He  had  all  the  bridges  over  the  South  Fork  destroyed,  except 
the  one  upon  his  line  of  retreat  at  Port  Republic.  That  one  he 
seized  and  held,  thus  preventing  the  junction  of  Fremont  and 
Shields,  and  enabling  him  to  beat  them  separately  and  drive 
them  back. 

Then  Jackson  disappeared  into  the  mountains.  He  had  pro 
duced  another  scare  in  Washington,  and  induced  the  Secretary 
of  War,  for  the  third  time,  to  revoke  the  order  for  McDowell 
to  join  McClellan.  It  was  at  the  time,  too,  when  McClellan 
needed  McDowell  most;  for  when  Jackson  reappeared  he  was 


238  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

upon    McClellan's    flank,    and    Lee    had    begun    his    offensive 
operations. 

In  all  of  his  operations  Jackson  made  the  most  effective  use 
of  his  cavalry.  Twice  only  did  it  fail  him ;  first  in  the  pursuit 
of  Banks  from  Strasburg  to  Winchester ;  and  secondly  in  the 
pursuit  after  the  action  at  Winchester.  In  both  of  those  in 
stances  failure  was  due  to  a  lack  of  that  discipline  which  comes 
only  of  systematic  training.  In  that,  of  course,  the  Virginian 
horsemen,  from  their  brilliant  leader  down  to  the  last  trooper, 
were  deficient.  But  in  the  methods  that  Jackson  taught 
them,  in  boldness,  in  swiftness,  in  endurance,  in  the  knowledge 
of  the  country,  in  the  duties  of  "security  and  information," — 
screening  and  reconnaissance, — in  action,  whether  afoot  or 
horseback, — generally  speaking,  in  cavalry  efficiency,  they 
have  not  been  excelled  by  any  cavalry  of  which  history  has 
kept  the  record.  No  cavalry  officer  that  wishes  to  know  the 
full  value  of  his  arm,  when  rightly  employed,  can  neglect 
to  study  the  story  of  Ashby's  work  in  the  Valley. 


LECTURE  XII. 
THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 

(116)  The  failure  of  Fremont  and  Banks  and  McDowell 
in  their  operations  against  Stonewall  Jackson  in  the  Valley  con 
vinced  the  President  that  their  three  armies  ought  to  be  under 
the  orders  of  a  single  commander  in  the  field.  Accordingly  he 
issued  an  order  on  the  26th  of  June,  1862,  consolidating  the 
three  armies  of  McDowell,  Banks,  and  Fremont  into  a  single 
army.  Pope,  who  had  gained  a  reputation  by  his  capture  of 
New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10,  was  called  from  the  West  to 
command  the  new  army.  McDowell,  Banks,  and  Fremont 
all  ranked  Pope;  Fremont  refused  to  serve  under  him  and 
resigned.  He  was  succeeded  by  General  -Sigel.  Pope's  army 
numbered  about  47,000. 

The  task  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  as  set  forth  in  orders  to 
Pope,  "was  threefold:  to  'cover  the  City  of  Washington  from 
any  attack  from  the  direction  of  Richmond ;  to  make  such  dis 
positions  as  were  necessary  to  assure  the  safety  of  the  Valley 
of  the  Shenandoah;  and  at  the  same  time  so  to  operate  on  the 
enemy's  lines  of  communication  in  the  direction  of  Gordons- 
ville  and  Charlottesville  as  to  draw  off  if  possible,  a  consider 
able  force  of  the  enemy  from  Richmond,  and  thus  relieve  the 
operations  against  that  city  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.'  "* 

The  very  day  on  which  the  order  issued  organizing  the  Army 
of  Virginia,  June  26,  1862,  Lee  began  the  turning  movement 
at  Mechanicsville  that  ended  with  the  retreat  of  McClellan's 
army  and  its  concentration  at  Harrison's  Landing. 

At  this  time  the  armies  of  Banks  and  Fremont,  now  corps  of 
the  Army  of  Virginia,  were  at  Middletown  and  Strasburg  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.  McDowell's  two  divisions,  which  we 
left  at  Luray  and  Front  Royal  at  the  close  of  the  Valley  Cam 
paign,  were  now  at  Manassas  Junction  and  Falmouth,  respec 
tively.  Harrisonburg,  Charlottesville,  and  Gordonsville  were 
occupied  by  Confederate  troops. 

*Ropes. 


239 


240  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

The  Rappahannock  River  and  its  branch,  the  Rapidan,  flow 
ing  eastward  between  the  regions  occupied  by  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  and  the  Confederate  troops,  although  they  were  fordable 
at  many  points  during  the  dry  season,  and  were  bridged  at 
some  points,  were,  none  the  less,  sufficiently  formidable  as 
military  obstacles  to  serve  as  defensive  lines  for  an  army. 
North  and  west  of  Gordonsville  the  country  was  mountainous, 
and  the  entire  theater  was  more  or  less  thickly  covered  with 
forests.  The  Bull  Run  Mountains,  like  the  Blue  Ridge,  could 
be  crossed  only  at  certain  passes,  or  "gaps."  The  highways 
were  mainly  earthen  roads,  fairly  good  in  dry  weather,  but 
muddy  and  difficult  in  wet  weather.  There  were  a  few 
macadam  roads,  like  the  Warrenton- Alexandria  Pike,  and  the 
Little  River  Turnpike  through  Aldie  Gap. 

The  Manassas  Gap  and  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Rail 
ways,  which  come  together  at  Manassas  Junction,  served  as  the 
lines  of  communication  for  the  Union  armies  in  this  region  with 
their  base  at  Washington ;  while  the  Virginia  Central  Railway, 
which  connected  with  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  at  Gordons 
ville,  and  with  the  East  Tennessee  and  Virginia  at  Charlottes- 
ville,  was  the  main  line  by  which  the  Confederate  army  in 
Virginia  received  its  supplies  from  the  Southwestern  States, 
and  kept  up  communication  between  Richmond  and  the  west 
ern  part  of  Virginia.  The  Junctions  at  Manassas,  Gordons 
ville,  and  Charlottesville  were,  therefore,  important  strategic 
points.  As  Gordonsville  was  near  enough  to  the  region  occu 
pied  by  the  Federal  troops  to  be  particularly  exposed  to 
capture,  its  protection  was  a  matter  of  special  concern  to  Lee. 

OPERATIONS. 

(117)  Pope,  believing  that  he  could  best  perform  his  three 
fold  task  by  assembling  the  widely  separated  parts  of  his  army 
at  some  central  position,  issued  orders  at  once  for  Banks  and 
Sigel  to  move  to  Sperryville  and  Little  Washington,  and  for 
Ricketts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  to  move  from  Manas 
sas  to  Warrenton.  In  these  positions  he  would  cover  the  ap 
proaches  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  Washington,  and 
threaten  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville.  Pope  would  have 
liked,  also,  to  close  in  King's  divisfon  of  McDowell's  corps  from 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  241 

Falmouth ;  but  the  National  Government  had  depots  and  ware 
houses  and  wharves  at  Aquia  Creek,  and  for  their  protection 
it  required  Pope  to  hold  on  to  Falmouth;  and  hence  to  keep 
his  army  stretched  upon  a  much  wider  front  than  he  ought  to 
have  covered. 

Early  in  July  Pope's  army  was  concentrated  as  ordered. 
Meantime  Burnside  had  brought  up  an  army  from  North 
Carolina,  and  had  it  in  camp  at  Fort  Monroe ;  and  McClellan's 
army  had  fallen  back  to  Harrison's  Landing.  General  Pope 
was  still  in  Washington,  where  he  was  detained  by  the  Presi 
dent  as  his  military  adviser.  He  ordered  Banks  to  send  for 
ward  his  cavalry  to  occupy  Culpeper,  and  "to  throw  out 
pickets  for  at  least  twenty  miles  in  the  direction  of  Gordons- 
ville." 

On  the  14th  of  July  General  John  P.  Hatch,  with  the 
cavalry  of  Banks's  corps,  was  ordered  to  seize  Gordonsville, 
then  held  by  about  200  Confederate  infantry  and  a  few  cav 
alry.*  Hatch  encumbered  himself  with  field-artillery  and  a 
wagon-train  which  so  hindered  his  march  that  Storuewall  Jack 
son  arrived  ahead  of  him.  (118)  Jackson  had  been  started  by 
Lee  from  Richmond  with  two  divisions  on  July  13  for  Gor 
donsville.  He  reached  that  town  on  the  19th.  Thus  one  of 
Pope's  objects  had  been  achieved — he  had  induced  Lee  to  send 
away  one  of  his  best  generals  and  a  large  force.  The  capture 
of  Richmond  was  made  so  much  easier  for  McClellan. 

But  McClellan  was  not  to  be  allowed  to  make  another  effort 
against  Richmond.  On  the  llth  of  July  General  Halleck  was 
appointed  General-in-Chief  of  all  the  land  forces  in  the  United 
States,  and  was  called  to  Washington  from  Mississippi.  To 
ward  the  end  of  July  Halleck  visited  McClellan  at  Harrison's 
Landing,  and,  after  looking  over  the  situation  and  discussing 
the  matter  with  McClellan,  determined,  much  against  Mc 
Clellan's  protest,  to  withdraw  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
the  James,  and  unite  it  with  the  Army  of  Virginia.  The  order 
for  the  withdrawal  was  issued  on  August  the  3rd.  From  that 
moment  Pope's  army,  which  had  been  organized  for  the  pur 
pose  of  playing  a  secondary  part,  was  to  have  the  principal 
role  in  the  campaign;  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was,  there 
after,  to  play  the  secondary  part. 

General  Halleck  had  proposed  that  the  two  armies  should 
unite  at  Fredericksburg.  "Here,"  said  General  Halleck,  "the 
armies  would  find  a  new  base  on  the  Rappahannock  River, 


^Alexander. 


242  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

nearer  to  Richmond  than  Yorktown,  and  one  which,  being 
'between  Richmond  and  Washington,'  "  would  cover  Washing 
ton  from  any  attack  by  the  enemy.*  At  the  same  time  he 
ordered  Burnside  to  transfer  his  army  from  Fort  Monroe  to 
Aquia  Creek. 

Pope  remained  in  Washington  till  Halleck's  return  from 
Harrison's  Landing;  then,  with  a  full  understanding  of  Hal 
leck's  change  of  plan,  he  joined  his  army  at  Sperryville  on  the 
1st  of  August.  (119)  He  began  at  once  issuing  orders  for 
the  movement  of  his  troops,  and,  after  a  good  deal  of  unneces 
sary  marching,  and  many  changes  in  his  orders,  he  finally  got 
his  army  together  at  Culpeper  by  about  the  12th  of  August. 
Burnside  had  reached  Falmouth  with  his  force  on  the  5th. 

Meantime  Jackson  had  been  eager  to  attack  the  first  one  of 
Pope's  corps  to  arrive  at  Culpeper.  Could  he  defeat  it  "and 
occupy  that  central  position  in  time,  he  might  deal  with  the 
other  two  in  succession,  as  he  had  dealt  with  Fremont  and 
Shields  at  Port  Republic."!  To  enable  him  to  take  the  aggres 
sive  Lee  had  sent  him  A.  P.  Hill's  division.  This  raised  his 
strength  to  24,000  men.  So  on  the  7th  of  August  he  started 
for  Culpeper.  The  distance  was  only  about  thirty  miles ;  but 
by  reason  of  slow  marching,  and  confusion  caused  by  defects  in 
the  orders  he  gave  his  division  commanders,  it  was  not  until 
about  noon  of  the  9th  that  his  advance  reached  Cedar  (or 
Slaughter)  Mountain,  seven  or  eight  miles  south  of  Culpeper. 
(120)  Here  he  encountered  Union  cavalry  under  Bayard, 
and  the  whole  of  Banks's  corps,  which  had  been  sent  forward 
by  Pope  to  support  the  cavalry.  When  only  two  of  Jackson's 
divisions  were  on  the  ground  Banks  attacked  them  furiously. 
He  routed  the  left  of  their  line  and  threw  a  whole  division  into 
confusion.  But  A.  P.  Hill  arrived  on  the  field  with  his  division 
in  time  to  turn  the  scale  and  save  the  day.f  Banks  had  gone 
into  the  combat  without  reserves  and  had  not  sent  back  to  ask 
for  reinforcements.  So  his  unaided  corps  was  "utterly  over 
whelmed  and  driven  back  with  great  loss."*  It  was  now  dark, 
but  Jackson  pursued  Banks  by  moonlight  across  Cedar  Creek. 
Here  he  came  upon  Ricketts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  in 
line  of  battle,  and  was  checked.  Meantime  Jackson's  cavalry 
had  brought  in  prisoners  from  Sigel's  corps.  Thus  Jackson 
learned  that  the  last  of  Pope's  three  corps  was  close  at  hand, 

*  Ropes. 
fAlexander. 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  243 

and  that  he  had  lost,  by  the  slowness  of  his  march,  the  chance 
of  defeating  them  one  at  a  time.* 

The  hostile  forces  stood  for  two  days  watching  each  other. 
Jackson  hoped  Pope  would  attack  him  in  position.  (121) 
Failing  this  he  fell  back  all  the  way  to  Gordonsville,  hoping 
that  Pope  would  be  tempted  by  this  apparent  "confession  of 
weakness"  and  Pope's  "own  boastings"  to  come  forward  and 
assault  him.*  But  Pope  stopped  behind  the  Rapidan.  Here  he 
was  joined  on  the  15th  of  August  by  General  Reno  with  8,000 
men  of  Burnside's  forces.  This  reinforcement  increased  Pope's 
assembled  army  to  45,000. 

The  same  day,  the  15th  of  August,  General  Lee  himself 
arrived  at  Gordonsville.  While  McClellan's  army  had  been 
embarking  at  Harrison's  Landing  Lee's  troops  had  been 
hastening  toward  Gordonsville.  Longstreet  started  from 
Richmond  on  the  13th;  Stuart's  cavalry  and  all  the  rest  of  the 
army,  except  two  brigades  left  to  guard  the  Southern  capital 
against  calvary  raids,  soon  followed. 

(122)  Lee  now  had  about  55,000  effectives.  His  army  was 
not  well  organized  like  the  Union  army.  Instead  of  being 
divided  into  corps  it  was  separated  into  two  wings  under  Jack 
son  and  Longstreet.*  Lee  resolved  to  strike  Pope's  army 
before  it  could  be  joined  by  McGlellan's.  Pope's  army,  with 
its  center  at  Cedar  Mountain,  rested  its  flanks  upon  Robert 
son's  River  and  the  Rapidan,  respectively,  four  or  five  miles 
above  and  below  the  crossing  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railway.  Nearly  opposite  Pope's  left  flank  on  the  southern 
side  of  the  Rapidan  was  a  high  wooded  hill  called  Clark's 
Mountain,  with  spurs  stretching  down  the  river  to  Somerville 
Ford,  about  three  miles  below.  On  the  17th  of  August  Lee 
had  his  army  massed  behind  this  mountain.  His  purpose  was 
"to  cross  at  Somerville  Ford,  fall  upon  Pope's  left  flank  and 
sweep  around  with  a  superior  force,  cutting  off  Pope's  re 
treat  to  Washington."*  From'  his  position  behind  Clark's 
Mountain  Lee  was  almost  as  near  Culpeper  and  the  railway 
beyond  as  the  front  of  Pope's  army  was;  and  he  planned 
to  have  Stuart's  cavalry  cross  at  a  ford  farther  to  the  east 
ward,  dash  for  Rappahannock  Station,  and  destroy  the  bridge 
behind  Pope's  position.  Failure  on  the  part  of  Fitzhugh  Lee 
to  understand,  or  to  carry  out  promptly,  an  order  of  Stuart, 
caused  a  delay,  and  also  occasioned  the  capture  of  an  officer 


*Alexander. 


244  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

bearing  a  copy  of  Lee's  order.*  Thus  Pope  learned  Lee's 
project,  and  he  withdrew  his  army  behind  the  Rappahannock 
before  Lee  could  put  the  project  into  effect. 

Lee  advanced  to  the  Rappahannock  which  he  found  low  and 
easily  fordable.  He  now  undertook  to  turn  Pope's  right,  and 
spent  five  days  vainly  making  feints  for  a  favorable  opening. 
Meantime  Stuart  had  made  a  bold  raid  in  rear  of  the  Union 
army  and  captured  Pope's  headquarters.  By  this  means  Lee 
learned  that  the  corps  of  Heintzelman  [Third]  and  Porter 
[Fifth],  and  Reynolds's  division  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves, 
20,000  men  all  told,  were  already  within  two  days'  march  of 
Pope's  position,  and  that  the  rest  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
as  well  as  other  reinforcements,  was  not  more  than  five  days 
behind.  Thus  within  five  days  Pope  would  have  nearly  130,000 
troops.  Lee's  only  hope  of  success  depended  upon  his  doing 
something  quickly.  Further  to  add  to  his  embarrassment  a 
heavy  rainfall  had  made  the  Rappahannock  unfordable.f 

(123)  Lee  quickly  decided  to  strike  at  Pope's  communica 
tions  by  a  wide  turning  movement  to  the  left ;  he  started  Jack 
son's  wing  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  some  24,000  men  in  all,  to 
make  the  movement.  With  the  rest  of  his  army,  25,000  to 
30,000  men  ,J  he  remained  to  occupy  Pope's  attention  on  the 
Rappahannock. 

Jackson  started  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  August.  He 
marched  through  Amissville  and  Orleans,  and  bivouacked  that 
night  at  Salem.  The  next  day  [the  26th]  he  pushed  on 
through  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  Gainesville  to  Bristoe  Station, 
meeting  no  resistance  and  reaching  that  place  about  sunset. 
Stuart's  cavalry  and  two  regiments  of  infantry  captured  Ma- 
nassas  Junction  that  night,  with  several  hundred  prisoners  and 
large  depots  of  quartermaster's  and  commissary  supplies. 

Pope  and  his  officers  saw  Jackson's  column  moving  north 
ward  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  and  concluded  that  it  must 
be  making  for  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  perhaps  covering  the 
flank  of  Lee's  main  body,  which  might  be  marching  toward 
Front  Royal.*  No  troops  were  sent  in  pursuit.  Pope's  army 
remained  at  rest  on  the  26th  also.  (124)  On  the  26th  Lee 
followed  Jackson  with  the  rest  of  the  Confederate  army,  and 
that  night  Longstreet's  wing  bivouacked  at  Orleans. 

"Report  of  Jackson's  raid  on  the  railroad  was  made  to  Pope 


*Alexander. 
fAlexander.     Ropes. 
JRopes. 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  245 

early  in  the  evening  of  the  26th.  Pope  at  first  thought  it  must 
be  the  work  of  a  small  force;  but  upon  the  receipt  of  further 
information  he  appreciated  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  27th  issued  orders  for  the  abandonment 
of  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock."*  (125)  Hooker's  division 
of  Heintzelman's  corps  was  ordered  to  move  directly  to  Ma- 
nassas,  to  drive  away  the  enemy  and  reopen  communication 
with  Alexandria.  McDowell  with  his  own  and  Sigel's  corps 
and  Reynolds's  division  was  ordered  to  Gainesville;  Heintzel- 
man  with  Reno's  corps  and  Kearny's  division  of  his  own  corps 
was  ordered  to  Greenwich  in  support  of  McDowell ;  Porter  was 
ordered  to  move  on  Manassas  as  soon  as  he  should  be  relieved 
by  Banks,  who  was  to  have  charge  of  the  wagon-trains. 

McDowell  and  Heintzelman  reached  their  respective  posi 
tions  without  opposition ;  Hooker  encountered  Swell's  division 
of  Jackson's  wing,  at  about  2  p.  m.,  holding  the  line  of  Broad 
Run  at  Bristoe  Station,  and  covering  the  rest  of  Jackson's 
force,  which  was  destroying  the  stores  at  Manassas.  Ewell 
had  more  men  than  Hooker ;  but  his  orders  were  to  avoid 
bringing  on  a  general  engagement,  and  Hooker's  attack  was 
vigorous ;  so  after  an  hour  of  resistance  Ewell  retreated  to 
Manassas. f 

In  the  course  of  the  day  [the  27th]  a  small  force  had  been 
sent  by  rail  from  Alexandria  under  the  supposition  that  there 
was  only  a  Confederate  raiding  party  at  Manassas.  This  force 
was  repulsed  and  its  commander,  General  Taylor,  was  killed. 

Pope  now  perceived  that  the  whole  of  Jackson's  command 
was  at  Manassas,  so  he  issued  orders  with  a  view  to  cut  it  off 
and  capture  or  destroy  it.  He  ordered  Porter  to  march  at 
1  a.  m.  [the  28th]  from  Warrenton  Junction  to  Bristoe; 
Heintzelman  to  move  Kearny's  division  and  unite  it  with  his 
other  division  [Hooker]  at  Bristoe;  Reno  to  march  his  troops 
direct  from  Greenwich  to  Manassas;  and  McDowell  to  march 
his  own  and  Sigel's  corps  and  Reynolds's  division  from  Gaines 
ville  to  Manassas,  resting  his  right  on  the  railway  and  extend 
ing  his  left  well  to  the  east  so  as  to  intercept  Jackson  in  case  he 
attempted  to  retreat  to  the  north.  McDowell  was  not  ordered 
to  move  until  daylight  of  the  28th.  Pope's  orders  took  no  ac 
count  of  the  rest  of  Lee's  army,  which  was  but  a  long  day's 
march  behind  Jackson  and  bivouacked  the  night  of  the  27th  at 
White  Plains.  But  McDowell  took  the  responsibility  of  order- 

*  Ropes. 
fAlexander. 


246  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ing  one  of  his  divisions  [Ricketts]  to  take  position  in  front  of 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  to  oppose  the  passage  of  Lee's  forces. 

(126)  Jackson  did  not  wait  at  Manassas  to  be  destroyed. 
During  the  night  [27-28]  he  sent  Taliaferro's  division  north 
ward  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  to  cross  Warrenton  Pike 
and  take  a  position  north  of  Groveton.  Here  it  was  joined  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th  by  Ewell's  division,  which  left  Manas 
sas  at  dawn,  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  marched 
through  the  fields  to  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  recrossed  to  the 
right  bank.  Later  in  the  day  A.  P.  Hill's  division  also  re 
joined.  It  had  left  Manassas  at  1  a.  m.  and  marched  to  Centre- 
ville,  and  thence  westward  on  the  Warrenton  Pike.  Hill  and 
Ewell,  but  especially  Hill,  had  been  sent  by  these  roundabout 
routes  for  the  purpose  of  misleading  Pope  as  to  the  destination 
of  the  Confederates. 

About  noon  on  the  28th  Pope  himself  reached  Manassas. 
He  found  the  place  deserted,  and  could  learn  nothing  of  Jack 
son's  movements.  Later  in  the  day  he  received  reports  that 
Hill  had  been  seen  at  Centreville,  and  that  Confederate  cavalry 
had  been  raiding  between  Bull  Run  and  Alexandria.  At  4.15 
p.  m.  Pope  issued  orders  directing  all  his  troops  to  march  on 
Centreville,  whither  he  supposed  Jackson's  entire  force  had 
gone. 

The  corps  of  Heintzelman  and  Reno  marched  straight  for 
Centreville;  Sigel's  corps  and  Reynolds's  division  counter 
marched  to  Warrenton  Pike,  but  did  not  cross  Bull  Run; 
King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps,  which  was  not  far  south 
of  the  Pike  when  it  received  the  order  to  march  on  Centreville, 
turned  eastward  on  the  Pike.  This  division  found  Jackson's 
position.  As  it  marched  along  on  the  turnpike  it  was  sud 
denly  fired  upon  by  artillery  from  the  north,  at  about  5.30 
p.  m.  Immediately  afterwards  Jackson  attacked  it  with  the 
divisions  of  Taliaferro  and  Ewell.  A  fierce  fight  ensued  which 
lasted  till  nine  o'clock.  The  losses  were  very  heavy  on  both 
sides. 

"Jackson,  about  a  mile  from  the  road,  might  have  remained 
hidden  and  allowed  King  to  pass.  Had  he  known  that  at  that 
moment  Lee  and  Longstreet  were  still  beyond  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  and  that  Ricketts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  was  at 
the  Gap,  one  might  suppose  that  he  would  hesitate  to  disclose 
himself.  But  if  Pope  was  allowed  to  withdraw  behind  Bull 
Run  the  result  of  the  whole  campaign  would  be  merely  to  force 
Pope  into  an  impregnable  position.  It  was  the  fear  of  this 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  247 

which  led  Jackson  to  attack  King  immediately,  even  though  he 
knew  it  would  draw  upon  him  Pope's  whole  force."* 

News  of  this  action  was  at  once  sent  to  Pope,  and  he  jumped 
to  the  conclusion  that  Jackson  had  quit  Centreville  and  was  in 
full  retreat  for  Thoroughfare  Gap;  and  that  King  had  met  the 
head  of  his  column.  Pope  "therefore  at  once  issued  orders 
for  the  assembling  of  his  troops  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike." 
In  his  orders  he  wrote:  "Genl.  McDowell  has  intercepted  the 
retreat  of  the  enemy  and  is  now  in  his  front,  Sigel  on  the  right 
of  McDowell.  Unless  he  can  escape  by  by-paths  leading  to 
the  north  to-night,  he  must  be  captured/'f  Meantime  the 
head  of  Longstreet's  column  had  reached  Thoroughfare  Gap  at 
3  p.  m.  of  this  day  [the  28th  August].  Finding  his  passage  at 
the  Gap  blocked  by  the  enemy  [Ricketts's  division  of  Mc 
Dowell's  corps],  Longstreet  sent  detachments  round  by  way  of 
Hopewell  Gap  and  a  cattle  trail  to  turn  Ricketts's  position. 
Ricketts,  therefore,  at  nightfall  retired  to  Gainesville.  The 
two  divisions  of  McDowell's  corps  [King  and  Ricketts]  were 
this  night  reunited,  and  Reynolds's  division  and  Sigel's  corps 
were  in  supporting  distance  to  the  right.  But  McDowell  was 
away  looking  for  Pope;  so  King,  without  any  orders,  started 
at  1  a.  m.  with  his  division  for  Manassas,  and  Ricketts  marched 
his  at  the  same  time  on  Bristoe. 

(127)  On  the  morning  of  the  29th  Pope's  troops,  worn  out 
by  marching  and  countermarching,  were  badly  scattered. 
Sigel's  corps  and  Reynolds's  division  were  the  only  troops  near 
Jackson's  position.  They  were  on  Bull  Run,  two  miles  east  of 
Jackson's  position.  The  corps  of  Banks  and  Porter,  and  Rick 
etts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  were  at  Bristoe;  King's 
division  of  McDowell's  corps  was  at  Manassas;  Reno's  and 
Heintzelman's  corps  were  at  Centreville.  There  was  nothing 
to  keep  Longstreet  from  marching  through  Gainesville  to  join 
Jackson. 

With  a  view  to  preventing  his  escape  Sigel  and  Reynolds 
were  ordered  to  attack  Jackson  at  daybreak  [the  29th]  ;  Heintz- 
elman  and  Reno  were  ordered  to  reinforce  Sigel  and  Reynolds ; 
Porter  was  ordered  to  march  to  Centreville.  McDowell's  two 
divisions  [Ricketts  and  King]  were  supposed  by  Pope  to  be 
blocking  Jackson's  retreat  on  Warrenton  Pike.  Pope  himself 
was  at  Centreville. 

When  Pope  learned  that  King  and  Ricketts  had  fallen  back 

*Alexander. 
fRopes. 


248  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

during  the  night  he  was  surprised  and  greatly  incensed.  Hop 
ing  still  to  cut  off  Jackson's  supposed  retreat,  he  sent  the  fol 
lowing  order  to  Porter :  "Push  forward  with  your  corps  and 
King's  division,  which  you  will  take  with  you,  upon  Gaines 
ville.  I  am  following  the  enemy  down  the  Warrenton  Turn 
pike.  Be  expeditious  or  we  will  lose  much."*  Porter  was  east 
of  Manassas  on  his  way  to  Centreville,  carrying  out  Pope's 
last  order  to  him,  when  he  received  this  order.  He  imme 
diately  turned  about  and  directed  his  march  upon  Gainesville. 

(128)  About  noon  Porter  and  McDowell  were  together  on 
the  Manassas-Gainesville  road,  when  they  received  a  joint  or 
der  from  Pope  directing  them  to  move  on  Gainesville,  but  add 
ing:  "I  desire  that  as  soon  as  communication  is  established 
between"  the  troops  on  the  right  "and  your  own  the  whole 
command  shall  halt.  It  may  be  necessary  to  fall  back  behind 
Bull  Run  at  Centreville  to-night." 

Pope's  idea  when  he  wrote  that  order  was  to  capture  or  de 
stroy  Jackson,  and  then  to  fall  back  and  take  up  a  strong  posi 
tion  at  Centreville  before  Lee's  main  body  could  arrive  on  the 
scene.  But  if  Jackson  had  escaped  he  was  riot  to  be  pursued 
beyond  Gainesville.  Pope  added :  "The  indications  are  that  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy," — i.  e.,  Lee's  main  body, — "is  mov 
ing  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  that  will  bring  them  here  [Cen 
treville]  by  to-morrow  night  or  the  next  day."  Pope's  joint 
order  further  read:  "If  any  considerable  advantages  are  to  be 
gained  by  departing  from  this  order  it  will  not  be  strictly  car 
ried  out."*  At  that  moment  McDowell  had  a  dispatch  in  his 
pocket  from  General  Buford,  who  commanded  the  Union  cav 
alry  on  the  right,  saying  that  seventeen  regiments,  a  battery, 
and  500  Confederate  cavalry  had  passed  through  Gainesville 
from  the  west  about  8.45  a.  m.  McDowell  and  Porter  felt  sure 
that  Pope  had  not  been  aware  of  this  fact  when  he  wrote  the 
order.  After  conferring  together  McDowell  marched  his  corps 
up  the  Sudley  Springs  road  and  Porter  took  the  Gainesville 
road.  At  Dawkins  Branch  Porter's  column  encountered  the 
enemy.  It  was  Longstreet's  wing  forming  on  Jackson's  right. 
Porter  deployed  a  part  of  his  command  and  halted. 

Meantime  a  battle  was  in  progress  to  the  north  of  Warrenton 
Pike.  Jackson  had  placed  his  command  in  the  cut  of  an  un 
finished  railway,  extending  from  near  Sudley  Springs  south 
westerly  back  of  Groveton.  His  line  was  about  two  miles  long. 
Sigel  and  Reynolds  had  attacked  him  first;  later  they  had 

*Ropes. 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  249 

been  joined  by  Heintzelman  and  Reno.  It  was  2  p.  m.  before 
the  battle  had  reached  its  height.  All  during  the  afternoon 
portions  of  Jackson's  line  were  assaulted ;  but  the  assaults  were 
not  made  by  all  the  troops  at  once ;  first  one  division,  or  part  of 
a  division,  would  charge,  and  then  another.  All  failed.  The 
weak  part  of  Jackson's  line  was  his  left  flank.  "Pope  might 
have  turned  this  early  in  the  afternoon  when  Heintzelman  and 
Reno  came  up.  But  he  made  no  attempt  to  do  this."  He 
made  none  but  frontal  attacks.  At  dusk  King's  division  of 
McDowell's  corps  arrived  and  took  part  in  the  action;  it  was 
driven  back  by  a  part  of  Longstreet's  force.  "The  Federal 
attacks  had  everywhere  been  repulsed,  and  the  battle  was  over" 
for  that  day.* 

(129)  Pope  was  not  aware  until  the  close  of  the  day  that 
Longstreet  had  arrived  and  taken  his  place  on  Jackson's  right. 
Toward  sunset  he  had  sent  Porter  an  order  to  attack  Jack 
son's  right,  not  knowing  that  Longstreet's  whole  command 
stood  between  Porter  and  Jackson's  right. 

During  the  night  the  Confederates  fell  back  to  their  orig 
inal  line  of  battle  from  the  advanced  position  they  had  reached 
in  following  up  their  repulse  of  the  enemy.  This  led  Pope,  as 
well  as  McDowell  and  Heintzelman,  the  next  morning,  the 
30th,  to  believe  that  Lee  had  retreated  toward  Gainesville. 
So  Pope  issued  at  noon  an  order  for  the  "vigorous  pursuit  of 
the  enemy."  McDowell  was  "assigned  to  the  command  of 
the  pursuit,"  in  which  his  own  corps,  Reynolds's  division,  and 
Porter's  corps  were  to  be  employed.*  (130)  Pope  had 
massed  nearly  all  of  his  army  north  of  the  Pike.  Porter  was 
to  move  on  the  Pike  followed  by  Reynolds.  Ricketts's  division 
and  Heintzelman's  corps  were  to  follow  the  Sudley  Springs- 
Haymarket  road. 

Hardly  had  the  troops  started  before  they  discovered  that 
the  Confederates  were  not  retreating,  but  were  awaiting  attack 
in  their  strong  position.  The  Confederate  line  formed  an  ob 
tuse  reentrant  angle,  with  Jackson's  wing  on  the  left  in  the 
railway  cut,  and  Longstreet's  on  the  right,  the  greater  part  of 
it  south  of  the  Turnpike.  Most  of  the  Confederate  artillery 
occupied  a  high  position  in  the  space  between  the  ends  of  Jack 
son's  and  Longstreet's  positions.  These  guns  had  a  clear 
sweep  of  the  ground  between  the  southern  end  of  Jackson's 
line  and  the  woods  out  of  which  Porter's  corps  must  advance 
to  attack  it. 

*Ropes. 


250  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Reynolds's  division  was  posted  on  Bald  Hill,  and  other  troops 
were  placed  on  the  Henry  House  Hill  to  hold  the  National  left 
and  to  guard  against  an  attack  on  that  flank,  which,  if  success 
ful,  would  cut  off  Pope's  line  of  retreat.  Porter,  at  the  center, 
assaulted  Jackson's  position;  but  he  was  overwhelmed  by  the 
Confederate  artillery  and  musketry  fire,  and  repulsed.  (131) 
Thereupon  Long-street  advanced  his  right  and  captured  Bald 
Hill,  from  which  Reynolds's  division  had  been  previously  with 
drawn  by  Pope  to  support  Porter.  Sigel's  corps,  which  had 
been  in  reserve,  made  great  efforts  to  recover  this  hill;  but 
without  success. 

Reynolds's  division,  Sykes's  brigade  of  regulars,  and  other 
available  troops  had  been  sent  to  the  Henry  House  Hill.  The 
Confederates  under  Toombs  and  Wilcox  and  others  made  re 
peated  and  desperate  efforts  to  carry  this  position,  but  failed. 
The  fighting  lasted  till  after  dark.  Meantime  Jackson,  having 
repulsed  Porter's  charge,  was  pushing  his  troops  against  the 
Federals  north  of  the  turnpike.  This  part  of  the  Federal  line 
had  been  so  much  weakened  by  sending  troops  from  it  to  the 
left  that  it  was  unable  to  arrest  Jackson's  advance,  and  was 
driven  from  the  field.  Thus  ended  the  Second  Battle  of  Bull 
Run. 

The  retention  of  the  Henry  House  Hill  by  the  Union  forces 
secured  their  retreat  over  Bull  Run  by  the  Stone  Bridge  and 
the  neighboring  fords. 

(132)  The  next  morning,  August  31,  Pope's  army  took 
position  on  the  heights  of  Centreville.  Banks  rejoined  with  his 
corps  of  9,000,  which  had  taken  no  part  in  the  battle,  but  had 
brought  the  wagon-train  with  much-needed  supplies  safe  to 
Fairfax  Court  House.  Franklin  and  Sumner,  also,  with  their 
corps  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  reported  to  Pope  at  Cen 
treville,  having  marched  out  from  Alexandria. 

Stuart  had  started  with  his  cavalry  at  daybreak  to  recover 
touch  with  the  Union  army,  and  he  soon  reported  to  Lee  that 
it  was  in  position  at  Centreville.  Lee  resolved  to  turn  the 
Union  right  by  the  Little  River  Turnpike.  So  Jackson  moved 
out  in  the  afternoon  [Sunday,  August  31]  by  way  of  Sudley 
Springs,  and  that  night  bivouacked  at  Pleasant  Valley,  about 
four  miles  west  of  Chantilly  on  the  Little  River  Turnpike. 
Longstreet  followed  later  in  the  day,  but  halted  for  the  night 
near  Sudley  Springs. 

Foreseeing  the  possibility  of  a  turning  movement  by  way  of 
the  Little  River  Turnpike,  Pope  sent  out  a  brigade  of  infantry 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  251 

early  in  the  morning  of  September  the  1st  to  reconnoiter — there 
being  actually  no  cavalry  with  his  army  fit  for  service.  Before 
long  he  received  report  that  such  a  movement  of  the  enemy  was 
in  progress.  At  noon,  therefore,  he  ordered  McDowell  to 
march  his  corps  rapidly  to  Fairfax  Court  House,  and  to  occupy 
Germantown.  Shortly  afterwards  he  dispatched  General 
Stevens  with  two  brigades  across  the  fields  to  the  Little  River 
Turnpike,  with  orders  to  "take  a  position  across  it,"  and  to 
hold  the  Confederate  force  in  check. 

At  Ox  Hill  Stevens  encountered  Jackson's  command,  and  a 
desperate  fight  took  place.  Stevens  was  killed  almost  at  the 
start.  Finally  Kearny  arrived  with  his  division ;  still  the  Union 
force  was  greatly  outnumbered  by  the  Confederates.  Kearny, 
mistaking  the  Confederate  troops  for  Federals  in  the  woods 
and  the  darkness  of  evening,  rode  right  into  their  midst  and 
was  killed.  Night  put  an  end  to  the  combat,  which  is  known 
as  the  battle  of  Chantilly. 

During  the  night  the  Union  troops  retired  to  Germantown 
and  Fairfax  Court  House.  Upon  the  recommendation  of  Gen 
eral  Pope  Halleck  issued  orders  on  September  the  2nd  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Union  army  to  the  intrenchments  in  front 
of  Washington,  there  to  reorganize.  Pope  reported  that  eve 
ning  to  Halleck  that  the  troops  would  be  within  the  works  by 
the  morning  of  the  3rd.  Pope's  campaign  in  Virginia  was 
at  an  end. 

The  losses  of  the  whole  campaign,  most  of  which  took  place 
in  the  great  battle,  were  as  follows : 

Confederates:  1,553  killed,  7,812  wounded,  109  missing; 
total,  9,474. 

Federals:  1,747  killed,  8,452  wounded,  and  4,263  captured 
or  missing;  total,  14,462.* 

The  Confederates  collected  thirty  guns  and  20,000  small- 
arms  from  the  field  of  Bull  Run.f 

An  unhappy  incident  of  this  battle  was  the  trial  of  General 
Fitz-John  Porter  by  court-martial.  Pope  preferred  charges 
against  him  for  not  obeying  the  order  to  attack  Jackson  late 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  of  August.  There  were  other 
minor  charges.  Porter  was  dismissed  the  service,  and  the 
Union  army  thereby  lost  one  of  its  very  best  generals.  Gen 
eral  Alexander  says:  "The  ex-Federal  Confederates  who  had 
known  Porter  considered  this  result  as  one  of  the  best  fruits 

*B.  &  L. 
fAlexander. 


252  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  the  victory."  To  this  day  the  question  of  General  Porter's 
guilt  or  innocence  is  not  settled  in  the  minds  of  the  American 
people.  There  are  persons  yet  that  cling  to  the  belief  in  his 
martyrdom;  there  are  others  of  this  generation  that  have  in 
herited  the  conviction  that  he  ought  to  have  been  shot.  Pope 
unquestionably  made  a  scapegoat  of  him;  General  Alexander 
says  Porter's  "course  was  proper."  My  own  opinion  is  that, 
while  Porter  could  not  do  what  Pope  ordered  him  to  do,  he 
ought  to  have  done  something.  He  ought  not  to  have  stood 
idle  with  10,000  men  during  a  whole  afternoon,  while  a  battle 
was  raging  close  at  his  right  hand;  that  is  virtually  what  he 
did.  But  if  the  South  had  been  as  severe  with  Stonewall 
Jackson  for  his  shortcomings  in  the  Seven  Days'  Campaign  as 
the  North  was  with  Porter  for  his  lesser  offense  on  this  29th 
of  August  the  victories  of  the  Second  Bull  Run  and  Chan- 
cellorsville  would  not  have  been  for  Southern  arms. 

COMMENTS. 

The  President  and  Secretary  Stanton  were  conforming  to 
one  of  the  first  principles  of  war  when  they  consolidated  the 
three  armies  of  Fremont,  Banks,  and  McDowell  into  a  single 
army  with  one  head.  "Nothing  is  so  important  in  war  as  an 
undivided  command."*  And  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Wash 
ington  by  reason  of  the  electric  telegraph  was  in  such  close 
communication  with  the  armies  in  the  field  as,  practically,  to  be 
inside  the  general  theater  of  operations,  they  were  further  con 
forming  to  right  principles  in  appointing  a  general-in-chief 
and  keeping  him  at  Washington.  The  theater  of  this  war  was 
so  vast,  extending  from  Pennsylvania  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
and  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  Missouri  River,  that  it 
was  not  possible  for  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  mount  a  horse 
and,  with  his  chief  of  staff  at  his  side,  follow  the  movements 
of  the  armies  in  the  field,  like  the  Prussian  King  with  von 
Moltke  in  the  Franco-German-  War. 

8  And  yet  the  armies  in  all  this  wide  theater  ought  to  have 
been  controlled  by  one  person  from  the  very  beginning,  and 
continually;  and  that  person  ought  to  have  been  the  best  gen 
eral  in  the  service,  and  not  a  politician,  nor  a  statesman.  The 
politicians  and  statesmen  on  either  side  had  plunged  the  coun 
try  into  war;  it  was  now  time  for  them  to  take  a  back  seat 

*Napoleon's  Maxim  XLIV. 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  253 

and  let  the  men  with  a  knowledge  of  the  science  of  war,  if 
there  were  any  such,  conduct  the  campaigns. 

That  is  precisely  what  the  President  and  the  Secretary  were 
trying  to  do  when  they  called  General  Halleck  to  Washington 
and  made  him  general-in-chief.  And  it  does  not  appear  that 
they  fettered  him  in  any  manner  in  his  direction  of  the  opera 
tions  of  the  two  armies  at  this  time  in  Virginia — McClellan's 
and  Pope's.  The  mistake  the  President,  or  the  Secretary  of 
War,  made,  was  in  the  selection  of  their  men,  Halleck  and 
Pope.  Yet  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stanton  were  not  to  blame 
for  the  choice.  They  were  trying  to  pick  the  best  generals; 
and  so  far  success  pointed  to  Halleck  and  Pope  as  the  best. 

That  General  Halleck  made  a  mistake  in  withdrawing  Mc 
Clellan's  army  from  the  James  River  after  it  had  established 
itself  at  Harrison's  Landing  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  General 
Grant,  three  years  later,  captured  Petersburg  and  Richmond, 
and  ended  the  war,  upon  the  very  lines  of  operation  that 
McClellan  proposed  to  follow, — south  of  the  James  River, — 
after  seven  other  lines  had  been  tried  without  success. 

Pope's  campaign  should  have  had  three  distinct  phases. 
First,  under  his  original  instructions  "to  cover  the  City  of 
Washington ;  to  assure  the  safety  of  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah" ;  and  "to  operate  on  the  enemy's  lines  of  communication 
in  the  direction  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville"  in  order 
to  assist  McClellan's  army  by  drawing  away  forces  of  the 
enemy  from  Richmond, — under  these  instructions  Pope's  oper 
ations  should  have  been  both  offensive  and  defensive.  But 
they  should  have  been  secondary  to  the  operations  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  The  main  objective  was  Lee's  army  and 
Richmond ;  and  the  main  army  operating  against  this  objective 
was,  at  this  time,  McClellan's  and  not  Pope's.  The  disposi 
tions  made  by  Pope  to  carry  out  these  instructions  were  good ; 
he  concentrated  his  army  behind  the  Rapidan  River  and  started 
a  force  forward  to  capture  Gordonsville.  The  operation  had 
the  desired  effect,  too,,  inasmuch  as  it  obliged  Lee  to  detach 
Jackson  from  his  army  to  the  threatened  point. 

But  Halleck  changed  the  general  plan  of  the  campaign 
against  Richmond,  and  withdrew  McClellan's  army  from  the 
James  River  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  it  with  Pope's  and 
sending  the  combined  force  against  Richmond  by  a  new  and 
different  line  of  operations.  The  withdrawal  of  McClellan's 
army  set  Lee's  army  free,  for  the  time  being,  to  move  against 
Pope.  With  this  change  of  situation  the  second  phase  of 


254  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Pope's  campaign  began;  the  character  of  his  operations  ought 
to  have  changed  accordingly.  From  this  moment  until  every 
corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  made  the  journey 
around  by  Aquia  Creek,  or  by  Alexandria,  and  united  with  his 
army,  Pope  ought  to  have  confined  himself  strictly  to  a  defen 
sive  role.  He  ought  to  have  avoided  a  battle  with  Lee's  army 
and,  if  necessary,  continued  to  fall  back  even  as  far  as  beyond 
Bull  Run.  After  the  junction  of  the  two  armies  he  should 
have  resumed  offensive  operations.  This  would  have  been  the 
third  phase. 

During  McClellan's  withdrawal  Pope  ought  not  to  have 
tried  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Rapidan;  this  river  was  two  days' 
march  farther  to  the  front  than  the  Rappahannock,  and — 
which  was  of  more  importance — it  was  nearly  parallel  to  his 
line  of  communications,  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway 
from  Culpeper  Court  House  to  the  Rappahannock.  The  front 
of  an  army  should  be  as  nearly  perpendicular  to  its  line  of 
communications  as  possible.  Moreover,  the  topography,  with 
Clark's  Mountain  and  thick  woods  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Rapidan,  peculiarly  lent  itself  to  a  Confederate  turning  move 
ment. 

Lee  had  prepared  to  turn  Pope's  left  and  intercept  the  rail 
way  when,  luckily  for  Pope's  army,  a  copy  of  the  order  de 
tailing  Lee's  plan  fell  into  Pope's  hands.  Thereupon  Pope 
promptly  withdrew  behind  the  Rappahannock,  which  he  ought 
to  have  done  before.  The  Rappahannock  is  perpendicular  to 
the  line  of  the  railway. 

Pope  was  greatly  hampered  and  annoyed  by  Halleck's  insist 
ing  that  he  should  hold  Falmouth  to  protect  the  Government 
wharves  and  storehouses  at  Aquia  Creek.  It  obliged  Pope 
continually  to  pivot  his  army  about  that  point  and  to  keep  it 
stretched  out  upon  a  front  of  some  forty  miles.  And  there 
was  no  real  use  of  it.  In  the  end  the  Union  troops  abandoned 
the  place  and  themselves  burned  the  wharves  and  storehouses. 

Being  prevented  by  the  nature  of  Pope's  position  and  the 
high  water  of  the  Rappahannock  from  turning  Pope's  flank 
Lee  started  Jackson  on  his  raid  against  Pope's  communica 
tions.  Judged  by  its  results  this  was  certainly  a  brilliant 
movement;  but  judged  by  any  principles  of  war  it  was  a  peril- 
OjUS  thing  to  do.  Only  Pope's  blunders  saved  it  from  failure. 
Not  even  the  successful  issue  of  the  expedition  can  clear 
General  Lee's  reputation  of  the  risk  he  took  in  ordering  or 
permitting  it.  It  is  certainly  not  a  safe  example  of  strategy 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  255 

for  future  commanders  to  copy.  Lee's  chief  motive  in  sending 
Jackson  with  nearly  half  his  army  on  this  great  turning  move 
ment  was  to  induce  Pope  to  make  some  move  that  would  give 
him  an  opening  to  strike  the  Federal  army  before  it  was  joined 
by  the  rest  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  So  far  as  the  cutting 
of  Pope's  communications — the  destruction  of  the  railway  track 
and  his  depots  at  Manassas — was  concerned,  it  cannot  be  seen 
but  this  could  have  been  done  just  as  well  by  Stuart's  cavalry 
as  by  Jackson's  wing.  This  destruction  should,  however,  have 
had  very  little  effect  upon  the  campaign.  There  were  at  this 
time  plenty  of  Union  troops  at  Washington  to  reopen  the  com 
munications  within  two  days,  and  plenty  of  supplies  at  Wash 
ington  to  replace  those  destroyed  at  Manassas. 

Moreover,  Pope  had  another  base  at  Aquia  Creek.  In  a 
bombastic  address*  published  to  his  army  on  his  taking  com 
mand  of  it,  Pope  had  said,  "Let  us  discard  such  ideas"  as 
"bases  of  supplies."  Now  was  his  time;  indeed  he  needed  to 
have  very  little  worry  about  bases  of  supply.  A  general  quick 
to  take  advantage  of  his  adversary's  mistakes,  like  Napoleon 
or  Jackson,  in  Pope's  place,  might  have  let  Lee  march  on  to 
Manassas,  or  even  to  Washington,  and,  basing  himself  on 
Aquia  Creek,  have  marched  promptly  upon  Richmond,  now 
defended  by  only  two  small  brigades.  The  garrison  and  works 
of  Washington  were  strong  enough  alone  to  hold  out  against 
Lee's  army;  but  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  on  its  way 
thither,  also,  and  would  easily  have  reached  there  ahead  of  Lee. 
As  the  United  States  had  full  control  of  the  sea,  Pope  could 
have  shifted  his  base  round  the  coast  as  he  approached 
Richmond,  like  General  Grant  in  his  overland  campaign  of 
1864.  It  must  be  said,  however,  that  it  is  hardly  likely  the 
Washington  authorities  Would  have  allowed  Pope  to  undertake 
such  a  movement  at  this  time ;  their  fears  concerning  the  cap 
ture  of  the  city  were  too  great. 

Pope's  first  movements  on  finding  the  Confederate  army 
split  in  two  and  Jackson  in  his  rear  were,  however,  certainly 
judicious.  McDowell  with  about  40,000  men  was  sent  to 
Gainesville  and  Heintzelman  to  Greenwich  in  support  of  him. 
These  forces  could  cut  off  Jackson's  retreat,  and,  with  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains  to  hold,  could  keep  back  the  rest  of  Lee's 
army,  which  was  two  days'  march  behind  Jackson.  In  fact, 
here  was  the  key  to  the  situation.  Here  Pope  had  the  oppor 
tunity  to  place  his  whole  army  between  Lee's  separated  wings, 
and  the  choice  of  holding  either  wing  with  a  "containing" 


256  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

force  and  falling  upon  the  other  with  the  bulk  of  his  troops. 
If  Jackson  had  managed  to  escape  at  all  he  ought  at  least  to 
have  been  made  to  lead  his  footsore  command  as  far  northward 
as  Aldie  Gap  to  do  so.  Meantime  Longstreet's  wing  might  have 
been  overwhelmed. 

From  this  time  on  Pope  seems  not  to  have  had  a  "cool 
head."  Napoleon's  seventy-third  Maxim  says:  "The  first 
qualification  in  a  general-in-chief  is  a  cool  head — that  is,  a  head 
which  receives  just  impressions,  and  estimates  things  and  ob 
jects  at  their  real  value.  He  must  not  allow  himself  to  be  elated 
by  good  news,  or  depressed  by  bad.  The  impressions  he  re 
ceives  either  successively  or  simultaneously  in  the  course  of 
the  day  should  be  so  classed  as  to  take  up  only  the  exact  place 
in  his  mind  which  they  deserve  to  occupy  ;^  since  it  is  upon  a 
just  comparison  and  consideration  of  the  weight  due  to  dif 
ferent  impressions  that  the  power  of  reasoning  and  of  right 
judgment  depends." 

When  Pope  learned  that  Jackson  had  his  whole  force  at 
Manassas  he  instantly  ordered  all  his  corps  to  concentrate  on 
that  point,  never  seeming  to  imagine  that  Jackson  would  not 
stay  there  to  be  surrounded.  In  ordering  McDowell  to  quit 
Gainesville  and  move  to  Manassas,  instead  of  guarding  Thor 
oughfare  and  Hopewell  Gaps  against  Longstreet's  advance, 
Pope  committed  his  fatal  mistake.  He  seems  to  have  given  no 
thought  at  that  time  to  Longstreet's  wing  of  Lee's  army.  If 
he  considered  it  at  all  he  thought  it  was  so  far  behind  that  he 
should  be  able  to  capture  or  destroy  Jackson  before  it  could 
arrive  on  the  field. 

Pope  ought  to  have  kept  himself  better  informed  concerning 
his  enemy;  but  his  cavalry  was  so  exhausted  with  courier  and 
escort  duty  that  it  was  in  no  condition  properly  to  perform  the 
work  of*  reconnaissance.  Buf  ord's  cavalry  did,  however,  send 
in  the  first  information  of  the  approach  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
and  it  had  delayed  Longstreet's  column  several  hours  at  Salem. 

When  Pope  got  to  Manassas  and  found  Jackson  gone,  and 
then,  later,  learned  that  Hill's  division  had  been  seen  at  Centre- 
ville,  he  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  Jackson  had  marched 
his  whole  force  to  Centreville;  and  he  immediately  sent  out 
orders  directing  all  his  corps  to  change  the  direction  of  their 
march  for  that  town.  Then,  when  King's  division  of  McDow 
ell's  corps  encountered  Jackson  on  the  Warrenton  Pike,  Pope 
thought  it  had  struck  the  head  of  Jackson's  column,  which  he 
was  sure  was  in  full  retreat  for  Thoroughfare  Gap.  There- 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  257 

upon  Pope  issued  another  set  of  orders  based  upon  this  conclu 
sion.  Then,  when  he  learned  that  King  had  given  way  and 
fallen  back  to  Manassas,  he  concluded  that  Jackson  was  con 
tinuing  his  retreat  toward  the  Gap,  and  he  issued  new  orders. 
Finally,  on  the  29th  August,  when  his  right  wing  was  en 
gaged  with  Jackson,  he  ordered  Porter  to  move  by  the  Ma- 
nassas-Gainesville  road  and  attack  Jackson's  right  flank;  when 
at  that  very  moment  Longstreet's  whole  command  was  formed 
or  forming  on  Jackson's  right. 

Pope  did  not  receive  "just  impressions"  and  estimate  "things 
and  objects  at  their  real  value."  He  did  not  form  right  con 
clusions;  and  with  each  new  report  he  changed  his  mind  con 
cerning  the  situation  and  issued  new  orders.  He  wore  his 
men  out  with  marching  and  countermarching,  and  destroyed 
their  confidence  in  himself  with  vacillating  and  contradictory 
orders.  He  never  had  a  true  conception  of  the  situation  from 
the  time  when  he  learned  of  Jackson's  movement  northward, 
until  he  reached  the  fortifications  of  Washington  with  his  beaten 
army.  He  never  discerned  the  opportunity  presented  him  to 
destroy  the  two  fractions  of  Lee's  army  separately. 

He  ought  not  to  have  resumed  the  battle  on  the  30th  of 
August.  He  knew  then  that  the  whole  of  Lee's  army  had  ar 
rived  on  the  ground.  But  again  he  drew  a  false  conclusion. 
He  thought  Lee  had  begun  to  retreat,  and  he  gave  orders, 
accordingly,  to  pursue.  He  ought  to  have  taken  up  a  strong 
defensive  position  that  day  and  resisted  Lee's  attack  until  he 
was  reinforced  by  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner  and  other 
troops,  which  were  on  their  way  from  Alexandria.  And  that 
is  what  he  ought  to  have  done  on  the  night  of  the  30th,  after 
making  the  mistake  of  attacking  Lee  and  being  repulsed  on 
that  day.  His  army  .was  not  routed  on  the  30th ;  it  had  suf 
fered  hardly  more  than  Lee's  army.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
Lee  would  have  felt  equal  to  attacking  the  Union  army  on  the 
31st,  if  he  had  found  it  in  position  in  front  of  him.  This  army 
might  have  spent  the  night  intrenching,  instead  of  marching 
back  to  Centreville.  And  if  then  it  had  been  attacked  by  Lee, 
it  could  almost  surely  have  maintained  itself  until  the  arrival 
of  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner,  and  that  of  Banks,  also, 
which  had  been  escorting  the  wagon-train  and  had  taken  no 
part  in  the  battle  as  yet.  These  30,000  and  odd  fresh  troops 
put  into  the  fight  must  have  decided  it  in  favor  of  the  Union 
side ;  for  Lee  did  not  have  a  fresh  regiment  in  reserve  to  meet 
their  counter-attack.  Pope's  withdrawal  over  Bull  Run  that 


258  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

night  only  demoralized  his  troops,  destroyed  what  confidence 
they  may  still  have  had  in  him  as  a  commander,  and  stamped 
his  campaign  as  a  complete  failure.* 

Except  with  General  Lee's  audacious  plan  for  this  campaign, 
which  he  justified  by  saying  "The  disparity  of  force  between 
the  contending  forces  rendered  the  risks  unavoidable,"t  there 
is  not  much  fault  to  find  with  the  operations  of  the  Confed 
erates.  Yet  there  is  some.  Lee  ought  to  have  gained  a  de 
cisive  victory  on  the  29th  of  August.  He  arrived  with  Long- 
street's  wing  on  Jackson's  right  early  in  the  afternoon.  If  he 
had  put  these  troops  into  action  promptly  and  pushed  down 
the  Warrenton  Pike  he  might  have  overwhelmed  the  right  of 
the  Union  line,  separating  it  wholly  from  Porter's  corps  stand 
ing  idle  behind  Dawkins  Branch.  McDowell's  corps  would 
have  been  struck  in  flank  on  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  and 
forced  with  the  right  wing  back  upon  Bull  Run.  This  is  what 
Lee  started  to  do,  but  he  allowed  himself  to  be  dissuaded  by 
Longstreet.  Longstreet  wanted  time  to  reconnoiter ;  then  he 
reported  against  the  movement.  He  said  it  would 'expose  his 
right  flank  to  attack  by  troops  from  Manassas.  And  Long- 
street  wasted  time  arranging  his  elaborate  order  of  battle.  The 
upshot  of  it  all  was,  the  whole  afternoon  was  thrown  away. 
Two  of  Longstreet's  brigades  were  sent  forward  only  to  make 
a  reconnaissance.  It  was  they  that  drove  back  King's  Union 
division  at  dusk.J  ' 

In  the  accounts  of  this  campaign  almost  nothing  is  said  of 
the  work  of  the  Union  cavalry.  At  the  beginning  of  the  cam 
paign  Pope,  in  a  letter  to  Halleck,  spoke  of  "the  large  force 
of  cavalry  at"  his  "disposal" ;  and  at  Centreville,  near  the  end 
of  it,  Pope  had  to  send  out  a  brigade  of  infantry  on  reconnais 
sance  because  "there  was  absolutely  no  cavalry  fit  for  service."* 
It  should  have  been  the  business  of  the  cavalry  to  keep  touch 
with  Jackson  from  the  time  when  he  started  on  his  raid  till 
the  end.  Jackson  ought  never  to  have  been  allowed  to  play 
hide-and-seek  with  Pope's  army;  every  move  he  made  should 
have  been  reported  to  Pope  by  the  cavalry.  Likewise,  by  means 
of  his  cavalry  Pope  ought  to  have  kept  himself  perfectly  in 
formed  of  the  progress  of  Longstreet's  wing.  In  truth  Pope's 
cavalry  was  utterly  broken  down,  worn  out  by  courier  and  escort 

*Ropes. 

f  Alexander,  from  Allan's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

^Alexander. 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  259 

service.  It  was  not  till  after  this  campaign  that  the  cavalry  of 
the  National  army  was  allowed  to  perform  its  proper  duty. 

In  the  work  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  there  was  a  marked 
contrast.  Stuart  was  always  out  looking  for  information  of 
the  enemy.  While  Pope's  army  was  on  the  Rappahannock,  he 
rode  round  its  flank  and  captured  Pope's  headquarters  at  Cat- 
lett  Station  in  its  rear.  When  Jackson's  column  marched,  Stu 
art's  cavalry  was  in  front  of  it  and  covering  its  flanks.  On 
the  morning  of  the  31st  August  Stuart  was  in  the  saddle  by 
daybreak ;  and  before  eight  o'clock  he  had  reported  to  Lee  that 
the  Union  army  was  in  position  on  the  heights  of  Centreville. 
Again,  when  Jackson  started  round  by  the  Little  River  Turn 
pike,  he  had  Stuart's  horsemen  in  front  of  him.  If  the  Union 
cavalry  had  performed  its  duty  as  well  as  the  Confederate  cav 
alry  this  campaign  would  have  furnished  our  annals  some  of 
the  same  pretty  cavalry  .combats  that  we  find  in  the  later  cam 
paigns;  and  the  outcome  might  have  been  very  different  from 
what  it  was. 

One  of  the  highest  qualifications  of  an  army-commander  is 
to  know  how  to  employ  the  three  arms  of  the  service  for  their 
proper  purposes ;  to  know  the  possibilities  and  the  limitations 
of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry;  to  know  when  to  use  one 
and  when  another ;  to  know  when  to  conserve  one  and  when  to 
expend  another.  Such  a  knowledge,  also,  is  among  the  high 
est  qualifications  of  the  staff  officer ;  but  it  is  a  knowledge  that 
can  be  gained  only  by  serving  with  the  three  arms.  The  day 
will  certainly  come  in  our  service  when  every  ambitious  young 
officer  that  wishes  to  fit  himself  for  staff  duty  in  campaign  will 
be  given  the  opportunity  to  serve  in  peace  with  all  three  of  the 
field  arms,  cavalry,  infantry,  and  field-artillery. 


LECTURE  XIII. 
THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN. 

(133)  We  have  seen  that  Pope's  campaign  in  Virginia 
ended  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  Union  forces,  consisting  of 
the  Army  of  Virginia  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  within 
the  defenses  of  Washington,  on  September  3,  1862.  The  day 
before,  September  2,  the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  was  concentrated  in  the  vicinity  of  Chantilly. 

There  was  great  excitement  and  alarm  in  Washington,  and, 
for  a  time,  the  main  question  with  the  Administration  and  the 
War  Department  was  to  save  the  city  from  capture  by  the  Con 
federates.  On  the  5th  of  September  Pope  was  relieved  from 
command,  and,  although  no  formal  order  was  issued,  the  two 
Union  armies  were  merged  into  one  under  the  old  name  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  Army  of  Virginia  was  not  heard 
of  again.  General  McClellan  was  in  command  of  the  combined 
forces. 

While  Lee  never  for  a  moment  contemplated  moving  his 
army  of  55,000  men  against  Washington  he  felt  that  he  must 
take  the  offensive  at  once  in  order  to  gain  any  permanent  ad 
vantage  from  his  victory  at  Bull  Run.  He  knew  that  the 
United  States  government  would  immediately  take  steps  to  re 
pair  and  reorganize  its  forces,  and  that  if  his  army  in  the 
meanwhile  remained  idle,  he  should  soon  have  to  meet  another 
great  army  of  invasion  in  some  quarter  of  Virginia.  He  was 
well  aware  that  his  army  was  not  in  fit  condition  to  invade  the 
North.  "The  army,"  he  wrote  President  Davis,  "is  not  prop 
erly  equipped  for  an  invasion  of  an  enemy's  territory.  It  lacks 
much  of  the  material  of  war,  is  feeble  in  transportation,  the 
animals  being  much  reduced,  and  the  men  are  poorly  provided 
with  clothes,  and,  in  thousands  of  instances,  are  destitute  of 
shoes."*  But  his  troops  were  in  the  best  state  of  morale ;  they 
had  perfect  confidence  in  themselves  and  their  leaders;  and 
Lee,  like  Bragg  in  his  invasion  of  Kentucky,  hoped  that  the 
presence  of  his  army  in  Maryland  would  stimulate  the  people 
of  that  State  to  rise  and  join  their  fortunes  with  the  Con 
federacy. 

*  Ropes. 
260 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  261 

If  successful  in  his  movement  into  Maryland  he  would  de 
stroy  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway,  then  push  on  into  Penn 
sylvania  and  destroy  the  Pennsylvania  Railway.  This  would 
leave  only  one  line  of  communication  between  the  East  and  the 
West,  the  circuitous  route  by  the  Lakes.  Lee  could  then  turn 
his  attention  to  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  or  Washington  ac 
cording  to  circumstances.*  Lee  also  believed  that  the  pres 
ence  of  his  victorious  army  north  of  the  Potomac  "could  not 
fail  to  alarm  the  Federal  authorities  and  make  them  draw  forces 
from  every  quarter  for  the  defense  of  their  capital,  thus  re 
lieving  the  Confederacy  of  pressure,  and — for  a  time  at  least — 
from  the  exhaustion  incident  to  invasion."f  "The  relief  of 
Virginia  for  a  time  from  military  occupation,  and  the  support 
of  the  Confederate  army  in  a  region  not  yet  drained  of  sup 
plies,  were  additional  inducements.''^  Lee  resolved,  therefore, 
to  cross  the  Potomac ;  and  more  effectively  to  threaten  Wash 
ington  and  keep  alive  the  alarm  for  its  safety,  he  chose  a  route 
east  of  the  Blue  Ride  Mountains  rather  than  the  route  down 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  which  would  better  have  concealed  his 
movements. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

There  are  a  few  difficult  fords  in  the  Potomac  between  the 
Great  Falls  and  Conrad's  Ferry,  but  the  river  can  be  forded  at 
many  places  above  this  ferry  in  summer  and  early  fall.  "The 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  a  more  difficult  military  obstacle 
than  the  Potomac  itself,  runs  parallel  to  the  river  across  the 
entire"  theater  of  this  campaign. §  The  Monocacy  River  and 
Catoctin  and  Antietam  Creeks  are  the  only  tributaries  of  any 
military  importance  on  the  north  side  of  the  Potomac. 

The  Blue  Ridge  Mountains  cross  the  State  of  Maryland  in 
two  distinct  ranges  stretching  almost  north  and  south  with  a 
fertile  valley  six  or  eight  miles  wide  between  them.  These 
ranges  are  known  as  the  Catoctin  Mountains  and  South  Moun 
tain.  South  Mountain  is  the  more  difficult  obstacle  and  it  can 
be  crossed  only  at  its  passes,  the  most  important  of  which  are 
Turner's  Gap,  Crampton's  Gap,  and  the  pass  through  which  the 
Potomac  breaks.  About  three  miles  west  of  South  Mountain, 


*J.  G.  Walker  in  B.  &  L. 

fLong. 

^William  Allan. 

§Paper  by  General  Geo.  B.  Davis. 


262  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

at  its  southern  end,  is  another  short  ridge  called  Elk  Ridge, 
which  terminates  in  Maryland  Heights  overlooking  the  Poto 
mac  and  Harper's  Ferry,  and  commanding  Loudon  and  Boli 
var  Heights  on  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac  and  on  opposite 
sides  of  the  Shenandoah  River.  Pleasant  Valley  lies  between 
Elk  Ridge  and  South  Mountain. 

The  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway  crosses  to  the  north  side 
of  the  Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry,  passes  along  the  river-bank 
until  it  breaks  through  the  Catoctin  Mountains,  then  turns 
northeast,  and,  crossing  the  Monocacy  River  at  Frederick 
Junction,  leads  on  to  Baltimore.  There  were  in  1862  no  other 
railways  within  this  field  of  operations.  There  were  several 
turnpikes  in  the  region,  the  best  known  of  which  was  the  old 
National  Road,  which  passed  westward  through  Frederick  City 
and  crossed  South  Mountain  at  Turner's  Gap.  There  were 
earthen  roads  in  all  directions,  and  all  of  them  were  in  good 
condition  in  the  fall.  There  were  a  good  many  small  towns 
and  villages  in  the  country,  of  which  the  most  considerable  was 
Frederick.  The  theater  was  a  comparatively  thickly  settled 
farming  country ;  the  mountains  were,  generally  speaking,  cov 
ered  with  woods ;  and  the  valleys,  also,  except  where  they  had 
been  cleared  for  tillage. 

OPERATIONS. 

Covered  by  Stuart's  cavalry,  which  made  a  demonstration  in 
the  direction  of  Chain  Bridge  and  Alexandria,  Lee's  army 
crossed  the  Potomac  by  the  fords  near  Leesburg  on  the  4th, 
5th,  and  6th  of  September,  and  had  concentrated  about  Fred 
erick  by  the  7th. 

On  this  date  the  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were 
stationed  as  follows:  the  First  [Hooker],  Ninth  [Burnside], 
including  Cox's  Kanawha  division,  at  Leesboro ;  the  Second 
[Sumner]  and  Twelfth*  [Mansfield]  in  front  of  Rockville; 
the  Sixth  [Franklin]  at  Rockville;  Couch's  division  of  the 
Fourth  at  Offutt's  Cross  Roads.f  The  Third  Corps  [Heintzel- 
man],  the  Fifth  [Porter]  and  the  Eleventh  [Sigel]  were  within 
the  lines  of  Washington.  'The  Fifth  was  sent  on  the  12th  of 
September  to  join  McClellan,  thereby  raising  his  entire  [nom- 

*The  Twelfth  Corps  was  composed  of  the  troops  lately  commanded 
by  General  Banks. 
fMcClellan  in  B.  #  L. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  263 

inal]  force  to  nearly  97,000  men."*  The  Union  cavalry  under 
Pleasanton  was  well  in  front  and  in  contact  with  Stuart's 
cavalry,  which,  stretching  from  New  Market  to  Poolesville, 
formed  a  strong  screen  for  Lee's  army.  Pleasanton's  squadrons 
got  in  touch  with  the  Confederate  cavalry  on  the  6th  of  Sep 
tember,  and  maintained  touch  with  it  until  this  cavalry  crossed 
Antietam  Creek  on  the  1 5th ;  and  they  fought  with  it  every  day 
from  the  6th  to  the  15th,  "generally  with  success,  and  always 
with  profit  in  the  way  of  information  as  to  the  movements  and 
designs  of  the  enemy."f 

The  first  stage  in  Lee's  invasion  ended  at  Frederick.  Here 
Lee  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Maryland — which 
had  no  effect — and  gave  his  troops  two  days  of  rest.  His  next 
objective  was  to  be  Harrisburg,  but  before  entering  Pennsyl 
vania  he  must  change  his  line  of  communications.  The  line  by 
which  he  had  advanced,  Manassas-Frederick,  lay  "too  near  the 
Potomac,  and"  was  "liable  to  be  cut  any  day  by  the  enemy's 
cavalry.":):  Lee  gave  orders,  therefore,  to  move  the  line  back 
into  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  But  at  this  time  Harper's  Ferry 
and  Martinsburg  were  occupied  by  about  12,000  Federal  troops. 
These  garrisons  would  have  to  be  captured  or  driven  out  before 
Lee's  communications  could  be  safely  established  by  that 
route.  § 

(134)  Accordingly,  on  the  9th  of  September  at  Frederick 
Lee  issued  his  famous  field  order,  designated  "Special  Orders, 
No.  191,"  for  a  resumption  of  the  march  on  the  following  day. 
Jackson  with  all  of  his  corpsfl  except  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was 
directed  to  march  on  Harper's  Ferry  by  way  of  Sharpsburg 
and  Martinsburg  ;**  McLaws  with  his  own  division  and  R.  H. 
Anderson's  [Longstreet's  corps]  was  to  march  by  way  of 

*Humphreys's  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  did  not  join  McClellan 
until  September  18th,  after  the  battle  of  Antietam. — Ropes. 

fDavis. 

JWalker. 

§It  will  be  seen,  however,  in  the  lecture  on  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
that  Lee's  lines  of  communication  and  retreat  ran  by  way  of  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  while  Harper's  Ferry  was  still  held  by  Union  troops. 

ffThe  different  divisions  were  still  only  associated,  not  formed,  into 
corps.  .  .  .  The  organization  into  corps  was  slowly  develop 
ing  ...  and  was  reached  at  the  close  of  the  campaign.— Alex 
ander. 

**Fearing  that  the  Union  garrison  at  Martinsburg  would  retreat  to 
the  west  and  escape  him,  if  he  moved  on  that  place  by  way  of  Sharps- 
burg,  Jackson  took  a  more  northerly  route  and  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Williamsport.— Ropes. 


264  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Crampton's  Gap  to  Maryland  Heights;  Walker's  division 
[Longstreet's  corps]  was  to  destroy  the  stone  viaduct  by  which 
the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal  crossed  the  mouth  of  the 
Monocacy,  then  to  cross  the  Potomac  near  that  point  and  go 
to  Loudon  Heights;  the  rest  of  Longstreet's  corps  (the  divi 
sions  of  Evans  [Hood  commanding]  and  D.  R.  Jones)  was  to 
march  to  Boonsboro  and  there  halt  with  the  baggage  and  sup 
ply  trains;  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  to  form  the  rear-guard 
of  the  main  column,  with  Stuart's  cavalry  still  farther  behind. 
The  commands  of  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker  were  ordered 
to  rejoin  the  main  body  at  Boonsboro,  after  accomplishing  the 
objects  for  which  they  were  detached. 

Although  it  was  soon  known  by  tHe  authorities  at  Washing 
ton  that  Lee's  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Maryland, 
they  could  not  tell  what  was  its  purpose.  Ever  uneasy  about 
the  safety  of  the  capital,  Halleck  was  afraid  for  McClellan  to 
move  his  troops  far  from  that  city,  and  McClellan  concurred 
in  his  view  of  the  case.  "But  the  report  of  the  cavalry  under 
Pleasanton  .  .  .  finally  satisfied  McClellan,  who  had  been 
slowly  marching  north  with  his  left  on  the  Potomac  and  his 
right  on  the  railroad  which  connected  Washington  with  Balti 
more,  that  Lee  had  fallen  back  behind  the  Monocacy.  Ac 
cordingly,  on  the  10th  of  September  he  pushed  forward  more 
rapidly,  and  on  the  12th  and  13th  the  right  wing  and  center  of 
his  army  entered  Frederick  City."*  McClellan  had  organized 
his  army  into  two  wings  and  a  center  column.  The  right  wing 
under  Burnside  consisted  of  the  First  Corps  [Hooker],  and  the 
Ninth  [now  under  Reno]  ;  the  center  under  Sumner  consisted 
of  the  Second  [his  own]  Corps  and  the  Twelfth  [Mansfield]  ; 
the  left  wing  under  Franklin  consisted  of  the  Sixth  [his  own] 
Corps  and  Couch's  division  of  the  Fourth.  The  Fifth  Corps 
[Porter]  had  not  yet  joined  from  Washington.  The  army 
marched  by  the  three  main  roads:  the  right  wing  by  the 
Brookeville-New  Market  road;  the  center  by  the  Rockville- 
Frederick  road;  the  left  wing  by  the  Offutt's  Cross  Roads- 
Seneca  road. 

On  the  morning  of  September  13  a  copy  of  Lee's  "Special 
Orders,  No.  191"  was  found  at  Frederick  and  handed  to 
McClellan. |  This  gave  him  full  information  of  Lee's  plans, 

*Ropes. 

fThe  copy  of  the  order,  wrapped  around  three  cigars,  was  picked 
up  by  a  Federal  soldier  on  ground  where  the  Confederates  had 
camped. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  265 

and  enabled  him  to  judge  about  where  every  part  of  Lee's  army 
should  be  on  that  day. 

On  the  evening  of  the  13th  the  different  corps  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac  were  bivouacked  as  follows:  the  First  Corps 
on  the  Monocacy  near  Frederick;  the  Ninth  between  Middle- 
town  and  Frederick ;  the  Second  and  Twelfth  and  Sykes's  divi 
sion  [regulars]  of  the  Fifth  at  Frederick;  the  Sixth  at 
Buckeystown;  and  Couch's  division  at  Licksville.*  Pleasan- 
ton's  cavalry  had  pushed  the  Confederate  cavalry  before  it  and 
was  at  the  foot  of  Turner's  Gap. 

Lee's  army  on  the  same  evening  was  distributed  as  follows : 
Stuart's  cavalry  at  the  passes  of  South  Mountain ;  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  on  the  road  between  Turner's  Gap  and  Boonsboro; 
Longstreet  with  his  two  divisions  near  Hagerstown;  Jackson's 
detachment  close  to  Harper's  Ferry;  McLaws  between  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap  and  Maryland  Heights;  Walker's  division  nearing 
Loudon  Heights.  General  Lee  had  meant  to  have  Longstreet 
wait  at  Boonsboro  until  the  detached  troops  rejoined,  while 
D.  H.  Hill  was  to  hold  Turner's  Gap  with  his  whole  division. 
On  the  way,  however,  it  was  learned  that  a  body  of  Pennsylva 
nia  militia  had  collected  at  Chambersburg ;  on  that  account 
Longstreet  was  sent  forward  to  Hagerstown  and  was  at  that 
point,  thirteen  miles  from  Turner's  Gap,  when  the  battle  of 
South  Mountain  began. f 

The  night  of  September  13  Stuart  informed  Lee  that  Mc- 
Clellan  had  come  into  possession  of  a  copy  of  his  field  order, 
and  that  the  advance  of  the  Federal  army  was  at  the  eastern 
foot  of  Turner's  Gap.  Thereupon  Lee  ordered  Longstreet  and 
D.  H.  Hill  to  move  their  forces  back  to  dispute  the  passage  of 
South  Mountain.  Two  of  Hill's  brigades  were  already  at  Tur 
ner's  Gap,  and  the  rest  returned  thither  early  next  morning. 
Longstreet's  troops  did  not  reach  the  ground  till  late  in  the 
afternoon. 

(135)  On  the  morning  of  the  14th  Pleasanton's  cavalry 
opened  the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  At  about  9  a.  m.  Cox 
arrived  with  his  Kanawha  division,"  and  took  command  of  the 
attack.  About  noon  the  rest  of  the  Ninth  Corps  came  up  under 
Reno,  and  later  the  First  [Hooker].  The  entire  right  wing  of 
the  Union  army  was  now  on  the  field,  and  Burnside  took  charge 
of  the  attack.  Hooker's  corps  assaulted  the  left  of  the  Confed 
erate  position,  and  Reno's  the  right  at  Fox's  Gap  on  the  old 


*Davis. 
fAlexander. 


266  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Sharpsburg  Road.*  The  battle  lasted  till  10  p.  m.,  and  when  it 
ceased  both  flanks  of  the  Confederate  position  had  been  envel 
oped.  About  midnight  the  Confederates  began  to  withdraw. 

(136)  Franklin  had  been  ordered  to  move  with  the  left 
wing  by  way  of  Crampton's  Gap  to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Har 
per's  Ferry,  and  to  cut  off  McLaws  on  Maryland  Heights.  At 
about  noon  on  the  14th  the  head  of  his  column  reached  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap  and  found  it  held  by  Confederates.  Franklin  suc 
ceeded  in  carrying  the  pass,  and  by  nightfall  had  "effected  a 
lodgment  of  his  troops  in  Pleasant  Valley."f  A  soon  as  Mc 
Laws  heard  of  this  he  "established  a  formidable  line  of  defense 
across  Pleasant  Valley,  from  Elk  Ridge  on  the  west  to  South 
Mountain  on  the  east,  and  succeeded  in  conveying  to  his  an 
tagonist  the  appearance  of  having  occupied  the  line  in  great 
strength.  Franklin,  in  fact,  thought  that  he  was  outnumbered 
'two  to  one.'  While  he  remained  in  presence  of  this  force 
Harper's  Ferry  surrendered,  and  McLaws,  during  the  after 
noon  of  the  15th,  skilfully  and  without  molestation,  withdrew 
his  command  across  the  river  to  the  town."f 

Let  us  now  see  how  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry  was  ef 
fected.  (134)  The  Federal  detachment  at  Martinsburg  had 
tallen  back  before  Jackson's  column  to  Harper's  Ferry.  (137) 
Jackson  had  been  in  position  in  front  of  Bolivar  Heights  since 
the  13th.  On  that  day  one  of  McLaws's  brigades  had  routed 
the  Federal  detachment  on  Maryland  Heights,  and  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  14th,  while  the  battles  were  going  on  at  Turner's 
Gap  and  Crampton's'  Gap,  McLaws  was  shelling  Harper's 
Ferry  from  those  Heights.  Walker,  also,  had  got  into  position 
on  Loudon  Heights,  and  had  opened  fire  with  his  artillery  in  the 
forenoon  of  the  14th.  "Early  on  the  15th  fire  was  opened  upon 
the  Federal  troops  and  defenses  from  all  quarters;  there  was 
no  resistance;  the  commanders  and  the  troops  considered  their 
case  hopeless ;  and  at  9  a.  m.  the  post  was  surrendered. "J  The 
Federal  cavalry  of  the  garrison,  however,  like  Forrest's  at  Fort 
Donelson,  had  made  its  escape.  Led  by  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis, 
8th  New  York  Cavalry,  it  crossed  the  river  by  the  pontoon- 
bridge  during  the  night  of  the  14th,  rode  by  the  Confederate 
picket  at  a  gallop  in  the  moonlight,  and  hurried  on  through 
Sharpsburg  to  Greencastle,  Pennsylvania ;  and  captured  "an 
ordnance  train  of  Longstreet's  on  the  way."f 


*Reno  was  killed  in  this  battle. 

fRopes. 

^General  Dixon  S.  Miles,  the  commandant,  was  mortally  wounded. 


THE.ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  267 

(138)  Let  us  now  return  to  General  Lee.  The  morning 
after  the  battle  of  South  Mountain  the  Confederate  troops  there 
engaged  fell  back  to  Sharpsburg.  Lee  had  been  informed  that 
Crampton's  Gap  had  been  carried  by  a  Federal  column,  and  he 
had  not  yet  received  word  of  the  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
He  had  with  him  only  about  19,000  men — the  rest  were  invest 
ing  Harper's  Ferry.  His  chief  concern  was  to  reunite  his 
divided  army  before  McClellan  could  fall  upon  the  separated 
parts  in  detail.  The  night  of  the  14th,  after  his  failure  to  hold 
the  mountain  passes,  he  had  resolved  to  withdraw  to  the  south 
side  of  the  Potomac.  He  was  especially  anxious  about  Mc- 
Laws's  force,  which  he  feared  might  be  overwhelmed  or  cut 
off  at  Maryland  Heights.  At  8  p.  m.  of  the  14th  he  "wrote  to 
McLaws,  telling  him  to  abandon  his  poistion  that  night,  and  to 
cross  the  river,  if  possible  by  a  ford  east  of  that  at  Shepherds- 
town,  leaving  the  ford  at  Shepherdstown  for  the  main  army  to 
take."* 

About  noon  on  the  15th  Lee's  force  was  on  its  way  to  this 
ford.  Lee  was  marching  with  the  rear-guard,  and  had 
reached  the  position  now  occupied  by  the  National  Cemetery, 
when  he  was  handed  a  dispatch  stating  that  "Harper's  Ferry 
had  fallen  and  Jackson  was  on  his  way  to  rejoin  him  at  Sharps- 
burg."  "He  at  once  ordered  the  batteries  into  position,  re 
called  D.  H.  Hill's  division  from  [the  ford  at]  the  Potomac, 
and  established  a  line  of  battle  on  the  heights  overlooking  the 
Antietam,  and  commanding  the  approaches  to  the  town  by  the 
Boonsboro  Pike"  and  the  bridge  since  known  as  the  Burnside 
Bridge.  By  nightfall  of  the  15th  the  divisions  of  Hood,  D.  H. 
Hill,  and  D.  R.  Jones  were  in  position  for  battle. f  The  ex 
treme  left  of  the  line  was  held  by  Stuart  with  the  greater  part 
of  the  cavalry  and  horse-artillery  upon  a  commanding  hill  not 
far  from  the  Potomac,  about  a  mile  northwest  of  the  Dunker 
or  Dunkard  church.  Colonel  Munford  with  his  brigade  of 
cavalry  was  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line.* 

The  field  of  the  battle  of  Antietam  lies  in  a  space  from  two 
and  a  half  to  four  miles  wide  between  Antietam  Creek  and  a 
bend  of  the  Potomac.  Sharpsburg  is  near  its  central  and  high 
est  part,  in  a  sort  of  depression.  The  space  was  divided  into 
farms,  and  most  of  the  ground  was  under  cultivation ;  but  there 
were  several  patches  of  wood.  Those  since  known  as  the  East 
Woods  and  the  West  Woods  played  an  important  part  in  the 

*Ropes. 
fDavis. 


268  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

battle.  The  space  was  crossed  by  many  farm  roads,  and  by  the 
Hagerstown  and  the  Boonsboro  turnpikes  which  converged  on 
Sharpsburg.  At  the  eastern  edge  of  the  West  Woods,  a  little 
more  than  a  mile  north  of  Sharpsburg,  was  the  little  church  of 
the  Dunkards. 

The  Antietam  was  spanned  by  four  bridges,  the  Upper, 
the  Middle,  the  Burnside  Bridge,  and  the  bridge  near  the 
mouth  of  the  creek.  The  creek  could  be  forded  almost  any 
where.  From  a  short  way  below  the  Middle  Bridge,  to  its 
mouth,  the  bluffs  on  the  west  of  the  creek  were  steep  and 
rugged.  From  Pry's  Mill  down  to  the  Middle  Bridge  on  the 
east  bank  there  was  a  line  of  prominent  hills,  and  a  single  high 
ridge  from  this  bridge  down  to  the  Burnside  Bridge..  Other 
prominent  hills  were  just  east  of  the  Burnside  Bridge.  From 
positions  upon  these  hills  and  ridges  the  Federal  batteries  swept 
most  of  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Confederate  lines.  Ledges 
of  rock  cropped  out  in  some  parts  of  the  battle-field,  but,  in 
general,  troops  could  pass  in  any  direction,  though  the  ways 
were  obstructed  by  many  rail  fences  and  a  few  stone  walls. 

(139)  After  a  hard  night-march  Jackson  arrived  at  Sharps 
burg  with  Walker's  division  and  two  of  his  own  early  on  the 
16th.  He  had  left  A.  P.  Hill  with  his  division  to  complete  the 
arrangements  for  the  surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry.  McLaws 
with  his  own  division  and  Anderson's  did  not  rejoin  until  the 
morning  of  the  17th.  Jackson's  two  divisions  took  their  place 
on  the  left  of  the  line,  between  the  Hagerstown  Pike  and 
Stuart's  cavalry.  Next  was  Hood's  division,  on  the  pike; 
.then  D.  H.  Hill's  forming  a  curve  parallel  to  the  pike.  Long- 
street  with  D.  R.  Jones's  division  and  Evans's  brigade*  pro 
longed  the  line  to  the  Burnside  Bridge.  Walker's  division  was 
placed  in  reserve  behind  the  right  flank.| 

On  the  15th  McClellan  with  the  right  wing  and  center  of  the 
Federal  army  moved  forward  from  Turner's  Gap  as  far  as 
Keedysville.  Franklin  with  the  left  wing  was  at  Rohrersville 
(133)  watching  for  McLaws.  (139)  A  few  shots  were  ex 
changed  by  the  artillery  late  in  the  afternoon,  but  there  was  no 
other  fighting  that  day.  "The  16th  passed  without  serious 
fighting,"  also,  "though  there  was  desultory  cannonading  and 
picket  firing.":): 

*This  brigade  belonged  to  Evans's  division  now  command  by 
Hood. 

fAlexander. 
JJ.  D.  Cox. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  269 

PLAN  OF  BATTLE. 

In  his  first  report  of  the  battle  of  Antietam  McClellan  says : 
"The  design  was  to  make  the  main  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
left — at  least  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  main  attack, 
with  the  hope  of  something  more,  by  assailing  the  enemy's 
right — and,  as  soon  as  one  or  both  of  the  flank  movements 
were  fully  successful,  to  attack  their  center  with  any  reserve 
I  might  then  have  in  hand."*  This,  then,  was  probably  the 
plan  of  battle  he  -had  in  mind. 

As  the  first  step  in  the  execution  of  this  plan,  the  First  Corps 
[Hooker]  crossed  the  creek  at  the  Upper  Bridge  and  a  ford 
near  by,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  to  look  for  the  Confed 
erate  left.  The  Confederates  saw  the  movement  and  Hood's 
division  was  pushed  forward  into  the  East  Woods  to  meet  it. 
Some  fighting  took  place  there;  during  the  night  Hood  with 
drew,  and  Hooker  deployed  his  corps  ready  to  renew  the  attack 
in  the  morning.  (140)  At  dawn  the  line  advanced,  with 
Doubleday's  division  on  the  right,  Ricketts's  on  the  left,  and 
Meade's  in  reserve  close  behind.  Almost  immediately  it  be 
came  engaged  with  a  part  of  Jackson's  command  that  had 
formed  line  in  a  cornfield  from  the  pike  across  to  the  East 
Woods.  Soon,  also,  Doubleday's  division  on  the  right  en 
countered  the  Confederate  left  in  the  West  Woods.  The  com 
bat  raged  desperately  on  both  sides.  Hooker's  reserve  was 
quickly  brought  into  action,  and  the  Confederates  in  the  corn 
field  were  driven  back ;  but  Hood  soon  came  to  their  relief  with 
his  division,  and  Early  in  the  West  Woods  fell  upon  the  flank 
of  the  Union  line,  while  Stuart's  artillery  raked  it  in  enfilade. 
After  more  than  an  hour  of  hard  fighting  Hooker's  line  was 
forced  back,  leaving  some  of  its  guns  in  the  hands  of  the 
Confederates. 

But  Mansfield's  Union  corps  was  now  coming  upon  the  field. 
This  corps  had  crossed  the  creek  in  the  night,  but,  taking  the 
wrong  direction,  had  bivouacked  more  than  a  mile  north  of 
Hooker's  corps.  (141)  It  had  quitted  its  bivouac  at  daybreak 
and  started  to  Hooker's  support;  but  it  made  its  deployment 
so  slowly  that  it  was  half  after  seven  o'clock  before  any  part 
of  it  got  into  the  battle.  Mansfield  had  been  killed  almost  at 
the  start,  and  General  Williams,  the  senior  division-com 
mander,  was  now  in  command  of  the  corps.  Williams  deployed 
his  own  division  on  the  right  and  Greene's  on  the  left,  and  ad- 


*J.  D.  Cox. 


270  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

vanced  his  line  across  the  cornfield  toward  the  West  Woods. 
It  struck  Hood's  division  in  the  cornfield,  supported  on  its  right 
by  three  of  D.  H.  Hill's  brigades,  and  on  its  left  by  Walker's 
small  division  and  another  brigade  that,  by  this  time,  had 
come  up  from  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line.  Again  the 
combat  raged  fiercely,  and  the  lines  wavered  backward  and  for 
ward  across  the  cornfield.  At  the  end  of  two  hours  the  Fed 
eral  line  had  again  forced  its  enemy  back,  and  reopened  still 
wider  the  gap  that  Hooker's  corps  had  made.  Greene's  divi 
sion  was  in  possession  of  the  Dunker  church  and  a  part  of  the 
woods  near  it.  But  the  whole  Twelfth  Corps  was  by  now  ex 
hausted  with  its  struggle.  Greene's  division  was  content  to 
rest  where  it  was,  and  Williams's  had  to  be  withdrawn  to  the 
rear  to  rest  and  replenish  ammunition.  For  a  time  the  firing 
ceased  altogether.* 

But  the  cessation  was  not  long,  for  the  head  of  the  Second 
Corps  [Sumner]  was  approaching.  From  the  sound  of  the 
first  guns  Sumner  had  been  eager  to  cross  the  Antietam  and 
go  into  the  battle ;  but  not  until  7.20  a.  m.  did  he  succeed  in  get 
ting  his  orders  from  McClellan  to  do  so.  At  about  nine  o'clock 
he  arrived  upon  the  field  at  the  head  of  Sedgwick's  division. 
"He  found  affairs  in  a  desperate  state";  Hooker's  corps  had 
been  repulsed  and  driven  back;  and  the  Twelfth  was  barely 
holding  its  own.f  Sumner  judged  that  a  counter-attack  by  the 
enemy  might  be  expected  at  any  moment,  and  that  the  situation 
called  for  instant  action  on  his  part. 

(142)  So,  without  waiting  for  his  rear  two  divisions 
[French  and  Richardson]  to  come  up,  he  led  Sedgwick's  to  the 
assault  in  close  column  with  brigade  front.  In  this  formation, 
with  the  lines  of  his  assaulting  column  not  more  than  thirty 
yards  apart,  he  advanced  out  of  the  East  Woods,  across  the 
cornfield,  straight  for  the  West  Woods.  He  threw  out  no 
skirmishers,  stopped  not  to  reconnoiter  or  to  inquire  for  the 
position  of  the  enemy.  He  entered  the  wood  to  the  north  of 
the  Dunker  church,  .passed  Greene's  division  on  his  left,  and 
pushed  straight  ahead. %  Without  being  aware  of  it  he  passed 
within  close  range  of  Early's  Confederate  brigade,  and  Wal 
ker's  division  on  his  left,  and  was  just  emerging  from  the  far 
side  of  the  wood  when  Early's  brigade,  which  had  changed  its 
position  under  cover  of  a  ridge,  opened  fire  on  the  flank  of  his 
close  column.  At  the  same  time  McLaws's  division,  from  a 

*Alexander. 
fDavis. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  271 

position  at  the  left-front  of  the  column,  opened  fire  upon  it 
at  close  range,  and  "the  remnants  of  Walker's  two  brigades 
lined  up  against  the  left  flank  of  the  column,  now  almost  help 
less  between  converging  fires."*  (141)  The  divisions  of  Mc- 
Laws  and  Anderson,  after  their  weary  night-march  from  Har 
per's  Ferry,  had  been  allowed  an  hour's  rest,  and  then  hurried 
to  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line.  McLaws's  column  had  not 
quite  finished  its  deployment  when  the  left-front  of  Sumner's 
column  came  before  it.  Anderson's  division  had  gone  to  sup 
port  D.  H.  Hill. 

(143)  Within  a  few  minutes,  more  than  2,200  of  Sumner's 
officers  and  men  had  fallen, — Sedgwick  himself  received  three 
wounds, — and  the  division  started  to  the  rear.  "The  Confed 
erates  followed  in  pursuit,  and  once  more  the  tide  of  battle 
swept  across  the  ghastly  cornfield.  .  .  .  The  Federals  were 
driven  to  the  shelter  of  their  strong  line  of  artillery  in  front  of 
the  North  Wood.  .  .  .  Greene's  men  about  the  Dunker 
church  were  also  forced  back  to  the  Federal  guns,  leaving  the 
Confederate  line  practically  the  same  that  it  had  been  in  the 
morning,  although  now  held  only  by  scattered  fragments  and 
almost  destitute  of  artillery."*  (142)  Meantime  where  were 
the  other  two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  [French  and 
Richardson]  ?  French's  division  crossed  the  Antietam  by  a 
ford  a  short  way  below  the  Upper  Bridge;  but  from  there  it 
diverged  too  far  to  the  south,  and  came  into  the  battle  to  the 
left  of  Greene's  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  striking  the  part 
of  the  Confederate  line  held  by  D.  H.  Hill  near  the  Roulette 
house.  Richardson's  division  came  up  later  on  the  left  of 
French's,  and  their  combined  strength  amounted  to  about 
10,000  muskets.  They  were  opposed  by  some  7,000  Confed 
erates  "in  good  order  and  condition,"  besides  three  brigades 
already  "broken  and  much  demoralized"  by  previous  fighting. 
(143)  The  Confederates  were  soon  driven  back  to  the  sunken 
road  which  has  since  borne  the  name  of  the  Bloody  Lane. 
"The  combat  that  here  took  place,"  says  Ropes,  "was  beyond 
question  one  of  the  most  sanguinary  and  desperate  in  the  whole 
war.  The  carnage  was  awful ;  the  road  was  speedily  filled  with 
the  dead  and  wounded." 

At  last  the  Federal  line  in  its  extension  to  the  left  reached  a 
position  from  which  it  enfiladed  the  Bloody  Lane.  The  com 
mander  of  the  6th  Alabama  at  that  end  of  the  Confederate  line 
was  ordered  "to  throw  his  right  wing  back  and  out  of  the 


*  Alexander. 


272  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

road."  He  gave  the  command  "Sixth  Alabama,  about  face; 
forward  march!"  That  command  was  fatal.  The  whole  line 
gave  way  and  fled  in  confusion,  (144)  leaving  the  Federals  in 
possession  of-  the  Bloody  Lane  and  the  adjacent  hills  to  the 
south  of  it.  General  Alexander  says  that  by  the  mistake  of 
that  officer  "Lee's  army  was  ruined,  and  the  end  of  the  Confed 
eracy  was  in  sight."* 

The  casualties  in  the  two  Federal  divisions  exceeded  2,900, 
but  were  fewer  than  those  of  the  Confederates.  The  Confed 
erate  artillery,  though  suffering  heavily  from  the  superiority 
of  the  Federal  guns  on  the  other  side  of  the  creek,  kept  up  a 
vigorous  fire ;  but  the  battle  was  practically  at  an  end  in  all  the 
left  wing  of  Lee's  line.  There  was  not  a  body  of  infantry  in 
that  quarter  that  could  have  resisted  a  vigorous  charge,  nor  a 
fresh  regiment  in  reserve.  One  more  assault  here  was  all  that 
was  needed  to  win  a  decisive  Union  victory;  maybe  to  destroy 
the  Confederate  army.  That  assault  was  not  made. 

Yet  the  Sixth  Corps  [Franklin],  which  had  not  been  ordered 
back  from  Pleasant  Valley  until  the  night  before,  had  rejoined, 
and  was  now  in  that  part  of  the  field.  The  Fifth  [Porter], 
which  formed  the  general  reserve,  was  also  still  intact,  and  the 
First,  Second,  and  Twelfth,  in  spite  of  the  hard  fighting  they 
had  already  done,  were  able  to  do  more.  Franklin  urged  Mc- 
Clellan  to  let  him  renew  the  attack  with  his  fresh  troops,  but 
Sumner  opposed  it,  and  McClellan  agreed  with  Sumner.  All 
the  morning,  too,  since  nine  o'clock,  Pleasanton's  squadrons 
had  stood  idle  on  the  high  ground  to  the  west  of  the  Middle 
Bridge,  supporting  his  horse  batteries;  and  with  them  were 
several  of  the  regular  battalions  of  Sykes's  infantry  division. 

(143)  To  Burnside  with  the  Ninth  Corps  had  been  as 
signed  the  task  of  attacking  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line. 
He  was  notified  on  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  and  a  little  after 
7  a.  m.  on  the  17th  he  received  orders  to  prepare  for  the  attack. 
He  accordingly  moved  his  command  nearer  to  the  Antietam. 

The  Burnside  Bridge  was  defended  by  Toombs's  brigade  of 
D.  R.  Jones's  Confederate  division,  posted  on  the  bluffs  above 
it,  as  well  as  by  Confederate  batteries  in  the  vicinity  of  where 
the  National  Cemetery  is  now  situated.  At  about  9  a.  m.  Burn- 
side  received  an  order  to  carry  the  bridge  and  assault  the  Con 
federate  line.  "Preparations  for  crossing  the  stream  were  im 
mediately' made.  (144)  Rodman's  division,"  accompanied  by 
one  brigade  of  Cox's  division,  "was  sent  down  the  stream  to  the 


"^Alexander. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  273 

fords.  To  Sturgis's  division,  assisted"  by  Crook's  brigade  of 
Cox's  division,  "was  assigned  the  task  of  carrying  the  stone 
bridge.  Willcox's  division  was  held  in  reserve."* 

With  the  support  of  the  artillery  two  efforts  were  made  to 
rush  the  bridge,  but  both  were  repulsed."  As  yet  no  attempt 
had  been  made  to  ford  the  stream  near  the  bridge,  although  it 
was  fordable  almost  anywhere.  A  third  charge  was  made 
about  one  o'clock,  and  the  bridge  was  carried.  Crook  crossed 
at  a  ford  above.  (145)  Toombs  withdrew  his  brigade  to  the 
right  of  the  main  Confederate  line  on  the  heights  three-quar 
ters  of  a  mile  west  of  the  bridge.  Meantime  Rodman's  divi 
sion  had  crossed  at  Snavely's  Ford,  about  a  mile  below  the 
bridge,  and  it  now  connected  with  the  left  of  Sturgis's  troops 
on  the  west  bank.  Sturgis  was  allowed  to  withdraw  his 
division  upon  the  plea  of  fatigue,  and  Willcox's  division  took 
its  place.  General  Cox  took  command  of  the  Union  troops  on 
the  west  of  the  stream  and  set  about  forming  them  to  assault 
the  right  of  the  Confederate  line,  which  was  held  by  four 
brigades  of  D.  R.  Jones's  division. 

It  was  after  three  o'clock  before  Cox  had  formed  his  lines 
for  the  assault ;  at  four  he  began  his  advance  in  "handsome 
style."  The  Confederates,  only  2»000  strong,  made  a  desperate 
defense,  but  they  were  forced  back — up  the  slope  of  Cemetery 
Hill  and  into  the  edge  of  the  town.  A  Confederate  "battery 
was  captured,  and  a  complete  victory  seemed  within  sight.  But 
this  was  not  to  be."*  At  this  moment  A*  P.  Hill's  division, 
which  had  marched  out  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  crossed  the 
Potomac  unopposed,  was  approaching  the  battle-field.  (146) 
Seizing  his  opportunity,  Hill  threw  his  brigades  against  the  left 
flank  of  Cox's  victorious  troops,  recaptured  the  Confederate 
battery,  and  finally  drove  the  Federals  in  "more  or  less  disorder 
to  the  neighborhood  of  the  bridge,  where  they  bivouacked  for 
the  night.  This  ended  the  battle."* 

The  hostile  armies  bivouacked  on  the  battle-field,"  and  with 
little  change  of  position  remained  there  watching  each  other 
all  the  day  of  the  18th.  (138)  On  the  evening  of  the  18th 
Lee's  army  began  to  withdraw,  and,  undiscovered  by  the  enemy, 
had  recrossed  the  Potomac  at  Blackford's  or  Boteler's  Ford 
by  the  morning  of  the  19th.  Thus  ended  Lee's  invasion  of 
Maryland. 

It  is  very  hard  to  determine  what  was  the  number  of  men 
on  either  side  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  or  as  it  is  called  in 

*  Ropes. 


,  274  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Southern  reports,  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg.  General  George 
B.  Davis  in  his  description  gives  the  following  figures :  "The 
Army  of  the  Potomac  87,164,  of  all  arms,  not  all  of  whom  were 
engaged.  The  Confederate  strength  at  Frederick  2-  .  . 
60,000;  ...  at  the  battle  of  Antietam  .  .  .  about 
37,000."  Mr.  John  Codman  Ropes,  in  his  able  review  of  the 
battle,  says:  "The  Confederate  infantry  did  not  exceed  31,200 
men  or  thereabouts,  while  the  First,  Second,  Ninth,  and 
Twelfth  Corps,  which  were  the  only  troops  put  in  by  Mc- 
Clellan  .  .  .  numbered  about  46,000  men.  .  .  .  Add 
ing  the  Confederate  cavalry  and  artillery  to  their  infantry, 
therefore,  we  have  a  total  of  39,200;  and  adding  the  Fifth  and 
Sixth  Corps  and  the  cavalry  and  artillery  to  the  46,000  Federal 
troops  already  enumerated,  we  arrive  at  a  total  of  about  70,000 
men." 

Ropes  says,  further,  that  it  "was  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles 
of  the  war,  and  it  is  likely  that  more  men  were  killed  and 
wounded  on  the  17th  of  September  than  on  any  single  day  in 
the  whole  war."  General  Alexander  says  "it  was  the  bloodiest 
battle  ever  fought  upon  this  continent."  The  Confederate  loss 
"probably  amounted  to  8,000  men  or  more" ;  that  of  the  Union 
army  is  given  at  12,410  men*  For  the  whole  campaign  Gen 
eral  Alexander  gives  the  following  figures : 

Confederates :     1,924  killed,  9,381  wounded. 

Federals:    3,273  killed,  11,756  wounded. 

COMMENTS. 

(133)  An  unsual  circumstance  of  this  campaign  was  the 
fact  that  Lee  took  the  offensive  and  invaded  the  enemy's  coun 
try  without  any  intention  of  seeking  or  attacking  the  hostile 
army.  He  knew  that  his  army  was  greatly  inferior  in  numbers 
and  in  equipment  to  that  of  his  adversary.  Yet  he  meant  to 
fight  if  the  Federal  army  came  out  to  seek  him,  as  he  felt  sure  it 
would;  he  had  no  thought  of  making  a  mere  raid  into  Mary 
land  and  Pennsylvania;  of  destroying  railways  and  canals  and 
then  making  his  escape  when  the  National  army  came  after 
him. 

In  fact  the  objective  of  this  invasion  was  political  rather 
than  military;  the  campaign,  like  Bragg's  in  Kentucky,  was  an 
example  of  what  Captain  Bigelow  in  his  Principles  of  Strategy 
terms  "political  strategy."  First,  the  Confederate  authorities 
believed  that  Maryland  was  held  in  the  Union  by  force  and  in- 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  275 

timidation,  and  that  the  presence  of  a  Confederate  army  within 
its  borders  would  encourage  and  embolden  its  people  to  break 
away  and  join  Secession.  We  have  seen,  however,  that  this 
did  not  take  place.  Secondly,  there  was  a  large  element  in  the 
North  opposed  to  the  war  and  proclaiming  it  already  a  failure. 
It  was  believed  at  the  South  that  the  presence  of  a  victorious 
Confederate  army  within  loyal  States  would  strengthen  this 
element,  and  strengthen  the  sentiment  at  the  North  in  favor 
of  terminating  the  war.  And  thirdly,  it  was  hoped  that  the 
presence  of  such  an  army  would  make  for  a  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  by  foreign  powers.  Strategically,  then,  the  cam 
paign,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  was  offensive ;  but  tac 
tically  it  could  only  be  defensive,  for  Lee  was  not  strong 
enough  to  attack  McClellan, — to  fight  an  offensive  battle, — 
unless,  of  course,  McClellan  should  divide  his  army,  or  commit 
some  other  fatal  mistake. 

It  is  hard  to  say  whether  Lee  was  right  or  wrong  in  de 
taching  a  large  part  of  his  army — more  than  half  of  it — for  the 
capture  of  Harper's  Ferry.'  Longstreet  advised  against  it,  but 
Jackson  favored  it.  It  was  certainly  contrary  to  a  recognized 
principle  of  war,*  and  it  had  a  very  serious  effect  upon  the  cam 
paign.  Lee  supposed  that  Harper's  Ferry  would  be  abandoned 
by  the  Federals  as  soon  as  his  army  appeared  north  of  the  Poto 
mac.  And  the  place  should  have  been  abandoned  at  that  time. 
It  was  in  an  indefensible  pocket,  and  its  only  supposed  impor 
tance  consisted  in  the  fact  that  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway 
crossed  the  Potomac  there.  But  the  garrison  was  powerless  to 
defend  the  railway  bridge,  commanded  as  the  place  was  by  the 
surrounding  hills.  McClellan  urged  Halleck  to  withdraw  the 
large  garrison  and  order  the  troops  to  join  his  army;  but  Hal 
leck  refused  to  do  so. 

Jackson  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry  about  11,000  prisoners, 
13,000  stand  of  arms,  and  seventy-three  cannon;  but  it  was  not 
for  this  prize  that  the  expedition  was  undertaken.  Lee  says  in 
his  report  that  it  was  "necessary  to  dislodge  the  enemy  before 
concentrating  the  army  west  of  the  mountains,"  because  the 
garrisons  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  Martinsburg  were  upon  the 
new  line  of  communications  that  he  purposed  adopting.  But 
Harper's  Ferry  was  not  a  fortress,  it  was  an  absolutely  untena- 


*Napoleon's  Maxim  LXXVII.  .  .  .  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Turenne, 
and  Frederick,  as  well  as  Alexander,  Hannibal  and  Caesar,  have  all 
acted  upon  the  same  principles.  These  were — to  keep  their  forces 
united;  to  leave  no  weak  part  unguarded;  to  seize  quickly  important 
points. 


276  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ble  place.  Lee's  communications  could  not,  of  course,  cross 
the  Potomac  at  that  point  while  the  garrison  stood  there;  but 
this  alone  did  not  justify  Lee  in  dividing  his  army — in  separat 
ing  the  two  parts  by  rivers  and  mountains  and  so  many  miles  of 
distance  that  neither  part  could  go  to  the  support  of  the  other, 
in  case  the  enemy  attacked  one  part  with  all  his  strength. 

It  would  have  been  safer  for  Lee  to  abandon  his  original  line 
of  communications  and  live  off  the  country  for  a"  while,  if  neces 
sary,  as  Grant  did  later  in  the  Vicksburg  Campaign.  Indeed 
the  Confederate  soldiers  were  already  subsisting  mainly  upon 
roasting-ears  and  fruit  gathered  along  the  way.*  While  the 
Union  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  would  imperil  his  line  of 
communications  by  way  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  it  was  not 
strong  enough  to  jeopard  his  line  of  retreat  by  that  route. 

Lee  did  not  expect  to  hold  Harper's  Ferry ;  so  what  was  there 
to  prevent  McClellan,  or  Halleck,  from  sending  another  gar 
rison  thither  as  soon  as  Jackson  turned  his  back  upon  the 
place?  Likewise  McClellan  might  have  sent  back  a  corps  to 
occupy  Winchester,  and  another  to  Charlestown,  and  corps  to 
any  other  places  on  the  Confederate  line  of  communications, 
if  he  had  chosen  to  split  his  army  up  in  so  unscientific  a  man 
ner.  There  was  probably  not  another  point  between  Richmond 
and  Hagerstown  that  could  not  have  been  held,  if  once  taken, 
more  easily  than  Harper's  Ferry. 

With  the  view,  however,  that  Harper's  Ferry  had  to  be  cap 
tured  before  Lee  could  proceed  farther,  his  safest  plan  would 
have  been  to  march  his  main  body  by  way  of  Crampton's  Gap 
instead  of  by  way  of  Turner's  Gap,  thus  keeping  it  within  sup 
porting  distance  of  the  troops  detached,  and  leaving  no  road 
open  by  which  the  enemy  could  enter  between  his  divided 
forces. 

The  truth  of  the  whole  matter  is,  however,  that  Lee  was 
emboldened  to  take  such  a  risk  as  he  took  by  the  slow  and 
leisurely  way  in  which  McClellan's  army  was  following  him. 
And  but  for  the  untoward  incident  of  the  "lost  order"  Jackson 
would  probably  have  captured  Harper's  Ferry  and  rejoined 
Lee  with  McLaws  and  Walker  and  A.  P.  Hill  before  McClellan 
gained  the  top  of  South  Mountain.  But  McClellan  was  not 
altogether  to  blame  for  his  slow  and  cautious  pursuit.  True, 
he  reckoned  that  Lee  had  an  army  of  120,000  men,  and  he  was 
correspondingly  careful.  But  the  telegrams  he  was  receiving 
hourly  from  Halleck  at  Washington  would  have  held  him  back 


*Alexander. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  277 

even  if  he  had  felt  any  inclination  to  move  fast.  Halleck,  says 
General  Franklin,  "could  not  divest  himself  of  the  notion  that 
Lee  was  about  to  play  the  Union  army  some  slippery  trick  by 
turning  its  left,  getting  between  it  and  Washington  and  Balti 
more,  and  then  taking  each  city  by  a  coup-de-main."  The 
burden  of  Halleck's  dispatches  to  McClellan  was  to  watch 
his  left  flank,  and  not  to  let  Lee  turn  it  and  get  between  him 
and  Washington.  There  were,  in  fact,  enough  troops  in 
Washington  to  hold  that  city  against  Lee's  army,  even  if 
McClellan's  forces  had  been  removed  from  the  theater  alto 
gether. 

The  chance  finding  on  the  13th  September  of  Lee's  order  No. 
191,  dated  the  9th,  ought  to  have  cleared  up  all  doubt  concern 
ing  Lee's  plans.  Seldom  in  war  has  a  commanding  general 
been  so  favored  by  luck  as  McClellan  was  in  getting  hold  of 
that  order.  The  circumstances  under  which  it  was  found,  and 
the  fact  that  officers  at  McClellan's  headquarters  recognized 
the  signature  as  genuine,  coupled  with  what  was  already 
known  of  Lee's  columns,  left  little  doubt  as  to  the  authenticity 
of  the  order.  Yet  McClellan  was  slow  to  take  advantage  of 
his  good  luck.  Now  was  the  time  for  extra  exertion.  The 
march  so  far  had  been  very  easy.  Instead  of  resting  the  night 
of  the  13th,  as  it  did,  the  army  should  have  pressed  forward. 
There  was  a  moon  to  light  the  way.*  If  McClellan's  main 
army  had  pressed  forward  it  would  have  reached  Turner's  Gap 
by  daylight,  and  brushed  away  Stuart's  little  force  of  cavalry, 
and  D.  H.  Hill's  two  brigades,  and  been  in  possession  of  the 
pass  long  before  Longstreet's  command  could  have  marched 
back  from  Hagerstown,  and  even  before  D.  H.  Hill  could  have 
brought  back  his  advanced  troops  from  Boonsboro.  If  there 
had  been  any  battle  at  all  at  South  Mountain  it  would  have 
been  a  small  affair. 

Likewise  at  Crampton's  Gap:  Franklin's  corps  did  not 
reach  it  until  noon  of  the  14th,  and  did  not  succeed  in  getting 
through  it  into  Pleasant  Valley  much  before  dark.  Yet  it  was 
defended  then  only  "by  Munford's  cavalry  [brigade],  as 
sisted,  but  not  very  efficiently,  by  troops  of  McLaw's  com 
mand.'^  Had  Franklin  reached  there  earlier  and  attacked  with 
more  vigor  and  skill  he  might  have  saved  Harper's  Ferry,  and 
ought  to  have  handled  McLaw's  force,  much  smaller  than  his 
own,  very  roughly.  Instead  of  these  successes,  Harper's  Ferry 


*Alexander. 
tRopes. 


278  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

surrendered  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  McLaws  "with 
out  molestation  withdrew  his  command  across  the  river  to  the 
town."* 

But  the  relief  of  Harper's  Ferry  would  have  been  as  nothing 
compared  to  the  greater  advantage  such  prompt  action  would 
have  brought  McClellan — the  advantage  of  having  his  entire 
army  over  the  mountains,  and  upon  interior  lines,  between  the 
separated  parts  of  Lee's  army,  ready  to  unite  and  cut  off  the 
troops  with  Lee  and  Longstreet  from  their  line  of.  retreat,  and 
maybe  to  capture  or  destroy  them.  A  still  more  certain  way 
for  McClellan  to  have  achieved  this  result  would  have  been  to 
push  forward  with  his  whole  army  on  the  afternoon  and  night 
of  the  13th  of  September  for  Crampton's  Gap.  This  would 
almost  surely  have  brought  his  united  corps  between  the  sepa 
rated  parts  of  the  Confederate  army.  Here  he  threw  away  the 
same  sort  of  chance  that  Pope  lost  when  he  withdrew  McDow 
ell  from  Gainesville.f 

After  the  battle  of  South  Mountain  Lee  was  allowed  to 
escape  with  his  army,  and  by  the  afternoon  of  the  15th  he  was 
in  position  behind  Antietam  Creek.  The  distance  from  Turner's 
Gap  to  Antietam  Creek  is  not  ten  miles ;  yet  so  slowly  and  de 
liberately  did  McClellan  follow  that  it  was  not  till  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  16th  when  his  first  troops,  Hooker's  single 
corps,  crossed  the  creek  and  moved  against  Lee's  line.  What 
the  purpose  of  sending  this  corps  over  alone  was,  it  is  hard  to 
say,  unless  it  was  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  force  in  order  to 
ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy's  left.  What  it  did  was 
plainly  to  indicate  to  Lee  where  McClellan  purposed  making 
his  main  attack,  and  to  enable  Lee  to  place  his  own  troops 
accordingly. 

Franklin,  having  failed  to  save  Harper's  Ferry,  and  having 
let  McLaws  escape  on  the  15th,  should  have  been  ordered 
to  rejoin  McClellan  without  delay,  in  order  to  take  part  in  the 
impending  engagement;  but  it  was  not  till  the  night  of  the 
16th  that  he  received  an  order  to  quit  Pleasant  Valley  and  re 
join  the  main  body.  He  was  not  -then  required  to  bring  his 
whole  force,  but  was  directed  to  leave  Couch's  division  [Fourth 
Corps]  to  hold  Maryland  Heights — for  what  purpose  it  is  im 
possible  to  say. 

Longstreet  did  not  favor  giving  battle  at  Sharpsburg.  He 
wanted  Lee  to  withdraw  to  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac. 


*Ropes. 
fAlexander. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  279 

Lee  wanted  to  fight  at  Sharpsburg,  and  Jackson  concurred  with 
him.  Lee  could  probably  have  crossed  his  army  and  trains  over 
the  Potomac  without  any  serious  opposition  by  McClellan,  and 
no  good  reason  can  be  seen  why  he  did  not  do  so.  Politically 
his  invasion  of  Maryland  had  already  proved  a  failure,  and  his 
defeat  at  South  Mountain  had  stopped  his  progress  toward 
Pennsylvania.  But  Lee  thought  the  morale  and  prestige  of 
his  army,  and,  no  doubt,  public  sentiment  at  the  South,  re 
quired  that  he  should  win  a  victory  north  of  the  Potomac. 
There  could  have  been  no  other  reasons  for  the  battle  of  An- 
tietam,  and  those  were  not  sufficient  reasons. 

Strategically  Lee's  position  in  this  battle  was  as  bad  as  it 
could  be.  Two  miles  directly  behind  it  was  an  impassable 
canal  and  river,  and  his  only  line  of  retreat  led  away  from  his 
right  flank  to  a  difficult  ford  less  than  three  miles  distant. 
The  wages  of  defeat  ought  to  have  been  destruction ;  while 
\he  reward  of  victory  could  only  have  been  the  enemy's  re 
pulse.  In  their  attack  the  Federals  were  so  well  covered  by 
their  superior  artillery  upon  the  hills  on  the  eastern  side  of. 
Antietam  Creek  that  they  would  have  been  protected  from  a 
Confederate  counter-attack,  in  case  of  their  repulse,  just  as 
they  were  later  at  Fredericksburg  by  the  batteries  on  Stafford 
Heights.*  A  Confederate  victory  could  have  had  no  decisive 
results. 

General  Palfrey  says  in  his  account  of  this  battle:  "If  Lee 
had  been  in  McClellan's  place  on  the  17th  of  September,  and 
had  sent  Jackson  to  conduct  the  right  attack  and  Longstreet 
to  force  the  passage  of  the  lower  bridge  and  turn  the  Con 
federate  left  [sic],  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  though 
commanded  by  a  second  Lee,  a  second  Jackson,  and  a  second 
Longstreet,  would  have  ceased  to  exist  that  day."  McClellan 
claims  to  have  defeated  Lee  in  the  battle;  but  it  is  hard  to  say 
which  should  reflect  least  credit  upon  the  Union  commander, 
not  to  have  defeated  Lee's  army,  or  not  to  have  destroyed  it  if 
he  defeated  it.  Truth  to  tell,  McClellan  did  neither. 

The  strategical  employment  of  the  cavalry  on  both  sides  in 
the  campaign  was  excellent.  The  hostile  cavalry  forces  were 
in  contact  with  each  other  from  the  moment  the  Confederates 
crossed  the  Potomac,  until  the  two  armies  confronted  each 
other  across  the  Antietam,  each  covering  the  columns  of  its 
own  army  and  gathering  all  possible  information  of  its  enemy. 
Pleasanton's  advanced  cavalry  was  in  touch  with  Stuart's 

*Alexander. 


280  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

squadrons  at  the  eastern  foot  of  Turner's  Gap  on  the  evening 
of  September  13,  and  opened  the  battle  the  next  morning.  If 
it  had  been  promptly  supported  by  infantry  in  sufficient  force, 
as  it  should  have  been,  the  pass  would  have  been  in  possession 
of  the  Federals  within  three  hours. 

It  is  idle  to  speculate  upon  what  might  have  been  the  out 
come  of  this  campaign,  if  Lee  had  not  detached  the  expedition 
against  Harper's  Ferry,  and  if  his  "lost  order"  had  not  fallen 
into  McClellan's  hands.  Even  with  the  garrison  of  Harper's 
Ferry  out  of  the  way,  and  his  line  of  communications  estab 
lished  through  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  it  cannot  be  seen  how 
Lee  could  have  penetrated  far  into  Pennsylvania.  Staunton, 
150  miles  in  rear,  was  the  nearest  railway  point  upon  his  line 
of  communications;  he  could  not  have  kept  his  army  sup 
plied  over  so  great  a  distance  by  wagon-trains.* 

He  had,  moreover,  only  55,000  men,  with  little  hope  of  re 
inforcements;  while  McClellan  had  nearly  90,000,  with  strong 
reinforcements  on  the  way  to  join  him.  McClellan's  army  was 
marching,  but  marching  very  slowly,  straight  against  Lee's 
line  of  retreat.  If  Lee's  army  had  remained  at  Hagerstown 
or  had  gone  farther  northward  McClellan  could  easily  have 
thrown  his  army  across  its  rear  and  cut  off  its  retreat.  Lee 
would  then  have  had  to  fight  faced  to  the  rear  against  almost 
double  his  numbers.  At  best  it  could  only  have  been  the  Get 
tysburg  campaign  set  forward  ten  months;  but  Gettysburg 
might  have  been  otherwise  with  Stonewall  Jackson  alive,  and 
McClellan,  not  Meade,  in  command  of  the  Union  army. 

TACTICS. 

(139)  The  field  of  Antietam  was  far  better  tactically  than 
strategically  for  a  defensive  battle.  The  line  had  a  sort  of  ir 
regular  ridge  to  rest  upon,  while  its  left  was  protected  by  a 
bend  of  the  Potomac  and  its  right  rested  upon  heights  over 
looking  the  Antietam  and  had  the  town  of  Sharpsburg  as  a 
rallying-point  behind  it.  This  flank  was,  nevertheless,  the 
weakest  part  of  the  line;  it  was  practically  "in  the  air,"  and 
could  easily  have  been  turned  or  enveloped.  There  were 
woods,  ledges  of  rock,  stone  walls,  uneven  ground,  and  sunken 
roads,  all  of  which  were  used  by  the  Confederates  for  cover. 
Sharpsburg  contained  many  old  brick  buildings,  which  gave  it 
something  of  the  defensive  strength  of  European  villages. 


*Alexander. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  281 

The  right  of  the  Confederate  line  had  already  taken  refuge  in 
the  streets,  when  A.  P.  Hill's  timely  arrival  on  the  field  saved 
the  town  from  the  necessity  of  having  its  strength  put  to  the 
test.  This  was  one  of  the  few  engagements  of  the  war  in 
which  a  village  was  included  within  the  lines  of  battle. 

Antietam  Creek  in  front  of  the  line,  though  bridged  at  four 
places  and  fordable  nearly  everywhere,  was  nevertheless  a  con 
siderable  obstacle.  It  was  not,  however,  so  serious  an  ob 
stacle  as  Burnside  regarded  it.  Along  the  greater  part  of  their 
position  the  Confederates  had  a  comparatively  clear  field  of 
fire  for  their  infantry.  The  field,  however,  was  generally 
narrow,  and  was  obstructed  in  some  quarters  by  high  corn 
and  in  others  by  woods.  There  were  fairly  good  positions  for 
the  artillery,  but  they,  like  all  parts  of  the  field,  were  com 
manded  by  the  Federal  batteries  on  the  far  side  of  the  stream. 
Good  roads  in  rear  of  the  line  enabled  troops  to  march  quickly 
from  one  place  to  another,  generally  under  cover.  The  posi 
tion  could  have  been  greatly  strengthened  by  intrenchments, 
and  there  was  ample  time  to  dig  them.  The  advantage  they 
would  have  given  was  shown  by  the  defense  of  the  Bloody 
Lane — a  sunken  earthen  road,  .which  could  not  be  carried 
until  it  was  enfiladed. 

On  account  of  the  walls  and  fences  and  ledges  of  rock  the 
ground  was  not  suitable  for  the  charge  of  cavalry;  but  the 
squadrons  of  Stuart  and  Munford  effectually  guarded  the 
flanks  of  the  position. 

Ropes  remarks :  "Of  General  Lee's  management  of  the  bat 
tle  there  is  nothing  but  praise  to  be  said";  he  might  have 
added :  "Of  McClellan's  management  of  the  attack  there  is 
nothing  but  censure  to  be  said."  In  the  first  place,  no  ade 
quate  reconnaissance  was  made  to  find  out  the  position  occu 
pied  by  the  Confederates;  where  the  creek  could  be  forded, 
etc.  When  the  attack  was  finally  made  it  was  made  piece 
meal;  in  fact  there  were  five  separate  and  distinct  attacks  by 
detachments,  instead  of  one  single  attack  by  the  whole  army 
with  a  general  reserve  held  back  to  throw  in  at  the  critical  mo 
ment.  First  there  was  Hooker's  attack  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  16th ;  secondly,  Hooker's  attack  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th;  thirdly,  Williams's  attack  with  the  Twelfth  Corps  after 
Hooker's  repulse  on  the  17th;  fourthly,  Sumner's  attack  after 
Williams's,  and  the  attack  of  French  and  Richardson  about 
the  same  time  at  another  part  of  the. line;  fifthly,  Burnside's 
attack  on  the  Confederate  right.  If  all  the  corps  engaged  in 
these  attacks  had  assaulted  Lee's  line  at  the  same  time  it  does 


282  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

not  seem  possible  for  him  to  have  escaped  a  disastrous  defeat. 
But  since  they  assaulted  one  at  a  time  Lee  was  enabled  to  with 
draw  troops  from  one  part  of  his  line  and  send  them  to  another 
where  for  the  moment  they  were  needed.  Thus  he  withdrew 
Walker  from  his  right  and  sent  him,  as  well  as  McLaws,  to 
his  left  in  time  to  repulse  Sumner's  impulsive  column. 

The  Federal  troops,  however,  had  fought  so  well  that,  not 
withstanding  the  mistakes  of  their  commanders,  a  decisive  vic 
tory  was  still  within  McClellan's  reach,  and  he  had  but  to  close 
his  grasp  upon  it.  By  the  time  that  Franklin's  corps  had 
reached  the  field  from  Pleasant  Valley,  on  the  17th,  Lee's  army 
was  well-nigh  exhausted.  Nearly  a  fourth  of  his  soldiers 
were  dead  or  wounded,  and  there  was  not  a  regiment  in  re 
serve.  It  was  the  crisis  of  the  battle.  French  and  Richardson 
had  possession  of  the  Bloody  Lane,  and  if  Franklin's  fresh 
battalions  had  renewed  the  assault,  Lee's  spent  troops  must 
have  been  routed.  And  McClellan  had  other  fresh  troops  be 
sides  Franklin's  corps ;  Porter's  Fifth  Corps  was  practically 
intact.  "McClellan  had  some  24,000  troops  who  had  not  been 
seriously  engaged"  in  the  battle.*  A  still  more  decisive  result 
might  have  been  achieved  if  these  24,000  men  had  been  led 
across  Antietam  Creek,  by  the  fords  near  its  mouth  and  by  the 
lower  bridge,  and  hurled  against  the  right  of  Lee's  line.  This 
would  have  cut  Lee  off  from  his  line  of  retreat  by  way  of 
Boteler's  Ford.  McClellan's  main  attack  should  have  been 
made  against  this  flank  of  Lee's  army. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th  Couch  and  Humphreys  arrived 
with  more  than  12,000  fresh  troops.  Why  did  not  McClellan 
renew  the  battle?  In  McClellan's  Own  Story  the  Union  com 
mander  admits  that  he  was  afraid  to  renew  the  attack.  "At 
that  critical  juncture,"  says  he,  "I  should  have  had  a  narrow 
view  of  the  condition  of  the  country  had  I  been  willing  to 
hazard  another  battle  with  less  than  an  absolute  assurance  of 
success.  •;  -.  .  One  battle  lost  and  almost  all  would  have 
been  lost.  Lee's  army  might  then  have  marched  as  it  pleased 
on  Washington,  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  or  New  York."  Such 
timidity  is  not  consistent  with  the  character  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  an  army;  and  it  does  not  win  victories.  In  re 
maining  upon  the  field  and  offering  battle  on  the  18th,  "Lee 
had  everything  to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain" ;  all  of  his  com 
manders  were  in  favor  of  withdrawing  on  the  night  of  the 
17th.  "Lee,  alone,  was  in  no  wise  moved,"  says  General  Alex- 

*Ropes. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN.  283 

ander.  "He  had  read  McClellan's  inmost  soul  and  knew  he 
was  not  to  be  feared."  By  standing  his  ground  defiantly  an 
other  day  instead  of  taking  to  flight  that  night,  Lee  strength 
ened  the  morale  of  his  troops,  and  saved  the  prestige  of  his 
army. 

Burnside's  failure  to  cross  the  creek  and  assault  the  right  of 
the  Confederate  line  before  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th  enabled  Lee  to  draw  6,000  men  from  that  flank  with 
which  to  save  his  left;  and  it  also  gave  A.  P.  Hill  time  to  come 
up  from  Harper's  Ferry  and  reach  the  field  at  the  exact  mo 
ment  -to  wrest  victory  from  the  assaulting  column.  If  the 
Union  cavalry  had  been  guarding  the  flanks  of  the  attack,  in 
stead  of  standing  idle  at  the  center,  the  approach  of  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  would  have  been  discovered  in  time  for  dis 
positions  to  be  made  to  meet  it. 

General  George  B.  Davis,  in  his  review  of  the  campaign, 
says:  "The  management  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was. 
halting,  dilatory,  wanting  in  firm  direction  and  to  a  degree 
irresolute  and  unskilful";  and  of  the  battle,  "The  artillery 
alone,  everywhere  on  the  field,  had  been  brilliantly  handled  and 
had  rendered  most  valuable  service  to  the  Union  cause.  At 
times,  indeed,  the  Federal  lines  were  practically  held  by  the 
superb  management  of  the  light  batteries,  which  dominated 
everywhere  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  compelled  his  infantry 
to  seek  shelter  from  the  effects  of  their  destructive  and  well- 
directed  fire."  From  beginning  to  end  of  the  campaign  the 
Confederate  commander's  conduct  was  characterized  by  bold 
ness,  resolution,  and  quickness;  the  Federal  commander's  by 
timidity,  irresolution,  and  slowness. 


LECTURE  XIV. 
THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 

(147)  We  saw  in  the  last  lecture  that  Lee's  army  with 
drew  from  the  battle-field  of  Antietam  on  the  night  of  the  18th 
September,  1862,  and  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Boteler's  or 
Blackford's  Ford.  The  next  morning,  the  19th,  the  Federal 
cavalry  started  in  pursuit,  but  found  the  fords  covered  by 
Confederate  batteries.  The  Fifth  Corps  [Porter]  was  ordered 
to  support  the  cavalry,  and  Porter  determined  to  carry  the 
fords.  By  night  he  had  succeeded  in  making  a  lodgment  on 
the  south  bank  of  the  river,  having  captured  five  Confederate 
guns. 

The  following  morning,  the  20th,  the  divisions  of  Morell  and 
Sykes  were  sent  across  the  river  to  make  a  reconnaissance 
in  force.  They  found  an  overwhelming  body  of  Confederates 
under  A.  P.  Hill,  and  were  driven  back  with  considerable  loss. 
The  result  of  this  reconnaissance  was  to  put  a  stop  to  any  fur 
ther  pursuit  or  other  offensive  movement  on  the  part  of 
McClellan's  army  for  the  time  being. 

Lee's  army  went  into  camp  in  the  fertile  valley  of  Opequan 
Creek  to  rest  and  regain  strength  after  its  hard  campaign, 
while  it  kept  watch  upon  the  movements  of  the  Federal  army. 
The  Confederate  army  had  lost  many  thousands  of  men  by 
straggling,  much  of  it  due  to  the  soldiers'  lack  of  shoes  and 
their  bodily  weakness,  but  much  of  it  due,  also,  to  a  lack  of 
discipline  in  the  ranks.  The  army  went  into  the  battle  of  An 
tietam  with  fewer  than  40,000  troops,  but  "its  numbers  rose 
by  October  20  to  68,000  men  'present  for  duty/  "*  It  was 
now  for  the  first  time  definitely  organized  into  the  1st  and  2nd 
Corps,  under  Longstreet  and  Jackson,  respectively,  who  had 
been  made  lieutenant-generals.  Major-generals  and  briga 
diers  were  also  promoted  to  command  the  divisions  and  bri 
gades,  respectively,  into  which  the  corps  were  subdivided.! 
The  army,  moreover,  had  received  such  supplies  as  the  Con 
federate  government  was  able  to  furnish  it.  The  Federal 
army,  also,  was  in  need  of  recruits  and  supplies,  rest  and 
recuperation.  McClellan  did  not  consider  it  in  a  fit  condition 
to  follow  up  at  once  the  advantage  gained  by  the  victory  he 


*Allan. 
fAlexander. 

284 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  285 

claimed  at  Antietam.  So  he  contented  himself  with  having 
expelled  the  enemy  from  Maryland,  and  with  negative  meas 
ures  to  prevent  his  return,  while  he  looked  after  the  refitting 
and  reorganizing  of  his  army.  He  garrisoned  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  fortified  Maryland,  Loudoun,  and  Bolivar  Heights,  where 
he  stationed  Sumner  with  the  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps.* 

But  the  authorities  at  Washington  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  impatient  for  McClellan  to  resume  the  of 
fensive  while  the  fine  autumn  weather  lasted  and  the  roads 
remained  good.  On  the  6th  of  October  Halleck,  by  direction 
of  the  President,  sent  to  McClellan  an  order  to  "cross  the  Poto 
mac  and  give  battle  to  the  enemy,  or  drive  him  south."*  But 
such  were  the  hindrances  encountered  by  McClellan  in  getting 
supplies  for  his  army,  due  apparently  more  to  the  incom 
petence  and  hostility  of  Halleck  than  to  anything  else,  that  it 
was  not  till  near  the  end  of  October  that  he  felt  ready  to 
cross  the  Potomac. 

STUART'S  RAID. 

Meantime  Stuart  had  aggravated  the  impatience  at  the 
North  by  making  a  cavalry  raid  through  Maryland  into  Penn 
sylvania,  and  entirely  around  the  Federal  army.  Skilfully 
eluding  the  Federal  garrisons  along  the  upper  Potomac,  he 
crossed  the  river  near  the  mouth  of  Black  Creek  on  the  10th 
of  October  with  the  three  Brigades  of  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Wade 
Hampton,  and  W.  E.  Jones,  about  1,800  troopers,  and,  avoid 
ing  Hagerstown,  which  was  strongly  garrisoned  by  Union 
troops,  pushed  on  through  Mercersburg  to  Chambersburg. 
Here  he  gathered  about  500  horses,  and  destroyed  a  machine 
shop  and  a  lot  of  public  stores,  then  bivouacked  in  the  streets 
of  the  town,  and  was  off  again  by  daybreak  of  the  llth.  He 
marched  east  as  far  as  Cashtown;  then  took  the  Emmitsburg 
Road  and  the  route  down  the  Monocacy  Valley ;  then  he  passed 
out  through  Hyattstown,  and  recrossed  the  Potomac  into  Vir 
ginia  near  Poolesville.  He  hastened  on  by  way  of  Leesburg, 
and  on  the  13th  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains  to  rejoin 
Lee.  "The  distance  traveled  had  been  126  miles,  of  which  the 
last  eighty  from  Chambersburg  were  accomplished  without  a 

halt."t 

The  news  of  the  raid  reached  McClellan's  headquarters  on 
the  evening  of  the  10th;  Pleasanton  and  Averell  with  the  Union 

*  Ropes. 
[Alexander. 


286  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

cavalry  were  at  once  started  in  pursuit,  and  the  Federal  gar 
risons  along  the  Potomac,  as  far  as  Poolesville,  were  warned 
to  watch  for  Stuart  at  the  fords.  Pleasanton's  scouts  came 
upon  the  raiding  column  just  before  it  reached  the  Potomac, 
but  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  stop  it;  nor  were  200  in 
fantrymen,  who  had  been  stationed  at  the  ford  to  guard  it. 
The  Count  of  Paris  says:  "It  [the  Confederate  column]  had 
scarcely  reached  the  other  side,  when  it  saw  Pleasanton  ap 
proaching  in  one  direction,  whose  march  had  been  retarded  by 
the  slow  movements  of  the  infantry  and  artillery,  and  in  an 
other  direction  a  brigade  which  had  left  Poolesville  since  morn 
ing,  and  which  had  lost  much  valuable  time  on  the  road." 
Pleasanton  had  made  a  march  of  fifty-five  miles  in  twenty-four 
hours,  partly  over  mountain  roads;  and  Averell's  brigade  had 
traveled  200  miles  in  four  days ;  but  the  commands  were  broken 
down  by  the  hard  marching,  and  had  to  rest  and  receive  sev 
eral  thousand  fresh  horses  before  they  were  fit  for  further 
active  service.  Thus  the  raid  hindered  McClellan's  operations. 
Yet  the  results  were  hardly  worth  the  risk;  Stuart  ought  to 
have  lost  his  whole  command,  but  by  reason  of  good  luck  and 
better  management  he  lost  only  one  man  wounded.* 

PLANS  AND  OPERATIONS. 

(148)  In  his  dispatch  of  October  the  6th,  mentioned  before, 
Halleck  told  McClellan  that  the  President  preferred  that  he 
should  move  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains,  so  as  to  cover 
Washington;  and  that,  if  he  should  adopt  this  line  of  march 
he  would  be  furnished  30,000  reinforcements;  but,  if  he  decided 
to  move  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  he  could  be  given  only 
12,000  or  15,000  reinforcements.  At  this  time  the  waters  of 
the  Potomac  were  very  low,  and  McClellan  feared  that,  as 
soon  as  he  removed  his  main  army  from  Lee's  front,  Lee  would 
again  cross  into  Maryland.  McClellan  replied,  therefore,  to 
Halleck  that  "  'he  had  determined  to  adopt  the  line  of  the 
Shenandoah  for  immediate  operations/  but  that  he  did  not  re 
gard  the  line  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  as  important  for  ulte 
rior  objects.  .  .  .  'The  only  possible  object/  he  continued, 
'to  be  gained  by  an  advance  from  this  vicinity,  is  to  fight  the 
enemy  near  Winchester/  "f 

^Alexander. 
fRopes. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  287 

By  the  time,  however,  that  McClellan  was  ready  to  start,  the 
October  rains  had  raised  the  river,  and  'the  Union  general  felt 
sure  that  another  invasion  of  the  North  was  no  longer  to  be 
apprehended,  and  that  he  could  safely  adopt"  the  line  of  ad 
vance  east  of  the  Mountains.*  Nevertheless,  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  now  commanded  by  Slocum,  was  left  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
"and  Morrell  with  about  4,500  men  was  directed  to  guard  the 
upper  Potomac."*  McClellan's  army  began  to  cross  the  Poto 
mac  at  Berlin  on  the  26th  of  October,  but  the  last  troops  were 
not  over  before  the  2nd  of  November.  With  its  right  flank 
covered  by  Pleasanton's  cavalry  the  army  then  directed  its 
march  upon  Warrenton  as  its  first  objective. 

PLAN. 

At  this  time  McClellan  does  not  appear  to  have  had  a  defi 
nite  plan.  His  movements  were  to  depend  upon  those  of  the 
enemy.  He  says:  "It  was  my  intention  if,  upon  reaching 
Ashby's  or  any  other  pass,  I  found  that  the  enemy  was  in  force 
between  it  and  the  Potomac,  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah, 
to  move  into  the  Valley  and  endeavor  to  gain  their  rear.  I 
hardly  hoped  to  accomplish  this,  but  did  expect  that  by  strik 
ing  in  between  Culpeper  Court  House  and  Little  Washing 
ton  I  could  either  separate  their  army,  and  beat  them  in  detail, 
or  else  force  them  to  concentrate  as  far  back  as  Gordonsville, 
and  thus  place  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  position  either  to 
adopt  the  Fredericksburg  line  of  advance  upon  Richmond,  or 
to  be  removed  to  the  Peninsula,  if,,  as  I  apprehended,  it  were 
found  impossible  to  supply  it  by  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad,  beyond  Culpeper."f 

The  army  moved  up  the  valley  between  the  Bull  Run  and  the 
Blue  Ridge  Mountains.  The  gaps  in  the  latter  range  were 
seized  and  occupied  one  after  another  as  they  were  passed, 
in  order  to  cover  the  line  of  communications  with  Harper's 
Ferry,  which  was  now  the  base  of  supplies.  But  by  the  6th 
of  November  the  army  had  reached  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail 
way,  and  thereafter  received  its  supplies  by  that  line  from 
Washington. 

As  soon  as  Lee  learned  that  McClellan's  army  had  crossed 
the  Potomac  he  put  his  own  in  motion  to  oppose  it.  He  left 


*Ropes. 

fScribner's  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War:  Antietam  and  Fredericks- 
burg— -F.  W.  Palfrey. 


288  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Jackson's  corps  to  hold  the  Valley  and  threaten  the  Union 
flank  until  he  should  determine  what  were  to  be  the  plans  of 
the  enemy;  and  with  Longstreet's  corps,  covered  by  the  cav 
alry,  he  moved  from  Winchester  on  the  2nd  of  November 
toward  Culpeper  Court  House.  The  main  column  marched 
by  way  of  Front  Royal,  but  one  division,  with  cavalry,  took 
the  road  through  Ashby's  Gap  "to  look  for  the  head  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  army."* 

In  the  movement  southward  the  cavalry  of  the  hostile  armies 
were  almost  constantly  in  touch  with  each  other,  and  engaged 
in  combat  on  November  2  at  the  village  of  Union  near  Ashby's 
Gap,  and  on  the  3rd  at  Upperville.  On  the  5th  there  was  an 
other  cavalry  fight  at  Barber's  Cross-Roads,  near  Chester  Gap. 
In  all  these  combats  the  Federal  cavalry  was  victorious;  it 
had  to  be  driven  away  from  Manassas  Gap  by  Hood's  infantry 
division,  and  from  Chester  Gap  by  McLaws's  division.* 

On  the  7th  of  November  Lee  was  at  Culpeper  Court  House 
with  Longstreet's  corps,  38,110  men,  the  reserve  artillery, 
1,027  men,  and  two  brigades  of  cavalry  under  Stuart,  5,484 
troopers.  Jackson's  corps,  some  40,000  strong,  was  near  Mill 
wood  in  the  Valley.f 

On  this  date  the  Federal  army  was  distributed  as  follows : 
the  First,  Second  and  Fifth  Corps,  and  the  reserve  artillery 
were  at  Warrenton;  the -Ninth  Corps  was  at  Waterloo;  the 
Sixth  was  at  New  Baltimore;  the  Eleventh  Corps,  sent  out 
from  Washington,  was  at  New  Baltimore,  Gainesville,  and 
Thoroughfare  Gap ;  and  one  division  of  the  Third  Corps  was 
between  Manassas  Junction  and  Warrenton  Junction.  Pleas- 
anton  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry  was  at  Amissville  and 
Jefferson,  with  pickets  on  Hazel  River,  and  flank  pickets  at 
Newby's  Cross-Roads  and  Gaines's  Cross-Roads,  and  patrols 
toward  Woodville,  Sperryville  and  Little  Washington.  Bay 
ard  with  his  cavalry  was  at  Rappahannock  Station;  General 
Morell  with  a  division  of  infantry  was  on  the  Potomac  from 
Sharpsburg  up;  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  at  Harper's 

Ferry.J 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  two  corps  of  Lee's  army  were  about 
forty  miles  apart  in  a  direct  line ;  while  McClellan's  army  was 
concentrated  about  Warrenton,  within  twenty  miles  of  Long- 


*From  Manassas  to  Appomaitox — Longstreet. 

tGeneral  Alexander  gives  the  following  figures :  Longstreet's  corps 
with  its  reserve  artillery,  34,916;  Jackson's  corps,  31,692;  Stuart's  cav 
alry,  9,146;  Pendleton's  reserve  artillery,  718;  total,  76,472. 

JW.  F.  Smith  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  289 

street's  corps,  and  still  nearer  the  shortest  road  by  which  the 
two  corps  of  the  Confederate  army  could  unite.  It  was,  there 
fore,  impossible  for  Jackson  to  march  to  Lee  by  this  road 
while  the  Federal  army  remained  at  Warrenton. 

The  time  had  arrived  for  McClellan  to  strike  "in  between 
Culpeper  Court  House  and  Little  Washington,"  separate  the 
wings  of  the  Confederate  army,  "and  beat  them  in  detail,  or 
else  force  them  to  concentrate  as  far  back  as  Gordonsville"; 
he  purposed  making  an  effort  to  this  end  at  once,  but  again  the 
authorities  at  Washington  intervened,  as  they  had  done  when 
McClellan  had  his  army  concentrated  at  Harrison's  Landing, 
to  prevent  his  carrying  out  or  even  undertaking  his  project. 

As  McClellan  sat  in  his  tent  near  Salem,  late  on  the  evening 
of  the  7th  of  November,  General  Buckingham,  special  messen 
ger  from  the  War  Department,  presented  himself,  and  handed 
the  general  a  sealed  envelope.  It  contained  an  order  from  the 
President,  relieving  McClellan  from  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  appointing  his  personal  friend,  Burnside,  in 
his  stead.  Burnside  formally  assumed  command  of  the  army 
on  the  9th.  The  stations  of  the  various  units  were  practically 
the  same  as  on  the  7th,  but  the  headquarters  had  been  shifted 
to  Warrenton. 

Burnside  was  called  upon  by  Halleck  to  submit  a  plan  of 
operations,  and  on  the  9th  he  forwarded  a  letter  explaining  his 
plan.  "This  was  to  give  up  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Rail 
way  as  his  line  of  communications,  and  make  Aquia  Creek  his 
base  of  supplies"  ;*  to  "impress  upon  the  enemy  the  belief  that 
he  was  to  attack  Culpeper  or  Gordonsville,  .  .  .  then  to 
make  a  rapid  move  of  the  whole  force  to  Fredericksburg,  with 
a  view  to  a  movement  upon  Richmond  from  that  point. "f 
Burnside  stated  that  a  wagon-train  of  subsistence  stores,  pre 
ceded  by  a  train  of  pontoons,  "enough  to  span  the  Rappahan- 
nock  with  two  tracks,"  should  be  dispatched  from  Alexandria 
to  Falmouth,  and  that  forage  and  provisions  should  be  sent  to 
Aquia  Creek  and  Belle  Plain.  Not  until  the  14th  did  the  Presi 
dent  give  his  reluctant  assent  to  Burnside's  plan. 

One  of  Burnside's  first  steps  was  to  reorganize  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  into  three  Grand  Divisions  and  a  Reserve  Corps. 
The  Second  and  Ninth  Corps  [Couch  and  Willcox]  formed 
the  Right  Grand  Division,  under  General  Sumner;  the  Third 
and  Fifth  Corps  [Stoneman  and  Butterfield]  formed  the  Center 

*  Ropes. 
fPalfrey. 


290  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Grand  Division,  under  General  Hooker;  and  the  First  and 
Sixth  Corps  [Reynolds  and  W.  F.  Smith]  formed  the  Left 
Grand  Division,  under  General  Franklin.  The  Eleventh 
Corps,  under  General  Sigel,  formed  the  Reserve  Corps.*  It 
will  be  noticed  that  most  of  the  corps  have  new  commanders. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  the  Right  Grand  Division 
[Sumner]  started  for  Falmouth,  arriving  at  that  place  on  the 
17th.  The  other  two  Grand  Divisions  followed  a  day  or  two 
later.  But  the  army  could  not  cross  the  Rappahannock — 
there  were  no  pontoons.  The  pontoon-train  did  not  arrive 
until  the  25th.  The  Reserve  Corps  did  not  reach  Falmouth 
until  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.f 

On  his  arrival  at  Falmouth  Sumner  wanted  to  send  a  part  of 
his  command  across  the  river,  which  at  this  time  could  be 
forded,  to  capture  and  hold  Fredericksburg ;  but  Burnside 
would  not  consent.  He  "decided  that  it  was  impracticable  .to 
cross  large  bodies  there,  and  he  was  afraid  to  cross  small 
bodies."^  At  this  time  the  Confederate  garrison  holding 
Fredericksburg  was  so  weak  that  it  could  have  offered  but 
feeble  resistance  to  Sumner's  Grand  Division  of  "fifteen  bri 
gades  and  thirteen  batteries."  .  . 

Lee  was  not  surprised  by  Burnside's  change  of  plan  and 
sudden  movement  upon  Fredericksburg.  He  had  already  con 
sidered  it  probable  that  the  Federal  army,  instead  of  moving 
against  Longstreet  at  Culpeper,  might  march  on  Fredericks 
burg,  and  he  had,  accordingly,  sent  orders  to  destroy  the  rail 
way  from  that  place  to  Aquia  Creek,  and  had  strengthened  the 
garrison  of  Fredericksburg  by  a  small  force.  On  the  18th  of 
November,  being  convinced  by  Stuart's  reports  that  Burnside's 
army  was  concentrating  at  Fredericksburg,  Lee  ordered  Mc- 
Laws's  division  thither  from  Culpeper ;  the  next  day  he  started 
the  rest  of  Longstreet's  corps  for  the  same  place.  By  the 
21st  Longstreet's  whole  corps  was  at  Fredericksburg. 

"Lee  had  not,  however,  definitely  decided  to  fight  at  Fred 
ericksburg."  His  first  intention  had  been  to  make  the  North 
Anna  his  defensive  line.  So  he  left  Jackson  to  decide  in  his 
own  discretion  whether  to  remain  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  or 
to  cross  to  the  east  side  of  the  mountains.  Jackson  crossed  the 
mountains  and  halted  with  his  corps  at  Orange  Court  House. 
But  "on  the  26th  and  27th  of  November"  ...  Lee  "wrote 

*Ropes. 

fAlexander. 

JPalfrey. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  291 

to  Jackson  to  join  him  .  .  .  if  in  Jackson's  judgment  noth 
ing  was  likely  to  be  gained  by  his  remaining  away."  In  giv 
ing  Jackson  this  direction  Lee  was  "influenced  partly  by  the 
lateness  of  the  season  and  the  consequent  danger  that  the  roads 
might  become  bad,  which  would  render  the  cooperation  of 
Jackson  difficult,  -and  partly  by  certain  indications  that  the 
Union  general  intended  crossing  the  river  before  long."*  Jack 
son  had  joined  Lee  by  the  30th  of  November,  at  Fredericks- 
burg. 

(149)  The  two  hostile  armies  now  occupied  the  opposite 
banks  of  the  Rappahannock,  the  Union  army  122,000  strong; 
the  Confederate  army  about  78,500. 

At  this  point  the  Rappahannock,  about  400  feet  wide,  breaks 
through  a  chain  or  group  of  hills,  and  makes  a  sharp  turn  in  its 
course  from  east  to  southeast.  As  one  would  naturally  sup 
pose,  the  hills  on  the  outer  side  of  the  bend,  known  as  Stafford 
Heights,  come  down  closer  to  the  water's  edge  than  those  on 
the  opposite  or  inner  side,  and  they  are  also  higher,  and  com 
mand  the  latter.  On  the  right  bank  the  range  of  heights  be 
gins  near  the  river,  a  little  way  above  the  bend,  and  runs  ap 
proximately  parallel  to  the  river  and  about  a  mile  from  it  for 
two  miles.  Then  it  is  broken  by  Hazel  Run.  From  this  point 
southward  the  slopes  are  not  so  steep,  they  are  covered  with 
wood,  and  they  curve  away  still  farther  from  the  river,  ap 
proaching  it  again  toward  the  Massaponax  River,  which  is 
about  six  miles  from  the  northern  end  of  the  ridge.  The 
range  of  heights  is  broken  by  ravines  and  small  streams,  and 
is  marked  by  several  prominent  features.  The  general  line  of 
heights  from  Taylor's  Hill,  at  the  northwestern  end,  to  Marye's 
Hill,  just  north  of  Hazel  Run,  is  known  as  Marye's  Heights. 
Between  these  two  hills  are  Stansbury's  Hill  and  Cemetery 
Hill.  In  the  southern  portion  of  the  range  of  heights,  Lee's 
Hill,  at  the  northwest,  and  Prospect  Hill,  at  the  southeast,  are 
the  most  prominent  points. 

Fredericksburg  was  on  the  river  in  front  of  Marye's  Heights, 
and  the  gently  sloping  space  between  the  edge  of  the  town  and 
the  foot  of  the  heights  was  crossed  by  a  wide  ditch,  about  400 
yards  in  front  of  the  heights,  that  carried  off  the  waste  water 
from  a  canal  along  the  foot  of  the  hillside  farther  northward. 
South  of  Hazel  Run  the  space  between  the  foothills  and  the 
river  was  crossed  by  several  brooks,  the  most  considerable  of 
which  was  Deep  Run,  whose  various  branches  reached  back 

*  Ropes. 


292  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

into  the  wooded  ravines.  The  Richmond,  Fredericksburg  and 
Potomac  Railroad  crossed  the  river  at  Fredericksburg,  and  fol 
lowed  down  it  for  about  four  miles  to  Hamilton's  Crossing, 
where  it  turned  south.  Another  railway,  unfinished,  led  out 
of  the  town  and  through  the  hills  by  way  of  Hazel  Run  Valley. 
Falmouth  was  on  the  left  bank,  about  a  mile  above  Fredericks 
burg,  at  the  bend  of  the  river. 

There  were  numerous  roads  traversing  the  range  of  heights 
and  the  space  between  its  base  and  the  river-bank,  the  most 
notable  of  which  were  the  Plank  Road  and  the  Telegraph  Road. 
The  Plank  Road  was  in  the  prolongation  of  one  of  the  streets 
in  the  heart  of  Fredericksburg.  It  crossed  the  ditch  in  front 
of  Marye's  Heights  by  a  wooden  bridge,  and,  ascending  the 
heights,  led  on  west  through  Chancellorsville  to  Orange  Court 
House.  (148)  (149)  The  Telegraph  Road  also  led  out  of 
one  of  the  streets  of  the  town,  but  it  turned  round  the  base  of 
Marye's  Hill,  and  continued  out  through  the  valley  of  Hazel 
Run  southward  to  Richmond.  At  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill 
was  a  sunken  road  with  a  stone  retaining-wall  on  each  side, 
the  one  on  the  east  "just  breast-high  for  a  man."*  The  space 
in  front  of  the  sunken  road  slopes  gently,  "until  near"  the  wide 
ditch,  "where  it  drops  off  three  or  four  feet,  leaving  space  near 
the  canal  [ditch]  of  a  rod  or  two  of  level  ground."* 

The  bridges  by  which  the  railway  and  the  old  Richmond 
stage  road,  parallel  to  it,  crossed  Deep  Run  had  been  de 
stroyed,  and  the  boards  had  been  removed  from  those  by  which 
the  Plank  and  Telegraph  Roads  crossed  the  wide  ditch  in  front 
of  Marye's  Heights.  Marye's  Hill  is  only  about  half  as  high 
as  the  other  hills  along  the  front  line  of  the  range;  it  is  really 
the  eastern  edge  of  a  bench,  which  stretches  back  about  a  half- 
mile  to  the  foot  of  another  higher  slope.  Such  was  the  battle 
field  of  Fredericksburg. 

Longstreet's  corps  at  first  occupied  the  line  all  the  way  from 
Taylor's  Hill  to  Hamilton's  Crossing ;  but  Jackson's  corps,  upon 
its  arrival,  was  "assigned  position  on  the  right  near  Hamilton's 
Crossing  and  the  Massaponax."*  Batteries  of  position  were 
placed  along  the  heights,  and  covered  with  epaulements.  Alto 
gether  the  Confederates  had  306  guns  in  their  line  "The  line 
was  strengthened  by  a  few  slight  earthworks  at  some  points, 
but  was  nowhere  strongly  fortified.  The  heavy  works  at 

*Longstreet. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  293 

Fredericksburg,  so  often  referred  to,  were  constructed  after 
the  battle,  not  before  it."* 

(148)  The  day  after  Jackson  arrived  several  Union  gun 
boats  were  reported  in  the  river,  at  Port  Royal,  about  twenty 
miles  below  Fredericksburg;  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  with  sev 
eral  batteries,  was,  therefore,  detached  to  drive  the  gunboats 
away,  and  to  guard  against  the  enemy's  crossing  at  that  point. 
Hill  succeeded  in  driving  the  gunboats  back,  and  was  left  in 
observation.  Early's  [Ewell's]  division  took  post  at  Skinker's 
Neck,  about  twelve  miles  below  Fredericksburg.  W.  H.  F. 
Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  with  D.  H.  Hill,  while  Wade 
Hampton's  guarded  the  fords  of  the  upper  Rappanannock. 

PLANS  AND  OPERATIONS. 

Finding  himself  balked  in  his  project  of  crossing  the  Rap- 
pahannock  at  Fredericksburg  and  moving  at  once  against 
Richmond  by  delay  in  the  arrival  of  his  pontoon-train,  Burn- 
side  was  at  a  loss  what  to  do.  He  had  to  do  something — the 
press  of  the  country  demanded  it.  He  must  either  force  a 
crossing  at  Fredericksburg,  or,  by  maneuvering,  turn  Lee's 
position  and  cross  the  river  somewhere  else.  A  turning  move 
ment  by  the  upper  river  does  not  appear  to  have  been  seriously 
considered,  though  the  country  was  hilly  and  wooded  in  that 
quarter,  and  the  river  narrow  and  fordable  at  several  points — 
conditions  that  "would  have  made  a  crossing  easy  to  accom 
plish  by  surprise,  "f  as  was  later  proved  in  the  Chancellor sville 
campaign.  Such  a  movement,  however,  would  have  left  Burn- 
side's  communications  with  Aquia  Creek,  though  covered  by 
the  river,  more  or  less  exposed  to  Lee's  army. 

Burnside  made  some  preparations  for  a  turning  movement 
by  way  of  Skinker's  Neck,  where  the  river  was  300  yards  wide ; 
but  the  appearance  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division  near  that  point 
caused  him  to  drop  that  project.  (149)  He  then  resolved  to 
force  a  crossing  in  front  of  the  Confederate  position.  Lee's 
line  was  too  far  away  from  the  river,  and  the  place  was  too 
much  dominated  by  Hunt's  powerful  batteries  of  147  guns,  on 
Stafford  Heights,  for  Lee  to  oppose  any  effective  resistance  to 
the  actual  passage  of  the  river.  His  real  fight  was  to  be  made 
after  the  Union  Army  had  got  across. 

On  the  night  of  December  10  arrangements  were  made  to 


*Allen. 

f  Alexander. 


294  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

span  the  river  with  five  pontoon-bridges,  three  opposite  Fred- 
ericksburg,  and  two  just  below  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run.  Sum- 
ner's  Grand  Division  was  to  cross  by  the  upper,  and  Franklin's 
by  the  lower,  bridges.  Hooker's  Grand  Division  was  to  remain 
on  the  left  bank  as  the  general  reserve. '  The  Grand  Divisions 
took  their  positions  during  the  night.  Some  Confederate 
sharpshooters  were  posted  along  the  river-bank  in  rifle  pits ; 
but  Franklin's  command  had  little  trouble  in  driving  them 
away  from  its  front,  and  by  noon  of  the  llth  had  laid  its  two 
bridges.  The  work  was  facilitated  by  a  dense  fog,  which  hung 
over  the  valley  during  the  morning. 

The  construction  of  the  bridges  at  Fredericksburg  was  a 
harder  undertaking.  A  brigade  of  Confederates  under  Barks- 
dale  was  posted  in  cellars  and  behind  brick  walls,  along  the 
water-front  of  the  town,  and  their  fire  was  so  deadly  that  it 
drove  the  bridge-builders  away.  Several  hours  were  wasted 
in  unavailing  efforts.  At  ten  o'clock  Burnside  ordered  Hunt's 
artillery  to  shell  the  town.  "On  this,"  says  Swinton,  who  was 
an  eye-witness,  "there  opened  up  from  the  massive  concentra 
tion  of  artillery  a  terrific  bombardment,  that  was  kept  up  for 
above  an  hour.  Each  gun  fired  fifty  rounds,  and  I  know  not 
how  many  hundred  tons  of  iron  were  thrown  into  the  town." 
The  shells  set  the  town  on  fire,  but  the  guns  could  not  be  de 
pressed  enough  to  reach  the  sharpshooters.  "The  day  was 
wearing  away  and  affairs  were  at  a  deadlock,"  when  General 
Hunt  suggested  that  a  party  be  sent  across  in  the  boats  to  drive 
the  Confederates  away.  This  succeeded.  The  7th  Michigan, 
the  19th  and  20th  Massachusetts,  and  the  89th  New  York  vol 
unteered  for  the  apparently  perilous  exploit.  Federal  sharp 
shooters  lined  the  left  bank,  and  kept  down  the  Confederate  fire 
as  well  as  possible.  The  party  landed  on  the  other  side  without 
much  loss,  and  had  little  further  trouble  in  putting  Barksdale's 
men  to  flight,  and  capturing  about  100  of  them.  The  bridges 
were  then  laid  in  a  few  minutes. 

(150)  Of  Franklin's  command,  which  had  orders  to  await 
the  construction  of  the  upper  bridges,  one  brigade  c'rossed  over 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  llth,  and  by  3  p.  m.  of  the  12th  both 
of  his  corps,  the  First  and  the  Sixth,  were  on  the  right  bank. 
One  of  Sumner's  divisions,  also,  crossed  over  and  occupied 
Fredericksburg  the  night  of  the  llth;  the  next  day  the  rest 
of  the  Right  Grand  Division  crossed  to  the  right  bank.  Nine 
teen  batteries,  104  guns,  crossed  with  Sumner's  Grand  Divi 
sion,  of  which  only  about  seven  batteries  could  be  used  in  the 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  295 

battle.  Twenty-three  batteries,  116  guns,  crossed  by  the  lower 
bridges,  all  of  which,  but  one  battery,  were  engaged. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  Burnside  was  at  Franklin's 
headquarters,  and  discussed  the  situation  with  Franklin  and 
his  commanders.  It  was  practically  agreed  that  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  line  was  too  strong  to  be  carried ;  the  right,  at 
Hamilton's  Crossing,  was  plainly  the  weaker  flank,  as  it  rested 
on  no  natural  obstacle.  It  was,  however,  strengthened  by 
abatis  and  earthworks,  and  Stuart's  cavalry  and  horse-artillery 
guarded  the  space  between  Hamilton's  Crossing  and  the  Mas- 
saponax.  Franklin's  command  was  reinforced  by  two  of 
Stoneman's  divisions  [Third  Corps],  which  raised  its  strength 
to  about  50,000.  It  was  agreed — and  Franklin  so  understood 
— that  Franklin  was  to  make  the  "main  attack,"  and  that  Sum- 
ner's  would  be  the  "secondary  attack."  Burnside  said  he 
would  send  Franklin  his  orders,  sand  Franklin  made  ready  to 
attack  at  daybreak. 

But  it  was  half  after  seven  on  the  morning  of  the  13th 
before  Franklin  received  his  order ;  and  when  it  came  it  was 
wholly  different  from  what  Franklin  had  expected,  and  it  left 
him  in  much  doubt  as  to  what  was  required  of  him.  The  order 
directed  that  "you  keep  your  whole  command  in  position  for  a 
rapid  movement  down  the  old  Richmond  Road,  and  you  will 
send  out,  at  once,  a  division,  at  least,  to  pass  below  Smithfield, 
to  seize,  if  possible,  the  heights  near  Captain  Hamilton's,  on 
this  side  of  the  Massaponax,  taking  care  to  keep  it  well  sup 
ported,  and  its  line  of  retreat  open.  He  [the  commanding 
general]  has  ordered  another  column,  of  a  division  or  more, 
to  be  moved  from  General  Sumner's  command,  up  the  Plank 
Road,  to  its  intersection  with  the  Telegraph  Road,  where  they 
will  divide,  with  a  view  to  seizing  the  heights  on  both  of  those 
roads.  Holding  those  two  heights,  with  the  heights  near  Cap 
tain  Hamilton's  will,  he  hopes,  compel  the  enemy  to  evacuate 
the  whole  ridge  between  these  points.  I  make  these  moves  by 
columns  distant  from  each  other  with  a  view  of  avoiding  the 
possibility  of  a  collision  of  our  own  forces  which  might  occur 
in  a  general  movement  during  the  fog.  .  .  ."  This  order 
was  dated  5.55  a.  m. 

Sumner's  order,  dated  6  a.  m.,  directed  him  to  extend  his 
left  to  Deep  Run,  connecting  with  Franklin's  right,  and  his 
right  as  far  as  his  judgment  might  dictate.  Sumner  was  also 
directed  to  push  a  "column,  of  a  division  or  more,  along  the 
Plank  and  Telegraph  Roads,  with  a  view  to  seizing  the  heights 


296  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

in  rear  of  the  town."  Hooker's  order  was  dated  7  a.  m.,  and 
directed  him  to  place  Butterfield's  corps  [Fifth]  and  Whipple's 
division  [Third  Corps]  in  position  to  cross  at  a  moment's  no 
tice  at  the  upper  three  bridges  in  support  of  Sumner's  troops, 
and  the  two  remaining  divisions  of  Stoneman's  corps  [Third] 
in  readiness  to  cross  to  Franklin's  support.  These  were  the 
orders  that  opened  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

The  movements  of  troops  in  the  Federal  camps  on  the  10th 
and  the  reports  of  his  scouts  warned  Lee  of  Burnside's  pur 
pose,  and  he  gave  notice  to  the  commanders  along  the  line,  and 
had  D.  H.  Hill  recalled  from  Port  Royal,  and  Early  from 
Skinker's  Neck.  They  did  not  reach  the  battle-field  until  the 
morning  of  the  13th. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  the  hostile  forces  were  in  position 
about  as  follows :  the  Second  Corps  at  the  town  on  the  right ; 
the  Ninth  Corps  next,  south  of  Hazel  Run ;  then  the  Sixth ;  and 
then  the  First.  During  the  day  Burns's  division  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  crossed  Deep  Run  to  support  Franklin.  Meade's  divi 
sion  of  the  First  Corps  was  on  the  left  of  the  general  line 
facing  southward,  with  its  right  touching  the  left  of  Gibson's 
division  of  the  same  corps,  and  its  left  resting  on  the  river  near 
Smithfield.  Doubleday's  division  of  the  same  corps  was  in  re 
serve,  formed  in  column  on  the  bank  of  the  river  behind 
Meade's  left.  Hunt's  artillery  reserve  was  upon  Stafford 
Heights. 

In  Lee's  line,  Longstreet's  corps  was  on  the  left,  "with  An 
derson's  division  resting  upon  the  river,  and  the  divisions  of 
McLaws,  Pickett,  and  Hood  extending  to  the  right  in  the  order 
named."*  Cobb's  brigade  of  McLaws's  division  was  in  the 
sunken  road  behind  the  stone  wall  at  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill. 
Jackson's  corps  held  the  right  of  the  line.  Here  the  front  was 
occupied  by  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  with  the  brigades  of  Brocken- 
brough,  Archer,  Lane,  and  Pender  in  the  first  line,  from  right 
to  left,  along  the  railway,  at  the  edge  of  a  wood.  In  the  second 
line  were  the  brigades  of  Gregg  and  Thomas.  A  third  line 
was  occupied  by  Early's  and  Taliaferro's  divisions — Early's  on 
the  right.  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  in  rear  of  the  right.  Bat 
teries  were  on  both  flanks.  Stuart's  horse-artillery  and  cavalry 
were  on  the  plain  at  the  right,  in  the  valley  of  the  Massa- 
ponax.f 


'Palfrey. 
fAlexander. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  297 

In  A.  P.  Hill's  front  line  Archer's  left  was  separated  from 
Lane's  right  by  500  to  600  yards  of  swampy  wood  which  the 
Confederates  carelessly  supposed  to  be  impassable.  Gregg's 
brigade,  in  the  second  line,  was  behind  this  swamp.  There 
was  also  too  wide  a  space  for  mutual  support  between  Lane's 
left  and  Fender's  right. 

Carrying  out  the  spirit  of  Burnside's  vague  and  unintelli 
gible  order  as  well  as  he  was-  able  to  interpret  it,  Franklin 
selected  Meade's  division  of  the  First  Corps  [Reynolds]  to 
assault,  "and  seize,  if  possible,  the  heights  near  Captain  Ham 
ilton's,"  supported  by  Gibbon's  division  on  the  right,  and  Dou- 
bleday's  in  reserve.  The  aggregate  strength  of  these  three 
divisions  was  about  16,000  men.  Meade's  division  moved  out 
from  Smithfield,  and  encountered  its  first  obstacle  at  the  Rich 
mond  Road,  where  it  was  delayed  by  the  hedges  and  ditches 
alongside.  Between  nine  and  ten  o'clock  it  had  got  over 
these  obstacles,  when  the  fog  suddenly  lifted  and  exposed  its 
columns  to  the  Confederates,  who,  before  this,  had  fired  only  a 
few  random  shots.  (151)  Pelham,  who  commanded  Stuart's 
horse-artillery,  immediately  opened  fire  upon  Meade's  left  flank, 
compelling  him  to  halt.  Meade  replied  with  twelve  guns,  and 
Doubleday's  division  came  up  and  faced  Stuart's  command; 
after  a  half-hour's  halt  Meade  resumed  his  march  to  the 
front. 

Not  an  enemy  was  to  be  seen,  but  the  Federal  artillery  shelled 
the  woods  occupied  by  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  "and  inflicted  con 
siderable  losses."  Pelham's  batteries  had  withdrawn,  but 
Doubleday  kept  his  division  facing  to  the  left  to  watch  Stuart's 
threatening  squadrons.  Meade's  columns  moved  forward 
again  until  they  came  within  800  yards  of  the  batteries  on  the 
right  and  left  of  Jackson's  line.  These  batteries  then  opened 
a  cross  fire  upon  the  columns  and  checked  them ;  but  the  woods 
in  front  maintained  an  ominous  silence. 

Gibbon  came  up  and  deployed  on  Meade's  right,  and  the  left 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  [Smith]  connected  with  Gibbon's  right. 
The  whole  of  Franklin's  Grand  Division  was  now  in  line,  and 
Franklin  summoned  the  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps 
[Stoneman]  to  his  support.  The  Federal  artillery  engaged  the 
Confederate  batteries,  and,  after  an  hour  and  a  half,  succeeded 
in  silencing  them. 

Meade's  lines  now  charged  the  woods  in  their  front,  and, 
when  at  point-blank  range,  were  suddenly  fired  upon  with  mus 
ketry  by  the  Confederates  concealed  within  them,  and  by  can- 


298  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

non  with  shell  and  canister.  (152)  But  the  Federal  bri 
gades,  now  in  three  lines,  pressed  forward  into  the  swampy 
wood  between  Archer's  and  Lane's  brigades.  The  first  line 
turned  to  right  and  left  to  assault  the  flanks  of  these  Confed 
erate  brigades,  while  the  other  two  pushed  ahead  until  they 
came  upon  Gregg's  Confederate  brigade  at  rest  in  the  Military 
Road  back  of  the  swamp.  Gregg  himself  was  taken  by  sur 
prise,  and  was  slain  while  trying  to  stop  his  men  from  firing 
on  Meade's  troops,  which  he  took  for  Confederates.  Lawton's 
brigade  [Early's  division]  quickly  came  to  help  Gregg's. 
Meade's  advance  in  the  woods  was  checked,  and  there  were  no 
Federal  troops  at  hand  to  render  assistance.  Doubleday,  with 
the  reserve,  was  out  of  reach,  still  watching  the  left  on  the 
Richmond  Road,  and  carrying  on  a  desultory  skirmish  with 
Stuart's  dismounted  troopers;  Gibbon's  division  had  been 
stopped  at  the  railway;  Smith's  corps  [Sixth],  over  on  the 
right,  was  scarcely  engaged  at  all,  but  was  too  far  away. 
Franklin  himself  was  far  in  rear. 

The  Confederate  brigades  rallied,  and  the  rest  of  Early's 
division  hastened  to  their  support.  Together  they  drove  the 
Federal  division  back,  out  of  the  swamp,  and  into  the  plain 
beyond.  Gibbon's  division  went  with  it.  The  Confederates 
followed;  but  Birney's  division  of  the  Third  Corps  had  now 
arrived  to  support  Meade,  and  Sickles's  division  was  behind 
Gibbon's.  The  Confederates  were  in  their  turn  driven  back 
into  the  woods,  with  a  loss  of  more  than  500  killed  and 
wounded.  (153)  At  two  o'clock  Reynolds  [First  Corps], 
with  the  assistance  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps, 
held  the  railway  line,  but  he  was  not  strong  enough  to  re 
capture  the  woods.* 

Meanwhile  the  battle  had  been  raging  at  the  other  end  of  the 
line.  Burnside  personally  directed  the  attack  in  that  quarter, 
though  he  remained  at  the  Phillips  house  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river.  The  Confederates  opened  the  battle.  As  soon  as  the 
fog  rose,  about  eleven  o'clock,  and  disclosed  the  streets  of 
Fredericksburg  crowded  with  Union  troops,  the  Confederate 
artillery  from  the  heights  began  to  shell  the  town.  French's 
division  [Second  Corps,  Couch],  followed  by  Hancock's  in 
support,  led  the  attack.  The  division  had  to  keep  in  column 
until  it  had  crossed  over  the  damaged  bridges  of  the  wide 
ditch.  During  this  time  the  Confederate  artillery,  beyond  the 


*Comte  de  Paris. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  299 

reach  of  Hunt's  batteries  on  Stafford  Heights,  turned  all  its 
fire  upon  the  Federal  columns.  The  division  then  deployed 
on  ground  along  the  ditch  sheltered  by  the  low  bank ;  and,  in 
column  of  brigades,  charged  the  stone  wall  behind  which  stood 
two  Confederate  brigades  in  the  sunken  road.  When  the  Fed 
erals  came  within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  wall  the  Confed 
erates  opened  upon  them  with  musketry  fire.  But  the  leading 
brigade  pushed  on  to  within  sixty  yards  of  the  wall ;  there 
it  was  forced  to  stop.  The  other  two  brigades  came  on,  but 
they  too  had  to  halt  at  sixty  yards ;  and  after  a  single  discharge 
they  were  all  forced  to  retire,  leaving  a  third  of  their  number 
on  the  ground.  Three  regimental  flags  were  left  standing 
within  eighty  yards  of  the  Confederate  line. 

Hancock's  division  followed  immediately  and  passed  beyond 
the  flags  planted  by  French's  regiments ;  it  got  within  thirty  or 
forty  yards  of  the  stone  wall,  but  could  not  reach  it.  The 
Confederates  behind  the  wall  had  been  reinforced,  till  now  they 
were  firing  in  four  ranks.  Howard's  division  [Second  Corps] 
followed  Hancock's;  while  Sturgis  and  Getty  crossed  Hazel 
Run  with  their  divisions  [Ninth  Corps]  to  support  the  assault. 
But  all  effort  was  in  vain ;  the  Federal  line  had  to  yield.  It  fell 
back  behind  the  low  bank  near  the  ditch,  which  afforded  some 
shelter.  Out  of  5,006  men  Hancock  had  lost  2,013.  This 
happened  at  half  after  one  o'clock,  just  the  moment  when 
Meade  was  driven  out  of  the  woods  on  the  left. 

Burnside  now  sent  an  order  to  Franklin  *to  charge  the  enemy 
with  his  whole  force,  in  order  to  draw  all  his  attention  to  that 
quarter;  he  ordered  Hooker,  who  still  held  the  three  divisions 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  in  reserve,  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  stone 
wall  with  two  of  his  divisions,  and  to  support  Sturgis  and  Getty 
on  the  left  with  the  other.  Hooker  started  at  once  to  obey  the 
order,  and  led  his  troops  across  the  river ;  but  he  was  convinced 
by  Hancock  and  French  of  the  hopelessness  of  making  another 
assault.  So  he  went  back  to  Burnside  at  the  Phillips  house, 
and  begged  to  be  excused  from  taking  his  men  to  the  sacrifice. 
Burnside  was  immovable;  "That  height  must  be  carried  this 
evening,"  he  repeated,  pacing  up  and  down. 

Hooker  returned  to  the  field  and  prepared  for  his  assault 
by  causing  every  available  battery  to  concentrate  its  fire  on 
the  sunken  road.  Pickett's  division,  meantime,  had  gone  to 
Marye's  Hill,  and  one  of  Hood's  brigades  had  taken  post  be 
hind  the  wall  in  the  sunken  road  where  already  there  were  four 
brigades.  Part  of  the  firing  line  was  now  six  ranks  deep.  At 


300  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

four  o'clock  Hooker  gave  the  signal  for  the  assault,  and  Hum- 
phreys's  division  charged;  but  it  was  stopped  like  those  that 
had  gone  before  it.  As  dusk  was  falling  Getty,  on  the  left, 
made  a  final  assault  upon  the  end  of  Marye's  Hill,  but  was 
repulsed.  Twilight  came  on,  and  Hooker  ordered  his  men  to 
fall  back.  "Finding,"  says  he,  "that  I  had  lost  as  many  men  as 
my  orders  required  me  to  lose,  I  suspended  the  attack/'  The 
battle  was  over. 

There  has  been  much  dispute,  and  there  is  still  much  uncer 
tainty,  as  to  the  time  when  Franklin  received  Burnside's  after 
noon  order  to  attack  with  his  whole  force;  and  what  orders 
he  actually  received.  He  probably  received  the  orders  before 
2.30  p.  m.  His  line  was  then  stretched  out  three  miles  long, 
from  Deep  Run  nearly  to  the  Massaponax.  It  was  a  short 
winter's  day,  and  Franklin  considered  it  too  late  to  collect  his 
extended  line  and  put  it  to  the  charge.  He  contented  himself, 
therefore,  with  letting  his  troops  continue  to  occupy  the  atten 
tion  of  the  Confederate  right  with  fire  action  alone. 

Night  ended  the  battle  all  along  the  line.  The  Union  side 
had  lost  10,208  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  Confederates 
had  lost  5,209.  Sixty-three  hundred  of  the  Federal  soldiers 
were  killed  or  wounded  at  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill. 

Burnside  issued  an  order  to  renew  the  attack  next  morning, 
but  his  commanders  succeeded  in  persuading  him  to  recall  it. 
Morning  found  the  troops  where  nightfall  had  left  them. 
Jackson  and  Hood 'had  made  new  intrenchments  during  the 
night,  and  Lee  hoped  Burnside  would  attack  him  again ;  but 
the  14th  and  the  15th  passed  without  a  renewal  of  the  battle. 
On  the  night  of  the  15th  the  Federal  army  withdrew  to  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rappahannock. 

COMMENTS. 

(148)  The  battle  of  Antietam  was  fought  on  the  17th  of 
September,  but  it  was  the  end  of  October  before  McClellan's 
army  resumed  the  offensive,  and  recrossed  the  Potomac.  To 
be  sure,  the  army  was  in  need  of  reorganization,  recruitment, 
and  refitting,  and  there  were  exasperating  delays  in  the  ship 
ment  of  the  stores;  but  even  so,  nothing  can  excuse  General 
McClellan  for  letting  so  many  weeks  of  fine  autumn  weather 
pass  without  his  making  an  aggressive  movement.  Lee's 
army  was,  in  the  meanwhile,  recuperating  itself  at  a  faster  rate 
than  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  inasmuch  as  it  was  getting 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  301 

back  the  large  number  of  stragglers  it  had  lost  on  its  rapid 
movement  in  Maryland.  Just  after  the  battle  of  Antietam  the 
Confederate  army  was  certainly  in  a  worse  condition  than  the 
Union  army ;  and  then  was  when  McClellan  should  have  pushed 
his  advantage. 

Yet  it  was,  undoubtedly,  mainly  for  political  reasons  that 
McClellan  was  removed  from  command  of  the  army.  Ropes 
makes  this  comment:  "McClellan  ought  not  to  have  been 
removed  unless  the  Government  were  prepared  to  put  in  his 
place  some  officer  whom  they  knew  to  be  at  least  his  equal  in 
military  capacity.  This  assuredly  was  not  the  case  at  this  mo 
ment."  Burnside  had  gained  prestige  in  newspaper  and  polit 
ical  circles  as  commander  of  the  expedition  to  the  coast  of 
North  Carolina,  "where  his  overwhelming  force  easily  over 
came  the  slight  resistance  that  it  met";*  but  he  knew  that  he 
was  not  equal  to  the  office  now  imposed  upon  him,  and  he 
accepted  it  with  great  reluctance.  His  modest  opinion  of  his 
abilities  was  shared  by  the  rest  of  the  army.  McClellan  was 
relieved  (November  7)  just  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  concentrated  near  Warrenton,  while  the  two  wings  of 
Lee's  army  were  at  Culpeper  and  Millwood,  respectively, 
forty  or  fifty  miles  apart.  He  was  about  to  move  against 
Longstreet's  wing  at  Culpeper,  and  says,  "Could  he  have  been 
brought  to  a  battle  within  reach  of  my  supplies  I  cannot  doubt 
that  the  result  would  have  been  a  brilliant  victory  for  our 
army."f  Many  of  the  reviewers  of  this  campaign  agree  with 
McClellan.  But  Lee  and  Longstreet  would  not  have  stood  to 
fight  a  decisive  battle ;  they  would  have  fallen  back  along  the 
railway,  destroying  it  as  they  retreated,  until  they  formed  a 
junction  with  Jackson,  who  would  have  moved  up  the  Valley 
far  enough  safely  to  cross  the  mountains  and  join  Longstreet. 
So  McClellan,  in  his  pursuit,  would  almost  surely  have  found 
himself  beyond  "reach  of  his  supplies,"  and  Jackson  would 
probably  have  found  an  opportunity  to  pass  through  some 
gap. of  the  mountains,  in  McClellan's  rear,  and  intercept  his 
communications.  This  would  have  forced  McClellan  to  fall 
back. 

Lee,  at  this  time,  did  not  expect  to  defend  the  line  of  the 
Rappahannock ;  that  river  could  be  crossed  at  so  many  points 
that  "Lee  expected  to  use  it  simply  to  gain  time  for  the  concen- 


*Alexander. 
t  Ropes. 


302  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

tration  of  his  troops."*  "Lee  proposed  to  take  a  position  be 
hind  the  North  Anna  with  part  of"  his  forces,  "while,  with 
Jackson's  and  Longstreet's  corps  united,  he  moved  in  such  a 
manner  as  might  enable  him  to  fall  upon  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  Federal  army,  when  it  attempted  the  passage  of  that 
river."f  But  Lee  was  in  doubt  for  some  days  as  to  what  the 
Federal  army  was  going  to  do;  whether  it  was  going  to  move 
against  Longstreet  at  Culpeper,  or  toward  the  Valley  to  cut 
Jackson  off,  or  on  Fredericksburg. 

Some  of  the  critics  think  that  Burnside  ought  to  have  moved 
against  Longstreet  at  Culpeper,  while  others  say  his  move 
ment  to  Fredericksburg  was  right,  and  that  it  miscarried 
through  the  failure  of  the  pontoons  to  arrive,  which  was  no 
fault  of  his.  He  might,  also,  have  escaped  the  battle  of  Fred 
ericksburg  by  crossing  the  Rappahannock  by  the  fords  higher 
up,  and  marching  to  that  town  by  the  right  bank ;  this  is  what 
General  Halleck  and  the  President  expected  him  to  do  when 
they  consented  to  his  plan.J  He  certainly  made  a  mistake  in 
not  allowing  Sumner  to  cross  the  river  and  occupy  the  heights 
near  Fredericksburg  with  his  Grand  Division,  as  soon  as  it 
reached  Falmouth.  The  Confederate  garrison  at  Fredericks 
burg,  at  that  time,  was  hardly  more  than  a  regiment,  and  the 
river  was  fordable.  Burnside  would  not  let  Sumner  cross  for 
fear  the  river  might  rise,  before  the  arrival  of  the  pontoon- 
train,  and  cut  him  off. 

Burnside's  plan  was  based  wholly  upon  the  supposition  that 
his  pontoons  would  be  at  hand,  and  that  he  could  cross  his 
army  to  Fredericksburg,  before  Lee  should  discover  his  move 
ment  and  have  time  to  meet  and  oppose  his  passage.  Had  the 
plan  succeeded  Lee  would  have  made  his  main  defense  -behind 
the  North  Anna.  But  upon  Burnside's  letting  a  week  or  more 
pass  without  making  any  effort  to  cross,  Lee  resolved  to  make 
every  effort  to  stop  him  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahan 
nock,  and  to  compel  him  either  to  make  another  change  of  base, 
or  to  stand  fast  till  the  winter  came  on  and  suspended  the 
operations.  Either  of  these  events  Lee  knew  would  cause  great 
dissatisfaction  at  the  North.  "It  appears  to  me,"  he  wrote 
to  Mr.  Davis  on  the  25th  of  November,  "that  should  General 


*Allen. 
tLong. 
±  Alexander. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  303 

Burnside  change  his  base  of  operations  the  effect  produced  in 
the  United  States  would  be  almost  equivalent  to  a  defeat.  I 
think,  therefore,  he  will  persevere  in  his  present  course,  and  the 
longer  we  can  delay  him  and  throw  him  into  the  winter  the 
more  difficult  will  be  his  undertaking.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  I  have  determined  to  resist  him  at  the  outset  and  to  throw 
every  obstacle  in  the  way  of  his  advance."*  With  this  pur 
pose  in  view  Lee  then  ordered  Jackson  to  bring  his  corps  up 
to  the  Rappahannock,  from  Orange  Court  House,  where  it  had 
remained  for  several  days  awaiting  developments,  and  waiting 
for  Lee  to  decide  upon  his  plan  of  resistance. 

It  was  during  the  movement  on  Fredericksburg  that  Burn- 
side  had  his  best  chance.  If  after  inducing  Lee  to  move  Long- 
street's  corps  to  that  place  Burnside  had  suddenly  turned  back 
with  his  united  forces,  and,  crossing  the  Rappahannock  above 
Fredericksburg,  had  fallen  upon  that  wing  of  Lee's  army,  he 
would  have  had  an  excellent  chance  of  destroying  it.  The 
head  of  Sumner's  Grand  Division,  it  will  be  remembered, 
reached  Falmouth  on  the  17th  of  November,  and  the  rest  of 
the  Union  army  was  close  behind  it;  Longstreet's  whole  corps 
was  at  Fredericksburg  on  the  21st,  while  Jackson  did  not  leave 
Winchester  until  the  22nd.  For  a  few  days  Longstreet's  and 
Jackson's  corps  were  150  miles  apart,  and  the  united  Federal 
army  was  practically  between  them.  What  an  opportunity  for 
a  man  like  Napoleon  or  Jackson!  But  Lee  and  Jackson  had 
both  presumed  largely  on  Burnside's  want  of  enterprise  in 
allowing  for  even  a  few  days,  150  miles  to  separate  the  two 
corps.f  The  best  part  of  Lee's  strategy  appears  to  have  been 
his  understanding  of  the  characters  of  his  enemy's  com 
manders,  and  the  use  he  made  of  it.  Burnside's  foremost  mis 
take  was  his  making  Richmond  and  not  Lee's  army  his  main 
objective.f 

Swinton  thinks  Lee  could  have  stopped  Burnside's  movement 
upon  Fredericksburg  by  marching  his  forces  toward  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway — threatening  Washington; 
but  Ropes  says  "for  Lee  to  have  done  this  would  have  been  to 
risk  a  battle  in  which  he  would  have  been  opposed  by  a  well- 
appointed  army  much  larger  than  his  own,"  and  with  no  other 
end  in  view  "than  that  of  winning  that  battle." 


*Allen. 
fAlexander. 


304  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

THE  BATTLE. 

(150)  The  battle  of  Fredericksburg  was  another  of  the 
great  engagements  of  the  Civil  War  in  which  the  value  of 
artificial  cover  was  shown.  The  left  of  Lee's  position  was 
naturally  strong  against  frontal  assaults,  but  it  was  not  so  much 
the  heights,  which  afforded  commanding  positions  for  the  artil 
lery,  as  the  sunken  road  revetted  with  stone  at  the  base  of 
Marye's  Hill,  like  the  railway  cut  at  the  Second  Bull  Run, 
that  made  the  position  impregnable  against  direct  attack. 

From  Taylor's  Hill,  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  to  its 
right  at  Hamilton's  Crossing  was  about  six  and  a  half  miles. 
Lee's  force  was  large  enough  to  occupy  this  position  with  about 
six  men  to  the  yard.  But  along  the  two  miles  of  strong 
heights,  Marye's  Heights,  Lee  placed  only  1 1 ,000  men ;  while 
in  the  space  between  Deep  Run  and  Hamilton's  Crossing,  about 
two  miles,  which  might  more  easily  have  been  turned  or  en 
veloped,  he  posted  Jackson  with  30,000  men.  The  other  two 
miles  of  the  position,  those  at  the  center  of  the  concave  line, 
were  defended  by  only  three  men  to  the  yard,  and  most  of  those 
were  afterwards  moved,  when  the  force  of  the  attack  devel 
oped  against  the  wings.  At  first  examination,  then,  the  center 
would  appear  to  have  been  the  weakest  part  of  the  line — the 
part  against  which  the  Federal  main  attack  should  have  been 
launched.  But  Burnside  could  not  have  massed  troops  for 
such  an  attack  without  exposing  them  to  the  view  of  the  Con 
federates,  who  could  then  have  concentrated  promptly  at  the 
center ;  for  roads  had  been  repaired  and  built  in  rear  of  the 
position  for  that  purpose. 

"The  Confederate  line  was  strengthened  by  a  few  slight 
earthworks  at  some  points,  but  was  nowhere  strongly  forti 
fied."*  Had  it  been  strongly  intrenched  along  the  edge  of  the 
woods  on  the  right  Meade's  frontal  assault  must  have  failed 
to  break  through  it.  Yet  strategically  and  tactically  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  line  was  where  Burnside's  main  attack 
should  have  been  made.  Strategically,  because,  if  successful, 
it  would  have  thrown  Lee  off  the  Richmond  Road  and  the  rail 
way,  his  lines  of  communications,  and  placed  the  Federal  army 
between  the  Confederates  and  Richmond;  tactically,  because 
the  Massaponax  could  easily  have  been  crossed,  and  that  flank 
of  the  position  might  have  been  turned  or  enveloped.  True, 

'Allen. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  305 

unless  the  attention  of  the  Confederates  could  have  been  occu 
pied  by  the  secondary  attack  all  along  the  line,  their  right 
could  quickly  have  been  reinforced,  and  by  swinging  to  the 
right  in  great  force  it  might  have  cut  off  the  turning  or  en 
veloping  columns  from  their  pontoon-bridges.  General  Alex 
ander,  who  knows  the  ground,  believes  the  Confederate  left 
might,  also,  have  been  turned.  "The  most  obvious,  and  the 
proper  attack  for  the  Federal  right,"  he  says,  "was  one  turn 
ing  the  Confederate  left  along  the  very  edge  of  the  river  above 
Falmouth,  supported  by  artillery  on  the  north  bank  which  could 
enfilade  and  take  in  reverse  the  Confederate  left  flank."  If 
the  main  attack,  however,  had  been  made  against  this  flank, 
and  had  succeeded,  it  would  have  thrown  the  Confederates 
back  upon  their  line  of  communications  rather  than  away 
from  it. 

The  attack  was,  in  point  of  fact,  made  without  any  real 
plan.  It  resolved  itself  into  fourteen  desperate,  unsupported, 
successive  assaults  at  one  impregnable  point  of  the  line,*  and 
another  at  a  different  point  five  miles  away;  while  there  was 
practically  no  fighting  along  a  great  part  of  the  line,  and  large 
numbers  of  the  troops  scarcely  fired  a  shot. 

It  is  hard  to  say  what  Burnside  expected  to  accomplish,  or 
why  he  fought  this  battle.  "The  only  important  reason  given 
by  General  Burnside  for  fighting  the  battle  was  that  he  thought 
that  the  troops  which  General  Lee  had  sent  down  the  river  to 
oppose  the  landing  of  the  Federal  army  in  that  region  had  not 
returned. "f  "His  balloon,"  says  Colonel  Henderson  in  his 
life  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  "had  reported  large  Confederate 
bivouacs  below  Skinker's  Neck,  and  he  appears  to  have  be 
lieved  that  Lee  .  .  .  had  posted  half  his  army  in  that 
neighborhood."  Colonel  Allan  remarks:  "He  appears  to 
have  relied  chiefly  tupon  his  balloons — a  wretched  substitute 
at  best  for  scouts  and  cavalry,  and  especially  so  in  a  broken 
and  heavily  wooded  country."  But  he  began  crossing  the 
night  of  the  10th  and  did  not  attack  until  the  morning  of  the 
13th;  this  delay  enabled  Lee  to  recall  his  detachments  in  time 
for  the  battle. 

As  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  so  in  this  battle,  Napoleon's 
Twenty-ninth  Maxim  was  violated  on  the  Union  side;  the 
"whole  force"  within  the  theater  was  not  collected.  This  mis 
take  cannot,  however,  be  charged  altogether  to  Burnside,  but 

*Alexander. 
fRopes. 


306  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

more  to  the  authorities  at  Washington  in  their  exaggerated 
anxiety  about  the  safety  of  the  Capital.  There  were  46,000 
men  under  Heintzelman  within  the  defenses  of  Washington — 
enough  to  have  held  the  city  indefinitely  against  Lee's  whole 
army.  Besides  these  there  were  some  12,000  troops  scattered 
in  detachments  through  Maryland,  Delaware,  southern  Penn 
sylvania,  and  upon  the  eastern  shore  of  Virginia;  Morell  had 
about  5,000  along  the  upper  Potomac;  while  Sigel  with  the 
Reserve  Corps  [Eleventh]  was  at  Dumfries,  within  twenty 
miles  of  the  battle-field,  and  Slocum  with  the  Twelfth  Corps 
was  near  Centreville,  not  fifty  miles  away.  These  two  corps 
at  least  ought  to  have  been  brought  to  Fredericksburg  in  time 
for  the  battle.* 

An  unusual  feature  of  the  battle,  viewed  as  the  passage  and 
defense  of  a  river,  was  the  fact  that  little  real  opposition  was 
encountered  by  the  Federal  army  in  the  actual  crossing  of  the 
stream.  Owing  to  the  conformation  of  the  ground  Lee  could 
not  seriously  resist  this  part  of  the  undertaking;  he  could  not 
place  his  men  to  contest  the  landing  of  troops,  because  they 
would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the  Federal  artillery  on  Staf 
ford  Heights. 

It  has  been  said  that  Lee  missed  his  opportunity  when  he 
failed  to  follow  up  his  successful  defense  by  a  counter-attack. 
Less  than  half  of  his  army,  only  four  out  of  nine  divisions,  had 
been  engaged.f  Yet,  while  it  is  true  that  Lee  had  not  pro 
vided  a  general  reserve,  or  made  any  arrangements  for  a 
counter-attack  ;J  and  while  he  did  not  know  how  badly  he  had 
defeated  Burnside,  and  "among  the  Confederates  no  one  con 
ceived  that  the  battle  was  over"f  at  the  end  of  the  first  day, 
there  was  no  opportunity  for  counter-attack  on  the  13th  at 
Longstreet's  end  of  the  line,  where  "the  Federal  assaults  were 
maintained  with  unwavering  determination  till  dark.  But  at 
the  other  end  of  the  line,  when  Meade  and  Gibbon  were  driven 
back,  Early's  division  followed  them  until  it  was  stopped  by 
Birney."§  If  Early  had  been  followed  up  and  supported  by 
a  strong  force  of  reserves  at  the  right  moment  the  effect 
might  have  been  decisive.  Half  of  Jackson's  corps  was  massed 
in  reserve,  but  his  biographers  say  it  was  not  practicable  for 
him  to  put  them  into  the  fight  at  this  critical  moment ;  Jackson 


'Pamphlet  by  Captain  Alstaetter,  C.  E. 

fAlexander. 

JHenderson. 

§Allan. 


THE  FREDERICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  307 

had  to  hold  them  to  meet  assaults  that  he  momentarily  expected 
at  other  points  of  his  line.  As  no  such  assaults  came  he 
resolved  to  make  a  counter-attack;  but  he  says:  "The  first 
gun  had  hardly  moved  forward  from  the  wood  a  hundred 
yards  when  the  enemy's  artillery  reopened  and  so  completely 
swept  our  front  as  to  satisfy  me  that  the  proposed  movement 
should  be  abandoned."* 

During  the  next  two  days,  the  14th  and  15th,  while  the  Fed 
eral  army  was  back  in  Fredericksburg  and  on  the  river-bank, 
an  attack  by  Lee's  army  would  have  had  no  chance  of  suc 
ceeding.  For  70,000  men  to  come  out  of  their  own  strong 
position,  and  cross  an  open  plain  to  attack  100,000  behind  the 
bank  of  a  river,  would  have  been  f  oolhardly  in  itself ;  but  when 
it  is  remembered  that  Hunt  had  147  guns  on  Stafford  Heights, 
which  had  a  perfect  sweep  of  the  whole  field,  it  must  be  con 
cluded  that  such  an  undertaking  would  have  been  hopeless. 
Burnside  ought  not,  however,  to  have  been  allowed  to  with 
draw  his  army  across  the  river  on  the  night  of  the  15th  with 
out  any  interference.  True,  the  night  "was  dark  and  rainy, 
with  high  wind  from  the  south,  preventing"  the  Confederates 
"from  hearing  noises  from  the  enemy's  direction."  Still  the 
successful  passage  unmolested  under  their  guns  reflects  badly 
upon  the  vigilance  of  the  Confederates.  "It  should  have  been 
suspected,  discovered  by  scouts,  and  vigorously  attacked  with 
artillery."t 

The  important  effect  of  stationing  cavalry  and  horse-artillery 
on  the  flank  of  the  line  was  shown  in  this  battle  as  it  was  at 
Antietam.  Stuart's  guns  not  only  checked  Meade's  charge 
for  an  hour,  but  his  threatening  position  kept  Doubleday's 
division  out  of  the  main  fight  at  that  end  of  the  line. 

*  Allan. 

fAlexander. 


LECTURE  XV. 
STONES*  RIVER  CAMPAIGN. 

(154)  After  the  battle  of  Shiloh  [April  6  and  7,  1862] 
General  Halleck  took  command  of  the  National  forces  in  per 
son  at  Pittsburg  Landing;  and  after  the  arrival  of  Pope  with 
the  30,000  men  "fresh  from  the  capture  of  Island  No.  10." 
and  other  reinforcements,  he  had  an  army  of  some  1 20,000. f 
Beauregard's  Confederate  army  was  estimated  at  about  70,000. 
It  really  was  much  smaller,  and  was  a  good  deal  demoralized. 
It  was  at  Corinth. 

Instead  of  following  the  Confederate  army  vigorously  and 
destroying  it  with  his  overwhelming  numbers  Halleck  did  not 
begin  his  forward  movement  until  the  30th  of  April ;  and  then, 
General  Grant  says  in  his  Memoirs,  "the  movement  was  a 
siege  from  the  start  to  the  close."  The  vast  army  would  build 
corduroy  roads  and  move  forward  a  mile  or  two,  then  halt  and 
intrench.  Its  objective  was  the  town  of  Corinth,  not  Beaure 
gard's  army  as  it  should  have  been.  Finally  the  "grand 
army"  reached  Corinth  and  took  possession  of  the  town,  al 
most  without  bloodshed,  on  the  30th  of  May.  Corinth,  it  will 
be  remembered,  is  only  about  twenty  miles  from  Shiloh.  The 
Confederate  army  had  retreated  south  about  sixty  miles  to 
Tupelo.  Halleck  did  not  pursue,  but  split  his  army  in  pieces, 
sending  one  division  to  Arkansas,  and  stationing  others  at  va 
rious  points  between  Memphis  and  Decatur. 

Buell  with  the  army  of  the  Ohio,  about  31,000  strong,  was 
started  about  the  10th  of  June  for  Chattanooga,  to  seize  that 
important  town,  and  to  carry  out  the  President's  long-cherished 
desire  to  have  a  Union  force  enter  East  Tennessee  in  order  to 
protect  and  encourage  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  that  region. 
But  Halleck  ordered  Buell  to  rebuild  and  repair  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railway  as  he  proceeded,  which  was  to  be  his 

*This  name  is  variously  written  Stone,  Stone's,  and  Stones.  Lip- 
pincott's  Gazetteer  has  it  "Stone";  the  Century  Atlas  has  it  "Stones"; 
and  The  U.  S.  Geographic  Board  has  adopted  "Stone."  The  lecturer 
wrote  to  the  Mayor  of  Murfreesboro  to  inquire  what  form  was  used 
by  the  people  of  the  country.  The  Mayor  answered  that  the  form 
"Stones"  was  the  one  used.  He  also  sent  letter-heads  of  the  "Stones 
River  National  Bank"  to  show  the  form  generally  used. 

fGrant's  Memoirs 

308 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  309 

line  of  communication.  (155)  This  task  so  hindered  Buell's 
march  that  Bragg,  who  had  succeeded  Beauregard  in  command 
of  the  Confederates,  had  time  to  transfer  his  army — the  in 
fantry  by  rail  by  way  of  Mobile — from  Tupelo,  to  Chatta 
nooga  ahead  of  Buell.  Yet  Bragg  did  not  begin  to  move  from 
Tupelo  until  the  21st  of  July.  A  large  part  of  Bragg's  army 
was  left  in  Mississippi  under  Price  and  Van  Dorn.  The  force 
that  assembled  at  Chattanooga  numbered  about  30,000.  Gen 
eral  Kirby  Smith,  at  Knoxville,  commanded  another  Confed 
erate  force  in  East  Tennessee  of  about  18,000,  "half  of  which 
was  opposed  by  the  Federal  general,  Morgan,  at  or  near  Cum 
berland  Gap."* 

When  his  leading  divisions  had  gone  as  far  as  Stevenson, 
Buell,  with  Halleck's  consent,  gave  up  the  effort  to  keep  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railway  open  in  his  rear,  and  adopted 
the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway  as  his  line  of  commu 
nications,  with  Nashville  as  his  secondary  base  of  supplies. 
Louisville  was  the  primary  base.  But  on  the  13th  of  July 
Forrest  with  his  Confederate  cavalry,  some  1,400  troopers, 
suddenly  fell  upon  Murfreesboro,  and  captured  the  Union  gar 
rison  of  that  town,  more  than  1,000  officers  and  men.  He 
broke  up  the  railway  so  thoroughly  that  it  was  not  repaired 
until  the  28th  of  the  month ;  and  Buell's  advance  against  Chat 
tanooga  was,  for  the  time,  brought  to  a  full  stop.  Buell  then 
moved  his  divisions  forward  to  the  following  .positions: 
Wood's  division  to  Decherd ;  Nelson's  to  Murfreesboro ;  Mc- 
Cook's  and  Crittenden's  to  Battle  Creek;  Thomas's  to  Athens, 
Ala.  His  own  headquarters  were  at  Huntsville.  But  his 
advance  was  again  stopped  by  a  Confederate  cavalry  raid; 
John  Morgan  captured  Gallatin,  Tenn.,  and  destroyed  the  tun 
nel  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railway,  effectually  inter 
rupting  this  line  of  communications. 

Meantime  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  had  arranged  for  an  in 
vasion  of  Kentucky.  The  plan  of  invasion  proposed  that 
Smith  should  turn  the  Union  position  at  Cumberland  Gap  and 
intercept  its  line  of  communications  by  a  movement  to  the  left 
of  the  Gap;  while  Bragg  with  the  main  column,  covered  by 
his  cavalry,  and  a  small  column  on  his  left  to  threaten  Nash 
ville,  should  advance  directly  against  Munfordville.  Here  he 
would  be  squarely  upon  Buell's  line  of  communications, 
Bragg's  and  Smith's  forces  were  to  unite  in  Kentucky. 

*Ropes. 


310  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

An  examination  of  the  map  shows  that  there  were  no  rail 
ways  and  no  rivers  in  the  direction  of  the  proposed  Confederate 
advance;  the  columns  would  have  to  rely  wholly  upon  wagon- 
trains  for  the  transportation  of  their  stores,  and  the  roads  were 
part  of  the  way  over  mountains,  and  generally  poor.  Munford- 
ville  is  about  160  miles  from  Chattanooga  in  a  straight  line. 
Very  little  forage  and  subsistence  could  be  obtained  in  the 
country  through  which  the  columns  were  to  advance. 
"Bragg's  march  presented  peculiarly  trying  features.  He  had 
to  cross  the  river  Tennessee  .  .  . ;  then  traverse  Walden's 
Ridge,  .  .  .  some  1,200  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea; 
then  descend  into  the  valley  of  the  Sequatchie  River  ,  .-  . 
and  then  ascend  the  plateau  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains, 
somewhere  about  2,200  feet  above  sea-level,  before  he  could 
possibly  concentrate  his  army  for  the  invasion  proper."* 

OPERATIONS. 

About  the  middle  of  August,  Kirby  Smith  crossed  the  moun 
tains  and  cut  Morgan's  line  of  communications.  Leaving  one 
of  his  divisions  to  watch  Morgan  in  the  vicinity  of  Cumberland 
Gap,  he  pressed  forward  into  Kentucky,  and  on  August  30 
encountered  an  extemporized  force  of  Federal  troops  at  Rich 
mond  and  routed  them  with  great  loss.  On  September  2  he 
was  in  possession  of  Lexington,  and  he  established  his  head 
quarters  there. 

"Bragg,  too,  effected  his  movement  through  the  Sequatchie 
Valley  and  his  crossing  of  the  Cumberland  Plateau  in  the  first 
days  of  September,  and  on  the  5th  established  his  headquarters 
at  Sparta.  .  .  .  Up  to  this  point  Bragg's  movements  had 
been  screened  by  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  and  Buell  could 
not  obtain  any  definite  information  respecting  them. 

"Buell  decided  to  concentrate  his  scattered  forces  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  where  his  army  would  cover  Nashville,  and  where 
he  could  easily  receive"  reinforcements  that  he  was  expecting 
"from  Grant's  army  in  western  Tennessee.  This  he  accom 
plished  by  September  the  5th.  .  .  .  He  had  then  heard  of 
Kirby  Smith's  victory  at  Richmond,  and  he  strongly  suspected 
that  Bragg  was  intending  to  effect  a  junction  with  him."*  So 

*Ropes. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  311 

he  planned  to  leave  a  sufficient  force  to  defend  Nashville,  and 
to  march  the  rest  of  his  army  rapidly  into  Kentucky. 

"On  the  14th  of  September  Buell  was  at  Bowling  Green  with 
the  bulk  of  his  army ;  Bragg  had  reached  Glasgow  .  .  .  the 
day  before."  On  that  day  Bragg' s  advance  attacked  the  Fed 
eral  post  at  Munfordville,  but  was  repulsed.  "Bragg  at  once 
brought  up  his  main  army,  and  the  Federal  commander,  on 
being  satisfied  that  he  was  largely  outnumbered,  surrendered 
on  the  17th  with  4,000  men."* 

Bragg's  army  was  now  squarely  across  Buell's  line  of  com 
munications  with  his  main  base  at  Louisville.  Bragg  remained 
at  Munfordville  several  days,  hoping  Buell  would  attack  him. 
This  Buell  would  not  do,  and  on  the  21st  Bragg  started  for 
Bardstown  to  connect  with  Kirby  Smith.  Buell  immediately 
moved  to  Louisville,  where  he  arrived  on  the  25th.  (156) 
Here  his  army  was  largely  reinforced.  On  the  last  day  of 
September  the  main  hostile  armies  were  posted  as  follows: 
Buell's  at  Louisville,  Bragg's  at  Bardstown,  and  Kirby  Smith's 
at  Lexington. 

On  the  1st  of  October  Buell  with  his  reorganized  army  re 
sumed  the  offensive.  He  sent  two  divisions  toward  Frankfort 
to  "contain  or  observe  Kirby  Smith,  and  with  the  rest  of  his 
army  marched  in  three  columns  toward  Bardstown,  with  the 
intention  of  attacking  Bragg."* 

On  the  30th  of  September  Bragg  was  at  Frankfort  with 
Kirby  Smith's  army  conducting  the  inauguration  of  a  Seces 
sionist  governor  of  Kentucky.  He  and  Smith  were  deceived  by 
Buell's  movements,  and  thought  the  main  force  of  the  Federals 
was  advancing  toward  Frankfort.  Bragg,  therefore,  ordered 
Polk,  who  had  been  left  at  Bardstown  in  command  of  his  army 
and  had  fallen  back  before  Buell's  columns,  to  march  north  and 
attack  the  Federal  army  in  flank.  Polk,  however,  knowing  that 
Buell's  main  force  was  advancing  on  Bardstown,  refused  to 
obey  Bragg's  order,  and  retired  toward  the  southeast.  Bragg 
then  ordered  Polk  to  concentrate  at  Harrodsburg,  in  order  to 
cover  the  large  depot  of  stores  that  Kirby  Smith  had  collected 
at  Lexington.  Smith  moved  to  Versailles  for  the  same  purpose. 
Bragg's  left  wing  under  Hardee  had  reached  Perryville  and 
was  there  being  pressed  by  the  Federal  advance.  It  was  then 
reinforced  by  a  division  of  his  right  wing  from  Harrodsburg. 

"Buell's  forces,  excepting  the  divisions  of  Sill  and  Dumont, 

*  Ropes. 


312  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

were  also  near  Perryville,  but  his  troops  had  arrived  from  sev 
eral  directions — 'the  distance  from  one  flank  of  the  army  to 
the  other  was  not  perhaps  less  than  six  miles' — the  different 
bodies  were  much  separated  from  each  other  in  search  of  water 
.  .  .  and  the  line  of  battle  had  not  been  formed  by  noon 
[October  8].  (157)  The  presence  of  the  enemy  in  force  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  recognized.  .  .  .  (158)  About  2 
p.  m.  the  Confederates  assaulted  the  Federal  left  under  Mc- 
Cook,  and  drove  it  back  in  disorder,  capturing  some  fifteen 
guns.  (159)  Later  in  the  day  Sheridan  drove  the  Confed 
erates  in  front  of  him  through  the  town  of  Perryville.  The 
Confederates  achieved  a  tactical  success  against  the  Union  left, 
but  for  all  practical  purposes  the  battle  was  a  drawn  battle. 
(156)  At  night  the  Confederates  retired"  to  Harrodsburg.* 
Here  Bragg's  force  was  joined  on  the  10th  by  Kirby  Smith's. 

Bragg  waited  at  Harrodsburg  a  day  or  two  to  see  if  Buell 
would  attack  him  in  position,  then  withdrew  his  army  to  Camp 
Dick  Robinson,  and  from  there  into  East  Tennessee.  On  the 
12th  Buell  "started  in  pursuit,  but  the  Confederate  retreat  was 
well  managed;  their  rear,"  says  Ropes,  "was  admirably  pro 
tected  by  the  cavalry  of  Wheeler  and  Wharton ;  and  at  London, 
Buell,  convinced  of  the  impolicy  of  carrying  his  army  at  that 
season  of  the  year  into  the  difficult  country  of  East  Tennessee, 
discontinued  the  pursuit  and  transferred  his  troops  to  Bowling 
Green  and  Glasgow,  intending,  later  on,  to  place  his  forces  at 
some,  point  or  points  east  of  Nashville,  on  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  Railroad,  in  readiness  for  another  season  of  ac 
tive  campaigning.  At  this  juncture,  on  October  24th — by  an 
order  received  October  30th — Buell  was  relieved  from  com 
mand,  and  Rosecrans,  who,  under  Grant,  had  been  command 
ing  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  in  western  Tennessee,  was  put 
in  Buell's  place."  Rosecrans  had  gained  considerable  repu 
tation  by  defeating  the  Confederates  under  Van  Dorn  and 
Price  at  luka,  Mississippi,  on  the  19th  of  September,  and  at 
Corinth  on  the  3rd  and  4th  of  October. 

At  this  time  the  garrison  that  Buell  had  left  at  Nashville 
under  Negley  was  besieged  by  Forrest's  cavalry  and  Breckin- 
ridge's  infantry  division.  Rosecrans  sent  McCook's  corps  to 
Negley's  relief,  holding  the  rest  of  his  army  at  Bowling  Green 
until  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railway  could  be  repaired. 
By  the  end  of  November  he  had  his  whole  army  concentrated 
at  Nashville. 

*Ropes. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  313 

Meantime  Bragg  had  withdrawn  his  army  to  Morristown  in 
East  Tennessee.  Thence  he  transferred  it  by  way  of  Knox- 
ville  and  Chattanooga  to  Murfreesboro.  (160)  Rosecrans,  in 
spite  of  urgent  and  even  threatening  letters  from  the  War  De 
partment,  would  not  move  against  Bragg  until  he  had  collected 
an  abundance  (2,000 ,000). of  rations  at  Nashville  to  make  him 
independent  of  the  railway  back  from  Nashville  to  Louisville; 
he  well  knew  that  he  could  not  prevent  the  interruption  of  this 
line  of  communication  by  the  Confederate  cavalry.  In  fact, 
Morgan's  cavalry  broke  up  this  railway  again  on  the  26th  of 
December. 

At  the  same  time  Forrest's  cavalry,  also,  was  absent  from 
Bragg's  army  upon  a  raid  against  Grant's  line  of  communica 
tions,  the  railway  from  Corinth  to  Columbus,  Kentucky,  which 
it  succeeded  in  breaking  up.  But  Bragg  had  retained  the  three 
cavalry  brigades  of  Wheeler,  Wharton,  and  Pegram,  "and  their 
skilful  movements,"  says  Ropes,  "screened  the  positions  and 
maneuvers  of  his  infantry,  on  which  he  placed  his  chief  re 
liance,  and  delayed  the  advance  of  the  Federal  forces  until 
arrangements  could  be  completed  for  their  reception."  It 
would  have  been  better  for  the  Confederate  army  if  Bragg  had 
also  kept  back  the  brigades  of  Morgan  and  Forrest ;  but  he  had 
sent  them  off  before  he  was  sure  that  Rosecrans  was  about 
to  move  against  him. 

The  contact  squadrons  of  Bragg's  cavalry  were  in  touch  with 
the  Federal  camps  at  Nashville;  and  as  soon  as  Rosecrans's 
army  began  the  march  toward  Murfreesboro,  on  the  morning 
of  December  26,  Wheeler,  who  was  Bragg's  chief  of  cavalry, 
sent  report  of  the  movement  to  Bragg,  and  made  ready  to  dis 
pute  the  advance  of  the  Federal  army,  and  to  delay  its  march. 

This  army  moved  in  three  columns,  designated  the 
"Right  Wing,"  "Center,"  and  "Left  Wing,"  commanded  re 
spectively  by  McCook,  Thomas,  and  Crittenden.  McCook's 
column  took  the  Nolensville  Turnpike;  Thomas's  the  Franklin 
and  Wilkinson  Turnpikes,  to  threaten  Bragg's  left.*  This  had 
been  on  the  turnpike  between  Triune  and  Eagleville,  but  was 
immediately  drawn  in  to  the  position  in  front  of  Murfreesboro. 
Crittenden  took  the  direct  road  to  Murfreesboro.  These 
columns  encountered  Wheeler's  cavalry  almost  as  soon  as  they 
had  started,  and  were  opposed  by  it  at  every  step.  At  Nolens 
ville,  at  Lavergne,  and  wherever  a  strong  position  could  be 

*G.  C.  Kniffin  in  B.  &  L. 


314  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

found,  the  Confederate  cavalrymen  with  their  carbines,  aided 
by  their  artillery,  compelled  the  Federal  divisions  to  halt  and 
deploy.  Where  opportunity  offered  the  squadrons  charged 
with  saber  and  revolver.  And  there  was  not  a  moment  when 
they  did  not  keep  Bragg  perfectly  informed  of  the  movements 
and  whereabouts  of  Rosecrans's  columns.  Aided  by  fogs  and 
hard  rains  they  succeeded  in  so  hindering  the  progress  of  the 
Federals  that  it  was  the  evening  of  the  29th  [December]  before 
the  leading  divisions  were  within  three  miles  of  Murfreesboro, 
though  the  distance  marched  was  only  thirty  miles. 

From  the  accounts  of  the  campaign  it  does  not  appear  that 
the  Federal  cavalry  took  its  place  in  front  of  the  infantry 
columns  until  the  29th.  Van  Home  says  in  his  History  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland:  "The  cavalry  moved  in  three 
columns.  Colonel  Minty's  brigade,  under  Colonel  Kennett, 
the  division  commander,  accompanied  the  left  wing.  Colonel 
Zahm's  brigade  proceeded  on  the  Franklin  Road,  as  a  protec 
tion  to  General  McCook's  right  flank,  and  General  Stanley, 
with  the  reserve  brigade,  also  accompanied  the  right  wing." 
Whatever  was  the  cause,  the  Union  cavalry  certainly  rendered 
no  efficient  service  on  this  march  until  the  29th.  On  that  day, 
the  same  historian  says,  "General  Stanley  moved  in  advance 
of  the  right  wing.  .  .  .  The  Anderson  cavalry,  the  Fifteenth 
Pennsylvania,  pushed  the  enemy,  at  full  charge,  for  six  miles." 
And  so  poorly  was-Rosecrans  kept  informed  by  his  cavalry 
concerning  the  movements  of  Bragg's  army  that  he  ordered 
.Crittenden's  wing,  which  was  in  advance,  "to  occupy  Murfrees 
boro  with  one  of  his  divisions  on  the  night  of  the  29th,  and  en 
camp  the  other  two  miles  outside."*  B.ut  Bragg's  whole  army 
was  at  that  time  in  line  of  battle  between  Crittenden  and 
Murfreesboro.  Crittenden  could  not  obey  the  order,  of  course. 

(161)  The  field  upon  which  the  battle  of  Stones  River  was 
fought  lies  along  the  stream  of  this  name  about  two  miles  west 
of  Murfreesboro.  In  a  very  winding  course  the  river  here 
flows  in  a  general  direction  slightly  west  of  north.  It  was,  at 
the  time  of  the  battle,  spanned  by  several  bridges,  and  was 
fordable  at  various  places;  hence  it  was  not  in  itself  a  serious 
obstacle  in  a  military  sense.  The  northern  part  of  the  main 
battle-field  was  traversed  by  the  Nashville  Turnpike  and  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway,  which  intersected  within 
it  at  a  very  acute  angle,  and  crossed  the  river  each  by  its  own 


*Van  Home. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  315 

• 

bridge.  Across  the  center  of  the  field,  from  east  to  west,  was 
the  Wilkinson  Turnpike,  and  .across  the  southern  part  of  it, 
from  east  to  west,  was  the  Franklin  Road.  These  highways 
were  connected  by  a  country  road  that  crossed  the  battle 
field.  West  of  the  battle-field  was  a  fordable  stream  called 
Overall  Creek,  from  two  to  three  miles  from  Stones  River. 
The  space  between  these  two  streams  was  rather  flat,  but  with 
hills  here  and  there  high  enough  to  serve  as  artillery  positions. 
The  space  was  occupied  by  a  considerable  number  of  farm 
houses  and  cultivated  fields ;  but  the  greater  part  of  it  was  cov 
ered  with  cedar  thickets,  through  which  infantry  could  pass 
easily  enough  and  cannon  could  be  taken  with  difficulty.  The 
thickets  were  dense  enough  to  conceal  troops  within  them. 

On  the  29th  of  December  Bragg's  army  occupied  a  "position 
in  readiness"  covering  the  approaches  to  Murfreesboro  from 
the  west.  Hardee's  corps,  consisting  of  the  divisions  of  Breck- 
inridge  and  Cleburne,  with  Jackson's  brigade  as  reserve,  formed 
the  right  wing,  and  was  assigned  to  the  sector  extending  from 
the  Lebanon  Turnpike  to  the  river;  while  Folk's  corps,  com 
posed  of  the  divisions  of  Withers  and  Cheatham,  formed  the 
left  wing  and  guarded  the  sector  from  the  river  to  the  Frank 
lin  Road.  McCown's  division  was  held  in  reserve  at  the 
center.*  Wheeler's  cavalry  was  out  in  front  and  guarding 
the  flanks. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  Crittenden's  divisions  ad 
vancing  by  the  Nashville  Turnpike  discovered  the  Confederate 
army  in  position;  they  deployed  into  line  of  battle  and  halted 
about  a  mile  in  front  of  the  enemy.  Negley's  division,  of  the 
"Center,"  took  its  place  in  the  same  line.  These  four  Federal 
divisions  bivouacked  for  the  night  in  this  position.  The  other 
Federal  divisions  bivouacked  on  the  night  of  the  29th  at  differ 
ent  points  on  the  roads  west  of  Overall  Creek. 

(162)  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  McCook's  divisions, 
the  "Right  Wing,"  moved  forward  on  the  Wilkinson  Turnpike 
with  orders  to  form  line  on  Negley's  right.  Sheridan's  division, 
preceded  by  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  was  in  the  lead,  followed  by 
the  divisions  of  Johnson  and  Davis.  Sheridan  and  Davis  were 
met  by  fire  from  the  enemy's  line,  and  they  lost  nearly  300  men 
in  getting  into  place.  "The  left  of  Sheridan's  division,  when 
in  line,  rested  on  the  Wilkinson  Turnpike.  General  Davis 

*Colonel  Urquhart  in  B.  6-  L. 


316  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGN. 

formed  his  division  on  Sheridan's  right,  and  General  Johnson 
held  his  in  reserve/'* 

The  "Left  Wing"  on  the  30th  remained  in  about  the  position 
it  had  taken  on  the  29th.  Palmer's  division  moved  a  little  for 
ward,  and  the  pioneer  brigade  took  its  place  at  the  river  to 
prepare  the  fords.  Rousseau's  division  of  Thomas's  "Center" 
took  position  behind  Negley's  line.  A  brigade  was  left  to 
guard  the  bridge  of  the  Jefferson  Turnpike  across  Stones  River 
about  eight  miles  in  rear ;  and  another,  at  Lavergne,  about  fif 
teen  miles  back  on  the  Nashville  Turnpike. 

There  was  considerable  fighting  between  the  hostile  lines 
during  the  day,  especially  with  artillery.  (163)  Suspecting 
from  the  direction  of  McCook's  advance  that  the  Federals  were 
trying  to  envelop  or  turn  his  left,  Bragg  placed  McCown's 
division,  which  had  been  in  reserve,  on  Folk's  left.  In  the 
afternoon  McCook,  learning  that  the  right  of  Davis's  line  was 
opposite  the  center  of  Bragg's,  placed  Johnson's  division  in 
position  on  the  right  of  Davis. 

Bragg  was  disappointed  not  to  be  attacked  in  his  position  on 
the  30th.  He  resolved  himself  to  attack  early  the  next  morn 
ing,  making  his  main  effort  against  the  right  of  Rosecrans's 
line.  Accordingly  he  moved  Cleburne's  division  from  the  right 
of  his  line  to  the  left.  General  Hardee  was  to  command  the 
main  attack,  and  to  envelop  the  enemy's  right  flank;  and  the 
whole  line  was  to  swing  to  the  right,  pivoting  on  the  river,  and 
drive  the  Federal  army  back,  off  its  line  of  communications  and 
into  the  river.  Bragg  designated  no  general  reserve,  but  he 
did  not  believe  that  Breckinridge's  division  would  be  attacked 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  river;  he  purposed  using  it  as  his 
general  reserve. 

Not  suspecting  that  Bragg  meant  to  take  the  offensive,  Rose- 
crans  planned  a  very  similar  form  of  attack  for  his  forces  to 
make  on  the  morning  of  the  31st,  and  issued  very  detailed 
orders  accordingly.  He  purposed  making  his  "main  attack" 
against  the  Confederate  right  on  the.  east  bank  of  the  river, 
while  his  "secondary  attack"  should  occupy  the  attention  of  the 
left  of  the  Confederate  line.  His  "plan  of  battle,"  as  revealed  in 
his  official  report  and  by  his  orders  on  the  field,  was  as  follows : 
General  McCook  was  instructed  to  take  an  advantageous  posi 
tion  on  the  right,  and  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  if  attacked; 
but  if  overpowered,  to  fall  back  slowly,  refusing  his  right.  If 


*Van  Home. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  317 

not  attacked,  he  was  to  engage  the  enemy  sufficiently  to  hold 
him  in  his  front.  Generals  Thomas  and  Palmer  were  to  open 
with  skirmishing,  and  gain  the  enemy's  center  and  left  as  far  as 
the  river.  General  Crittenden  was  to  throw  Van  Cleve's  divi 
sion  across  the  river,  at  the  lower  ford,  to  advance  against 
Breckinridge,  and  to  cross  Wood's  division  by  brigades  at  the 
upper  fords,  and  support  Van  Cleve's  right.  If  successful  in 
driving  back  the  enemy's  right,  General  Wood  was  to  place 
his  batteries  on  the  heights  east  of  the  river,  and  open  on  his 
center  and  left  in  reverse.  Then  General  Palmer  should  press 
the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  General  Thomas  should  sustain  the 
movement  in  the  center."* 

As  the  two  plans  of  battle  were  identical,  the  initial  advan 
tage  would  rest  with  the  army  which  got  the  start ;  and  that  was 
Bragg's  army.  Soon  after  dawn  Hardee  with  nearly  half  of 
the  Confederate  infantry  opened  the  attack  on  the  Federal 
right ;  from  that  moment  Rosecrans's  army  was  thrown  upon 
the  defensive. 

At  the  start  McCown's  division  inclined  to  the  left,  leaving 
a  gap  between  his  right  and  Folk's  left,  which  Cleburne  quickly 
filled  with  his  division.  Then  these  two  divisions  wheeled  upon 
McCook's  right  flank.  (164)  Johnson's  division  of  Mc- 
Cook's  right  was  driven  from  the  field  after  a  short  resistance. 
This  exposed  the  right  of  Davis's  division  which  was  imme 
diately  refused.  The  divisions  of  McCown,  Cleburne,  and 
Withers  then  assaulted  Davis's  line  and  the  right  of  Sheridan's. 
These  lines  were  at  right  angles  to  each  other  and  presented  a 
salient  to  the  enemy;  but  they  repulsed  the  Confederate 
assault. 

(165)  Cheatham's  division,  which  had  been  held  in  re 
serve,  was  now  put  into  the  Confederate  line,  and  a  second 
assault  was  made  at  this  angle.  This  also  was  repulsed.  But 
the  Confederates  made  a  third  assault.  This  time  they  en 
veloped  the  right  of  Davis's  line,  and  forced  it  to  withdraw. 
This  left  Sheridan's  right  exposed  to  flank  attack,  and  it  also 
fell  back.  But  Sheridan  wheeled  his  left  brigade  to  the  right 
and  charged  the  Confederates.  This  action  arrested  their  ad 
vance  and  gave  Sheridan  time  to  form  a  new  line  facing  south. 
He  then  wheeled  his  line  farther  to  the  rear  and  made  another 
stand  facing  southwest.  His  line  was  now  parallel  to  the 
Nashville  Pike  and  formed  a  right  angle  with  Negley's. 

*Van  Home. 


318  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

At  this  juncture  Rousseau's  division,  which  had  been  held  in 
reserve,  took  its  place  on  Sheridan's  right.  The  entire  Con 
federate  force  except  Breckinridge's  division  now  assaulted 
the  Federal  front  occupied  by  the  divisions  of  Rousseau,  Sheri 
dan,  Negley,  and  Palmer,  arranged  in  order  from  right  to  left. 
The  assaults  were  at  first  repulsed ;  but  finally  Sheridan's  am 
munition  became  exhausted,  and  he  was  forced  to  fall  back. 
(166)  His  withdrawal  left  a  gap  between  Rousseau's  left  and 
Negley's  right  into  which  the  Confederates  pushed.  Rousseau 
and  Negley  then  withdrew  their  divisions ;  but  they  halted 
them  in  a  depression  between  the  edge  of  a  cedar  thicket  and 
the  turnpike,  and  there  stubbornly  withstood  the  enemy's 
attacks,  and  forced  him  to  fall  back.  In  this  stand  Shepherd's 
brigade  of  regulars  lost  twenty  officers  and  518  men  killed  and 
wounded. 

(167)  The  withdrawal  of  Negley's  division  involved  Palm 
er's  division,  which  connected  with  Negley's  left.  Palmer's 
right  was  driven  back;  but  his  left  under  Hazen,  which  was 
posted  in  an  oak  grove  on  high  ground,  crossed  by  the  railway 
eight  or  nine  hundred  yards  northwest  of  the  junction  with  the 
turnpike,  repulsed  all  the  attacks  of  the  Confederates,  and  held 
its  ground.  This  was  the  only  part  of  the  original  Federal 
line  that  had  stood  fast.  The  entire  right  wing  and  center 
and  the  right  of  the  left  wing  had  been  forced  back  about  this 
point  as  a  pivot. 

Let  us  now  see  how  much  of  Rosecrans's  original  plan  of 
battle  had  been  carried  out.  (165)  According  to  the  plan 
Van  Cleve's  division  of  Crittenden's  corps  was  in  motion  be 
fore  eight  o'clock.  The  firing  four  miles  away  on  the  right 
had  been  heard  since  a  little  after  daybreak;  but  McCook  had 
said  that  he  could  hold  the  enemy  in  that  quarter  for  three 
hours,  while  the  left  wing  executed  the  main  attack  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river.  As  Rosecrans  expected  fighting  on  his 
right,  he  was  not  disturbed  when  it  took  place  there.  So 
Van  Cleve's  division  pushed  on,  and  two  of  his  brigades 
were  actually  deployed  in  front  of  Breckinridge's  position  be 
fore  Rosecrans  knew  that  his  right  had  been  enveloped  and  de 
feated,  and  was  falling  back.  As  soon,  however,  as  Rosecrans 
learned  the  extent  of  this  disaster,  he  recalled  his  offensive 
movement  against  Bragg's  right  in  order  to  reinforce  his  own 
right  wing.  (167)  The  first  of  the  reinforcing  troops  to  get 
into  action  were  a  part  of  Van  Cleve's  division.  They  formed 
on  the  right  of  Rousseau's  line  just  in  time  to  aid  it  in  stop- 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  319 

ping  the  pursuit  of  the  Confederates,  after  the  divisions  of 
Rousseau  and  Negley  had  been  forced  back. 

By  noon  Rosecrans  had  a  strong  line  formed  on  high  ground 
along  the  Nashville  Turnpike,  extending  from  Hazen's  original 
position  to  a  point  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  to  the  right  of  it. 
The  right  of  this  line  was  occupied  by  portions  of  McCook's 
divisions,  and  the  center  by  a  part  of  ^  Thomas's  and  Critten- 
den's  troops.  From  Hazen's  position  the  left  of  the  line  bent 
back  to  the  river.  The  Confederates  continued  to  assault  this 
line  till  about  4  p.  m. ;  but  could  not  break  it. 

(168)  Up  to  this  time  Breckinridge's  Confederate  division 
had  remained  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  comparatively  idle. 
As  early  as  ten  o'clock  Bragg  had  ordered  Breckinridge  to 
send  two  brigades  to  reinforce  Hardee  in  the  main  attack. 
Instead  of  obeying  this  order  Breckinridge  had  sent  back  word 
that  Federal  troops  were  advancing  in  heavy  force  against  his 
own  position.  On  receipt  of  this  report,  Bragg  sent  Breckin 
ridge  an  order  to  move  out  and  attack  the  enemy  advancing 
against  him — not  to  stand  and  be  attacked.  Thereupon 
Breckinridge  advanced,  only  to  find  that  the  Union  troops  had 
already  retired  across  the  river.  But  by  this  time  it  was  too 
late  for  him  to  send  assistance  to  Hardee.  Thus  Rosecrans's 
offensive  movement  against  Bragg's  right,  while  it  had  to  be 
recalled,  and  was,  to  that  extent,  a  failure,  nevertheless  had  a 
very  decided  effect  upon  the  battle ;  it  kept  Breckinridge's  divi 
sion  from  reinforcing  Hardee  just  at  a  time  when  it  might 
have  enabled  him  "to  reach  the  center  and  left  of  the  National 
army."* 

The  left  wing  of  the  Confederate  army  had  been  fighting 
since  daybreak;  all  of  its  brigades  had  been  engaged,  many 
of  them  in  repeated  assaults ;  and  the  losses  had  been  heavy.* 
"At  four  o'clock  it  became  evident  to  the  Confederate  com 
mander  that  his  only  hope  of  success  lay  in  a  charge  upon  the 
Union  left,  which,  by  its  overpowering  weight,  should  carry 
everything  before  it."f  Breckinridge's  were  the  only  fresh 
troops  he  had  for  such  a  charge;  Breckinridge  was  per 
emptorily  ordered  to  send  them  over  the  river.  While  this 
movement  was  taking  place  "there  was  a  lull  in  the  action  on 
the  left."*  In  fact  the  Confederate  left  had  ceased  its  aggres 
sive  action,  and  from  this  time  to  the  end  it  remained  strictly 
on  the  defensive.  It  was  well-nigh  exhausted. 

*Van  Home. 
fKniffen  in  B.  &  L. 


320  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  angle  of  the  Federal  line  held  by  Hazen  was  the  point 
against  which  the  final  assaults  of  the  Confederates  were 
mainly  to  be  directed.  This  place  was  strongly  reinforced 
from  other  parts  of  the  Union  line  to  receive  the  assaults. 

Breckinridge  was  slow  in  sending  his  brigades  over  to  the 
west  of  the  river.  As  soon  as  the  first  two  brigades  had 
crossed,  Polk,  who  was  to  command  the  attack,  hurled  them 
against  the  Federal  position  without  waiting  for  the  other  bri 
gades  to  cross.  The  attack  was  repulsed  with  great  loss. 
Forming  a  new  line,  reinforced  by  Breckinridge's  other  bri 
gades  which  had  now  crossed,  Polk  advanced  again,  only  to  be 
repulsed  again.  This  ended  the  day's  battle. 

Folk's  assaults  had  cost  the  Confederates  dearly.  "Some  of 
the  assaulting  regiments  lost  more  than  half  their  strength; 
and  none  of  these  attacks  were  even  temporarily  successful."* 
Bragg  attributed  his  failure  to  the  concentration  of  the  fire  of 
the  Federal  artillery  upon  his  lines. 

(169)  After  the  long  day's  fight  the  two  hostile  armies 
bivouacked  on  the  field  within  musket  range  of  each  other. 
The  Confederates  intrenched  their  lines.  There  was  no  fight 
ing  along  the  line  on  the  1st  of  January,  1863,  although  Bragg 
made  some  show  of  attacking  the  center  and  right  of  the 
Federal  line.  In  the  afternoon  Crittenden  moved  a  division 
across  the  river  and  formed  line  of  battle  in  front  of  Breckin 
ridge,  who  had  resumed  his  position  on  that  side. 

Bragg  expected,  or  hoped,  to  find  the  Federal  army  gone 
from  his  front  on  the  morning  of  January  the  2nd.  His  cavalry 
had  reported  the  turnpike  in  rear  of  the  Federal  position  full 
of  troops  and  wagons  making  for  Nashville.  But  he  soon 
found  that  his  enemy  had  not  budged.  He  resolved  to  dis 
lodge  the  enemy  from  the  position  on  the  east  of  the  river,  and 
assigned  the  task  to  Breckinridge  with  four  brigades.  He 
ordered  Breckinridge  to  carry  a  hill  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
and  there  to  halt  and  intrench.  Breckinridge  took  the  hill,  but 
was  unable  to  stop  his  men,  who  pushed  on  after  the  retreating 
Federals.  Whereupon  the  enemy's  batteries,  massed  on  the 
other  side  of  the  river,  opened  fire  upon  the  Confederates,  and 
drove  them  back  with  great  slaughter.f  Federal  troops  were 
then  hurried  across  the  river  in  large  numbers.  They  recov 
ered  the  position  and  intrenched  themselves  in  it. 

There  was  little  fighting  on  the  3rd  of  January.    Just  before 

*Van  Home. 
fUrquhart  in  B.  &  L. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  321 

dark  Thomas  sent  forward  two  brigades,  which  broke  the 
center  of  the  Southern  line,  and  drove  the  Confederates  out  of 
their  intrenchments  at  that  point.  (160)  That  night  Bragg 
withdrew  from  the  battle-field  and  started  in  retreat  upon 
Tullahoma.  Rosecrans  entered  Murfreesboro  the  next  morn 
ing,  but  made  no  pursuit  of  the  Confederate  army. 

During  the  whole  of  this  battle  Wheeler's  cavalry  was  very 
active  in  rear  of  the  main  Federal  army.  An  infantry  brigade, 
as  we  have  seen,  had  to  be  left  to  guard  the  bridge  on  the 
Jefferson  Turnpike  over  Stones  River ;  it  was  attacked  by 
Wheeler  on  the  30th  of  December.  The  same  day  another 
part  of  his  cavalry  captured  McCook's  wagon-train,  and  800 
men.  At  Lavergne  a  Federal  infantry  brigade  retook  the  men 
and  animals,  but  the  Confederates  had  burned  the  wagons. 
On  the  31st  the  Confederate  cavalry  passed  entirely  round 
Rosecrans's  army,  capturing  wagons  and  stragglers,  and  hav 
ing  several  encounters  with  Stanley's  Federal  cavalry.  On  the 
1st  of  January,  also,  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  busy  in  rear 
of  the  Federal  army,  stopping  the  passage  of  trains  to  and 
from  Nashville,  and  watching  for  indications  of  the  retreat  of 
the  army.  About  2  p.  m.  a  large  force  of  this  cavalry  appeared 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Lavergne,  captured  part  of  a  Union 
train  and  dispersed  the  rest,  then  attacked  a  regiment  of  engi 
neers  and  mechanics  in  a  stockade.  The  action  of  Wheeler's 
squadrons  in  attacking  train-guards,  destroying  wagons,  cap 
turing  animals,  and  terrifying  teamsters,  created  wild  con 
fusion  on  Rosecrans's  line  of  communications  all  the  way  back 
to  Nashville. 

COMMENTS. 

(154)  When  General  Halleck  took  command  of  the  Fed 
eral  army  in  the  field,  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  saw  it 
raised  to  a  strength  of  more  than  120,000  men,  while  the  Con 
federate  army  under  Beauregard  at  Corinth  was  not  even  esti 
mated  at  more  than  70,000,  and  was  really  much  smaller,  he 
ought  to  have  moved  promptly  against  the  Confederate  army, 
with  a  view  to  capturing  or  destroying  it.  In  not  doing  so  he 
violated  what  von  der  Goltz  considers  the  first  principle  of 
modern  warfare:  namely,  that  "the  immediate  objective, 
against  which  all  our  efforts  must  be  directed,  is  the  hostile 
main  army." 

Halleck  made  the  little  town  of  Corinth  his  main  objective, 
and,  no  doubt,  congratulated  himself  that  he  got  possession  of 


322  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

it  without  a  battle,  after  spending  a  whole  month  with  his  large 
army  in  advancing  twenty-two  miles.  Corinth's  only  military 
importance  consisted  in  the  fact  that  it  was  at  the  junction  of 
two  important  railways. 

After  reaching  Corinth  Halleck  still  had  a  chance  of  over 
taking  Beauregard's  army  and  forcing  it  to  fight;  but  he 
halted  his  main  army,  and  contented  himself  with  sending  a 
small  force  to  follow  the  Confederates  a  short  way.  Then 
Halleck  gave  up  all  thought  of  destroying  this  force  of  the 
enemy,  and  broke  up  his  own  large  army,  scattering  it  in  de 
tachments  along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railway.  In 
doing  this  he  probably  acted  under  orders  from  Washington. 
In  starting  Buell  off  to  Chattanooga  we  know  that  he  was 
carrying  out  instructions  from  Washington.  "To  this  move 
ment"  President  Lincoln  "had  always  attached  an  importance 
far  in  excess  of  its  real  consequence,  if  the  matter  be  con 
sidered  from  a  purely  military  standpoint;  his  sympathies  were 
excited  by  the  sufferings  of  the  Unionists  in  that  region  [East 
Tennessee] ,  and  he  also  deemed  it  very  desirable  that  the 
United  States  Government  should  show  itself  capable  of  afford 
ing  succor  to  those  who  claimed  its  protection."* 

But  in  ordering  Buell  to  rebuild  and  repair  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railway  as  he  progressed,  Halleck  placed  upon 
him  a  handicap  that  defeated  the  object  of  the  enterprise. 
It  so  hindered  him  that  Bragg  not  only  reached  Chattanooga 
with  the  Confederate  army  ahead  of  him,  but  had  time,  also, 
to  plan  and  begin  an  invasion  of  Kentucky.  And  in  ordering 
and  expecting  Buell  to  use  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail 
way  as  his  line  of  supply,  Halleck  imposed  upon  him  a  con 
dition  impossible  for  him  to  fulfill  with  the  troops  at  his  com 
mand.  It  would  have  taken  Buell's  whole  force  adequately  to 
guard  this  railway  and  keep  it  open  from  Corinth  to  Chat 
tanooga.  The  railway  "ran  on  the  boundary  between  the  terri 
tory  which  had  just  been  conquered  and  the"  unconquered 
"hostile  region  south  of  it,  and  .  .  .  was  therefore  exposed 
to  interruption  in  every  mile  of  its  course"  by  the  Confederate 
cavalry,  and  partisans,  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.* 
With  such  leaders  as  Morgan  and  Forrest  to  contend  with, 
it  even  taxed  the  Federals  to  their  .utmost  to  keep 'the  railways 
open  in  their  rear,  through  country  wholly  conquered,  and 
garrisoned  by  Federal  troops. 

*Ropes. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  323 

In  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  under  Morgan  and  Forrest 
and  Wheeler  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  we  find  examples  of 
successful  raids,  like  those  of  Stuart  in  Virginia.  Later  in  the 
war  we  shall  find  several  cavalry  raids  that  were  dismal  fail 
ures,  such  as  Morgan's  raid  in  Ohio,  Stuart's  in  Pennsylvania 
during  the  Gettysburg  Campaign,  Stoneman's  in  Virginia  dur 
ing  the  Chancellorsville  Campaign,  Kilpatrick's  upon  Rich 
mond  in  1864,  Stoneman's  upon  Macon,  Georgia,  during  the 
Atlanta  Campaign,  and  Wilson's  in  Virginia  during  the  opera 
tions  round  Petersburg.  The  first  were  made  in  friendly  co;**'- 
try,  while  the  latter  were  all  made  in  hostile  country.  It  ma> 
then  be  laid  down  as  a  rule,  that  a  cavalry  raid  covering  mar^ 
miles  of  country  and  a  considerable  length  of  time  must,  in 
order  to  achieve  success,  be  made  in  a  country  whose  inhabit 
ants  are  friendly.  To  succeed  in  hostile  country  such  a  raid 
must  be  made  under  exceptional  circumstances,  like  those 
under  which  Grierson's  raid  was  made  in  Mississippi,  during 
the  Vicksburg  Campaign,  or  Wilson's  in  Alabama  in  1865,  etc. 

The  halt  of  Buell's  advance  against  Chattanooga  caused  by 
Forrest's  breaking  up  the  railway  at  Murfreesboro,  in  July, 
as  well  as  that  caused  by  Morgan's  destroying  the  tunnel  at 
Gallatin,  a  few  weeks  later,  shows  how  dependent  an  army  is 
upon  its  line  of  communications.  True,  commanders  hav. 
been  known  to  cut  loose  from  their  bases,  as  Scott  did  in  hib 
campaign  against  the  City  of  Mexico,  and  as  McClellan  did  iu 
the  retreat  from  the  Chickahominy  to  the  James,  and  as  Grant 
did  in  the  Vicksburg  Campaign;  but  in  every  such  case  the 
commander,  like  McClellan,  must  expect  to  gain  a  new  base 
before  the  supplies  in  his  trains  become  exhausted,  or  he  must 
expect  to  live  off  the  country,  like  Scott  and  Grant. 

(155)  When  an  army  finds  its  communications  menaced  by 
the  enemy  it  must  fall  back  to  recover  or  protect  them;  or  it 
must  concentrate  and  either  attack  the  enemy  or  seize  his 
communications.  When,  therefore,  it  became  known  to  Buell 
that  Bragg  was  moving  against  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railway,  that  was  enough  in  itself  to  make  him  fall  back  into 
Kentucky.  But  he  also  had  another  reason — a  political  reason ; 
so,  too,  the  chief  motive  of  Bragg's  invading  Kentucky  was 
political  and  not  military.  Questions  of  politics  cannot  be 
separated  from  war ;  they  cause  every  war ;  they  govern  the 
conduct  of  every  campaign ;  they  fix  the  terms  of  every  peace. 
The  political  motive  of  Bragg's  invasion  of  Kentucky  was  to 
encourage  such  an  uprising  among  the  citizens  of  the  State 


324  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

favorable  to  Secession  as  would  place  the  State  in  the  Con 
federacy;  the  political  motive  of  Buell's  retreat  into  the  State 
was  to  hold  it  for  the  Union. 

Yet  from  a  purely  military  point  of  view,  also,  Bragg's  ad 
vance  to  Munf ordville  was  good  strategy  and  well  managed. 
By  threatening  Nashville,  Buell's  secondary  base,  Bragg  made 
Buell  believe  for  a  time  that  Nashville  was  his  objective;  thus 
he  detained  the  Federal  army  long  enough  to  enable  him  to 
beat  it  in  the  race  for  Munfordville.  He  had  captured  Mun- 
fordville  and  was  in  possession  of  it  when  Buell  was  still  at 
Bowling  Green ;  he  was,  therefore,  squarely  across  Buell's  line 
of  communications.  Bragg,  strategically,  had  every  advantage 
of  position  over  Buell.  He  was  not  concerned  about  his  own 
communications  with  Chattanooga — he  had  no  railway  connec 
tion  with  that  place  nor  other  line  than  the  long  miserable 
roads  by  which  he  had  marched.  If  defeated  at  Munfordville 
he  would. fall  back  upon  Lexington,  Kentucky,  where  Kirby 
Smith  had  gathered  a  large  quantity  of  stores.  So  it  mattered 
nothing  to  him  that  his  army  at  Munfordville  faced  toward  its 
original  rear.  The  case  was  quite  different  with  Buell.  He 
was  already  deprived  of  his  communications  with  Louisville, 
his  only  base  of  supplies.  He  was  obliged  to  recover  them 
soon;  even  if  he  could  have  collected  provisions  in  the  country 
for  his  army  he  could  not  have  left  the  city  of  Louisville,  with 
its  great  depots  of  public  stores,  to  be  captured  by  the  enemy. 
The  consequences  of  defeat  for  Buell  would,  therefore,  have 
been  very  serious. 

But  Bragg's  position  athwart  Buell's  communications  gave 
him  no  tactical  advantage  over  his  adversary;  if  he  had  at 
tacked  Buell  he  would  have  found  it  as  hard  to  win  a  victory 
as  it  would  have  been  if  Buell's  communications  had  been 
straight  behind  the  Union  army.  Yet  to  make  sure  of  his 
strategic  advantage,  Bragg  had  either  to  attack  and  win,  or 
else  leave  a  force  to  "contain"  Buell's  army,  and  with  the  bulk 
of  his  own  army  capture  Louisville.  But  Bragg  did  not  feel 
himself  strong  enough  for  either  of  these  projects;  and  Kirby 
Smith's  army  was  a  hundred  miles  away  and  not  under  his 
command.  Although  he  and  Smith  were  cooperating  with 
each  other,  they  were  mutually  independent  of  each  other. 
There  was  lack  of  a  single  supreme  commander  in  the  theater 
of  war  at  the  critical  moment.  General  Wheeler,  in  his  ac 
count  of  the  campaign,  says :  "Nothing  was  therefore  wanting 
in  Kentucky  but  absolute  authority  in  one  responsible  com- 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  325 

mander.  Cooperation  of  the  most  cordial  character  is  a  poor 
substitute.  The  word  cooperation  should  be  stricken  from  mili 
tary  phraseology.  "It  was  another  instance  of  the  folly, 
which  both  the  Union  and  the  Confederate  governments  were 
so  constantly  committing,  of  having  more  than  -one  command 
ing  officer  in  one  theater  of  war."* 

(156)  Bragg  could  not  remain  at  Munfordville  many  days 
waiting  for  Buell  to  attack  him  in  his  chosen  position.  He 
was  out  of  supplies,  so  had  to  move  toward  Lexington.  And 
having  cleared  the  way  and  let  Buell  pass  on  to  Louisville, 
where  he  received  large  reinforcements  and  reorganized  his 
army,  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  had  nothing  left  to  do  but 
to  retreat  into  Tennessee.  From  the  political  as  well  as 
from  the  military  point  of  view  their  invasion  had  proved  a 
failure.  The  proclamations  to  the  people  had  been  in  vain; 
they  had  brought  about  no  uprising  in  favor  of  Secession. 
The  Secessionists  went  through  the  form  of  installing  a  Con 
federate  governor  at  Frankfort,  and  Bragg  was  away  at  that 
empty  ceremony,  when  he  might  better  have  been  with  his 
army,  just  before  the  battle  of  Perryville.  That  battle  "was  an 
accidental  encounter  of  two  armies,  rather  than  a  pitched 
battle."* 

The  North  and  the  South  were  both  disappointed  at  the  out 
come  of  the  campaign  in  Kentucky ;  the  North  thought  Buell 
ought  not  to  have  let  Bragg's  army  escape,  but  ought  to  have 
destroyed  it;  the  South  thought  Bragg  had  achieved  a  great 
victory  at  Perryville  and  ought  to  have  followed  it  up  instead 
of  retreating.  The  press  of  the  two  sections  respectively  con 
demned  the  two  commanders;  and  the  governments  at  Wash 
ington  and  Richmond  yielded  to  the  dictates  of  the  press. 
Buell  was  replaced  by  Rosecrans.  Referring  to  this  incident 
Ropes  says :  "It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  cause  of  the  Union 
was  seriously  injured  by  withdrawing  Buell  from  the  command 
of  this  army.  Buell  was  as  able  a  general  as  any  in  the  serv 
ice."  Bragg  was  not  removed ;  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was 
sent  to  his  headquarters  with  orders  to  relieve  him,  but  was 
prevented  by  circumstances  from  carrying  out  the  order.  So 
Bragg  was  left  in  command. 

Hardly  had  Rosecrans  taken  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  when  he  began  to  receive  harassing  letters  from 
Halleck,  who  was  now  general-in-chief  at  Washington.  About 

*Ropes. 


326  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  6th  of  December  he  received  such  a  letter.  "The  Presi 
dent/'  said  Halleck,  "is  very  impatient  at  your  long  stay  in 
Nashville.  .  .  .  Twice  have  I  been  asked  to  designate  some 
one  else  to  command  your  army.  If  you  remain  one  more 
week  at  Nashville  I  cannot  prevent  your  removal.  As  I  wrote 
you  when  you  took  the  command,  the  Government  demands 
action,  and,  if  you  cannot  respond  to  that  demand,  some  one 
else  will  be  tried."  To  this  letter  General  Rosecrans  sent  a 
reply  for  which  the  country  and  all  its  future  commanders  owe 
his  memory  a  debt  of  gratitude.  "I  reply,"  said  he,  "in  few 
but  earnest  words.  I  have  lost  no  time.  ...  If  the  Govern 
ment  which  ordered  me  here  confides  in  my  judgment  it  may 
rely  on  my  continuing  to  do  what  I  have  been  trying  to  do — 
that  is,  my  whole  duty.  If  my  superiors  have  lost  confidence 
in  me  they  had  better  at  once  put  some  one  in  my  place  and 
let  the  future  test  the  propriety  of  the  change.  I  have  but  one 
more  word  to  add,  which  is,  that  I  need  no  other  stimulus  to 
make  me  do  my  duty  than  the  knowledge  of  what  it  is.  To 
threats  of  removal  or  the  like  I  must  be  permitted  to  say  that 
I  am  insensible."*  He  did  not  move  within  a  week,  and  he  was 
not  relieved  from  command. 

THE  CAVALRY. 

The  excellence  of  the  work  of  Bragg's  cavalry  in  the  last 
phase  of  this  campaign — the  operations  extending  from  Nash 
ville  to  Murfreesboro — has  already  been  noticed.  This  cav 
alry  did  equally  as  good  service  on  the  advance  into  Middle 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  during  the  retreat  from  Ken 
tucky.  Of  a  truth,  it  would  be  hard  to  find  in  the  annals  of 
modern  warfare  any  better  cavalry  work.  Colonel  David 
Urquhart,  a  member  of  Bragg's  staff,  in  a  narrative  of  the 
campaign,  says,  concerning  the  retreat  from  Kentucky:  "Gen 
eral  Wheeler  with  his  cavalry  brought  up  the  rear — fighting  by 
day  and  obstructing  the  roads  at  night.  Before  the  pursuit 
was  abandoned  at  Rock  Castle  that  officer  was  engaged  over 
twenty-six  times.  His  vigilance  was  so  well  known  by  the 
infantry  that  they  never  feared  a  surprise." 

On  the  other  hand,  Buell's  army  was  so  lacking  in  the 
number  and  quality  of  its  cavalry  as  to  be  at  a  great  disad 
vantage.  Bragg  was  kept  informed  by  his  cavalry  scouts  of 

*  Ropes. 


STONES  RIVER  CAMPAIGN.  327 

the  movement  of  every  part  of  Buell's  army,  while  Buell  was 
left  in  ignorance  of  Bragg's  movements.  Buell  "had  again  and 
again  applied  to  the  Government  to  remedy"  his  deficiency  in 
cavalry,  "but  in  vain."* 

THE  BATTLE  OF  STONES  RIVER. 

In  the  first  place,  why  was  the  main  part  of  Bragg's  first  de 
fensive  position,  or  rather  his  "position  in  readiness,"  taken  on 
the  west  side  of  Stones  River?  Certainly  a  stronger  position 
would  have  been  one  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  with  the 
town  either  in  the  first  line  or  as  a  rallying  point.  On  this  side 
a  shorter  line  would  have  covered  all  the  roads  converging  on 
the  town;  it  would  have  had  a  clearer  field  of  fire  in  front  of 
it;  it  would  have  had  the  river  in  its  front  as  an  obstacle  for 
the  enemy,  rather  than  in  its  own  rear.  If  Murfreesboro  had 
been  in  the  enemy's  country  Bragg  would  undoubtedly  have 
taken  his  position  on  the  east  side  of  the  river.  As  it  was  he 
wanted  to  save  the  town  from  the  horrors  of  battle ;  so  he  put 
his  line  as  far  in  front  of  it  as  he  could,  without  uncovering 
the  convergent  roads.  » 

Rosecrans  had  47,000  men,  and  Bragg  had  only  38,000— 
why,  then,  did  Bragg  attack  instead  of  waiting  in  his  intrench- 
ments  for  Rosecrans  to  attack  him?  He  knew  that  Rosecrans 
would  attack — it  was  for  this  that  Rosecrans  had  marched 
from  Nashville.  The  answer  is  found  in  Bragg's  "personal 
equation."  Almost  any  other  general  would  have  waited,  but 
it  was  Bragg's  nature  to  attack  whenever  he  saw  a  chance  of 
victory.  He  was  naturally  aggressive.  He  believed  in  getting 
in  the  first  lick.  In  this  case  he  hoped  to  defeat  Rosecrans 
before  all  of  the  National  troops  could  reach  the  battle-field. 

This  was  the  second  battle  of  the  war  in  which  the  plans  of 
the  hostile  commanders  were  practically  the  same.  At  the 
First  Bull  Run  Beauregard  meant  to  attack  the  Union  left, 
while  McDowell  purposed  turning  the  Confederate  left.  In 
each  case  the  commander  that  was  first  to  move  threw  his 
opponent  on  the  defensive.  At  Stones  River  each  commander 
selected  his  opponent's  right  flank,  instead  of  his  left,  to  attack, 
for  the  reason  that  he  was  thereby  better  able  to  cover  his  own 
communications.  If  either  of  these  commanders  had  chosen 

*  Ropes. 


328  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  other  flank  he  would  have  fought  with  his  army  faced  to 
a  flank. 

That  the  right  wing  of  the  Federal  army  was  beaten  and 
driven  back  in  the  early  stages  of  the  battle  was  undoubtedly 
due  to  the  faulty  position  of  that  part  of  the  line,  and  to  poorly 
performed  outpost  duty.  McCook  knew  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  30th  December  that  the  Confederate  line  was  extending 
beyond  his  right,  and  he  so  informed  Rosecrans.  Rosecrans 
then  said  that  he  thought  the  line  ought  to  face  more  nearly 
south ;  but  he  left  the  matter  to  McCook,  and  the  direction  of 
the  line  was  not  changed.  McCook  should  have  turned  his 
line  so  that  his  right  would  have  extended  along  the  southern 
edge  of  the  thicket  whose  corner  rested  on  Overall  Creek, 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  due  south  of  the  crossing  of 
Wilkinson  Turnpike. 

"Few  battles,"  says  Ropes,  "have  been  fought  which  have 
better  exhibited  the  soldierly  virtues  than  the  battle  of  Mur- 
freesboro  or  Stones  River.  The  Confederate  assaults  were 
conducted  with  the  utmost  gallantry  and  with  untiring  energy. 
They  were  met  with  great  coolness  and  resolution.  .  . 
The  Confederates  had  a  right  to  claim  a  victory,  for  they  had 
taken  twenty-eight  guns  and  about  3,700  prisoners.  Still,  the 
Federal  army  was,  for  all  practical  purposes,  as  strong  as  ever. 
The  truth  is,  the  Confederates  were  not  numerous  enough  to 
complete  their  victory." 

The  tactics  were,  in  general,  good  on  both  sides.  The  units 
of  troops  were  brought  into  action  in  the  proper  order  and 
manner ;  gaps  in  the  line  were  filled,  and  supports  put  in 
promptly.  The  artillery,  especially  on  the  Federal  side,  was 
employed  most  effectively.  Bragg's  army  fought  the  battle 
almost  as  he  had  planned  it;  but  not  quite.  And  the  little  de 
parture  from  his  plan  was  fatal  to  his  success.  He  purposed 
using  Breckinridge's  division  as  his  general  reserve ;  but 
Breckinridge  failed  to  send  it  over  the  river,  when  ordered  to 
do  so  at  the  crisis  of  the  battle.  Finally  when  he  did  send 
over  his  division,  Polk  made  the  mistake  of  assaulting  with  a 
part  of  it,  instead  of  waiting  for  the  whole  division  to  cross; 
and  he  was  repulsed. 


LECTURE  XVI. 
THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

(170)  After  the  disaster  at  Frederick sburg  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  resumed  its  position  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Rappahannock.  Its  morale  had  never  been  so  badly  shaken. 
"It  would  be  impossible,"  says  Swinton,  who  was  with  it  as  a 
newspaper  correspondent,  "to  imagine  a  graver  or  gloomier, 
a  more  somber  or  unmusical  body  of  men  ...  a  month 
after  the  battle.  .  .  .  And  as  the  days  went  by,  despond 
ency,  discontent,  and  all  evil  inspirations,  with  their  natural 
consequence,  desertion,  seemed  to  increase  rather  than  dimin 
ish."  And  the  cause  of  it  all  "could  not  be  concealed ;  it  was 
the  lack  of  confidence  in  General  Burnside." 

This  cause  was  soon  removed.  Burnside  issued  an  order 
summarily  dismissing  Hooker  and  three  other  general  officers 
from  the  service,  and  relieving  Franklin  and  four  others  from 
duty  with  his  army,  and  took  it  to  Washington  for  the  Presi 
dent's  approval,  or  the  acceptance  of  his  own  resignation  as  the 
alternative.  The  President  chose  the  alternative,  and  ap 
pointed  Hooker  in  Burnside's  place. 

Hooker  had  gained  an  enviable  newspaper  reputation  as  a 
dashing  corps-commander,  and  however  he  may  have  been  re 
garded  by  the  higher  officers,  to  the  rank  and  file  he  was 
"Fighting  Joe."  His  appointment  revived  the  morale  of  the 
army.  He  at  once  instituted  some  excellent  reforms.  He 
abolished  the  clumsy  Grand  Divisions  of  Burnside,  and  reor 
ganized  the  army-corps.  The  cavalry,  which  had  hitherto  been 
attached  in  fragments  to  infantry  divisions,  and  frittered  away 
at  all  kinds  of  uncavalry  duty,  he  consolidated  into  the  Cavalry 
Corps,  under  General  Stoneman.  This  corps  consisted  of 
three  divisions,  under  Pleasanton,  Averell,  and  Gregg,  re 
spectively,  and  a  reserve  brigade  under  Buford. 

Hooker  reported  that,  when  he  took  command,  there  were 
2,922  officers  and  81,694  enlisted  men  absent  from  their  colors, 
scattered  all  over  the  country,  and  the  majority  from  causes 
unknown.*  He  adopted  a  system  of  furloughs  that  remedied 
this  evil  to  a  large  degree. 


*Major  J.   F.   Huntington  in   Military   Historical  Society   of   Mass., 
Vol.  3. 

329 


330  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Sumner  and  Franklin  retired  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
when  Hooker  assumed  command,  and  the  Ninth  Corps  [Burn- 
side's  old  corps]  was  transferred  to  Newport  News.  The  in 
fantry  of  the  army  now  consisted  of  seven  corps,  as  follows: 
First  under  Reynolds,  Second  under  Couch,  Third  under 
Sickles,  Fifth  under  Meade,  Sixth  under  Sedgwick,  Eleventh 
under  Howard,  and  Twelfth  under  Slocum.  The  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  Corps  had  not  been  present  at  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg.  Hooker  spent  the  rest  of  the  winter  in  building 
up  his  army  and  putting  it  in  trim  for  campaign.  By  the  end 
of  April,  1863,  he  had  the  largest  and  best  organized  and 
equipped  army  that  had  ever  been  assembled  on  the  continent. 
Hooker  spoke  of  it  as  "the  finest  army  on  the  planet."  It 
numbered  about  122,000  infantry  and  artillery,  with  more  than 
400  cannon,  and  about  12,000  cavalry.  Its  camps  reached 
back  to  Aquia  Creek,  its  advanced  base. 

The  Southern  army,  poorly  equipped,  wretchedly  clad,  and 
living  upon  short  rations,  occupied  camps  on  the  southern  bank 
of  the  Rappahannock,  from  Bank's  Ford  to  Port  Royal. 
Stuart's  cavalry  watched  the  upper  crossings  of  the  Rappahan 
nock.  Lee  now  had  no  more  than  60,000  troops,  6,509  of 
which  were  cavalry,  and  170  guns,  to  guard  this  long  line  of 
front;  for  Longstreet  was  absent  with  two  of  his  divisions 
[Hood  and  Pickett].  The  great  need  of  rations  for  the  com 
ing  summer  had  led  the  Confederate  war  department  to  send 
him  upon  a  campaign  in  the  neighborhood  of  Suffolk,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  gather  provisions  in  the  counties  near 
the  Federal  lines.  Lee  had,  therefore,  only  six  infantry  divi 
sions  present :  those  of  Anderson  and  McLaws  of  Longstreet' s 
corps;  and  those  of  A.  P.  Hill,  Rodes,  Early,  and  Colston  of 
Jackson's  corps.* 

PLANS. 

Lee  had  his  army  so  disposed  that  he  could  promptly  concen 
trate  it  at  any  point  along  his  front,  and  the  Union  failure  at 
Fredericksburg  had  shown  the  difficulty  of  attempting  to  force 
a  crossing  and  break  through  his  line.  Hooker  saw  that  the 
position  must  be  turned;  but  to  turn  its  right  was  practically 
impossible,  owing  to  the  width  of  the  Rappahannock  toward 
its  mouth,  the  swampy  character  of  the  country,  and  the  diffi- 


*Alexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  331 

culty  of  concealing  the  movement  in  the  open  country  below 
Fredericksburg.*  Hooker  resolved,  therefore,  to  turn  Lee's 
left.  To  carry  out  this  plan  the  cavalry,  except  one  small  bri- 
grade  under  Pleasanton,  was  to  start  upon  a  raid,  under  Stone- 
man,  two  weeks  in  advance,  with  the  object  of  destroying  Lee's 
lines  of  communication  with  Richmond  and  with  Gordonsville — 
the  Fredericksburg  -  Richmond  railway  and  the  Virginia 
Central  Railway — and,  should  Lee  retreat,  of  holding  or  de 
laying  him.  Sedgwick,  with  two  army-corps,  the  First  and 
Sixth,  was  to  cross  the  river  below  Fredericksburg,  and  make 
a  demonstration  of  attack.  If  the  enemy  fell  back  Sedgwick 
was  to  pursue  him.  While  Lee's  attention  was  thus  occupied, 
Hooker,  with  the  Fifth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  Corps,  would 
move  up  to  Kelly's  Ford,  and  thence,  by  way  of  Germanna  and 
Ely's  Fords  of  the  Rapidan,  push  on  to  Chancellorsville.  The 
Third  Corps  was  to  remain  on  Stafford  Heights,  ready  to  move 
at  a  moment's  notice  to  reinforce  either  wing  as  might  be  nec 
essary.  "The  Second  Corps  was  to  leave  one  division  on  out 
post  at  Falmouth,  and  to  post  two  divisions  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  Rappahannock  opposite  Banks's  Ford/'f 

Hooker  believed  that  Lee,  as  soon  as  he  found  his  posi 
tion  turned  and  Stoneman  upon  his  lines  of  communication, 
would  fall  back.  But  of  this.  Hooker  could  not  be  sure ;  he 
thought,  however,  that  the  dispositions  he  purposed  making 
would  successfully  meet  any  movement  Lee  might  make. 
"Either  wing  was  practically  equal  to  the  whole  Confederate 
force."f  Sedgwick  would  have  40,000  men,  supported  by  the 
Third  Corps,  about  19,000,  on  Stafford  Heights,  and  a  division 
of  the  Second  Corps  at  Falmouth;  the  main  turning  force 
would  have  about  42,000,  with  two  divisions 'of  the  Second 
Corps  at  Banks's  Ford ;  "and  Stoneman's  10,000  sabers  riding 
at  will  amongst  Lee's  depots  would  surely  prevent  him  from 
attacking.  Still,  precaution  was  taken  in  case  the  attempt  were 
made.  Sedgwick,  if  the  enemy  detached  any  considerable  part 
of  his  force  toward  Chancellorsville,  was  'to  carry  the  works 
at  all  hazards,  and  establish  his  force  on  the  Telegraph  Road.' 
The  right  wing,  'if  not  strongly  resisted,  was  to  advance  at  all 
hazards,  and  to  secure  a  position  uncovering  Banks's  Ford.' 
Were  the  Confederates  found  in  force  near  Chancellorsville  it 
was  to  select  a  strong  position  and  await  attack  on  its  own 


*Fieberger's  Campaigns  and  Battles. 
fHenderson. 


332  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ground,    while    Sedgwick,    coming    up    from    Fredericksburg, 
would. assail  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear/'* 

Lee  was  on  the  defensive.  He  was  still  tied  to  Richmond, 
and  his  chief  business  was  to  cover  that  city.  But,  as  will  be 
seen,  he  had  not  thought  of  a  "strategic  retreat  from  one  de 
fensive  position  to  another."  In  fact,  he  was  already  consid 
ering  an  offensive  movement.  "On  April  16  [1863]  he  had 
written  Mr.  Davis :  'My  only  anxiety  arises  from  the  condi 
tion  of  our  horses  and  the  scarcity  of  forage  and  provisions. 
I  think  it  all  important  that  we  should  assume  the  aggressive 
by  the  1st  of  May.'  "*  He  was  contemplating  a  movement  by 
way  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  but  was  forestalled  by  Hooker. 

OPERATIONS. 

To  confuse  the  Confederates  as  much  as  possible,  demonstra 
tions  were  made,  toward  the  end  of  April,  beyond  both  ends  of 
their  line — at  Kelly's  Ford  on  their  left,  and  opposite  Port 
Royal  on  their  right.  The  main  operations  were  delayed  sev 
eral  days  by  heavy  rains,  but  on  the  27th  of  April  the  Fifth, 
Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  Corps  started  for  Kelly's  Ford,  under 
the  command  of  Slocum.  They  dispersed  the  small  Confed 
erate  guard  at  that  point,  and  by  the  morning  of  the  29th  had 
crossed  the  stream  by  pontoon-bridges.  They  then  pushed  on 
towards  Chancellorsville,  the  Fifth  Corps  by  way  of  Ely's 
Ford,  and  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  by  way  of  Germanna 
Ford.  They  reached  Chancellorsville  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
30th.  The  infantry  was  preceded  by  Pleasanton's  cavalry 
brigade. 

Two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  had  marched  as  far  as 
United  States  Ford,  and  there  had  waited  until  the  other  col 
umns  had  crossed  the  Rapidan.  They  then  crossed  the  river 
and  joined  the  other  three  corps  at  Chancellorsville,  where 
they  all  bivouacked  on  the  night  of  the  30th.  The  same  night 
Hooker  himself  arrived  at  Chancellorsville.  Meanwhile  Sedg- 
wick's  force,  the  First  and  Sixth  Corps,  had  moved  down  the 
river,  on  the  28th,  and  bivouacked  near  where  Franklin  had 
crossed  at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  The  next  day  this 
command  laid  four  pontoon-bridges,  and  crossed  the  river 

On  the  Confederate  side  Stuart  had  notified  Lee,  on  the 
evening  of  the  28th,  "that  a  strong  force  of  all  arms  was  mov- 

*Henderson. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  333 

ing  up  the  Rappahannock  in  the  direction  of  Kelly's  Ford"; 
and  the  movements  of  Sedg wick's  command  had  been  ob 
served.*  On  the  29th  Lee  received  word  from  his  cavalry  that 
a  force  of  unknown  strength  had  crossed  at  Kelly's  Ford.  Lee 
could  not  as  yet  determine  what  these  movements  meant.  He 
even  suspected  that  they  might  mean  an  advance  against  Gor- 
donsville  and  the  Virginia  Central  Railway.f  He,  therefore, 
awaited  further  developments.  Some  shells  were  thrown  at 
Sedgwick's  brigades,  and  Jackson's  outposts  skirmished  with 
the  first  troops  sent  across ;  but  no  further  opposition  to  Sedg 
wick's  passage  was  made  by  the  Confederates. 

On  the  29th  Stuart's  cavalry  "was  actively  engaged  between 
the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan,  testing  the  strength  of  the 
enemy's  columns.  The  country  was  wooded,  the  Federals  ac 
tive,  and,  as  usual  in  war,  accurate  information  was  difficult 
to  obtain  and  more  difficult  to  communicate.  It  was  not  till 
6.30  p.  m.  that  Lee  received  notice  that  troops  had  crossed  at 
Ely's  and  Germanna  Fords  at  2  p.  m.  Anderson's  division  was 
at  once  dispatched  to  Chancellorsville."* 

The  next  news  Lee  received  from  Stuart  arrived  on  the 
morning  of  the  30th,  and  informed  him  that  three  Union  corps- 
commanders,  Howard  [Eleventh],  Meade  [Fifth],  and  Slocum 
[Twelfth],  were  with  the  troops  advancing  on  Chancellors 
ville.  Then  came  the  word  that  Anderson,  who  had  been  di 
rected  to  select  and  intrench  a  strong  position  near  Chancellors 
ville,  was  falling  back  before  the  Federal  advance.  It  was  now 
evident  to  Lee  that  Hooker's  purpose  was  to  turn  the  Confed 
erate  left,  and  that  he  had  divided  his  army.  Lee  resolved  to 
attack  one  of  its  wings.  The  question  was,  which  wing  to 
attack?  Jackson  was  at  first  in  favor  of  attacking  Sedgwick, 
but,  after  carefully  reconnoitering  Sedgwick's  position  on  the 
river-bank,  he  came  to  Lee's  opinion.  This  was  to  leave 
Early's  division  reinforced  by  Barksdale's  brigade  and  the  re 
serve  artillery  to  hold  the  heights  and  "contain"  Sedgwick; 
and  to  march  the  rest  of  the  army  to  reinforce  Anderson  and 
assault  the  Federal  turning  columns  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Chancellorsville.  Accordingly  McLaws's  division  started  to 
join  Anderson,  and  Jackson  followed  soon  afterwards  with 
three  of  his  divisions.  Before  the  fog  lifted,  on  the  morning 


""Henderson. 

"^Campaigns   of   the    Civil    War — Chancellorsville    and    Gettysburg — 
Doubleday. 


334  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  the  1st  of  May,  these  forces  were  in  line  with  Anderson  at 
Tabernacle  Church.* 

Up  to  the  evening  of  April  30  Hooker's  plan  had  apparently 
worked  out  so  well  that  he  gave  vent  to  his  elation  by  issuing 
an  order  to  his  troops  in  which  he  stated,  "the  enemy  must 
either  ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind  his  defenses 
and  give  us  battle  on  our  own  ground,  where  certain  destruc 
tion  awaits  him."  And  the  historian  Swinton  declares  that 
he  heard  Hooker  say  "The  rebel  army  is  now  the  legitimate 
property  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  They  may  as  well  pack 
up  their  haversacks  and  make  for  Richmond ;  and  I  shall  be 
after  them,  etc.,  etc."  But  at  that  time  Hooker  was  not  well 
informed  concerning  what  was  taking  place  on  the  Confederate 
side  of  the  forest  screen  that  separated  the  two  hostile  armies. 
"He  was  only  aware,  on  the  night  of  April  30,  tjiat  the  Confed 
erate  position  before  Fredericksburg  was  still  strongly  occu- 
pied."t 

Hooker  appears  to  have  supposed  that,  as  soon  as  Stoneman's 
movement  against  the  Virginia  Central  Railway  became  known, 
Lee  would  send  his  entire  cavalry  force  against  the  Federal 
horse.  Instead  of  doing  this,  Stuart  detached  two  regiments 
onlyj  to  observe  Stoneman,  and  kept  the  rest  of  his  troopers 
with  him,  to  hang  on  the  Federal  turning  force  and  gather  in 
formation  of  it,  while  they  covered  the  movements  of  the  Con 
federates.  Pleasanton's  small  cavalry  brigade,  therefore,  which 
was  all  the  cavalry  there  was  to  cover  the  Federal  movement, 
was  not  strong  enough  to  break  through  Stuart's  screen  and 
get  information  of  the  forces  behind  it.  So  while  "Lee  was 
fully  informed  as  to  his  adversary's  strength  ;  M* .  Hooker 
had  no  knowledge  whatever  of  what  was  going  on  in  the  space 
between  Sedgwick  and  himself. "f  Yet  signal  stations  had  been 
placed  on  all  commanding  heights ;  a  field-telegraph  had  been 
laid  from  Falmouth.to  United  States  Ford;  and  there  were 
no  less  than  three  captive  balloons.  The  thick  woods,  the 
darkness  of  night,  and  the  fog  combined  to  defeat  the  ob 
servations  from  the  balloons. 

THE  BATTLE-FIELD. 

(171)  The  ground  which  was  to  be  the  battle-field  of  Chan- 
cellorsville  was  in  the  midst  of  a  forest  of  second-growth  pine 


*Long.     Henderson. 

fHenderson. 

^Alexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  335 

and  black-oak.  The  forest  was  twelve  to  fourteen  miles  long 
from  east  to  west,  and  eight  to  ten  wide  from  north  to  south; 
"the  soil  was  poor,  farms  were  rare,  and  the  few  clearings 
were  seldom  more  than  a  rifle-shot  in  width."*  The  under 
growth  was  dense  and  tangled  with  vines,  and  the  space  was 
cut  up  by  numerous  crooked  little  streams  with  marshy  banks. 
No  wonder  it  was  called  the  "Wilderness."  Chancellorsville 
was  no  more  than  a  single  brick  house.  It  stood  within  the 
Wilderness,  about  a  mile  from  its  eastern  edge,  upon  high 
ground  from  the  direction  of  which  all  the  little  streams  flowed. 
West  of  the  house  was  a  considerable  clearing.  Here  the 
Orange  Plank  Road  and  the  Old  Turnpike,  which  merged 
into  a  single  highway  two  miles  farther  west,  separated  again 
to  come  together  a  second  time  at  Tabernacle  Church  about 
half-way  to  Fredericksburg.  The  river  road  to  Banks's  Ford, 
and  the  roads  to  the  other  fords,  as  well  as  various  other  roads 
and  trails,  radiated  from  Chancellorsville,  while  two  miles 
south  of  it  an  unfinished  railway  from  Fredericksburg  to 
Orange  Court  House  traversed  the  Wilderness. 

A  space  less  suited  to  the  maneuvering  of  a  great  body  of 
troops  could  scarcely  be  found.  Bodies  of  cavalry  could  not 
move  at  all  off  the  roads,  and  infantry  could  move  only  with 
great  difficulty.  There  were  few  positions  for  artillery,  and 
almost  no  range  for  the  guns  except  in  the  direction  of  the 
roads.  Eastward,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Banks's  Ford,  the 
ground  was  more  open.  It  was  there  that  Hooker  expected  to 
fight  his  battle.  With  this  in  view,  he  ordered  his  columns  to 
move  forward  on  the  morning  of  May  the  1st. 

OPERATIONS  ON  MAY  1. 

Pleasanton's  cavalry  had  been  in  touch  with  Anderson's  out 
posts  all  the  morning,  and  now  led  the  advance  against  the  Con 
federates.  Hooker  moved  out  at  11  a.  m.  in  four  columns. 
"Slocum's  corps  [Twelfth],  followed  by  that  of  Howard 
[Eleventh],  took  the  Plank  Road  on  the  right.  Sykes's  divi 
sion  of  Meade's  corps  [Fifth],  followed  by  Hancock's  division 
of  Couch's  corps  [Second],  went  by  the  Turnpike  in  the  center. 
The  remainder  of  Meade's  corps — Griffin's  division,  followed 
by  that  of  Humphreys — took  the  river  road.  Lastly,  French's 


*Henderson. 


336  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

division  of  Couch's  corps  was  under  orders  to  turn  off  and 
march  to  Todd's  Tavern."* 

Before  the  advance  began  the  Third  Corps  [Sickles],  which 
had  been  ordered  up  from  Stafford  Heights,  had  arrived.  It 
was  left  at  Chancellorsville  as  the  general  reserve,  with  one  bri 
gade  guarding  United  States  Ford,  and  another  at  Dowdall's 
Tavern  [Melzi  Chancellor's],  watching  the  approaches  in  that 
quarter. 

Anderson  had  taken  a  strong  position  at  Tabernacle  Church. 
His  line  stretched  "along  a  low  ridge,  partially  covered  with 
timber,  and  with  open  fields  in  front.  Beyond  the  fields  a  few 
hundred  paces"  was  the  edge  of  the  forest.  When  Jackson, 
after  marching  since  midnight,  arrived  (about  8  a.  m.  May  1), 
Anderson  had  strongly  intrenched  his  whole  front,  from  near 
Duerson's  Mill  on  the  right,  to  the  unfinished  railway  on  the 
left,  about  three  miles.  The  position  effectually  blocked  the 
four  roads  by  which  the  Federals  would  have  to  advance  out 
of  the  forest,  and  there  were  available  to  hold  it  40,000  Con 
federate  infantry,  more  than  100  guns,  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's 
brigade  of  cavalry — about  eight  men  to  the  yard  of  front.f 

But  Early  had  only  10,000  men  with  whom  to  keep  the  large 
force  of  Federals  that  Jackson  had  seen  near  Fredericksburg 
from  coming  upon  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  position  at 
Tabernacle  Church.  Therefore,  General  Lee,  who  was  on  the 
ground,  resolved  to  move  against  the  Federal  right  wing  in 
the  Wilderness.  With  a  regiment  of  cavalry  in  front  and 
Fitzhugh  Lee  on  the  left  flank,  the  army  started  forward  at 
11  a.  m.  Anderson  was  in  the  advance,  with  one  brigade  on 
the  Turnpike  and  two  on  the  Plank  Road.  Next  followed  An 
derson's  other  two  brigades  and  McLaws's  division  on  the 
Turnpike.  Jackson's  three  divisions  marched  on  the  Plank 
Road. 

(172)  The  advanced  cavalry  of  the  two  hostile  forces  were 
soon  in  contact,  and  at  about  two  miles  from  Chan 
cellorsville  the  Confederate  infantry  on  the  Turnpike  became 
engaged  with  Sykes's  division  of  regulars.  "Sykes's  orders 
had  been,  however,  only  to  advance  to  the  first  ridge  beyond 
the  forest,  and  he  maintained  his  position  there,  though  men 
aced  by  the  extension  of  the  Confederate  lines  beyond  his 
flank. "f  The  Confederates  on  the  Plank  Road  were  also  soon 
engaged  with  Slocum's  corps  [Twelfth].  Slocum  formed  line 


*Doubleday. 
fAlexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  337 

with  his  right  on  the  Plank  Road  and  his  left  upon  high 
ground.  Wright's  brigade  of  Anderson's  division  advanced 
along  the  unfinished  railway  to  turn  this  position.*  "Alto 
gether  the  general  line"  of  the  Federals  "was  a  good  one ; 
for  there  were  large  open  spaces  where  the  artillery  could 
move  and  maneuver,  and  the  army  was  almost  out  of  the  thick 
ets."*  The  Federal  column  on  the  river  road  had  by  this  time 
arrived,  without  meeting  any  resistance,  within  sight  of 
Banks's  Ford. 

Everything  had  gone,  apparently,  as  Hooker  wished;  "he 
could  scarcely  hope  for  more  propitious  circumstances,  and, 
by  all  the  rules  of  the  game,  a  victory  was  now  within  his 
grasp."f  Yet,  at  this  stage  of  the  engagement,  and  in  spite 
of  the  protests  of  his  amazed  and  indignant  corps-commanders, 
Hooker  ordered  his  forces  to  withdraw  to  Chancellorsville. 
The  unbeaten  Federals  fell  back  reluctantly,  and  the  Confed 
erates,  unable  to  comprehend  the  meaning  of  such  an  easy 
victory,  and  fearing  some  kind  of  trap,  pursued  them  with 
great  caution. 

(173)  Wilcox's  brigade,  on  the  extreme  right,  moved  up 
the  old  Mine  Road;  Wright's  brigade  on  the  extreme  left  fol 
lowed  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  on  the  unfinished  railway;  while 
the  main  body  kept  on  the  Turnpike  and  the  Plank  Road.  At 
Chancellorsville  the  Federal  army  took  up  a  defensive  posi 
tion,  about  five  miles  in  length,  reaching  from  Scott's  Dam 
of  the  Rappahannock,  around  to  Talley's  farm  on  the  Turnpike. 
The  Fifth  Corps  [Meade]  held  the  left  of  the  line  along  the 
low  divide  between  Mine  Run  and  Mineral  Spring  Run.  Then 
came  the  Second  [Couch],  making  an  angle  with  the  Fifth, 
and  facing  more  nearly  east.  French's  division  of  this  corps 
inclined  toward  the  east  to  cover  the  junction  of  roads  at 
Chancellorsville;  and  Hancock's  division  of  the  same  corps 
took  an  advanced  position  several  hundred  yards  in  front  of 
French's.  Next  came  the  Twelfth  Corps  [Slocum],  formed 
around  the  crest  of  Fairview  Hill,  and  facing  southward. 
Then  there  was  a  gap  in  the  line  of  about  a  half-mile,  and  be 
yond  the  gap  the  Eleventh  Corps  [Howard],  in  echelons  along 
the  Turnpike,  held  the  right  of  the  line.  The  Third  Corps 
[Sickles]  was  kept  in  reserve  back  of  the  mansion.  The  next 
morning,  May  2,  two  brigades  of  Birney's  division  of  this 
corps,  and  two  batteries,  were  placed  at  Hazel  Grove,  in  the  gap 

*Doubleday. 
fAlexander. 


338  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

between  Howard's  left,  and  Slocum's  right.  "The  8th  Penn 
sylvania  cavalry  picketed  the  road  and  kept  the  enemy  in 
sight/'* 

The  Union  and  Confederate  batteries  fired  some  rounds 
wherever  they  could  find  an  opening  through  the  dense  tim 
ber,  but  there  was  little  other  fighting  during  the  afternoon. 
Until  nightfall,  however,  the  Confederate  skirmishers  were 
pushed  forward  everywhere,  in  order  to  determine  the  exact 
position  of  the  Federal  line.f  The  Confederates  "formed  in 
line  of  battle  in  front  of  Chancellorsville,  at  right  angles  to  the 
Plank  Road,  extending  on  the  right  of  the  Mine  Road,  and  to 
the  left  in  the  direction  of  the  Catherine  Furnace."J  Both 
sides  spent  the  night  felling  trees  and  preparing  their  lines 
for  defense. 

General  Doubleday,  writing  from  the  Federal  point  of  view, 
says :  "The  thickets  which  surrounded  this  position  were  al 
most  impenetrable,  so  that  .an  advance  against  the  enemy's 
lines  became  exceedingly  difficult  and  maneuvering  nearly  im 
practicable,  nor  was  this  the  only  defect.  Batteries  could  be 
established  on  the  high  ground  to  the  east,  which  commanded 
the  front  facing  in  that  direction,  while  our  own  artillery  had 
but  little  scope ;  and  last,  but  most  important  of  all,  the  right 
of  Howard's  corps  was  'in  the  air';  that  is,  it  rested  on  no 
obstacle."  On  the  other  hand  General  Lee  said  in  his  report: 
"He  [Hooker]  assumed  a  position  of  great  natural  strength, 
surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a  dense  forest,  filled  with  a  tangled 
undergrowth,  in  the  midst  of  which  breastworks  of  logs  had 
been  constructed,  with  trees  felled  in  front,  so  as  to  form  an 
almost  impenetrable  abatis.  His  artillery  swept  the  few  nar 
row,  roads  by  which  the  position  could  be  approached  from 
the  front,  and  commanded  the  adjacent  woods."  But  "the 
strength  of  a  position  is  measured  not  by  the  impregnability 
of  the  front,  but  by  the  security  of  the  flanks. "§  Let  us  see 
how  this  axiom  was  exemplified  in  this  battle.  The  only  as 
sailable  part  of  the  Union  line  was  its  right  flank.  Lee  re 
solved  to  assault  this  flank  by  a  turning  movement,  and  -en 
trusted  the  execution  of  it  to  Jackson.  To  guard  against  an 
attack  upon  his  own  right  and  rear  by  way  of  Banks's  Ford, 
he  sent  Wilcox  with  his  brigade  to  hold  that  ford.* 

*  Doubleday. 
fAlexander. 
$Lee's  Report. 
§Henderson. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  339 

There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  dispute  as  to  who  first  sug 
gested  this  daring  project.  But  regarded  as  a  military  study, 
and  that  is  our  chief  concern  with  this  battle,  it  makes  no  dif 
ference  whether  Fitzhugh  Lee  or  Stuart  discovered  that  the 
Union  right  was  in  the  air;  whether  Lee  or  Jackson  thought 
out  the  scheme;  who  it  was  that  guided  the  turning  column — 
Jackson  commanded  the  forces  and  directed  the  execution  un 
til  he  was  borne  away  wounded  from  the  field.  Of  this  there 
is  no  question. 

The  troops  employed  in  the  movement  were  Jackson's  own 
three  divisions,  about  26,000  men,  some  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  and 
Alexander's  battalion  of  artillery  from  Longstreet's  corps. 
(174)  The  infantry  and  artillery  started  in  a  single  column 
about  6  a.  m.  [May  2],  Rodes's  division  in  the  lead,  then  Col 
ston's,  and  A.  P.  Hill's  last.  Fitzhugh  Lee  covered  the  front 
with  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  squadrons  of  three  other  regi 
ments  marched  on  the  right  of  the  column.  Lee  remained  with 
the  divisions  of  Anderson  and  McLaws,  about  17,000  men,  to 
make  feints  along  the  front  of  Hooker's  line,  in  order  to 
draw  attention  away  from  the  movement  against  its  right. 

Jackson  marched  by  way  of  Catherine  Furnace,  and  there' 
turned  southward  by  Lewis  Creek,  and,  having  crossed  the  un 
finished  railway,  'turned  southwestward  and  entered  the  Brock 
Road.  His  column  did  not  escape  the  notice  of  the  Federals. 
About  8  a.  m.  Birney,  from  his  position  at  Hazel  Grove,  re 
ported  a  column  of  Confederates  moving  southward  at  Cath 
erine  Furnace,  accompanied  by  a  wagon-train.  In  that  direc 
tion  lay  the  road  to  Orange  Court  House,  one  of  Lee's  lines  of 
retreat;  but  Hooker,  fearing  a  movement  against  his  right  flank, 
dispatched  a  note  to  Howard,  saying,  "We  have  good  reason 
to  suppose  that  the  enemy  is  moving  to  our  right,"  and  directing 
Howard  to  take  the  necessary  precautions. 

About  11  a.  m.  a  battery  on  Hazel  Grove  heights  opened  fire 
on  Jackson's  train,  and  drove  it  off  to  another  road.  A  little 
after  midday  Sickles  was  allowed  to  move  Birney's  division, 
followed  by  Whipple's,  against  Catherine  Furnace,  in  order  to 
develop  the  situation  there.  The  reserve  brigade  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  [Barlow]  also  went  forward  with  Sickles. 
Sickles's  force  captured  the  23rd  Georgia  regiment  which  had 
been  left  by  Jackson  near  the  furnace  to  cover  his  rear,  and 
threatened  to  cut  the  Confederate  army  in  two ;  but  Anderson's 
division  opposed  the  attack  so  stoutly  that  Sickles  called  for  re 
inforcements.  Pleasanton's  cavalry  was  sent  out  to  him.  The 


340  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

two  brigades  at  the  rear  of  Jackson's  column,  and  Brown's 
battalion  of  artillery,  were  halted  for  an  hour  in  observation, 
but  were  not  engaged.  It  was  after  dark  before  they  over 
took  the  column.*  Pleasanton's  cavalry  followed  Jackson's 
column. f 

About  2  p.  m.  Jackson,  at  the  head  of  his  column,  arrived  at 
the  point  where  the  Brock  Road  crossed  the  Orange  Plank 
Road.  Here  he  was  met  by  Fitzhugh  Lee  and  conducted  to  a 
high  point  from  which  he  could  see  the  right  of  the  Federal 
line  as  far  eastward  as  Dowdall's  Tavern.  "Below,  and  but 
a  few  hundred  yards  distant,  ran  the  Federal  breastworks,  with 
abatis  in  front  and  long  lines  of  stacked  arms  in  rear ;  but 
untenanted  by  a  single  company.  Two  cannon  were  seen  upon 
the  highroad,  the  horses  grazing  quietly  near  at  hand.  The 
soldiers  were  scattered  in  small  groups,  laughing,  cooking, 
smoking,  sleeping,  and  playing  cards,  while  others  were  butch 
ering  cattle  and  drawing  rations.''^ 

Jackson  sent  back  an  order  to  Rodes  to  continue  the  march 
across  the  Plank  Road  to  the  Turnpike.  (175)  The  cavalry 
and  one  brigade  were  immediately  placed  beyond  the  fork  of 
the  Plank  Road  to  mask  the  march  of  the  column.  The  col 
umn  turned  up  the  Turnpike  toward  the  Union  position,  and 
by  6  p.  m.  had  formed  for  battle  across  the  highway.  Rodes's 
division  formed  the  first  line,  and  Colston's  the  second,  while 
one  of  A.  P.  Hill's  brigades  formed  a  third  line  on  the  left  of 
the  Turnpike.  Hill's  other  brigades  remained  in  column  on  the 
roads.*  A  few  hostile  patrols  had  been  seen,  but  not  a  shot  had 
been  fired. 

At  this  time  the  Eleventh  Corps  [Howard],  forming  the 
Union  right,  was  thus  disposed:  Devens's  division  was  along 
the  turnpike  on  the  right,  with  two  regiments  north  of  the 
pike  in  two  lines  facing  west,  and  the  rest  of  the  division  facing 
south.*  Schurz's  division  came  next,  part  of  it  deployed  along 
the  pike,  and  three  regiments  in  close  column  north  of  the  pike. 
Next,  at  Dowdall's  Tavern,  was  Buschbeck's  brigade  of  Stein- 
wehr's  division  in  a  line  of  rifle-pits  at  right  angles  to  the 
pike.  Barlow's  brigade  of  this  division  was  away  helping 
Sickles.  Batteries  were  in  the  roads,  and  twelve  guns  were 
near  the  Wilderness  Church. 


"•Alexander. 
fDoubleday. 
^Henderson. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  341 

As  the  day  wore  on  Hooker  appears  to  have  become  con 
vinced  that  the  column  seen  in  the  morning  was  retreating. 
Very  early  in  the  forenoon,  anticipating  attack  by  Lee,  he  had 
ordered  the  First  Corps  [Reynolds],  which  had  been  acting 
with  Sedgwick,  to  join  him  by  way  of  United  States  Ford, 
and  had  recalled  Averell's  cavalry,  which  was  now  approaching 
Ely's  Ford  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Rapidan.  "As  the  hours 
went  by,  however,  and  Jackson's  column  disappeared  in  the 
forest,  he  again  grew  confident."*  At  4.10  p.  m.  he  sent  an 
order  to  Sedgwick  to  "capture  Fredericksburg  and  vigorously 
pursue  the  enemy."  "We  know,"  it  stated,  "that  the  enemy  is 
fleeing,  trying  to  save  his  trains.  Two  of  Sickles's  divisions  are 
among  them." 

Jackson  sat  on  his  horse  awaiting  the  formation  of  his  lines, 
watch  in  hand;  it  was  six  o'clock  and  less  than  two  hours  of 
daylight  remained. 

"Are  you  ready,  General  Rodes  ?"  he  asked. 

"Yes,  sir,"  Rodes  answered. 

"You  can  go  forward,  sir." 

The  lines  started  forward  through  the  Wilderness.  The  first 
warning  the  Eleventh  Corps  received  was  not  given  by  its  out 
posts,  for  they  hardly  reached  the  main  position  ahead  of  the 
Confederates ;  it  was  given  by  the  deer  and  rabbits  and  wild 
turkeys  of  the  forest  put  to  flight  by  the  advance  of  the 
enemy.f 

Devens's  division,  taken  in  flank,  was  driven  back  upon 
Schurz's  before  the  latter  had  time  to  deploy;  and  the  whole 
mass  ran  pellmell  toward  Chancellorsville.  Buschbeck,  be 
hind  in  his  rifle-pits,  held  Jackson  at  bay  for  three-quarters  of 
an  hour.  But  Rodes's  division  was  reinforced  by  Colston's 
"and  the  two  together  folded  around  his  flanks,  took  his  line  in 
reverse,  and  finally  carried  the  position  with  a  rush;  and  then 
Buschbeck's  brigade  retired  in  good  order  through"  the  crowd 
of  fugitives,  which  was  "streaming  in  wild  disorder  to  the  rear, 
past  Hooker's  headquarters. ':J 

At  the  moment  when  Jackson  was  about  to  attack,  the  Con 
federates  at  the  other  end  of  the  line  attacked  Meade  vigor 
ously,  in  order  to  draw  attention  away  from  Jackson ;  and  Lee 
soon  engaged  the  whole  Federal  line. 


*Henderson. 

fDoubleday.     Alexander. 
JDoubleday. 


342  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(176)  Jackson's  lines  followed  the  routed  Eleventh  Corps 
across  a  clearing  east  of  Dowdall's  Tavern,  and  was  entering 
the  forest  beyond  when  the  8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  which 
was  on  its  way  to  assist  the  Eleventh  Corps,  came  unexpectedly 
upon  them  and  charged  them.  At  the  same  time  about  a  score 
of  guns  opened  fire  upon  their  flank  from  Hazel  Grove.  This 
checked  the  pursuit.  As  night  had  now  fallen,  Rodes's  and 
Colston's  divisions,  which  "were  broken,  mingled,  and  ex 
hausted,"  and  had  left  several  of  their  brigades  far  behind,  had 
to  halt  and  reform.  Hill's  division  was  then  deployed  to  take 
the  lead  in  the  woods. 

During  this  long  pause  Berry's  division  [Third  Corps],  sup 
ported  by  Hays's  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps,  formed  line 
under  the  bank  of  a  little  brook,  across  the  road  and  at  the 
foot  of  Fairview  Hill;  at  the  same  time  thirty-four  guns  took 
position  upon  the  hill,  behind  the  left  flank  of  the  infantry. 
This  hill  "became  the  key-point  of  the  battle.  In  front  of  it  the 
open  ground  extended  about  600  yards  to  the  edge  of  the 
forest"  where  the  Confederates  were  forming.  The  only  point 
from  which  it  could  be  reached  by  artillery  fire  was  Hazel 
Grove,  which  was  within  the  Federal  lines.*  By  10.00  p.  m. 
Sickles's  troops  had  returned  from  Catherine  Furnace  to  Hazel 
Grove. 

Jackson  was  preparing  to  press  his  advantage  and,  if  pos 
sible,  cut  off  Hooker  from  United  States  Ford.  He  had  ridden 
forward  with  some  of  his  staff  to  reconnoiter,  when  firing 
began  between  the  hostile  lines.  Jackson's  party  started  back, 
but,  in  the  dark  woods,  it  was  mistaken  for  Federal  cavalry, 
and  fired  upon  by  a  North  Carolina  regiment.  Two  of  the 
party  were  slain,  and  Jackson  received  three  shots  and  had  to 
be  borne  away.  He  died  on  the  10th  of  May.  As  A.  P.  Hill, 
the  next  in  rank,  was  soon  afterwards  wounded,  Stuart,  who 
had  gone  round  with  his  cavalry  to  attack  the  Union  trains 
near  Ely's  Ford,  came  back  and  took  command.* 

Hooker  ordered  Sickles  to  attack  the  Confederate  flank  by 
moonlight  from  Hazel  Grove.  So  Birney's  division  moved  out 
about  midnight ;  but  it  glanced  by  the  Confederate  right  flank, 
provoking  the  fire  of  only  about  two  regiments,  and  pushed 
into  the  woods  in  front  of  Fairview.  Here  it  was  mistaken  for 
Confederates  by  the  Federal  lines,  and  fired  upon.  It  returned 
the  fire  which,  it  supposed,  came  from  Confederates.  Thus  a 

^Alexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  343 

noisy,  but  not  bloody,  battle  raged  for  an  hour  or  two  between 
friends,  while  the  enemy  listened  to  it  but  took  no  part  in  it.* 

SUNDAY,  MAY  3. 

(177)  At  daybreak  Stuart  renewed  the  attack.     He  seized 
the  heights  of  Hazel.  Grove,  from  which  Hooker  had  made  the 
fatal  mistake  of  withdrawing  Sickles,  and  placed  thirty  guns 
there.    The  guns  opened  fire  on  the  space  around  the  mansion 
and  enfiladed  a  part  of  the  Federal  line.f    This  line  had  been 
adjusted,  during  the  night,  to  conform  to  the  new  condition. 
The  Eleventh  Corps  had  been  sent  to  the  extreme  left  to  re 
organize;  the  right  was  held  by  the  Second   [Couch],  Third 
[Sickles],  and  Twelfth  Corps  [Slocum].     Facing  Stuart's  line 
were  two  Federal  lines  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  long,  reach 
ing  northward  from  Fairview  to  the  other  side  of  the  Plank 
Road.     They  were  held  by  some  25,000  men — about  as  many 
as  Stuart  had.     The  whole  Union  position  was  covered  with 
breastworks  of  earth  and  logs  behind  abatis.     The  roads  to 
ward  Fredericksburg  were"  covered  by  Hancock's  division  of 
the  Second  Corps,  and  a  part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps.     Batteries 
massed  on  the  high  ground  at  Fairview  were  behind  field- 
works.    The  First  Corps  [Reynolds]  was  covering  the  road  to 
United  States  Ford,  and  the  Fifth  [Meade]  was  on  the  left. 

Stuart  assaulted  the  line  in  his  front  and  after  several  hours 
of  hard  fighting,  during  which  the  hostile  lines  surged  to  and 
fro  many  times,  succeeded  in  driving  the  Federals  back.  The 
artillery  at  Hazel  Grove  had  been  increased  to  about  fifty  guns, 
which  moved  forward  to  Fairview  Hill  when  that  position  was 
vacated  by  the  retiring  Union  batteries. 

While  the  battle  was  raging  in  this  quarter  Anderson  was 
assaulting  the  center  of  the  Union  line  and  McLaws  its  left; 
seeing  "the  enemy  withdrawing  from  their  fronts"  they 
"pressed  forward  at  the  same  time  that  Stuart's  infantry 
crowned  the  plateau  [of  Fairview]  from  the  west."* 

(178)  Finally  the  flanks  of  Anderson's  and  Stuart's  forces 
made  connection  at  Fairview.     Then  Lee  advanced  the  whole 
Confederate  line,  and  at  ten  o'clock  had  possession  of  Chan- 
cellorsville,  now  only  a  smoking  ruin ;  it  had  been  set  on  fire 
by  Confederate  shells.* 

*Alexander. 
fSwinton.     Alexander. 


344  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Just  before  this  Hooker  had  been  knocked  down  and  dis 
abled  by  a  brick  torn  by  a  shell  from  one  of  the  columns  of  the 
front  porch.  Couch,  therefore,  superintended  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Union  forces  to  a  line  in  rear,  which  had  been  selected 
by  the  engineers  and  prepared  during  the  night.  The  new 
position  was  in  the  space  between  Hunting  Run  and  Mineral 
Spring  Run,  and  covered  the  line  of  retreat  ^by  way  of  United 
States  Ford.  The  right  rested  on  the  Rapidan  and  the  left  on 
the  Rappahannock,  and  the  line  followed  the  direction  of  the 
two  runs  and  bent  across  the  space  between  their  headwaters. 
The  First  and  Fifth  Corps,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve  all 
morning  and  not  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  battle,  were  formed 
on  this  new  line,  and  there  "joined  by  the  rest  of  the  army  fall 
ing  back  from  Chancellorsville."* 

Lee  was  making  ready  to  assault  this  new  position  when  he 
was  stopped  by  reports  that  called  for  his  attention  in  the 
direction  of  Fredericksburg. 

SEDGWICK'S  OPERATIONS. 

(179)  At  nine  o'clock  the  night  lief  ore   [the  2nd]   Hooker 
had  dispatched  an  order  to  Sedgwick  directing  him  to  move 
through   Fredericksburg,   drive   Early   away,   continue   toward 
Chancellorsville  and  be   ready  at  daybreak   to  -attack   Lee   in 
reverse,  while  he  himself  assaulted  him  in  front.    It  was  nearly 
midnight  when   Sedgwick  received   the   order,   but  he   moved 
almost  immediately  toward   Fredericksburg,   skirmishing  with 
the  Confederate  outposts  on  the  way. 

The  bulk  of  Early's  own  division  was  on  the  ridge  below  the 
town,  and  the  line  from  Taylor's  Hill  to  the  Howison  house, 
about  three  miles,  was  held  by  the  brigades  of  Barksdale  and 
Hays  supported  by  a  few  pieces  of  artillery.  Two  regiments, 
only,  with  eight  guns,  guarded  Marye's  Hill  from  the  Plank- 
Road  to  Hazel  Run. 

(180)  Sedgwick  reached  Fredericksburg  at  3  a.  m.,  and  at 
daybreak  moved  against  Early's  position.     Four  regiments  as 
saulted  Marye's  Hill,  but  were  repulsed.    A  second  assault  was 
made  and  also  repulsed.    Howe's  division,  south  of  Hazel  Run, 
tried  to  turn  the  hill  but  met  with  no  success.     Gibbon,  who 
had  brought  his  division  of  the  Second  Corps  over  from  Fal- 
mouth,  had  no  better  success  against  the  Confederate  left.     He 
was  unable  to  get  across  the  canal.     Soon  after  his  effort  Wil- 

*S\vinton. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  345 

cox,  who  had  brought  his  Confederate  brigade  from  Banks's 
Ford,  occupied  Taylor's  Hill. 

About  eleven  o'clock  a  third  assault  was  made  on  Marye's 
Hill  by  a  whole  division  supported  by  a  brigade.  This  assault, 
also,  was  repulsed,  "although  Barksdale's  line  was  so  thin  that 
it  scarcely  averaged  a  man  to  five  feet  of  parapet."  But  in 
removing  the  wounded  under  flag  of  truce  after  this  assault 
the  Federals  discovered  how  weak  the  Confederate  line  was.* 
Taking  advantage  of  this  information,  they  quickly  renewed 
the  attack,  and  carried  the  position  in  the  sunken  road  at  the 
foot  of  the  hill — the  rampart  against  which  Burnside  had 
shattered  his  army. 

In  defense  of  their  guns  on  the  crest  the  Confederates  made 
a  savage  stand;  but  Sedgwick's  line  carried  everything  before 
it.  At  the  same  time  Howe's  division  carried  the  heights  below 
the  town,  and  the  Federals  were  then  in  possession  of  the  whole 
ridge.  Early's  troops  retreated  by  the  Telegraph  Road,  leaving 
the  way  to  Chancellorsville  open  to  Sedgwick. 

These  were  the  tidings  that  Lee  received  just  as  he  was 
about  to  complete  his  victory  at  Chancellorsville.  He  with 
drew  four  brigades  at  once  from  his  line  and  dispatched  them, 
under  McLaws,  to  meet  Sedgwick.  He  counted  upon  Early's 
returning  to  attack  Sedgwick  in  rear.  (1-81)  Wilcox  formed 
his  brigade  across  the  Plank  Road,  and,  when  Sedgwick  ad 
vanced,  fell  back  slowly  toward  Chancellorsville,  delaying 
Sedgwick  as  much  as  he  could.  He  reached  Salem  Church 
about  three  o'clock,  and  joined  McLaws,  who  was  already 
there  with  his  four  brigades.  At  four  o'clock  Sedgwick 
reached  Salem  Church  and  immediately  attacked  the  Con 
federate  line.  The  combat  that  ensued  kept  up  until  dark,  and 
Sedgwick  was  stopped  in  his  march.  He  had  lost  nearly  5,000 
men  since  morning. f 

The  next  morning,  as  it  did  not  appear  that  Hooker  was 
going  to  take  the  aggressive,  Lee  resolved  still  further  to  rein 
force  the  troops  opposed  to  Sedgwick,  with  a  view  to  capture 
him,  or  force  him  to  cross  the  Rappahannock.  Accordingly  he 
withdrew  the  rest  of  Anderson's  division  and  marched  it  to 
McLaws's  support,  leaving  only  what  remained  of  Jackson's 
old  corps  in  front  of  Hooker.J 

(182)     In  the  meantime  Early  had  retaken  Marye's  Heights, 


*  Alexander. 

fSwinton. 

$Doubleday. 


346  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  then  turned  his  troops  on  Salem  Church.  When  Ander 
son's  brigades  arrived,  also,  and  formed  line  on  the  right  of 
McLaws,  parallel  to  the  Plank  Road,  Sedgwick  was  sur 
rounded  on  three  sides.  His  position  covered  the  road  to 
Banks's  Ford,  but  he  was  now  upon  the  defensive,  and  only 
hoped  to  hold  his  position  until  night  should  fall  to  cover  his 
withdrawal. 

Anderson  had  been  delayed  several  hours  in  getting  away 
from  Chancellorsville ;  and,  also,  in  forming  his  line  for  attack, 
owing  to  "Sedgwick's  peculiar  rectangular  formation."*  So 
it  was  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  before  the  Confederates  were 
ready  to  make  a  vigorous  assault.  Sedgwick  was  forced  back 
on  Banks's  Ford  [Scott's  Ford],  but  darkness  fell  before  he 
could  be  cut  off  by  the  Confederates.  During  the  night  he 
crossed  the  river  by  a  pontoon-bridge,  which  had  been  laid  the 
day  before  after  Wilcox  had  quitted  his  position  at  the  Ford. 

(178)  Tuesday  morning,  the  5th,  Lee  withdrew  the  divi 
sions  of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  and,  with  his  united  forces, 
resolved  to  make  a  final  effort  to  destroy  Hooker.  Every 
thing  was  arranged  to  assault  the  Federal  position  at  daybreak 
on  the  6th.  "When  daybreak,  however,  came,  and  the  Con 
federate  skirmishers  advanced,  it  was  found  that"  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  "had,  during  the  night,  withdrawn  across  the 
Rappahannock,"  leaving  behind  "its  killed,  its  wounded,  four 
teen  pieces  of  artillery,  and  twenty  thousand  stand  of  arms."f 
The  Federal  losses  in  the  few  days  of  this  campaign  amounted, 
in  killed  and  wounded,  to  11,128,  and  those  of  the  Confederates 
to  10,960.* 

STONEMAN'S  CAVALRY. 

(170)  Much  had  been  expected  of  Stoneman's  Cavalry 
Corps.  It  was  the  first  time  since  the  war  had  begun  that  the 
Union  cavalry  had  been  given  a  chance.  The  fates,  however, 
seemed  to  be  against  it  still.  The  column  got  off  in  good  sea 
son  ;  but  it  was  delayed  by  the  heavy  rains,  so  that  it  could  not 
cross  the  Rappahannock  till  the  29th  of  April — the  same  day 
the  infantry  crossed. 

"Hooker  then  divided  the  command  into  two  columns,  send 
ing  one  under  Averell"  toward  Gordonsville  and  the  other 
under  Buford  to  break  up  the  Fredericksburg-Richmond  rail- 

*Alexander. 
fSwinton. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  347 

way.  The  only  cavalry  the  Confederates  could  spare  to  oppose 
these  forces  was  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigade.  It  fell  back  before 
Averell's  column,  and  was  pursued  as  far  as  Rapidan  Station. 
From  there  Averell  was  recalled  by  Hooker,  and  he  reached 
Ely's  Ford  the  night  of  May  2.  On  the  3rd  Averell  recon- 
noitered  on  Hooker's  right,  but  returned,  reporting  the  coun 
try  impracticable  for  cavalry  work.  Hooker  thereupon  re 
lieved  him  from  command  and  put  Pleasanton  in  his  place. 

Stoneman  broke  up  Buford's  command  into  five  or  six  de 
tachments,  and  sent  them  in  as  many  different  directions. 
They  did  considerable  damage  and  spread  dismay  through 
Virginia.  One  detachment  went  within  two  miles  of  Richmond. 
Several  of  them  wound  up  their  raid  at  Gloucester  on  the 
coast,  which  was  in  the  possession  of  Union  troops.  The 
Fredericksburg-Richmond  railway  was  not  reached  until  the 
3rd  of  May,  and  very  little  damage  was  done  to  it;  for  the 
Confederates  sent  prisoners  and  wounded  over  it  to  Richmond, 
on  the  5th. 

On  the  whole  the  Cavalry  Corps  exerted  no  practical  in 
fluence  upon  the  campaign  after  the  main  operations  had  ac 
tually  begun;  while,  if  it  had  been  kept  with  the  main  army,  it 
would  have  been  of  great  service.  On  the  8th  of  May  the 
entire  cavalry  force,  except  what  was  at  Gloucester  Point,  re- 
crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  Kelly's  Ford,  on  its  way  to  re 
join  the  army.  The  corps  had  lost  only  seventeen  killed  and 
seventy-five  wounded  during  all  its  operations ! 

COMMENTS. 

The  first  movements  of  the  main  force  in  the  Chancellors- 
ville  Campaign  began  on  the  27th  of  April,  1863,  and  the 
campaign  ended  with  Hooker's  withdrawal  across  the  Rappa 
hannock,  on  the  night  of  May  5.  It  would  be  hard  to  pick 
out  another  nine  days  of  the  Civil  War  so  fraught  with  lessons 
for  the  student  of  the  military  art.  If  many  of  these  lessons 
are  to  be  learned  from  the  mistakes  that  were  made  and  their 
fatal  consequences,  there  are  others  that  may  be  learned  from 
the  examples  of  sound  strategy  and  tactics  presented,  and 
their  results. 

Up  to  the  time  when  the  right  wing  of  the  Federal  army 
reached  Chancellorsville  on  the  30th  of  April,  General  Hooker's 
plan,  in  its  conception  and  its  execution,  has  been  characterized 
by  the  critics  as  "masterly" ;  but  from  that  moment  to  the  end 


348  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

every  item  of  it  was  so  faulty  that  no  one  has  arisen  bold 
enough  to  venture  a  word  in  Hooker's  defense.  Of  course 
Hooker  can  be  criticized  for  dividing  his  army  into  two  almost 
equal  parts,  separated  by  nearly  forty  miles  of  bad  road  and  a 
river,  and  with  the  enemy  between  them;  but  Napoleon  took 
such  risks  when  necessary.  "The  rules  of  war  only  point  out 
the  dangers  which  are  incurred  by  breaking  them."*  More 
over,  either  of  Hooker's  separated  wings,  by  itself,  was  nearly 
equal  in  strength  to  Lee's  whole  army.  The  fact  that  Hooker's 
right  wing  was  allowed  to  reach  Chancellorsville  without 
molestation  proves  that  he  had  taken  sufficient  measures  to 
deceive  Lee.  Not  until  then — not  until  he  received  word  that 
Anderson  had  fallen  back  from  Chancellorsville — did  Lee  guess 
what  Hooker's  project  was. 

Of  the  measures  taken  by  Hooker  to  fool  Lee,  none  other 
had  so  great  an  effect  as  the  march  of  Stoneman's  cavalry 
corps  up  the  Rappahannock  two  weeks  before  the  principal 
movement  began.  Stoneman  marched  to  Warrenton  Junction. 
Lee  at  first  "believed  that"  he  "was  going  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  As,  however,"  he  "continued  near  Warrenton  Junc 
tion,  Lee  concluded  that  the  movement  was  a  feint  intended 
to  draw  his  army  to  the  Upper  Rappahannock  in  order  that 
Fredericksburg  might  be  seized."f  So  Lee  clung  more  tena 
ciously  than  ever  to  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg,  while 
Stuart's  cavalry  confronted  Stoneman's  across  the  upper  Rap 
pahannock.  Thus  Stuart  was  still  at  Culpeper  Court  House 
with  his  main  force  when  the  Federal  right  wing  had  reached 
Kelly's  Ford,  on  its  way  to  Chancellorsville. 

Having  arrived  at  Chancellorsville,  on  the  afternoon  of 
April  30,  Hooker's  first  fatal  mistake  was  his  stopping  there 
for  the  night.  He  ought  to  have  pushed  on  out  of  the  Wilder 
ness,  until  he  uncovered  Banks's  Ford  and  reached  the  open 
ground  in  that  neighborhood,  where  he  could  maneuver  his 
large  army.  A  night's  march  would  even  have  brought  him 
upon  the  rear  of  Lee's  army  at  Marye's  Heights.  Nothing  but 
Anderson's  division  barred  the  way,  the  distance  was  only  ten 
miles,  and  he  had  four  army-corps  at  hand.  The  failure  to 
march,  to  keep  on  marching  after  nightfall,  has  lost  many  a 
victory  in  war. 

Even,    however,    after    bivouacking    at    Chancellorsville,    if 


*Henderson. 

^Principles  of  Strategy — Bigelow. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  349 

Hooker  had  started  his  army  toward  Fredericksburg  at  day 
light  on  the  1st  of  May,  he  would  have  got  possession  of 
Banks's  Ford,  and  the  open  ground  near  it,  before  the  arrival 
of  Jackson  with  reinforcements.  But  Hooker  did  not  move 
until  eleven  o'clock.  The  possession  of  Banks's  Ford  would 
have  shortened  the  communication  between  the  two  wings  of 
the  army  by  several  miles;  virtually  it  would  have  united  the 
army.  With  all  of  his  tardiness  Hooker's  line,  none  the  less, 
got  within  reach  of  Banks's  Ford  on  the  1st,  and  attained  a 
good  position  almost  without  the  forest,  when  it  was  with 
drawn  to  Chancellorsville.  The  enemy  had  "come  out  from 
behind  his  defenses."  as  Hooker's  order  had  predicted  he  must, 
and  now  Hooker  was  going  to  compass  his  "certain  destruc 
tion"  on  Hooker's  "own  ground."  He  made  a  fatal  mistake  in 
undertaking  to  "consummate  offensive  strategy  with  defensive 
tactics."* 

Hooker's  object  was,  or  ought  to  have  been,  to  destroy  Lee's 
army.  The  strategic  situation  was  not  such  that  the  simple 
repulse  of  that  army  meant  its  destruction  ;•  repulse  would  only 
have  forced  it  back  upon  its  line  of  communications.  But  to 
achieve  a  decisive  tactical  victory  from  the  defensive  requires 
the  skill  of  a  master  like  Napoleon,  and  unusually  favorable 
conditions.  Later  battles  present  no  such  decisive  counter 
attacks  as  that  of  Austerlitz.  Upon  the  defensive,  victory 
means  usually  no  more  than  to  repulse  the  enemy's  assault, 
not  to  destroy  the  assailant.  Certainly  Hooker  could  not  hope 
to  do  more  than  repulse  Lee's  assaults  in  the  jungle  about 
Chancellorsville.  If  he  expected  to  hold  Lee  in  his  front  until 
Sedgwick  could  come  up  and  strike  him  from  behind  he 
reckoned  without  his  host. 

Far  more  hazardous  than  the  flank  march  of  Hooker's  right 
wing  to  Chancellorsville  was  the  flank  march  of  Lee's  left 
wing  under  Jackson,  on  the  2nd  of  May.  All  day  long  Ja'ck- 
son's  column  was  marching  across  Hooker's  front  and  within 
two  miles  of  it,  with  his  right  flank  covered  only  "by  woods  and 
by  Stuart's  busy  and  noisy  cavalry. "f  And  Hooker  and  How 
ard,  'and  the  rest,  knew  that  this  Confederate  column  was 
marching,  yet  made  no  effort  to  destroy  it  and  no  adequate 
preparation  to  oppose  it.  Howard  says  he  "sent  out  scouts 
who  returned  with  reports  that  the  enemy  was  not  more  than 
three  or  four  miles  off,  and  in  motion."  And  "we,  who  were 


*Bigelow. 

tGeneral  Howard  in  B.  &  L. 


350  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

at  Dowdall's,  had  been  watching  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which 
kept  pushing  through  the  woods  just  far  enough  to  receive  a 
fire  and  then  withdrawing."*  Hooker  and  his  corps-com 
manders  were  sure  that  the  marching  column  was  Lee's  army 
retreating  on  Gordonsville. 

Never  was  the  cavalry  of  an  army  more  needed  in  the  right 
place  than  Hooker's  cavalry  was  needed  on  the  exposed  Fed 
eral  right  flank  that  2nd  of  May.  If  Stoneman's  Cavalry  Corps 
had  been  on  the  Brock  Road  Jackson's  march  would  have  been 
impossible;  but  if  Stoneman's  cavalry  had  been  there  Jackson's 
march  would  not  have  been  attempted,  for  Fitzhugh  Lee  would 
not  have  been  permitted  to  discover  that  Howard's  flank  was 
"in  the  air." 

In  view  of  the  exposed  condition  of  the  Federal  right  and 
the  cover  afforded  by  the  dense  forest  "the  chief  danger"  of 
Jackson's  flank  movement  "lay  in  this,  that  the  two  wings, 
each  left  to  its  own  resources,  might  fail  to  act  in  combina 
tion,"!  for  Lee  and  Jackson  had  no  means,  as  our  Signal  Corps 
has  to-day,  of  laying  a  field-telegraph  as  fast  as  their  troops 
could  march. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  no  sense  defeated  by  the 
disaster  of  the  Eleventh  Corps ;  if  Jackson  had  not  been 
wounded,  and  if  night  had  not  intervened,  this  disaster  might 
have  extended  to  the  rest  of  the  army.  Jackson  purposed  tak 
ing  the  Union  army  in  reverse  and  cutting  it  off  from  its  line  of 
retreat  by  United  States  Ford,  while  Lee  held  it  fast  in  front. 
But  "Hooker  had  two  corps  in  position  which  had  hardly  been 
engaged,  the  Second  and  the  Fifth,"  with  which  to  meet  Jack 
son  ;  "and  another,  the  First,  under  Reynolds,  was  coming 
up."f  If  Jackson  had  made  a  night-march  instead  of  waiting 
until  day  to  begin  his  movement  he  might  not  have  been  shot  in 
the  dark  by  his  own  men,  and  he  might  have  had  time  to  push 
his  advantage  to  a  conclusion  before  nightfall. 

There  was,  in  fact,  not  a  moment  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end  of  the  engagement  at  Chancellorsville  when  the  Union 
army  as  a  whole  was  beaten;  there  was  not  a  time  when  by  a 
vigorous  combined  assault  it  might  not  have  defeated  Lee's 
army.  General  Hooker  says  the  dense  forest  prohibited  a 
Union  victory;  but  the  ground  was  of  his  own  choosing;  Lee 

^General  Howard  in  B.  6"  L. 
fHenderson. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  351 

attacked  upon  it,  and  turned  the  dense  thicket  to  his  own  ad 
vantage. 

During  the  whole  of  Saturday  [May  2],  while  Jackson  was 
making  his  flank  march,  the  Confederate  commander  held 
Hooker's  50,000  troops  with  only  16,000.  Again,  from  four 
o'clock  Sunday  afternoon  until  midnight  on  Monday,  while  the 
bulk  of  Lee's  army  was  operating  against  Sedgwick,  Hooker 
with  60,000  men,  strongly  fortified,  allowed  himself  to  be  held 
in  place  by  20,000  Confederates,  and  neither  sent  a  man  to 
Sedgwick's  assistance,  seven  miles  away,  nor  made  an  effort 
to  break  the  thin  line  of  the  enemy  by  whom  he  was  himself 
beleaguered.  Swinton  truly  remarks  that  "not  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  beaten  at  Chancellorsville,  but  its  com 
mander."  An  army  is  not  beaten  so  long  as  there  are  reserves 
to  put  into  the  fight,  and  in  the  action  on  Sunday,  when  the 
Federal  line  was  driven  back  from  Chancellorsville,  Hooker 
"employed  little  more  than  half  his  force — neither  Reynolds 
[First  Corps]  nor  Meade  [Fifth  Corps]  being  allowed  to  go 
into  action,  though  eager  to  do  so/'*  Hooker's  final  decision 
to  retreat  on  the  night  of  the  5th  was,  General  Alexander 
believes,  "the  mistake  of  his  life."  He  then  had  his  whole 
united  army,  upwards  of  90,000  men,  behind  "probably  the 
strongest  field-intrenchment  ever  built  in  Virginia. "f  Lee  was 
going  to  attack  this  army  with  only  35,000  troops,  which  had 
been  fighting  and  marching  for  seven  days !  Nothing  but 
Hooker's  withdrawal  saved  Lee's  army  from  a  terrible  repulse. 

Hooker  charged  his  defeat  to  Sedgwick's  failure  to  execute 
the  order  he  sent  him  Saturday  night,  May  2.  But  that  order 
was  impossible  to  execute.  Sedgwick  was  directed  to  be  in 
rear  of  Lee's  position  ready  to  fall  upon  the  Confederates  at 
daybreak.  It  was  nearly  midnight  when  he  received  the  order, 
and  he  had  fourteen  miles  to  march,  with  Early's  10,000  Con 
federates  on  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg  blocking  the  way. 
Day  broke  before  five  o'clock  at  that  time.  It  would  be  impos 
sible  to  awaken  a  body  of  twenty-odd  thousand  men  and  march 
it  in  so  short  a  time  fourteen  miles  in  the  dark,  even  though  no 
enemy  stood  in  the  way.  It  does,  nevertheless,  appear  that 
Sedgwick  might  have  made  better  speed.  The  assault  that 
carried  the  sunken  road  and  Marye's  Hill  was  not  made  until 
after  11  a.  m. ;  but  after  driving  the  Confederates  and  gaining 
the  ridge  "Sedgwick,  instead  of  pushing  on,  halted  to  reform 

*  Swinton. 
fAlexander. 


352  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

his  men,  and  sent  for  Brooks's  division,  which  was  still  at  its 
old  position  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  to  come  up  and 
take  the  advance.  It  was  full  3  p.  m.  before  the  final  start  was 
made."* 

As  everything  turned  out  it  would  have  been  better  if  Sedg- 
wick  had  not  advanced  at  all  from  the  heights  of  Fredericks- 
burg.  If  he  had  intrenched  himself  there  he  could  have  held 
on  against  Early  and  such  forces  as  Lee  could  have  sent  against 
him  until  reinforcements  could  come  to  him  by  way  of 
United  States  Ford.  Then  the  "whole  Army  of  the  Potomac,- 
after  withdrawing  from  Chancellorsville,  could  have  joined  him 
by  way  of  Fredericksburg.  This  would  have  given  Hooker  all 
that  Burnside  made  his  fierce  fight  to  gain.  In  view  of  the  fact 
that  Hooker  made  no  effort  to  cooperate  with  Sedgwick,  but 
remained  in  his  trenches,  it  is  perhaps  fortunate  for  Sedgwick 
that  he  was  stopped  at  Salem  Church.  If  he  had  been  allowed 
to  march  on  a  little  farther  he  might  have  had  no  line  of  re 
treat  when  Anderson  and  McLaws  and  Early  surrounded  him. 

Chancellorsville  was  the  first  great  battle  of  the  Civil  War  in 
which  the  infantry  of  both  sides  made  use  of  field-works. 

*Doubleday. 


LECTURE  XVII. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG 
THE  FIRST  DAY 

(183)  After  the  battle  of  Chancellor sville  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  again  resumed 
their  positions  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Rappahannock  River. 
The  two  main  armies  stretched  from  about  the  mouth  of  the 
Rapidan  to  points  six  or  seven  miles  below  Fredericksburg. 
The  right  of  the  Confederate  line  rested  on  Massaponax  Creek. 
The  hostile  cavalry  forces  confronted  each  other  along  the 
upper  course  of  the  Rappahannock,  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Rapidan  to  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway. 

Both  armies  were  in  need  of  rest,  recuperation,  and  reor 
ganization.  The  morale  of  the  Union  army  had  suffered 
from  another  defeat,  while  that  of  the  Confederate  army  had 
reached  the  highest  point  that  it  attained  in  the  course  of  the 
war.  The  Confederacy  had  resorted  to  obligatory  service,  and 
Lee's  army  was  at  once  increased  by  a  large  force  of  conscripts. 
Longstreet's  two  divisions,  which  had  been  absent  during 
the  Chancellorsville  campaign,  also  soon  rejoined.  On  May 
31,  1863,  Lee  had  an  army  of  76,224  officers  and  men,  and  272 
guns.* 

Lee  reorganized  his  infantry  into  three  corps,  commanded 
by  Longstreet,  Ewell,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  respectively.  Each  corps 
consisted  of  three  divisions,  and  each  of  the  divisions,  except 
three,  consisted  of  four  brigades.  Lee  was  a  full  general,  his 
corps-commanders  were  lieutenant-generals,  his  division-com 
manders  were  major-generals,  and  all  of  his  brigades — thirty- 
seven  of  infantry  and  five  of  cavalry — except  two,  were  com 
manded  by  brigadier-generals.  "Nearly  all  of  these  officers 
were  veterans  of,  proved  ability,  and  many  had  served  in  the 
Mexican  War."  "The  artillery  had  recently  received  an  ex 
cellent  organization.  ...  It  consisted,  besides  the  horse- 
artillery,  or  fifteen  so-called  'battalions,'  each  of  four  batteries, 
with  one  lieutenant-colonel  and  a  major.  To  each  army-corps 
were  attached  five  battalions,  one  for  each  division  and  two  as 
reserve,  the  whole  under  a  colonel  as  chief  of  artillery"  of  the 
corps. f  The  general  artillery  reserve  for  the  army,  formerly 

^Alexander. 

fGeneral  Hunt  in  B.  &  L. 

353 


354  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

maintained,  was  broken  up.  The  artillery  organization  adopted 
at  this  time  by  the  Confederacy  was  the  first  of  its  kind  ever 
employed,  and  it  has  since  been  adopted  by  the  leading  nations 
of  Europe.*  It  will  be  observed  that  a  Confederate  army-corps 
only  lacked  a  complement  of  cavalry  to  make  it  a  complete 
little  army  in  itself,  which  is  the  approved  organization  of  an 
army-corps  to-day.  And  it  approximated  in  numbers  what  is 
to-day  considered  the  proper  strength  of  an  army-corps,  that  is, 
about  30,000  men. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  "the  average 
strength  of  army-corps  and  divisions  was  about  half  that  of  the 
Confederates.  ...  At  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  the  seven  army- 
corps  consisted  of  nineteen  infantry  divisions,  seven  of  which 
had  two  brigades,  eleven  had  three,  and  one  had  four;  in  all 
fifty-one  brigades.  .  .  .  The  army  and  army-corps  were 
commanded  by  major-generals,  the  divisions  by  three  major- 
generals  and  sixteen  brigadier-generals,  the  infantry  brigades 
by  twenty-two  brigadier-generals  and  twenty-nine  colonels. "f 
Our  Government  has  always  evinced  an  incomprehensible  aver 
sion  to  bestowing  adequate  rank  upon  its  higher  commanders. 
Since  the  very  beginning,  1775,  there  have  been  only  four  full 
generals  in  our  service,  Washington,  Grant,  Sherman,  and 
Sheridan.  Not  so  in  the  Confederate  army;  there  we  find 
every  separate  army  commanded  by  a  full  general,  and  the 
army-corps  commanded  by  lieutenant-generals.  In  the  four 
short  years  of  this  army's  existence  seven  full  generals  and 
eighteen  lieutenant-generals  were  commissioned. 

The  returns  of  June  30,  1863,  give  the  strength  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  as  115,256  officers  and  men,  with  362  guns.* 

PLANS. 

In  assuming  the  offensive  in  the  campaign  now  to  be  dis 
cussed  Lee  and  the  Confederate  authorities  "at  Richmond  were 
actuated  by  many  considerations,  political  as  well  as  military. 
Politically  it  was  believed  that  the  South's  recognition  by 
foreign  powers  awaited  only  a  victory  upon  Northern  soil ;  and 
the  Southern  authorities  still  believed  that  an  invasion  of  the 
North  would  strengthen  the  influence  of  the  "copperhead  or 
anti-war  party,"  and  increase  the  disaffection  that  already 
existed  there  on  account  of  the  heavy  taxation  and  the  draft 

*Alexander. 
fHunt. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  355 

law ;  furthermore  the  financial  condition  of  the  Confederacy 
was  becoming  worse  from  day  to  day,  and  the  notes  issued  by 
the  government  were  now  hardly  worth  the  paper  of  which 
they  were  made.  It  was  believed  that  a  successful  invasion 
would  not  only  hasten  the  end  of  the  war  but  would  strengthen 
the  Confederacy's  credit  in  the  financial  world  abroad. 

But  there  were  also  purely  military  reasons.  The  spirit  of 
Lee's  army  was  such  that  it  believed  itself  equal  to  any  under 
taking;  a  purely  defensive  war  could  have  no  hope  of  final 
success;  soon  or  late  the  army  would  be  forced  back  on  Rich 
mond  and  ultimately  have  to  surrender ;  Lee  needed  supplies  of 
clothing  and  subsistence  for  his  army,  and  expected  to  obtain 
them  in  Pennsylvania ;  and  of  more  consequence  than  anything 
else  was  the  serious  condition  of  affairs  at  Vicksburg.  Pem- 
berton's  army  was  there  besieged  by  Grant's  and  could  not  hold 
out  many  days  longer,  and  Bragg  was  hard  put  to  it  to  keep 
Rosecrans  from  advancing  farther  in  East  Tennessee.  Lee  not 
only  felt  sure  that  his  movement  northward  would  cause  the 
recall  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  cover  Washington,  but 
he  hoped  it  might  also  "lead  to  the  calling  of  some  of  the  forces 
from  the  west,  and  thus  relieve  the  pressure  on  Vicksburg  and 
Chattanooga."*  He  felt  that,  if  Vicksburg  should  fall  while  he 
was  still  on  the  defensive  behind  the  Rappahannock,  it  would 
"dishearten  the  Southern  people  and  stimulate  the  North  to 
renewed  effort. "f.  He  therefore  resolved  to  transfer  his  army 
to  northern  soil  by  way  of  the  Shenandoah  and  the  Cumberland 
Valleys.  His  line  of  communications  would  thus  be  covered  by 
his  holding  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the  South 
Mountains. 

Secondary  to  his  own  movements  Lee  urged  that  an  army 
"even  in  effigy,"  as  he  expressed  it,  be  organized  under  Beaure- 
gard  at  Culpeper  Court  House.  This  he  believed  would  so 
menace  Washington  as  not  only  to  hinder  the  advance  of  troops 
to  oppose  him  but  also  to  cause  the  withdrawal  of  Federal 
troops  from  other  points  at  the  South  to  protect  that  city.  The 
government  at  Richmond  could  not  see  its  way  to  carry  out 
this  part  of  Lee's  plan. 

There  was  another  great  strategic  plan  which,  at  this  time, 
held  out  far  better  chances  of  success  to  Southern  arms,  and 
greater  results  in  case  of  success,  than  the  plan  of  invading 
Pennsylvania.  It  was  a  plan  that  General  Longstreet  urged 


*Fiebeger. 
tDoubleday. 


356  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

upon  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War  and  General  Lee,  but 
was  unable  to  persuade  them  to  adopt.  If  we  consider  the  whole 
vast  theater  of  war  from  the  Potomac  to  the  delta  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  the  Southern  armies  had  the  advantage  of  interior  lines. 
Never  before  in  any  of  the  world's  great  wars  would  it  have 
been  possible  to  shift  armies  from  one  side  to  another  of  such  a 
wide  theater  in  time  for  sudden  strategic  combinations ;  but  it 
was  possible  at  this  time  in  this  theater  by  means  of  the  rail 
ways  within  the  Southern  lines. 

Adopting  the  figures  given  by  General  Alexander  in  his 
Memoirs:  Pemberton  had  30,000  men  at  Vicksburg  invested  by 
Grant's  60,000;  Joseph  E.  Johnston  had  25,000  at  Jackson, 
Mississippi,  looking  on  at  the  siege  of  Vicksburg,  but  giving  no 
assistance  to  Pemberton ;  Bragg  had  45,000  in  Tennessee  con 
fronting  Rosecrans  with  84,000;  Buckner  had  5,000  at  Knox- 
ville,  "and  there  were  also  scattered  brigades  in  southwest 
Virginia  and  eastern  North  Carolina."  Nothing  aggressive 
was  to  be  expected  from  Hooker's  army  for  several  weeks. 

The  plan  suggested  by  Longstreet  proposed  that  General  Lee 
should  leave  the  troops  that  had  just  defeated  Hooker  to 
"contain"  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  Rappahannock,  and 
that  Lee  himself  should  hasten  to  Bragg's  headquarters  and 
assume  command;  and  that  Longstreet  with  his  two  divisions, 
13,000  strong,  which  had  been  absent  from  the  battle  of  Chan- 
cellorsville,  and  Johnston  and  Buckner  with  their  commands, 
and  all  other  available  troops,  should  be  hurried  by  rail  to  join 
Bragg's  army.  Thus  General  Lee  would  have  had  an  army  of 
nearly  90,000  with  which  to  take  the  offensive  against  Rose- 
crans.  "Rosecrans  might  have  been  defeated,"  says  General 
Alexander,  "and  an  advance  made  into  Kentucky,  threatening 
Louisville  and  Cincinnati.  If  anything  could  have  caused 
Grant's  recall  from  Vicksburg  it  would  have  been  this. 
Surely,"  he  continues,  "the  chances  of  success  were  greater, 
and  of  disaster  less,  than  those  involved  in  our  crossing  the 
bridgeless  Potomac,  into  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country, 
where  ammunition  and  supplies  must  come  by  wagons  from 
Staunton,  nearly  200  miles,  over  roads  exposed  to  raids  of  the 
enemy  from  either  the  east  or  the  west.  In  this  position  a 
drawn  battle,  or  even  a  victory,  'would  still  leave  us  compelled 
soon  to  find  our  way  back  across  the  Potomac." 

Toward  the  latter  part  of  May  Hooker  got  wind  of  Lee's 
contemplated  advance;  he  proposed,  therefore,  "that  in  case 
Lee  moved  via  Culpeper  toward  the  Potomac  with  his  main 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  357 

body,  leaving  a  corps  at  Fredericksburg,"  he  should  be  allowed 
to  attack  this  corps.  This,  however,  he  was  forbidden  by  the 
Washington  authorities  to  do.  A  little  later,  learning  that 
Lee's  army  was  in  motion,  "and  that  there  were  but  few  troops 
in  Richmond,  he  proposed  an  immediate  march  on  that  place." 
This  plan  was  also  disapproved  by  the  President  in  a  letter  to 
Hooker  which  shows  a  very  sound  sense  of  strategy.*  Hooker 
was  instructed  to  keep  "always  in  view  the  safety  of  Washing 
ton  and  Harper's  Ferry"  ;f  no  plan  would  receive  the  assent  of 
the  President  and  his  incompetent  adviser,  General  Halleck, 
that  contemplated  the  removal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  between  Lee's  army  and  Washington.  Hooker's  opera 
tions,  therefore,  must  be  wholly  subordinated  to  those  of  the 
enemy. 

OPERATIONS. 

(184)  Early  in  June  Lee's  army  began  its  advance,  and  by 
the  8th  the  corps  of  Ewell  and  Longstreet,  covered  by  Stuart's 
cavalry  division,  were  concentrated  at  Culpeper.  A.  P.  Hill's 
corps  remained  at  Fredericksburg  to  watch  Hooker  and  keep 
him,  as  long  as  possible,  from  discovering  the  movement. 

Hooker's  suspicions,  however,  were  aroused  by  his  seeing  a 
smaller  number  of  tents  on  the  Fredericksburg  heights ;  and  on 
the  6th  June  he  ordered  Sedgwick  to  throw  bridges  across  the 
river  and  make  a  reconnaissance  on  the  other  side  with  his 
corps.  After  making  such  reconnaissance  Sedgwick  reported 
that  he  thought  the  main  Confederate  army  was  still  in  position. 
Hooker,  nevertheless,  ordered  Pleasanton,  who  had  replaced 
Stoneman  as  commander  of  the  Union  Cavalry  Corps,  to  move 
against  Stuart's  cavalry  at  Culpeper  and  "get  information 
as  to  the  enemy's  position  and  proposed  movement."!  The 
result  was  the  cavalry  combat  at  Brandy  Station  on  the 
9th  of  June.  The  Union  cavalry  encountered  Stuart's  contact- 
troops  as  soon  as  it  crossed  the  Rappahannock,  and  pushed 
them  back  to  Brandy  Station.  Here  it  was  met  by  Stuart's 
main  body,  and,  after  righting  all  day,  it  withdrew ;  but  not  until 
it  had  captured  dispatches  and  sufficient  information  to  enable 
its  commander  to  report  to  Hooker  "that  two-thirds  of  the 
enemy  were  at  Culpeper  preparing  to  move  on  Washington/'^ 


*See  Rhodes's  History  of  the  U.  S.t  IV -27 1. 

fHunt. 

$Doubleday. 


358  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  battle  of  Brandy  Station  was  an  important  one  for  the 
Union  cavalry — it  marked  the  turning  point  in  its  relative  effi 
ciency  and  excellence  as  compared  with  its  adversary's.  It  was 
the  first  true  cavalry  combat  of  the  war,  "and  it  enabled  the 
Federals  to  dispute  the  superiority  hitherto  claimed  by,  and 
conceded  to,  the  Confederate  cavalry."* 

(185)  As  soon  as  Hooker  received  Pleasanton's  report  that 
a  large  Confederate  force  was  at  Culpeper  he  extended  his  right 
up  the  Rappahannock. 

Meantime  Ewell's  corps  was  on  its  way  to  Winchester,  hav 
ing  left  Culpeper  on  the  10th  of  June.  Imboden's  cavalry  bri 
gade  had  already  marched  toward  Cumberland,  Maryland,  to 
destroy  the  railway  from  that  place  to  Martinsburg,  as  well  as 
the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal.  Winchester  was  occupied  by 
Milroy's  Federal  division  (about  9,000  men),  with  an  advance 
brigade  at  Berryville.  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry  were 
also  garrisoned  by  Federal  troops.  From  Chester  Gap  Ewell 
dispatched  Rodes's  division  with  Jenkins's  cavalry  brigade  by 
way  of  Berryville  toward  Martinsburg.  The  Berryville  garri 
son  withdrew  to  Winchester,  and  the  Federals  at  Martinsburg 
retreated  to  Harper's  Ferry.  (186)  With  the  rest  of  his 
corps  Ewell  pushed  on  to  Winchester,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
evening  of  the  13th  June.  He  skilfully  surrounded  the  town 
and  prepared  to  storm  its  fortifications  at  dawn  on  the  15th; 
but  Milroy,  seeing  his  line  of  retreat  threatened,  had  before  that 
hour  begun  a  retreat  toward  Martinsburg.  His  command  was 
split  in  two  by  a  Confederate  force  posted  on  the  Martinsburg 
Turnpike,  and  one  part  of  it  reached  Harper's  Ferry,  while  the 
other  part  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Hancock,  thirty-five  miles  in 
a  straight  line  farther  up  the  river.  (187)  Ewell  crossed  the 
Potomac  and  occupied  Hagerstown  and  Sharpsburg,  sending 
Jenkins's  cavalry  on  to  Chambersburg,  Penn.,  to  collect  sup 
plies.  On  the  17th  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  withdrew 
to  Maryland  Heights  and  the  Shenandoah  Valley  was  cleared 
of  Federal  troops. 

(186)  On  learning  of  Ewell's  movement  toward  the  Val 
ley,  being  forbidden  to  take  advantage  of  Lee's  widely  extended 
front  to  attack  his  isolated   corps   separately,   and   being  re 
quired  to  keep  his  army  between  Lee  and  Washington,  Hooker 
started  on  the  night  of  June  13  toward  Manassas  Junction,  on 
the  way  to  the  Potomac,  which  he  expected  to  cross  near  Lees- 

*Hunt. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  359 

burg.  Hooker's  withdrawal  from  Falmouth  was  immediately 
followed  by  A.  P.  Hill's  movement  toward  the  Valley.* 

(187)  On  the  15th  of  June  Longstreet  left  Culpeper;  he 
marched  along  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge  mountains,  in 
order  to  cover  the  passes.  Hill's  corps,  which  had  left  Fred- 
ericksburg  on  the  14th,  crossed  the  mountains  in  rear  of  Long- 
street,  and,  marching  down  the  Valley,  reached  Shepherdstown 
on  the  23rd. 

Stuart's  cavalry  had  been  thrown  out  to  the  right  of  Long- 
street's  column  to  cover  the  Confederate  movement  and  keep  in 
touch  with  Hooker's  army.  Pleasanton's  cavalry  was  in  like 
manner  covering  this  army.  The  result  was  several  fine  cavalry 
combats,  the  most  notable  of  which  were  those  at  Aldie,  Mid- 
dleburg,  and  Upperville.  Stuart  retreated  through  Ashby's 
Gap.  (188)  Longstreet  withdrew  through  the  passes  and  fol 
lowed  Hill  to  the  Potomac.  On  the  24th  he  crossed  the  river 
at  Williamsport ;  Hill  had  crossed  it  at  Shepherdstown  the  day 
before.  Their  columns  united  at  Hagerstown  on  the  25th. 
Stuart  continued  to  guard  ,the  mountain  passes  until  the 
Federal  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac. 

(187)  Conforming  his  movements  to  those  of  Lee's  army, 
Hooker  marched  northward.  (188)  On  the  25th  and  26th 
of  June  his  army  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Edwards's  Ferry. 
(189)  On  the  27th  two  army-corps  [First  and  Eleventh] 
under  Reynolds  occupied  Middletown  and  the  South  Mountain 
passes.  The  Twelfth  Corps  [Slocum]  was  near  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  the  other  four  corps  were  concentrated  at  Frederick. 

Swell's  Confederate  corps  had  continued  its  march  toward 
Harrisburg,  which  was  now  Lee's  objective.  On  the  28th  of 
June  the  divisions  of  Rodes  and  Johnson  were  at  Carlisle,*  and 
Early's  reached  York.  Early's  orders  were  "to  break  up  the 
Northern  Central  Railroad,  destroy  the  bridge  across  the 
Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville,  and  then  rejoin  the  main  body 
at  Carlisle."*  At  the  first  signs  of  invasion  Governor  Curtin 
had  called  out  the  Pennsylvania  militia,  but  it  does  not  appear 
to  have  opposed  any  effective  resistance  to  Ewell's  advance. 
At  Wrightsville,  however,  a  small  militia  force,  after  retreating 
across  the  fine  bridge,  set  fire  to  it,  which  not  only  de 
stroyed  the  bridge  but  came  near  destroying  the  town  also. 
Gordon's  Confederate  brigade  helped  the  citizens  put  out  the 
fire. 

*Himt. 


360  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Hooker  ordered  the  Twelfth  Corps  [Slocum]  to  march  early 
on  the  28th  of  June  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  there  to  unite  with 
the  force  at  Maryland  Heights  and  cut  Lee's  communications; 
and,  in  conjunction  with  Reynolds,  to  operate  on  Lee's  rear. 
But  Halleck  forbade  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  Mary 
land  Heights  "notwithstanding  Hooker's  representations  that 
the  position  was  utterly  useless  for  any  purpose."*  Whereupon 
Hooker,  finding  that  he  was  "not  to  be  allowed  to  maneuver  his 
own  army  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,"  asked  to  be  relieved 
from  his  command.  As  it  had  already  been  decided  at  a  council 
between  the  President,  Stanton,  and  Halleck,  that  Hooker 
should  never  again  be  intrusted  with  the  conduct  of  a  battle, 
and  he  had  been  left  in  command  only  for  political  reasons,! 
his  request  to  be  relieved  was  promptly  granted.  Major-Gen 
eral  George  G.  Meade  was  immediately  appointed  in  his  place, 
and  he  took  command  of  the  Union  army  on  the  28th.  Meade 
was  the  fifth  commander  assigned  to  this  army  within  ten 
months.  Halleck  imposed  no  restrictions  upon  him  as  to 
the  use  of  the  troops  at  Maryland  Heights,  and  they  were  soon 
ordered  to  Frederick. 

On  the  day  that  Meade  assumed  command  it  was  known  at 
Federal  headquarters  that  Lee's  army  was  distributed  as  fol 
lows:  Longstreet's  corps  at  Chambersburg ;  A.  P.  Hill's  be 
tween  that  town  and  Cashtown;  and  Ewell's  at  Carlisle  and 
York  and  in  the  country  between  those  towns,  threatening  Har- 
risburg: 

Meade  dropped  Hooker's  plan  of  operating  against  Lee's 
rear  and  "determined  at  once  to  move  on  the  main  line  from 
Frederick  to  Harrisburg,  extending  his  wings  as  far  as  com 
patible  with  ready  concentration,  in  order  to  force  Lee  to  battle 
before  he  could  cross  the  Susquehanna,"*  but,  at  the  same  time, 
covering  Baltimore  and  Washington.  To  fulfil  these  condi 
tions  he  selected  the  line  Emmitsburg-Hanover  for  the  front 
of  his  army.  Westminster  was  to  be  his  base.J  Buford's 
division  of  cavalry  was  ordered  to  cover  the  left  of  the  army, 
Gregg's  the  right,  and  Kilpatrick's  was  put  in  front. 

At  this  time  Lee  had  no  knowledge  concerning  the  position 
of  the*  Federal  army.  Stuart,  instead  of  being  between  the 
Confederate  army  and  the  Federals,  was  away  beyond  the  Fed- 


*Hunt. 

fAlexander. 

^Fiebeger. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  361 

eral  columns  with  three  of  his  brigades.  Longstreet  and  Hill 
had  been  halted  in  the  neighborhood  of  Chambersburg  to 
await  tidings  from  Stuart;  but  no  tidings  had  come.  So  Lee 
was  under  the  belief  that  the  Federal  army  was  still  south  of 
the  Potomac,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th  he  ordered 
Longstreet  and  Hill  to  join  Ewell  at  Harrisburg.  That  night, 
however,  one  of  Longstreet's  spies — called  a  "scout"  for  the 
sake  of  euphony — brought  in  the  startling  news  that  the 
Federal  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac  and  was  at  Frederick, 
and  that  Hooker  had  been  replaced  by  Meade.* 

(190)  A  speedy  concentration  of  the  Confederate  army  was 
now  imperative.  It  must  hold  Meade  east  of  the  mountains,  and 
keep  him  away  from  its  line  of  retreat  by  way  of  the  Valley. 
To  this  end  "Lee's  plan  had  long  been  formed  to  concentrate 
his  army  somewhere  between  Cashtown  and  Gettysburg,  in  a 
strong  position  where  it  would  threaten  at  once  Washington, 
Baltimore,  and  Philadelphia.  The  enemy,  he  hoped,  would. then 
be  forced  to  attack  him."t  "Before  dawn  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th  orders  were  dispatched  requiring  the  immediate  junc- 


*In  a  volume  called  Stuart's  Cavalry  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign, 
lately  published  by  Colonel  John  S.  Mosby,  the  following  letter  appears, 
which  claims  to  have  been  copied  from  General  Lee's  letter-book : 

"From  memory — sketch  of  letter. 
Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 

Chambersburg,  June  28th,  1863,  7.30  A.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  R.  S.  Ewell, 
Commanding  Corps. 

"General :  I  wrote  you  last  night,  stating  that  General  Hooker  was 
reported  to  have  crossed  the  Potomac  and  is  advancing  by  way  of 
Middletown,  the  head  of  his  column  being  at  that  point  in  Frederick 
county.  I  directed  you  in  that  letter  to  move  your  forces  to  this  point. 
If  you  have  not  already  progressed  on  the  road,  or  if  you  have  no  good 
reason  against  it,  I  desire  you  to  move  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg, 
via  Heidlersburg,  where  you  will  have  turnpike  most  of  the  way,  and 
you  can  thus  join  your  other  divisions  (Johnson's  and  Rodes's)  to 
Early's,  which  is  east  of  the  mountain  (at  York). 

"I  think  it  preferable  to  keep  the  east  side  of  the  mountains.  When 
you  come  to  Heidlersburg  you  can  either  move  directly  on  Gettysburg 
or  turn  down  to  Cashtown.  Your  trains  and  heavy  artillery  you  can 
send,  if  you  think  proper,  on  the  road  to  Chambersburg.  But  if  the 
roads  which  your  troops  take  are  good,  they  had  better  follow  you. 

"Official,  C.  S.  Venable,  R.  E.  LEE, 

"Maj.  and  A.  D.  C.  General." 

It  would  appear  from  this  letter  that  General  Lee  had  received  re 
ports  of  Hooker's  passage  of  the  Potomac,  and  had  sent  a  letter  on 
the  night  of  July  27  to  Ewell  directing  him  to  rejoin  the  main  army 
with  his  corps.  This  view  is  contrary  to  all  accounts  heretofore  pub 
lished  of  the  Campaign  of  Gettysburg,  and  contrary  to  General  Lee's 
official  reports. 

fAlexander. 


362  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

tion  of  the  army"  at  Cashtown.*  On  the  29th  the  two  hostile 
armies  drew  nearer  together. 

Never  did  Lee  so  much  need  the  "eyes  of  his  army,"  which 
were  now  wandering  on  a  fool's  errand.  Without  his  cavalry 
his  army  was  groping  in  the  dark.  He  was  in  the  enemy's 
country  and  could  get  no  information  from  the  people.  He  did 
not  know  where  Meade's  army  was.  All  he  could  hope  to  do 
was  to  concentrate  his  forces  and  be  ready  for  a  blow  on  any 
side. 

Stuart,  by  some  misunderstanding,  instead  of  marching  his 
squadrons  on  the  right  of  the  main  army  for  the  purpose  of 
screening  its  columns  and  keeping  his  chief  informed  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  was  making  a  raid  round  the  Union 
army.  (189)  He  left  two  brigades  [Robertson  and  Jones]  to 
guard  the  passes  of  the  B]ue  Ridge  Mountains,  and  on  the 
night  of  the  24th  of  June,  with  three  brigades  [Fitzhugh  Lee, 
Hampton,  and  W.  H.  F'.  Lee],  started  upon  his  raid.  He  ex 
pected  to  complete  the  circuit  and  rejoin  Lee  in  Maryland, 
but  the  movements  of  the  Union  army  forced  him  so  far  east 
that  he  was  obliged  to  ford  the  Potomac  within  twenty  miles 
of  Washington,  on  the  night  of  the  27th.  The  next  morning, 
learning  that  the  Union  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  he 
marched  northward  to  Rockville,  where  he  captured  a  wagon- 
train.  He  pushed  on  through  Westminster,  where  he  had  an 
action  with  a  Delaware  squadron,  to  L^nion  Mills,  where  he 
camped  the  night  of  the '29th.  During  the  night  he  learned 
that  the  Federal  army  was  still  between  him  and  Lee,  and  that 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry  was  at  Littlestown.  So  he  moved  across 
country  on  the  30th  to  Hanover,  where  his  leading  brigade  en 
countered  Kilpatrick  passing  through  the  town ;  he  attacked 
Kilpatrick  and  was  repulsed. 

"Stuart's  men  and  horses  were  now  nearly  worn  out"  and  he 
was  encumbered  with  the  captured  wagon-train.  He  was  in 
the  enemy's  country,  and  his  case  was  growing  perilous.  "He 
made  a  night  march  for  York  only  to  learn  that  Early  had  left 
the  day  before."f  He  pushed  on  to  Carlisle,  there  to  learn  that 
Early  had  gone,  and  that  the  place  was  held  by  a  Pennsylvania 
militia  force.  He  fired  a  few  shells  into  the  town  and  burned 
the  government  barracks.  That  night  [July  1]  he  learned  that 
Lee's  army  was  concentrating  at  Getty sburg,  and  he  set  out  for 


*Long. 
tHunt. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  363 

that  place  next  morning.  Thus  ended  this  useless  and  fatal 
raid,  which  captured  a  few  hundred  prisoners  and  a  wagon- 
train,  but  probably  lost  a  victory  'for  Lee's  army. 

The  two  cavalry  brigades  left  by  Stuart  to  cover  the  flank  of 
the  army  had,  by  some  misunderstanding,  remained  in  Vir 
ginia  ;  Imboden's  brigade  had  tarried  on  the  way  to  destroy  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal ;  and  Jenkins's  brigade  was  with 
Ewell's  corps.  So  Lee  had  no  cavalry  with  his  main  army.* 

(191)  On  the  30th  of  June  the  Federal  troops  were  dis 
posed  as  follows  :  Buf ord's  cavalry  division  was  at  Gettysburg ; 
the  First  Corps  [Reynolds]  was  at  Marsh  Run;  the  Third 
[Sickles]  at  Bridgeport;  the  Twelfth  [Slocum]  at  Littlestown; 
the  Eleventh  [Howard]  at  Emmitsburg,  behind  the  First. 
These  troops  with  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division  at  Hanover 
composed  the  first  line.  In  the  second  line  were  the  Second 
Corps  [Hancock]  at  Uniontown;  the  Fifth  [Sykes]  at  Union 
Mills;  and  the  Sixth  [Sedgwick]  at  Manchester.  Gregg's 
cavalry  division  was  covering  the  rear  at  Westminster. 

On  the  same  day  Lee's  army  was  thus  situated :  two  of 
Ewell's  divisions  were  at  Heidlersburg  and  the  third  was  at 
Greenwood;  two  of  Longstreet's  were  at  Fayetteville,  while 
Pickett's  division  was  back  at  Chambersburg  guarding  the 
trains;  Hill's  corps  had  reached  Cashtown  and  Mummasburg, 
except  Anderson's  division,  which  was  back  at  the  mountain 
pass  on  the  Chambersburg  Road. 

By  rapid  movements  Meade  had  placed  his  corps  between 
Lee's  army  and  the  cities  of  Washington  and  Baltimore,  and 
his  flank-position  so  menaced  Lee's  line  of  retreat  as  effectually 
to  have  stopped  his  advance  toward  the  Susquehanna.  Meade 
now  "proposed  to  rest  and  supply  his  army,  and  find  out  more 
definitely  the  position  and  the  intentions  of  his  adversary  be 
fore  assuming  the  offensive.  This  day  he  had  his  engineers 
examine  a  position  along  Pipe  Creek  for  a  defensive  field  of 
battle;  he  notified  his  corps-commanders  that  circumstances 
might  lead  him  to  take  up  this  position,  and  outlined  their 
marches  to  it.  He  added,  however,  'developments  may  cause 
the  commanding-general  to  assume  the  offensive  from  his  pres 
ent  position.'  "f  Meade,  like  Lee,  hoped  to  fight  on  the  de 
fensive.* 

Heth,  whose  division  of  Hill's  corps  was  at  Cashtown, 
learned  that  there  was  a  supply  of  shoes  at  Gettysburg,  and 


^Alexander. 
fFiebeger. 


364  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

sent  Pettigrew's  brigade  forward  on  the  30th  of  June  to  take 
possession  of  them.*  This  apparently  unimportant  circum 
stance  brought  on  the  decisive  battle  of  the  Civil  War. 

On  approaching  the  place  Pettigrew  discovered  what  he 
supposed  to  be  a  large  Federal  force  moving  on  the  town,  and 
he  promptly  returned  to  Cashtown.  The  force  discovered  by 
Pettigrew  was  Buford's  cavalry  division  advancing  from  Fair- 
field.  "Buford  learning  that  Hill  and  Longstreet  were  in  the 
direction  of  Chambersburg,  and  Ewell  in  the  direction  of  Car 
lisle  and  York,  saw  the  importance  of  Gettysburg  as  a  strategic 
center,  and  made  his  dispositions  to  hold  it  if  possible.  He  es 
tablished  his"  outposts  "to  the  west  and  north 'of  the  town,  and 
sent  patrols  out  in  all  directions  to  get  information.  He  also 
informed  Generals  Meade  and  Reynolds  of  what  he  had 
learned."t 

The  town  of  Gettysburg  lies  in  a  small  valley  surrounded  by 
low  hills.  Its  strategic  importance  at  this  time  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  great  roads  diverged  from  it  not  only  through  the 
mountain  passes  to  Lee's  main  line  of  retreat,  but  southward 
along  the  east  side  of  the  mountains  toward  the  Potomac, 
northward  and  eastward  toward  Harrisburg  and  all  points  of 
the  Susquehanna,  and  southeastward  to  Baltimore  and  Wash 
ington.  In  case  of  victory  Lee  had  the  choice  of  advancing 
against  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  or  Washing 
ton,  according  to  circumstances ;  in  case  of  defeat  he  had  a  line 
of  retreat  through  mountain  passes — the  easiest  kind  of  line 
to  defend. 

(192)  Looking  westward  from  Gettysburg  the  horizon  ten 
miles  away  is  bounded  by  the  South  Mountain  range.  Just 
west  of  the  town,  a  half-mile  from  it,  is  a  somewhat  elevated 
ridge,  called  Seminary  Ridge  from  the  Lutheran  Seminary 
standing  upon  it.  This  ridge  begins  at  a  commanding  knoll 
nearly  a  mile  and  a  half  north  of  the  Seminary,  called  Oak  Hill 
on  account  of  the  thick  grove  of  oaks  that  covered  it.  The 
ridge  extends  southward  from  Oak  Hill,  and  was  covered 
throughout  its  whole  length  with  open  woods.  The  ground 
slopes  to  the  west  from  Seminary  Ridge,  and,  rising  again, 
forms  another  nearly  parallel  ridge  about  500  yards  from  the 
first.  This  ridge  is  wider,  smoother,  and  lower  than  Seminary 

*This  was  related  to  the  lecturer  by  General  Harry  Heth  in  the 
summer  of  1892.  It  is  also  mentioned  by  General  Alexander  and  other 
historians. 

fFiebeger. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  365 

Ridge.  The  western  ridge,  like  Seminary  Ridge,  begins  at 
Oak  Hill,  which  has  a  clear  view  of  both  ridges  and  the  shallow 
valley  between  them. 

West  of  the  second  ridge  Willoughby  Run  flows  south  to 
Marsh  Creek.  The  Chambersburg  Pike  and  the  Hagerstown 
Road  cross  the  run  about  a  mile  apart,  and,  passing  on  over  the 
ridges,  unite  at  the  end  of  one  of  the  streets  at  the  western  edge 
of  Gettysburg.  Parallel  to  the  Chambersburg  Pike  and  200 
yards  north  of  it,  was  an  unfinished  railway,  crossing  the 
ridges  and  valleys  by  cuts  and  fills.  Willoughby  Run  was 
bordered  by  woods,  a  patch  of  which,  known  as  McPherson's 
Woods,  just  south  of  Chambersburg  Pike,  reached  back  to 
the  top  of  the  western  ridge.  Six  or  eight  hundred  yards  west 
of  the  creek  there  was  another  long  stretch  of  woods. 

Directly  north  of  the  town,  and  traversed  by  Rock  Creek, 
the  country  is  comparatively  flat  and  open.  About  a  half- 
mile  directly  south  of  the  town  is  Cemetery  Hill,  rising  eighty 
feet  above  the  level  of  the  valley  below.  By  a  lower  ridge, 
which  curves  southward  and  then  northward,  this  hill  is 
connected  with  Gulp's  Hill,  a  rocky,  wooded  knoll  half-a-mile 
farther  east,  whose  base,  on  its  eastern  and  northeastern  sides, 
is  washed  by  Rock  Creek.  Gulp's  Hill  reaches  southward 
nearly  a  half-mile,  ending  in  low  ground  near  Spangler's 
Spring.  Cemetery  Hill  is  at  the  junction  of  the  Baltimore  Pike 
with  the  Taneytown  and  Emmitsburg  Roads.  At  the  time  of 
the  battle  Rock  Creek  could  be  forded  at  only  a  few  places.* 
The  country  was  dotted  with  farms  connected  by  cross  roads 
and  cut  up  and  separated  by  fences  and  stone  walls.  It  was 
upon  the  ground  to  the  west  and  north  of  the  town  that  the 
fighting  took  place  on  the  1st  of  July,  1863 — the  first  of  the 
three  days  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

(191)  At  5  a.  m.  on  the  1st  of  July,  A.  P.  Hill  with  his 
leading  two  divisions  [Heth  and  Pender],  and  his  artillery, 
started  from  Cashtown  to  Gettysburg,  eight  miles  distant. 
(193).  Buford  was  expecting  him.  At  eight  o'clock  the  Union 
scouts  reported  the  Confederate  advance,  and  Buford  formed 
his  line  of  dismounted  troopers  behind  Willoughby  Run,  across 
the  Chambersburg  Pike,  with  two  sections  of  his  artillery  in 
the  Pike  and  the  third  section  on  the  left  of  the  line. 

Heth's  Confederate  division  was  in  advance,  and  at  about 
ten  o'clock  it  came  forward  against  Buford's  line  with  two 


*Alexander. 


366  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

brigades  deployed  and  two  in  the  second  line.  Fender's  divi 
sion  was  close  behind.  Buford's  line,  though  greatly  outnum 
bered  in  cannon  and  small  arms,  stood  its  ground  and  kept  the 
Confederates  back,  (191)  while  Reynolds  was  making  all 
haste  to  reach  the  field  with  the  First  Corps  [his  own]  and  the 
Eleventh  [  Howard  ] . 

( 194)  About  half  after  ten  Reynolds  arrived  on  the  ground 
and  relieved  the  cavalry  with  Wadsworth's  division,  which  he 
deployed  southward  from  the  railway  cut  along  the  ridge.  The 
cavalry  then  took  post  on  the  flanks  of  the  line.  Reynolds's 
right  had  hardly  deployed  at  the  railway  cut  when  it  was  en 
veloped  by  the  Confederate  left  and  driven  back  to  Seminary 
Ridge.  (195)  Thereupon  Colonel  Fowler  faced  three  regi 
ments  to  the  right  and  charged  the  Confederate  brigade  which 
had  got  the  cut,  and  drove  it  from  the  field  with  such  punish 
ment  that  it  was  of  no  "further  effective  service  that  day/'* 

(194)  In  the  meantime  Archer's  Confederate  brigade  had 
entered  McPherson's  Woods,  but  the  left  of  Reynold's's  line 
had  charged  into  the  woods  about  the  same  time.  It  engaged 
the  Confederates,  enveloped  their  right  flank,  captured  Archer 
and  a  large  number  of  his  men,  and  drove  the  rest  back  across 
Willoughby  Run. 

(196)  Just  as  this  part  of  the  battle  began  General  Reynolds 
was  shot  through  the  head  and  instantly  killed  at  the  edge  of 
the  wood,  and  Doubleday  fell  into  command  for  the  time. 
Doubleday  reformed  the  Union  line  on  the  ridge,  and  Heth  set 
about  reorganizing  his  front  line  and  preparing  to  renew  the 
attack  with  his  other  two  brigades.  So  there  was  a  lull  in  the 
combat. 

About  eleven  o'clock  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  First 
Corps  arrived  with  four  more  batteries  of  artillery.  The  guns 
and  one  of  the  divisions  were  placed  in  the  line,  which  was 
prolonged  to  the  right ;  the  other  division  [Robinson]  was 
placed  in  reserve  at  the  Seminary. 

At  about  noon  Howard  arrived  ahead  of  his  corps  and  as 
sumed  command  of  the  Union  forces  by  virtue  of  his  rank. 
The  Eleventh  Corps  began  to  arrive  at  about  one  o'clock,  and 
its  temporary  commander,  General  Carl  Schurz,  was  ordered 
to  prolong  the  line  of  the  First  Corps  along  'Seminary  Ridge 
with  two  of  his  divisions,  and  to  post  his  other  division  as  a 
general  reserve  at  Cemetery  Hill.  Before  these  dispositions 

*Hunt. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  367 

could  be  made  Bu ford's  cavalry  brought  in  word  that  Ewell's 
Confederate  corps  was  advancing  from  the  direction  of  Heid- 
lersburg  straight  against  the  right  of  the  Union  position. 
Thereupon  Howard  directed  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  change 
front  to  the  right  in  order  to  meet  Ewell,  and  called  on  Sickles 
with  the  Third  Corps  at  Emmitsburg,  ten  miles  distant,  and 
Slocum  with  the  Twelfth  Corps  at  Two  Taverns,  five  miles 
distant,  for  aid.  These  generals  marched  promptly  to  his 
assistance. 

Ewell's  leading  two  divisions  were  soon  at  hand.  Ewell  had 
been  instructed  by  Lee  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement,  if  the 
enemy  was  in  force  at  Gettysburg,  until  the  rest  of  the  Con 
federate  army  was  up.  Ewell  deployed  his  line  facing  south, 
from  the  Hunterstown  Road  on  his  left  to  the  Mummasburg 
Road  on  his  right,  about  two  miles  and  a  half.  He 
placed  a  battalion  of  artillery  on  Oak  Hill,  which  opened  fire 
on  both  wings  of  the  Federal  line,  enfilading  the  left  wing. 
The  artillery  fire  forced  the  right  of  this  wing  back  to 
Seminary  Ridge.  The  reserve  of  the  First  Corps  now  rein 
forced  this  part  of  the  Union  line,  one  brigade  facing  west  and 
the  other  north.*  The  action  grew  fierce  at  this  angle,  and 
soon  extended  to  the  right  of  the  Union  line,  while  the  left 
wing  was  desperately  struggling  with  Hill's  corps.  With  over 
whelming  numbers  Ewell  assailed  the  right  flank  and  rear  of 
the  Union  right;  then  the  whole  left  of  the  Confederate  line 
advanced,  and  after  a  hard  fight,  succeeded  in  driving  the  entire 
Eleventh  Corps  back.  (197)  Schurz  received  reinforcements 
from  the  general  reserve,  and  tried  to  rally  his  troops  and  cover 
the  town;  but  the  Confederate  force  was  overpowering  in 
numbers,  and  it  drove  the  Union  right  wing  back  to  Cemetery 
Hill,  capturing  some  5,000  prisoners.  It  was  now  about  three 
o'clock.f 

The  retreat  of  the  Federal  right  wing  uncovered  the  right 
flank  of  the  left  wing,  and  made  its  position  untenable.  This 
wing  had  been  contending  for  several  hours  with  greatly 
superior  numbers,  its  left  flank  had  been  enveloped,  and  it  had 
been  forced  back  to  Seminary  Ridge.  Seeing  his  corps  heavily 
pressed  and  its  right  now  uncovered  Doubleday  gave  the  order 


*It  was  here  that  General  Paul,  who  commanded  one  of  the 
brigades  of  the  First  Corps,  received  a  shot  that  put  out  both  of  his 
eyes. 

fAlexander. 


368  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

to  fall  back  to  Cemetery  Hill.  The  withdrawal  was  made  in 
comparatively  good  order. 

(198)  Steinwehr's  division  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  in 
position  on  Cemetery  Hill,  which  now  became  the  rallying 
point  for  the  Union  troops.  The  division  was  posted  behind 
stone  walls  on  the  slopes,  and  its  skirmishers  occupied  the 
houses  in  front  of  the  line.  As  the  retreating  troops  arrived 
they  were  placed  in  position — the  rest  of  the  Eleventh  Corps 
on  the  right  of  Steinwehr's,  and  the  bulk  of  the  First  on  his 
left.  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First  was,  however,  posted 
on  Gulp's  Hill. 

Hancock,  whose  presence  was  always  an  inspiration  to  the 
troops  that  knew  him,  had  arrived  with  orders  from  Meade, 
who  had  been  apprised  of  Reynolds's  death,  to  take  command 
on  the  ground.  With  the  assistance  of  Howard,  and  Warren, 
the  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  selected  a 
strong  position  and  assigned  the  troops  to  it  as  they  arrived. 

"Soon  after  two  o'clock  Lee  had  arrived  on  Seminary  Ridge, 
and  seen  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  and  their  retreat  o.ver  Ceme 
tery  Hill."  He  immediately  sent  word  to  Ewell,  who  had 
stopped  the  pursuit,  to  press  the  fugitives  and  take  Cemetery 
Hill  "if  possible."  Again  a  fatal  qualifying  clause  in  the  order 
was  to  defeat  the  purpose  of  the  commanding  general  of  an 
army.  General  Ewell  did  not  consider  it  "possible."  He  had 
sent  away  two  of  his  brigades  to  meet  a  column  of  Federals  re 
ported  to  be  advancing  on  the  Hanover  Road ;  and  one  of  his 
divisions  [Johnson]  had  not  yet  come  up.  He  decided  to 
await  the  arrival  of  this  division.  It  arrived  before  six  o'clock ; 
still  Ewell  made  no  attack,  though  the  sun  did  not  go  down 
until  7.30,  and  there  was  a  full  moon.  Instead  of  attacking  he 
rode  to  General  Lee  and  persuaded  him  to  allow  Johnson's 
division  to  seize  Gulp's  Hill.  About  midnight  the  division 
moved  around  the  base  of  Gulp's  Hill,  "and  a  reconnoitering 
party  ascended,  but  found  the  enemy  [Wadsworth's  division] 
in  possession."* 

Johnson's  division  was  not  withdrawn  from  the  isolated 
position  it  had  reached  at  the  base  of  Gulp's  Hill  until  the  end 
of  the  battle,  which  General  Alexander  considers  one  of  the 
most  serious  mistakes  made  by  the  Confederates.  "It  was  far 
too  weak,"  he  says,  "to  attack  the  strong  position  of  the  enemy 


*Alexander. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  369 

on  Gulp's  Hill,  and  its  communication  with  the  rest  of  the  army 
was  long,  roundabout,  and  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view.  But 
the  division  was  alloivcd  to  remain  until  the  end  of  the  battle, 
and,  as  long  as  it  remained  absent,  the  task  before  the  re 
mainder  of  the  army  was  beyond  its  strength."* 

Narrating  the  events  of  this  day,  General  Long  in  his 
Memoirs  of  Lee  says :  "While  Lee  and  his  staff  were  ascending 
South  Mountain,"  on  their  way  from  Chamber sburg  to  Cash- 
town,  "firing  was  heard  from  the  direction  of  Gettysburg. 
This  caused  Lee  some  little  uneasiness.  The  unfortunate  ab 
sence  of  the  cavalry  prevented  him  from  knowing  the  position 
and  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  it  was  impossible  to  estimate 
the  true  condition  of  affairs  in  his  front.  He  was  at  first  per 
suaded  that  the  firing  indicated  a  cavalry  affair  of  minor  im 
portance;  but  by  the  time  Cashtown  was  reached  the  sound 
had  become  heavy  and  continuous,  and  indicated  a  severe  en 
gagement.  .  .  .  In  a  short  time  ...  his  suspense  was 
relieved  by  a  message  from  A.  P.  Hill,  who  reported  that  he 
was  engaged  with  two  corps  of  the  enemy,  and  requested  re 
inforcements.  Anderson's  division,  which  had  just  reached 
Cashtown,  was  at  once  pushed  forward  to  his  support,  and 
General  Lee  with  his  staff  quickly  followed."  Near  the  close 
of  the  day's  battle  Anderson's  division  reached  the  field. 

Longstreet  joined  Lee  on  Seminary  Ridge  before  the  battle 
was  over,  but  his  corps  was  still  far  behind.  It  had  been  cut 
off  at  Greenwood,  seventeen  miles  from  Gettysburg,  by  John 
son's  division  [Ewell's  Corps],  which  crossed  the  road  ahead  of 
it.  This  division  with  the  trains  and  reserve  artillery  of  its 
corps  was  about  fourteen  miles  long,  and  delayed  Longstreet's 
two  divisions  [Hood  and  McLaws]  four  hours.  They  did  not 
reach  their  bivouac,  four  miles  from  the  battle-field,  until  near 
midnight.  Pickett's  division  was  still  back  at  Chambersburg. 

After  discussing  the  situation  with  Longstreet  General  Lee 
sent  Colonel  Long  to  reconnoiter  the  Federal  position  on 
Cemetery  Hill.  Long  appears  to  have  concluded  with  Ewell 
that  the  position  was  formidable, f  especially  as  it  was  known 
that  the  Federals  had  already  received  reinforcements.  A  part 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps  [Slocum]  had  arrived,  and  the  Third  was 
coming  up.  On  receiving  Long's  report,  therefore,  Lee  con 
sidered  the  "worn-out  condition  of  his  men,  and  the  strength  of 

*The  italics  are  General  Alexander's. 
tHunt. 


370  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  Federal  position,  and  decided  to  wait  until  morning  be 
fore  attempting  to  follow  up  the  victory  gained  by  the  corps 
of  Hill  and  Ewell.  He  turned  to  Longstreet  and  Hill,  and 
said,  'Gentlemen,  we  will  attack  the  enemy  in  the  morning  as 
early  as  practicable.'  "* 

*Long. 


LECTURE  XVIII. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG. 
SECOND  AND  THIRD  DAYS. 

SECOND  DAY. 

(192)  The  field  of  the  second  and  third  days  of  battle  at 
Gettysburg  lies  south  of  the  town  between  Willoughby  Run 
and  Rock  Creek.  The  Union  army  occupied  a  defensive  posi 
tion  of  which  Gulp's  Hill,  Cemetery  Hill,  and  the  two  Round 
Tops  were  the  key-points.  The  possession  of  any  one  of  these 
points  by  the  Confederates  would  have  rendered  the  position 
untenable. 

The  .line,  as  finally  occupied,  was  about  four  miles  long,  and 
had  the  general  shape  of  a  hugh  fish-hook,  which,  with  its  bent 
part  at  Cemetery  Hill,  had  its  barb  at  Gulp's  Hill,  its  point  at 
the  knoll  about  600  yards  farther  south,  its  shank  along  Ceme 
tery  Ridge,  and  its  eye  at  Round  Top.  Its  convex  form  gave  it 
the  advantage  of  interior  lines  of  operation.  While  this  posi 
tion  presented  a  salient  order  of  battle,  ordinarily  the  weakest 
defensive  order  of  battle,  it  has  been  selected  by  Hamley  to 
illustrate  the  single  exceptional  case  in  which  the  salient  posi 
tion  is  a  strong  one.  Here  the  apex  of  the  line  rested  on 
Cemetery  Hill,  which  formed  a  high  and  strong  part  of  the 
position,  and,  Hamley  says,  "acted  as  a  traverse  or  great  mound 
protecting  the  wings  from  enfilade."*  In  this  statement,  how 
ever,  Hamley  is  not  wholly  right.  The  northern  face  of  the 
salient  was  shielded  by  the  hill,  but  the  western  face,  "Extend 
ing  south  from  the  bend  of  Cemetery  Hill  toward  Little  Round 
Top,  was  subject  to  enfilade  fire  from  the  town  and  its  flanks 
and  suburbs."f 

From  Cemetery  Hill  the  ridge  of  the  same  name,  stretching 
almost  due  south,  decreases  in  height,  and  its  western  face, 
cleared  of  timber,  descends  in  slopes  almost  as  smooth  and 
gentle  as  the  glacis  of  a  fortress.  At  a  point  nearly  a  mile 
from  the  cemetery  the  crest  of  the  ridge  descends  almost  to  the 
level  of  the  valley  west  of  it ;  from  this  point  it  rises  abruptly, 
taking  in  the  peak  of  Little  Round  Top  and  ending  at  Round 


*Hamley's  Operations  of  War. 
tAlexander. 

371 


372  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Top,  whose  summit  "is  not  less  than  210  feet  above  Gettys 
burg."*  The  summit  of  Little  Round  Top  is  500  yards  north 
of  that  of  Round  Top  and  105  feet  lower.  These  two  knolls, 
separated  by  a  narrow  depression,  look  like  great  heaps  of 
boulders  covered  with  scrubby  bushes  and  trees  that  spring 
out  of  every  crack  and  hole.  The  knolls  command  all  the  coun 
try  around  about,  and  from  a  distance  appear  "inaccessible-  to 
man."  At  the  base  of  their  steep  western  slopes  flows  a  small 
marshy  stream,  Plum  Run,  whose  bed  is  more  than  300  feet 
below  the  summit  of  Round  Top.  Beyond  this  stream,  500 
yards  due  west  of  little  Round  Top,  rises  another  hill  not  so 
high  but  just  as  wild  and  steep.  It  has  taken  the  name  of 
Devil's  Den  from  one  of  its  chasms,  which  had  received  that 
impious  name  from  the  country  folk  thereabout. 

The  face  of  the  concave  ridge  leading  from  Cemetery  Hill  to 
Culp's  Hill  is  rather  steep  and  rocky,  and  Gulp's  Hill,  like 
Round  Top,  is  covered  with  boulders  and  tangled  woods  and 
underbrush  down  to  the  very  edge  of  Rock  Creek,  a  hundred 
and  fifty  feet  below  its  summit.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the 
stream,  a  mile  from  Culp's  Hill,  is  another  wooded  height 
known  as  Wolf  Hill.  The  small  knoll  at  the  point  of  the  fish 
hook  is  considerably  lower  than  Culp's  Hill;  its  sides  are  cov 
ered  with  woods. 

From  Cemetery  Hill  another  low  ridge,  along  which  runs 
the  Emmitsburg  Road,  reaches  toward  the  southwest,  becom 
ing  lower  and  flatter  until,  merging  with  Seminary  Ridge,  it 
joins  the  foot  of  the  slope  from  Devil's  Den  at  the  Peach 
Orchard,  just  one  mile  west  of  the  lowest  part  of  Cemetery 
Ridge.  The  Peach  Orchard  is  higher  than  this  part  of  Ceme 
tery  Ridge. 

The  space  between  Willoughby  Run  and  Rock  Creek  was  in 
the  main  cleared  and  under  cultivation  at  the  time  of  the  battle, 
but  there  were  still  many  irregular  patches  of  wood,  generally 
upon  rocky  ground  or  along  the  swampy  margins  of  the  creeks. 
Highways  and  by-roads  were  plentiful,  and  fences,  and  stone 
walls,  and  farm  houses. 

OPERATIONS. 

General  Meade  had  beforehand  no  knowledge  of  the  topog 
raphy  of  the  country  about  Gettysburg,  and  had  not  thought  of 

*Comte  de  Paris. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  373 

engaging  in  a  battle  there.  Hancock,  however,  after  examin 
ing  the  position  just  described,  was  greatly  impressed  with  its 
defensive  strength.  He  rode  back  to  M  cade's  headquarters 
and  recommended  that  the  army  occupy  the  position.  Meade 
approved  the  recommendations  and  issued  the  necessary  orders. 

(199)  Meade  reached  the  field  about  one  o'clock  at 
night,  and  at  seven  o'clock  a.  m.  on  the  2nd  he  had  at  hand  the 
following  troops:  the  First,  Second,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth 
Corps,  two-thirds  of  the  Third,  and  two-thirds  of  the  Fifth ;  by 
nine  o'clock  the  rest  of  the  Third  had  arrived,  and  by  twelve 
o'clock  the  rest  of  the  Fifth.  At  10.30  a.  m.  the  artillery  re 
serve  [Hunt]  and  its  large  ammunition  trains  arrived  from 
Taneytown.  At  two  o'clock  the  head  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
reached  the  ground.  This  corps  had  made  a  continuous  march 
of  thirty-four  miles  from  Manchester  and  was  well-nigh 
exhausted.* 

"Meade  spent  the  morning  looking  over  the  field, "f  and  as 
signing  his  troops  to  position.  Early  in  the  day  the  Confed 
erates  were  seen  deploying  beyond  Gulp's  Hill,  and  Meade 
ordered  Slocum,  who  commanded  the  right  wing,  to  attack  them ; 
but  having  received  a  report  from  Slocum  that  the  ground 
was  very  unfavorable,  he  withdrew  the  order. J 

The  First  and  the  Eleventh  Corps  were  left  in  the  positions 
they  had  taken  the  afternoon  before, — the  Eleventh  at  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  with  two  divisions  of  the  First  on  its  left,  and  Wads- 
worth's  division  at  Gulp's  Hill.  The  other  corps  were  assigned 
places  as  they  came  up — the  Twelfth  to  the  right  of  Wads- 
worth's  division;  the  Second  to  the  left  of  the  Eleventh  and 
First  on  Cemetery  Ridge.  The  Third,  most  of  which  had  ar 
rived  the  evening  before,  was  directed  to  prolong  the  line  to  the 
Round  Top  on  the  left.  Sickles,  however,  finding  the  part  of 
the  line  assigned  to  him,  just  north  of  Little  Round  Top,  lower 
than  the  ground  a  mile  in  front  of  it  at  the  Peach  Orchard, 
asked  leave  to  move  his  corps  forward  to  the  higher  position. 
General  Hunt  was  sent  to  examine  the  forward  position.  While 
the  examination  was  in  progress  Sickles  sent  out  some  skir 
mishers  to  reconnoiter  the  woods  to  the  west  of  the  Peach 
Orchard.  The  woods  were  found  to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
and  three  of  his  columns  were  reported  to  be  moving  to  the 
left.  On  receiving  this*  information  Sickles,  without  awaiting 


*Fiebeger.     Doubleday. 

fFiebeger. 

jSwinton. 


374  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  answer  to  his  request  for  permission  to  move  his  line  for 
ward,  did  so  on  his  own  responsibility.  He  placed  Humphreys's 
division  along  the  Emmitsburg  Road  with  its  left  at  the  Peach 
Orchard,  and  Birney's  division  on  the  ridge  from  Devil's  Den 
to  the  Orchard.  He  placed  no  troops  on  the  Round  Tops. 

The  Fifth  Corps  was  held  in  reserve  near  the  point  where 
Rock  Creek  crossed  the  Baltimore  Pike.  The  artillery  reserve 
and  the  ammunition  trains  were  parked  in  a  central  position 
from  which  roads  radiated  to  the  various  sections  of  the  line. 
Buford's  cavalry  division  had  been  posted  near  Round  Top  to 
guard  the  left  flank,  but  it  was  ordered  on  the  morning  of  the 
2nd  to  Westminster  to  escort  the  trains,  and  was  not  replaced 
by  Gregg's  division  "as  General  Mead  had  understood."*  The 
left  of  the  line  was  thus  left  uncovered.  The  cavalry  divisions 
of  Gregg  and  Kilpatrick  "were  well  out  on  the  right  flank,  from 
which,  after  a  brush  with  Stuart  on  the  evening  of  the  2nd, 
Kilpatrick  was  sent  next  morning  [the  3rd]  to  replace 
Buford."f 

"In  the  conversation  that  succeeded"  his  announcement  to 
Longstreet  and  Hill  on  the  evening  of  July  1,  that  he  would 
attack  the  Federal  position  next  morning,  Lee  "directed  them  to 
make  the  necessary  preparations  and  be  ready  for  prompt  ac 
tion.  "J  The  corps  of  Ewell  and  Hill  were  on  the  field  and 
Longstreet's  corps,  except  Pickett's  division  and  one  brigade, 
would  bivouac  only  four  miles  away.  Lee's  purpose  was  to 
attack  the  enemy  early  in  the  morning,  before  the  rest  of  the 
Union  troops  should  reach  the  field. 

Yet  time  was  consumed  in  reconnoitering  the  Union  position 
and  deciding  where  to  attack  it,  and  it  was  11  a.  m.  on  the 
2nd  before  Lee's  order  for  the  attack  was  issued.  "Ander 
son's  division  of  Hill's  corps  was  directed  to  extend  Hill's  line 
upon  Seminary  Ridge  to  the  right,  while  Longstreet  with 
Hood's  and  McLaws's  divisions  should  make  a  flank  march  to 
the  right  and  pass  beyond  the  enemy's  flank,  which  seemed  to 
extend  along  the  Emmitsburg  Road.  Forming  then  at  right 
angles  to  this  road,  the  attack  was  to  sweep  down  the  enemy's 
line  from  their  left,  being  taken  up  successively  by  the  brigades 
of  Anderson's  division  as  they  were  reached.  Swell's  corps, 


*Fiebeger. 

tHunt. 

JLong. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  375 

holding  the  extreme  left,  was  to  attack  on  hearing  Longstreet's 
guns."* 

The  map  here  shown  gives  the  position  of  the  troops  on  each 
side  at  about  half  after  three  in  the  afternoon.  In  the  Confed 
erate  line  Johnson's  division  of  Swell's  corps  was  on  the  east 
side  of  Rock  Creek;  Early's  division  was  between  Rock  Creek 
and  the  town;  and  Rodes's  division  was  in  the  town  with  its 
right  resting  on  Seminary  Ridge.  Then  came  Hill's  corps 
along  this  ridge  with  Fender's  division  at  the  left  and  Ander 
son's  at  the  right,  while  Heth's  division  was  on  the  west  side 
of  Willoughby  Run,  acting  as  the  general  reserve  of  the  whole 
army.  Longstreet's  corps  (except  Pickett's  division  which 
had  not  yet  come  up)  formed  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line, 
with  McLaws's  division  in  front  of  Sickles's  position  at  the 
Peach  Orchard,  and  Hood's  division  on  the  extreme  right. 
The  few  squadrons  of  cavalry  that  were  with  the  army  cov 
ered  its  extreme  left. 

Longstreet's  two  divisions  [Hood  and  McLaws]  had  quitted 
their  bivouacs  at  daybreak,  but  had  halted  on  the  way  and 
lost  time  in  finding  a  route  by  which  to  avoid  being  seen  by  the 
Federal  signal  party  on  Little  Round  Top.  "This  incident  de 
layed  the  opening  of  the  battle  nearly  two  hours" ;  and  there 
had  been  a  further  delay  of  a  half-hour  or  more  to  wait  for 
Law's  brigade,  which  was  still  behind,  to  join  its  division 
[Hood].  So  "it  was  about  3  p.  m.  when  Hood's  division,  in 
the  advance,  crossed  the  Emmitsburg  Road  about  1,000  yards 
south  of  the  Peach  Orchard."* 

In  his  flank  march  Longstreet  had  taken  every  pains  to  con 
ceal  his  columns ;  but  his  movement  had  not  wholly  escaped  the 
notice  of  the  Federals;  it  was  his  columns  that  had  been  seen  by 
the  scouts  sent  forward  by  Sickles  from  the  Peach  Orchard. 
Still  "his  strength  and  position  were  very  imperfectly  known" 
by  the  Federals  "at  the  beginning  of  the  battle."f 

The  artillery,  says  Longstreet,  opened  fire  at  three  o'clock 
against  the  two  sides  of  the  angle  at  the  Peach  Orchard.  But 
"Hood's  lines  were  not  yet  ready."  At  length  Hood  was  "or 
dered  to  bear  down  upon  the  enemy's  left,  but  he  was  not 
prompt,"!  and  it  was  after  four  o'clock  when  he  advanced  to 
the  attack. 

About  this  time  Warren,  the  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of 

*Alexander. 

fFieheger. 

^Longstreet. 


376  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  Potomac,  was  inspecting  the  left  of  the  Union  line,  and 
discovered  that  Little  Round  Top,  the  key  of  the  position,  was 
occupied  only  by  a  small  squad  of  signallers.  He  sent  word  at 
once  to  Meade  and  asked  for  a  division  to  hold  the  point. 
Seeing  the  Fifth  Corps  moving  to  the  front  to  reinforce  Sickles, 
Warren  hurried  to  its  commander  and  got  him  to  detach  two 
brigades  and  a  battery  to  Little  Round  Top.  The  two  bri 
gades  arrived  none  too  soon,  for  the  right  of  Hood's  line  had 
crossed  Plum  Run  and  ascended  the  slopes  of  Round  Top; 
then  it  had  wheeled  to  the  left  and,  crossing  the  depression 
between  the  two  knolls,  was  now  near  the  top  of  Little  Round 
Top.  Here  a  sharp  fight  took  place ;  but  the  Federals  kept  pos 
session  of  the  summit  and  drove  the  Confederates  back  to  the 
foot  of  the  hill. 

Meantime  Meade  had  hurried  reinforcements  to  aid  Sickles; 
but  Hood's  division  was  fighting  alone,  for,  in  the  "successive 
order  of  battle"  adopted  by  the  Confederates,  McLaws's  divi 
sion  was  standing  idle,  impatiently  waiting  for  Longstreet's 
order  to  attack.  Hood  had  been  wounded  and  Law  was  in 
command  of  his  division.  After  nearly  an  hour  of  fierce  com 
bat  Law  got  possession  of  Devil's  Den;  but  he  could  not  gain 
another  inch,  and  took  up  the  defensive  on  the  captured  hill, 
appealing  to  the  troops  on  his  left  for  help.  Two  of  McLaws's 
brigades  [Kershaw  and  Semmes]  then  advanced,  but  the  two 
on  their  left  [Barksdale  and  Wofford]  were  still  held  back 
by  Longstreet,  and  the  whole  of  Anderson's  division  farther  to 
the  left  also  stood  fast. 

Finally  Longstreet  started  the  brigades  of  Barksdale  and 
Wofford  forward.  General  Alexander  says :  "Barksdale's 
brigade  advanced  directly  upon  the  Peach  Orchard.  Wof- 
ford's  inclined  somewhat  to  the  right  and  went  to  the  assist 
ance  of  Kershaw  and  Semmes,  striking  the  flank  of  the  Feder 
als  opposing  them.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  with  severe 
loss  and  followed  across  the  Wheat  Field  and  on  the  slopes 
of  Little  Round  Top.  Barksdale  had  made  an  equal  advance 
upon  our  left.  But  by  this  time  the  reinforcements  which 
Meade  was  hurrying  from  every  part  of  the  Federal  line  began 
to  swarm  around  our  mixed-up  brigades.  Barksdale  was 
killed,  Semmes  mortally  wounded,  and  our  lines  were  slowly 
forced  back.  Another  partial  attack  had  spent  its  energy 
upon  a  task  impossible  for  so  small  a  force." 

After  another  long  delay  three  brigades  of  Anderson's  divi 
sion  moved  forward  and  charged,  in  succession  from  right  to 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  377 

left,  each  driving  the  enemy  before  it  toward  Cemetery  Ridge, 
and  each  in  turn  being  repulsed  and  driven  back.  One  bri 
gade  [Wright]  actually  made  a  lodgment  upon  the  crest,  but, 
failing  to  receive  prompt  support,  was  obliged  to  withdraw. 
Of  Anderson's  other  two  brigades,  Posey's  scarcely  advanced 
a  skirmish  line,  and  Mahone's  was  held  in  reserve ;  as  was, 
also,  Heth's  whole  division.  Thus  the  day's  battle  came  to 
an  end  in  the  right  wing  of  the  Confederate  line.* 

(200)  Sickles's  faulty  salient  at  the  Peach  Orchard  had 
been  crushed  in  and  pushed  back,  but  the  Confederates  had 
not  reached  the  main  front  of  the  Union  position,  nor  envel 
oped  its  flank.  In  all  this  conflict,  from  four  o'clock  till  after 
seven,  only  eleven  brigades  had  taken  part — eight  of  Long- 
street's  corps  and  three  of  Hill's.  Hill  and  Ewell  had  been 
ordered  to  cooperate  with  Longstreet's  battle,  but  they  limited 
their  cooperation  to  an  ineffective  cannonading  of  the  Federal 
intrenchments  in  their  front ;  while  Meade  was  stripping  those 
intrenchments  of  infantry  and  concentrating  it  upon  the  eleven 
Confederate  brigades  engaged.  Twenty  brigades  of  rein 
forcements  were  sent  to  that  part  of  the  Federal  line :  eight 
of  the  Fifth  Corps;  four  of  the  Second;  five  of  the  First;  and 
three  of  the  Twelfth.  Two  other  brigades  of  the  Twelfth 
started  for  the  scene  of  struggle,  but  lost  their  way.  All  of 
the  reinforcements  did  not  become  engaged.f 

Though  Ewell  had  received  orders  to  attack  on  hearing 
Longstreet's  guns,  he  limited  his  attack  to  artillery  fire  until 
6  p.  m. ;  then  he  sent  his  division  commanders  orders  to  attack 
in  their  fronts.  Johnson's  division  was  to  assault  the  Union 
right  at  Culp's  Hill,  which,  besides  its  great  natural  strength, 
was  strongly  fortified  with  field-works.  Only  three  of  John 
son's  four  brigades  crossed  Rock  Creek,  and  it  was  dark  when 
they  entered  the  woods  at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  The  left  one  of 
the  brigades  [Stuart]  took  possession  of  some  trenches  that 
had  been  vacated  by  a  part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps;  the  other 
two  brigades  were  stopped  in  the  woods  on  the  side  of  the  hill 
by  fire  from  the  breastworks  above;  and  their  "attack  re 
solved  itself  into  a  random  and  ineffective  musketry  fire."f 

fearly's  division,  supported  by  Rodes's,  was  to  attack  Ceme 
tery  Hill.  One  of  his  brigades  [Smith]  was  in  rear  watching 
the  York  Pike,  and  another  [Gordon]  was  held  in  reserve  and 
not  engaged.  The  other  two  brigades  of  the  division  charged 

*Doubleday.     Alexander. 
fAlexander. 


378  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  hill  and  carried  it ;  but  as  they  were  not  supported  by 
Rodes's  division,  and  Ames's  brigade  [Eleventh  Corps]  on  the 
hill  was  promptly  reinforced  by  a  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps, 
they  were  driven  back  ;*  and  the  second  day's  battle  was  over. 

Rodes's  division  had  not  fired  a  shot;  Ewell  had  allowed  it 
to  remain  all  day  at  the  northwestern  edge  of  the  town,  near 
where  the  battle  of  the  day  before  had  ended.  There  it  was 
when  Rodes  received  the  order  to  assault.  Before  he  could 
march  his  column  through  the  town,  and  across  the  interven 
ing  space  of  1,200  to  1,400  yards,  and  deploy  it  for  attack,  Early 
had  made  his  assault  and  been  repulsed.  Rodes,  therefore, 
withheld  his  attack  and  .bivouacked  his  troops  to  the  southwest 
of  the  town  "along  the  hollow  of  an  old  road-bed."* 

Such  was  the  second  day's  battle — on  the  part  of  the  Con 
federates  a  succession  of  tardy,  isolated,  unsupported  attacks, 
in  which  one  division,  Pickett's,  had  not  reached  the  field,  and 
three  others,  Heth's,  Fender's,  and  Rodes's,  and  four  brigades, 
had  scarcely  fired  a  shot;  on  the  part  of  the  Federals  a  well- 
managed,  if  perfectly  passive  defense,  in  which  every  im 
perilled  section  of  the  line  had  been  promptly  reinforced,  and 
every  assault  of  the  enemy  repulsed. 

THIRD  DAY. 

General  Lee  resolved  to  renew  the  assault  upon  the  Union 
position  on  the  3rd  of  July.  Stuart  had  rejoined  with  his 
column  of  cavalry,  which  was  very  much  the  worse  for  wear ; 
Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  also,  had  come  up;  so 
that  at  dawn  of  the  3rd  Lee's  whole  army  was  present  except 
a  small  force  (two  brigades)  of  cavalry  left  to  guard  the  river 
and  the  mountain  passes  on  the  line  of  retreat. 

About  midnight  the  Union  troops  that  had  been  with 
drawn  from  the  trenches  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line — 
Geary's  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps — returned  to  their 
trenches,  and  were  surprised  to  find  them  occupied  by  the 
enemy — the  left  of  Johnson's  Confederate  division.  Before 
dawn  Ewell  had  reinforced  this  advanced  portion  of  Johnson's 
division  with  two  of  Rodes's  brigades  and  one  of  Early's. 
Some  other  changes  had  been  made  on  both  sides  in  the  course 
of  the  night,  but,  on  the  whole,  the  two  forces  occupied  at 
dawn  about  the  same  positions  they  had  held  at  the  close  of  the 
battle  on  the  night  of  the  2nd.  Longstreet  held  the  rocks  and 

*Alexander. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  379 

woods  of  Devil's  Den,  the  bases  of  the  Round  Tops,  and  the 
Wheat  Field;  at  the  center  three  of  Anderson's  brigades  had 
partly  pierced  the  Union  line;  and  on  the  Confederate  left  a 
part  of  Johnson's  division  was  inside  the  Union  trenches  in 
a  position  from  which  it  could  take  the  Federal  line  in  reverse ; 
and  Lee  had  possession  of  the  Emmitsburg  Road  upon  whose 
ridge  there  were  good  positions  for  his  artillery.* 

Lee  knew  that  greater  successes  had  not  been  achieved  on 
the  2nd  for  lack  of  proper  concert  of  action  on  the  part  of  his 
corps  extended  over  so  wide  a  concave  front.  In  renewing  the 
battle  he  hoped  to  have  the  assaults  made  by  the  different  parts 
of  his  line  in  a  manner  to  support  one  another.f  He  pur 
posed  having  Longstreet  again  attack  the  Union  left;  while 
Ewell  should  hold  fast  to  the  advanced  position  he  had  gained 
and  assail  the  enemy's  right  and  rear;  and  Hill  should  occupy 
the  enemy  at  the  center. 

(201)  Before  the  Confederates  were  ready  to  open  their 
attack,  however,  "in  the  early  gray  of  the  morning"  Federal 
batteries  which,  during  the  night,  had  been  placed  on  all  the 
prominent  points  in  the  vicinity  of  Johnson's  position,  opened 
fire.  As  Johnson,  on  account  of  the  creek  and  the  steep  slope 
with  its  rocks  and  woods,  had  not  been  able  to  take  any  ar 
tillery  with  him,  he  could  not  reply  to  the  fire.  He  could  not, 
however,  lie  idle  under  it ;  he  resolved,  therefore,  to  charge  for 
a  better  position  on  higher  ground ;  but  he  was  met  in  front  by 
Geary's  division,  and  taken  in  flank  by  Ruger's  brigade.  Other 
Union  troops  hastened  to  oppose  him,  also,  and  he  was  re 
pulsed.  "At  about  11  a.  m.,  rinding  the  contest  hopeless,  and 
his  retreat  threatened  by  a  force  sent  up  Rock  Creek,  Johnson 
.  .  .  gave  up  the  position  and  withdrew  to  Rock  Creek, 
where  he  remained  until  night. "J 

This  unlooked-for  turn  of  events  "induced  General  Lee,  after 
making  a  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  position,  to  change 
his  plan  of  assault."§  He  was  aware  that  Cemetery  Ridge 
was  strongly  held  from  one  end  to  the  other,  but  he  judged  the 
weakest  part  of  the  line  to  be  at  the  curve  where  it  approached 
nearest  to  the  Emmitsburg  Road,  a  half  to  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  south  of  the  point  where  that  road  and  the  Taneytown 
Road  intersected.  Owing  to  its  convexity  this  part  of  the  Union 


*Hunt. 

fLee's  Report. 
JDoubleday. 
§Long. 


380  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

position  could  not  be  supported  by  cross  fire  from  its  right  or 
left,  except  by  the  cannon  on  Little  Round  Top.  These  Lee 
thought  could  be  silenced  by  his  own  guns.*  If  the  Confed 
erate  assaulting  column  could  pierce  the  Union  line  at  this 
point  it  would  then  take  the  entire  right  of  the  position  in  re 
verse;  and  if  the  Union  troops  on  the  left  should  fire  into  the 
backs  of  the  victorious  Confederates  they  would  hurt  their 
own  friends  on  the  right  as  much  as  their  foes.  So  Lee  de 
cided  to  make  the  main  assault  at  this  point,  and  directed 
Longstreet  to  carry  it  out. 

Most  of  the  forenoon  was  spent  by  the  Confederates  in 
moving  their  troops  into  position  for  the  attack.  Ten  brigades 
were  assigned  to  the  assaulting  column :  Pickett's  division  of 
three  brigades;  Heth's  of  four,  under  Pettigrew;  two  of  Pen- 
der's,  and  Wilcox's  brigade.  None  of  the  brigades  except 
Wilcox's  had  taken  part  in  the  battle  of  the  day  before.  The 
rest  of  Hill's  corps  was  to  support  the  assault  on  the  left,  and 
the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  in  front  of  the  Round 
Tops,  were  to  support  it  on  the  right.  Rodes  held  two  of  his 
brigades  in  the  old  sunken  road  that  he  had  found  the  night 
before  leading  out  from  the  southwestern  angle  of  the  town; 
his  other  two  were  with  Johnson.  The  two  brigades  of  Pen- 
der's  division  not  assigned  to  the  charge  took  their  place  on  the 
right  of  Rodes's  line;  Early  had  his  brigades,  except  the  one 
with  Johnson,  in  and  near  the  town;  and  Johnson  was  still  on 
Rock  Creek  at  the  foot  of  Gulp's  Hill.  ,  ; 

The  arrangement  of  the  brigades  in  the  assaulting  column, 
as  it  moved  out  to  charge,  may  be  represented  thus : 

Brockenbrough,  Davis,  McGoivan,  Archer,   Garnett,   Kemper 

Lane,  Scales,  Ar mislead, 

Wilcox. 

The  front  line  was  more  than  a  mile  long ;  its  right  was  near 
the  Peach  Orchard  and  its  left  near  the  southern  end  of  the 
hollow  road  occupied  by  Rodes.  The  second  line  was  200  yards 
behind  the  first,  and  Wilcox's  brigade,  not  having  started  till 
twenty  minutes  after  the  others,  "was  much  too  late  to  be  of 
any  assistance  whatever.  Both  flanks  of  the  assaulting  column 
were  in  the  air  and  the  left  without  any  support  in  rear."f  A 
hundred  and  fifty-nine  guns  had  been  placed  in  position,  nearly 


*Long. 
fAlexander. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  381 

all  of  them  in  an  irregular  line  along  Seminary  Ridge  from  the 
Peach  Orchard  to  the  Hagerstown  Road.  Strangely  enough, 
the  Confederate  artillerists  had  not  discovered  that  the  Union 
line  could  be  reached  by  artillery  fire  from  the  town  and  its 
flank,  and  had  put  no  guns  at  those  places  "to  enfilade  the 
'shank  of  the  fish-hook/  and  cross  fire  with  the  guns  from  the 
west."* 

In  the  Union  line  on  the  front  to  be  assaulted :  first  came  the 
Eleventh  Corps  on  Cemetery  Hill ;  then  one  division  of  the 
First;  then  the  Second;  then  another  division  of  the  First; 
then  the  Third ;  and  the  Fifth  prolonged  the  line  to  the  Round 
Tops.  Batteries  were  stationed  along  the  front  wherever  posi 
tions  could  be  found  for  the  guns;  but  only  77  pieces  were  in 
position  to  reply  to  the  Confederate  cannon.f  Kilpatrick 
covered  the  left  of  the  line  with  Farnsworth's  cavalry  brigade; 
and  later  in  the  day  Merritt's  brigade  of  Buf  ord's  division  came 
up  by  the  Emmitsburg  Road  from  the  direction  of  Frederick 
City,  and  fell  upon  the  rear  of  Longstreet's  right.J 

At  one  o'clock  Colonel  Alexander,  Longstreet's  chief  of  ar 
tillery,  opened  the  cannonade,  directing  his  fire  upon  a  clump 
of  trees  on  Cemetery  Ridge  which  marked  the  point  of  assault. 
The  Union  batteries  in  position  replied  with  all  their  guns,  and 
the  result  was  the  greatest  artillery  duel  that  has  ever  taken 
place  on  the  American  Continent.  Most  of  the  Confederate 
projectiles  flew  high  and  only  swept  the  ground  behind  the 
front  assailed.  The  main  damage  they  did  was  to  blow  up 
nearly  a  dozen  caissons  of  the  Federal  reserve  artillery  parked 
in  rear.  After  nearly  an  hour  of  firing  General  Hunt,  the 
Federal  chief  of  artillery,  saw  that  his  ammunition  was  run 
ning  low,  and  ordered  his  batteries  to  cease  firing.  Hunt's 
purpose  was  to  reserve  his  ammunition  for  the  enemy's  as 
saulting  columns,  which  it  was  now  plain  would  follow  soon. 

Before  the  Union  guns  ceased  firing,  however,  Colonel  Alex 
ander,  who  knew  that  the  ammunition  of  the  Confederate  bat 
teries  could  not  last  more  than  an  hour,  and  who  was  charged 
with  the  duty  of  giving  the  signal  for  the  advance,  had  sent  the 
following  note  to  Pickett:  "General:  If  you  are  to  advance  at 
all,  you  must  come  at  once  or  we  will  not  be  able  to  support  you 
as  we  ought.  But  the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened  materi 
ally,  and  there  are  still  18  guns  firing  from  the  cemetery."  (He 


•"Alexander. 

fHunt. 

jj.  T.  Long's  pamphlet  on  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 


382  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

had  been  told  that  the  clump  of  trees  marked  the  position  of 
the  cemetery.)  Soon  afterwards  Alexander  noticed  a  falling- 
off  in  the  enemy's  fire  and  saw  some  of  the  guns  withdraw.  At 
1.40  he  sent  another  note  to  Pickett,  saying:  "For  God's  sake, 
come  quick.  The  18  guns  have  gone.  Come  quick  or  my  am 
munition  will  not  let  me  support  you  properly."* 

In  a  few  minutes  Pickett's  15,000  infantry  emerged  from  the 
woods  behind,  and  passed  through  the  line  of  Alexander's  bat 
teries.  In  front  lay  an  almost  level  stretch  of  farm-land  about 
a  half-mile  wide  which  must  be  crossed  before  the  enemy's  line 
could  be  reached.  It  contained  scarcely  a  bit  of  cover  for  the 
assailants,  but  rail  fences  to  obstruct  their  advance.  Across 
this  space  the  first  and  second  lines  started ;  and  immediately 
Hunt's  batteries  reopened  their  fire  and  turned  it  all  upon  the 
charging  lines.  Alexander's  guns,  some  of  which  moved  for 
ward  to  closer  range,  supported  the  charge,  until  the  lines  were 
seen  to  "close  in  upon  the  enemy  in  smoke  and  dust."  The  ar 
tillery  ceased  firing,  then,  to  await  the  result. 

The  lines  kept  up  the  charge  to  within  close  musketry  range 
of  the  Union  position;  but  there  Pettigrew's  brigades,  on  the 
left,  wavered  and  then  fell  back.  Pickett's  brigades  were  thus 
left  without  support;  but  they  pushed  on.  Stannard's  brigade 
of  the  First  Corps  wheeled  to  the  right  and  charged  Pickett's 
troops  in  flank  and  rear,  adding  to  the  slaughter  and  confusion. 
Still  the  Confederates  were  not  stopped.  The  leading  troops  got 
over  the  stone  wall  behind  which  were  posted  troops  of  the 
Second  Corps,  and  captured  some  Federal  guns  beyond  it.  But 
soon  they  were  surrounded  on  all  sides  and  overwhelmed ; 
many  were  captured  and  the  rest  were  driven  back;  and  the 
losses  were  far  greater  in  the  retreat  than  in  the  advance. 

Wilcox's  brigade  was  not  in  this  charge ;  the  charge  had  been 
made  and  repulsed  before  this  brigade  moved  forward.  Then 
it  advanced  almost  alone  under  a  heavy  fire,  and  when  Federal 
infantry  came  out  and  attacked  its  left,  it  moved  by  the  right 
flank,  and,  making  a  circuit,  regained  the  Confederate  line  at 
the  Peach  Orchard.* 

CAVALRY. 

While  this  great  battle  was  raging  between  the  infantry  and 
artillery  of  the  hostile  armies  the  cavalry  was  not  standing 

"•Alexander. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  383 

idle.  Stuart  with  four  brigades  and  four  horse-batteries  had 
marched  round  to  the  right  and  rear  of  the  Union  line.  (202) 
Between  the  York  and  the  Hanover  Roads,  about  two  miles 
and  a  half  east  of  Gettysburg,  he  took  position  on  a  wooded 
ridge  from  which  he  had  a  view  of  the  roads  in  rear  of  the 
Federal  army.  He  threw  out  a  line  of  dismounted  skirmishers 
to  the  south  of  him. 

On  another  low  ridge  a  half-mile  to  the  east  was  Macintosh's 
brigade  of  D.  McM.  Gregg's  Federal  cavalry  division.  Mc- 
Intosh  sent  forward  a  dismounted  skirmish  line,  which  en 
gaged  Stuart's  near  the  Rummel  House.  Gregg,  who  was 
not  far  away  with  Custer's  brigade  of  Kilpatrick's  division, 
sent  Custer  and  two  batteries  of  artillery  to  aid  Mclntosh. 
The  combat  which  ensued  "swayed  from  side  to  side"  about  the 
Rummel .  farm,  until  the  Federal  cavalry  was  finally  forced 
back.  (203)  Then  the  three  Confederate  brigades  of  Wade 
Hampton,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  and  Chambliss  charged  in  close  col 
umn  of  squadrons,  saber  in  hand.  Custer  charged  in  like  man 
ner  and  met  the  Confederates  in  front,  while  several  other  de 
tachments  struck  them  in  flank;  and  the  Confederates  were 
thrown  into  confusion  and  driven  back.  Afterwards  the  hostile 
batteries  engaged  in  an  indecisive  duel,  "and  at  nightfall  each 
side  held  substantially  its  original  ground."* 

(204)  At  the  other  end  of  the  line,  about  an  hour  after  this 
fight,  Kilpatrick  required  Farnsworth  to  make  a  hopeless  and 
useless  sacrifice  of  his  own  life  and  a  large  part  of  his  cavalry 
brigade.  Two  regiments  were  made  to  charge  the  rear  of  Long- 
street's  right  on  the  slope  of  Round  Top.  They  rode  -in  col 
umns  as  best  they  could,  over  rocks  and  creeks,  rail  fences  and 
stone  walls,  and  were  shot  down  helplessly  by  the  Confederate 
infantry.  They  accomplished  nothing,  save  to  end  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  as  it  had  begun,  with  a  combat  between  Confed 
erate  infantry  and  Union  cavalry. 

LEE'S  RETREAT. 

Lee  now  gave  up  the  effort  to  dislodge  Meade's  army ;  there 
was  nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  to  retreat  across  the  Potomac 
as  quickly  as  practicable.  His  ammunition  was  nearly  ex 
hausted,  provisions  could  not  be  gotten  where  he  was,  and  his 
line  of  retreat  was  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  the  enemy. 

*Hunt. 


384  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(192)  In  anticipation  of  a  counter-attack  Lee  withdrew 
Ewell's  corps  to  Seminary  Ridge,  and  had  a  strong  line  of  in- 
trenchments  made  from  Oak  Hill  to  the  Peach  Orchard,  cover 
ing  his  lines  of  retreat,  the  Chambersburg  Pike  and  the  Hagers- 
town  Road.  (205)  On  the  4th  of  July  he  started  off  his 
train  of  ambulances  and  empty  wagons  laden  with  the 
wounded  by  the  Chambersburg  Pike  under  escort  of  Imbo- 
den's  cavalry  brigade.  At  dark  the  other  trains  set  out  by 
the  Fairfield  [Hagerstown]  Road,  guarded  by  Hill's  corps; 
Longstreet  followed  Hill,  and  Ewell's  corps  marched  as  the 
rear-guard. 

The  same  day  Meade  ordered  French,  whose  corps  had  been 
withdrawn  from  Maryland  Heights  to  Frederick  City,  to  seize 
the  lower  passes  of  the  mountains  and  reoccupy  Harper's 
Ferry;  and  he  started  Kilpatrick  with  all  the  cavalry  except 
two  brigades  [Mclntosh  and  D.  I.  Gregg]  "to  harass  the 
enemy's  anticipated  retreat  and  destroy  his  trains  and  bridges 
at  Williamsport."* 

There  was  a  fierce  rain  storm,  and  mud  and  the  darkness 
of  night  so  hindered  Lee's  movement  that  day  had  broken  on 
the  5th  before  the  rear-guard  had  started.  (206)  As  soon, 
on  the  5th,  as  Meade  was  sure  that  Lee  had  begun  a  retreat, 
he  started  D.  I.  Gregg's  cavalry  brigade  in  pursuit  by  the 
Chambersburg  Pike,  and  the  Sixth  Corps  [Sedgwick]  by  the 
Fairfield  Road.  The  rest  of  the  Union  army  set  out  the  next 
day  (the  6th)  by  the  Emmitsburg  Road. 

Sedgwick  found  the  Confederate  rear-guard  intrenched  in 
the  Fairfield  pass.  Thereupon  Meade  sent  two  corps  to  his 
support  and  halted  the  rest  of  the  army.  (207)  Then  Meade 
concluded  that  it  would  cost  too  much  to  carry  the  mountain 
pass,  and  withdrew  Sedgwick,  sending  only  Mclntosh's  cav 
alry  brigade  and  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  follow  the  Confed 
erates,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  moved  toward  the  lower 
passes. 

(208)  On  the  8th  the  Confederate  army  was  at  Hagerstown 
and  Funkstown,  and  the  Union  army  was  between  Frederick 
and  Boonsboro.  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  had  been  in  action  with 
the  Confederates  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  near  Fairfield,  and 
cavalry  combats  had  taken  place  every  day  for  several  days. 
Much  damage  had  been  done  the  Confederate  trains  and  many 
prisoners  had  been  captured  by  the  Federal  cavalry.  (206) 

*Hunt. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  385 

"On  the  6th  Buford's  division  had  attacked"  the  trains  "at 
Williamsport,  and  Kilpatrick  toward  Hagerstown;  but  as  Im- 
boden's  train-guard  was  strong  and  Stuart's  cavalry  was  up, 
and  Longstreet  close  by,  they  had  to  withdraw/5*  (209)  On 
the  9th  Meade' s  headquarters  were  at  Turner's  Gap  and  his 
leading  troops  were  at  Rohrersville  and  Boonsboro. 

Lee  had  arrived  at  Williamsport  on  the  7th  and  found  that 
Union  cavalry  sent  up  by  French  had  destroyed  the  pontoon- 
bridge  at  Falling  Waters,  and  heavy  rains  had  raised  the  river 
and  made  it  impassable.  (210)  Lee  therefore  took  up  a 
strong  position  covering  Williamsport  and  Falling  Waters, 
on  the  ridge  between  Marsh  and  Conococheague  Creeks,  with 
his  right  resting  on  a  bend  of  the  Potomac  and  his  left  on 
Conococheague  Creek.  Here  he  waited  for  the  river  to  fall, 
and  spent  the  time  building  a  pontoon-bridge  of  such  materials 
as  were  at  hand,  daily  expecting  to  be  attacked  by  Meade. 

On  the  10th  Meade  moved  his  headquarters  to  Antietam 
Creek;  the  left  of  his  line  crossed  the  creek  and  the  right 
moved  up  near  Funkstown  and  Leitersburg.  (211)  By  the 
13th  Meade  had  his  forces  in  front  of  the  position  taken  up 
by  Lee.f  He  spent  the  day  in  reconnoitering  the  Confederate 
position  and  issued  orders  for  a  "demonstration  in  force"  to 
take  place  on  the  morning  of  the  14th.  (212)  "On  advancing 
that  morning  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  his 
line"  during  the  night  "and  crossed  the  river,  partly  by  ford 
ing,  partly  by  a  new  bridge."*  Lee's  second  and  last  invasion 
of  the  North  had  ended  in  failure. 

In  this  campaign  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  lost:  3,155 
killed,  14,529  wounded,  5,365  missing,  or  23,049  all  told;  and 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  as  nearly  as  can  be  determined, 
had  lost  2,592  killed,  12,709  wounded  and  5,150  missing,  or 
20,451  all  told.  The  Confederate  loss  was  probably  greater; 
Livermore,  in  his  Numbers  and  Losses  in  the  Civil  War,  makes 
the  following  estimate :  killed,  3,903 ;  wounded,  18,735 ;  miss 
ing,  5,425 ;  total,  28,063. 

COMMENTS. 

(186)  Of  all  the  objects,  political  and  military,  for  which 
Lee's  invasion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  was  undertaken, 
only  one  was  achieved;  to  wit,  the  war  was  transferred  for  a 


*Hunt. 
fSwinton. 


386  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

few  days  from  Southern  to  Northern  soil,  and  the  Confederate 
army  subsisted  for  the  time  on  stores  collected  in  the  North. 
As  the  invasion  was  not  crowned  with  victory  it  did  not  in 
crease  Southern  prestige  and  credit  in  Europe  nor  strengthen 
the  anti-war  sentiment  at  the  North;  it  had  a  quite  contrary 
effect.  Nor  did  it  save  Pemberton's  army  at  Vicksburg,  which 
surrendered  to  General  Grant  on  the  4th  of  July. 

Lee  judged  Halleck  and  President  Lincoln  aright  in  believ 
ing  that  they  would  not  let  the  Army  of  the  Potmac  take 
advantage  of  his  movement  northward  to  advance  on  Rich 
mond,  but  would  require  it  to  march  northward,  too,  and  keep 
between  him  and  Washington.  There  was  apparently  some 
danger  that  a  Union  force  at  Fort  Monroe,  the  Seventh  Corps, 
might  move  against  Richmond ;  but  Lee  was  right,  also,  in  be 
lieving  that  Halleck  would  not  let  this  force,  either,  go  farther 
away  from  Washington  while  the  Confederate  army  was  north 
of  the  Potomac.  If  the  Confederate  government  could  have 
complied  with  Lee's  recommendation  to  put  an  army  "even  in 
effigy"  under  Beauregard  at  Culpeper  Court  House  to 
threaten  Washington,  it  is  likely  that  some  of  the  Union  corps 
that  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  would  have  been 
held  nearer  Washington. 

In  stretching  his  army  from  Fredericksburg  to  Williams- 
port,  ninety  miles  as  the  crow  flies,  Lee  gave  Hooker  an  oppor 
tunity  to  fall  upon  its  widely  separated  parts  and  destroy  them 
in  detail.  Lee  must  have  felt  sure  that  Halleck's  fear  for  the 
safety  of  Washington  would  restrain  Hooker  from  attacking 
the  divided  Confederate  forces.  "On  no  other  reasonable 
hypothesis  can  we  account  for  his  stretching  his  army  from 
Fredericksburg  to  Williamsport,  with  his  enemy  concentrated 
on  one  flank,  and  on  the  shortest  road  to  Richmond."* 

(189)  After  Lee  had  crossed  the  Potomac  and  started  up 
the  Cumberland  Valley,  Hooker,  while  still  holding  the  bulk  of 
his  forces  directly  between  the  Confederate  army  and  Wash 
ington,  ordered  the  garrison  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  intercept 
Lee's  line  of  communications  and  join  with  the  troops  of  Rey 
nolds  and  Slocum  in  operating  against  his  rear.  This  plan, 
if  carried  out,  would  have  divided  the  Union  army  by  South 
Mountain,  and  given  Lee  the  chance  to  fall  upon  the  part  west 
of  the  mountains.  It  was  not  carried  out,  however,  owing  to 
Halleck's  interference.  Whereupon  Hooker  asked  to  be  re 
lieved  of  the  command. 

"Hunt. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  387 

(190)  Meade,  who  succeeded  Hooker,  made  his  plans  and 
issued  orders  for  taking  up  a  position  on  the  line  Emmitsburg- 
Hanover  covering  Washington  and  Baltimore.  This  position, 
moreover,  was  on  the  flank  of  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  and  thus 
effectually  stopped  his  further  advance  northward.  It  was 
safe  defensive  strategy;  but  it  was  not  calculated  to  destroy 
the  invading  army,  nor  was  it  the  quickest  way  to  expel  that 
army.  Lee,  meantime,  was  making  for  Harrisburg,  ignorant, 
in  the  absence  of  his  cavalry,  of  the  proximity  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  He  supposed  it  was  still  south  of  the  Poto 
mac.  On  learning,  on  the  night  of  the  28th  of  June,  that  the 
Union  army  was  at  Frederick,  he  ordered  an  immediate  con 
centration  of  his  corps  at  Cashtown,  east  of  the  mountains. 
This  disposition  was  meant  to  threaten  Baltimore  and  thereby 
to  induce  Meade  to  move  his  army  northeast  to  cover  that  city ; 
possibly  to  induce  him  unduly  to  extend  its  front  in  order  to 
cover  Baltimore  and  Washington  at  the  same  time.  Had  Lee 
assembled  his  army  on  the  western  side  of  the  mountains,  in 
the  Cumberland  Valley,  its  position  would  noway  have  threat 
ened  Baltimore  or  Washington,  and  would  have  left  Meade 
free  to  cross  the  mountains  by  the  southern  passes  and  cut  off 
its  retreat.  This  concentration  was  ordered,  also,  with  a  view 
to  taking  up  a  "position  in  readiness"  and  waiting  for  Meade 
to  attack,  in  accordance  with  the  plan  to  which  Lee  had  agreed 
in  the  beginning  of  the  advance ;  namely,  a  combination  of  of 
fensive  strategy  with  defensive  tactics. 

(192)  The  choice  of  Gettysburg  as  a  battle-field  was  made 
wholly  by  chance.  The  first  day's  battle  was  a  rencounter. 
Neither  army  was  at  that  time  seeking  the  other  to  attack  it. 
Neither  Lee  nor  Meade  had  thought  of  Cemetery  Ridge  as  a 
defensive  position,  or  knew  anything  about  the  ground  in  the 
neighborhood.  A  part  of  Heth's  Confederate  division  went 
down  to  Gettysburg  to  seize  some  shoes.  This  circumstance 
br ought  on  the  battle  and  caused  the  choice  of  the  battle-field ; 
maybe  decided  the  fate  of  the  Union.  It  was  lucky  that  Bu- 
ford  was  there  with  his  cavalry  to  dispute  with  Heth  the  pos 
session  of  the  ground ;  it  was  lucky  that  Reynolds  was  so  near 
at  hand  to  support  Buford. 

The  possession  of  Cemetery  Hill  was  decisive  of  victory. 
Lee  made  a  great  mistake,  therefore,  in  not  following  up  the 
victory  of  Hill  and  Ewell  promptly  on  the  1st  of  July,  and  in 
not  making  a  vigorous  effort  to  carry  the  hill  as  soon  as  the 
Union  troops  were  driven  back  to  it.  True,  the  Confederate 


388  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

troops  were  then  well-nigh  spent  with  marching  and  fighting, 
and  their  lines  were  in  confusion.  Yet  this  was  apparently  the 
only  time  during  the  battle  when  it  would  have  been  possible 
for  them  to  carry  the  position.  At  that  moment  there  were 
seventeen  brigades  of  Confederate  infantry  on  the  ground  and 
only  thirteen  brigades  of  Federal  infantry  and  Buford's  cav 
alry.  General  Lee,  who  had  arrived  on  the  field,  saw  the  im 
portance  of  taking  Cemetery  Hill  at  once  and  sent  Ewell  an 
order  to  take  it ;  but  the  order  was  not  positive — it  contained  a 
condition — an  if.  Ewell  took  advantage  of  the  conditional 
clause,  and  did  not  assault.  Thus  Lee's  only  chance  of  victory 
was  thrown  away.  If  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  had  lost 
Cemetery  Hill  on  the  1st  of  July,  Meade's  army  would  have 
withdrawn  to  the  line  already  selected  behind  Pipe  Creek. 

Cemetery  Hill  was,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the 
engagement,  the  weakest  part  of  the  Federal  position.  In  the 
first  place  it  was  a  salient,  which  is  always  weak ;  furthermore, 
both  the  sunken  road  leading  from  the  southwest  angle  of  the 
town, — the  road  occupied  by  Rodes's  division  during  the  night 
of  the  2nd  and  the  day  of  the  3rd  of  July, — and  the  position 
from  which  Early  charged  on  the  evening  of  the  2nd,  afforded 
cover  within  500  yards  of  Cemetery  Hill  from  which  a  con 
vergent  assault  could  have  been  made;  and  there  were  posi 
tions  in  and  near  the  town  from  which  direct  and  enfilade  artil 
lery  fire  could  have  reached  the  hill.  If  instead  of  the  ill-man 
aged  attacks  of  the  2nd  and  3rd  Lee  had  concentrated  his  army 
and  assaulted  Cemetery  Hill,  he  would  have  had  a  better 
chance  of  success.* 

It  is  hard  to  conceive  of  a  worse-conducted  attack  than  that 
of  July  the  2nd.  It  ought  to  have  begun  at  daybreak ;  and  Lee's 
troops  were  all  near  enough  to  the  field  to  have  reached  their 
positions  at  that  hour  if  they  had  received  orders  to  do  so  and 
had  exerted  themselves.  But  the  order  did  not  issue  until 
11  a.  m.,  and  it  was  after  3  p.  m.  when  the  assault  began.  The 
plan  of  battle  had  in  view  successive  attacks  beginning  at  the 
right  and  progressing  toward  the  left.  The  Confederates  had 
already  used  the  same  "method  on  four  occasions, — at  Seven 
Pines,  Gaines's  Mill,  Frazier's  Farm  or  Glendale,  and  Malvern 
Hill, — and  always  with  poor  success."  The  result  at  Gettys 
burg  was  that  Hood's  division  fought  single-handed  for  more 
than  an  hour,  and  was  brought  to  a  stand-still;  then  two  of 

""Alexander. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  389 

McLaws's  brigades  took  up  the  battle ;  after  they  had  been  en 
gaged  for  a  half -hour  or  more  the  other  two  brigades  of 
McLaws's  division  charged;  and  all  were  driven  back.  Then 
three  brigades  of  Anderson's  division  advanced,  one  at  a  time 
from  right  to  left,  and  were  driven  back  in  the  same  order. 
Farther  to  the  left  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Fender  stood 
virtually  idle;  while  around  on  the  other  side  of  the  curve 
EwelFs  corps  did  not  fire  a  musket  until  near  dark,  and  then 
only  five  brigades  assaulted.  Two  of  these  carried  the  Union 
position  at  Cemetery  Hill,  but,  for  lack  of  support,  were 
straightway  driven  back.* 

In  allowing  Johnson's  division  to  go  to  the  east  side  of  Rock 
Creek,  reinforcing  it  with  three  brigades  to  assault  the  unas 
sailable  right  of  the  Union  position  at  Gulp's  Hill,  and  leaving 
it,  as  well  as  the  three  brigades  sent  to  reinforce  it,  until  the 
end  of  the  engagement,  Lee  practically  surrendered  the  use 
of  seven  of  his  brigades;  he  made  his  line  more  than  a  mile 
longer  than  it  would  otherwise  have  been,  and  put  these  bri 
gades  in  a  position  where  they  could  do  nothing,  and  from 
which  they  could  not  be  moved  to  assist  at  any  other  part  of 
the  attack. 

There  has  been  considerable  controversy  as  to  who  was  to 
blame  for  the  tardiness  of  Longstreet's  attack.  The  dispute 
is  of  no  moment  to  us  in  our  study  of  this  battle,  except  as  an 
illustration  of  certain  points.  First,  it  illustrates  the  difficulty 
of  combining  and  harmonizing  the  action  of  the  various  parts 
of  a  large  army  in  battle,  when  they  are  scattered  over  a  wide 
space — a  difficulty  greatly  lessened  nowadays  by  means  of  the 
field  telegraph  and  telephone.  Secondly,  it  illustrates  the  dis 
advantage  of  the  concave  order  of  battle  for  the  attack — Lee's 
line  was  more  than  six  miles  long,  while  Meade's  was  not 
four ;  and  Lee  could  not  dispatch  troops,  or  even  messages  and 
orders,  from  one  part  of  his  line  to  another  without  sending 
them  on  the  outside  of  the  curve,  while  Meade  could  move  his 
troops  by  the  chords  on  the  inside.  Thirdly,  it  illustrates  the 
importance  of  a  cheerful  yielding  to  the  will  of  the  commander, 
who  is  the  person  responsible.  Longstreet  did  not  approve 
Lee's  plan,  and  a  careful  study  of  the  battle  from  all  available 
sides  leads  to  the  suspicion  that  this  had  much  to  do  with 
Lee's  failure.  Possibly  the  hand  of  the  Almighty  was  direct 
ing  the  affair  for  the  salvation  of  the  Union.  And  fourthly, 

""Alexander. 


390  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

it  illustrates  the  vital  importance  of  dispatch — of  promptness 
in  the  movement  of  troops.  One  can  almost  show  that  every 
defeat  of  the  Civil  War  happened  because  somebody  was  slow ; 
somebody  stopped  to  rest,  or  lost  his  way,  or  marched  too 
slowly,  or  waited  for  somebody  else  to  get  out  of  the  road, 
or  waited  for  somebody  to  join,  or  waited  to  get  his  orders.  In 
this  instance  Longstreet's  corps  was  blocked  in  its  march  for 
four  hours,  and  kept  from  bivouac  until  midnight,  on  July  1, 
by  a  division  of  E  well's  corps  and  its  trains;  and  on  July  2 
Longstreet  says:  "Fearing  that  my  force  was  too  weak  to 
venture  to  make  an  attack,  I  delayed  until  General  Law's 
brigade  joined  the  division."  Longstreet's  column  also  lost 
two  hours  in  looking  for  a  route  by  which  to  escape  the  obser 
vation  of  a  Union  signal  party  on  Little  Round  Top. 

After  the  first  day  of  Gettysburg  Lee's  chances  of  victory 
steadily  diminished  to  the  end.  On  the  morning  of  the  2nd 
[July]  he  had  on  the  ground  thirty-three  brigades — all  of  his 
infantry  except  four  brigades.  At  seven  o'clock  Meade  had 
thirty-nine  brigades,  at  nine  o'clock  forty-one,  and  at  twelve 
o'clock  forty-three.  On  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  after  Pickett 
had  come  up  with  his  division,  Lee  had  only  thirty-seven  bri 
gades  ;  Meade  had  fifty-one  brigades,  Sedgwick  having  brought 
up  the  Sixth  Corps ;  the  weak  and  strong  points  of  the  position 
had  been  developed  in  the  fighting  of  the  day  before;  the 
troops  were  more  carefully  disposed ;  and  the  position  was 
more  thoroughly  prepared  for  defense.* 

General  Longstreet  was  opposed  to  assaulting  the  strong 
position  of  the  Union  army  on  either  the  2nd  or  the  3rd  of 
July;  he  wanted  to  turn  the  left  of  the  army  and  threaten  its 
line  of  retreat.  This  would  probably  have  forced  Meade  to  fall 
back.  By  changing  his  own  trains  from  the  Chambersburg  to 
the  Fairfield-Hagerstown  road  Lee  could  have  made  such  a 
maneuver  without  seriously  exposing  his  own  communications. 
Meade  was  prepared  for  such  a  contingency,  and  had  an  order 
already  drafted,  to  issue  in  case  he  should  have  need  to  fall 
back. 

As  a  purely  defensive  battle  there  is  little  to  criticize  in  the 
Union  position  or  General  Meade's  dispositions.  The  most  se 
rious  mistake  in  the  dispositions  was  Sickles's  putting  his  corps 
in  the  advanced  position  at  the  Peach  Orchard  in  place  of  at 
the  position  assigned  to  him.  It  was  the  fear  of  low  ground 
that  induced  Sickles  to  move  his  line  forward.  When  he 

*Fiebeger. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  391 

reached  his  designated  place  he  saw  the  crest  of  a  ridge  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  beyond,  which  he  fancied  would  give  the 
enemy  command  of  his  position.  He  moved  his  corps  for 
ward  to  the  ridge  and  thus  placed  it  beyond  the  support  of  the 
rest  of  the  line;  and  in  bending  back  his  left  flank  to  rest  it 
upon  Devil's  Den,  he  formed  a  salient  at  the  Peach  Orchard 
of  which  both  flanks  were  exposed  to  enfilade.  The  tactical 
advantage  of  high  ground  is  not  so  great  as  it  is  generally 
supposed  to  be;  about  its  only  real  advantage  is  the  wider 
sweep  of  view  and  fire  it  affords.  It  used  to  be  considered 
necessary  for  artillery,  but  even  that  is  not  so  to-day.  Prob 
ably  the  strongest  position  that  a  line  of  infantry  can  occupy 
is  a  trench  with  head-cover  in  a  perfectly  flat  prairie  or  desert. 
The  engagements  in  the  South  African  War  showed  that  the 
defensive  advantages  of  high  ground,  and  the  corresponding 
disadvantages  of  low  ground,  are  largely  imaginary.  An 
other  mistake  in  General  Meade's  original  dispositions  was 
his  failure  to  occupy  the  Round  Tops ;  but  General  War 
ren  discovered  this  error  in  time  to  amend  it  before  serious 
consequences  followed. 

General  Meade  defeated  and  repulsed  the  Confederates,  but 
he  did  not  reap  the  full  harvest  of  his  victory  tactically  or 
strategically.  Tactically  he  had  two  opportunities  to  make  de 
cisive  counter-strokes,  but  neglected  to  take  advantage  of  them. 
The  first  was  after  repulsing  Longstreet's  forces  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  2nd  of  July.  He  had  brought  twenty  bri 
gades  to  reinforce  Sickles,  a  good  many  of  which  he  had  not 
employed ;  if  he  had  "now  ordered  an  advance  he  would  have 
found  Longstreet's  left  flank  in  the  air,  and  the  whole  line 
of  McLaws's  and  Hood's  divisions  much  exhausted  and  but 
poorly  supplied  with  ammunition."*  Meade's  other  opportunity 
for  a  counter-attack  came  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett's  charge 
on  the  3rd.  True,  Pickett's  withdrawal  was  covered  by  the 
long  line  of  guns  on  Seminary  Ridge  and  by  infantry;  but 
these  ought  not  to  have  been  able  to  stop  the  counter-stroke 
if  a  fresh  corps,  the  Sixth  for  example,  had  been  sent  forward 
on  the  heels  of  the  fugitives.  Such  a  counter-charge  ought  to 
have  split  Lee's  line  in  two,  and,  possibly,  might  have  destroyed 
or  captured  one  wing  of  it.  But  Meade  had  not  provided  a 
general  reserve  against  such  an  opportunity.  Instead  of  hold 
ing  the  Sixth  Corps  together  as  a  general  reserve,  he  had 
distributed  it  along  the  line  "wherever  he  thought  it  needed 

*Alcxander. 


392  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

strengthening."*  Nor  did  General  Meade  molest  Lee's  army 
the  next  day,  although  it  spent  the  whole  day  in  a  defensive 
position  upon  Seminary  Ridge. 

(206)  Lee  began  his  retreat  on  the  night  of  the  4th  [July]  ; 
Meade's  cavalry  started  on  the  4th  and  maintained  touch,  but 
his  main  army  did  not  start  until  the  6th.  By  the  7th  Lee  had 
reached  the  Potomac,  only  to  find  his  bridge  gone  and  the 
river  too  high  to  ford.  As  soon  as  his  troops  arrived  he  took 
up  a  position  covering  the  site  of  the  bridge  and  ford,  and  in 
trenched.  The  Federal  army  did  not  arrive  until  the  12th. 
Meade  had  taken  a  route  much  longer  than  the  route  of  the 
Confederates.  A  single  corps  had  followed  the  retreating  col 
umn  directly ;  the  Confederate  rear-guard  not  only  stopped  this 
corps  in  the  Fairfield  pass,  but  caused  the  entire  Union  army 
to  halt  for  a  day. 

If  Meade's  whole  army  had  promptly  followed  Lee's  by  the 
Fairfield-Hagerstown  road  it  could  not  have  been  long  held 
by  the  Confederate  rear-guard  at  the  Fairfield  pass  or  else 
where,  and  it  ought  to  have  destroyed  or  captured  the  Con 
federate  army.  For  the  second  time  Lee  was  allowed  to  re 
treat  across  the  Potomac  under  such  difficulties  that  he  would 
have  found  it  impossible  to  escape,  had  he  been  vigorously 
pursued  and  attacked  by  his  adversary.  As  Vicksburg  had 
already  fallen,  it  looks  as  if  here  was  an  opportunity  to  end  the 
war  in  a  single  day.  The  hour  had  arrived,  but  not  the  man. 
If  General  Grant  had  been  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  this  time,  with  Sheridan  commanding  his  advance- 
guard,  Lee  would  not  have  got  across  the  Potomac;  but  Gen 
eral  Meade  and  his  corps-commanders,  whom  he  called  in 
council  on  the  night  of  the  12th  to  consider  the  question  of 
assaulting  Lee's  position,  appear  to  have  been  content  with 
driving  the  Confederate  army  out  of  Pennsylvania  and  Mary 
land. 

In  this  campaign,  from  beginning  to  end,  the  Union  cavalry 
generally  performed  excellent  service.  It  constantly  covered 
its  own  army  and  kept  touch  with  the  Confederates  until  the 
two  armies  joined  battle  in  front  of  Cemetery  Ridge.  It 
kept  the  enemy  back  at  the  crossing  of  Willoughby  Run  on  the 
1st  of  July  until  Reynolds  arrived  with  infantry.  This  was  the 
most  valuable  day's  work  done  by  cavalry  in  the  Civil  War.  In 
leaving  the  left  of  the  line  uncovered  on  the  2nd,  however,  the 


*Fiebeger. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  GETTYSBURG.  393 

Union  cavalry  allowed  Longstreet  to  march  his  column  by  the 
flank  and  deploy  it  before  the  Federal  dispositions  had  been 
made  to  repel  it.  Luckily  the  infantry  scouts  sent  forward  by 
Sickles  discovered  the  Confederate  column  in  time  to  prevent 
a  surprise.  On  the  3rd  of  July  a  part  of  the  Union  cavalry 
defeated  Stuart  on  the  east  side  of  the  battle-field,  and  pre 
vented  him  from  disturbing  the  Union  rear;  while  on  the  left 
another  part  of  it  so  menaced  Longstreet's  flank  and  rear  as  to 
prevent  him  "from  assailing  Round  Top  with  vigor,  or  detach 
ing  a  force  to  aid  Pickett."*  Yet  it  did  not  do  all  that  it 
might  have  done  on  the  left  that  day.  To  the  north  and  west 
in  the  valleys  of  Marsh  Creek  and  Willoughby  Run  were  all  the 
Confederate  trains  virtually  without  any  guard.  The  Federal 
cavalry  might  have  captured  or  destroyed  them  as  Wheeler  did 
the  Federal  trains  at  the  battle  of  Stones  River. f 

After  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  the  Union  cavalry  led  the  pur 
suit  and  kept  constantly  in  touch  with  the  enemy;  it  captured 
wagon-trains  and  harassed  the  Confederates  and  hindered  their 
retreat;  it  destroyed  the  bridge  over  the  Potomac  and  thus 
delayed  Lee's  passage  for  six  days;  and  two  of  its  divisions 
attacked  the  Confederate  rear-guard  just  before  it  crossed  the 
Potomac,  killing  General  Pettigrew,  and  capturing  about  1,000 
prisoners. $ 

On  the  other  hand,  Stuart's  Confederate  cavalry  was  out 
of  place  at  the  critical  time.  Its  raid  around  the  Federal  army 
was  a  fatal  mistake.  From  the  time  when  it  started  for  the  Po 
tomac  upon  that  raid  Lee  was  left  groping  in  the  dark.  On  the 
1st  of  July,  while  Stuart  was  still  absent,  General  Lee,  not 
knowing  where  the  Federal  corps  were  at  the  time,  "said  that 
he  had  been  kept  in  the  dark  ever  since  crossing  the  Potomac, 
and  intimated  that  Stuart's  disappearance  had  materially  ham 
pered  the  movements  and  disorganized  the  plans  of  the  cam 
paign.'^  On  the  retreat  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Confederates 
were  covered  and  their  trains  were  well  guarded  by  the  cavalry. 

*Doubleday. 
fAlexander. 
JFiebeger. 
§Long. 


LECTURE  XIX. 
THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 

(213)  The  object  of  contention  in  this  campaign  was  the 
Mississippi  River,  which  bore  the  same  relation  to  the  seceding 
Southern  States  that  the  Hudson  bore  to  the  rebellious  Thir 
teen  Colonies  in  the  Revolutionary  War;  it  divided  them  into 
two  parts.  If  the  Union  forces  could  get  control  of  this  river 
they  would  split  the  Confederacy  in  two,  and  stop  the  passage 
of  supplies  and  men  to  the  Confederate  armies  in  the  east  from 
Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and  Texas.  This  was  a  purely  military 
consideration,  but  there  was  also  a  political  and  commercial 
consideration.  The  Mississippi  was  the  great  highway  of 
trade  between  the  Northwestern  States  and  the  outside  world ; 
so  long  as  any  part  of  it  was  controlled  by  Confederate  batteries 
the  highway  was  closed. 

The  Confederates  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  controlled  the 
middle  portion  of  the  river  by  the  forts  at  Columbus,  New 
Madrid  and  Island  No.  10,  Fort  Pillow  and  Fort  Randolph. 
Columbus  was  evacuated  a  short  while  after  the  fall  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson.  General  Pope,  with  the  help  of  Foote's 
fleet,  captured  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10,  in  April,  1862. 
The  victory  at  Shiloh  (April  6  and  7,  1862)  advanced  the 
Union  line  southward  to  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail 
way,  Fort  Pillow  was  abandoned  by  the  Confederates  on  the 
4th  of  June,  and  Fort  Randolph  the  next  day. 

At  this  time  the  Federals  and  the  Confederates  both  had 
fleets  on  the  river.  Foote's  fleet,  now  commanded  by  Commo 
dore  Davis,  Foote  being  still  disabled  by  the  wound  he  re 
ceived  at  Donelson,  pushed  on  down  the  river,  as  one  Con 
federate  post  after  another  was  evacuated  or  taken.  On  May 
10,  1862,  the  Confederate  flotilla  had  attacked  the  Union 
fleet  at  Fort  Pillow  and  been  defeated.  On  June  7  the  Union 
squadron  attacked  the  Confederate  fleet  at  Memphis,  destroy 
ing  three  of  its  vessels,  damaging  others,  and  driving  the  fleet 
southward.  The  Mayor  of  Memphis  immediately  surrendered 
the  town  to  Davis.  The  river  was  now  open  southward  as 
far  as  Vicksburg.  On  the  25th  of  April,  1862,  Farragut's  fleet 
had  arrived  at  New  Orleans  and  taken  possession  of  that  city ; 
in  May  the  fleet  moved  up  the  river  and  took  Baton  Rouge  and 

394 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  395 

Natchez,  and,  with  the  assistance  of  a  small  detachment  of  land 
troops,  tried  to  take  Vicksburg,  but  failed. 

The  Confederate  authorities,  now  appreciating  the  impor 
tance  and  the  peril  of  Vicksburg,  had  it  strongly  garrisoned 
and  provided  with  batteries  to  command  the  river.  By  direc 
tion  of  the  authorities  at  Washington,  Farragut,  with  his  fleet 
of  ships  and  gunboats,  and  General  Williams,  with  a  small 
force  of  artillery  and  infantry,  made  another  unsuccessful 
effort  against  Vicksburg,  toward  the  end  of  June,  1862. 
Vicksburg  was  now  the  only  point  of  the  river  held  by  the 
Confederates,  but  in  August  General  Breckinridge  garrisoned 
Port  Hudson,  two  hundred  miles  below  Vicksburg,  and  began 
setting  up  heavy  batteries  there  to  command  the  river.  Thence 
forward  this  point,  also,  was  occupied  by  the  Confederates 
until  after  the  fall  of  Vicksburg.  The  Confederates  also  re 
gained  control  of  the  river  as  far  northward  as  Helena,  Ark. 
"Within  this  distance  batteries  were  erected  or  strengthened 
wherever  the  river  touches  the  eastern  bluffs — at  Port  Hudson, 
at  Natchez,  at  Grand  Bluff,  at  Vicksburg ;  and  a  fort  was  also 
erected  a  short  distance  up  the  Arkansas  River,  from  the  cover 
of  which  gunboats  could  issue  forth  and  destroy  all  unarmed 
vessels."* 

Such  was  the  situation  along  the  Mississippi  in  September, 
1862.  Halleck,  having  captured  Corinth  and  'dispersed  his 
army,  had  gone  to  Washington  to  assume  the  office  of  General- 
in-Chief,  leaving  Grant  "in  command  of  all  troops  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  Memphis  and  Corinth  and  as  far  back  as  Columbus,  Ky." 
Buell  and  Bragg  were  in  their  race  for  Kentucky,  and  Grant's 
forces  had  been  drawn  upon  to  reinforce  Buell's;  Grant  now 
had  only  about  42,000  men.  With  these  he  was  required  by 
Halleck  to  guard  the  railway  from  Memphis  to  Decatur,  two 
hundred  miles,  and  keep  open  communication  with  Buell.  This 
constrained  him  to  a  passive  defensive  attitude  for  the  time. 
(214)  "He  therefore  occupied  three  important  points  of  this 
road, — Memphis,  Corinth,  and  Tuscumbia, — with  considerable 
bodies,  and  posted  the  rest  of  his  men  at  Jackson  and  Bolivar, 
central  points  in  rear,  from  which  they  could  readily  be  moved 
in  any  required  direction.  In  this  position  he  awaited  the 
enemy,  in  whose  hands  the  power  of  initiative  had  passed."* 

The  Confederate  troops  in  Mississippi  composed  two  inde- 


*Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War  (Scribner's) — Greene. 


396  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

pendent  commands,  each  about  16,000  strong.  One  force  un 
der  Van  Dorn  "was  charged  with  the  defense  of  the  river"  and 
was  "scattered  from  Holly  Springs  to  Vicksburg";  the  other 
under  Sterling  Price  "was  to  guard  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Rail 
road  south  of  Corinth,"  and  was  posted  about  Topelo.*  On 
the  2nd  of  September  Price  received  word  from  Bragg  that 
Rosecrans,  whose  "Army  of  the  Mississippi"  formed  the  left 
of  Grant's  line,  was  about  to  march  to  Tennessee  in  order  to 
join  Buell.  Bragg  asked  Price  to  prevent  this  movement. 
Accordingly  Price  asked  Van  Dorn  to  join  forces  with  him 
to  attack  Rosecrans.  Van  Dorn  agreed  to  join  him,  but  re 
plied  that  he  should  not  be  able  to  assemble  his  scattered 
forces  before  the  12th  of  the  month.  Fearing  that  this  would 
not  be  early  enough  to  catch  Rosecrans,  Price  moved  out  with 
out  waiting  for  Van  Dorn.  On  the  14th  he  occupied  luka. 
About  the  18th  Price  and  Van  Dorn  arranged  to  join  their 
forces  at  Rienzi  for  an  advance  against  Corinth. 

Meantime  Grant  had  been  watching  the  movements  of  Price 
and  Van  Dorn,  and  had  resolved  to  attack  Price  at  luka,  before 
he  and  Van  Dorn  could  unite  their  forces.  To  this  end  he 
assembled  Rosecrans's  command  and  Ord's  division  at  Corinth, 
and  started  them  toward  luka.  Rosecrans  took  the  roads  by 
way  of  Rienzi  and  Jacinto,  and  was  to  approach  luka  from  the 
direction  of  tne  south.  Ord  marched  by  way  of  the  railway, 
and  was  to  attack  at  the  same  time  from  the  north  and  west. 
The  combined  attack  was  to  drive  Price  against. the  Tennessee 
River.  As  usually  happens  with  marches  of  concentration,  this 
one  miscarried.  The  upshot  was,  Rosecrans  approached  by 
one  road  only  from  the  south,  and  attacked  the  Confederates 
without  Ord.  Darkness  ended  the  combat,  and  during  the 
night  Price  slipped  out  by  the  other  road  [the  Fulton  road] 
to  the  south. 

Rosecrans  and  Ord  returned  to  Corinth.  Van  Dorn  and 
Price  met  at  Ripley  on  the  28th  of  September,  and  Van  Dorn 
took  command  of  their  combined  force  by  virtue  of  his  rank. 
Van  Dorn  marched  the  united  force  by  way  of  Pocahontas 
and  Che  walla,  and  formed  line  of  battle  to  the  northwest  of 
Rosecrans's  position,  near  intrenchments  at  Corinth,  on  the 
morning  of  October  the  3rd.  (215)  The  Confederates  at 
tacked,  and  by  sunset  had  driven  the  Federals  into  the  redoubts 
at  the  edge  of  the  town.  The  next  morning  Van  Dorn  renewed 
the  assault.  The  combat  was  ferocious;  but  by  noon  it  was 

*Greene. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  397 

over,  and  the  Confederates  were  retreating  from  the  field,  Rose- 
crans  made  no  pursuit  until  the  next  day.  (214)  Van  Dorn 
made  good  his  retreat  to  Holly  Springs.  Rosecrans  and  Hurl- 
but  pursued  to  Ripley  and  were  then  recalled  by  Grant  to 
Corinth  and  Bolivar. 

General  Pemberton  was  now  sent  to  Mississippi  to  take  com 
mand  of  all  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  State ;  Rosecrans  was 
called  from  Grant's  army  to  relieve  Buell  of  the  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  Grant  was  promised  by  Halleck  a 
"large  body  of  new  levies,"  and  he  purposed  taking  the  offen 
sive  without  delay. 

Meantime  McClernand  was  in  Washington  working  out  a 
secret  scheme  with  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
by  which  he  was  to  raise  a  volunteer  army  in  Indiana,  Illinois, 
and  Iowa,  and  lead  it  down  the  Mississippi  to  capture  Vicks- 
burg.  No  intimation  of  this  project  was  given  to  General 
Grant,  but  Halleck,  of  course,  was  informed  of  it.  The  re 
sult  was  that  when  Grant  first  wrote  to  Halleck  (October  26) 
asking  leave  to  move  against  Vicksburg,  he  received  no  reply 
to  his  letter.  Then  followed  several  contradictory  and  vague 
dispatches-  from  Halleck,  which  kept  Grant  for  some  time 
guessing  what  he  was  expected  to  do.  (213)  At  last,  how 
ever,  it  was  arranged  that  Grant  should  move  with  the  main 
army  from  Grand  Junction  to  Holly  Springs,  and  be  joined  by 
Sherman  with  the  troops  from  Memphis,  on  the  Tallahatchie 
River.  A  force  from  Helena  was  to  move  across  the  Missis 
sippi  and  threaten  the  Confederate  rear  at  Grenada. 

At  this  time  Van  Dorn  commanded  the  Confederate  forces 
about  Holly  Springs — some  24,000  men,  formed  in  two  divi 
sions,  under  Price  and  Lovell.  Vicksburg  was  garrisoned  by 
6,000  Confederates,  and  Port  Hudson  by  5,500.  Pemberton 
had  his  headquarters  at  Jackson. 

By  the  5th  of  November  Grant  had  reached  Oxford  with  the 
main  body,  and  Sherman  was  at  College  Hill,  a  few  miles 
northwest  of  that  place.  The  force  from  Helena  had  carried 
out  its  part  of  the  plan  and  had  returned  to  Helena.  Van  Dorn 
had  fallen  back,  before  Grant's  advance,  to  Grenada.  Up  to 
this  time  Grant  had  advanced  with  no  very  definite  plan,  ex 
cept  to  attack  the  enemy  if  he  overtook  him.  But  Van  Dorn, 
by  Pemberton's  order,  had  kept  falling  back.  As  Grant's 
line  of  communication  was  now  more  than  200  miles  long — 
a  single-track  railway  back  to  Columbus,  Kentucky, — Grant 
established  a  secondary  base  at  Holly  Springs. 


398  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

After  considerable  correspondence  with  Halleck.  and  the  dis 
cussion  of  several  plans  with  Sherman  for  the  capture  of 
Vicksburg,  it  was  finally  arranged,  with  Halleck's  approval, 
that  Sherman  should  return  to  Memphis  with  one  division. 
There  he  was  to  pick  up  all  the  newly  arrived  troops,  and,  with 
the  troops  under  Steele  from  Helena,  he  was  to  organize  an 
expedition  to  move  by  transports,  under  escort  of  Porter's 
fleet  of  gunboats,  to  Vicksburg,  while  Grant  marched  his  army 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Yazoo  against  the  same  objective. 
Sherman  was  back  at  Memphis  by  the  12th  of  December,  and 
set  out  for  Vicksburg  on  the  20th. 

But  events  occurred  which  prevented  Grant  from  carrying 
out  his  part  of  the  plan.  Forrest's  cavalry  broke  up  sixty 
miles  of  the  railway  north  of  Jackson,  Tennessee,  thereby 
interrupting  Grant's  communications  with  his  base  at  Colum 
bus  for  twelve  days  (Dec.  19-30).  About  the  same  time  Van 
Dorn  collected  a  mounted  force  of  some  3,500  men,  with  which 
he  marched  up  from  Grenada  and  surprised  the  Union  gar 
rison  at  Holly  Springs.  He  captured  the  garrison,  1,500 
men,  and  destroyed  the  depot  of  stores  valued  at  $1,500,000; 
then  he  moved  up  the  railway  as  far  as  Bolivar,  attacking  one 
small  post  after  another,  and  made  his  escape  back  to  Grenada. 
As  a  consequence  of  these  raids  Grant  was  forced  to  place  his 
army  on  short  rations,  fall  back  to  the  Memphis  and  Charles 
ton  Railway,  and  open  communications  with  Memphis.  No 
supplies  were  to  be  had  in  the  country;  it  had  been  stripped. 

Sherman,  in  the  meanwhile,  had  gone  down  the  Mississippi. 
He  had  a  force  of  32,000  men  and  sixty  guns,  which  he  organ 
ized  into  four  divisions.  His  division  commanders  were  M.  L. 
Smith,  A.  J.  Smith,  G.  W.  Morgan,  and  Fred  Steele.  The 
expedition  reached  Miliken's  Bend,  twenty-five  miles  above 
Vicksburg,  before  daylight  on  Christmas  day. 

(216)  Vicksburg  stood  250  feet  above  the  waters  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  from  there  a  line  of  cliffs,  known  as  Chicka- 
saw  Bluffs,  ran  northward  twelve  miles,  to  Hayne's  Bluff  on 
the  Yazoo  River.  The  space  between  the  base  of  the  bluffs  and 
the  rivers  was  a  wooded  swamp  cut  up  by  bayous  and  creeks. 

Pemberton  had  learned  of  Sherman's  expedition,  and  had 
hurried  reinforcements  to  Vicksburg;  so  that  12,000  Confed 
erates  were  now  intrenched  upon  the  bluffs,  awaiting  Sher 
man's  attack.  Sherman  landed  his  troops,  on  the  26th  of  De 
cember,  at  Johnson's  plantation,  and  his  columns,  on  the  27th 
and  28th,  meandered  across  the  swamps  and  bayous  toward 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  399 

the  foot  of  the  bluffs.  Only  one  of  the  columns  had  a  bridge- 
train.  On  the  29th  Sherman  assaulted  the  Confederate  posi 
tion,  but  was  unable  to  carry  it.  He  remained  in  position  two 
or  three  days,  vainly  trying  to  find  some  way  by  which  to 
dislodge  the  Confederates.  On  the  2nd  of  January  he  re- 
embarked  his  men,  and,  without  opposition,  returned  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Yazoo.  Here  he  was  met  by  McClernand,  with 
an  order  assigning  that  general  to  command  the  expedition. 
The  order  was  dated  about  the  17th  of  December.  Thus  ended 
in  failure  the  project  of  a  combined  movement  against  Vicks- 
burg  by  land  and  water. 

(213)  This  expedition  was  also  to  have  received  the  co 
operation  of  an  expedition  under  Banks  from  New  Orleans. 
Banks,  however,  got  no  farther  than  Baton  Rouge.  He  did  not 
feel  strong  enough  to  attack  Port  Hudson,  and  his  operations 
afforded  Sherman  no  assistance. 

Having  assumed  command  of  the  Union  force  near  Vicks- 
burg,  McClernand  designated  it  the  "Army  of  the  Mississippi," 
and  divided  it  into  two  corps,  under  Morgan  and  Sherman, 
respectively.  McClernand  now  moved  his  army  up  the  river 
to  Arkansas  Post  (called  by  the  Confederates  Fort  Hindman). 
This  place  was  attacked  by  land  and  water,  and  on  January  11 
was  surrendered  to  McClernand,  with  about  5,000  prisoners. 
Here  McClernand  remained  two  or  three  days,  and  was  con 
templating  what  General  Grant  characterized  as  a  "wild-goose 
chase"  farther  into  Arkansas,  when  he  received  a  peremptory 
order  from  Grant  to  return  to  Miliken's  Bend. 

Under  authority  from  the  War  Department  General  Grant 
now  decided  to  take  command  in  person  of  the  operations  on 
the  Mississippi  against  Vicksburg.  By  orders  from  the  same 
source  he  organized  all  the  troops  under  his  command  into 
four  corps,  the  Thirteenth,  Fifteenth,  Sixteenth,  and  Seven 
teenth,  commanded  respectively  by  Major-Generals  McCler 
nand,  Sherman,  Hurlbut,  and  McPherson.  McPherson's 
corps  was  sent  down  the  river;  Hurlbut's  headquarters  were 
to  be  at  Memphis,  and  his  corps  was  to  embrace  all  the  troops 
left  back  to  guard  the  bases  and  lines  of  communication;  Mc 
Clernand  and  Sherman  were  ordered  to  set  their  men  to  dig 
ging  a  canal  across  the  peninsula  opposite  Vicksburg.  Grant 
hoped  to  transfer  his  army  by  this  canal  to  the  south  of  Vicks 
burg,  there  to  cross  the  Mississippi  and  reach  high  ground  in 
rear  of  the  town. 


400  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

The  Mississippi  River  from  Memphis  to  Vicksburg  flows 
through  a  vast  bottom  of  black  loam,  bounded  on  the  east  by 
a  line  of  hills,  which,  beginning  in  the  high  bluffs  at  Memphis, 
curves  outward  to  a  distance  of  forty  or  fifty  miles,  coming 
back  to  the  river  again  at  Vicksburg.  This  bottom  contains 
the  richest  cotton-fields  of  Mississippi,  and  in  the  parlance  of 
the  State  used  to  be  spoken  of  as  "The  Swamps" — a  name 
that  fittingly  applied  to  it.  It  is  in  fact  a  delta,  for  all  the 
branches  of  the  great  river  in  the  region  are  really  side-chan 
nels,  not  affluents  in  the  usual  sense.  They  begin  and  end  in 
the  main  stream.  The  surface  of  the  ground  is  very  low,  and 
most  of  it  would  be  under  water  a  great  part  of  the  time  but 
for  the  levees  along  the  river.  The  courses  of  the  streams 
through  this  bottom  are  so  crooked,  and  the  soil  is  so  soft,  that 
the  river-bends  are  continually  cutting  into  one  another,  caus 
ing  the  streams  to  take  new  channels,  and  leaving  crescent- 
shaped  bodies  of  stagnant  water.  These  are  the  bayous,  in 
which  the  whole  bottom  abounds.  They  appear  never  to  dry 
up.  The  rainfall  in  winter  is  very  heavy,  and  even  to-day  there 
is  hardly  a  large  plantation  in  the  region  that  does  not  contain 
some  swamp-lands  too  wet  and  low  to  clear  for  cultivation. 
There  is  not  a  rock  nor  a  stone  in  the  whole  country,  and  the 
roads  are  terrible  in  winter.  To-day  a  number  of  railways 
traverse  the  bottom,  but  at  the  time  of  the  Vicksburg  Campaign 
there  was  not  one. 

On  the  west  side  of  the  river  swamp-lands  of  like  character 
reach  many  miles  farther  southward.  (217)  On  the  east  bank 
the  swamps  disappear  below  Vicksburg,  except  in  the  large 
bends  between  New  Carthage  and  Grand  Gulf ;  the  region 
back  toward  Jackson  is  a  rolling  country  of  big  plantations, 
containing  much  woodland.  It  is  intersected  by  two  unforda- 
ble  streams,  Big  Black  River  and  Bayou  Pierre,  and  by  many 
of  their  branches  and  branches  of  Pearl  River,  which,  flow 
ing  south  by  Jackson,  bounds  the  region  on  the  east.  The 
roads  were  all  bad,  and  the  towns,  except  Vicksburg  and  Jack 
son,  were  villages.  Two  railways  crossed  at  Jackson,  and  it 
was  the  capital  of  Mississippi  and  the  base  of  supplies  for 
the  Confederate  troops  in  the  State;  hence  it  was  a  place  of 
great  strategic  importance. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  401 

OPERATIONS. 

Grant  joined  the  army  at  Young's  Point  on  the  29th  of  Jan 
uary,  1863.  On  examining  the  canal  undergoing  construc 
tion  he  was  not  favorably  impressed  with  the  project.  He  let 
the  work  go  on,  however,  but  had  two  other  routes  explored, 
with  a  view  to  turn  Vicksburg  and  reach  the  high  ground  in 
its  rear:  (213)  first,  by  way  of  Yazoo  Pass*  and  the  Talla- 
hatchie  and  Yazoo  Rivers  to  the  rear  of  Haynes's  Bluff,  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  position;  second,  by  way  of  Lake 
Providence,  Bayou  Macon,  the  Tensas,  Washita,  Red,  and 
Mississippi,  to  the  rear  of  Warrenton,  (217)  the  left  of  the 
position.  By  this  route  he  might  have  united  with  Banks  and 
Farragut. 

In  spite  of  floods  and  other  hindrances  work  was  continued 
on  the  canal  opposite  Vicksburg  till  near  the  end  of  March, 
when  it  was  stopped  by  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Warren- 
ton.  The  project  was  then  given  up  as  a  failure.  Meantime 
McPherson  had  been  at  work  with  his  corps  on  the  Lake 
Providence  route ;  this  route  was  also  abandoned  about  the  last 
of  March,  by  which  time  Grant  had  formed  plans  for  mov 
ing  south  from  Miliken's  Bend  by  land.  (213)  The  Yazoo 
Pass  project  had  appeared  to  be  the  most  likely  of  all  the  proj 
ects.  The  levee  that  stood  across  the  Pass  was  cut  away,  and 
a  division  from  Helena  was  started  in  light-draft  transports  to 
try  the  route. 

All  this  while  the  Confederates  in  Mississippi  had  not  been 
idle.  On  the  contrary,  they  had  made  extraordinary  efforts  to 
save  their  State  and  the  Mississippi  River.  The  garrison  at 
Vicksburg  had  been  strengthened  to  more  than  25,000.  From 
the  force  at  Grenada,  some  20,000,  Loring  conducted  a  detach 
ment  to  the  junction  of  the  Tallahatchie  and  the  Yalabusha 
rivers.  Here,  in  a  bend  of  the  Tallahatchie,  the  neck  of  which 
was  only  500  yards  wide,  he  built  Fort  Pemberton,  whose  guns 
completely  commanded  the  narrow  channel. 

After  a  slow  and  difficult  passage  down  the  crooked  streams, 
hindered  all  the  way  by  felled  trees  and  other  obstructions 
placed  by  the  Confederates,  the  Federal  gunboats  with  their 
convoy  from  Helena  reached  the  position  of  Fort  Pemberton, 
and  were  stopped  by  its  guns.  As  by  this  time  Grant  had  found 

*Where  the  Tallahatchie  River  breaks  out  of  the  Mississippi  a  few 
miles  below  Helena. 


402  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

that  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  enough  light-draft  transports, 
this  enterprise  was  also  abandoned. 

(217)  But  the  hope  of  reaching  the  rear  of  Vicksburg  by  a 
water  route  was  not  given  up  until  a  fourth  effort  was  made  by 
way  of  the  Yazoo,  Steele's  Bayou,  and  other  cross  bayous,  Deer 
Creek,  and  Sunflower  River.  (213)  Sherman,  escorted  by 
Porter's  gunboats,  explored  this  route;  he  was  met  by  Con 
federate  sharpshooters  behind  the  trees  along  the  way  through 
the  forests,  and  forced  to  withdraw.  So  narrow  and  crooked 
were  the  bayous  that  his  boats  could  not  turn  round ;  they  had 
to  back  out  stern- foremost. 

General  Grant  was  now  about  at  his  wit's  end — he  had  to  do 
something,  and  that  promptly,  or  pass  to  the  rear  with  the  other 
failures — McDowell,  McClellan,  Pope,  Burnside.  Already  the 
press  was  calling  for  his  removal.  Three  plans  only  were  left 
to  try :  first,  to  assault  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Vicksburg ; 
second,  to  return  to  Memphis  and  begin  a  new  advance  along 
the  Mississippi  Central  Railway;  third,  to  find  some  way  across 
the  swamps  opposite  Vicksburg  to  a  crossing  lower  down  the 
river,  and  from  there,  without  any  base  of  supplies,  to  move 
against  the  rear  of  the  town.  The  first  plan  would  have  been 
suicide;  the  second  plan  would  have  looked  like  a  retreat,  and 
if  Grant  had  adopted  it  the  public  press  would  probably  have 
forced  the  administration  to  relieve  him  of  command ;  the  third 
plan  involved  a  risk  seldom  justified  in  war.  He  chose  the 
third  plan.* 

(217)  New  Carthage  was  to  be  the  first  objective,  and  a 
route  thither  was  to  be  opened  by  way  of  the  bayous  from 
Miliken's  Bend  and  Duckport,  by  which  troops  and  supplies 
were  to  be  forwarded  on  flatboats  and  barges.  The  gunboats 
and  a  number  of  transports  were  to  run  past  the  Confederate 
batteries ;  but  General  Grant  found  again  that,  on  account  of  a 
lack  of  barges,  and  other  difficulties,  he  would  have  to  give  up 
the  effort  to  move  his  army  by  way  of  the  bayous ;  but  by  con 
structing  several  miles  of  corduroy  road  and  many  bridges  he 
was  enabled  to  move  his  troops  and  a  large  part  of  his  supplies 
by  land — or  rather  by  mud. 

Grant  found  on  arrival  at  New  Carthage  that  the  village 
"was  still  surrounded  by  water,  and  was  entirely  unsuitable  for 
concentrating  a  large  force."*  So  another  place  called  Hard 

*Greene. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  403 

Times,  lower  down  the  river,  was  selected,  and  more  bridges 
and  corduroy  roads  had  to  be  built.  With  some  losses  the  gun 
boats  and  transports  ran  by  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Vicks- 
burg,  and,  by  the  29th  of  April,  all  difficulties  had  been  so  far 
overcome  that  Grant  had  the  corps  of  McClernand  and  Mc- 
Pherson  assembled  at  Hard  Times  ready  to  cross.  (218) 

Let  us  see  what  Pemberton's  Confederate  forces  had  been 
doing  in  Mississippi  in  the  meanwhile.  At  the  last  of  March 
Pemberton  had  in  the  State  about  50,000  effectives.  General 
Stevenson  with  22,000  held  the  line  of  the  Mississippi  from 
Haynes's  Bluff  to  Grand  Gulf.  The  latter  place,  about  as 
strong  naturally  as  Vicksburg,  was  fortified  and  garrisoned. 
(213)  Port  Hudson  was  fortified,  and  garrisoned  by  15,000 
or  16,000  men  under  Gardner.  Loring  had  7,000  men  at  Fort 
Pemberton,  Grenada,  and  other  neighboring  points,  and  there 
were  some  3,000  or  4,000  in  the  north  of  the  State  watching 
the  Union  troops  along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railway. 
There  was  no  Confederate  cavalry  in  the  State,  Van  Dorn 
with  all  the  cavalry  in  that  quarter  having  been  ordered  to 
Tennessee  to  aid  Bragg. 

During  the  months  of  March  and  April  the  Confederates 
were  unable  to  decide  what  movement  Grant  was  undertaking. 
To  deceive  them  Steele's  division  of  Sherman's  corps  had  been 
sent  up  the  river  toward  Greenville,  and  rumor  said  that  Grant 
was  going  back  to  Memphis  to  begin  an  advance  by  way  of 
the  railway.  Then  the  report  reached  Pemberton  that  a  strong 
Union  column  was  actually  moving  southward  from  the  Mem 
phis  and  Charleston  Railway. 

This  was  Grierson's  cavalry  starting  on  its  famous  raid.  It 
left  Lagrange  on  the  17th  of  April,  and  on  the  2nd  of  May 
reached  the  Union  camp  at  Baton  Rouge.  With  barely  1,000 
horsemen  Grierson  had  ridden  entirely  through  the  State, 
marching  600  miles  in  sixteen  days — averaging  nearly  thirty- 
eight  miles  a  day — destroying  many  miles  of  railway  and  tele 
graph  lines  and  much  other  property.  "But,  far  more  impor 
tant  than  all  this,  he  had  distracted  the  enemy's  attention  in  an 
extraordinary  degree  at  a  most  critical  moment" — while  Grant 
was  making  his  preparations  to  cross  the  Mississippi. 

Having  no  cavalry  to  oppose  or  to  maintain  touch  with  Grier 
son's  column,  the  Confederates  were  kept  in  a  wild  state  of 
ignorance,  excitement,  and  alarm.  "The  most  exaggerated 
rumors  were  current  of"  Grierson's  "presence  in  a  dozen  places 


404  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

at  once,"*  and  large  infantry  detachments  were  sent  out  from 
almost  every  garrison  to  try  to  cut  him  off.  He  dodged  them 
all.  In  its  strategic  effect  this  was,  perhaps,  the  most  success 
ful  cavalry  raid  of  the  Civil  War,  or  of  all  modern  wars.  It 
drew  the  attention  of  the  Confederates  away  from  Grand  Gulf, 
and  prevented  them  from  sending  reinforcements  to  that  place 
just  at  the  critical  hour. 

(218)  At  7  a.  m.  on  the  29th  of  April  Porter's  squadron 
steamed  down  from  Hard  Times  to  Grand  Gulf,  followed  by 
all  the  available  transports  loaded  with  men — three  of  Mc 
Clernand's  divisions.  An  hour  later  Porter  opened  fire  on  the 
Confederate  batteries,  and  an  artillery  duel  was  kept  up  until 
the  Confederate  guns  ceased  firing,  about  1  p.  m.  But  the  re 
sult  was  not  such  as  to  let  Grant  believe  that  he  could  success 
fully  land  troops  from  his  transports  and  assault  the  parapets, 
and  he  decided  to  move  five  miles  farther  down,  to  De  Shroon's 
Landing.  Later  he  was  informed  by  a  negro  that  a  good  road 
ran  back  from  Bruinsburg  to  Port  Gibson,  and  he  decided  to 
make  his  crossing  at  Bruinsburg.  At  daylight  on  the  30th  of 
April  the  troops  began  crossing,  and  by  noon  McClernand's 
entire  corps,  18,000  men,  was  on  the  eastern  bank.  No  Con 
federates  had  appeared  to  dispute  the  landing.  After  delaying 
four  hours  to  issue  rations  to  his  men — which  ought  to  have 
been  issued  before — McClernand  moved  out.  At  sunset  he 
reached  the  bluffs  three  miles  back  of  the  landing,  which  he 
found  unoccupied  by  the  enemy.  He  pushed  on  toward  Port 
Gibson,  and  about  one  o'clock  in  the  night  his  leading  division 
[Carr]  met  the  enemy  some  four  miles  west  of  Port  Gibson. 
After  a  slight  skirmish  the  division  bivouacked  until  daylight. 
The  Confederates  encountered  at  this  point  were  a  detach 
ment  that  had  been  sent  out  from  the  garrison  at  Grand  Gulf. 
As  soon  as  Pemberton,  who  was  at  Jackson,  learned  by  tele 
graph  of  the  attack  on  Grand  Gulf,  he  ordered  reinforcements 
to  be  sent  thither  at  once  from  Vicksburg.  By  night  two  bri 
gades  had  arrived.  One  of  these  [Tracy]  marched  on  toward 
Port  Gibson,  and,  by  daybreak  of  May  1,  was  in  position  with 
the  brigade  that  had  been  met  during  the  night  by  the  head 
of  McClernand's  corps.  At  this  point  the  road  formed  two 
branches  which  came  back  together  at  Port  Gibson.  One  Con 
federate  brigade  [Tracy]  was  across  the  northern  branch,  and 
the  other  [Green]  across  the  southern  branch.  The  ground 


*Greene. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  405 

was  very  unfavorable  for  an  attack.  It  was  a  mass  of  short 
steep  hills,  separated  from  one  another  by  ravines  "filled  with 
a  dense  growth  of  cane  and  underbrush."* 

The  combat  opened  on  the  Confederate  right  at  daybreak. 
Soon  McClernand's  whole  corps  was  on  the  ground,  and  Mc- 
Pherson's  corps  was  crossing,  back  at  Bruinsburg.  McPherson 
came  up  with  two  brigades  of  Logan's  division  at  noon  and 
joined  in  the  battle.  The  ground  was  so  difficult  to  maneuver 
upon  that  the  Federal  troops,  though  outnumbering  the  Con 
federates  nearly  three  to  one,  found  it  hard  to  beat  them.  The 
left  Confederate  brigade  nevertheless  gave  way  within  an  hour 
or  two,  but  the  right  one,  on  the  northern  road,  held  fast. 
Before  noon  the  other  Confederate  brigade  from  Vicksburg 
[Baldwin]  arrived,  as  well  as  three  more  regiments  under 
Cockrell.  About  5  p.  m.  McPherson  succeeded  in  enveloping 
the  Confederate  right;  then  the  whole  line  gave  way.  The 
brigades  on  the  right  retreated  directly  upon  Grand  Gulf,  burn 
ing  the  bridge  over  Bayou  Pierre ;  the  left  brigade  fell  back  by 
way  of  Grindstone  Ferry,  burning  the  bridges  over  both  forks 
of  the  bayou.  This  brigade  finally  rejoined  the  right  by  way 
of  Willow  Springs. 

At  this  time  the  Confederate  troops  were  scattered  all  over 
Mississippi,  from  Grenada  to  Port  Hudson;  from  Meridian  to 
Vicksburg.  The  detachments  sent  out  after  Grierson  had  not 
returned  to  their  stations.  Pemberton  had  gone  to  Vicksburg, 
and  he  spent  the  1st  of  May  "sending  telegrams  in  all  direc 
tions  for  the  purpose  of  collecting  his  scattered  forces."* 
Three  more  brigades  were  started  from  Vicksburg  toward 
Port  Gibson.  These  were  met  on  the  morning  of  May  3,  at 
Hankinson's  Ferry,  by  the  Confederates  that  had  retreated 
from  Port  Gibson.  These  fleeing  troops  had  stopped  long 
enough  at  Grand  Gulf  to  blow  up  the  magazines  and  dismount 
the  guns ;  then,  with  the  rest  of  the  garrison,  they  had  hastened 
on  toward  Vicksburg,  by  way  of  Hankinson's  Ferry.  Here 
some  troops  from  the  direction  of  Jackson,  also,  had  joined. 
'So  that  on  the  3rd  of  May  there  were  retreating  beyond  Han 
kinson's  Ferry  some  17,000  Confederate  soldiers,  foot-sore  and 
worn-out  with  long  marches  and  fighting;  and  more  or  less 
demoralized. 

McPherson's  corps  followed  the  retreating  Confederates  and 
halted  at  Hankinson's  Ferry;  McClernand's  halted  at  Willow 


*Greene. 


406  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Springs.  Both  corps  remained  in  bivouac  for  three  days, 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  Sherman's  corps  as  well  as  of  ammu 
nition  and  rations.  (219)  Up  to  this  time  Sherman's  corps 
had  remained  at  Miliken's  Bend  and  Haynes's  Bluff,  making 
demonstrations  against  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line. 
Sherman  now  received  orders  to  move  his  corps  up  to  the  line 
of  the  other  two,  leaving  Blair's  division  to  guard  the  depots  at 
the  river  until  it  could  be  relieved  by  a  division  sent  down  from 
Memphis.  One  of  McPherson's  brigades,  also,  was  left  on  the 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River.  By  the  7th  of  May  Sherman 
was  across  the  river  at  Grand  Gulf.  The  same  day  McCler- 
nand  and  McPherson  moved  their  corps  to  Rocky  Springs. 

Grant  now  had  about  41,000  men  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Mississippi ;  Pemberton  had,  including  the  garrison  of  Port 
Hudson,  some  50,000  men  in  the  State.  But  Port  Hudson, 
which  was  about  as  important  to  hold  as  Vicksburg,  was 
threatened  by  Banks  and  Farragut  from  the  south,  and  was, 
moreover,  140  miles  by  road  from  Raymond  or  Jackson,  the 
nearest  points  at  which  its  troops  could  effect  a  junction  with 
Pemberton's  main  army. 

During  these  operations  of  General  Grant,  Banks  had  a  force 
operating  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi  from  New  Or 
leans.  The  War  Department  expected  Grant  and  Banks  to 
cooperate  against  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson.  On  the  10th 
of  April  Grant  received  a  letter  from  Halleck,  "calling  special 
attention  to  the  necessity  of  cooperating  with  Banks"  ;*  and, 
when  Grant  was  working  to  get  across  the  Mississippi  near 
Grand  Gulf,  he  meant  to  send  a  corps  down  toward  Port  Hud 
son  to  cooperate  with  Banks.  But  on  May  2  he  had  received 
a  letter  from  Banks,  dated  April  12,  and  written  while  Banks 
was  on  his  way  northward  with  an  expedition  against  the  Con 
federates  on  the  Red  River,  in  which  Banks  said  that  he  should 
"return  to  Baton  Rouge  on  May  10,"  and  would  then  co 
operate  against  Port  Hudson,  and  that  he  should  have  15,000 
men  available  for  field  service. 

Grant  had  wonked  for  months  to  reach  high  ground  back 
of  Vicksburg;  he  had  at  last  succeeded.  He  had  defeated  the 
enemy  the  day  before  at  Port  Gibson,  and  put  him  to  flight. 
Banks  was  not  operating  against  Port  Hudson,  as  Grant  had 
supposed,  and  he  would  not  be  there  until  the  10th  of  the 
month,  and  then  would  have  only  15,000  men.  Under  such  cir- 


*Greene. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  407 

cumstances  it  did  not  take  Grant  long  to  decide  that  the  right 
thing  for  him  to  do  was  to  give  up  all  thought  of  cooperating 
with  Banks,  and  to  push  ahead  by  himself  with  the  advantage 
he  had  already  gained. 

Grant  could  spare  no  cavalry  to  follow  up  the  enemy,  or  to 
reconnoiter  far  ahead  and  to  the  flanks  in  order  to  gain  infor 
mation  of  the  hostile  forces.  He  says  in  his  Memoirs:  "The 
cavalry  was  used  in  this  advance  in  reconnoitering  to  find  the 
roads;  to  cover  our  advances  and  to  find  the  most  practicable 
routes  from  one  command  to  another  so  they  could  support 
each  other  in  case  of  attack."  All  he  knew  was,  therefore,  that 
the  enemy's  troops  at  Hankinson's  Ferry  had  retreated  toward 
Vicksburg ;  how  far  they  had  gone,  or  what  was  their  strength, 
he  could  not  tell.  It  was  rumored  that  another  force  was  as 
sembling  at  Jackson.  He  must  place  his  army  between  these 
two  forces.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to  advance  against  the 
railway  between  Jackson  and  Vicksburg,  watching  closely  the 
ferries  of  the  Big  Black  to  prevent  an  attack  on  his  left  flank. 

McClernand's  corps  was  ordered  to  take  the  road  from 
Rocky  Springs  to  Edwards's  Station ;  McPherson's  was  to  take 
the  road  by  way  of  Raymond  for  Jackson,  and,  after  destroying 
the  railways  and  public  stores,  to  rejoin  the  main  army;  while 
Sherman's  Corps  was  to  follow  in  rear  of  McClernand's,  or 
midway  between  McClernand's  and  McPherson's,  if  it  could 
find  a  road  there,  in  supporting  distance  of  both  flank-columns. 
It  was  Napoleon's  favorite  movement  of  two  wings  with  a 
central  reserve.  The  army  had  a  train  of  120  wagons  and  five 
days'  rations.  No  line  of  communications  was  to  be  maintained 
with  the  base  on  the  river.  The  army  was  to  live  off  the 
country. 

On  the  evening  of  the  llth  of  May  Grant's  army  bivouacked 
as  follows :  McClernand's  corps  [Thirteenth]  at  Five  Mile 
Creek  on  the  Telegraph  Road ;  Sherman's  [Fifteenth]  at  Au 
burn;  McPherson's  [Seventeenth]  five  miles  northeast  of 
Utica.  That  evening  Pemberton's  main  army  was  distributed 
as  follows :  Walker's  brigade  at  Jackson ;  Gregg's  at  Raymond, 
guarding  some  provisions  collected  there ;  Bowen's  division  at 
Edwards's  Station,  and  the  divisions  of  Loring  and  Stevenson 
on  the  way  from  Warrenton  to  Edwards's  Station.  There 
were  also  two  divisions  [Forney  and  M.  L.  Smith]  at  Vicks 
burg. 

On  May  1,  Pemberton  had  telegraphed  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
of  whose  wide  territorial  command  Mississippi  formed  a  part, 


408  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

that  Grant  had  crossed  the  great  river,  "and  that  a  furious 
battle  had  been  raging  all  day  at  Port  Gibson."*  Johnston  re 
plied  from  Tullahoma,  Tennessee,  "If  Grant  crosses,  unite  all 
your  troops  to  beat  him — success  will  give  back  what  was 
abandoned  to  win  it."  Pemberton  did  not  attempt  to  obey  this 
order.  He,  as  well  as  Jefferson  Davis,  was  of  the  opinion  that 
Grant's  army  could  not  "live  more  than  a  few  days  away  from 
the  river."  He  thought,  however,  that  Grant  might  make  a 
raid  on  Jackson,  but  that  his  main  army  would  immediately 
march  for  the  Mississippi,  below  Warrenton,  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  intrenchments.  Accordingly  Pemberton  distrib 
uted  the  bulk  of  his  troops,  the  divisions  of  Bowen,  Loring, 
and  Stevenson,  at  the  ferries  of  the  Big  Black  River.  He 
appealed  to  the  war  department  at  Richmond  for  reinforce 
ments,  and  Walker's  brigade  was  sent  to  Jackson  from  South 
Carolina.  Other  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Port  Hudson 
and  placed  at  Jackson. 

On  the  12th  [May]  Grant's  army  moved  forward.  Mc- 
Pherson's  corps  marched  out  on  the  Raymond  Road  at  4  a.  m., 
covered  by  the  only  cavalry  regiment  with  the  army.  Con 
federate  videttes  were  soon  seen  falling  back  toward  Ray 
mond.  At  about  eleven  o'clock  a  line  of  Confederate  artillery 
and  infantry  was  found  drawn  up  across  the  road,  on  high 
ground  beyond  a  small  stream,  about  two  miles  from  Raymond. 
It  was  Gregg's  brigade.  Logan's  division  of  McPherson's 
corps  was  in  the  lead.  It  deployed  at  once,  and  attacked  the 
Confederate  position.  Crocker's  division  came  up  later,  but 
took  little  part  in  the  combat.  A  stubborn  little  fight  took 
place,  which  lasted  till  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  Con 
federates  were  driven  from,  the  field.  Logan  followed  them 
some  distance  beyond  Raymond,  then  halted  and  bivouacked 
for  the  night. 

The  stout  resistance  met  by  McPherson  at  Raymond  led 
Grant  to  believe  that  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  was  at 
Jackson.  On  the  other  hand,  the  columns  of  McClernand  and 
Sherman  had  encountered  Confederate  skirmishers  in  large 
numbers  along  Fourteen  Mile  Creek  this  same  day.  This 
satisfied  Grant  that  the  reports  he  had  received,  to  the  effect 
that  a  large  force  of  Confederates  was  assembling  at  Edwards's 
Station,  were  true.  He  resolved  to  turn  first  against  the  force 
at  Jackson,  and  issued  orders  accordingly.  Pursuant  to  these 

*Greene. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  409 

orders  McPherson's  column  moved  to  Clinton  on  May  the  13th, 
and  to  Jackson  on  the  14th;  Sherman  moved  to  Mississippi 
Springs  on  the  13th,  and  to  Jackson  on  the  14th,  keeping  touch 
with  McPherson ;  McClernand  moved  to  Raymond  on  the  13th, 
and  sent  a  division  forward  to  Clinton  on  the  14th. 

Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  at  Jackson.  On  the  9th  of  May  he 
had  received  orders  from  Richmond  to  "proceed  at  once  to 
Mississippi  and  take  chief  command  of  the  forces  there."*  He 
reached  Jackson  on  the  evening  of  the  13th,  and  found  the 
brigades  of  Gregg  and  Walker  there.  Gist's  brigade  from 
South  Carolina  and  Maxey's  from  Port  Hudson  were  expected 
to  arrive  next  day.  This  would  give  Johnston  12,000  men; 
but  finding  that  Grant's  whole  army  was  between  him  and 
Pemberton  at  Edwards's  Station,  Johnston  wired_  to  Rich 
mond  :  "I  am  too  late." 

(220)  In  intrenchments  previously  made  Johnston  placed 
Gregg's  brigade  on  the  Raymond  Road,  and  Walker's  on  the 
Clinton  road,  "on  high  ground  commanding  the  approaches 
over  open  fields."*  He  directed  them  to  hold  back  the  enemy, 
until  the  public  stores  and  property  could  be  removed  north 
ward,  by  the  railway,  toward  Canton. 

Sherman  and  McPherson  approached  Jackson  at  about  10 
a.  m.  on  the  14th.  It  was  pouring  rain;  so  McPherson  with 
held  his  assault  till  eleven  o'clock  for  fear  of  getting  his  am 
munition  wet.  Gregg's  brigade  did  not  stand  long;  its  flank 
was  enveloped  by  Sherman,  and  it  abandoned  its  trenches. 
"Walker  made  more  of  a  fight.  He  occupied  a  fine  position  on 
the  crest  of  a  semi-circular  ridge,  his  flanks  protected  by  woods, 
and  in  front  of  him  a  gently  sloping  open  field  terminating, 
about  one-third  of  a  mile  distant,  in  a  boggy  creek,  lined  with 
thick  willows.  His  artillery  commanded  the  bridge  over  this 
creek."*  Walker  was,  however,  unable  to  resist  McPherson's 
charge,  and  his  men  broke  and  ran  from  their  trenches.  Mc 
Pherson's  leading  division  pursued  them  for  about  a  mile  and 
a  half,  and  was  then  stopped  by  some  guns  on  an  inner  line  of 
works.  The  Confederates  escaped  by  the  Canton  Road ;  Sher 
man  and  McPherson  entered  Jackson  between  three  and  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

On  the  evening  of  the  14th  two  of  McClernand's  divisions 
were  at  Raymond,  one  was  at  Clinton,  and  one  with  the  wagon- 
train  between  Auburn  and  Raymond.  Frank  P.  Blair's  divi- 

*Greene. 


410  .  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

sion  of  Sherman's  corps,  and  the  brigade  of  McPherson's 
corps  that  had  remained  back  at  the  Mississippi,  had  come  up 
with  this  train. 

Grant  was  now  ready  to  move  on  Edwards's  Station  to  attack 
Pemberton,  if  he  should  remain  there,  before  he  could  be  joined 
by  Johnston  with  the  troops  from  Jackson.  Sherman  was  left 
with  his  two  divisions  to  complete  the  work  of  destruction  at 
Jackson;  all  the  rest  of  the  army,  on  the  15th,  moved  by  the 
various  convergent  roads  on  Edwards's  Station.  Pemberton 
was  at  that  place  with  three  divisions,  about  23,000  men;  the 
Confederate  divisions  of  Forney  and  M.  L-.  Smith  were  still 
on  the  river  at  Vicksburg. 

On  the  evening  of  the  13th,  when  Johnston  learned  that 
Grant  was  moving  on  Jackson,  he  sent  an  order  to  Pemberton, 
"if  practicable  to  come  up  in  Grant's  rear  at  once."*  Pember 
ton  called  a  council  of  war,f  shilly-shallied,  and  wasted  time; 
did  nothing  for  twenty-four  hours;  then,  instead  of  obeying 
Johnston's  order,  started  his  force  at  1  p.  m.,  on  the  15th, 
southward  to  intercept  Grant's  communications — when,  in  fact, 
Grant  had  no  communications.  Grant's  little  wagon-train  was 
that  day  near  Dillon's ;  but  it  was  well  guarded  by  two  Federal 
divisions.  Owing  to  high  water,  rain,  and  mud,  Pemberton's 
column  got  no  farther  than  the  cross-road  leading  from  Cham 
pion's  Hill  to  the  Edwards's  Station — Raymond  road,  where  it 
bivouacked  the  night  of  the  15th.  On  the  morning  of  the  16th 
Pemberton  changed  his  mind,  and  decided  to  try  to  unite  with 
Johnston  by  way  of  Brownsville.  He  gave  orders,  therefore, 
to  counter-march  to  Edwards's  Station,  there  to  take  the 
Brownsville  Road.  He  was  too  late :  the  enemy  was  upon  him ; 
the  Confederate  outposts  and  the  Union  advance-guards  were 
already  skirmishing. 

(221)  On  the  night  of  the  15th  Grant's  army,  except  Sher 
man's  two  divisions  at  Jackson,  bivouacked  on  the  three  roads 
leading  west  to  Edwards's  Station.  Its  flanks  were  about  four 
miles  from  each  other,  and  the  line  was  four  miles  from  Pem 
berton's  bivouac.  Neither  army  appears  to  have  been  aware 
of  the  nearness  of  the  other. 

*Greene. 

fNapoleon's  Maxim  LXV:  The  same  consequences  that  have  uni 
formly  attended  long  discussions  and  councils  of  war  will  follow  at 
all  times.  They  will  terminate  in  the  adoption  of  the  worst  course, 
which  in  war  is  always  the  most  timid,  or,  if  you  will,  the  most  prudent. 
The  only  true  wisdom  in  a  general  is  determined  courage. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  411 

Pemberton  formed  line  of  battle  across  the  two  roads  south 
of  Champion's  Hill — a  prominent  knoll  seventy  or  eighty  feet 
high  in  Mr.  Champion's  plantation.  The  knoll  was  steep  and 
rugged  and  covered  with  timber  on  the  northern  side,  but 
gentler  and  partly  cleared  on  the  southern  and  eastern  slopes. 

(222)  McClernand's  divisions  were  in  front  of  Pember- 
ton's  line  at  9.30  a.  m.,  and  this  general  sent  a  dispatch  to 
Grant,  who  was  with  McPherson  on  the  northern  road,  inquir 
ing  whether  he  should  attack.  It  was  two  o'clock  before  he  re 
ceived  Grant's  reply  to  attack;  and  then  the  two  leading  divi 
sions  [Osterhaus  and  Smith]  on  the  lower  roads  did  not  attack 
very  vigorously.  On  the  northern  road  McPherson's  corps 
came  up  at  eleven  o'clock,  with  Logan's  division  in  the  lead. 
Meantime  Stevenson  had  moved  his  Confederate  division  to  the 
left  and  taken  position  on  the  hill.  Later,  during  the  combat 
that  ensued,  Bowen  moved  his  division  to  assist  Stevenson. 
Logan  swung  round  and  attacked  the  hill  from  the  north,  while 
Hovey,  and  later  Crocker,  assailed  it  from  the  east.  The  pos 
session  of  the  hill  was  stubbornly  contested.  It  was  taken  by 
the  Federals,  then  retaken  by  the  Confederate^,  and  then 
taken  again  by  the  Federals.  The  battle  lasted  till  nearly  dark. 
"Stevenson's  division  was  completely  routed  and  broken  up." 
It  and  Bowen's  division  retreated  over  Baker's  Creek,  at  the 
crossing  of  the  Raymond  Road.  Loring's  division  covered 
their  retreat,  but  was  itself  cut  off,  and  had  to  retreat  south 
ward.  The  next  day  it  reached  Crystal  Springs,  on  the  railroad 
twenty-five  miles  south  of  Jackson.  "Bowen's  division,  and 
the  remnants  of  Stevenson's,  made  their  way  back  to  the  Big 
Black  River."* 

If  the  left  of  the  Union  line,  under  McClernand,  had  attacked 
as  vigorously  as  the  right  attacked  under  McPherson,  the 
beaten  Confederates  would  have  been  cut  off  from  the  ford 
over  Baker's  Creek,  on  the  Raymond  Road,  as  they  were  cut 
off  from  the  bridge  on  the  Clinton  Road ;  and  they  would  have 
been  captured.  On  the  other  hand,  while  McPherson  was  as 
saulting  the  left  of  the  Confederates  and  McClernand  was 
standing  idle  in  front  of  their  right,  Pemberton  ordered  Lor- 
ing  to  attack  McClernand.  Loring  replied  that  McClernand 
was  too  strongly  posted.  Later  Pemberton  ordered  him  to 
move  to  the  left  to  aid  Stevenson.  This,  also,  he  failed  to  do, 
and  Pemberton  laid  upon  him  the  blame  for  Stevenson's  rout. 

*Greene. 


412  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(223)  Grant's  army,  except  Sherman's  corps,  bivouacked 
the  night  of  the  16th  between  the  battle-field  and  Edwards's 
Station.     Sherman  had  come  forward  as  far  as  Bolton.     Grant 
took  up  the  pursuit  at  daylight  on  the  17th.    Sherman  marched 
directly  for  Bridgeport  in  order  to  turn  the  bridge  at  the  railway 
crossing.     This  crossing  was  in  a  deep  bend  of  the  Big  Black, 
which  was  concave  toward  the  east,  and  about  a  mile  wide. 
The  ground  within  the  bend  was  flat  and  low,  while  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  river  the  banks  were  high.     The  Con 
federates  had  dug  a  trench  within  the  bend,  straight  across  the 
road,  and  it  was  now  occupied  by  about  5,000  men — part  of  the 
troops  that  had  escaped  from  Champion's  Hill,  and  a  small 
force  that  had  been  stationed  at  the  bridge.     None  of   the 
troops  were  placed  on  the  opposite  bank.     Besides  the  railway 
bridge,   which  had   been   planked,   the   Confederates  had   im 
provised  another  bridge  by  using  a  steamboat  as  a  sort  of  pier 
in  the  narrow  stream. 

The  head  of  Grant's  column  arrived  in  front  of  the  Con 
federate  trenches  about  8  a.  m.  On  the  right  of  the  road  there 
was  a  clump  of  woods,  upon  the  flank  of  the  trench.  The  lead 
ing  Union  division  [Carr]  formed  line  in  these  woods,  prepara 
tory  to  assaulting.  The  next  division  opened  fire  at  the  center. 
There  were  about  10,000  Federals  in  the  line.  The  Confed 
erates  saw  themselves  in  a  pocket,  and  after  a  brief  resistance 
fled  for  the  bridges.  The  fight  was  all  over  by  nine  o'clock. 
Eighteen  pieces  of  artillery  were  abandoned,  and  1,751  men 
were  cut  off  and  captured. 

Pemberton  hastened  to  Vicksburg  to  prepare  for  its  defense, 
leaving  Stevenson  to  bring  on  what  remained  of  the  routed 
army.  On  the  18th  Pemberton  received  an  order  from  John 
ston  to  evacuate  Vicksburg,  if  not  too  late,  and  save  his  army 
from  ultimate  surrender.  Knowing  that  this  meant  the  loss  of 
large  quantities  of  stores  and  munitions  collected  at  Vicksburg, 
"the  fall  of  Port  Hudson,  the  surrender  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  the  severance  of  the  Confederacy,"*  Pemberton 
foolishly  submitted  the  question  to  a  council  of  war,  which  de 
cided  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  army  to  withdraw.  Pem 
berton  therefore  made  no  effort  to  obey  his  commander's  order. 

(224)  As  stated  before,  Vicksburg  stood  upon  a  bluff  250 
feet  above  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi.     The  country  round 
about  was  cut  up  into  a  jumble  of  narrow  ridges  with  deep 


*Pemberton's  Report. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  413 

ravines  between  them.  A  more  or  less  continuous  ridge  curved 
along  the  heads  of  the  ravines  from  Fort  Hill,  overlooking  the 
river  a  mile  above  the  town,  to  Stout's  Bayou,  three  miles  be 
low  the  town.  Outside  the  outer  curve  of  this  ridge  the  ground 
was  very  broken  and  difficult ;  along  its  crest,  almost  without  a 
break,  the  Confederates  had  constructed  very  strong  fortifica 
tions  enclosing  the  town  on  the  land  side.  To  defend  these 
works  Pemberton  had  128  guns  and  about  20,000  effective 
men.  He  placed  Stevenson's  division  on  the  right,  Forney's  in 
the  center,  and  M.  L.  Smith's  on  the  left.  Bowen's  division 
was  held  in  reserve. 

After  the  battle  of  the  Big  Black  River  Grant  pushed  on  in 
pursuit  of  the  Confederates.  His  leading  troops  reached  the 
neighborhood  of  Vicksburg  by  the  evening  of  the  18th  [May]. 
Before  two  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  his  corps  were 
all  three  in  position — Sherman's  on  the  right,  McPherson's  in 
the  center,  and  McClernand's  on  the  left.  Grant  hoped,  by 
attacking  the  position  of  the  Confederates  promptly,  to  carry  it 
before  they  should  recover  from  their  demoralization.  So  he 
ordered  a  general  assault  at  2  p.  m.  Within  the  works,  how 
ever,  were  troops  that  had  not  been  beaten ;  and  those  that  had 
suffered  defeat  and  rout  recovered  their  nerve  as  soon  as  they 
found  themselves  behind  Vicksburg's  thick  parapet.  The  as 
sault  failed  all  along  the  line.  Sherman,  on  the  right,  "suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  the  ditch,  but,  being  unsupported  by  the 
other  corps,  was  repulsed."*  McClernand  and  McPherson  ad 
vanced  several  hundred  yards  under  a  heavy  fire,  but  were 
brought  to  a  halt  by  darkness. 

(218)  Grant  now  established  his  base  of  supplies  on  the 
Yazoo  River  near  the  mouth  of  Steele's  Bayou.  For  eighteen 
days  his  army  had  been  marching  and  fighting,  and,  with  the 
exception  of  five  days'  rations,  had  got  its  supplies  from  the 
country. 

(224)  Grant  resolved  to  assault  the  Confederate  works 
again.  His  army  was  "flushed  with  an  unbroken  series  of 
victories,"  and  was  anxious  to  carry  the  .works  and  end  the 
campaign;  Grant  believed  the  army  equal  to  the  task.  There 
were  other  reasons  for  making  the  effort.  Johnston  was  col 
lecting  an  army  with  which  to  come  to  Pemberton's  relief.  If 
Grant  could  capture  Vicksburg  he  would  be  free  to  turn  his 
army  to  meet  Johnston,  and  then  to  send  a  detachment  against 


*Greene. 


414  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Port  Hudson.  A  siege  would  be  a  slow  and  dreary  work,  and, 
as  his  immediate  forces  were  not  enough  completely  to  invest 
the  place,  he  would  have  to  draw  troops  from  Memphis  to  ef 
fect  the  siege.  Grant,  therefore,  ordered  his  artillery  to  open 
fire  on  the  works  at  daybreak,  on  the  22nd,  and  his  infantry  to 
make  a  general  assault  at  ten  o'clock.  Admiral  Porter  was 
asked  to  shell  the  water-batteries.  The  assault  was  gallantly 
made,  and,  after  desperate  fighting,  the  Union  troops  reached 
the  ditches,  and  planted  their  colors  in  several  places  upon 
the  parapets ;  but  they  could  go  no  farther. 

Grant  was  in  a  good  position  from  which  to  see  most  of  his 
line,  and  by  1 1 .30  a.  m.  he  was  persuaded  that  the  assault  could 
not  succeed.  But  about  this  time  he  began  receiving  notes  from 
McClernand,  telling  of  success  in  his  part  of  the  line.  One  note, 
dated  12  m.,  said :  "We  are  hotly  engaged  with  the  enemy.  We 
have  part  possession  of  two  forts,  and  the  Stars  and  Stripes  are 
floating  over  them.  A  vigorous  push  ought  to  be  made  all  along 
the  line."  Another,  written  about  1  p.  m.,  said:  "We  have 
gained  the  enemy's  entrenchments  at  several  points,  but  are 
brought  to  a  stand.  ..."  Grant  was  doubtful  of  McClernand's 
successes;  he  had  seen  nothing  of  them  himself.  But  there  was 
no  time  for  him  to  ride  over  to  that  flank  to  see  for  himself. 
So  he  ordered  one  of  McPherson's  divisions  over  to  help  Mc 
Clernand,  and  had  the  rest  of  McPherson's  corps  and  Sher 
man's  renew  the  assault.  The  result  was  like  that  of  the  morn 
ing's  attack;  the  works  were  reached  but  could  not  be  carried. 
The  hostile  lines  were  so  close  together  that  the  Confederates 
behind  the  parapet  could  throw  hand-grenades  among  the  as 
sailants.  The  assault  failed  all  along  the  line.  Just  at  dark  the 
Confederates  in  front  of  McClernand's  troops  made  a  sortie, 
and  drove  the  Federals  out  of  the  ditch  they  had  taken.  In  this 
day's  work  35,000  Union  infantry  had  engaged.  The  line  as 
saulted  was  held  in  the  morning  by  fewer  than  four  Con 
federate  brigades.  As  soon  as  the  assault  had  begun  the  re 
serves  were  put  into  the  works;  but  the  entire  force  of  the 
defenders  engaged  did  not  exceed  13,000.  Grant's  losses  were 
more  than  3,000,  and  he  blamed  McClernand's  misleading  dis 
patches  with  half  of  them. 

(225)  It  was  now  plain  that  Vicksburg  could  be  taken  only 
by  siege,  and  preparations  were  accordingly  begun  at  once. 
Regular  siege-works  were  constructed.  Reinforcements  were 
sent  from  various  parts  of  the  country,  and,  within  a  few 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  415 

weeks.  Grant  had  Vicksburg  completely  invested,  with  71,141 
men  and  248  guns  in  his  line.  Twelve  miles  of  trenches  were 
made  and  eighty-nine  batteries  were  set  up.  Approaches  were 
dug  and  mines  and  counter-mines  set  off.  The  lines  were 
brought  so  close,  toward  the  end  of  the  siege,  that  hand- 
grenades  were  used,  and  shells  were  thrown  by  small  mortars 
made  of  logs  with  metal  bands  shrunken  around  them.  With 
such  implements  from  ten  to  a  hundred  men  were  killed  daily. 
"On  July  1  the  approaches  were  all  withjn  from  five  to  a 
hundred  yards  of  the  defenders'  works,"*  and  orders  were 
issued  for  a  final  assault  to  be  made  on  the  6th.  But  this  was 
not  to  be;  Pemberton  surrendered  on  the  4th  of  July.  The 
siege  had  lasted  forty-seven  days. 

(226)  All  this  time  Johnston  had  been  organizing  an  army 
at  Jackson  for  Pemberton's  relief,  of  troops  sent  to  him  from 
wherever  they  could  be  spared;  and  the  Richmond  authorities 
had  been  urging  him  to  move  out.  Meantime  Grant  had  sent 
strong  columns  under  Blair  and  Osterhaus  to  reconnoiter  for 
Johnston  in  the  direction  of  Mechanicsburg  and  the  Big  Black. 
They  found  no  signs  of  a  Confederate  army  approaching. 

At  length,  on  June  the  28th,  Johnston  issued  orders  for  his 
army  to  advance.  On  paper  his  army  numbered  nearly  55,000, 
but  it  had  only  31,000  present  for  duty.  On  the  1st  of  July 
three  of  its  divisions  had  reached  Birdsong's  Ferry,  and  the 
fourth  was  at  Edwards's  Station.  Johnston  spent  the  2nd,  3rd, 
and  4th  of  July  in  reconnoitering.  At  this  time  Sherman  was 
in  command  of  a  force  of  30,000  men,  stretched  across  from 
Haynes's  Bluff  to  the  Black  River  Bridge,  covering  the  siege 
of  Vicksburg.  "On  the  night  of  the  4th  Johnston  received  the 
news  of  Pemberton's  surrender;  he  countermarched  his  col 
umns  forthwith  toward  Jackson.  He  was  none  too  quick,  for 
Sherman  was  on  his  heels  in  pursuit,  with  nearly  50,000  men, 
before  sunset  of  the  day  on  which  the  garrison  laid  down  their 
arms."*  All  arrangements  had  been  made  beforehand  for  this 
pursuit.  Johnston  fell  back  into  the  works  at  Jackson;  Sher 
man  arrived  there  on  the  10th  [July].  Johnston  hoped  Sher 
man  would  assault,  but  Sherman  prepared  to  besiege  the  place. 
Johnston  was  not  to  be  caught,  like  Pemberton,  in  a  trap;  on 
the  night  of  the  16th  he  skilfully  withdrew  his  army  across  the 
bridges  of  Pearl  River,  and  made  his  escape.  Sherman  fol 
lowed  him  about  twelve  miles,  then  was  recalled  to  Vicksburg. 

*Greene. 


416  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Johnston  went  into  camp  half-way  between  Jackson  and 
Meridian. 

The  Vicksburg  Campaign  was  over. 

(213)  Port  Hudson  surrendered  to  Banks  on  the  9th  of 
July,  and  the  Mississippi  River  was  again  opened  to  the  world's 
traffic.  The  Confederacy  was  split  in  twain. 

COMMENTS. 

(217)  When  General  Grant  had  his  army  in  its  camps  in 
the  swamps  across  the  Mississippi  from  Vicksburg,  after  fail 
ing  in  all  his  efforts  to  turn  the  town  by  way  of  bayous  and 
canals,  he  was  at  the  crisis  of  his  military  career.  His  next 
effort  was  to  decide  whether  he  was  to  go  down  in  history  as  a 
failure  or  as  a  success. 

He  had  already  failed  in  five  different  projects  for  the  cap 
ture  of  Vicksburg:  first,  the  combined  movement  in  which  he 
was  to  march  a  force  overland  from  Northern  Mississippi 
against  the  rear  of  the  town,  while  Sherman  moved  by  trans 
ports  down  the  great  river.  This  enterprise  was  brought  to 
naught  by  the  capture  of  Grant's  advanced  base  at  Holly 
Springs  by  Van  Dorn's  cavalry,  by  the  breaking  up  of  the 
railway  in  his  rear  by  Forrest,  and  by  Sherman's  failure  to 
defeat  the  Confederates  at  Chickasaw  Bluffs.  The  second 
effort  was  by  way  of  the  canal  across  the  peninsula  opposite 
Vicksburg;  the  third  was  by  way  of  Lake  Providence  and 
bayous  and  rivers  west  of  the  Mississippi;  the  fourth  was  the 
expedition  by  way  of  the  Yazoo  Pass;  the  fifth  was  the  expedi 
tion  by  way  of  Steele's  Bayou.  All  of  these  projects  had 
failed,  and  months  of  patient  labor  had  been  wasted  upon 
them.  The  capture  of  Vicksburg  seemed  farther  away  than 
ever.  A  year  before  10,000  men  could  easily  have  taken  it; 
but  within  the  last  few  months  the  Confederates  had  turned 
it  into  a  fortress  and  placed  22,000  men  in  its  garrison.  A 
large  part  of  the  public  press  had  already  declared  Grant  a 
failure,  and  Halleck  and  the  Administration  at  Washington 
were  about  ready  to  try  some  one  else  in  his  place. 

When  Grant  decided  to  cut  loose  from  his  base  and  make  his 
campaign  without  a  line  of  communications,  he  took  the  same 
kind  of  risk  that  General  Scott  took  when  he  abandoned  his 
communications  at  Puebla  and  advanced  against  the  City  of 
Mexico.  It  was  not  a  change  of  base  like  McClellan's  move 
ment  from  the  York  to  the  James  in  the  Peninsular  Campaign ; 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  417 

Grant  was  not  sure  where  his  next  base  would  be,  or  how  long 
he  should  be  without  any  base.  Sherman  advised  against  the 
movement,  and  was  in  favor  of  returning  to  Memphis  and 
making  a  new  start  by  way  of  the  railway;  and  Grant's  better 
judgment  told  him  that  this  was  the  safer  and  surer  plan.  But 
the  cry  of  the  press  and  public  opinion  were  behind  him  to 
pronounce  such  a  movement  a  retreat — another  failure;  and 
almost  surely  to  force  Grant's  removal.  So,  like  Scott  at 
Puebla,  Grant  took  the  hazard  of  operating  without  a  base ;  and 
he  won.  The  stakes  were  larger,  too,  than  he  had  reckoned 
them;  they  were  not  only  Vicksburg,  but  Chattanooga,  Appo- 
mattox,  peace  in  the  land,  a  general's  commission,  the  White 
House  and  a  fame  immortal. 

It  has  been  said  that  Grant,  in  case  of  defeat,  could  have 
fallen  back  upon  the  Federal  posts  at  New  Orleans  or  Baton 
Rouge;  or  that  he  might  have  drawn  supplies  from  those 
places.  But  such  is  not  the  case.  Those  cities  were  nearly  200 
miles  from  his  line  of  operations ;  a  beaten  army  of  forty-odd 
thousand  men  would  have  slim  chances  before  an  active  enemy, 
in  a  retreat  of  200  miles,  with  no  base  from  which  to  draw 
ammunition  and  subsistence,  and  in  a  hostile  country. 

Barring  the  question  of  a  base  and  a  line  of  communications 
there  has  been  no  more  brilliant  series  of  military  operations  in 
American  history,  and  none  that  conformed  more  closely  to 
the  principles  of  the  military  art,  than  the  operations  of  Grant's 
army  from  the  day  on  which  it  fought  the  battle  of  Port  Gib 
son  until  it  arrived  in  front  of  the  Confederate  works  at 
Vicksburg.  The  campaign  was  full  of  lessons  for  the  military 
student;  on  the  Union  side,  full  of  examples  to  be  followed;  on 
the  Confederate  side,  full  of  examples  to  be  avoided.  Not  a 
mistake  of  strategy  can  be  pointed  out  in  Grant's  operations, 
and  scarcely  a  mistake  of  tactics  was  made  by  his  subordinate 
commanders. 

In  those  "eighteen  days"  Grant  "had  marched  about  200 
miles,  and,  by  keeping  his  army  together,  had  defeated  the 
enemy's  scattered  detachments,  in  four  engagements,  at  Ray 
mond,  Jackson,  Champion's  Hill,  and  Big  Black,  all  fought 
within  six  days;  he  had  inflicted  a  loss  upon  them  of  8,000  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  had  captured  eighty-eight  pieces 
of  their  artillery,  and,  finally,  had  driven  them  into  the  narrow 
defenses  of  Vicksburg,  causing  their  outworks  at  Haynes's 
Bluff,  Warrenton,  and  Grand  Gulf  to  be  abandoned,  and  estab 
lishing  his  own  base  on  the  Yazoo  River,  in  easy  and  safe 


418  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

reach  of  his  gunboats  and  transports.  He  had  not  only  pre 
vented  the  junction  of  the  enemy's  detachments,  but  had  still 
further  scattered  their  forces;  so  that  they  had  fully  14,000 
fewer  men  available  in  Vicksburg  at  the  close  of  this  period 
than  at  the  beginning.  During  these  eighteen  days  Grant's 
men  had  had  but  five  days'  rations,  having  lived  for  the  rest  on 
the  country;  their  own  losses  had  been  a  little  less  than  3,500."* 

Grant  was  fortunate  in  having  two  such  lieutenants  as  Sher 
man  and  McPherson  to  command  two  of  his  three  corps;  he 
was  no  less  fortunate  in  having  a  Pemberton  as  his  adversary. 
If  Pemberton  issued  a  single  order  or  made  a  single  move  in 
those  eighteen  days  that  was  wholly  right  the  historians  have 
failed  to  record  it.  It  is  true,  however,  that  Pemberton  had 
a  difficult  problem  to  solve.  With  the  troops  and  means  at  his 
disposal  it  appears  difficult  as  viewed  by  us  to-day  with  a  full 
knowledge  of  all  the  circumstances;  but  it  was  much  more  so 
to  him,  for  the  situation  was  by  no  means  as  clear  to  him  as  it 
is  to  us.  His  task  was  to  guard  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson, 
the  locks  that  kept  the  Mississippi  shut.  Port  Hudson  was 
threatened  from  below  by  Farragut's  fleet  and  Banks's  army. 

As  to  the  struggle  for  Vicksburg,  Pemberton's  task  at  first 
was  to  keep  Grant  from  placing  the  Federal  army  on  high 
ground  back  of  the  town.  So  long  as  Pemberton  could  do  that 
he  held  Vicksburg  secure  from  capture.  While  the  operations 
connected  with  this  stage  of  the  struggle  were,  in  many  re 
spects,  wholly  different  from  any  other  operations  found  in 
military  history,  they,  nevertheless,  fall  under  the  general  class 
of  those  relating  to  the  attack  and  defense  of  a  river-line.  To 
put  an  army  across  a  great  river,  defended  by  an  enemy,  and 
make  a  firm  lodgment  upon  the  other  bank,  looks  like  a  hard 
task  to  undertake;  but  history  shows  that  the  task  has  never 
been  so  hard  as  the  task  to  prevent  the  passage  of  such  a 
river.  Not  mountains,  nor  rivers,  nor  swamps,  though  de 
fended  by  an  ejiemy,  have  ever  permanently  stopped  an  army 
commanded  by  a  skilful  and  determined  general.  The  task  of 
Pemberton  was  made  doubly  hard  by  General  Grant's  dogged 
persistence,  and  the  clever  measures  employed  to  deceive 
him, — such'as  Grierson's  raid,  Steele's  movement  to  Greenville, 
and  Sherman's  feints  at  Haynes's  Bluff.  Yet  Pemberton,  as 
sisted  by  the  unusual  features  of  the  topography — swamps, 
jungle,  and  a  network  of  creeks  and  bayous — managed  to 

*Greene. 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN,  419 

thwart  all  of  Grant's  efforts  for  three  months — from  the  end 
of  January  to  the  end  of  April. 

After  Grant  had  succeeded  in  making  a  lodgment  upon  high 
ground  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river  Pemberton's  task  was  to 
destroy  the  Union  army  or  drive  it  back ;  or  to  delay  it  until  the 
Confederate  government  could  take  measures  to  destroy  it  or 
drive  it  back.  Pemberton  had  about  35,000  men  within  the  tri 
angle,  Haynes's  Bluff — Grand  Gulf — Jackson,  and  about  15,000 
at  Port  Hudson.  Grant  had  41,000,  but  they  were  united.  (213) 
If  Pemberton  had  withdrawn  the  garrison  from  Port  Hudson 
he  would  have  opened  the  way  for  Banks  and  Farragut  to  join 
Porter  and  Grant;  besides,  it  would  have  taken  ten  or  fifteen 
days  for  the  troops  at  that  point  to  join  the  main  army  on  the 
Vicksburg-Jackson  line.  Pemberton,  therefore,  was  obliged  to 
rely  upon  the  force  of  35,000  to  defeat  or  hold  Grant,  until 
reinforcements  could  come.  He  was  further  puzzled  to  decide 
what  Grant  meant  to  do.  He  believed  that  Grant  would  turn 
northward  and  take  the  shortest  route  to  Vicksburg,  keeping 
in  touch  with  the  river  for  his  supplies;  but  Grant  might  turn 
southward  first,  and  unite  with  Banks  against  Port  Hudson. 
The  last  thing  Pemberton  supposed  Grant  would  do  was  pre 
cisely  what  he  did — cut  loose  from  his  base  and  move  on  Jack 
son  with  his  whole  army ;  he  feared,  however,  that  Grant  might 
send  a  large  detachment,  a  raiding  force,  to  make  a  dash  for 
Jackson  and  destroy  the  public  stores  there,  and  the  railways. 
Jackson  was  the  base  from  which  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg 
and  Pemberton's  army  drew  supplies.  To  do  this  was  General 
Grant's  first  intention — his  main  force  started  toward  Ed- 
wards's  Station,  and  McPherson's  corps  alone  set  out  for  Jack 
son.  It  was  not  until  McPherson  encountered  stout  resistance 
at  Raymond  that  Grant  concluded  there  was  a  strong  enough 
force  of  the  enemy  at  Jackson  to  require  the  attention  of  his 
main  body. 

(217)  To  guard  Jackson  and  Vicksburg  and  the  railway 
connecting  them,  at  the  same  time,  Pemberton  made  the  fatal 
mistake  of  stretching  his  army  across 'the  space  from  Jackson 
to  the  Mississippi.  He  left  two  divisions  at  Vicksburg  and 
Haynes's  Bluff — one  of  which,  at  least,  had  to  stay  there  so 
long  as  Sherman  remained  thereabouts  with  his  corps,  else 
Sherman  would  have  turned  his  feints  into  a  real  attack  and 
captured  the  town.  One  division,  however,  might  have  been 
withdrawn  at  once,  and  the  bulk  of  the  other  as  soon  as  Sher 
man  withdrew  to  join  Grant.  Three  of  his  divisions  Pember- 


420  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ton  placed  at  the  different  ferries  of  the  Big  Black  to  bar 
Grant's  direct  advance  on  Vicksburg;  and  the  rest  of  his 
troops,  two  or  three  brigades  which  had  been  sent  to  him  from 
other  States,  he  left  at  Jackson.  Thus  he  scattered  his  army 
so  that  it  could  make  no  effective  resistance  at  any  point. 

What  Pemberton  should  have  done  was  to  assemble  his 
whole  force  as  quickly  as  practicable  at  that  point  nearest 
Grant's  line  of  march  which  all  the  detachments  could  reach 
before  he  should  have  to  fight  a  decisive  battle.  Edwards's 
Station  was  perhaps  the  best  point  for  the  assembly.  Having 
gotten  his  forces  together  he  then  should  have  attacked 
Grant  if  he  felt  strong  enough  to  do  so ;  or  taken  up  a  strong 
position  such  that  Grant  would  have  had  to  attack  him  in  order 
to  advance  farther ;  or  made  use  of  his  "power  of  attraction"  to 
lead  Grant  farther  and  farther  away  from  the  Union  base,  and 
to  gain  time  for  reinforcements  to  come. 

If  Pemberton  had  taken  position  at  Edwards's  Station  with 
his  35,000  men  Grant  could  hardly  have  dared  to  move  either 
against  Vicksburg  or  Jackson  without  first  attacking  and  de 
feating  him.  By  the  14th  of  May  the  force  at  Jackson  would 
have  been  reinforced  to  12,000  men,  if  Sherman  and  McPher- 
son  had  not  taken  the  town  that  day.  All  of  these  12,000 
might  have  joined  Pemberton  at  Edwards's  Station  by  the  15th 
or  16th  if  he  had  been  in  position  there  with  his  other  35,000, 
delaying  Grant;  or  if  he  had  found  it  necessary  to  fall  back 
before  Grant's  superior  numbers  farther  north  or  east,  such 
of  the  Jackson  troops  as  had  not  been  able  to  reach  him  at 
Edwards's  Station  could  have  joined  him  at  some  other  point. 
With  these  reinforcements  his  united  army  would  have  num 
bered  some  47,000, — a  strong  enough  force  to  have  taken  the 
offensive. 

If  Pemberton  had  possessed  the  soldierly  quality  of  obe 
dience  he  might  still  have  saved  his  army  in  spite  of  all  the 
mistakes  he  had  made.  If  he  had  moved, — as  Johnston  or 
dered, — from  Edwards's  Station  to  Clinton  upon  Grant's  rear, 
at  the  time  when  Grant  moved  against  Jackson,  he  might  have 
gained  some  advantage  in  cooperation  with  the  Confederate 
troops  at  Jackson.  He  would  thus  at  least  have  lessened  the 
distance  between  the  two  Confederate  forces,  and  made  better 
their  chances  of  uniting.  Instead  of  obeying  Johnston's  order 
Pemberton  called  a  council  of  war  and  stayed  at  Edwards's 
Station  nearly  two  days,  then  started  southward  to  cut  Grant's 
communications,  when  Grant  had  no  communications.  Then 


THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  421 

later,  when  Johnston,  who  saw  that  all  hope  of  saving  Vicks- 
burg  was  lost,  ordered  Pemberton  to  evacuate  the  place,  Pem- 
berton  by  vigorous  movement  might  still  have  saved  the  rem 
nant  of  his  army,  if  he  had  obeyed  Johnston's  order.  Instead 
of  doing  so  Pemberton  remained  in  Vicksburg,  and  lost  his 
army  as  well  as  the  town. 

Vicksburg,  Metz,  Paris,  Plevna,  Santiago,  Port  Arthur,  all 
point  the  lesson  that  an  army  which  takes  refuge  in  a  fortified 
place  and  stays  there  to  be  besieged,  will  be  lost.  They  also 
point  the  lesson  that  surrender  is  usually  brought  about  more 
quickly  by  starvation  than  by  saps  and  mines;  that  bombard 
ing  a  beleaguered  city  does  not  shorten  the  siege ;  and  that  as 
saults  in  such  cases  are  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life.* 

Johnston  saved  his  little  army  at  Jackson  by  slipping  away 
with  it  across  Pearl  River,  when  Sherman  had  surrounded  the 
town  on  the  side  away  from  the  river.  Johnston  showed  a  far 
better  judgment  throughout  the  campaign  than  Pemberton 
showed;  but  he  lacked  the  sort  of  boldness  and  energy  that 
might  have  delivered  the  Confederate  army  from  the  toils  into 
which  Pemberton  had  gotten  it.  If,  instead  of  stopping  at 
Jackson,  Johnston  had  hurried  on  toward  Vicksburg  and  taken 
command  in  person  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army  he  might 
have  avoided  the  blunders  from  which  it  suffered,  and  saved  it 
from  capture.  Johnston  did  nothing  in  this  campaign  that 
gave  him  any  title  to  fame  as  a  general. 

Too  much  praise  cannot  be  spoken  of  Admiral  Porter's  fleet ; 
without  its  cooperation  the  campaign  would  have  been  im 
possible. 

In  the  eighteen  days'  operations  just  preceding  the  siege 
both  sides  were  greatly  hampered  by  a  lack  of  cavalry  to  do 
the  work  of  reconnaissance.  And  even  during  the  siege  an 
adequate  cavalry  force,  to  watch  for  Johnston's  movements, 
would  have  relieved  Grant  of  considerable  anxiety,  and  saved 
him  the  necessity  of  sending  a  large  infantry  force  under 
Blair  and  Osterhaus  to  look  for  Johnston's  army. 


*Point  Arthur  does  not  point  all  these  lessons. 


LECTURE  XX. 
THE   CHICKAMAUGA   CAMPAIGN. 

AFTER  STONES  RIVER. 

(227)  Having  taken  possession  of  Murfreesboro  after  the 
battle  of  Stones  River,  in  the  first  days  of  January,  1863,  Rose- 
crans,  with  his  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  remained  with  his 
headquarters  at  that  town  until  near  the  end  of  the  following 
June.  Bragg  during  the  same  time  had  his  headquarters  at 
Tullahoma,  and  kept  his  army  so  disposed  as  to  cover  the  routes 
to  Chattanooga. 

Within  this  time  there  were  no  operations  on  a  large  scale 
between  these  two  armies;  the  Confederate  cavalry,  however, 
was  all  the  while  very  active.  After  capturing  Grant's  depot 
at  Holly  Springs  Van  Dorn  had  joined  Bragg  with  three  or 
four  more  thousands  of  cavalry.  These  with  the  squadrons  of 
Wheeler  and  Forrest  and  Morgan  made  a  mounted  force  greatly 
outnumbering  Rosecrans's  cavalry,  and  were  a  constant  an 
noyance  to  the  Union  commander.  They  would  break  up  the 
railways  in  rear  of  his  army,  attack  isolated  posts  and  detach 
ments,  capture  wagon-trains,  burn  bridges,  and  do  all  manner 
of  things  to  harass  the  army.  For  the  first  few  weeks  after  the 
battle  of  Stones  River  Bragg's  cavalry  kept  the  army  of  the 
Cumberland  on  half  rations.  To  oppose  it  Rosecrans  begged 
the  War  Department  for  an  adequate  cavalry  force  properly 
equipped.  He  begged  in  vain.  He  had  incurred  the  hostility 
of  Mr.  Stanton  and  General  Halleck  by  writing  them  one  or 
two  right  manly  letters,  and  they  would  do  nothing  for  him. 
Partly  to  make  up  for  his  lack  of  cavalry  he  mounted  one  of  his 
infantry  brigades  [Wilder]  on  captured  horses,  and  it  did  good 
work  throughout  the  Chickamauga  Campaign. 

All  the  while  the  War  Department  was  persuading,  urging, 
and  even  threatening  Rosecrans  to  induce  him  to  move  against 
Bragg's  army  and  drive  it  out  of  Tennessee.  Grant,  who  was 
conducting  the  campaign  against  Vicksburg,  joined  in  urging 
Rosecrans  to  take  the  offensive,  as,  otherwise,  he  believed 
Bragg's  army,  or  part  of  it,  would  be  transferred  to  Mississippi 
— as  a  small  part  of  it  was.  Rosecrans,  on  the  other  hand,  ar 
gued  that,  if  he  moved  against  Bragg's  army  and  drove  it  out  of 

422 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  423 

Tennessee,  he  should  only  hurry  it  to  reinforce  the  troops  op 
posed  to  Grant  in  Mississippi.  So  he  remained  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  doing  the  best  he  could  to  put  his  own  army  into  good 
shape  for  active  campaign,  strengthening  his  bases,  and  keeping 
his  communications  open. 

Meantime,  by  War  Department  orders,  his  troops  had  been 
organized  into  three  corps:  the  Fourteenth  under  Thomas, 
the  Twentieth  under  McCook,  and  the  Twenty-first  under  Crit- 
tenden;  they  consisted  practically  of  the  same  divisions  that 
had  composed  the  Center,  Right  Wing,  and  Left  Wing,  respect 
ively,  in  the  Stones  River  Campaign.  In  addition  Rosecrans 
organized  a  Reserve  Corps  of  three  brigades  under  General 
Gordon  Granger.  The  army  numbered  some  60,000,  while 
Bragg  had  about  43,000.  At  the  same  time  Buckner  occupied 
the  Valley  of  East  Tennessee  with  a  Confederate  corps,  and 
Burnside  was  organizing  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  with  which  to 
advance  into  East  Tennessee  from  Kentucky,  by  way  of  Cum 
berland  Gap. 

At  length,  toward  the  end  of  June,  Rosecrans  was  ready  to 
move;  Burnside  was  on  his  way  toward  Cumberland  Gap; 
Grant  had  Pemberton's  army  invested  in  Vicksburg;  and  Lee 
was  on  his  way  to  Gettysburg. 

THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN. 

On  the  23rd  of  June  Rosecrans  issued  his  orders  for  a  for 
ward  movement.  The  main  part  of  Bragg's  army  was  at  Shel 
by  ville  in  an  intrenched  camp;  but  Hardee's  corps  was  at  War- 
trace  and  Fairfield.  The  two  cavalry  corps  were  on  the  right 
and  left  of  the  line  with  their  headquarters  respectively  at  Mc- 
Minnville  and  Columbia.*  The  position  of  the  army  was  upon 
a  high  plateau,  locally  called  the  Barrens,  accessible  from  the 
north  only  by  way  of  the  breaks  and  canons.  The  principal 
approaches  were  by  way  of  Hoover's  Gap,  Liberty  Gap,  and 
Guy's  Gap.  The  railway  and  one  of  the  roads  to  Murfrees- 
boro  passed  through  Bellbuckle  Gap.  All  these  passes  were 
held  by  Confederate  forces.  The  Shelbyville  position  was  well- 
nigh  impregnable  from  the  front,  so  Rosecrans  resolved  to 
make  a  feint  against  this  point  with  Granger's  Reserve  Corps 
and  most  of  the  cavalry,  while  he  massed  his  three  main  corps 


*Columhia  is  not  shown  on  Map  No.  227.  It  is  southwest  of  Murfrees- 
boro  (almost  due  west  of  McMinnville)  and  about  as  far  as  McMinn- 
VJHe  from  Murfreesboro. 


424  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

against  Bragg's  right  at  Wartrace.  The  army  started  in  a 
pouring  rain,  and  the  roads  were  terrible.  Granger's  corps 
and  the  cavalry  moved  toward  Shelbyville;  McCook's  corps 
took  the  road  through  Liberty  Gap ;  Thomas's  the  Hoover's  Gap 
road ;  Crittenden's  corps  marched  first  to  Bradyville.  The 
movement  succeeded ;  there  was  considerable  fighting  at  the 
gaps,  but  the  Confederate  right  was  forced  back  from  one  posi 
tion  after  another,  and  the  left  had  to  fall  back  to  keep  from 
being  cut  off.  By  June  30  the  Union  army  had  reached  Man 
chester,  where  it  was  concentrated;  Bragg's  army  had  retired 
as  far  as  Tullahoma,  where  it  had  taken  up  a  position. 

(228)  On  the  1st  of  July  Bragg  evacuated  Tullahoma  and 
started  for  Chattanooga.  Rosecrans  pursued  as  vigorously  as 
the  deep  roads  and  swollen  streams  would  let  him.  It  was  now 
a  stern  chase  with  all  the  advantages  of  topography  in  favor 
of  the  Confederates.  Within  a  week  Bragg's  army  was  at 
Chattanooga.  The  Tullahoma  Campaign  had  lasted  nine  days, 
within  which  time  Rosecrans  had  so  maneuvered  as  to  force 
Bragg  to  abandon  his  intrenched  camp  at  Shelbyville,  his 
strong  line  of  defense  in  the  mountain  gorges,  his  fortified  base 
at  Tullahoma,  and  all  of  the  State  west  of  the  Tennessee 
River ;  and  had  lost  only  560  men  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing. 

PLAN. 

Rosecrans's  next  task  was  to  wrest  Chattanooga,  the  impor 
tant  railway  center  and  key  not  only  to  East  Tennessee,  but  to 
North  Alabama,  North  Georgia,  and  Middle  Tennessee  as  well, 
from  Bragg.  The  Tennessee  River  and  Cumberland  Moun 
tains  were  formidable  obstacles  across  Rosecrans's  -  path. 
Three  plans  of  operation  were  to  be  considered :  first,  to 
force  a  passage  of  the  river  in  the  face  of  the  Confederates  at 
Chattanooga — a  plan  which  had  little  to  commend  it;  second, 
to  cross  the  river  considerably  above  the  town,  turn  the 
right  of  Bragg's  army,  and  strike  its  line  of  communications, 
which  was  the  railway  back  through  Dalton.  This  was  the 
movement  that  Bragg  was  expecting,  as  it  was  the  movement 
that  would  bring  the  columns  of  Rosecrans  and  Burnside 
more  nearly  within  supporting  distance  of  each  other ;  had  it 
been  adopted  by  Rosecrans,  Bragg  would  undoubtedly  have  en 
deavored  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy  closely  enough 
to  be  on  hand  with  his  main  army  near  the  point  of  passage. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  425 

By  skilful  maneuvers,  however,  Rosecrans  could  have  deceived 
him  and,  sooner  or  later,  effected  a  crossing  somewhere  before 
Bragg  discovered  it.  But  either  of  these  two  plans  would 
have  taken  the  Federal  army  far  away  from  the  railway,  and 
made  it  dependent  upon  wagon-trains  and  worthless  moun 
tain  roads  for  its  supplies.  The  third  plan  was  to  cross  the 
river  below  Chattanooga  and  turn  the  Confederate  left,  inter 
cepting  the  army's  communications  and  taking  the  town  in 
rear.  This  was  the  plan  Rosecrans  decided  to  adopt. 

At  the  end  of  the  short  Tullahoma  Campaign  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  and  Bragg's  Army  of  the  Tennessee  "re 
sumed  in  the  main  the  attitude  of  the  previous  summer,  when 
each  was  gathering  forces  for  an  aggressive  movement"* — 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  being  then  under  Buell.  The 
Union  army  occupied  camps  from  Winchester  on  the  right  to 
McMinnville  on  the  left,  forty  miles  apart.  The  Reserve 
Corps  [Granger]  was  guarding  the  bases  and  lines  of  com 
munication,  and  garrisoning  posts  as  far  back  as  Clarksville 
and  Fort  Donelson.  Early  in  July  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  con 
centrated  at  Salem,  preparatory  to  a  "general  sweep"  south 
ward  into  Alabama. 

Bragg  stationed  his  headquarters  and  Folk's  corps  at  Chatta 
nooga  and  began  at  once  to  fortify  the  town.  Hardee's  corps 
was  placed  on  the  line  of  the  railway  to  Knoxville,  with  its 
center  at  Tyner's  Station.  All  the  crossings  of  the  Ten 
nessee  were  prepared  for  defense  as  high  up  as  Blythe's  Ferry. 
Forrest's  cavalry  was  stationed  at  Kingston,f  and  had  orders 
to  guard  the  approaches  to  the  river  from  the  Sequatchie  Val 
ley,  and  the  crossings  of  the  river,  and  to  keep  a  watch  upon 
Burnside's  movements  in  East  Tennessee.  Wheeler's  cavalry 
was  out  on  the  left,  and  a  brigade  of  infantry  was  stationed  at 
Bridgeport. 

Halleck  immediately  began  urging  Rosecrans  to  "advance 
against  the  enemy  south  of  the  Tennessee."*  In  Rosecrans's 
judgment  three  things  were  needed  for  the  success  of  his 
movement ;  these  were  ripe  corn  in  the  fields,  the  repair  of  the 
railway  to  the  Tennessee  River,  and  support  for  his  flanks. 
Vicksburg  had  fallen,  and  he  thought  troops  should  be  sent 
from  Grant's  command  to  cover  his  advance  on  the  right;  he 
wanted  to  wait  for  Burnside  to  come  into  East  Tennessee  on 


*Van  Home. 

fOn  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  about  ninety  miles  above  Chat 
tanooga.    Not  shown  on  map  No.  228. 


426  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

his  left;  and  it  would  be  more  than  a  month  before  the  har 
vest  of  the  corn  in  Tennessee  and  Georgia.  The  judgment 
of  Rosecrans  did  not  appeal  to  the  Commanding-General  at 
Washington,  who  dispatched  him,  on  the  5th  of  August,  a 
peremptory  order  to  advance.  Rosecrans,  however,  did  not 
move  until  the  middle  of  the  month. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

Between  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  and  its  objec 
tive,  Bragg's  army  at  Chattanooga  or  its  line  of  commu 
nications,  the  Western  and  Atlantic  Railroad,  lay  not  only 
the  high  plateaus  and  the  gorges  of  the  Cumberland  range 
west  of  the  Tennessee,  and  this  river  itself,  but  also  a  series 
of  mountain  ridges,  valleys,  and  streams,  generally  parallel  to 
the  river,  on  the  eastern  side.  First  is  Sand  Mountain,  with 
a  plateau  ten  or  twelve  miles  wide  and  2,200  feet  above  sea- 
level.  This  mountain  ends  in  a  mass  of  rough  ridges  and 
gorges,  called  Raccoon  Mountain,  enclosed  in  a  deep  bend 
of  the  Tennessee,  about  four  miles  west  of  Chattanooga. 
Next  is  the  valley,  two  or  three  miles  wide,  of  Will's  and  Look 
out  Creeks.  These  two  creeks  have  their  headwaters  very 
near  together,  but  flow  in  opposite  directions,  the  first  south 
west  and  the  second  northeast,  in  a  continuous  valley.  Beyond 
this  valley  is  Lookout  Mountain,  another  long  ridge.  About 
thirty  miles  south  of  Chattanooga  this  mountain  divides,  throw 
ing  off  a  long  thin  spur  to  the  right,  called  Pigeon  Mountain, 
and  continuing  in  its  main  ridge,  narrower  and  more  rugged, 
straight  toward  Chattanooga.  It  ends  abruptly  four  miles 
south  of  the  town  in  a  commanding  point  of  rock,  rising  from 
the  edge  of  the  Tennessee  River.  At  the  fork  of  Lookout  and 
Pigeon  Mountains  is  McLemore  Cove,  in  the  head  of  which 
are  the  sources  of  Chickamauga  Creek.  Beyond  Lookout 
Mountain,  toward  the  east,  are  other  parallel  ridges  and 
valleys. 

There  were  several  villages  in  the  valleys.  There  were  no 
good  roads  in  the  region,  but  along  the  direction  of  all  the 
valleys,  and  also  along  the  tops  of  some  of  the  plateaus,  were 
ordinary  country  roads.  Radiating  from  the  river  at  Caper- 
ton's  Ferry  near  Stevenson,  and  from  Bridgeport  and  Shell- 
mound,  were  roads  leading  through  gaps  in  the  ridges,  and 
across  the  valleys,  to  the  various  towns.  One  of  the  roads 
from  Shellmound,  with  branches  coming  into  it  from  other 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  427 

ferries,  passed  round  the  upper  end  of  Mount  Lookout  to 
Chattanooga.  Time  would  be  required  to  repair  all  the  roads 
before  the  wagons  could  go  over  them.  The  valleys  contained 
some  farms,  but  for  the  main  part  were  covered  with  timber. 
The  tops  of  the  ridges,  also,  though  of  poor  sandy  soil,  and 
almost  destitute  of  water,  had  thin  woods  upon  them.  Indeed 
it  was  a  difficult  mountain  region,  different  from  any  other  in 
which  a  great  campaign  had  as  yet  been  carried  on  in  this 
war,  though  not  wholly  unlike  the  theater  of  the  Tullahoma 
Campaign. 

OPERATIONS. 

Rosecrans's  movement  began  on  the  16th  of  August. 
The  passage  of  the  river  was  to  be  made  at  points  between 
Shellmound  and  Stevenson.  The  Twenty-first  Corps  [Critten- 
den]  was  to  move  in  three  columns  through  the  Sequatchie 
Valley,  covered  by  Minty's  brigade  of  cavalry;  the  rest  of  the 
cavalry  was  to  march  beyond  the  right  flank  of  the  main  army ; 
the  Fourteenth  Corps  [Thomas]  was  to  move  in  two  columns 
down  Battle  Creek  and  Big  Crow  Creek,  respectively ;  McCook 
was  to  send  Johnson's  division  of  his  corps  [Twentieth]  by  way 
of  Salem  to  Bellefonte,  and  David's  division  by  way  of  the 
mountain  road  from  Winchester  to  Stevenson;  Sheridan's 
division  of  this  corps  had  already  been  sent  forward  to 
Stevenson  and  Bridgeport;  the  Reserve  Corps  [Granger]  was 
to  follow  up  the  movement  of  the  main  army  and  close  up  on  it 
as  soon  as  practicable. 

To  deceive  Bragg  as  to  the  point  of  crossing,  these  move 
ments  were  to  be  concealed  as  well  as  possible,  and  a  detach 
ment  of  three  brigades  under  Hazen  from  Crittenden's  corps 
was  to  make  a  feint  all  along  the  river,  from  Chattanooga  as 
far  up  as  the  Confederates  were  defending  the  crossings.  On 
the  21st  of  August  a  battery  of  this  detachment  threw  shells 
into  Chattanooga  from  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river.  By  the 
evening  of  the  20th  these  movements  had  all  been  made  and 
the  army  was  concentrated  near  the  Tennessee. 

On  the  6th  of  August  "Burnside's  advance  into  East 
Tennessee  was  announced  by  the  presence  of  his  cavalry  in  the 
vicinity  of  Knoxville."*  Thereupon  Bragg  ordered  Buckner 
to  withdraw  his  corps  from  Knoxville  to  Loudon — back  on  the 

^Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War   (Scribner's) — Henry  M.  Cist. 


428  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

railway  thirty  miles  nearer  Chattanooga.  Hazen's  demonstra 
tion  along  the  river  caused  Bragg  to  draw  Buckner  still  nearer, 
and,  a  little  while  later,  to  order  him  into  Chattanooga.  About 
this  time,  also,  Walker's  corps  of  two  divisions  from  Joseph  E. 
Johnston's  Mississippi  forces  joined  Bragg's  army,  and  Long- 
street  was  started  with  two  divisions  and  Alexander's  battalion 
of  artillery  from  Lee's  army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Part  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  however,  did  not  arrive  until  after  the 
battle  of  Chickamauga.  Hardee  had  been  detached  from 
Bragg's  army,  and  D.  H.  Hill  had  been  assigned  to  it ;  Hill  was 
now  in  command  of  a  corps. 

(229)  Rosecrans  did  not  have  pontoons  enough  to  build 
two  bridges, — the  river  was  high  and  wide  from  the  recent 
heavy  rains, — but  by  eking  out  his  means  with  a  trestle  and 
rafts  and  boats  he  succeeded  in  passing  his  army  to  the  east 
bank  by  the  4th  of  September.  Thomas's  corps  [Fourteenth] 
took  the  road  to  Trenton;  McCook's  [Twentieth]  took  the  road 
to  Alpine  by  way  of  Winston's  Gap;  Crittenden's  [Twenty- 
first]  was  ordered  to  move  from  Shellmound  toward  Chatta 
nooga,  threatening  that  place.  All  the  cavalry  except  Minty's 
brigade  accompanied  McCook's  column.  Minty's  brigade  and 
Wilder's  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  went  with  Crittenden's 
column. 

On  the  9th  of  September  Rosecrans  learned  that  Bragg  had 
evacuated  Chattanooga  and  was  retreating  southward.  Rose 
crans  then  ordered  McCook,  covered  by  the  cavalry,  to  push 
ahead  toward  Alpine  and  Summerville  to  try  to  cut  Bragg  off, 
while  Crittenden,  passing  through  Chattanooga  and  leaving  a 
brigade  to  garrison  the  town,  was  to  pursue  by  the  Ringgold 
Road,  with  Minty's  brigade  of  cavalry  and  Wilder's  brigade  of 
mounted  infantry  covering  his  front.  Thomas  continued  to 
advance  by  the  Trenton-Lafayette  Road.  The  two  flanks  of 
the  army  were  marching  forty  miles  apart,  and  the  three 
columns  were  so  far  separated,  one  from  another,  by  impass 
able  mountains,  that  no  two  of  them  were  within  supporting 
distance  of  each  other. 

By  the  10th  McCook  had  reached  Alpine;  Thomas  was  at 
Stevens's  Gap;  his  leading  division  [Negley]  had  met  the 
enemy  in  Dug  Gap;  Crittenden  was  at  Chickamauga  Creek  on 
the  Ringgold  Road ;  the  head  of  his  column  had  also  met  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  Reports  received  by  the  commanders  of  all 
three  of  the  columns  indicated  that  there  was  a  large  force  of 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  429 

Confederates  in  the  neighborhood  of  Lafayette.  And  such  was 
the  case ;  it  was  Bragg's  army. 

Bragg  had  called  in  his  outlying  detachments,  and,  on  the 
8th  of  September,  having  learned  that  Rosecrans  had  crossed 
the  river  and  was  advancing  against  his  rear,  had  evacuated 
Chattanooga  and  moved  out  on  the  Lafayette  Road  to  meet  the 
enemy.  On  this  day,  the  10th  [September],  his  army  was  con 
centrated  behind  Pigeon  Mountain  with  its  front  and  flanks 
covered  by  his  cavalry.  Cleburne's  division  of  D.  H.  Hill's 
corps  occupied  the  gaps  of  Pigeon  Mountain. 

Bragg  was  aware  of  the  isolated  positions  of  the  Federal 
corps,  and  appears  to  have  seen  his  opportunity  to  destroy 
them  in  detail.  He  has  been  greatly  censured  for  his  failure 
to  do  so.  The  evening  of  the  9th  of  September  he  had  ordered 
Hindman  to  march  his  division  [Folk's  corps]  into  McLemore 
Cove  and  attack  Negley's  division  in  its  advanced  position ; 
and  he  had  ordered  Hill  to  send  or  lead  Cleburne's  division 
through  the  gaps  of  Pigeon  Mountain  in  conjunction  with 
Hindman. 

Hindman  reached  his  position  on  the  10th,  but  Hill  failed  to 
carry  out  his  part  of  the  order.  He  reported  that  the  gaps — 
Dug  and  Catlett's — had  been  closed  with  felled  trees,  and  that  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  get  through  them.  Bragg  thereupon 
ordered  Buckner  to  march  his  corps  to  Hindman's  assistance, 
which  he  did  on  the  afternoon  of  the  10th.  Thus  three  Con 
federate  divisions  were  now  within  three  miles  of  Negley's 
Federal  division,  which  was  far  ahead  of  the  rest  of  Thomas's 
corps.  Instead  of  attacking  Negley,  as  ordered,  Hindman  and 
Buckner  conferred  together  and  decided  that  another  plan  was 
better.  They  then  sent  back  their  recommendation  to  Bragg 
and  awaited  his  reply — and  lost  their  opportunity.  Negley, 
seeing  the  danger  of  his  position,  hastened  back  to  Stevens's 
Gap  where  he  rejoined  the  rest  of  Thomas's  corps.  Bragg 
refused  to  adopt  the  plan  recommended  by  his  subordi 
nates  and  insisted  upon  their  carrying  out  his  orders.  At  the 
same  time  he  ordered  Polk  to  march  his  other  division  to 
support  Hindman  and  Buckner ;  a.nd  Walker  to  move  his  corps 
to  Dug  Gap.  The  whole  combination,  which  ought  to  have 
succeeded,  failed,  apparently  through  the  sloth  and  reluctance 
shown  by  Bragg's  subordinate  commanders  in  the  execution  of 
his  orders. 

Meantime  Crittenden's  Federal  corps  had  divided;  two  divi 
sions  continued  the  march  toward  Ringgold,  while  one  moved 


430  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

to  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills;  both  detachments  were  recon- 
noitering  for  Bragg's  army.  Bragg  knew  of  this,  and  now 
turned  his  attention  to  Crittenden's  corps.  On  the  evening  of 
the  12th  of  September  he  ordered  Polk  to  move  his  corps  and 
Walker's  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills  and  strike  "Crittenden  in 
detail/'*  At  eleven  o'clock  that  night  Polk  sent  back  a  dis 
patch,  stating  "that  he  had  taken  a  strong  position  for  defense," 
and  asking  "that  he  be  heavily  reinforced."f  Bragg  replied 
to  him  that  he  was  already  greatly  superior  in  number  to  the 
enemy  in  his  front  and  promised  to  support  him  with  reinforce 
ments.  He  urged  Polk  to  attack  at  dawn  of  the  13th.  Early  on 
the  morning  of  the  13th  Bragg  moved  with  Buckner's  corps  to 
Polk's  support.  He  found  that  Polk  had  not  attacked,  and  that 
Crittenden  had  reunited  his  divisions  on  the  west  side  of  Chick  - 
amauga  Creek.  Finding  that  the  Confederates  had  not  re 
treated  by  way  of  Ringgold,  Crittenden  had  marched  his  two 
divisions  across  from  that  place  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  12th. 

(230)  Bragg  now  concentrated  his  army  along  the  east 
bank  of  Chickamauga  Creek.  As  soon  as  his  reinforcements 
under  Longstreet  from  Virginia  should  arrive  he  meant  to 
attack  with  his  whole  command. f 

On  the  12th  of  September,  Rosecrans  became  convinced  that 
Bragg  was  concentrating  his  army  behind  Pigeon  Mountain, 
and  he  appreciated  the  danger  of  his  own  army's  position  with 
its  flank  columns  thirty  miles  apart — from  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mills  to  Alpine — and  Bragg's  army  holding  the  direct*  road 
between  them.  He  sent  an  order  at  once  to  McCook,  directing 
him  to  unite  with  Thomas.  McCook  began  his  march  in 
obedience  to  this  order  on  the  night  of  the  13th  by  way  of 
Valley  Head.  On  the  17th  he  had  his  corps  concentrated  at 
the  eastern  end  of  Stevens's  Gap.  The  corps  of  Thomas  and 
Crittenden  had  been  held  in  place  to  await  McCook's  arrival. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA. 

On  the  morning  of  September  the  18th  Hood  had  reached 
Ringgold  with  three  of  Longstreet's  brigades;  six  others  and 
Alexander's  battalion  of  artillery  were  on  the  way.  Deter 
mined,  as  at  Perryville  and  Stones  River,  to  get  the  initiative, 
Bragg  decided  not  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  hinder  six  bri 
gades  and  the  artillery,  but  to  advance  in  force  at  once.  Long- 


*Bragg-'s  order  to  Polk. 
tCist. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  431 

street  arrived  on  the  night  of  the  19th  with  two  more  of  the 
brigades,  but  the  rest  of  his  troops  did  not  come  in  time  to 
take  part  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga. 

Rosecrans  had  decided  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  cover 
ing  the  roads  to  Chattanooga.  On  the  morning  of  the  18th 
his  troops  were  situated  as  follows:  Crittenden's  corps  was  in 
front  of  Lee  and  Gordon's;  Thomas's  corps  was  at  Pond 
Spring ;  McCook's  was  on  its  right  at  Stevens's  Gap ;  Granger's 
Reserve  Corps  was  at  Rossville;  Mitchell's  cavalry  corps,  ex 
cept  Minty's  brigade,  covered  the  right  of  the  army  and  was 
along  the  road  from  Alpine  to  McLemore's  Cove ;  Minty's  bri 
gade  was  on  the  Ringgold  Road  east  of  Reed's  Bridge;  and 
Wilder's  mounted  brigade  guarded  Alexander's  Bridge. 

Bragg  planned  to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  and  cut 
him  off  from  the  roads  by  way  of  Rossville  and  McFarland's 
Gap  back  to  Chattanooga.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of 
the  18th,  he  issued  an  order  for  an  immediate  movement.  (231) 
Hood  with  his  own  and  Bushrod  Johnson's  troops  was  to  cross 
at  Reed's  Bridge,  "turn  to  the  left  by  the  most  practicable  route, 
and  sweep  up  the  Chickamauga  toward  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mills."*  This  turning  movement  was  to  be  followed  progres 
sively  by  Walker,  who  was  to  cross  his  corps  at  Alexander's 
Bridge,  and  Buckner,  who  was  to  cross  his  corps  at  Tedford's 
Ford,  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  up-stream  from  Alexan 
der's  Bridge.  Folk's  corps  was  to  cross  at  Lee  and  Gordon's, 
or,  if  the  enemy  should  be  found  too  strong  there,  at  Dalton's 
or  Tedford'a  Ford.  (Dalton's  Ford  was  about  a  mile  and 
three-quarters  below  Lee  and  Gordon's.)  Hill  was  to  cover 
the  left  against  a  possible  advance  of  the  enemy  from  Mc 
Lemore's  Cove,  or  attack  him  in  flank  if  he  undertook  to  rein 
force  the  troops  at  Lee  and  Gordon's.  The  cavalry  was,  of 
course,  to  cover  the  flanks — Wheeler  on  the  left  and  Forrest 
on  the  right. 

Rosecrans  had  guessed  what  Bragg's  plan  of  battle  was  to 
be.  The  clouds  of  dust  raised  by  the  marching  columns — es 
pecially  by  Longstreet's  troops  marching,  on  {heir  way  to  re 
inforce  Bragg,  by  the  road  from  Dalton  to  Ringgold — indicated 
that  Bragg's  army  was  massing  beyond  the  left  of  the  Union 
army  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  the  roads  to  Chattanooga. 
Accordingly,  on  the  18th,  Thomas's  corps,  followed  by  Mc 
Cook's,  was  started  for  the  space  between  the  crossings  of  the 
Chickamauga,  above  mentioned,  and  Missionary  Ridge,  to  pre- 


*D.  H.  Hill  in  B.  6-  L. 


432  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

vent  Bragg  from  seizing  the  roads  to  Chattanooga.  Two  of 
the  brigades  of  the  Reserve  Corps  [Granger],  also,  marched 
toward  Reed's  Bridge ;  while  the  third  moved  out  on  the  Ring- 
gold  Road  to  keep  watch  in  that  direction. 

The  advance  of  the  Confederate  columns  on  the  18th 
was  slow,  due  to  the  narrow  and  difficult  mountain  roads,  and 
to  the  resistance  offered  by  Minty's  cavalry  and  Wilder's 
mounted  infantry.  Minty's  cavalry  resisted  stoutly  the  ad 
vance  of  Johnson's  [Hood's]  column  (Hood  joined  this 
column  and  took  command  of  it  about  4  p.  m.),  but  was  finally 
driven  across  the  creek;  it  managed  to  burn  the  bridge  after 
one  of  the  Confederate  brigades  had  crossed.  Wilder's  mount 
ed  infantry  successfully  held  Alexander's  Bridge  against  Walk 
er,  and  forced  him  to  move  down  to  Lambert's  Ford  in  order 
to  cross;  Wilder  was  then  driven  beyond  the  Lafayette  Road. 
Hood's  six  brigades  and  Walker's  five  bivouacked  that  night 
on  the  west  side  of  the  Chickamauga ;  the  other  Confederate 
corps  bivouacked  on  the  east  bank,  Buckner's  at  Tedford's  and 
Dalton's  Fords,  Folk's  opposite  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills,  and 
Hill's  opposite  Glass's  Mill,  a  mile  and  a  half  above  Lee  and 
Gordon's. 

(232)  The  forces  on  each  side  were  in  motion  during  the 
night  of  the  18th,  and  by  morning  on  the   19th  all  the  Con 
federate  infantry  except  the  divisions  of  Hindman,  Breckin- 
ridge,  and  Cleburne,  was  on  the  west  side  of  the  creek.    On  the 
Union  side  Thomas's  corps  had  come  up.    Negley's  division  of 
it  had  been  placed  at  Crawfish  Springs;  Reynolds's  near  the 
Widow  Glenn's;  while  those  of  Brannan  and  Baird  took  posi 
tion  covering  the  roads  from  Reed's  and  Alexander's  Bridges. 
Crittenden's  corps  still  held  the  crossing  at  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mills;  the  two  brigades  from  Granger's  Reserve  Corps  were 
on  the  left  beyond  the  road  to  Reed's  Bridge;  Minty's  cavalry 
brigade  was  still  on  the  left,  and  Wilder 's  mounted  infantry 
was  near  the  Widow  Glenn's;  McCook's  corps  had  not  come 
up. 

Neither  army  Jcnew  the  exact  position  of  the  other ;  none  of 
the  Federal  commanders  were  aware  that  "seven-tenths  of 
Bragg's  army  was  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Chickamauga."*  It 
is  probable  that  division  commanders  on  either  side  hardly 
knew  where  their  own  commands  were,  in  the  thick  woods,  let 
alone  the  other  troops  of  their  own  army,  or  the  troops  of  the 
hostile  army.  The  lines  were  at  this  time  about  six  miles  long. 

(233)  Thomas  now  ordered  Brannan  to  move  two  of  his 


*Van  Home. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  433 

brigades  forward  and  reconnoiter  toward  the  crossings  of  the 
Chickamauga.  In  carrying  out  this  order,  Brannan  soon  came 
into  contact  with  Forrest's  cavalry  dismounted  on  the  Con 
federate  right.  This  brought  on  the  battle  of  the  19th  of 
September. 

Forrest  was  driven  back,  and  Walker's  corps  came  into  the 
fight  on  the  Confederate  side.  Baird  with  his  division  came  to 
the  support  of  Brannan ;  but  they  were  both  driven  back  in  dis 
order.  Meantime  McCook's  corps  had  arrived  at  Crawfish 
Springs,  and,  at  about  10  a.  m.,  Johnson's  division  of  this  corps 
was  sent  by  Rosecrans  in  all  haste  to  help  Thomas  on  the  left. 
It  arrived  just  in  time  to  fall  on  the  left  flank  of  Liddell's 
Confederate  division  [Walker's  corps]  and  drive  it  back  with 
heavy  loss. 

A  little  while  later  Cheatham's  Confederate  division  [Folk's 
corps]  came  into  the  battle  at  this  point,  too  late  to  save  Lid- 
dell;  for  about  the  same  time  Palmer's  division  [Crittenden's 
corps]  and  Reynolds's  division  [Thomas's  corps]  came  to  John 
son's  assistance.  Then  Stewart's  Confederate  division  [Buck- 
ner's  corps]  attacked  Palmer's,  which  was  assailing  the  flank 
of  Cheatham's  division,  and  drove  it  back.  Johnson's  division 
fell  back  at  the  same  time.  Soon,  also,  Reynolds's  division  was 
retiring,  as  well  as  Van  Cleve's  [Crittenden's  corps],  which 
had  also  been  sent  to  this  part  of  the  line.  It  was  now  the 
middle  of  the  afternoon,  and  all  the  Federal  divisions  except 
those  of  the  Reserve  Corps  [Granger]  were  already  at  this  part 
of  the  line,  or  were  marching  for  it.  (230)  The  Reserve 
Corps  remained  at  McAfee's  Church  all  day  watching  the  Ring- 
gold  Road  and  covering  the  line  of  retreat  through  Rossville. 

(233)  Davis's  division  of  McCook's  corps  had  arrived  from 
the  extreme  right  in  time  to  check  the  Confederate  advance, 
and  soon  afterwards  was  joined  by  Wood's  division  of  Critten 
den's  corps  from  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills.  Sheridan  [McCook's 
corps]  also  joined  Wood  and  Davis  with  the  bulk  of  his 
division  from  Crawfish  Springs  about  6  p.  m. 

About  half-past  two  Hood  had  moved  his  brigades  forward 
and  fallen  upon  the  divisions  of  Reynolds  and  Van  Cleve,  and, 
after  desperate  fighting,  had  forced  them  back,  pierced  the 
Union  line,  and  got  possession  of  the  Lafayette  Road  at  that 
point.  Thereupon  Negley's  division  and  part  of  Brannan's 
attacked  Hood's  troops  and  succeeded  in  "driving  them  until 
darkness  ended  the  combat."*  Bragg  had  not  succeeded  in 

*Cist. 


434  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

turning  the  Federal  left,  and  Rosecrans  still  had  possession  of 
the  roads  to  Chattanooga. 

About  three  o'clock  Breckinridge's  Confederate  division 
[Hill's  corps],  from  the  left  of  Bragg's  line,  had  relieved  Hind- 
man's  division  [Folk's  corps]  at  Lee  and  Gordon's;  Hindman's 
division  then  started  for  the  line  of  battle  by  way  of  Dalton's 
Ford;  Cleburne's  division  [Hill's  corps]  had  crossed  at  Ted- 
ford's  Ford.  Later  in  the  evening  Breckinridge's  division  start 
ed  toward  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line.  Cleburne's  divi 
sion  joined  in  the  battle  at  about  6  p.  m.,  but  Hindman's  and 
Breckinridge's  did  not  reach  the  fighting  front  till  darkness 
had  ended  the  battle.  Preston's  Confederate  division  [Buck- 
ner's  corps],  also,  had  taken  no  part  in  the  battle. 

At  eleven  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  19th  Longstreet,  with 
two  brigades  of  McLaws's  division,  reported  his  arrival  to 
Bragg.  All  the  Confederate  army  was  now  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  Chickamauga,  and  Bragg  gave  orders  to  renew  the  bat 
tle  with  the  same  plan  at  daybreak  on  the  20th.  Polk  was  placed 
in  command  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  and  Longstreet  of 
the  left  wing. 

Both  armies  had  bivouacked  where  they  found  themselves  at 
the  end  of  the  day's  battle,  but  in  the  early  morning  of  the  20th 
the  lines  were  rearranged.  (234)  "Rosecrans  withdrew  his 
right  from  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  and  the  vicinity  of  Viniard's 
to  the  high  ground  west  and  north  of  the  Widow  Glenn's.  The 
left  of  his  line  was  formed  around  the  northeast  corner  of  the 
Kelly  Field,  the  extreme  left,  facing  north,  being  within  200 
yards  of  the  Lafayette  Road.  The  line  then  extended  along  the 
low  crest  east  of  the  Kelly  Field,  crossed  the  Lafayette  Road  at 
the  northern  edge  of  the  Poe  Field,  and  ran  thence  to  Widow 
Glenn's.  The  Union  line  by  divisions  from  left  to  right  ran  as 
follows:  Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  Reynolds,  Brannan,  Negley, 
and  Sheridan,  with  Wilder's  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  on 
the  extreme  right,  and  Van  Cleve's,  Wood's,  and  Davis's  divi 
sions  west  of  the  Crawfish  Springs  road  in  rear  of  the  right 
wing."*  During  the  night  the  Union  position  had  been 
strengthened  with  breastworks  made  of  logs,  rails,  and  rocks. 
From  Lee  and  Gordon's  southward  Mitchell's  two  divisions  of 
Union  cavalry  and  Wheeler's  squadrons  faced  each  other.  The 
Reserve  corps  [Granger]  was  still  at  McAfee's  Church. 

In  the  Confederate  line  Forrest's  cavalry  and  the  right  of 


•"Legend  with  Official  Maps. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  435 

Breckinridge's  division  reached  beyond  the  Union  left.  The 
other  divisions  were  arranged  as  follows :  Cleburne,  Stewart, 
Bushrod  Johnson,  and  Hindman  in  the  front  line;  Walker's 
corps  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Breckinridge ;  Preston's  division 
to  the  left  and  rear  of  Hindman;  the  divisions  of  Cheatham, 
Hood,  and  McLaws  at  first  in  reserve.  Although  Bragg  ex 
pected  to  renew  the  attack  with  his  extreme  right,  Hill's  corps, 
at  daylight,  and  to  take  it  up  with  his  troops  successively  to 
ward  his  left,  it  was  not  until  9.30  a.  m.  that  Breckinridge's  di 
vision  opened  the  battle.  Apparently  Polk,  who  commanded 
Bragg's  right  wing>  made  no  effort  to  carry  out  his  command 
er's  order  to  attack  at  daybreak.  Bragg's  orders  were  given  to 
Polk  at  midnight,  but  did  not  reach  Hill  until  7.30  a.  m.  The 
troops  were  not  then  in  position,  and  there  was  a  dense  fog 
which  hindered  their  movements.  Two  hours  were  spent  in  get 
ting  them  into  position.* 

With  part  of  Forrest's  cavalry  dismounted  on  his  right, 
Breckinridge  moved  his  division  forward.  Within  fifteen 
minutes  Cleburne's  division  advanced  on  his  left.  Breck 
inridge's  division  enveloped  the  left  of  Thomas's  line 
and  forced  it  back;  but  Cleburne's  division  and  the  left  of 
Breckinridge's  were  stopped  by  the  fire  from  behind  the  Union 
breastworks.  Breckinridge's  right  had  pushed  on  beyond  the 
Rossville  Road,  and  was  in  position  to  take  Thomas's  main 
line  in  reverse.  But  reinforcements  had  been  hurried  to 
Thomas's  left.  Rosecrans  had  foreseen,  in  his  inspection  of  the 
position  before  the  battle  opened,  that  Bragg  was  going  to 
repeat  the  effort  to  turn  his  left,  and  he  had  personally  ordered 
Negley's  division  from  the  right  to  the  left  of  the  Union  line. 
Other  troops  had  been  hurried  to  that  part  of  the  line,  also,  and 
with  their  combined  effort  they  checked  Breckinridge's  envel 
opment  and  drove  his  troops  away  from  Thomas's  left  and  rear. 
Cleburne's  assault  had  fallen  upon  Palmer  and  Johnson,  and  a 
desperate  fight  had  ensued. 

At  eleven  o'clock  Stewart's  Confederate  division  advanced 
and  struck  the  divisions  of  Reynolds  and  Brannan  in  the  Union 
line,  pressing  them  back  beyond  the  Lafayette  Road.  Here  it 
"encountered  a  fresh  artillery  fire  on  both  front  and  flank, 
heavily  supported  by  infantry,  and  had  to  retire."f  About  this 
time  Walker's  corps  was  put  into  the  battle  to  assist  Breckin 
ridge. 

*  Alexander. 
fD.  H.  Hill. 


436  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Up  to  this  time  there  had  practically  been  no  fighting  along 
the  right  of  the  Union  line ;  so  Rosecrans  had  continually  with 
drawn  troops  from  that  part  of  his  line  and  dispatched  them  to 
Thomas  on  the  left.  He  "sent  word  to  Thomas  that  he  would 
be  supported  if  it  required  all  of  McCook's  and  Crittenden's 
corps  to  do  so."*  Negley's  division,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been 
withdrawn  from  its  position  in  the  right  wing  and  sent  to 
Thomas  early  in  the  morning,  and  Wood's  division  had  taken 
Negley's  place  in  the  right  wing.  A  little  after  eleven  o'clock 
Wood's  division,  through  a  blunder  of  one  of  Thomas's  staff 
officers,  was  ordered  to  close  to  the  left  on  Reynolds.  To 
carry  out  the  order,  Wrood  withdrew  his  division  from  the  line 
and  started  to  march  it  by  the  rear  of  Brannan's  division.  This 
left  a  wide  gap  in  the  Union  line  between  Brannan's  right  and 
Sheridan's  left. 

Just  at  this  time  Longstreet's  turn  to  move  out  had  arrived 
in  Bragg's  progressive  order  of  attack.  Stewart's  division  was 
already  in  motion,  and  the  order  had  been  given  for  the  rest  of 
the  wing  to  advance.  Bushrod  Johnson's  division  was  on  the 
right  of  the  front  line  and  Hindman's  on  the  left ;  Hood's  divi 
sion  was  behind  Johnson's,  and  Preston's  was  in  reserve  on  the 
left.  Wood  had  hardly  moved  a  brigade's  length  in  his  flank 
march  when  he  was  struck  by  Longstreet's  column.  "Long- 
street  has  been  given  great  credit  for  it,  which,  however,  he 
never  claimed.  It  was  entirely  accidental  and  unforeseen,  but 
in  a  brief  period  it  threw  the  entire -left  [right]  flank  of  the 
enemy  in  a  panic."f  Brannan  and  Wood  were  struck  in  flank 
and  forced  to  withdraw ;  and  Davis's  division  which  .was  mov 
ing  to  fill  the  gap  left  by  Wood,  Sheridan's  division  on  Davis's 
right,  and  Wilder's  brigade  on  the  extreme  right  were  cut  off 
and  driven  from  the  field. 

These  troops  withdrew  by  a  road  through  McFarland's 
Gap.  After  passing  round  through  Rossville,  the  troops  of 
Sheridan  and  Davis  returned  to  the  Union  line  at  about  7  p.  m., 
in  time  to  aid  in  covering  the  withdrawal  of  the  Union  army. 
Rosecrans,  McCook,  and  Crittenden  were  carried  away  from 
the  battle-field  with  these  columns  and  did  not  return  to  it. 
Thomas  was  left  in  command  of  the  Union  forces. . 

(235)  Contrary  to  Bragg's  original  plan  of  enveloping  the 
left  of  the  Union  position,  Longstreet's  line  now  swung  to  the 


*Cist. 
fAlexander. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  437 

right, — a  movement  justified  by  the  changed  condition, — 
sweeping  before  it  the  troops  of  Brannan  and  Wood,  which  it 
had  taken  in  flank.  The  Federals  took  advantage  of  a 
pause  in  the  fighting  to  form  a  new  line  facing  south,  on  a 
wooded  ridge  just  south  of  the  Snodgrass  house.  This  line  was 
composed  of  Brannan's  division,  with  fragments  of  Wood's, 
Negley's,  and  Van  Cleve's  divisions.  At  two  o'clock  Longstreet 
assaulted  the  Union  line  with  five  brigades,  and  came  near  en 
veloping  Brannan's  right.  This  was  prevented  by  the  timely 
arrival  of  Gordon  Granger  with  Steedman's  division  of  the 
Reserve  Corps. 

Granger,  over  at  McAfee's  Church,  had  heard  the  heavy 
firing  of  the  batteries,  and  without  orders,  in  fact  contrary  to 
his  orders,  had  left  one  brigade  to  watch  the  Ringgold  Road 
and  the  line  of  retreat  through  Rossville,  and  with  Steedman's 
division  had  hastened  to  the  sound  of  the  battle.  He  arrived 
in  the  nick  of  time.  Steedman  led  his  division  against  Long- 
street's  left,  and,  after  a  desperate  struggle,  drove  it  back  and 
took  possession  of  the  hill  it  had  gained  on  Brannan's  right. 
"At  three  o'clock  Longstreet,  with  three  divisions — McLaws's, 
Hindman's,  and  Johnson's — again  assaulted  the  Union  line  and 
was  repulsed."*  Later  in  the  day  Longstreet,  with  a  view  to 
recovering  this  key-point,  asked  Bragg  for  reinforcements 
from  the  right  wing.  Bragg'replied  that  the  troops  of  his  right 
wing  "had  been  beaten  back  so  badly  that  they  could  be  of  no 
service  to  him/'f  Thereupon  Longstreet  formed  a  column  of 
such  troops  as  he  could  get  together  and  assaulted  the  hill  that 
Steedman  had  taken  from  him. 

The  combat  that  took  place  here  was  desperate,  and  it  kept  up 
till  dark.  The  ammunition  of  the  National  troops  became  al 
most  exhausted,  and  Longstreet's  final  charges  had  to  be  met 
with  the  bayonet.  Steedman  was  driven  back  to  the  next  ridge 
in  his  rear,  and  the  Confederates  occupied  the  ground  on  Bran- 
nan's  right. 

Meantime  the  battle  had  been  renewed  on  the  left  of 
Thomas's  position.  At  about  four  o'clock  D.  H.  Hill's  corps 
[Breckinridge  and  Cleburne],  reinforced  by  a  part  of  Walker's 
corps,  again  assaulted  this  part  of  the  Union  line.  At  six 
o'clock  Cheatham's  division  joined  in  the  attack.  By  this  time 
the  right  of  the  force  had  enveloped  the  Union  left,  and  was 
across  the  Rossville  Road.  Here  it  was  a  little  while  later 

*  Official  Maps  and  Legend. 
fCist. 


438  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

attacked  by  Reynolds's  division  and  driven  back  to  the  east  of 
the  road.  Reynolds's  division  was  at  this  time  withdrawing 
from  the  field.  Thomas,  whom  Rosecrans  had  ordered  several 
hours  before  to  retire,  had  given  the  order  to  withdraw  by  way 
of  McFarland's  Gap  to  Rossville,  and  the  line  was  withdrawn 
by  divisions  from  the  right  of  the  Kelly  Field. 

(236)  After  seven  o'clock  the  line  on  Snodgrass  Hill  was 
withdrawn.  The  Union  army  passed  through  McFarland's 
Gap,  and  between  midnight  of  the  20th  and  morning  of  the 
21st  "reformed  in  Rossville  Gap,  upon  the  adjoining  crests  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  across  Chattanooga  Valley  to  Lookout 
Mountain."*  Here  the  army  remained  until  after  nightfall  of 
the  21st,  when  it  was  withdrawn  to  Chattanooga.  The  night 
of  the  20th  found  Bragg's  army  in  possession  of  the  battle 
field.  Wheeler's  cavalry  made  a  "slight  demonstration  on  Mc 
Farland's  Gap"  on  the  21st,  and  Forrest's  on  Rossville  Gap; 
with  this  exception  Bragg's  army  did  not  follow  up  or  molest 
the  Union  army  that  day. 

It  is  hard  to  determine  what  were  the  numbers  on  each  side 
engaged  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  General  Alexander 
gives  the  following  figures : 

Confederates,  47,520  infantry  and  artillery,  and  14,260  cav 
alry;  total  61,780. 

Federals,  55,799  infantry  and  artillery,  and  9,842  cavalry; 
total  65,641. 

The  figures  given  in  Battles  and  Leaders  are  as  follows : 

Federals,  56,965  of  all  arms;  Confederates,  71,551  of  all 
arms. 

The  Confederates  lost  about  2,000  killed  and  13,000  wound 
ed;  the  Federals,  about  1,700  killed  and  10,000  wounded. 

COMMENTS. 

(227)  It  is  seldom  that  two  hostile  armies  find  themselves 
in  precisely  the  relative  positions  that  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  [Rosecrans]  and  the  Army  of  Tennessee  [Bragg] 
occupied,  when  the  former  was  at  Murfreesboro  and  the 
latter  held  the  line  Shelbyville-Wartrace-Fairfield.  The  two 
armies  used  parts  of  the  same  almost  straight  railway  as  lines 
of  communication,  and  the  front  of  each  was  squarely  across 
the  road — the  very  best  position  an  army  can  have  with  refer 
ence  to  its  line  of  communications.  The  Confederate  army  had 

*Legend  with  Official  Maps. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  439 

the  advantage  of  topography  in  its  position,  but  the  Federal 
army  had  the  advantage  of  numbers;  the  former  was  on  the 
defensive,  the  latter  on  the  offensive.  Each  army  had  but  a 
single  point,  its  base,  and  its  line  of  communications  to  cover. 
Neither  army  had  a  wide  stretch  of  country  to  defend  or 
several  cities  to  guard ;  Chattanooga  was  the  single  object  of 
contention. 

The  first  phase  of  the  general  campaign,  that  phase  usually 
spoken  of  as  the  Tullahoma  Campaign,  was,  on  the  part  of  the 
Union  forces,  an  example  of  what  von  der  Goltz  calls  "the 
strategic  attack  of  a  wing" ;  the  last  phase  of  it,  the  passage  of 
the  Tennessee  and  the  operations  thereafter,  was  an  example  of 
a  "strategic  turning  movement/'  The  first  was,  in  a  way,  en 
tirely  successful ;  the  second  was  successful  in  so  far  as  to 
gain  the  main  objective  for  which  the  campaign  was  under 
taken.  Yet  the  capture  of  Chattanooga  involved  an  unsual 
turn  of  events ;  to  wit,  the  army  that  had  taken  the  offensive,  in 
order  to  get  possession  of  the  town,  was  beaten  and  driven  back 
into  it,  and  was  there  besieged  by  the  very  army  it  had  success 
fully  maneuvered  out  of  the  town.  If,  in  his  invasion  of  Ken 
tucky,  after  placing  his  army  across  Buell's  communications, 
Bragg  had  proceeded  to  capture  Louisville,  and  then  had  been 
beaten  and  driven  into  the  city,  and  there  besieged  by  Buell,  his 
case  would  have  been  similar  to  that  of  Rosecrans  in  the  Chick- 
amauga  Campaign. 

The  chief  end  of  strategy  is  to  destroy  or  capture  the  hostile 
army.  This  is  the  end  a  commander  should  keep  in  view,  and 
not  simply  to  get  possession  of  towns  or  territory.  Viewed 
from  this  standpoint,  no  part  of  Rosecrans's  operations  was  a 
success;  but  viewed  as  a  game  of  maneuvers,  General  Rose 
crans's  first  nine  days  of  offensive  operations  were  a  triumph 
of  strategic  skill.  With  the  loss  of  only  560  men  he  forced 
Bragg's  army  to  abandon  a  naturally  strong  line  of  defense, 
which  it  had  spent  six  months  in  further  strengthening  with 
fortifications,  and  compelled  it  to  retreat  all  the  way  back  to 
its  base,  a  hundred  miles  in  rear.  He  fairly  outmaneuvered 
Bragg. 

His  first  maneuver  was  to  make  a  vigorous  demonstration 
against  Bragg's  left,  and  with  the  bulk  of  his  army  to  force 
back  the  Confederate  right.  This  succeeded  until  he  finally 
reached  Manchester  with  the  main  body  of  his  troops.  By  this 
time  Bragg  was  at  Tullahoma  with  his  main  army.  Rosecrans 
had  his  own  communications  covered,  and  was  in  reach  of 


440  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Bragg's.  There  was,  therefore,  nothing  for  Bragg  to  do  but  to 
fall  back  farther.  The  stout  resistance  made  by  Hardee's  corps 
at  Hoover's  Gap,  and  the  heavy  roads  and  swollen  streams,  due 
to  the  continuous  rain,  retarded  Rosecrans's  enveloping  col 
umns  enough  to  prevent  them  from  seizing  Bragg's  commu 
nications  and  forcing  him  to  fight  faced  to  the  rear. 

In  this  short  campaign  Rosecrans  made  the  first  use  in  the 
Civil  War  of  the  kind  of  flank  or  turning  movements  afterwards 
successfully  employed  by  Sherman  in  the  Atlanta  campaign. 
Such  movements  constituted  a  favorite  method  of  Napoleon  in 
offensive  mountain  warfare;  that  is  the  method  by  which  the 
attention  of  the  enemy  in  position  at  a  gorge  or  upon  heights 
is  occupied  by  one  force,  while  another  turns  his  position  and 
gains  or  threatens  his  rear  by  a  different  pass. 

(229)  From  the  time  when  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
crossed  the  Tennessee,  until  it  was  shut  up  by  the  Army  of 
Tennessee  in  Chattanooga,  there  was  little  in  the  strategy  of 
either  Rosecrans  or  Bragg  to  commend.  Each  commander 
seemed  to  be  more  ignorant  concerning  his  adversary's  move 
ments  than  was  generally  the  case  in  the  campaigns  of  this 
war ;  this  ignorance  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  mistakes.  The 
country  was  so  rugged  and  wooded,  and  so  lacking  in  roads  and 
good  trails,  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  cavalry  to  do  first  rate 
reconnaissance.  Yet  it  should  seem  that  the  cavalry  ought  to 
have  been  able  to  do  better  work  than  it  did.  In  fact,  if  we 
except  the  work  of  Minty's  cavalry  brigade  and  Wilder's 
mounted  infantry,  the  cavalry  operations  in  this  campaign  do 
not  appear  to  have  been  as  good  as  we  find  in  many  other 
campaigns  of  the  war.  More  fault  can  be  found  with  the  Con 
federate  cavalry  than  with  that  of  the  Federals,  mainly  be 
cause  its  strength  was  greater.  Bragg  had  14,260  troopers, 
while  Rosecrans  had  only  9,842.*  It  should  seem  that  Wheeler 
and  Forrest  ought  to  have  met  the  Federal  columns  as  soon  as 
those  columns  got  across  the  Tennessee,  and,  by  holding  the 
mountain  passes,  ought  to  have  delayed  their  progress  many 
days.  Time  was  of  great  importance  to  Bragg — a  few  more 
days  would  have  brought  him  four  more  of  Longstreet's  bri 
gades  and  Alexander's  battalion  of  artillery.  The  trouble  with 
Bragg's  cavalry  at  this  time  was  the  lack  of  unity  in  its  com 
mand.  It  consisted  practically  of  two  corps  under  separate 
commanders,  Wheeler  and  Forrest,  with  no  single  cavalry  gen 
eral  commanding  them  as  a  body. 

*Alexander. 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  441 

It  was  misinformation  concerning  Bragg's  movements  that 
induced  Rosecrans  to  send  his  columns  forward  on  such  widely 
separated  roads;  and  while  Bragg  was  aware  that  one  Federal 
column  was  on  the  Ringgold  Road  and  another  in  McLemore's 
Cove,  about  fifteen  miles  distant,  he  could  not  have  known 
that  McCook's  column  was  so  far  separated  from  Thomas's 
column,  and  that  Granger's  Reserve  Corps  was  so  far  in  rear, 
else  he  must  surely  have  attacked  and  destroyed  one  or  another 
of  the  columns  in  detail. 

He  had  his  own  army  in  hand  from  the  day  on  which  it 
marched  out  of  Chattanooga  [September  8]  ;  from  that  time 
until  McCook  united  with  Thomas  in  McLemore's  Cove  on  the 
17th  all  the  advantage  of  position  was  with  Bragg.  It  is  seldom 
that  an  army  finds  itself  in  so  perilous  a  situation  as  that  of 
Rosecrans's  army  during  those  days;  it  is  seldom  a  general  is 
given  such  an  opportunity  to  destroy  his  adversary's  army  in 
detail  as  there  fell  to  Bragg.  Considering  the  eagerness  Bragg 
usually  showed  to  attack  when  he  had  any  chance  of  winning, 
it  can  only  be  concluded  that  he  failed  to  take  advantage  of  his 
opportunity  through  ignorance  of  the  enemy's  predicament. 
To  be  sure,  he  did  issue  orders  for  an  attack  against  Thomas's 
advanced  division  [Negley]  in  McLemore's  Cove,  and  as  late 
as  the  night  of  the  12th  of  September  he  ordered  Polk  to  attack 
Crittenden's  isolated  divisions ;  but  his  subordinate  commanders 
failed  to  execute  his  orders.  Thereafter  he  was  content  to 
stand  fast  and  wait  until  Hood  arrived  with  reinforcements 
from  Virginia  on  the  18th.  Four  precious  days,  from  the  13th 
to  the  16th,  inclusive,  were  thrown  away.  Bragg's  army  with 
out  the  Virginia  troops  was  superior  in  numbers  to  any  force 
Rosecrans  could  have  opposed  to  him  during  that  time.  On 
the  17th,  however,  the  Federal  columns  were  united.  After 
that  Bragg  ought  to  have  waited  until  all  of  his  Virginia  rein 
forcements  had  joined,  before  he  attacked.  In  fact,  he  ought 
to  have  taken  up  a  defensive  position  and  awaited  attack  from 
Rosecrans. 

Bragg  did  not  have  the  knack  of  getting  cheerful  service  out 
of  his  subordinate  officers;  but  as  the  commander  enjoys  the 
reward  of  his  subordinates'  fitness  and  performance,  so,  also, 
must  he  suffer  the  blame  for  their  unfitness  and  failure.  If 
they  will  not,  or  cannot,  do  his  bidding,  he  can  relieve  them  on 
the  spot  and  put  others  into  their  places.  If  Bishop  Polk  would 
not  obey  Bragg's  orders  he  ought  to  have  been  sent  to  the  rear 
in  arrest  instanter.  Kitchener's  favorite  reply  is  a  good  one 


442  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

for  a  commander  to  remember :  "Your  reasons  for  not  doing 
what  you  were  told  to  do  are  the  best  I  ever  heard;  now  go 
and  do  it." 

Some  of  Bragg's  critics  have  censured  him  for  quitting 
Chattanooga.  He  certainly  left  the  town  an  easy  capture  for 
Rosecrans ;  but  he  probably  saved  his  own  army  by  withdraw 
ing  it.  Had  he  remained  in  Chattanooga,  Rosecrans  would 
have  taken  possession  of  his  communications  and  invested  the 
town.  Within  a  week  Rosecrans  would  have  been  joined  by 
Burnside's  army  from  Knoxville,  and  a  little  later  by  a  part  of 
Grant's  from  Memphis;  and  he  would  have  had  Bragg's  army 
as  securely  trapped  as  Grant  had  Pemberton's  at  Vicksburg. 

Bragg  ought,  however,  to  have  been  able  easily  to  keep  his 
army  between  the  main  part  of  the  Union  army  and  Chatta 
nooga,  and  at  the  same  time  to  guard  his  railway  back  to  Dai- 
ton.  If,  while  he  was  waiting  for  Longstreet's  divisions,  from 
about  the  10th  to  the  18th  of  September,  he  had  destroyed  or 
captured  Crittenden's  corps,  or  forced  it  back,  and  had  placed 
his  own  army  across  the  valley  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  facing 
south  and  covering  Rossville  Gap,  he  would  have  blocked  the 
road  to  Chattanooga,  and  stood  in  a  position  to  strike  the 
Federal  columns  in  flank  if  they  moved  against  his  own  com 
munications,  the  railway  through  Dalton.  Here  also  he  would 
have  been  in  position  to  attack  Burnside's  army,  if  it  had 
attempted  to  slip  down  from  Knoxville  to  seize  Chattanooga. 
On  the  arrival  of  Longstreet's  whole  force  Bragg  could  then 
have  taken  the  offensive  against  the  rest  of  Rosecrans's  army. 

In  putting  into  effect  Longstreet's  suggestion  to  transfer 
troops  from  Virginia  to  Bragg's  assistance  the  Confederate 
authorities  had  waited  too  long;  if  they  had  done  it,  and  on  a 
larger  scale,  before  Gettysburg  and  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  the 
results  might  have  been  decisive;  if  they  had  done  it  as  soon  as 
practicable  after  the  defeat  of  Gettysburg,  Rosecrans  might 
have  been  beaten  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  and  Chat 
tanooga  saved;  if  they  had  done  it  before  Burnside  seized 
Knoxville,  near  the  end  of  August,  Bragg  would  have  had  nine 
of  Longstreet's  infantry  brigades  and  his  artillery  at  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga  in  place  of  only  five  of  his  brigades.  Burnside's 
presence  at  Knoxville  closed  the  short  line  of  railway  from 
Virginia,  and  forced  the  Confederate  reinforcements  to  travel 
the  long  route  by  way  of  Petersburg,  Wilmington,  Augusta, 
and  Atlanta.  The  first  train  started  from  Louisa  Court  House, 
Virginia,  on  September  the  9th,  but  did  not  reach  Ringgold 


THE  CHICKAMAUGA  CAMPAIGN.  443 

until  the   18th.     The  artillery  did  net  arrive  there  until   the 
25th.* 

TACTICS. 

(232)  The  attack  at  Chickamauga  had  the  usual  fault  of 
being  made   in  detail,   and   the  victory,   like   others,   was   not 
made  complete  by  a  vigorous  pursuit.     The  fighting  was  des 
perate  and  the  losses  were  heavy.     Bragg's  plan  of  attack,  an 
envelopment  of  the  Federal  left,  was  all  right,  but  his  method, 
a  successive  movement  from  right  to  left,  was  faulty ;  the  exe 
cution  was  tardy  and  ineffectual,  due  to  the  thick  woods,  the 
fog  on  the  morning  of  the  20th  September,  and  the  lack  of 
prompt  and  cheerful  obedience  on  the  part  of  subordinate  com 
manders.    It  would  have  been  better  to  let  the  secondary  attack 
begin  first  along  the  enemy's  front,  to  gain  and  hold  his  atten 
tion  in  that  quarter ;  then  to  let  the  main  attack,  the  enveloping 
movement,  follow. 

(233)  The  penetration  made  by  Longstreet's  column  on  the 
20th,  and  his  right-turn,  though  contrary  to  Bragg's  purpose 
of  turning  the  Union,  left,  was  most  effective ;  but  it  did  not 
destroy  or  capture  any  considerable  part  of  the  Union  army. 
In  fact  Chickamauga  was  to  Bragg's  army  a  Pyrrhic  victory — 
costly  and  barren. 

General  Alexander  makes  the  following  critical  summary  of 
the  second  day's  attack:  "The  battle  was  opened  by  two  divi 
sions  attacking  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy  in  a  fortified 
position,  the  attack  being  made  in  a  single  line  without  supports 
at  hand.  They  are  defeated  and  put  out  of  action  for  the  day. 
Two  more  divisions  try  and  fare  little  better.  A  fifth,  in  re 
serve,  sends  in  one  brigade  without  result;  four  are  not  en 
gaged.  The  morning  is  gone  and  the  battle  of  the  Right  Wing 
is  over.  That  of  the  Left  Wing  is  scarcely  begun.  It  ad 
vances,  finds  by  accident  a  gap  in  the  enemy's  line,  and  drives 
off  three  divisions  of  the  enemy.  The  Left  Wing  fights  the 
rest  of  the  enemy's  army  (three-fourths  of  it)  until  near  dark, 
when  both  wings  unite  and  drive  the  enemy  off  the  field,  dark 
ness  covering  his  retreat.  It  is  the  old  familiar  story  of  piece 
meal  attacks."  At  the  time  that  Longstreet  asked  Bragg  for 
reinforcements  to  help  him  complete  his  victory  by  crushing 
Thomas's  right,  and  received  the  answer  that  "there  was  no 
fight  left  in  the  right  wing,"  Cheatham's  division  was  standing 


^Alexander. 


444  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

idle  in  that  wing,  as  it  had  been  doing  all  morning  and  con 
tinued  to  do  until  6  p.  m. 

The  divisions  of  Davis  and  Sheridan  which  were  cut  off  by 
Longstreet's  assault  might  have  rallied  within  a  mile  of  the 
battle-field ;  for  they  were  virtually  not  pursued.  If  they  had 
done  so,  and  had  returned  and  assailed  Longstreet's  left  flank, 
which  was  in  the  air,  they  might  have  turned  the  victory  against 
him.  Instead  of  doing  that  they  marched  all  the  way  to  Ross- 
ville  before  countermarching ;  when  they  got  back  near  the 
field  the  battle  was  over. 


LECTURE  XXL 
THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA. 

(236)  Having  withdrawn  from  Rossville  Gap  on  the  night 
of  September  the  21st,  1863,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
formed  in  front  of  Chattanooga  "from  the  river  above  to  the 
river  below."  The  cavalry  had  covered  the  movement  and 
occupied  the  roads  in  the  Chattanooga  Valley  until  it  was 
driven  in  by  the  Confederates.  (237)  The  Union  army  occu 
pied  as  salients  the  strong  unfinished  works  left  by  Bragg's 
army,  and  before  noon  of  the  22nd  had  them  connected  by 
rifle-pits.  "Within  two  days  these  rifle-pits  became  formidable 
earth-works."*  A  little  before  midday  on  the  22nd  September 
the  Confederate  cavalry,  supported  by  McLaws's  division  of 
infantry,  passed  through  Rossville  Gap  and  down  the  other 
roads  in  the  Chattanooga  Valley,  and  advanced  to  within  three 
miles  of  Chattanooga. 

Bragg's  main  army  did  not  quit  the  field  of  Chickamauga 
until  the  afternoon  of  the  21st,  when  Folk's  corps  started  down 
the  valley  of  the  Chickamauga.  The  movement  northward 
continued  on  the  22nd  and  23rd,  and  ended  by  placing  the 
Confederate  army  in  position  in  front  of  the  Union  army.  The 
Confederate  line  stretched  along  the  western  base  of  Mission 
ary  Ridge  from  near  the  railway  tunnel  to  a  point  about  two 
miles  farther  south  than  Orchard  Knob;  thence  it  bent  west 
ward  across  Chattanooga  Valley  to  Mount  Lookout.  Bragg 
now  contented  himself  with  investing  the  Federal  army  with 
this  incomplete  line,  leaving  to  Wheeler's  cavalry  the  task  of 
cutting  off  its  communications  with  its  depot  at  Bridgeport  on 
the  northern  side  of  the  river,  and  the  destruction  of  its  rail 
way  beyond  that  point. 

(238)  Rosecrans  placed  his  cavalry  on  the  northern  bank 
of  the  river  from  Washington  to  Caperton's  Ferry  (near 
Stevenson)  to  protect  his  trains  passing  from  Bridgeport  to 
Chattanooga,  and  to  watch  for  the  enemy  at  the  river-cross 
ings.  Wheeler,  however,  eluded  the  Union  cavalry,  and,  on 
the  1st  of  October,  got  across  the  river  with  a  large  force 
of  horsemen  and  made  for  Rosecrans's  communications.  At 

*Legend  with  Official  Maps. 

445 


446  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

this  time  the  shortest  roads  from  Chattanooga  to  Bridgeport 
— the  one  by  way  of  Brown's  and  Kelly's  Ferries,  and  the 
one  by  way  of  Wauhatchie  and  Whiteside — were  commanded 
by  Confederate  batteries  on  Mount  Lookout,  and  watched  by 
Confederate  sharpshooters;  and  the  .only  route  available  for 
the  use  of  the  Federal  army  was  the  difficult  road,  sixty  miles 
long,  over  Walden's  Ridge  and  thence  down  the  Sequatchie 
Valley.  Wheeler  struck  this  road  at  Anderson's  Cross-Roads 
in  the  Sequatchie  Valley,  and  there  destroyed  300  wagons  of 
the  Federal  trains  and  captured  a  large  number  of  mules. 

But  the  Federal  cavalry,  which  had  started  in  pursuit,  was 
close  on  his  heels.  (227)  He  made  for  Murfreesboro  with 
the  view  to  destroy  the  railway  and  the  Federal  stores  col 
lected  there ;  but  Crook's  column  of  Federal  cavalry  reached 
Murfreesboro  ahead  of  him  and  turned  him  southward.  With 
out  accomplishing  the  destruction  of  the  Nashville  railway  he 
was  finally  driven  out  of  Tennessee  in  a  very  shattered  con 
dition,  across  the  Tennessee  River,  into  Alabama.  In  these 
cavalry  operations  "marches  were  made  on  several  days  rang 
ing  from  forty  to  fifty-seven  miles,"*  and  many  combats  took 
place  in  several  of  which  the  "saber  was  freely  used." 

(238)  Meanwhile  the  condition  of  the  beleaguered  army 
was  becoming  very  serious.  At  first  the  wagon-trains  were 
large  and  in  good  condition,  and  it  looked  as  if  they  would  be 
able  to  keep  the  army  supplied  with  provisions  even  though 
they  had  to  haul  by  way  of  the  long  Sequatchie  Valley — 
Walden's  Ridge  road.  But  early  in  October  rains  set  in,  and 
soon  the  roads  became  almost  impassable.  "The  destruction 
of  hundreds  of  wagons  and  animals  by  Wheeler  was  almost 
fatal  to  the  army.  The  remaining  animals,  from  necessity, 
were  pressed  beyond  endurance."  Each  successive  trip  from 
Bridgeport  was  made  with  fewer  wagons  and  lighter  loads; 
and  the  rations  issued  had  to  be  reduced  in  a  like  proportion.* 
The  artillery  horses  died  by  the  score  from  starvation,  and  in 
the  end  the  batteries  could  not  be  moved  for  want  of  animals. 
It  began  to  look  as  if  the  Union  army  would  have  to  choose  the 
alternative  of  surrender  or  "retreat  with  great  peril  and  cer 
tain  loss  of  all  materiel."  Bragg  believed  the  army  would  be 
forced  by  starvation  to  surrender.  But  this  was  not  so.  The 
country  and  the  authorities  at  Washington  had  become  thor- 

*Van  Home.  .* 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA  447 

oughly  aroused  concerning  the  perilous  situation  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  and  vigorous  efforts  were  making  for  its 
relief.  Orders  had  already  been  sent  to  General  Grant  at 
Vicksburg  directing  him  to  dispatch  a  large  force  to  aid  Rose- 
crans;  Burnside,  at  Knoxville,  had  also  been  ordered  to  go  to 
his  assistance;  and  Hooker  had  been  started  for  Chattanooga 
with  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  [Howard  and  Slocum] 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.*  These  troops  ought  all  to 
have  been  sent  in  time  to  aid  Rosecrans  in  his  battle  with 
Bragg — the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  No  more  troops  were  now 
wanted  within  the  lines  at  Chattanooga,  until  the  railway  from 
Bridgeport  to  Nashville  could  be  made  secure  against  raids, 
and  a  shorter  wagon-road  could  be  opened  between  Bridgeport 
and  Chattanooga.  Rosecrans,  therefore,  ordered  Hooker,  upon 
his  arrival  at  Nashville,  to  place  his  troops  along  the  railway 
and  guard  it  until  arrangements  could  be  made  for  opening  the 
shorter  route  to  Bridgeport.  The  bulk  of  Hooker's  command 
took  station  at  Bridgeport  ready  for  call  to  Chattanooga  the 
moment  it  should  be  required. 

Some  changes  in  the  organization  and  among  the  subordi 
nate  commanders  of  the  two  hostile  armies  had  taken  place. 
McCook  and  Crittenden  had  both  been  relieved  of  command 
and  ordered  before  a  court  of  inquiry  to  account  for  their  con 
duct  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  and  their  two  corps,  the 
Twentieth  and  Twenty-first,  had  been  consolidated  into  a  single 
corps,  numbered  the  Fourth,  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
General  Gordon  Granger.  In  Bragg's  army  Polk  had  been  re 
lieved  of  command  and  placed  under  charges  for  "failing  to 
open  the  battle  of  the  20th  (September)  at  day-light,"  at 
Chickamauga,  as  he  had  been  ordered  to  do.  Most  of  Bragg's 
generals  were  at  loggerheads  with  him,  and  all  that  could  do 
so  had  got  away  from  him.  D.  H.  Hill  and  Buckner  were  gone, 
but  Hardee  had  rejoined.  Bragg's  army  was  now  organized 
in  three  corps  under  Longstreet,  Hardee,  and  Breckenridge, 
respectively. 

The  Washington  authorities  had  at  last  awakened  to  the 
impolicy  of  having  several  armies  in  the  field  operating  inde 
pendently  of  one  another,  and  with  no  common  head  except 
General  Halleck  at  the  Capital.  They  had  discovered  the  man 
equal  to  the  command  of  all  the  armies  and  operations  in  the 
southwestern  theater.  General  Grant  had  already  been  ordered 


*Cist.     Grant. 


448  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

to  go  to  Nashville  "to  superintend  the  movement"  of  the  troops 
sent  by  him  to  reinforce  Rosecrans.  Later  he  was  ordered  to 
proceed  "to  the  Gait  House,  Louisville,  Kentucky,  where  [he] 
would  meet  an  officer  from  the  War  Department  with  his  in 
structions."*  The  officer  was  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr. 
Stanton,  who  joined  Grant  on  the  way  to  Louisville.  This  was 
about  the  17th  or  18th  of  October. 

General  Grant  says:  "The  Secretary  handed  me  two  orders, 
saying  that  I  might  take  my  choice  of  them.  The  two  were 
identical  in  all  but  one  particular.  Both  created  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  giving  me  the  command,  composed 
of  the  Departments  of  the  Ohio,  the  Cumberland,  and  the 
Tennessee,  and  all  the  territory  from  the  Alleghanies  to  the 
Mississippi  River,  north  of  Banks's  command  in  the  southwest. 
One  order  left  the  department  commanders  as  they  were,  while 
the  other  relieved  Rosecrans  and  assigned  Thomas  in  his  place. 
I  accepted  the  latter."  The  .order  was  dated  October  16.  -  A 
copy  of  it  was  sent  to  Rosecrans  and  reached  him  on  the  19th. 

While  Stanton  and  Grant  were  still  at  Louisville  the  Secre 
tary  received  a  telegram  from  Mr.  C.  A.  Dana,  at  Chattanooga, 
"informing  him  that,  unless  prevented,  Rosecrans  would  re 
treat,  and  advising  peremptory  orders  against  his  doing  so."* 
The  telegram  was  sent,  of  course,  before  Rosecrans-  re 
ceived  his  order  of  relief.  There  was  really  no  truth  in  the 
telegram.  All  the  evidence  goes  to  show  that  at  that  time 
Rosecrans  had  no  notion  of  retreating,  but  had  all  arrange 
ments  under  way  for  opening  a  short  line  of  supply  by  way  of 
Brown's  and  Kelly's  Ferries,  and  thence  by  boat  to  Bridge 
port.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  make  out,  Mr.  Dana  was  a  sort  of 
chartered  spy  placed  by  the  War  Department  to  keep  it  con 
fidentially  advised  of  what  was  going  on  at  the  headquarters 
of  this  army.  Truly,  the  military  service  of  the  United  States 
had  its  drawbacks  under  Mr.  Stanton  and  General  Halleck! 
Those  two  men  sent  many  a  loyal  and  able  soldier  to  his 
grave  with  a  heart  crushed  under  the  burden  of  their  in 
justice.  Rosecrans  was  far  too  frank  and  outspoken  to  last 
under  them.  On  the  receipt  of  Mr.  Dana's  telegram  Stanton, 
in  a  state  of  great  excitement,  sent  for  Grant.  The  latter 
wired  Thomas,  who  was  now  in  command  at  Chattanooga, 
"that  he  must  hold  Chattanooga  at  all  hazards."  Thomas  re 
plied,  "We  will  hold  the  town  till  we  starve." 

*Grant. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  449 

(240)  Meanwhile  there  was  practically  no  fighting  between 
the  hostile  lines  around  Chattanooga.  The  Confederates  threw 
a  few  shells  into  the  town,  but  they  did  no  harm.  The  lines  of 
hostile  outposts  were  so  close  together  that  the  sentinels  could 
swap  yarns  and  tobaeco  at  some  points.  The  main  Confederate 
position  at  the  foot  of  the  slopes  was  fortified  with  breast 
works,  and  there  were  some  unfinished  earthworks  half-way 
up  the  hillside. 

The  right  of  the  Confederate  line  was  held  by  Hardee's 
corps,  and  the  center  by  Breckinridge's,  while  Longstreet's 
corps  held  the  left  of  the  line  from  Chattanooga  Creek  to 
Mount  Lookout;  batteries  occupied  the  northern  point  of  this 
mountain,  but  were  too  high  above  the  Federal  works  to  be 
effective.  Beyond  the  mountain  Bragg  had  a  string  of  sharp 
shooters  stretched  along  the  river-bank  from  Lookout  Creek  to 
a  point  ten  miles  down-stream.  They  were  to  guard  the  road 
on  the  opposite  bank  and  prevent  the  passage  of  the  Union 
trains,  and  were  supported  by  Law's  brigade  of  infantry  from 
Longstreet's  corps.  The  railway  and  roads  toward  Bridgeport 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  river  were  guarded  by  the  cavalry ; 
but  Longstreet  says  this  cavalry  "was  not  found  as  watchful  as 
the  eyes  of  an  army  should  be." 

The  project  which  Rosecrans  had  begun  arranging,  and 
Thomas  continued,  for  shortening  the  line  of  communications 
with  Bridgeport,  was  approved  and  completed  by  General 
Grant,  who  reached  Chattanooga  on  the  23rd  of  October. 
(239)  By  examining  the  map  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Tennes 
see  River  flows  west  for  a  mile  or  two  at  Chattanooga,  then 
bends  and  flows  south  for  about  two  miles  until  it  strikes  the 
rock  on  Mount  Lookout,  by  which  it  is  turned  round  to  the 
west  again.  Then  it  flows  north  and  makes  a  deep  bend  round 
the  northern  end  of  Raccoon  Mountain.  With  two  or  three 
more  windings  round  the  mountain  spurs,  in  a  generally  south 
westerly  course,  it  passes  Bridgeport.  Across  the  narrow 
tongue  of  land  called  Moccasin  Point  was  Brown's  Ferry, 
about  two  miles  from  Chattanooga,  and  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  road  that  led  over  Raccoon  Mountain  to  Kelly's  Ferry. 
By  this  route  Kelly's  Ferry  was  only  eight  miles  from  Chatta 
nooga  ;  by  the  river  it  was  twenty-odd  miles.  Part  of  the  way 
between  the  two  ferries,  the  river,  where  it  flowed  through  a 
narrow  channel  of  rock,  was  too  swift  to  be  navigated  by  such 
boats  as  were  available.  So  a  plan  was  devised  to  throw  a 
pontoon-bridge  across  the  Tennessee  at  Brown's  Ferry,  get 


450  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

control  of  the  country  south  of  the  river  and  west  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  establish  a  line  of  communications  by  wagon- 
road  from  Chattanooga  to  Kelly's  Ferry,  and  by  boat  from 
the  ferry  to  Bridgeport.  The  execution  of  the  plan  required 
the  cooperation  of  Hooker's  command  from  the  direction  of 
Bridgeport.  A  steamer  had  been  built  at  Bridgeport,  and  one 
captured  at  Chattanooga  had  been  put  in  running  order;  and 
pontoons  had  been  constructed  for  use  in  the  enterprise. 

General  W.  F.  Smith,  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  had  devised  the  scheme  and  worked  out  its  details, 
and  he  was  entrusted  with  its  execution  from  the  Chattanooga 
side.  He  was  given  two  brigades,  Hazen's  and  Turchin's,  and 
three  batteries.  Hooker  was  ordered  to  cross  the  river  at 
Bridgeport  with  the  Eleventh  Corps  and  one  division  of  the 
Twelfth  "and  march  up  by  Whiteside's  and  Wauhatchie  to 
Brown's  Ferry.  General  Palmer,  with  a  division  of  the  Four 
teenth  Corps,  was  ordered  to  move  down  the  river  on  the  north 
side,  by  a  back  road,  until  opposite  Whiteside's,  then  cross  and 
hold  the  road  in  Hooker's  rear  after  he  had  passed."* 

Hooker  crossed  the  river  on  the  26th  of  October  and  began 
his  march ;  at  3  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  Smith's  pon 
toon-boats  were  cast  loose  at  Chattanooga.  They  bore  1,500 
picked  men  under  Hazen ;  the  rest  of  Smith's  command  under 
Turchin  marched  overland  to  Brown's  Ferry.  The  night  was 
foggy,  and,  by  keeping  in  close  to  the  right  bank,  the  boats 
passed  unnoticed  by  the  Confederate  outposts  until  they  were 
about  to  touch  shore  at  the  western  side  of  Brown's  Ferry. 
Here  the  Confederate  picket  fired  a  "harmless  volley  and  fled." 
The  troops  from  the  boats  quickly  landed  and  took  possession 
of  the  heights  above  the  ferry.  A  small  Confederate  force, 
aroused  by  the  firing  of  the  picket,  .hurried  to  attack  the  Fed 
erals  on  the  heights;  but,  in  the  short  combat  that  followed, 
they  were  defeated,  and  they  retired  up  the  valley.  Turchin's 
part  of  the  Union  command,  meanwhile,  had  been  brought 
over  from  the  right  bank.  The  pontoon-bridge  was  promptly 
laid.  "For  an  hour  or  so  in  the  morning  the  work  progressed 
under  an  artillery  fire  from  the  rebel  batteries  on  Lookout 
Mountain"  ;f  but  the  Federal  losses  were  only  six  killed, 
twenty-three  wounded  and  nine  missing.  Six  Confederates 
were  captured  and  six  left  dead  on  the  ground.  The  position 
was  intrenched  by  the  Federals  and  held  until  the  arrival  of 


*Grant. 
tCist. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  451 

Hooker's   troops  the   next  day.      "No  attempt   was   made   by 
Bragg  to  dislodge  this  force  or  to  destroy  the  bridge."* 

Hooker  marched  by  the  road  along  the  base  of  Raccoon 
Mountain  into  Lookout  Valley.  On  the  28th,  near  where  this 
road  joined  the  valley  road,  Howard's  corps,  which  was  in  the 
lead,  met  the  Confederate  advanced  post  and  drove  it  down 
the  valley.  This  was  a  part  of  the  Confederate  brigade  [Law] 
placed  in  the  valley  to  support  -the  line  of  sharpshooters  along 
the  river.  The  detachment  in  its  retreat  destroyed  the  railway- 
bridge  over  Lookout  Creek.  Hooker's  command  moved  on, 
and  Howard's  corps  halted  for  the  night  at  six  o'clock,  within 
about  two  miles  of  Brown's  Ferry.  Geary's  division  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps  was  left  at  Wauhatchie  to  guard  the  road  to 
Kelly's  Ferry. 

The  Confederate  cavalry  on  the  left  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  very  vigilant,  but  Longstreet's  signal  party  reported  the 
advance  of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  from  the  direction  of 
Bridgeport  on  the  afternoon  of  the  27th.  Bragg,  according  to 
Longstreet,  did  not  credit  the  report.  The  next  day,  the  28th, 
Bragg  and  Longstreet  stood  on  the  top  of  Mount  Lookout  and 
watched  Hooker's  column  "marching  quietly  along  the  valley 
toward  Brown's  Ferry."f  Longstreet  says :  "Presently  the 
rear-guard  came  in  sight  and  made  its  bivouac  immediately  in 
front  of  the  point  where  we  stood."  This  was  Geary's  division 
at  Wauhatchie. 

(240)  It  was  arranged  to  make  a  night  attack  upon  this 
detachment  with  three  brigades  of  Hood's  division  (now  under 
Jenkins),  reinforced  by  Law's  brigade,  which,  having  fallen 
back  before  Hooker's  advance,  was  in  bivouac  "near  the  north 
ern  base  of  the  mountain  about  a  mile  east  of  the"  road  by 
which  the  enemy  was  marching.  Law  with  his  own  and  two 
of  Jenkins's  brigades  took  a  position  to  check  troops  from 
Howard's  corps,  in  case  they  should  be  sent  to  Geary's  assist 
ance,  and  Jenkins  led  his  other  brigade  to  assault  Geary. 

On  hearing  the  sound  of  battle  at  Wauhatchie,  Hooker  dis 
patched  Howard's  corps  to  Geary's  aid.  On  the  way  Howard 
encountered  Law's  detachment  and  drove  it  away,  but  failed  to 
reach  Geary.  Geary,  however,  repulsed  Jenkins's  attack.  The 
casualties  on  both  sides  were  heavy. 

General  Alexander  characterizes  this  night  attack  as  "one  of 
the  most  foolhardy  adventures  of  the  war."  "Night-attacks," 


*Cist. 
fLongstreet. 


452  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

he  says,  "are  specially  valuable  against  troops  who  have  been 
defeated  and  are  retreating.  They  are  of  little  value  under  any 
other  circumstances."  This  attack  would  have  had  little  effect 
on  the  campaign  if  it  had  succeeded. 

After  these  combats  Lookout  Valley  and  the  short  line  of 
communication  with  Bridgeport  by  way  of  Brown's  and  Kelly's 
Ferries  were  held  by  Hooker  without  further  molestation ;  and 
the  problem  of  supplying  the  forces  in  Chattanooga  was  solved. 

In  the  early  days  of  November  Bragg  detached  Longstreet's 
corps  with  Wheeler's  cavalry  and  Alexander's  artillery,  in  all 
about  20,000  men,  and  dispatched  them  against  Burnside  at 
Knoxville.  This  created  great  anxiety  at  Washington,  and 
Grant  was  urged  to  act  promptly  and  send  relief  to  Burnside. 
Grant  knew  that  the  quickest  way  to  relieve  Burnside  was  to 
attack  Bragg  and  force  him  to  recall  Longstreet  to  his  assist 
ance.  Accordingly,  on  the  7th  of  November,  he  ordered 
Thomas  to  attack  Bragg's  right.  As  Thomas,  however,  did  not 
have  the  animals  to  move  a  "single  piece  of  artillery"*  he  could 
not  make  the  attack.  "Nothing  was  left  to  be  done,"  General 
Grant  remarks,  "but  to  answer  Washington  dispatches  as  best 
I  could,  urge  Sherman  forward,  although  he  was  making  every 
effort  to  get  forward,  and  encourage  Burnside  to  hold  on, 
assuring  him  that  in  a  short  time  he  would  be  relieved." 

By  the  14th  of  November  Sherman  was  at  Bridgeport  with 
the  Fifteenth  Corps  [Frank  P.  Blair]  and  the  Seventeenth 
[John  E.  Smith] — the  troops  Grant  had  started  from  the 
Mississippi  River  to  reinforce  Rosecrans.  General  Grant  was 
now  ready  to  attack.  His  plan  of  battle  as  finally  adopted  was 
as  follows: 

Sherman  with  his  four  divisions  was  to  cross  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  at  Brown's  Ferry,  and  march  out  behind  the 
hills,  concealed  from  view  of  the  Confederates,  and  take  a 
position  under  cover  of  the  woods  opposite  the  mouth  of 
Chickamauga  Creek.  It  was  hoped  that  the  Confederates, 
upon  seeing  this  body  of  troops  cross  at  Brown's  Ferry,  then 
disappear  altogether  from  view,  would  be  confused,  and,  possi 
bly,  deceived  into  the  belief  that  it  had  crossed  the  river  higher 
up  and  marched  to  Burnside's  relief.  Sherman  was  to  recross 
the  river  by  pontoon-bridge  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga, 
"surprise  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge  and  carry  it  to  the 
railroad  tunnel  before  the  enemy  should  occupy  it.  As  soon  as 

'Grant. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  453 

Sherman  was  astride  the  ridge  at  the  tunnel  Thomas  was  to 
move  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  left"  and  c'onnect 
with  him ;  then  their  united  forces  were  to  move  southward, 
sweeping  the  Confederates  up  the  valley  of  Chattanooga  Creek 
and  away  from  their  base  of  supplies  at  Chickamauga  Station. 
(238)*  (240)  Howard's  Corps  [Eleventh]  was  to  take  its 
place  as  a  sort  of  general  reserve  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river, 
in  position  to  go  to  Sherman  or  Thomas  as  circumstances  re 
quired.  Hooker  with  the  Twelfth  Corps,  and  Cruft's  division 
of  the  Fourth  sent  to  him  from  Chattanooga,  was  to  hold 
Lookout  Valley.  A  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Colonel  Long 
was  to  cover  the  left  of  Sherman's  force,  and,  when  no  longer 
needed  there,  to  cross  Chickamauga  Creek  by  a  pontoon-bridge 
to  be  laid  near  its  mouth,  and  make  a  raid  upon  Bragg's  com 
munications  in  the  direction  of  Chickamauga  Station.  It  will 
be  seen  later  that  this  plan  was  much  altered  and  modified  in 
its  execution. 

It  was  intended  that  Sherman  should  make  his  crossing  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga  at  daylight  on  the  21st  (Novem 
ber),  but  heavy  rains  raised  the  river  and  delayed  the  move 
ment  until  the  morning  of  the  24th.  Even  then  one  of  Sher 
man's  divisions  could  not  go  with  him ;  for  a  break  in  the  bridge 
at  Brown's  Ferry  had  prevented  Osterhaus  from  crossing  with 
his  division,  and  he  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  report  to  Hooker 
for  duty. 

(241)  Meantime,  contrary  to  the  original  plan,  there  was 
fighting  at  other  parts  of  the  line.  There  were  rumors,  and 
there .  appeared  to  be  other  indications,  that  Bragg  was  with 
drawing  his  army.  To  test  the  truth  of  these  indications 
Thomas  was  ordered  to  make  a  demonstration  in  his  front  on 
the  23rd. 

The  right  of  the  Confederate  outpost  line  rested  upon 
Orchard  Knob,  a  prominent  knoll  about  a  mile  in  front  of  the 
western  base  of  Missionary  Ridge.  From  here  the  line  ran 
southward  and  westward  across  Chattanooga  Valley.  From 
Orchard  Knob  the  ground,  generally  open  but  partly  covered 
with  wood  and  brush,  sloped  downward,  then  upward  again, .to 
the  high  ground  upon  which  the  Union  line  rested.  The  most 
prominent  point  in  the  Union  position  was  the  hill  upon  which 
stood  Fort  Wood,  in  front  of  which  was  a  wide  plain.  Upon 
this  plain,  about  noon  on  the  23rd,  the  assaulting  columns 

*Legend  with  Official  Maps. 


454  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

formed  in  echelon  of  divisions  from  the  left.  Wood's  division 
[Fourth  Corps]  was  to  be  the  division  of  direction,  and  was 
on  the  left  at  Fort  Wood.  Next  came  Sheridan's  division 
[Fourth  Corps]  to  its  right  and  rear,  and  next  Baird's  [Four 
teenth  Corps].  Johnson's  division  [Fourteenth  Corps]  re 
mained  to  hold  the  trenches,  and  Howard's  corps,  which  had 
come  over  from  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  acted  as  a  re 
serve. 

At  two  o'clock  Wood's  division  moved  forward,  and,  after 
some  resistance,  drove  off  the  Confederate  outposts  and  carried 
Orchard  Knob.  Sheridan  and  Baird  then  moved  forward  and 
took  possession  of  high  ground  to  the  right  and  slightly  to  the 
rear  of  Wood.  They  all  intrenched  their  positions,  and  an 
epaulment  was  constructed  for  a  battery  on  Orchard  Knob. 
After  4  p.  m.  Howard's  corps  advanced  and  occupied  a  line  on 
Wood's  left.  The  result  of  the  day's  work  was  to  develop  the 
fact  that  Bragg's  army  was  still  in  position  and  meant  to  stay 
there  until  driven  out;  to  gain  an  excellent  vantage-ground 
from  which  the  Union  center  was  to  make  a  later  assault ;  and 
to  cause  Bragg  to  transfer  Walker's  division  (under  Gist) 
from  Lookout  Mountain  to  "Missionary  Ridge,  to  observe  the 
Union  movements  in  the  valley.  It  took  position  half  a  mile 
south  of  the  Tunnel  and  was  the  first  Confederate  division  to 
occupy  the  crest  of  Missionary  Ridge."*  Walker's  withdrawal 
from  Mount  Lookout  lightened  the  task  which  Hooker  was  to 
have  the  next  day — the  task  of  assaulting  and  carrying  the 
mountain. 

The  failure  of  Osterhaus's  division  to  cross  at  Brown's 
Ferry  caused  a  modification  of  Grant's  original  plan.  This 
plan  required  no  more  of  Hooker  than  to  hold  Lookout  Valley 
and  guard  the  communications  with  Bridgeport.  But  the  addi 
tion  of  another  division  made  Hooker's  force  strong  enough 
to  do  more.  Hooker  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  try  "to  take  the 
point  of  Lookout  Mountain."!  At  this  time  the  top  of  Mount 
Lookout  was  held  by  two  Confederate  brigades,  and  the  slope, 
where  Hooker  made  his  assault,  was  held  by  Walthall's  single 
brigade,  and  a  few  pickets  from  a  brigade  higher  up  the  slope 
— in  all  about  1,700  men.  Later  in  the  fight  the  two  brigades 
from  above  went  to  Walthall's  help.  Hooker  had  some  10,000 
men.* 


*Legend  with  Official  Maps. 
fVan  Home. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  455 

From  the  plateau  of  Mount  Lookout,  nearly  1,100  feet  above 
the  waters  of  the  Tennessee,  a  precipice  of  solid,  bare,  jagged 
rock  drops  straight  down  several  hundred  feet.  From  the  foot 
of  this  precipice  the  mountainsides  fall  away  to  the  valley  be 
low  in  the  natural  slope,  and  are  covered  with  a  scrubby  growth 
of  wood,  and  with  boulders  of  all  sizes  that  have  fallen  down 
from  the  cliffs  above.  At  the  northern  end,  however,  beyond 
the  foot  of  the  precipice,  was  a  comparatively  smooth  piece  of 
ground  under  cultivation,  the  Craven's  farm.  Below  the  farm, 
and  also  between  it  and  the  base  of  the  palisades,  are  wooded 
and  rocky  slopes ;  these  end  abruptly  in  another  rock  cliff  which 
drops  straight  to  the  railway  track  at  the  water's  edge.  The 
narrow  wagon-road  from  Chattanooga  to  Lookout  Valley 
passes  over  the  nose  of  the  mountain  just  above  this  cliff. 
Another  road  led  from  Chattanooga  up  trie  eastern  face  of  the 
mountain  to  Summertown  upon  the  plateau.  This  road  was 
the  only  way  by  which  troops  from  the  plateau  could  reach  the 
slopes  of  the  mountain  or  the  valleys  below.  The  Confederates 
had  intrenchments  near  the  base  of  the  western  slope  covering 
the  railway  and  wagon  bridges  over  Lookout  Creek;  they  also 
had  intrenchments  at  the  Craven's  farm,  and  down  the  north 
ern  slope,  arranged  to  meet  attacks  from  either  Lookout  Val 
ley  or  Chattanooga  Valley. 

At  eight  o'clock  on  the  24th  Geary's  division  [Twelfth 
Corps]  of  Hooker's  command  crossed  Lookout  Creek  from 
Wauhatchie,  and  climbed  straight  up  the  mountainside,  until 
the  head  of  the  column  reached  the  base  of  the  cliff.  The  divi 
sion  then  moved  by  the  left  flank  toward  the  north.  About  ten 
o'clock  it  encountered  the  Confederate  skirmishers  and  drove 
them  in  front  of  it.  Lower  down  the  valley  it  was  joined  on 
the  left  by  Osterhaus's  division  [Fifteenth  Corps]  and  Cruft's 
division.  These  troops,  supported  by  batteries  of  artillery 
placed  in  commanding  positions  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Creek, 
had  driven  the  Confederates  out  of  their  intrenchments  at  the 
bridges,  and  had  crossed  near  that  point.  Aided  by  the  fire 
from  batteries  on  Moccasin  Point  the  whole  force  now  pushed 
up  the  rocky  slope,  driving  the  Confederates  from  one  position 
after  another.  By  noon  Hooker  had  possession  of  the  Craven's 
farm.  ''At  two  o'clock  the  Confederates  made  a  stand  about 
400  yards  beyond  the  Craven's  House.  Here  they  were  joined 
by  the  two  brigades  from  the  plateau.  The  Confederates  held 
this  line  until  after  midnight,  when  they  withdrew  from  the 


456  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

mountain."*  All  morning  there  had  been  a  mist  over  the 
mountain,  but  it  settled  at  about  two  o'clock  into  so  dense  a  fog 
that  it  was  impossible  to  see  the  lines  of  troops.  It  was  on 
account  of  this  fog  and  the  exhaustion  of  his  ammunition  that 
Hooker  halted  his  line  and  intrenched. 

Later  in  the  afternoon  Carlin's  brigade  marched  out  from 
the  line  in  front  of  Chattanooga,  carrying  a  supply  of  ammu 
nition  to  Hooker.  The  brigade  took  post  on  the  right  of 
Hooker's  line.  Early  the  next  morning  a  party  from  the  8th 
Kentucky  scaled  the  heights  and  planted  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
on  Point  Lookout,  where,  at  sunrise,  it  floated  in  full  view  of 
the  Union  and  Confederate  soldiers  in  the  lines  below. 

While  Hooker  was  taking  Mount. Lookout,  Sherman,  at  the 
other  end  of  the  line,  was  endeavoring  to  carry  out  his  part 
of  the  program.  The  pontoons,  which  had  been  concealed  in 
North  Chickamauga  Creek  (which  empties  into  the  Tennessee 
on  the  north  side  two  miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Chicka 
mauga),  were  quietly  floated  down-stream  during  the  night  of 
the  23rd,  and,  by  daylight  on  the  24th,  8,000  men  had  crossed, 
and  were  on  the  south  bank,  just  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Chickamauga,  at  work  throwing  up  a  bridge-head.  Little  op 
position  had  been  encountered.  By  noon  the  pontoon-bridge 
was  finished  and  at  one  o'clock  Sherman  moved  out  by 
echelons  from  the  left,  with  his  own  three  divisions,  and  Davis's 
division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  which  had  been  sent  to  take 
the  place  of  Osterhaus's ;  at  4  p.  m.  Sherman  seized  the  north 
ern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  which  was  unoccupied,  except  by 
Confederate  outposts.  To  his  surprise  he  found  a  wide  de 
pression  separating  the  high  ground  he  had  seized  from  Tun 
nel  Hill  to  the  south  of  it.  Moreover,  Cleburne's  Confederate 
division  had  been  hurried  to  Tunnel  Hill,  and  had  there  been 
getting  into  position  and  intrenching  itself  since  half  after  two 
o'clock.  Sherman  made  no  effort  to  carry  this  hill  at  once, 
but  intrenched  his  troops  where  they  were.* 

(242)  During  the  night  of  the  24th  Bragg  withdrew  all  his 
troops  from  Lookout  Mountain  and  Chattanooga  Valley  to 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  posted  his  line  from  Tunnel  Hill  on  the 
right  to  Rossville  Gap  on  the  left — more  than  six  miles.  Har- 
dee  had  command  of  the  right  wing  and  Breckinridge  of  the 
left  wing. 

*Legend  with  Official  Maps. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  457 

Grant's  orders  for  the  morning  of  the  25th  were  as  follows : 
"Sherman  was  directed  to  attack  at  daylight.  Hooker  was 
ordered  to  move  at  the  same  hour,  and  endeavor  to  intercept 
the  enemy's  retreat,  if  he  still  remained ;  if  he  had  gone,  then 
to  move  directly  to  Rossville  and  operate  against  the  left  and 
rear  of  the  force  on  Missionary  Ridge.  Thomas  was  not  to 
move  until  Hooker  had  reached  Missionary  Ridge."  Grant 
stationed  his  headquarters  upon  Orchard  Knob,  "from  which 
the  whole  field  was  in  full  view."* 

By  sunrise  Sherman's  command  was  in  motion.  His  line 
moved  directly  against  the  hill  occupied  by  Cleburne's  division 
and  attacked  it  vigorously;  but  the  assault  was  unable  to  dis 
lodge  the  defenders,  who  had  strengthened  their  field-works 
during  the  night.  Howard's  corps  went  to  Sherman's  support, 
and  the  Confederate  position  was  assaulted  several  times  with 
out  success.  The  combat  kept  up  until  three  o'clock.  Sher 
man  had  six  divisions  against  Cleburne's  one,  but  could  not 
carry  the  works.  Such  is  the  strength  of  field-works  against 
frontal  assault;  and  Sherman  does  not  appear  to  have  tried  to 
out-flank  Cleburne's  position.  Finally,  however,  the  Union 
troops  succeeded  in  making  a  lodgment  on  the  slopes  of  Tunnel 
Hill;f  but  "soon  after  three  o'clock  a  charge  of  the  Confed 
erates  from  the  summit  cleared  the  slopes,  and  the  Union  forces 
thereafter  did  not  reopen  the  battle"  at  that  point.J  Thus 
Sherman's  assault,  the  main  attack,  had  failed;  but  the  battle 
was  not  over. 

From  his  position  at  Orchard  Knob  Grant  saw  that  Sher 
man  was  unable  to  carry  his  assault  home;  he  had  seen  Con 
federate  troops  in  motion  on  Missionary  Ridge  and  had 
wrongly  judged  that  Bragg  was  weakening  his  centre  to  rein 
force  Cleburne  on  his  right  ;$  he  had  watched  in  vain  "to  see 
Hooker  crossing  the  ridge  in  the  neighborhood  of  Rossville,"* 
counting  upon  that  to  afford  some  relief  to  Sherman,  by  oblig 
ing  Bragg  to  send  troops  to  the  left  of  his  line.  Hooker  had 
started  early  enough  from  his  bivouac,  but  he  found  the  bridge 
over  Chattanooga  Creek  destroyed  and  the  roads  obstructed, 
and  was  thus  delayed  four  or  five  hours  in  his  march. 

Sherman's  situation  appeared  too  critical  to  wait  longer  on 
Hooker  for  relief ;  so  "Grant  ordered  Thomas  to  move  out  the 


*Grant. 

fLegend  with  Official  Maps.    Alexander. 

^Legend  with  Official  Maps. 


458  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

four  divisions"  he  held  at  the  center,  and  assault  the  first  line 
of  the  enemy's  rifle-pits  in  front ;  and  there  to  halt  and  await 
orders.  At  half-past  three  Thomas's  line  started  forward  with 
Baird's  division  on  the  left,  then  Wood's,  then  Sheridan's,  and 
then  Johnson's  on  the  extreme  right — in  all  eleven  brigades 
and  four  field-batteries,  on  a  front  two  miles  and  a  half  long. 
Idle  these  troops  had  been  under  arms  all  day;  they  were  now 
eager  for  battle,  and  anxious  to  redeem  their  defeat  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  and  to  show  Grant  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  not  so  demoralized  as  he  supposed  it  to  be.  Three  lines 
of  intrenchments  were  in  front  of  them,  one  at  the  foot  of  the 
ridge,  another  near  the  middle  of  the  slope,  and  the  third  and 
strongest  on  the  crest.  The  divisions  of  Stewart,  Bate  [Breck- 
inridge],  Patton  Anderson  [Hindman],  and  Cheatham — eleven 
and  a  half  brigades  and  sixteen  batteries* — held  this  part  of  the 
ridge;  but  the  commanders  had  made  the  fatal  mistake  of 
dividing  their  forces,  and  occupying  the  intrenchments  both 
at  the  crest  and  at  the  foot  of  the  slope ;  and  had  given  private 
instructions  to  the  superior  officers  in  the  lower  line  "to  await 
the  enemy's  approach  within  200  yards,  then  to  deliver  their 
fire  and  retire  to  the  works  above."  The  ridge  here  was  some 
200  feet  high,  with  steep  slopes  broken  by  many  ravines  and 
swaks,  and,  at  this  time,  obstructed  by  the  stumps  of  recently 
felled  timber.  The  Confederate  engineers  had  placed  the 
upper  line  of  works,  which  had  been  begun  only  two  days  be 
fore,  on  the  natural  instead  of  the  "military"  crest;  this  mis 
take  "left  numerous  approaches  up  ravines  and  swales  entirely 
covered  from  the  fire  of  the  breastworks. "f 

The  Confederates  opened  fire  with  all  their  available  guns 
and  musketry  upon  the  advancing  lines,  but  could  not  check 
them.  The  Federals  charged  at  double  time,  and  carried  the 
first  line  of  intrenchments  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  putting 
the  defenders  to  flight  up  the  ridge,  "killing  and  capturing 
them  in  large  numbers.''^  The  lines  then  halted  as  ordered ; 
but  they  found  themselves  exposed  to  a  galling  fire  from  the 
Confederate  trenches  on  the  ridge,  and  soon,  without  any  or 
ders,  they  started  up  the  slopes  by  regiments  one  after  another. 
Before  long  the  whole  line  was  advancing.  The  center  of 
Sheridan's  division  reached  the  top  first;  "the  rest  of  the  line 


*  Legend  with  Official  Maps. 

fAlexander. 

tCist. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  459 

was  soon  up,  and  almost  simultaneously  the  ridge  was  carried 
in  six  places."*  Van  Home  in  his  History  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  says :  "There  is  no  doubt  that  General  Wood's 
division  first  reached  the  summit."  Perhaps  this  charge  was 
like  the  one  at  San  Juan  Hill  thirty-five  years  afterwards,  in 
which  nobody  claims  to  have  been  the  second  to  reach  the 
crest,  but  many  were  the  first. 

The  Confederates  made  a  feeble  stand,  and  then  gave  way 
in  panic;  Bragg's  center  was  broken  and  driven  from  the  field 
in  rout.  Thirty-seven  guns  and  2,000  prisoners  were  captured. 
Some  of  the  captured  guns  were  turned  against  the  fugitives. 
The  assault  lasted  about  an  hour.*  Sheridan's  division  reached 
the  crest  just  too  late  to  capture  Bragg,  Breckinridge,  and 
other  Confederate  generals,  who  quitted  Bragg's  headquarters 
when  the  charge  up  the  hillside  began.  These  generals  were 
making  unavailing  efforts  to  rally  their  beaten  and  panic- 
stricken  troops.  "The  victory  was  gained  too  late  in  the  day 
for  a  general  pursuit.  General  Sheridan's  division  and  Wil- 
lich's  brigade  of  General  Wood's  division  pushed  the  enemy 
for  a  short  distance  down  the  eastern  slope.  Later  General 
Sheridan  advanced  and  drove  the  enemy  from  a  strong  posi 
tion.'^ 

Meanwhile  Hooker  with  three  divisions  had  reached  the  pass 
at  Rossville  and  driven  away  the  Confederate  left.  He  then 
turned  to  the  left  and,  almost  unopposed,  advanced  northward, 
with  one  division  on  top  of  the  ridge  and  one  on  each  side,  until 
he  connected,  about  sundown,  with  the  right  of  Thomas's  line.l 
During  the  night  Hardee  withdrew  from  the  position  he  had 
held  so  stoutly  against  Sherman's  assaults. 

Grant's  victory  was  decisive,  and  the  siege  of  Chattanooga 
was  raised.  The  next  thing  was  to  pursue  Bragg's  defeated 
army  and  send  a  column  to  Burnside's  relief  at  Knoxville. 
(230)  The  following  morning  Sherman  took  up  the  pursuit 
by  way  of  Chickamauga  Station,  while  Hooker,  and  Palmer 
who  now  had  command  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  marched 
by  the  Ringgold  and  Greyville  roads.  On  this  day,  the  26th, 
Bragg's  army  reached  Ringgold,  where  it  made  a  stand  on  the 
27th.  It  "then  withdrew  to  Dalton,  where,  five  days  later, 
Bragg  at  his  own  request  was  relieved  of  the  command."! 


*Cist. 

fVan  Home. 

^Alexander. 


460  >     AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  pursuit  was  suspended  on  the  28th;  Hooker  stayed  a  few 
days  at  Ringgold,  and  Palmer  returned  to  Chattanooga. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th  Granger  had  set  out  for  Knox- 
ville  with  his  own  corps  [Fourth]  and  reinforcements  enough 
to  make  a  command  of  20,000  men.  On  the  28th  Sherman 
with  his  command  also  started 'for  Knoxville;  he  had  orders 
to  join  his  forces  with  Granger's  and  assume  command  of  the 
expedition,  and  to  advance  with  all  speed. 

Burnside  had  met  Longstreet's  column  south  of  Knoxville, 
but,  according  to  his  orders,  had  offered  little  resistance,  and 
fallen  back,  drawing  Longstreet  as  far  as  possible  from  Chatta 
nooga.  Burnside  withdrew  behind  the  fortifications  of  Knox 
ville.  After  ten  days  of  reconnoitering  and  arranging  for  one 
kind  of  assault  and  another,  and  waiting  for  one  thing  and 
another,  Longstreet's  troops  stormed  Fort  Sanders,  the  south 
western  salient  of  Burnside's  works,  just  before  dawn  on  the 
morning  of  November  29.  The  fort  was  provided  with  a  wet 
ditch  and  garrisoned  by  about  220  men  including  artillery.  The 
storming  column  consisted  of  nine  regiments  supported  by 
three  brigades.  The  assault  was  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  129 
killed,  458  wounded,  and  226  captured.  Longstreet  was  about 
to  renew  the  assault  when  he  received  a  telegram  from  Presi 
dent  Davis  informing  him  of  Bragg's  defeat  at  Chattanooga. 
This  decided  him  to  give  over  the  attempt.  On  the  4th  of 
December  he  raised  the  siege  and  started  in  retreat  for  Vir 
ginia,  and  after  a  march  of  great  hardship  halted  at  Greenville, 
where  he  wintered.*  Sherman  arrived  with  his  column  at 
Knoxville  on  the  6th  of  December.  Leaving  Granger's  corps 
to  help  pursue  Longstreet  he  returned  with  the  rest  of  his  force 
to  Chattanooga  on  the  16th  of  December. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  war  had  begun  the  whole  of 
East  Tennessee  was  under  control  of  the  Union  army,  and 
President  Lincoln's  devoutly  cherished  wish  for  the  relief  and 
protection  of  the  loyal  inhabitants  was  at  last  achieved. 

In  the  battles  around  Chattanooga  Grant  had,  according  to 
Livermore's  estimate,  56,359  men,  and  Bragg  40,929.  The 
losses  were  not  heavy ;  on  the  Union  side  they  were :  752  killed, 
4,713  wounded,  and  350  missing;  on  the  Confederate  side,  361 
killed,  2,180  wounded,  and  4,146  captured  and  missing.f 


*Alexander. 
£.  &  L. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  461 

COMMENTS. 

At  Chancellorsville  we  saw  that  it  was  the  commanding- 
general  and  not  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  was  defeated; 
at  Missionary  Ridge  the  case  was  exactly  the  reverse:  the 
rank  and  file,  not  the  Confederate  commanders,  were  whipped. 
The  soldiers  fled  from  sheer  animal  fear ;  fear  inspired  wholly 
by  the  sight  of  their  foes.  This  was  the  only  battle  of  the  war 
in  which  the  topographical  conditions  were  such  that  well- 
nigh  every  man  of  the  defenders  could  plainly  see  the  hosts 
of  the  enemy  forming  for  the  assault.  From  their  position  on 
Missionary  Ridge  the  Confederate  soldiers  could  look  down 
upon  all  the  Federal  columns ;  "The  sight  was  a  grand  and 
impressive  one,"  says  General  Alexander,  "the  like  of  which 
had  never  been  seen  before  by  any  one  who  witnessed  it." 
It  was  too  awful  for  the  nerve  of  the  Confederate  soldiers; 
which  is  to  say  that  it  was  too  awful  for  the  nerve  of  any  sol 
diers,  for  these  were  the  veterans  that  had  fought  and  won 
at  Chickamauga.  In  his  brief  report  General  Bragg  says: 
"No  satisfactory  excuse  can  possibly  be  giyen  for  the  shame 
ful  conduct  of  our  troops  on  the  left  in  allowing  their  line  to  be 
penetrated.  The  position  was  one  which  ought  to  have  been 
held  by  a  line  of  skirmishers  against  any  assaulting  col 
umn.  .  .  .  But  one  possible  reason  presents  itself  to  my 
mind  in  explanation  of  this  bad  conduct  in  veteran  troops  who 
never  before  failed  in  any'  duty  assigned  them,  however  diffi 
cult  and  hazardous:  they  had  for  two  days  confronted  the 
enemy,  marshaling  his  immense  forces  in  plain  view." 

The  result  might  have  been  the  same,  or  possibly  more  dis 
astrous  for  Bragg's  army,  if  General  Grant  had  withheld 
Thomas's  assault  for  two  hours.  By  that  time  Hooker  would 
have  been  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  position  assaulted. 
As  it  was  a  short  autumn  day,  however,  this  would  have  been 
to  put  the  attack  off  till  about  sunset;  and  it  would  soon  have 
been  ended  by  darkness.  The  consciousness  of  Hooker's  ap 
proach  against  their  left  and  rear  undoubtedly  added  to  the 
demoralization  of  the  Confederates.  General  Grant  ordered 
Thomas's  assault  under  a  misapprehension ;  he  believed  that 
Bragg  was  reinforcing  Cleburne  against  Sherman.  This  "was 
not  only  wholly  erroneous,  but  on  the  contrary,  when  the  Union 
movement  against  the  center  began,  three  brigades  were  hur 
ried  from  the  Confederate  right  to  the  center  to  resist  the 


462  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Union  advance  there."*  Sherman  had  been  repulsed,  but  he 
was  never  in  any  danger  of  a  serious  counter-stroke. 

Swinton  does  not  include  the  battles  around  Chattanooga 
among  the  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  but  in  a  sense  they 
were  decisive;  they  marked  a  distinct  phase  of  the  war  and  of 
the  life  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  They  did  not  mark  the 
beginning  of  its  end,  but,  taken  in  connection  with  Gettys 
burg  and  Vicksburg,  they  marked  the  end  of  the  beginning  of 
its  dissolution.  All  that  was  now  left  of  Secession  was  the 
narrow  strip  of  country,  without  harbors  or  seacoast,  lying 
south  of  the  Potomac  and  east  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains. 
The  end  of  the  war  and  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  was  in 
sight. 

The  great  strategic  front  of  the  Confederacy  from  Rich 
mond  to  Jackson,  Mississippi,  was  now  sundered  at  its  middle. 
If  Grant  had  been  defeated  and  compelled  to  withdraw  from 
Chattanooga  it  would  not  have  taken  the  Confederates  long 
to  capture  Burnside  at  Knoxville,  and  reopen  the  line  of  the 
East  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railway;  but  now  this  railway 
was  lost  to  them  for  good  and  all,  and  the  great  strategic  ad 
vantage  of  interior  lines  in  the  vast  general  theater  of  the  war, 
from  Virginia  to  Mississippi,  had  passed  irretrievably  from 
the  Confederacy  to  the  Union.  Lee  still  guarded  the  Virginia 
end  of  the  railway,  and  even  yet  might  possibly  have  moved 
his  army  by  rail  against  Knoxville,  picking  up  Longstreet's 
detachment  on  the  way.  This,  however,  would  have  risked  the 
loss  of  Richmond,  to  which  Lee's  army  was  as  fast-tethered 
as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  Washington.  From  Knox 
ville  to  Memphis  the  railway  was  now  wholly  in  possession 
of  the  Federals. 

The  War  Department  order  that  created  the  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  placed  all  the  territory  and  all  the  Union  ar 
mies  south  of  the  Ohio  River  and  east  of  the  Mississippi  under 
a  single  commander  in  the  field,  was  one  of  the  wisest  and  most 
important  orders  issued  during  the  Civil  War.  Such  an  ar 
rangement  had  been  needed  from  the  very  beginning  to  bring 
about  concert  of  action  between  the  several  armies.  We  saw 
that  the  lack  of  it  gave  the  Confederates  opportunities  in  the 
Henry  and  Donelson  Campaign  of  which  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston  neglected  to  take  advantage;  barely  missed  costing  the 
Union  arms  defeat  and  disaster  in  the  Shiloh  Campaign ;  and 

*  Legend  with  Official  Mafs. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  463 

probably  retarded  the  capture  of  Vicksburg  by  many  weeks. 
Whereas  the  immediate  consequences  of  the  order  were  the 
prompt  breaking  of  the  siege  at  Chattanooga  and  the  defeat 
of  Bragg's  army,  the  relief  of  Burnside's  army  at  Knoxville, 
and  the  total  expulsion  of  Confederate  troops  from  the  State 
of  Tennessee. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  had  been  nominally  in  command 
of  all  the  Confederate  armies  in  this  section  since  November, 
1862,  but  it  does  not  appear  that  he  was  at  any  time  allowed 
to  exercise  real  command.  He  did  no  more  than  make  recom 
mendations  to  the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  and  his  rec 
ommendations  were  generally  not  approved  or  ordered  to  be 
carried  out.  On  more  than  one  occasion  Mr.  Davis  visited 
the  armies  in  person  and  issued  orders  to  their  immediate 
commanders  without  reference  to  Johnston. 

In  fact,  while  the  military  policies  of  the  Northern  and  the 
Southern  governments  were  not  identical,  they  were  alike. 
There  was  on  each  side  the  lack  of  a  chief  objective,  which 
every  commander  ought  to  have  kept  in  mind,  and  toward 
which  he  should  have  directed  the  operations  of  his  army. 
Instead  of  this,  in  the  vast  theater  from  Virginia  to  Texas,  dur 
ing  the  first  three  years  of  the  war,  every  army-commander  on 
either  side  appears  to  have  looked  only  to  his  own  immediate 
objective;  there  was  no  commander-in-chief  in  the  field  to 
concentrate  the  efforts  of  all  the  armies. 

After  allowing  Rosecrans's  army  quietly  to  withdraw  into 
Chattanooga,  Bragg  then  let  all  the  fruits  of  his  victory  at 
Chickamauga  gradually  slip  away  from  him,  apparently 
through  mere  inaction.  He  wisely  refrained  from  assaulting 
his  foe  behind  fortifications,  but  in  placing  his  army  in  front 
of  Chattanooga  and  holding  it  there,  practically  idle,  for  nearly 
two  months,  he  gave  away  the  advantages  gained  by  his  vic 
tory  at  Chickamauga.  Bragg  counted  upon  starving  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  into  capitulation ;  his  failure  to  do 
so,  however,  is  no  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  modern 
warfare,  that  an  army  which  allows  itself  to  be  shut  up  within 
fortifications  is  as  good  as  lost.  This  army  was  never  wholly 
invested;  although  its  line  of  supply  was  for  a  time  over  a 
very  long  and  difficult  road,  and  its  means  of  transportation 
were  very  poor,  the  army  was  at  no  time  in  real  danger  of 
starvation;  and  its  line  of  retreat  was  always  open.  Toward 
the  last,  after  so  many  of  the  draft  animals  had  died,  and  the 
rest  had  become  weak  from  hunger,  and  broken  down  by 


464  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

overwork,  the  army  would,  undoubtedly,  have  lost  most  of  its 
artillery  and  equipage  if  it  had  undertaken  to  retreat. 

The  short  piece  of  road,  about  five  miles  long,  from  Brown's 
Ferry  across  Raccoon  Mountain  to  Kelly's  Ferry,  was  of  the 
greatest  strategic  importance  during  the  siege  of  Chattanooga. 
So  long  as  the  Confederates  controlled  it  the  beleaguered 
Federals  had  to  haul  their  supplies  from  Bridgeport  by  wagon 
on  the  long  miserable  road  over  Walden's  Ridge.  Neither 
Bragg,  nor  Longstreet  who  commanded  the  left  of  the  Confed 
erate  line,  appears  to  have  appreciated  its  importance.  Nothing 
more  than  a  picket  guarded  Brown's  Ferry,  and  Law's  brigade 
was  the  only  Confederate  force  west  of  Mount  Lookout.  "A 
full  division  at  least  should  have  guarded"  this  road.515 

Bragg  expected  Wheeler's  cavalry  so  to  break  up  the  railway 
communications  of  Rosecrans  as  to  cause  him  to  quit  Chat 
tanooga  and  return  to  Murfreesboro  or  Nashville,  like  Grant 
after  Van  Dorn's  raid  upon  Holly  Springs;  but  we  have  seen 
that  Wheeler  did  little  more  than  destroy  some  hundreds  of 
Rosecrans's  wagons  and  teams. 

What  Bragg  should  have  done  was  to  move  with  his  main 
army  against  Rosecrans's  communications  as  soon  as  Rosecrans 
had  made  good  his  withdrawal  into  Chattanooga.  Bragg 
might  have  crossed  the  Tennessee  above  Chattanooga,  and 
marched  across  Walden's  Ridge  and  the  Cumberland  Plateau, 
or  he  might  have  crossed  at  Bridgeport  and  Stevenson,  or 
farther  down.  Either  movement  would  probably  have  forced 
Rosecrans  to  quit  Chattanooga.  The  second  movement  was 
actually  ordered  by  Mr.  Davis,  who  visited  Bragg's  headquar 
ters  about  the  10th  of  October.  A  few  days  afterwards,  how 
ever,  heavy  rains  set  in  and  the  roads  became  so  bad  that 
Bragg  made  them  an  excuse  "for  his  failure  to  execute  the 
campaign  that  the  President  had  ordered."!  The  plan  had 
not  been  suggested  by  Bragg;  he  had,  when  called  upon  by 
Mr.  Davis  for  a  suggestion,  proposed  the  other — "to  march  up 
and  cross  the  river  and  swing  round  toward  the  enemy's  rear 
and  force  him  out  by  that  means. "f  It  is  probable,  however, 
that  it  was  now  too  late  for  either  plan  to  succeed,  for  Hooker 
had  already  taken  charge  of  the  railway  in  rear  of  Rosecrans's 
army  with  his  15,000  fresh  troops,  and  Sherman  was  hastening 
forward  with  his  two  corps  from  Memphis.  "Longstreet  re 
ports  that  he  advised  crossing  the  Tennessee  and  moving 

*Alexander. 
fLongstreet. 


THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA.  465 

against  Rosecrans's  communications"  on  September  21st,  the 
day  after  Chickamatiga,  "and  "that  Bragg  approved  and  ordered 
"Folk's  wing  to  take  the  lead,  while  his  wing  cared  for  the 
wounded  and  policed  the  field.  The  army,  however,  was  in  such 
confusion  and  need  of  ammunition  that  it  was  dark  before  the 
rear  of  Folk's  corps  was  stretched  out  upon  the  road,  and 
Longstreet's  march  was  postponed  until  the  22nd.  During 
the  night  Thomas  withdrew  into  the  city ;  .  .  .  Bragg  fol 
lowed  on  the  22nd  and  took  position  in  front  of  him."*  By 
doing  this  Bragg  gave  up  his  opportunity. 

Another  project  that  Bragg  might  have  undertaken  with 
every  chance  of  success  at  first, — before  Rosecrans's  army  re 
covered  from  the  moral  effects  of  its  defeat,  and  before  the 
arrival  of  Union  reinforcements, — was  to  hold  the  siege  of 
Chattanooga  with  part  of  his  army,  and  send  the  rest  against 
Burnside  at  Knoxville.  Bragg  did  this,  but  not  until  it  was 
too  late;  and  then  he  did  not  give  Longstreet  a  large  enough 
force  to  cope  with  Burnside  behind  fortifications.  It  was  too 
late,  because  Hooker's  command  was  already  at  Bridgeport, 
and  Bragg  knew  that  Sherman  was  soon  to  arrive.  But  Bragg 
appears  to  have  considered  his  own  position  impregnable 
against  assault,  and  he  hoped,  also,  that  Longstreet  would 
accomplish  his  purpose,  and  return  to  the  main  army,  before 
the  arrival  of  Sherman.  His  detaching  Longstreet  at  that 
time  was  certainly  a  mistake ;  it  could  not  in  any  manner 
aid  in  the  achievement  of  Bragg's  main  purpose;  namely,  to 
capture  the  hostile  army  in  Chattanooga.  It  was  at  best  only 
a  "side  issue." 

^Alexander. 


LECTURE  XXII. 
THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 

THE  AUTUMN  AND  WINTER  AFTER  GETTYSBURG. 

(243)  The  14th  of  July,  1863,  found  Lee's  army,  after  its 
unsuccessful  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  again  on  the  south  side 
of   the   Potomac.      Lee   continued    his   retreat    slowly   up   the 
Shenandoah  Valley.     Toward  the  end  of  July   Meade  reen- 
tered  Virginia  on  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains; 
Lee  thereupon  withdrew   from  the  Valley  and  took  position 
in  the  neighborhood  of   Culpeper.     Meade  placed  the   Army 
of  the  Potomac  facing  him  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock. 

In  these  positions  the  two  armies  remained  inactive  for  sev 
eral  weeks,  and  both  were  considerably  reduced  by  the  with 
drawal  of  large  detachments  for  service  in  other  theaters. 
From  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  a  detachment  went  to  South 
Carolina ;  another  went  to  New  York  to  aid  in  enforcing  the 
draft.  From  Lee's  army  Longstreet  had  gone  with  two  of  his 
divisions  to  assist  Bragg  against  Rosecrans  in  Tennessee  and 
Georgia,  and  Pickett  had  ,been  detached  with  his  division  to 
the  south  of  Petersburg  to  "arrest  raiding  parties  of  the  enemy 
and  collect  supplies  for  the  army."* 

(244)  Learning  of  Longstreet' s  departure,  Meade  advanced, 
and  Lee  withdrew  behind  the  Rapidan.     Meade  followed  and 
put  his  army  into  position  about  Culpeper.     Meade  was  mak 
ing  ready  to  try  to  turn   Lee's  flank   when   he  was   ordered 
from  Washington  to  send  two  corps  to  the  assistance  of  Rose 
crans   at   Chattanooga.      It   was   then   that   Hooker   with   the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  went  to  Tennessee.    This  reduced 
Meade's  force  to  the  defensive,  and  Lee  was  not  slow  to  take 
advantage  of  the  situation.    Lee  resolved  to  try  to  turn  Meade's 
flank  and  get  between  him  and  Washington.     Accordingly,  on 
the  9th  of  October,  he  crossed  the  Rapidan,  and  there  followed 
from  then  on  into  November  a  series  of  operations  which  has 
been  called  by  the  historians  and  biographers  "a  campaign  of 
maneuvers,"    or    "a   campaign   of    strategy" ;    it    consisted    of 


*Long. 
466 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  467 

much  marching  and  maneuvering,  but  of  little  fighting ;  of  much 
strategy,  but  of  little  tactics. 

Finding  his  right  turned,  Meade  fell  back  along  the  rail 
way,  and,  in  the  series  of  movements  that  ensued,  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  continued  to  retreat  until  it  finally  took  posi 
tion  on  the  heights  of  Centreville — the  position  from  which 
McDowell  had  led  it  to  the  First  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  in  1861 ; 
the  position  to  which  Pope  withdrew  it  after  the  Second 
Battle  of  Bull  Run  in  1862.*  Lee  followed  as  far  as  Bull 
Run,  but  he  had  failed  to  cut  off  M cade's  retreat  and  force 
him  to  battle  faced  to  the  rear;  his  biographer  charges  the 
failure  mainly  to  Stuart  and  his  cavalry.f  As  in  the  Gettys 
burg  Campaign,  Stuart  had  yielded  to  the  temptation  of  trying 
to  capture  a  wagon-train  of  commissaries,  and  thereby  got  his 
command  into  a  perilous  trap.  Lee  had  to  send  Ewell's  corps 
to  save  Stuart  from  capture;  this  so  delayed  the  Confederate 
column  that  Meade's  army  got  safe  across  Broad  Run  at 
Bristoe  Station,  where  Lee  had  hoped  to  intercept  it. 

Lee  now  saw  the  uselessness  of  further  pursuit;  his  cam 
paign  had  failed,  except  that  it  had  driven  the  enemy  nearly 
out  of  Virginia.  Meade's  army  was  now  almost  within  sight 
of  the  intrenchments  of  Washington  and  Alexandria,  behind 
which  it  could  withdraw  within  a  few  hours.  Lee,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  a  long  way  from  his  base.  He,  therefore,  re 
turned  to  Culpeper,  destroying  the  railway  from  Cub  Run  to 
the  Rappahannock.  Meade  followed  up  the  retrograde  move 
ment  of  the  Confederates.  On  the  7th  of  November  he  crossed 
the  Rappahannock  at  Kelly's  Ford,  turning  the  right  flank  of 
the  Confederates.  Lee  then  withdrew  again  to  the  south  bank 
of  the  Rapidan. 

(245)  It  was  now  Meade's  turn  to  take  the  offensive. 
Ewell's  corps  of  the  Confederate  army  stretched  from  Clark's 
Mountain  to  Mine  Run,  covering  the  several  fords  be 
tween  those  points;  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  extended,  from 
Orange  Court  House  to  Liberty  Mills,  six  miles  southwest  of 
Orange  Court  House;  Stuart's  cavalry  covered  the  flanks; 
Longstreet  and  Pickett  were  still  absent  with  the  three  divi 
sions  of  the  1st  Corps.  Meade  resolved  to  try  to  cross  the 


"This  was  not  called  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  the  time  of  the 
First  Battle  of  Bull  Run;  and  at  the  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run 
only  a  part  of  Pope's  forces  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Meade's  army,  however,  was  the  outgrowth  of  those  two  armies. 

fLong. 


468  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Rapidan  on  the  right  of  Lee's  position,  and  fall  upon  the  Con 
federate  army  in  reverse  before  it  could  assemble  from  its  ex 
tended  winter-quarters.  As  secretly  as  possible  he  began  his 
march  for  Germanna  Ford  on  the  26th  of  November ;  but  his 
movement  did  not  escape  the  notice  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  which 
gave  Lee  warning.  So  when  Meade  moved  southward  from 
Germanna  Ford  in  the  Wilderness  he  found  Lee's  army  so 
strongly  intrenched  behind  breastworks  on  the  west  bank  of 
Mine  Run  that  he  did  not  deem  it  expedient  to  attack.  He 
quietly  withdrew  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Rapidan  and  into 
his  winter-quarters  at  Culpeper,  and  Lee's  army  returned  to 
its  position  on  the  south  side  of  the  Rapidan.  Another  blood 
less  game  of  kriegsspiel  was  at  an  end. 

This  was  the  last  important  campaign  of  the  year  1863,  the 
year  in  which  the  star  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  reached  its 
zenith.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  were  content  to  watch  each  other  from  now  on, 
until  the  following  May,  and  the  peace  of  Virginia  was  not 
disturbed  during  these  months,  save  by  the  unsuccessful  cav 
alry  raid  against  Richmond  in  February  and  March,  made  by 
Kilpatrick  and  Dahlgren. 

THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN. 

In  February,  1864,  Congress  revived  the  grade  of  lieuten 
ant-general,  which  had  last  been  held  in  the  American  army 
by  Washington  in  1799.  The  President  appointed  General 
Grant  to  the  office  and  made  him  general-in-chief  of  all  the 
Union  armies, — and  personally  gave  him  assurance  that  he 
was  to  be  allowed  to  exercise  the  real  functions  of  the  office. 

Then,  for  the  first  time  since  the  war  had  begun,  a  definite 
plan  of  action  was  laid  out  for  the  armies  of  the  United  States — 
a  plan  that  contemplated  the  simultaneous  and  concerted  move 
ment  of  all  the  armies  in  the  vast  theater  of  the  war  toward 
a  single  ultimate  objective;  namely,  the  destruction  of  the  only 
two  organized  armed  bodies  of  any  considerable  strength  that 
the  South  had  in  the  field.  Those  two  bodies  were  Lee's  army 
in  Virginia  and  the  force  then  under  General  Joseph  E.  John 
ston  at  Dalton,  Georgia.  That  force  was  composed  of  the 
Army  of  Tennessee,  lately  under  Bragg,  and  the  Army  of  Mis 
sissippi,  under  Johnston,  consolidated.* 

^Johnston's  Narrative. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  469 

"The  Union  armies  were  now  divided  into  nineteen  depart 
ments,"*  all  except  four  independent  of  one  another  and  under 
separate  commanders,  who  reported  directly  to  Washington. 
The  four  excepted  departments  were  those  that  had  been 
consolidated,  the  autumn  before,  into  the  Division  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  and  placed  under  Grant.  We  saw  that  the  defeat  of 
Bragg's  army  at  Chattanooga  was  the  direct  result  of  that  con 
solidation.  Sherman  succeeded  Grant  in  the  command  of  the 
Division  of  the  Mississippi.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  a 
separate  command,  and  had  no  territorial  limits. 

Grant's  general  plan  for  the  spring  campaign  was  outlined 
in  a  confidential  letter  to  Sherman,  from  which  the  following 
extracts  are  made : 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  April  4,  1864. 

"It  is  my  design,  if  the  enemy  keep  quiet  arid  allow  me  to 
take  the  initiative  in  the  spring  campaign,  to  work  all  parts 
of  the  army  together,  and  somewhat  towards  a  common  cen 
ter.  ...  I  have  sent  orders  to  Banks  ...  to  fin 
ish  up  his  present  expedition  against  Shreveport  with  all  dis 
patch;  to  turn  over  the  defense  of  Red  River  to  Genl.  Steele 
and  the  navy  .  .  . ;  to  abandon  all  of  Texas,  except  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  to  hold  that  with  not  to  exceed  four  thou 
sand  men;  to  reduce  the  number  of  troops  on  the  Mississippi 
to  the  lowest  number  necessary  to  hold  it,  and  to  collect  from 
his  command  not  less  than  25,000  men.  To  this  I  will  add 
5,000  men  from  Missouri.  With  this  force  he  is  to  commence 
operations  against  Mobile  as  soon  as  he  can.  .  .  . 

"Gillmore  joins  Butler  with  10,000  men  (from  South  Caro 
lina),  and  the  two  operate  against  Richmond  from  the  south 
side  of  the  James  River.  This  will  give  Butler  33,000  men. 
„  .  .  I  will  stay  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  increased 
by  Burnside's  corps  [Ninth]  of  not  less  than  25,000  effective 
men,  and  operate  directly  against  Lee's  army,  wherever  it  may 
be  found.  Sigel  collects  all  his  available  force  in  two  columns, 
one  under  Ord  and  Averell,  to  start  from  Beverly  [West], 
Virginia;  and  the  other  under  Crook,  to  start  from  Charles 
ton  on  the  Kanawha,  to  move  against  the  Virginia  and  Ten 
nessee  Railroad.  .  .  .  You  I  propose  to  move  against 
Johnston's  army,  to  break  it  up  and  to  get  into  the  interior  of 

*Grant. 


470  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  enemy's  country  as  far  as  you  can,  inflicting  all  the  dam 
age  you  can  against  their  war  resources.  .  .  ." 

The  movement  was  to  be  simultaneous  "all  along  the  line." 
The  plan  did  not  work  out  successfully  in  all  its  details; 
Banks  did  not  carry  out  his  part  of  it;  Butler  let  his  army 
be  "bottled  up"  by  Beauregard  between  the  James  and  the 
Appomattox  Rivers;  and  Sigel  did  nothing  but  retreat.  "Just 
as  I  was  expecting  to  hear  of  good  work  being  done  in  the 
Valley"  (by  Sigel's  command),  General  Grant  remarks  in  his 
Memoirs,  "I  received,  instead,  the  following  announcement 
from  Halleck:  'Sigel  is  in  full  retreat  on  Strasburg.  He  will 
do  nothing  but  run ;  never  did  anything  else/  "  But  the  main 
armies  under  Grant  and  Sherman  moved  simultaneously  with 
their  campaigns. 

In  one  of  his  early  interviews  with  the  President,  Grant  ex 
pressed  his  dissatisfaction  with  the  work  so  far  done  by  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  his  belief  that  the 
cavalry  could  do  more  "under  a  thorough  leader."  He  said  he 
"wanted  the  very  best  man  in  the  army  for  that  command."* 

So  Sheridan  was  called  up  from  Sherman's  army  and  given 
command  of  the  Cavalry  Corps.f  Pleasanton,  who  had  com 
manded  the  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign,  was 
transferred  to  Missouri;  of  the  old  division-commanders,  Bu- 
ford  had  died  in  the  previous  December,  and  Kilpatrick  was 
transferred  to  Sherman's  army.  D.  McM.  Gregg  remained  in 
command  of  his  division;  two  officers  who  had  not  served 
before  with  cavalry,  Torbert  and  J.  H.  Wilson,  were  given 
command  of  the  other  two  divisions,  while  Merritt  and  Custer 
remained  brigade-commanders. 

OPERATIONS. 

On  the  26th  of  March,  1864,  General  Grant  established  his 
headquarters  at  Culpeper  Court  House.  Meade  retained  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  all  orders  to  it  were 
given  through  him.  The  Ninth  Corps  [Burnside]  was  not 
until  the  24th  of  May  incorporated  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac;  it,  however,  went  through  the  campaign  with  this 
army.  (246)  P"or  the  present  this  corps,  with  its  headquar 
ters  at  Warrenton,  was  guarding  the  railway  from  the  Rappa- 

*Grant. 

fHe  was  suggested  by  Halleck. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  471 

hannock  back  to  Bull  Run.  The  five  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  been  consolidated  into  three,  "the  Second,  Fifth, 
and  Sixth  Corps  being  retained,  and  the  divisions  of  the  First 
and  Third  Corps  transferred  to  the  three  retained  corps." 
Hancock  still  commanded  the  Second  Corps  and  Sedgwick  the 
Sixth;  Warren  was  now  in  command  of  the  Fifth.  The  Army 
numbered  73,390  infantry  and  artillery  and  12,424  cavalry; 
the  strength  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  19,331.* 

Longstreet  had  rejoined  Lee  with  his  detachment  from  Ten 
nessee,  and  the  Confederate  army  was  still  organized  as  in  the 
Gettysburg  Campaign,  in  three  corps  under  Longstreet,  Ewell, 
and  A.  P.  Hill,  and  the  cavalry  division  under  Stuart ;  Pickett's 
division  of  Longstreet's  corps  was  still  absent.  There  were 
present  for  duty  with  this  army  53,554  infantry  and  artillery 
and  8,399  cavalry.  Lee's  headquarters  were  at  Orange  Court 
House,  and  his  line  extended  from  Barnett's  Ford,  about  five 
miles  above  the  railway  crossing,  to  Morton's  Ford,  a  dis 
tance  of  fifteen  or  eighteen  miles.  Swell's  corps  was  on  the 
right  and  Hill's  on  the  left.  Longstreet  was  at  Mechanics- 
burg,  six  miles  south  of  Gordonsville.  The  bulk  of  Stuart's 
cavalry  was  over  in  the  neighborhood  of  Fredericksburg, 
where  forage  was  more  plentiful  than  it  was  nearer  the  main 
body. 

PLAN. 

As  has  already  been  said,  Grant's  main  objective  was  to  be 
Lee's  army.  Behind  its  intrenchments  and  the  Rapidan  this 
army  was  unassailable  in  front;  Grant  must  turn  one  or  the 
other  of  its  flanks,  and  thus  force  it  to  come  out  of  its  intrench 
ments  and  fight,  or  suffer  itself  to  be  attacked  in  reverse.  He 
resolved  to  turn  its  right  flank,  and  hoped,  by  concealment  and 
celerity,  to  cross  the  Rapidan  and  get  out  of  the  Wilderness 
on  its  south  side  before  Lee  should  discover  his  movement;  or 
at  least  before  Lee  could  take  effectual  means  to  oppose  it. 

With  a  view  to  swift  marching,  and  on  account  of  the  bad 
roads  and  forest  country,  the  baggage  was  cut  down  to  the 
smallest  limit,  and  a  large  portion  of  the  artillery  was  left  be 
hind.  Ammunition  and  ten  days'  rations,  and  three  days'  for 
age,  however,  had  to  be  carried  in  wagons,  which  made  a  train 
"that  would  have  extended  from  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond, 


*The  Campaigns  of  Grant  in  Virginia  (Scribner's) — Humphreys. 


472  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

stretched  along  in  single  file,"* — that  is,  a  wagon-train  sixty 
or  seventy  miles  long.  The  order  for  the  movement  of  the 
army  issued  on  the  2nd  of  May,  and  the  movement  began  a't 
midnight  of  the  3rd.  Sheridan  with  two  of  his  cavalry  divi 
sions  led  the  way,  while  Torbert's  division  was  left  to  cover 
the  rear. 

(247)  The  army  marched  by  the  roads  to  Ely's  and  Ger- 
manna  Fords,  the  same  fords  that  Hooker's  right  wing  had 
used  in  crossing  the  Rapidan  a  twelvemonth  before.  Two  pon 
toon-bridges  were  laid  at  each  of  these  points,  and  another  was 
laid  between  them  at  Culpeper  Mine  Ford.  Hancock's  corps 
[Second],  preceded  by  Gregg's  cavalry  division,  and  followed 
by  the  reserve  artillery,  took  the  Ely's  Ford  road  for  Chan- 
cellorsville,  where  it  arrived  at  9  a.  m.  on  the  4th.  Here  it  re 
mained  the  rest  of  the  day;  the  cavalry  pushed  out  to  Piney 
Branch  Church,  and  threw  out  patrols  on  all  the  roads  from 
there.  The  Second  Corps  bivouacked  that  night  on  the  old 
battle-field  of  Chancellorsville. 

The  Fifth  Corps  [Warren],  preceded  by  Wilson's  cavalry 
division,  marched  by  way  of  Germanna  Ford,  and,  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  4th,  reached  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  at  the  junc 
tion  of  the  Germanna  Ford  road  and  the  old  Orange-Freder- 
icksburg  Turnpike — just  about  a  mile  west  of  where  Stone 
wall  Jackson's  turning-column  struck  the  Turnpike  on  the 
evening  of  the  2nd  of  May  the  year  before.  Here  the  Fifth 
Corps  bivouacked.  Sedgwick's  corps  [Sixth]  followed  the 
Fifth  and  bivouacked  the  night  of  the  4th  with  the  head  of  its 
column  three  miles  south  of  Germanna  Ford.  Wilson's  cav 
alry  division  moved  on  to  Parker's  Store,  throwing  out  patrols 
on  all  the  roads  from  that  point.  No  opposition  had  as  yet  been 
offered  by  the  enemy,  and  the  troops  were  all  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Rapidan  and  in  the  heart  of  the  Wilderness. 

But  for  the  great  wagon-train  the  army  might  have  marched 
on  and  gained  five  or  six  miles  of  its  way  through  the  forest 
before  nightfall.  The  trains,  however,  were  not  up;  they  did 
not  finish  crossing  at  Ely's  and  Culpeper  Mine  Fords  until 
after  5  p.  m.  on  the  5th.  The  army  could  not  move  on  without 
them.  Signs  of  the  enemy  appeared  before  one  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  4th.  Shots  were  heard  in  the  direction  of 
Locust  Grove,  and  a  considerable  force  was  seen  moving  from 
Orange  Court  House  toward  New  Verdiersville  on  the  Plank 

*Grant. 


^  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  473 

Road.  In  fact,  Lee's  army  was  in  motion  on  the  Turnpike  and 
the  Plank  Road.  Lee  had  anticipated  the  movement  of  the 
Federal  army.  He  had  not  been  deceived  by  feints  that  had 
been  made  on  his  left.  Standing  with  a  group  of  his  officers 
at  the  signal  station  on  Clark's  Mountain,  on  the  2nd  of  May, 
he  had  expressed  the  belief  that  Grant  would  move  round  his 
right  flank.  According  to  his  wont  he  took  no  steps  to  prevent 
Grant's  passage  of  the  river,  but,  as  soon  as  he  learned  that  the 
Union  army  was  in  march,  he  started  his  corps  forward  to 
strike  it  in  flank  before  it  should  get  out  of  the  Wilderness. 

Thus  it  happened  that  on  the  night  of  the  4th  the  head  of 
Swell's  corps  was  at  Locust  Grove,  on  the  Turnpike  within 
five  miles  of  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  where  Warren's  corps 
was  bivouacked ;  and  the  leading  division  of  Hill's  corps 
[Heth]  was  at  Mine  Run  on  the  Plank  Road,  seven  miles  from 
where  Wilson's  cavalry  had  its  bivouac  at  Parker's  Store.  It 
does  not,  however,  appear  that  either  of  the  hostile  armies  was 
aware  of  the  nearness  of  the  other.  Longstreet's  corps,  which 
had  a  march  of  forty-two  miles  to  make,  received  its  orders 
about  noon  on  the  4th  and  was  on  the  way  at  4  p.  m.  Stopping 
only  long  enough  to  feed  and  water,  it  marched  all  that  night 
and  until  nearly  sunset  on  the  5th ;  then  it  bivouacked  at  Craig's 
Meeting  House,  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  having  marched 
thirty-six  miles.* 

(248)  We  learned  in  the  study  of  the  Chancellorsville  Cam 
paign  that  the  great  dismal  forest  called  the .  Wilderness  was 
about  fourteen  miles  long  from  east  to  west  and  ten  miles  wide 
from  the  Rapidan  southward.  It  was  no  primeval  forest  of 
great  trees,  "the  survival  of  the  fittest,"  standing  apart  in  the 
midst  of  a  sparse  undergrowth  struggling  to  live  under  their 
shade ;  it  was  the  worst  kind  of  thicket  of  second-growth.  For 
more  than  a  hundred  years  iron  mines  had  been  worked  within 
it,  and  all  the  original  timber  had  been  cut  as  fuel  for  the  fur 
naces.  The  space  was  now  covered  with  a  dense  coppice  of 
cedar,  pine,  black-oak,  and  other  scrubby  and  tangled  under 
growth.  Hancock  in  his  report  says :  "It  was  covered  by  a 
dense  forest,  almost  impenetrable  by  troops  in  line  of  battle, 
where  maneuvering  was  an  operation  of  extreme  difficulty  and 
uncertainty.  The  undergrowth  was  so  heavy  that  it  was 
scarcely  possible  to  see  more  than  one  hundred  paces  in  any 
direction.  The  movements  of  the  enemy  could  not  be  observed 

*Alexander. 


474  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS.  , 

until  the  lines  were  almost  in  collision."*  As  stated  before, 
the  uneven  surface  of  the  ground  was  cut  up  by  a  number  of 
small  streams  with  marshy  banks;  the  clearings  were  few  and 
narrow;  the  highways  were  not  many,  but  there  were  numer 
ous  crooked  wood-roads  and  trails  leading  and  misleading  in 
every  direction.  To  Grant's  army  the  Wilderness,  especially 
that  part  west  of  the  old  Chancellorsville  battle-ground,  was 
totally  unknown;  but  Lee's  men  had  a  far  better  knowledge 
of  the  roads  and  trails  than  they  had  possessed  at  the  time  of 
Jackson's  last  battle. 

(246)  Early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  Grant  telegraphed 
Burnside,  whose  first  division  was  then  at  Brandy  Station,  to 
make  a  forced  march  to  Germanna  Ford.  The  fourth  division 
of  the  Ninth  Corps,  the  first  negro  troops  to  do  service  with 
the  Union  army  in  Virginia,  had  started  that  morning  from 
Manassas  Junction,  forty  miles  from  Germanna  Ford.  Burn- 
side  promptly  obeyed  Grant's  order,  and  his  first  division 
[Stevenson]  crossed  the  Rapidan  at  Germanna  Ford  the  next 
morning,  the  5th.  By  the  night  of  the  5th  the  divisions  of 
Potter  and  Willcox  had  also  come  up ;  they  bivouacked  two  or 
three  miles  south  of  the  ford.  The  fourth  division  [Ferrero] 
crossed  on  the  morning  of  the  6th. 

At  6  p.  m.  on  the  4th  Grant  issued,  through  Meade,  orders 
for  the  army  to  resume  the  march  southward  at  five  o'clock 
the  next  morning.  (248)  Sheridan,  with  Torbert's  and 
Gregg's  cavalry  divisions,  was  to  march  toward  Hamilton's 
Crossing  in  quest  of  Stuart's  cavalry.  Wilson  was  to  move 
his  cavalry  division  to  Craig's  Meeting  House,  and  sent  out 
reconnoitering  parties  on  the  Orange  Turnpike  and  the  Plank 
Road,  and  on  other  roads  converging  on  the  line  of  march  of 
the  army.  ,  Hancock's  corps  [Second]  was  to  march  by  way 
of  Todd's  Tavern  to  Shady  Grove  Church;  Warren's  [Fifth] 
to  Parker's  Store;  and  Sedgwick's  [Sixth]  to  Old  Wilderness 
Tavern,  leaving  a  division  to  cover  Germanna  Ford  until  the 
arrival  of  Burnside's  corps.  Each  corps  was  to  keep  in  touch 
with  the  troops  on  its  right  and  left.  The  march  began  on 
time  and  the  corps  were  soon  stretched  out  upon  the  narrow 
roads. 

Lee,  whose  purpose  was  to  attack  the  Union  army  while  it 
was  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  narrow  roads  and  jungle  of  the 
Wilderness,  hoped  not  to  have  to  bring  on  a  general  engage- 


*Humphreys. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  475 

> 

ment  before  Longstreet's  corps  should  reach  the  front.  He 
gave  his  orders  accordingly  to  Ewell  and  Hill.  At  this  time, 
the  morning  of  the  5th  of  May,  Longstreet's  corps  was  still  far 
behind;  it  did  not  reach  the  battle-field  until  the  next  morn 
ing.  It  does  not  appear  that  there  was  any  cavalry  in  front  of 
the  columns  of  Ewell  and  Hill — Stuart's  squadrons  had  not 
rejoined  from  Fredericksburg — or  that  the  infantry  advance- 
guards  were  very  far  in  front.  "Ewell's  corps  was  the  first 
to  find  itself  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  As  it  advanced 
along  the  Turnpike  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  the  Federal 
column  was  seen  crossing  it  from  the  direction  of  Germanna 
Ford.  Ewell  promptly  formed  line  of  battle  across  the  Turn 
pike."* 

It  was  Warren's  corps  that  was  crossing  the  pike  in  front 
of  Ewell's  column.  At  7.15  a.  m.  Warren  reported  to  Meade 
that  the  enemy's  infantry  was  on  the  pike  in  "some  force" 
about  two  miles  from  the  Wilderness  Tavern.  A  few  minutes 
later  Meade  ordered  Warren  to  halt  his  whole  corps  and  attack 
the  Confederates  on  the  pike.  The  Federal  commanders 
did  not  suspect  the  presence  of  Lee's  main  army.  Meade  re 
marked,  "They  have  left  a  division  to  fool  us  here,  while  they 
concentrate  and  prepare  a  position  toward  North  Anna."f 
Warren's  attack,  however,  would  develop  what  force  there 
was  of  the  enemy. 

At  the  same  time  Meade  dispatched  an  order  to  Hancock 
to  halt  his  corps  at  Todd's  Tavern  and  await  developments. 
This  order  did  not  reach  Hancock  until  nine  o'clock,  and  found 
him  two  miles  beyond  Todd's  Tavern.  Sedgwick  was  ordered 
to  move  out  on  the  road  that  left  the  Germanna  Plank  Road 
at  Spottswood's,  about  two  miles  north  of  the  Tavern,  and 
attack  the  enemy.  He  was  to  keep  in  touch  with  Warren's 
right.  (249)  Grant  joined  Meade,  and  they  took  their  post 
upon  a  knoll  on  the  Lacy  farm,  where  they  remained  during 
most  of  the  day. 

Johnson's  division  of  Ewell's  corps  was  formed  across  the 
pike,  Rodes's  division  was  forming  on  its  right,  and  Early's  on 
its  left.  Griffin's  division  of  Warren's  corps,  advancing  down 
the  Turnpike,  met  the  first  line  of  Johnson's  division  at  about 
noon,  and  drove  it  back.  Robinson's  division  was  ordered  to 
support  Griffin,  while  Wadsworth's  division  was  to  form  on  his 


*Law  in  B. 
fSwinton. 


476  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

left,  and  Wright's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  to  support 
his  right.  Wadsworth's  division  in  passing  through  the  dense 
thicket  moved  northwest,  instead  of  southwest  parallel  to  the 
Turnpike.  This  exposed  its  left  flank  to  the  right  wing  of 
Ewell's  line.  Wright's  division  found  the  jungle  so  close  that 
it  could  not  get  to  the  front  in  time  to  be  of  assistance.  So 
Warren's  three  divisions  after  a  short  but  fierce  fight  were 
driven  back,  losing  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  several  hundred 
prisoners.  Ewell's  corps  advanced  to  where  Johnson's  line  had 
first  stood,  and  there  intrenched. 

Crawford's  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  at  the  head  of 
the  Union  column  when  the  march  began  in  the  morning,  and 
its  leading  troops  had  reached  the  Chewning  farm,  three  miles 
from  Wilderness  Tavern,  when  the  order  reached  it  at  eight 
o'clock  to  halt.  Wilson  had  left  a  small  party  of  cavalry  at 
this  point,  and  Crawford  found  it  skirmishing  with  what  he 
took  for  Confederate  troopers  dismounted.  Crawford  halted 
as  ordered,  but  finding  presently  that  Wilson's  cavalry  at  Park 
er's  Store  was  engaged,  he  threw  out  a  skirmish  line  toward 
that  place.  The  skirmish  line  soon  became  engaged  with  the 
flankers  of  a  column  of  Confederate  infantry.  In  fact,  Heth's 
division  of  Hill's  corps  was  advancing  on  the  Plank  Road; 
Wilson's  cavalry  retired  before  it.  About  this  time  Crawford 
was  ordered  to  close  in  to  the  right  with  one  of  his  brigades 
and  join  in  the  attack  along  the  Turnpike.  The  brigade  lost 
its  way  in  the  underbrush,  and  became  enveloped  by  the  right 
of  Ewell's  line ;  it  had  many  men  killed  and  wounded,  lost  sev 
eral  hundred  prisoners,  and  fell  back.  (250)  About  two 
o'clock  Crawford  drew  in  his  division  and  posted  it  "about  a 
half-mile  southwest  from  the  Lacy  house,  facing  toward 
Chewning's."* 

As  soon  as  Meade  learned,  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock, 
that  there  was  a  Confederate  column  on  the  Plank  Road  also, 
he  dispatched  Getty's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  had 
not  advanced  with  the  rest  of  that  corps,  but  was  now 
at  the  Tavern,  out  on  the  Brock  Road  to  its  junction  with  the 
Plank  Road.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  Hancock  an  order 
to  return  with  his  corps  to  the  same  point.  On  reaching  the 
Plank  Road,  about  eleven  o'clock,  Getty  sent  forward  a  skir 
mish  line,  which  soon  encountered  Heth's  skirmishers  driving 
back  the  Union  cavalry  from  Parker's  Store.  Getty  learned 

^Humphreys. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  477 

from  prisoners  that  Hill's  corps,  except  Anderson's  division, 
was  on  the  road;  instead  of  attacking,  therefore,  he  halted  in 
the  Brock  Road  and  threw  up  slight  intrenchments,  pending 
the  return  of  Hancock's  corps. 

Hill  had  the  same  orders  as  Ewell,  to  avoid  bringing  on  a 
general  engagement.  So  Heth's  division,  which  was  in  ad 
vance,  took  up  a  position  early  in  the  afternoon  facing  Getty. 
His  line  was  on  comparatively  high  ground,  across  the  road, 
with  its  flanks  resting  on  marshy  ground  about  the  headwaters 
of  the  Ny  and  Wilderness  Run.  Wilcox  came  up  with  his 
division,  and,  at  about  two  o'clock,  formed  line  on  Heth's  left. 
He  extended  his  line  at  first  beyond  Chewning's  in  order  to 
connect  with  Ewell's,  which  was  in  sight  upon  the  open  ground 
at  the  Hagerson  farm.  Toward  five  o'clock  he  was  recalled 
to  the  right  to  support  Heth — "a  movement  which  was  ob 
served  by  General  Warren."*  The  two  divisions  of  Wilcox 
and  Heth  were  then  merged  into  one  line.  General  Lee  was 
with  Hill. 

At  2  p.  m.  the  head  of  Hancock's  corps  reached  the  Plank 
Road.  As  the  divisions  came  up  they  were  formed  on 
Getty's  left  in  the  following  order  from  right  to  left  along 
and  in  front  of  the  road  by  which  Jackson  had  made  his  turn 
ing  movement  a  year  before:  Birney's,  Mott's,  Gibbon's,  and 
Barlow's.  Hancock  was  ordered  to  support  Getty  and  drive 
the  enemy  beyond  Parker's  Store  and  was  urged  to  lose  no 
time;  he  nevertheless  spent  about  an  hour  completing  the  in 
trenchments  begun  by  Getty.  "This  delay  was  of  great  value 
to  Hill,  enabling  him  partially  to  select  and  prepare  his 
ground. "f  (251)  "At  a  quarter  past  four  Getty,  in  compli 
ance  with  his  orders  from  Meade,  advanced  to  the  attack, 
through  the  thick  undergrowth."  At  about  400  yards  from 
the  Brock  Road  Getty's  line  became  engaged  with  Heth's  di 
vision,  "part  of  which  was  lying  down  behind  the  crest  of  a 
small  elevation."  Finding  Getty  engaged  with  a  large  force  of 
the  enemy,  Hancock  sent  two  divisions  to  his  assistance — Bir 
ney's  to  his  right  and  Mott's  to  his  left.  Hancock  says  the 
fight  became  "very  fierce  at  once;  the  lines  were  exceedingly* 
close,  the  musketry  continuous  and  deadly  along  the  entire 
line."*  General  Alexander  says  :  "There  was  never  more  des 
perate  fighting  than  now  ensued."  Gibbon's  division  was  sent 


""Humphreys. 
fAlexander. 


478  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

forward,  but  Wilcox  had  reinforced  Heth,  and  the  Confed 
erates  could  not  be  driven ;  finally,  after  nightfall,  two  brigades 
of  Barlow's  division  attacked  Hill's  right  flank  and  forced  it 
back.  The  combat  lasted  till  eight  o'clock. 

Grant  and  Meade  heard  the  roar  of  musketry  at  this  end  of 
the  line,  and,  judging  rightly  that  Hancock  was  having  a  hard 
fight,  dispatched  Wadsworth's  division  of  Warren's  corps,  late 
in  the  afternoon,  southward  through  the  thicket,  to  attack 
Hill's  flank  and  rear.  Wadsworth's  movement  was  so  slow 
through  the  tangled  underbrush  that  he  was  overtaken  by 
night  before  he  reached  a  position  from  which  he  could  as 
sault  ;  his  men  therefore  lay  on  their  arms,  where  night  caught 
them — "in  contact  with  the  skirmishers  on  Hill's  left  flank."* 
There  was  heavy  skirmishing  at  the  other  end  of  the  line,  also, 
during  the  afternoon,  but  without  decisive  results.  Artillery 
was  used  wherever  practicable,  but  owing  to  the  denseness  of 
the  woods  it  played  no  great  part  in  the  battle. 

(248)  The  Union  squadrons  that  reconnoitered  toward 
Hamilton's  Crossing  found  that  Stuart's  cavalry  had  been 
drawn  in  to  the  right  of  Lee's  army.  Wilson's  division  met 
part  of  it  on  the  Catharpin  Road  and  skirmished  backward 
and  forward  with  it  during  most  of  the  day.  At  last  Wilson, 
having  fallen  back  to  Todd's  Tavern,  was  there  joined  by 
Gregg,  and  their  combined  forces  drove  the  Confederate  squad 
ron  across  Corbin's  Bridge. 

(251)  As  soon  as  the  battle  ceased  on  the  evening  of  the 
5th  the  Union  commanders  issued  orders  for  its  renewal  at 
five  o'clock  the  next  morning. 

We  have  seen  that  Burnside  had  arrived  with  three  of  his 
divisions  south  of  the  river  by  the  evening  of  the  5th.  He 
had,  however,  not  come  in  time  to  take  any  part  in  the  battle 
of  this  day.  At  the  end  of  the  day's  fighting,  and  indeed  all 
during  the  day,  there  was  a  wide  gap  between  the  two  wings 
of  the  line  of  battle — between  Hancock  and  Warren  on  the 
Union  side,  and  between  Hill  and  Ewell  on  the  Confederate 
side.  Two  distinct  battles  had  been  fought  on  fields  more 
*than  a  mile  apart.  Burnside  was  ordered  to  place  two  of  his 
divisions  in  the  interval  between  Warren  and  Hancock,  and 
to  be  in  position  to  advance  at  five  o'clock  next  morning  with 
the  rest  of  the  army.  He  was  to  get  possession  of  the  high, 
clear  ground  at  Chewning's,  and  attack  Hill's  left  and  rear. 


*Swinton. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  479 

Stevenson's  division  of  Burnside's  corps  was  to  remain  at  the 
Tavern  as  a  reserve.  During  the  night  both  sides  strengthened 
their  field-works. 

(252)  Punctually  at  5  a.  m.  on  the  6th  the  right  and  left  of 
the  Union  line  renewed  the  attack;  but  it  was  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  before  any  part  of  Burnside's  corps  on  the  left- 
center  of  the  Union  line  got  into  the  battle.     Sedgwick  and 
Warren  on  the  right  attacked  Ewell  furiously,  but  could  make 
no  headway  against  his  breast-works,  defended  by  artillery  and 
musketry.     At  about  half -past  ten  the  battle  had  become  so 
fierce  at  Hancock's  end  of  the  line  that  Sedgwick  and  Warren 
were   ordered   to   suspend   their   attacks   and   strengthen  their 
works,  in  order  that  troops  might  be  spared  from  their  corps 
to  assist  Hancock. 

Leaving  Gibbon  with  two  divisions  to  hold  his  left  on  the 
Brock  Road,  Hancock  sent  Birney  forward  along  the  Plank 
Road  with  his  other  two  divisions  and  Getty's  division  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  to  attack  the  Confederate  right.  Wadsworth's 
division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  advanced  on  the  right  of  this  line. 
Within  four  or  five  hundred  yards  Birney  came  upon  Hill's 
line  in  the  thicket,  but  was  unable  to  budge  it,  until  he  en 
veloped  its  right  flank,  and  Wadsworth  struck  its  left.  See 
ing  their  line  thus  rolled  up  toward  the  center,  the  Confeder 
ates  broke  from  both  flanks  and  ran  down  the  Plank  Road  past 
General  Lee.*  Just  at  this  time,  however,  Longstreet's  corps 
began  to  arrive,  and  a  little  later  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's 
corps.  These  fresh  troops  were  thrown  into  the  fight  and 
checked  Birney's  advance,  and  drove  his  left  back.  The  battle 
raged  and  the  hostile  lines  surged  backward  and  forward  in 
this  dense  thicket  over  a  space  of  two  or  three  hundred  yards 
until  nearly  eleven  o'clock,  when  the  firing  died  away  and 
there  was  a  lull. 

(253)  The  divisions  of  Wilcox  and  Heth,  after  Longstreet's 
arrival,  were  withdrawn  and  moved  to  the  left,  at  the  Chew- 
ning  farm,  to  connect  with  Ewell's  corps  at  the  Hagerson  farm. 
Stevenson's  division  of  Burnside's  corps  and  other  troops  had 
been  sent  to  reinforce  Hancock ;  Gibbon's  two  divisions  kept 
their  post  across  the  Brock  Road,  though  Hancock  had  sent 
Gibbon  an  order  to  move  them  to  the  front.     It  had  been  ex 
pected  or  apprehended  that  Longstreet's  corps,  which  it  was 
known  had  not  yet  arrived,  would  approach  by  way  of  the 

*Alexander. 


480  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Catharpin  Road,  and  Gibbon  had  been  on  the  lookout  for  this 
corps  all  the  morning.  Between  7  and  8  a.  m.  a  column  was 
seen  on  the  Brock  Road  approaching  from  the  direction  of 
the  Catharpin  Road.  The  column  was  thought  to  be  Long- 
street's;  but  it  turned  out  to  be  some  Federal  convalescents 
that  had  marched  out  by  way  of  Chancellorsville  and  Todd's 
Tavern  to  catch  up  with  the  army,  and  were  now  counter 
marching.  Then  later  Sheridan's  cavalry,  which  had  marched 
out  from  Chancellorsville,  had  a  dismounted  combat  with  Stu 
art's  on  the  Brock  Road  out  toward  Todd's  Tavern.  Again 
Gibbon  thought  Longstreet  was  approaching.  His  anxiety 
concerning  the  advance  of  Longstreet  by  the  Catharpin  and 
.Brock  Roads  seems  to  be  the  only  explanation  of  Gibbon's 
failure  to  go  forward  to  Hancock's  relief. 

Learning,  about  10  a.  m.,  that  there  was  an  unfinished  rail 
way  grading  south  of  the  Plank  Road,  from  which  an  attack 
could  be  made  against  Hancock's  left  flank,  which  was  in  the 
air,  Longstreet  organized  a  force  of  four  brigades  under  Ma- 
hone  to  make  the  attack.  Mahone  marched  his  command  by 
the  flank  through  the  undergrowth  to  the  unfinished  railway, 
and  formed  line  behind  the  grading,  facing  to  the  northeast; 
at  about  eleven  o'clock  he  advanced,  striking  the  Federal  line 
in  flank  and  rear.  The  movement  was  wholly  successful,  and 
Hancock's  line  fell  back  in  confusion  to  its  trenches  on  the 
Brock  Road.  The  panic  extended  across  the  Plank  Road, 
where  General  Wadsworth  was  killed  and  his  troops  were 
routed.* 

Longstreet  had  ordered  the  advance  of  all  his  troops — 
which  included  five  fresh  brigades — to  follow  up  the  advantage 
gained  by  Mahone,  and  was  riding  at  the  head  of  Jenkins's 
brigade  at  the  side  of  its  commander,  down  the  Plank  Road, 
when  some  of  Mahone's  troops  facing  this  road  from  the  south 
side  opened  fire  across  the  road.  The  head  of  the  column  was 
just  passing,  and  came  under  the  fire.  Jenkins  was  killed  and 
Longstreet  severely  wounded.  Longstreet,  nevertheless,  in 
structed  General  Field,  the  next  in  command,  to  press  the 
attack  in  front  by  the  Plank  Road  and  in  flank  by  the  Brock 
Road.  But  soon  afterwards  General  Lee  came  up,  and,  al 
though  Longstreet  explained  to  him  "the  plans,  orders,  and 
opportunity,"  he  "did  not  care  to  handle  broken  lines,  and 
ordered  a  formation  for  parallel  battle."  This  delayed  the 

*Alexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  481 

attack  until  4.15  p.  m.*  A  part  of  Hancock's  front  line  of 
breastworks  was  then  carried,  and  the  Confederate  flag  was 
planted  upon  it.  But  soon  the  captors  were  driven  out,  and  by 
five  o'clock  the  whole  Confederate  line  at  this  point  had  been 
repulsed  and  driven  back  with  heavy  loss. 

Meantime  Burnside's  corps  had  taken  but  small  part  in  the 
battle.  Willcox's  and  Potter's  divisions,  ordered  to  enter  the 
gap  between  Hill  and  Ewell,  did  not  reach  the  ground  before 
2  p.  m. ;  by  that  time  Heth  and  Wilcox  had  closed  the  gap,  and 
were  able  to  repel  the  Federal  assault.* 

Early  in  the  forenoon  General  John  B.  Gordon  had  learned 
that  the  right  of  the  Union  line  was  exposed  in  the  woods,  and 
could  be  surprised  and  taken  in  reverse.  He  was  anxious  to 
attack  it,  but  could  not  prevail  on  General  Ewell  to  allow  him 
to  do  so.  Ewell  had  let  himself  be  persuaded  by  Early  that 
Grant  had  that  flank  supported  by  Burnside's  corps;  which 
was  not  so.  Toward  sunset  General  Lee  was  at  Ewell's  end  of 
the  line,  and,  on  being  told  of  the  situation,  he  ordered  Gordon 
to  make  the  assault  with  his  own  and  another  brigade.*  Gor 
don  moved  out  of  his  trenches  at  sunset  and  enveloped  the 
Union  flank,  took  it  in  reverse,  and  rolled  it  up,  capturing 
Generals  Shaler  and  Seymour  and  several  hundred  prisoners. 
(254)  Darkness  put  an  end  to  the  battle  and  Gordon  took  up 
a  new  position  in  advance  of  the  old  one.  During  the  night 
the  lines  of  the  .Sixth  Corps  were  drawn  back,  and  a  new  posi 
tion  was  intrenched. 

Neither  side  renewed  the  engagement  on  the  7th  of  May; 
both  armies  remained  behind  their  breastworks,  and  Grant 
prepared  to  continue  "his  movement  southward,  with  the  hope 
of  getting  outside  of  the  Wilderness,  and  bringing  Lee  to  bat 
tle  in  the  open,  where  the  Union  superiority  in  numbers  would 
be  of  more  account. 

In  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  the  Union  losses  were  2,246 
killed,  12,037  wounded,  and  3,383  captured  or  missing.f  The 
Confederate  returns  were  not  complete;  General  Alexander 
estimates  the  Confederate  killed  and  wounded  as  7,750.  Gen 
eral  Grant  says  in  his  Memoirs,  "More  desperate  fighting  has 
not  been  done  on  this  continent  than  that  of  the  5th  and  6th 
of  May."  Livermore  estimates  the  numbers  engaged  as 
101,895  Federals,  61,025  Confederates. 

*Alexander. 
#.   &  L. 


482  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

COMMENTS. 

In  reviving  the  grade  of  lieutenant-general  in  our  army  in 
the  spring  of  1864  for  General  Grant,  and  making  him  com 
manding-general  of  all  the  troops  in  the  field,  the  Government 
was  not  only  showing  recognition  of  qualities  of  leadership 
that  Grant  had  proved  by  an  unbroken  chain  of  successes,  but 
it  was  continuing  and  enlarging  the  policy  of  having  a  single 
commander  in  a  given  theater — a  policy  that  had  succeeded 
so  well  at  Chattanooga.  It  was  the  first  time  in  this  war  that 
Napoleon's  maxim,  that  "nothing  is  so  important  in  war  as  an 
undivided  command  .  .  .  conducted  by  one  chief"  (Maxim 
LXIV),  was  to  have  full  effect.  And  it  was  the  first  time 
that  any  Union  army  east  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains  was 
not  to  be  trammeled  by  the  authorities  at  Washington.  The 
President  did  suggest  a  plan  of  campaign  to  Grant,  but  for 
tunately  did  not  insist  upon  its  adoption.*  Grant  was  allowed 
to  command  in  fact.  (246)  Having  "arranged  for  a  simul 
taneous  movement  all  along  the  line,"t  the  main  objectives  of 
which  were  to  be  Lee's  army  in  Virginia  and  Joseph  E.  John 
ston's  in  Georgia,  Grant  joined  the  main  army  in  Virginia. 
This  army  was  composed  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under 
Meade,  and  the  Ninth  Corps  under  Burnside.  Grant  found 
the  army  in  the  neighborhood  of  Culpeper  Court  House,  and 
Lee's  Confederate  army  confronting  it  on  the  south  bank  of 
the  Rapidan  River. J  We  shall  consider  that  the  hostile  forces 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  those  under  Beauregard  and 
Butler,  respectively,  south  of  the  James  River,  neutralized 
each  other  for  the  time  being;  and  we  will  confine  our  atten 
tion  to  the  single  campaign,  or  single  phase  of  the  campaign, 
described  in  the  lecture. 

Grant's  army  was  nearly  twice  as  large  as  Lee's,  being  more 
than  100,000  strong, .  while  Lee  had  only  61,000;  and  the 
Union  army  was  far  better  equipped  in  every  way  than  its 
adversary.  This  disparity  necessarily  obliged  Lee  to  hold  his 
army  on  the  defensive.  He  not  only  had  to  cover  Richmond, 
but  he  also  had  to  protect  the  Virginia  Central  Railway,  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway  south  of  the  Rapidan  River, 

*Grant's  Memoirs. 

fGrant. 

JThe  Ninth  Corps  was  at  this  time  at  Annapolis  awaiting  orders, 
but  it  was  soon  afterwards  ordered  to  take  station  .  within  supporting 
distance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  along  the  Orange  and  Alex 
andria  Railway. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  483 

and  the  Richmond  and  Danville  Railway  upon  which  Rich 
mond  and  the  Confederate  army  were  dependent  for  all  kinds 
of  supplies. 

Grant's  main  objective  was  to  be  Lee's  army  and  not  Rich 
mond.  He  was  at  first  undecided  whether  to  cross  -the  river 
above  or  below  Lee's  army.  The  only  apparent  advantage  he 
could  have  had  in  crossing  above,  that  is  west  of  the  railway, 
was  that  the  streams  were  smaller  and  probably  more  easily 
passed  in  that  quarter,  and  the  country  was  more  open  and 
better  suited  to  the  maneuvering  of  large  forces.  In  such  a 
movement  Grant's  army  would  have  operated  on  a  front  paral 
lel  to  its  line  of  communications,  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railway;  while  Lee  would  have  operated  on  a  front  perpendic 
ular  to  his  communications  with  Richmond. 

Barnett's  Ford  was  defended  by  Confederate  intrenchments, 
which  would  have  forced  Grant  to  cross  the  Rapidan  higher 
up;  yet  if  he  had  undertaken  to  pass  entirely  beyond  Gordons- 
ville,  to  turn  the  Confederate  left,  he  would  completely  have 
exposed  his  own  flank  and  rear.  On  the  other  hand,  by  select 
ing  Lee's  right  flank  to  turn,  Grant  was  able  to  keep  his  own 
communications,  the  wagon-roads  back  to  Brandy  Station  and 
the  railway  thence  to  Washington,  covered;  as  soon  as  he 
should  put  his  army  across  the  Rapidan  he  could  change  his 
base  to  Fredericksburg  and  Aquia  Creek.  That  is  exactly 
what  he  did.  The  movement,  also,  if  it  succeeded  in  placing 
Grant's  army  upon  the  south  bank  of  the  Rapidan,  before  it 
should  be  discovered  by  Lee,  would  compel  Lee  to  quit  his 
position  and  fight  faced  toward  Richmond. 

While  Grant  took  all  means  to  conceal  his  movement  on  the 
4th  of  May,  he,  nevertheless,  hardly  hoped  that  he  should  be 
allowed  to  cross  the  Rapidan  without  opposition.  "This,"  he 
says  in  his  report,  "I  regarded  as  a  great  success,  and  it 
removed  from  my  mind  the  most  serious  apprehension  I  had 
entertained — that  of  crossing  the  river  in  the  face  of  an  active, 
large,  well-appointed,  and  ably-commanded  army."  "It  was 
well  known,"  says  General  Humphreys,  chief  of  staff  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  "that  daylight  would  divulge  our  move 
ment  to  Lee's  signal  officers  .  .  .  and  it  was  believed  that 
he  would  at  once  move  by  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg  Pike 
and  Plank  Roads  to  oppose  us." 

Yet  it  does  not  appear  that  Grant,  on  the  morning  of  May 
5,  expected  to  encounter  Lee's  main  army  on  these  two  roads 
in  the  Wilderness.  Indeed  he  hoped  to  have  his  army  beyond 


484  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  Wilderness,  in  open  country,  before  he  should  have  to 
engage  battle  with  the  enemy.  Neither  army  appears  to  have 
done  very  effective  patrolling  during  the  evening  of  the  4th 
or  the  early  morning  of  the  5th  of  May.  It  is  almost  incon 
ceivable  that  two  large  armies  should  bivouac  within  four  or 
five  miles  of  each  other  without  cither's  suspecting  the  near 
ness  of  the  other;  yet  such  appears  to  have  been  the  case. 
And  when  Confederate  troops  were  discovered  at  about  7  a.  m. 
on  the  Turnpike,  Meade  supposed  they  were  only  a  division 
of  the  Confederates,  left  there  to  deceive  and  delay  the  Union 
army,  and  that  the  main  Confederate  army  was  falling  back 
to  the  North  Anna. 

No  poorer  cavalry  work  was  done  in  the  Civil  War  than 
that  done -by  the  cavalry  of  Sheridan  and  Stuart  on  the  after 
noon  and  evening  of  May  4  and  the  early  morning  of  May  5, 
1864.  It  was  no  better  than  the  work  of  the  Prussian  and 
Austrian  squadrons  on  the  day  before  Koniggratz.  That  the 
armies  were  in  the  Wilderness  is  no  excuse.  For  Stuart  the 
excuse  may  be  made  that  his  troops  were  away  from  the  main 
army  by  Lee's  authority — over  near  Fredericksburg,  where 
he  had  to  take  his  lean  horses  in  order  to  forage  them.  He 
did  not  rejoin  the  main  army  until  May  5.  For  Sheridan  and 
at  least  two  of  his  division  commanders,  Torbert  and  Wilson, 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  they  had  not  learned  the  lesson.  The 
record  shows  that  General  Sheridan's  only  cavalry  service  in 
the  Civil  War  had  been  as  colonel  of  a  Michigan  cavalry  regi 
ment  for  one  month  and  seven  days,*  and  that  neither  of  the 
other  two  had  ever  commanded  as  much  as  a  squad  of  cavalry 
until  they  were  given  their  high  commands  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  General  Torbert's  entire  service  had  been  with 
infantry,  and  General  Wilson's  as  an  engineer  officer  until 
he  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  Cavalry  Bureau  at  Washington 
on  the  17th  of  February,  1864.  He  joined  his  division  of 
cavalry  on  the  4th  of  May.  Sheridan  unquestionably  learned 
before  the  end  of  the  war  how  to  use  his  cavalry;  but  he  did 
not  use  it  right  on  these  two  days,  else  Grant  would  have  been 
informed  that  Lee's  army  was  bivouacked  within  five  miles 
of  him. 


*Like  most  active  young  infantry  officers,  General  Sheridan  had  done 
much  service  with  small  detachments  of  cavalry,  when  he  was  an 
infantry  lieutenant  in  the  Indian  country  in  the  far  West;  but  such 
service  alone  does  not  qualify  one  to  take  command  of  a  great  body 
of  cavalry  in  war. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  485 

It  was  a  bold  act  for  Lee  to  march  his  army  to  attack  the 
Union  army  of  twice  its  strength ;  a  more  timid  commander 
would  have  fallen  back  promptly  to  the  south  bank  of  the 
North  Anna,  and  made  that  stream  a  new  line  of  defense;  or, 
if  he  had  wished  to  take  advantage  of  the  dense  forest  to  make 
a  stand  within  it,  he  would  have  made  all  haste  to  reach  the 
Catharpin  Road,  and  taken  up  a  position  there,  barring  Grant's 
way  to  Richmond.  A  more  timid  commander,  also,  would 
have  guarded  the  crossings  of  the  Rapidan  more  closely,  and 
tried  to  prevent  its  passage.  Lee  made  no  opposition  to 
Grant's  passage,  and  was  pleased  to  have  the  Union  army  enter 
the  Wilderness,  and  put  the  Rapidan  at  its  back.  General  Grant 
violated  the  maxim  of  war  "never  to  do  what  the  enemy  wishes 
you  to  do."  Lee  and  his  army  were  better  acquainted  with  the 
Wilderness  and  its  roads  and  trails  than  they  had  been  a  year 
before,  and  Lee  believed  he  had  the  chance  for  another  such 
victory  as  Chancellorsville.  He  did  have  the  chance,  but  the 
Union  army  was  not  commanded  by  Hooker,  and  Lee  no 
longer  had  Jackson. 

Longstreet  was  behindhand  again,  but  through  no  fault  of 
his.  Longstreet's  corps  was  cantoned  too  far  away;  it  ought 
o  have  been  near  Orange  Court  House  instead  of  at  Gor- 
donsville.  Furthermore,  Lee  did  not  dispatch  the  order  for  an 
advance  to  his  corps-commanders  until  near  noon  on  the  4th 
of  May.  At  least  as  early  as  the  2nd  of  May  Lee  was  con 
vinced  that  Grant  was  going  to  turn  his  right  flank ;  he  ought 
then,  by  all  means,  to  have  drawn  Longstreet's  corps  toward 
his  other  two — Longstreet  had  forty-two  miles  to  march  after 
he  received  Lee's  order  on  the  4th  of  May,  while  Hill  had 
twenty-eight,  and  Ewell  only  eighteen.*  If  Longstreet's  corps 
had  been  on  the  Plank  Road  close  behind  Hill's  on  the  5th, 
the  combined  forces  might  have  destroyed  Getty's  division  at 
the  Brock  Road,  before  the  return  of  Hancock's  corps  from 
Todd's  Tavern ;  then  they  might  have  cut  off  and  overwhelmed 
Hancock's  corps. 

TACTICS. 

Most  of  the  bad  tactics  of  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  can 
be  charged  to  the  dense  undergrowth  and  lack  of  roads.  Or 
ganizations  could  not  be  kept  intact;  commanders  could  not 


"•Alexander. 


486  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

see  or  keep  in  touch  with  their  lines;  positions  could  not  be 
pointed  out,  described,  or  identified ;  columns  could  not  be 
directed;  distances  could  not  be  estimated,  nor  could  the  time 
be  calculated  that  troops  would  take  to  go  from  one  point  to 
another;  at  fifty  paces  friends  could  not  be  distinguished 
from  foes,  and  neither  could  be  seen  a  hundred  yards  away. 

Although  Ewell  and  Hill  must  have  expected  to  encounter 
the  Union  army  in  the  Wilderness,  they  seem,  nevertheless, 
not  to  have  been  aware  of  its  presence  until  they  came  upon 
it  in  the  thickets ;  and  the  Federal  commanders  were  certainly 
surprised  to  find  Lee's  main  army  upon  the  flank  of  their 
column.  To  this  extent  the  battle  was  a  rencounter.  There 
was  no  plan  of  battle  on  either  side  to  start  with,  and  none 
appears  to  have  been  evolved  as  the  battle  progressed.  No 
concerted  effort  was  made  on  either  side,  at  any  stage  of  the 
battle,  to  envelop  the  flank  of  the  other  or  to  pierce  its  center. 

First  one  part  of  a  line  and  then  another  would  attack  and 
be  driven  back  to  its  breastwork.  On  the  first  day  there 
were  two  distinct  battles,  one  on  the  Plank  Road  and  the  other 
on  the  Turnpike,  with  a  wide  stretch  of  brush  between  them 
without  a  soldier  in  it.  Meade  did  finally,  on  the  second  day, 
suspend  the  Union  attacks  on  the  Turnpike  and  hold  his  troops 
there  on  the  defensive,  in  order  to  send  reinforcements  to 
Hancock  on  the  Plank  Road;  beyond  this  there  was  no  co 
operation  nor  mutual  support  between  the  two  wings  of  the 
Union  line.  There  was  none  whatever  between  the  two  wings 
of  the  Confederate  line — no  such  concerted  action  as  at  Chan- 
cellorsville.  On  the  contrary  we  find  Mahone  at  noon  rolling 
up  the  left  of  the  Unon  line,  and  Gordon,  at  sunset,  rolling 
up  its  right,  or  the  novel  tactical  project  of  an  army  of  60,000 
trying  to  envelop  both  flanks  of  an  army  of  more  than  100,000. 
Yet  either  of  these  Confederate  flank-attacks  ought  to  have 
given  decisive  results;  the  first  one  probably  would  have  done 
so  but  for  the  untimely  wounding  of  Longstreet,  and  the  sec 
ond  might  have  done  so  if  it  had  been  made  earlier  in  the  day  ; 
but  it  was  stopped  at  the  height  of  victory  by  the  darkness  of 
night. 

If  the  Union  army  had  held  the  breastworks  on  each  of  its 
flanks  with  a  single  corps,  and  concentrated  its  bulk  at  the 
center,  on  the  forenoon  of  the  6th  of  May,  it  might  have 
pierced  the  center  of  the  Confederate  line  and  destroyed  one 
or  both  of  its  wings.  The  flanks  were  more  than  five  miles 
apart,  while  there  was  a  stretch  of  a  mile  or  more  at  the  mid- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  487 

die  without  a  soldier  in  it.  Burnside  was  ordered  to  put  two 
of  his  divisions  into  position  to  penetrate  this  gap  at  daybreak ; 
but  it  was  2  p.  m.  before  the  divisions  reached  the  ground,  and 
in  the  meanwhile  the  gap  had  been  closed  by  the  Confederate 
divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox.  Apparently  Burnside's  troops 
took  twelve  to  eighteen  hours  in  going  three  miles  through  the 
underbrush,  and  had  small  part  in  the  battle. 

There  was,  of  course,  little  chance  for  the  action  of  cav 
alry  or  artillery  on  such  a  battle-field ;  yet,  by  hovering  out 
on  the  flank  toward  Todd's  Tavern,  and  engaging  Sheridan  in 
combat,  Stuart's  cavalry  had  the  effect  of  holding  Gibbon  with 
two  divisions  across  the  Brock  Road  at  a  time  when  Hancock 
sorely  needed  his  help  at  the  front. 

The  battle  was  indecisive ;  the  tactical  advantage  rested 
with  the  Confederates,  but  neither  army  wanted  to  renew  the 
engagement  on  the  7th  of  May.  Strategically  Grant  had 
failed  to  make  Lee  come  out  into  the  open ;  but  Lee  had  failed 
to  stop  Grant's  army — it  was  the  first  time,  so  far,  that  the 
Union  army  had  fought  a  great  battle  on  the  soil  of  Virginia 
and  advanced  immediately  afterwards.  It  was  the  first  step 
gained  in  General  Grant's  policy  of  "continuous  hammering" ; 
the  Confederacy  could  not  stand  many  more  such  battles,  call 
it  victory  or  defeat. 


LECTURE  XXIII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA 
COURT  HOUSE. 

(255)  Having  resolved  to  continue  his  advance  southward 
from  the  Wilderness  battle-field,  and,  if  possible,  to  cut  Lee  off 
from  Richmond,  Grant  set  his  army  in  motion  on  the  evening 
of  May  7,  1864. 

As  the  movement  was  to  be  made  mainly  with  a  view  to  get 
ting  outside  of  the  Wilderness  and  inducing  Lee  to  go  out 
and  give  battle  in  the  open,  the  first  objective  points  assigned 
to  the  various  army-corps,  and  the  routes,  were  merely  pre 
liminary;  subsequent  movements  would  depend  upon  the  move 
ments  of  Lee's  army.  Hancock's  corps  [Second],  which  occu 
pied  the  left  of  the  line,  was  to  remain  in  position  until  the 
trains  and  the  rest  of  the  army  marched  off  the  battle-field  by 
the  rear  of  his  line.  The  trains  were  started  in  the  afternoon, 
and  at  half -past  eight  the  troops  took  up  the  march.  Passing 
behind  Hancock's  line,  Warren's  corps  [Fifth]  moved  by  the 
Brock  Road  toward  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  Sedgwick's 
[Sixth]  marched  by  way  of  Chancellorsville,  Aldrich's,  and 
Piney  Branch  Church,  toward  the  same  point.  Burnside's 
corps  [Ninth]  followed  Sedgwick's  as  far  as  Aldrich's.  Han 
cock  was  ordered  to  follow  close  behind  Warren  to  Todd's 
Tavern.  The  cavalry  covered  the  movement  in  flank  and  rear, 
and  pushed  out  ahead  of  the  infantry  columns. 

Todd's  Tavern  was  about  six  miles  from  Wilderness  Tav 
ern  by  the  Brock  Road,  and  Spottsylvania  Court  House  was 
about  twelve  miles.  By  way  of  Chancellorsville  Spottsylvania 
was  about  fourteen  miles  from  Wilderness  Tavern.  In  this 
preliminary  movement  the  corps  on  different  roads  would  be 
within  short  distances  of  one  another ;  but  the  woods  were  so 
close  and  the  cross-trails  so  little  known  that  it  would  be  diffi 
cult  to  pass  troops  from  one  road  to  another. 

Lee  was  informed  by  Stuart  on  the  afternoon  of  the  7th 
concerning  the  movement  of  the  Federal  wagon-trains,  and  he 
made  no  doubt  that  Grant's  objective  was  Spottsylvania  Court 
House.  He,  therefore,  ordered  Anderson,  now  commanding 
Longstreet's  corps,  to  make  a  night  march  for  the  same  point, 
by  way  of  by-roads  and  Shady  Grove  Church  Road.  Stuart's 

488 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       489 

cavalry  was  to  retard  the  march  of  the  Federal  Columns  as 
much  as  possible,  in  order  to  enable  Anderson  to  reach  Spott- 
sylvania  ahead  of  them  and  take  up  a  position. 

At  Spottsylvania  Court  House  several  roads  came  together 
from  the  direction  of  Wilderness  Tavern  and  Chancellorsville, 
as  well  as  from  Fredericksburg,  now  the  Union  base.  Other 
roads  led  from  Spottsylvania  toward  the  east  and  south.  The 
junction  of  all  these  roads  gave  the  place  a  temporary  strategic 
importance,  and  made  it  the  field  of  a  battle. 

(256)  So  well  did  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  division  perform 
its  task  along  the  Brock  Road  by  "felling  trees  across  it"  and 
disputing  "every  foot  of  ground"  that  Merritt,  whose  cavalry 
brigade  was  marching  ahead  of  Warren's  corps,  "found  it 
exceedingly  difficult  to  make  any  progress."*  It  was  the 
dark  of  the  moon  which  increased  the  difficulty  and  slowness 
of  the  advance.  So  it  was  half-after  eight  in  the  morning 
before  the  head  of  Warren's  column  emerged  from  the  woods 
into  open  ground  at  Alsop's,  about  two  miles  and  a  half  from 
the  Court  House.  Merritt's  cavalry  had  withdrawn  from  the 
front,  and  Robinson's  infantry  division  was  in  the  lead. 

This  division  marched  on  across  the  clearing  in  brigade  col 
umns  of  regiments  covered  by  a  line  of  skirmishers.  When 
the  skirmishers  arrived  within  two  or  three  hundred  yards  of 
the  next  wood,  a  dense  pine  thicket, — at  the  point  where  the 
prongs  of  the  road  from  the  New  Court  House  and  the  Old 
Court  House  came  together, — "suddenly  a  severe  musketry 
and  artillery  fire  was  opened  upon  their  front  and  right  from" 
a  breastwork  of  rails  at  the  edge  of  the  thicket.  "This  stag 
gered  them,  and  in  a  short  time  they  fell  back  to  the  shelter 
of  the  woods  in  their  rear."*  It  was  Kershaw's  division  of 
Anderson's  [Longstreet's]  corps  that  had  done  the  firing  from 
the  pines.  Robinson  was  badly  wounded  at  the  first  volley.  Grif 
fin's  division  had  come  up  on  Robinson's  right,  but  it  was  also 
forced  back,  until  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
[Crawford  and  Wadsworth]  got  to  the  front  and  joined  in  the 
engagement.  (257)  The  corps  then  pushed  the  Confeder 
ates  back  to  their  line  of  breastworks,  and  intrenched  its  own 
position,  "from  two  to  four  hundred  yards"  in  front  of  the 
Confederate  line. 

Meanwhile  Field's  division  of  Anderson's  [Longstreet's] 
corps  had  come  up  and  joined  the  line  with  Kershaw's.  About 


*Humphrevs. 


490  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

noon  Sedgwick's  corps  [Sixth]  arrived,  and  at  one  o'clock  it 
and  Warren's  corps  [Fifth]  were  ordered  to  attack  the  Con 
federate  position.  The  ground  was  unknown  and  the  troops 
were  tired;  so  the  arrangements  for  the  attack  were  not  made 
promptly.  It  was  late  in  the  afternoon  before  the  assault  was 
made — too  late  to  have  been  followed  up,  if  it  had  succeeded. 
But  it  did  not  succeed,  for  Ewell's  corps  reached  Spottsylvania 
at  five  o'clock — in  time  to  form  on  Anderson's  right  and  save 
his  flank  from  being  enveloped.  Both  sides  strengthened  and 
extended  their  intrenchments  during  the  night.  (256)  Early 
in  the  morning  Wilson's  cavalry  division  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Fredericksburg  had  pushed  Rosser's  Confederate  cav 
alry  brigade  before  it  and  got  possession  of  Spottsylvania 
Court  House.  But  Fitzhugh  Lee,  having  been  relieved  by 
Kershaw's  infantry  in  front  of  Warren's  corps,  had  hastened 
to  Rosser's  assistance.  Seeing  Lee's  and  Rosser's  combined 
forces  about  to  move  against  him,  Wilson,  after  having  held 
the  town  two  hours,  withdrew  his  division,  leaving  the  town 
in  possession  of  the  Confederates.* 

Let  us  now  see  where  the  other  troops  of  the  two  armies 
were — Hill's  corps  of  the  Confederate  army;  Hancock's  and 
Burnside's  of  the  Union  army.  Hancock,  who  was  to  follow 
close  behind  Warren's  corps  as  far  as  Todd's  Tavern,  found 
his  road  blocked  by  Warren's  troops  until  daylight.  He  then 
marched  to  Todd's  Tavern  and  there  intrenched.  He  sent 
Miles  with  his  own  brigade  and  a  detachment  of  cavalry  and 
artillery  to  reconnoiter  toward  Corbin's  Bridge  on  the  Cathar- 
pin  Road.  Miles  had  a  skirmish  with  Wade  Hampton's  Con 
federate  cavalry  and  part  of  Hill's  corps.  Burnside's  corps 
[Ninth]  bivouacked  at  Aldrich's  in  charge  of  the  trains.  Ewell 
had  followed  on  the  road  taken  by  Anderson,  and  Early,  who 
now  commanded  Hill's  corps,  Hill  being  ill,  was  ordered  to 
march  by  Todd's  Tavern  and  the  Brock  Road  "as  soon  as 
his  front  was  clear  of  the  enemy."  He  was  moving  on  the 
Catharpin  Road  toward  Todd's  Tavern  when  he  encountered 
Miles's  detachment.  Seeing  that  Todd's  Tavern  was  occupied 
by  Union  troops,  and  that  night  was  falling,  Early  bivouacked 
on  the  Catharpin  Road.  He  marched  to  Spottsylvania  the  next 
morning,  May  9,  by  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road. 

(258)  It  was  on  the  8th  of  May  that  Grant  gave  Sheridan 
an  order  "to  cut  loose  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  pass 

*Alexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       491 

round  the  left  of  Lee's  army  and  attack  his  cavalry;  to  cut" 
the  Virginia  Central  and  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg 
Railways,  "and,  when  compelled  to  do  so  for  want  of  forage 
and  rations,  to  move  on  to  the  James  River  and  draw  these 
from  Butler's  supplies."*  The  main  object  of  this  raid  was 
stated  by  Sheridan  at  the  time;  he  was  impatient  at  being 
tied  fast  to  the  army,  guarding  the  wagon-train  and  hovering 
along  the  flanks  and  rear,  while  Stuart's  cavalry  was  keeping 
Lee  informed  of  every  movement  the  Union  army  made,  and 
blocking  the  march  of  its  columns.  "If  I  am  permitted,"  said 
he,  "to  cut  loose  from  this  army,  I'll  draw  Stuart  after  me,  and 
whip  him,  too."f  This  was  the  main  object  of  the  raid. 
Sheridan  started  at  daylight  on  the  9th  of  May,  and  it  was 
sixteen  days  before  he  rejoined  the  army. 

Stuart  followed  him,  as  he  had  predicted,  arid,  before  night, 
came  upon  his  rear,  but  did  not  stop  him.  Then,  seeing  that 
Sheridan  was  making  for  Richmond,  Stuart  quitted  the  pur 
suit  and,  by  a  hard  roundabout  march,  placed  his  command 
across  Sheridan's  path  at  Yellow  Tavern,  only  six  miles  from 
Richmond.  Here  a  severe  combat  took  place  in  which  Stuart 
was  mortally  wounded  and  his  command  beaten  and  driven 
back.  Sheridan  passed  through  the  outer  defenses  of  Rich 
mond,  but  he  had  been  delayed  long  enough  by  Stuart  to 
enable  the  small  force  left  for  the  defense  of  Richmond  to 
take  its  place  in  the  inner  works;  there  he  was  checked. 
Sheridan  then  turned  toward  the  James.  He  tried  to  cross 
to  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  at  Mechanicsville, 
but  was  stopped  by  Confederate  batteries  and  cavalry.  His 
position  was  now  perilous,  with  the  troops  at  Richmond  on 
one  flank  and  the  Chickahominy  with  its  bridges  destroyed, 
held  by  the  enemy,  on  the  other.  He  built  a  bridge  under 
fire  and  forced  a  crossing ;  on  the  14th  May  he  was  at  Haxall's 
Landing.  Now  he  did  not  know  where  either  Lee's  army  or  the 
Union  army  was.  On  the  17th  he  started  back  to  look  for  the 
latter.  He  marched  by  way  of  White  House,  where  he  had 
to  build  a  bridge,  and  on  the  24th  rejoined  the  army  near 
Chesterfield.  He  "had  passed  entirely  around  Lee's  army; 
encountered  his  cavalry  in  four  engagements,  and  defeated 
them  in  all ;  recaptured  four  hundred  Union  prisoners,  and 
killed  and  captured  many  of  the  enemy;  destroyed  and  used 
many  supplies  and  munitions  of  war;  destroyed  miles  of  rail- 

*Grant 

fRodenbough  in  B.  &  L. 


492  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

road  and  telegraph,  (and  freed  us  from  annoyance  by  the  cav 
alry  of  the  enemy  for  more  than  two  weeks."*    ;  >  .3 

(259)  By  noon  on  the  9th  of  May  Burnside's  corps 
[Ninth]  had  come  up  from  Aldrich's,  and  was  on  the  Freder- 
icksburg  Road  with  the  leading  division  [Wilcox]  south  of 
the  Ny  River.  Ferrero's  division  [negroes]  was  left  with  the 
train. 

No  attack  was  made  by  either  side  on  the  9th.  "The  Fifth 
and  Sixth  Corps  [Warren  and  Sedgwick]  readjusted  their 
lines,  made  ^more  intrenchments,  strengthened  those  already 
made,  and  put  artillery  into  position.  The  skirmishers  and 
sharpshooters  were  very  active  on  both  sides,  and  in  the  morn 
ing  General  Sedgw'ick  was  killed  close  to  the  intrenchments 
at  the  right  of  his  corps  ...  at  the  point  where  the  forks 
of  the  road  in  Alsop's  field  unite."f  General  Wright  then  took 
command  of  the  Sixth  Corps.  The  Federal  skirmishers  of 
the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  were  pushed  forward  again  on 
the  morning  of  the  10th,  with  a  view  to  developing  the  posi 
tion  of  the  Confederate  line. 

The  Confederates  occupied  a  nearly  continuous  line  of 
intrenchments  running  in  a  broken  and  irregular  trace  from 
the  Po,  at  a  point  600  yards  above  the  crossing  of  the  Shady 
Grove  Church  Road,  to  a  point  a  half-mile  south  of  the  Fred- 
ericksburg  Road.  Without  considering  the  angles  and  small 
curves  the  line  was  more  than  four  miles  long.  It  inclosed 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  on  the  northwest,  north,, and  east, 
and  covered  the  roads  southward  to  Richmond.  The  center 
of  the  line  formed  a  sort  of  loop  a  half-mile  across  from  east 
to  west,  having  a  sharp  apex  upon  "a  high  open  point"  a  quar 
ter  of  a  mile  north,  slightly  east,  of  the  McCool  house.  The 
left  of  the  line,  about  a  third  of  a  mile,  rested  on  comparatively 
high  open  ground,  between  two  small  branches  of  the  Po.  In 
front  of  this  part,  at  no  point  more  than  two  hundred  yards 
distant,  was  a  narrow  belt  of  dense  cedars. 

The  intrenchments  crossed  the  Brock  Road  at  the  fork 
whose  branches  led  to  Spottsylvania  and  the  Old  Court  House. 
From  this  fork  the  earthworks  ran  through  woods  in  a  north 
easterly  direction  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  Harrison's  open 
ground ;  thence  north  and  northeast  for  half  a  mile,  partly  in 
open  and  partly  in  wooded  ground ;  thence  easterly  on  the  outer 
edge  of  a  wood  for  nearly  four  hundred  yards  to  the  high, 


*Grant. 
•{•Humphreys. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       493 

cleared  point  mentioned  before ;  there  the  line  turned  south 
east,  and  ran  "six  or  seven  hundred  yards,"  with  the  woods 
about  the  McCool  house  behind  it,  and  "fairly  open  ground  in 
front" ;  then  it  turned  southward  and  continued  a  half-mile 
with  broken  and  wooded  ground  in  front  of  it,  and  a  mile  in 
open  ground. 

Anderson's  [Longstreet's]  corps,  with  Field's  divisions  on 
the  left  and  Kershaw's  on  the  right,  held  the  trenches  from 
the  Po  to  the  reentrant  angle  about  west  of  the  Harrison 
house.  Ewell's  corps  held  the  intrenchment  from  Anderson's 
right,  around  the  loop  or  "salient,"  to  a  point  nearly  a  mile 
southeast  of  the  McCool  house.  Hill's  corps,  except  Mahone's 
[Anderson's]  division,  occupied  the  trenches  to  the  right  of 
EwelPs.  Mahone's  division  formed  to  the 'left  of  Field,  over 
looking  the  Po.*  Gordon's  [Early's]  division  of  Ewell's  corps, 
in  reserve,  dug  a  trench  nearly  across  the  loop  from  east  to 
west  a  quarter  of  a  mile  south  of  the  McCool  house.  Artil 
lery  was  placed  at  the  most  suitable  points  along  the  line  of 
the  intrenchments.  "Where  there  was  wood  in  front  of  them 
it  was  slashed,  and  where  the  ground  was  open"  abatis  was 
made. 

On  the  Union  side,  on  the  evening  of  the  9th  of  May,  Han 
cock's  corps  [Second],  which  had  come  up  from  Todd's  Tav 
ern,  occupied  the  right  of  the  line  in  an  intrenchment  over 
looking  the  Po;  Warren's  corps  [Fifth]  was  next,  intrenched 
in  front  of  Anderson.  The  left  of  Warren's  trench  was  at 
the  fork  of  the  road  in  Alsop's  field.  Wright's  corps  [Sixth], 
with  its  right  at  this  fork,  was  intrenched  along  a  brook  in  a 
northerly  direction.  Burnside  [Ninth]  was  still  near  the  Ny 
River  on  the  Fredericksburg  Road.  On  coming  up  on  the  9th, 
Burnside  had  encountered  a  small  force  of  Confederate  cav 
alry  dismounted,  which  he  mistook  for  infantry ;  this  led  Gen 
eral  Grant  to  believe  that  Lee's  whole  army  was  about  to  move 
on  the  Union  base  at  Fredericksburg,  and  he  ordered  Hancock 
to  cross  the  Po  and  reconnoiter  Lee's  left  by  recrossing  the 
Po  at  the  bridge  on  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road,  and  turn 
ing  the  Confederate  line. 

(260)  By  9  p.  m.  Hancock  had  crossed  three  of  his  divi 
sions  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Po.  His  other  division  [Mott], 
which  had  come  up  late  from  Todd's  Tavern,  had  been  sent 
to  the  left  of  Wright's  corps  [Sixth].  Hancock  had  three 


*Alexander. 


494  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

bridges  built  across  the  Po  during  the  night,  to  secure  his 
retreat,  and  "pushed  forward  toward  the  Blockhouse*  bridge; 
but  ...  it  was  impracticable  to  keep  the  skirmish  line  mov 
ing  through  the  dense  woods  in  the  darkness,"f  and  Hancock 
found  himself  compelled  to  wait  for  daylight  before  trying  to 
cross  the  bridge.  The  river  was  unfordable.  On  examining 
the  bridge  by  daylight  on  the  10th  Hancock  found  it  strongly 
defended  by  Confederate  infantry  and  artillery  behind  earth 
works.  These  troops  were  part  of  Mahone's  division.  Han 
cock  concluded  not  to  attempt  to  carry  the  bridge,  but  had 
Brooke's  brigade  cross  a  mile  lower  down  to  reconnoiter  the 
position  of  the  Confederate  left.  About  ten  o'clock,  however. 
Hancock  received  an  order  to  leave  one  division  to  threaten 
the  enemy's  left,  and  to  take  his  other  two  divisions  to  War 
ren's  position.  There  he  was  to  command  these  two  divisions 
and  the  corps  of  Warren  and  Wright  in  a  general  attack  that 
was  to  be  made  all  along  the  line  at  five  o'clock. 

He  left  Barlow's  division  on  the  south  side  of  the  Po.  The 
division  was  exposed  to  the  artillery  fire  from  the  Confederate 
left,  and  in  the  afternoon  was  attacked  by  Heth's  division  of 
Hill's  Corps,  which  Lee  had  dispatched  to  oppose  Hancock's 
movement.  (261)  After  desperate  fighting  in  which  the 
losses  were  heavy  on  each  side,  Barlow  withdrew  his  division 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river.  The  Confederates  then  pro 
longed  their  intrenchments  a  mile  upon  the  high  ground  west 
of  the  bridge,  thus  covering  the  approach  by  the  Shady  Grove 
Church  Road. 

Preliminary  to  the.  general  attack,  which  was  to  take  place 
at  5  p.  m.,  Warren  and  Wright  had  been  skirmishing  more  or 
less  in  their  front  during  the  day,  with  the  view  of  determin 
ing  the  enemy's  position  in  the  dense  woods.  Before  Hancock 
reached  Warren's  position  Warren  had  reported  "the  oppor 
tunity  for  immediate  attack  to  be  so  favorable  that  he  was 
ordered  to  attack  at  once"f  without  waiting  for  Hancock  and 
the  appointed  hour.  Wright  with  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  Mott's 
division  of  Hancock's  corps,  were  ordered  to  join  in  the 
assault.  Gibbon's  division  of  Hancock's  corps,  also,  arrived  in 
time  to  take  part  in  this  assault  with  Warren's  line.  The  ad 
vance  to  the  attack  was  made  about  four  o'clock.  In  front  of 


This  was  a  log  house  near  the  bridge  of  Shady  Grove  Road,  called 
the  Blockhouse  on  account  of  its  peculiar  form.     Alexander. 
fHumphreys. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       495 

the  right  of  Warren's  line  was  the  narrow  dense  thicket  of 
dead  cedars  already  mentioned — the  most  difficult  kind  of 
thicket  to  go  through.  On  emerging  from  the  cedars  into 
the  open  space  immediately  in  front  of  the  Confederate 
trenches,  Warren's  ranks,  under  heavy  cannon  and  musketry 
fire,  were  badly  disordered.  Yet  the  troops  "went  forward, 
some  to  the  abatis,  some  to  the  crest  of  the  parapet,  but  were 
all  driven  back  with  heavy  loss."* 

Farther  to  the  left  Upton  with  his  own  brigade  and  four 
other  regiments  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  to  assault  what  ap 
peared  to  be  the  weakest  part  of  the  Confederate  line — the 
face  of  the  salient  west  of  the  McCool  house.  This  face  was 
exposed  to  enfilade  fire  from  Union  batteries,  and  a  large  force 
could  approach  it  within  200  yards  without  being  seen.  The 
trench  here,  however,  was  in  open  ground,  with  abatis  in  front 
of  it,  and  traverses  at  intervals  to  protect  it  from  enfilade  fire ; 
and  a  hundred  yards  back  of  it  was  a  second  trench,  partly 
dug,  occupied  by  a  line  of  troops.  Two  hundred  yards  in 
front  of  it  was  the  edge  of  a  pine  wood.  Upton  formed  his 
assaulting  column  in  four  lines  inside  this  wood,  while  bat 
teries  were  shelling  the  point  of  attack.  Mott's  division  [Sec 
ond  Corps]  was  to  cooperate  from  the  direction  of  the  Brown 
house.  Upton's  column  came  out  of  the  pines  and  charged 
with  a  hurrah  at  6.10  p.  m.  "Under  a  terrible  front  and  flank 
fire,  it  gained  the  parapet,  had  a  hand-to-hand,  desperate  strug 
gle,  which  lasted  but  a  few  seconds,  and  .  .  .  poured  over 
the  works,  capturing  a  large  number  of  prisoners."* 

Gordon's  Confederate  division,  which  had  been  in  reserve, 
hurried  to  the  breach  in  the  line,  but  was  unable  to  stop  Up 
ton's  victorious  troops;  they  spread  to  right  and  left,  and  car 
ried  the  second  Confederate  line  in  rear.  But  Mott's  division 
had  failed  to  come  up  to  Upton's  support.  It  had  formed  in  the 
open,  and  was  driven  back  by  heavy  artillery  fire.f  Hancock 
was  now  on  the  ground .  with  Birney's  division.  To  relieve 
Upton,  Grant  ordered  the  assault  to  be  renewed  by  Hancock's 
troops  and  those  of  Warren  and  Wright.  This  assault  failed, 
and  Upton  withdrew  his  men  from  the  Confederate  lines 
under  cover  of  darkness.  On  the  extreme  left  Burnside,  "with 
but  little  fighting  and  almost  without  loss,"  had  got  up  to 
within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House, 

^Humphreys. 
fAlexander. 


496  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  there  intrenched.*  This  left  a  wide  gap  between  his  corps 
and  the  right  wing  of  the  Union  army,  and  before  morning 
of  the  llth  he  was  ordered  to  return  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
Ny  and  connect  with  Mott's  division  at  the  Brown  farm. 

"On  the  llth  there  was  no  battle  and  but  little  firing;  none 
except  by  Mott,  who  made  a  reconnaissance  to  ascertain  if 
there  was  a  weak  point  in  the  enemy's  line."*  This  recon 
naissance  discovered  the  salient  at  the  center  of  the  Confed 
erate  line.  Grant  resolved  to  assault  this  salient,  and  ordered 
Hancock  to  move  three  of  the  divisions  of  his  corps  during  the 
night  to  connect  with  the  right  of  Burnside's  corps,  which 
had  returned  to  its  trenches  in  front  of  the  Court  House. 
These  two  corps  were  ordered  to  make  "a  vigorous  attack 
against  the  enemy  at  four  o'clock  a.  m."  on  the  12th.  Warren 
and  Wright  were  ordered  to  "hold  their  corps  as  close  to  the 
enemy  as  possible." 

On  the  Confederate  side  Heth  had  moved  the  bulk  of  his 
division  back  from  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road  to  its  posi 
tion  in  front  of  the  Court  House.  (262)  Hancock  marched 
his  divisions  to  the  Brown  house,  and  formed  them  for  attack 
in  the  open  space,  400  yards  wide,  to  the  south  of  it.  He 
had  1200  yards  of  ground  to  traverse  before  reaching  the 
Confederate  breastworks.  Barlow's  division  was  to  lead  the 
assault  with  the  brigades  of  Miles  and  Brooke  abreast  in  the 
first  line.  The  four  brigades  of  this  division  formed  in  mass, 
with  a  depth  of  ten  double  ranks — twenty  lines  of  muskets. 
On  account  of  a  heavy  fog,  Hancock  postponed  the  attack  until 
4.35  a.  m.  The  Confederate  artillery  had  been  withdrawn  from 
this  part  of  the  line  during  the  night,  and  was  not  in  place  to 
fire  into  Hancock's  dense  column.  The  charge  was  received 
with  a  sharp  musketry  fire  only,  and  was  not  stopped.  The 
Federals  carried  the  trenches  in  a  rush,  capturing  the  Con 
federate  division  commander  [Johnson],  one  brigade-com 
mander  [Steuart],  4,000  prisoners,  thirty  colors,  and  twenty 
guns.  The  guns  were  caught  in  column  hastening  back  to 
their  position. f  The  victors  pushed  on  over  the  intrench- 
ments,  through  the  woods,  until  they  were  checked  by  a  line 
within  the  intrenchments,  south  of  the  McCool  house.  Rein 
forcements  had  been  hurried  to  this  quarter  from  the  left  of 
the  Confederate  position,  and  Hancock's  men  were  pushed 

*Grant. 
fAlexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       497 

back  to  the  outside  of  the  parapets ;  but  they  could  be  driven 
no  farther. 

Writing  of  this  charge,  General  Alexander  says :  "Had  they 
[the  Confederate  guns]  been  in  their  places,  it  is  quite  certain 
that  the  charge  would  not  have  been  successful.  Nowhere  else 
in  the  whole  history  of  the  war  was  such  a  target,  so  large, 
so  dense,  so  vulnerable,  ever  presented  to  so  large  a  force  of 
artillery.  Ranks  had  already  been  lost  in  the  crowd  and 
officers  could  neither  show  example  or  exercise  authority.  A 
few  discharges  would  have  made  of  it  a  mob  which  could  not 
have  been  rallied." 

At  6  a.  m.  Meade  received  report  of  Hancock's  success,  but 
he  was  informed  that  the  Confederates  were  trying  to  take  the 
offensive  in  that  quarter.  He,  therefore,  ordered  Wright  to 
move  his  corps  at  once  to  Hancock's  assistance  and  to  attack  on 
Hancock's  right.  Wright  directed  his  assault  against  the 
"west  angle."  The  struggle  lasted  all  day  long,  and  till  after 
midnight,  and  was  one  of  the  fiercest  and  bloodiest  of  the 
whole  war.  Its  memory  has  been  perpetuated  in  the  name  of 
Bloody  Angle,  which  the  narrow  space  has  borne  since  that 
day.  Five  other  Federal  brigades  came  to  this  point,  making 
twenty-four  brigades  that  engaged  in  assaulting  a  few 
hundred  yards  of  the  intrenchments.  Union  soldiers  stood 
from  twenty  to  forty  deep  outside  the  parapet;  the  bodies  of 
the  slain  were  shot  to  pieces  and  mangled  beyond  recognition; 
the  whole  forest  thereabouts  was  killed  by  the  fire,  and  one 
tree*  twenty-two  inches  in  diameter  was  literally  cut  down  by 

bullets.f 

On  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union  line  Warren  had  opened 
with  all  his  artillery  and  pushed  his  skirmishers  forward 
against  Anderson's  intrenchment  early  in  the  morning.  "At 
9.15  a.  m.  he  was  ordered  to  attack  at  once  at  all  hazards, 
with  his  whole  force  if  necessary."  He  did  so  and  was  re 
pulsed.  He  was  then  ordered  to  move  his  whole  corps  to 
Wright's  assistance  at  the  salient,  with  the  hope  of  carrying 
the  intrenchment  at  that  point.  This  order  was  revoked  before 
the  corps  reached  its  position  and  "the  project  of  further 
assault  was  given  up."$  In  his  Memoirs  General  Grant  charges 
Warren  with  being  slow  in  his  movement. 


*The  stump  of  this  tree  is  still  preserved  in  the  National  Museum  at 
Washington. 
fAlexander. 
^Humphreys. 


498  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

On  the  Union  left  Burnside  "accomplished  but  little  of 
positive  nature,"  says  General  Grant,  "but  negatively  a  great 
deal.  He  kept  Lee  from  reinforcing  his  center  from  that 
quarter."  Burnside  moved  to  the  attack  at  4  a.  m.,  as  directed, 
and  struck  the  part  of  the  Confederate  line  held  by  Hill's 
corps  and  the  right  of  Ewell's ;  he  connected  on  the  right  with 
Hancock's  corps  and  was  more  or  less  engaged  till  late  in 
the  day;  but  the  righting  in  this  quarter  was  noway  as  severe 
as  it  was  at  the  salient  where  Hancock  and  Wright  were 
engaged.  Burnside  intrenched  his  position.  The  Union  losses 
in  killed  and  wounded  on  this  12th  of  May  were  about  6,000 ; 
the  Confederate  losses  between  4,000  and  5,000.*  Hancock's 
corps  on  the  Union  side  lost  the  greatest  number,  some  2,500. 

(263)  During  the  night  Lee  withdrew  his  troops  from  the 
loop  around  the  McCool  house  to  ground  south  of  the  Harris 
house,  where  they  intrenched  a  new  and  shorter  line.  This 
was  the  line  the  Confederates  should  have  intrenched  at  the 
start.  The  salient — the  entire  loop  about  the  McCool  house — 
was  another  example,  like  Sickles's  salient  at  the  Peach  Or 
chard,  at  Gettysburg,  of  a  weak  position  taken  solely  for  the 
sake  of  high  ground.  In  the  hasty  extension  of  the  Confed 
erate  line  on  the  afternoon  of  May  8,  "Ewell,  to  keep  on  high 
ground,  had  changed  direction  and  gone  a  mile  north."f  This 
caused  the  salient,  because  he  had  to  bend  his  line  southward 
again  to  cover  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  to  avoid  being 
taken  in  reverse  by  Burnside's  column.  Ewell  ought  to  have 
disregarded  the  high  ground  and  continued  the  intrenchment 
eastward  along  the  trace  adopted  on  the  night  of  the  12th. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  direction  of  a  line  is  often 
of  more  consequence  than  its  elevation. 

There  was  no  battle  on  the  13th.  Grant  ordered  another 
general  assault  to  be  made  at  4  a.  m.,  the  14th.  Warren  was 
directed  to  march  his  corps  during  the  night  of  the  13th  by 
the  rear  of  the  Second  and  Ninth,  and  connect  it  with  Burn- 
side's  left,  and  to  attack  by  the  Fredericksburg  Road.  The 
Sixth  Corps  was  to  follow  Warren's  and  to  attack  by  the  next 
road  south  of  the  Fredericksburg  Road.  It  rained  during  the 
night,  and  the  way  was  so  dark  and  muddy  that  the  head  of 
Warren's  corps  did  not  reach  its  position  before  6  a.  m. ;  then 
the  whole  day  was  spent  in  putting  the  tired,  straggling  men 
into  position,  and  the  assault  had  to  be  given  up.  If  the  assault 


^Humphreys. 
fAlexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       499 

could  have  been  made  as  planned  it  would  have  proved  serious 
for  the  Confederates,  because  they  did  not  suspect  the  move 
ment,  and  the  intrenchments  on  their  right  flank  did  not  then 
extend  much  beyond  the  Court  House.* 

The  Sixth  Corps  massed  out  of  sight  near  the  Anderson 
Mill  on  the  north  side  of  the  Ny.  Upton's  brigade  crossed 
the  stream  and  occupied  a  commanding  position  covering  the 
crossings;  but  it  was  attacked  by  Chambliss's  cavalry  brigade 
and  Mahone's  infantry,  and  driven  away.  (264)  The  posi 
tion  was  later  retaken  by  the  Federals,  and  the  Sixth  Corps 
crossed  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Ny  and  intrenched.  Early 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th  Hancock's  corps,  except  Birney's 
division,  was  moved  round  to  the  Fredericksburg  Road,  near 
the  Ny.  Birney's  division  was  left  to  cover  Burnside's  right. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Union  right  was  not  discovered  by 
the  Confederates  until  the  afternoon  of  the  14th.  Thereupon 
Anderson  moved  his  line  forward  and  occupied  the  intrench 
ments  abandoned  by  Warren's  corps.  On  the  night  of  the 
14th  Anderson's  corps  was  transferred  over  to  the  right  of 
Hill's;  it  prolonged  the  Confederate  intrenchments  to  the  Po, 
covering  the  Richmond  Road  and  the  bridge  over  the  Po. 

There  was  little  righting  on  the  15th,  16th,  or  17th.  During 
those  days  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  advanced  their  intrench 
ments.  The  left  of  the  Union  works  did  not  follow  those  of 
the  Confederates  to  the  Po,  but  was  shorter  and  bent  back 
eastward.  Grant's  purpose  was  to  hold  this  part  of  his  line 
with  a  reduced  force,  while  he  assembled  a  strong  column  to 
make  another  effort  against  Lee's  new  line  south  of  the  Bloody 
Angle.  He  hoped  to  find  that  Lee  had  weakened  this  part  of 
his  line  by  withdrawing  troops  from  it  to  prolong  his  line  to 
the  right.*  Accordingly  Hancock  and  Wright  marched  their 
corps  during  the  night  of  the  17th  to  the  intrenchments  they 
had  captured  on  the  12th.  From  this  position  they  assaulted 
the  Confederates  at  daybreak  on  the  18th  in  their  new  breast 
works  south  of  the  Harrison  house.  The  Confederates  were 
on  the  lookout,  and  their  works  were  very  strong.  They  re 
ceived  the  charge  with  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery,  supported  by 
infantry,  which  completely  swept  the  ground  in  front,  and  they 
repulsed 'the  assault.  Burnside's  corps  attacked  at  the  same 
time  on  the  left  of  Hancock  and  Wright,  and  was  also  repulsed. 
Warren's  corps  cooperated  with  artillery. 

^Alexander. 


500  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

(265)  Wright's  corps  returned  to  its  place  on  the  left  of 
Warren's;  Hancock's  took  post  near  the  Anderson  house  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Ny.  During  the  night  of  the  18th  Burn- 
side's  corps  was  moved  to  the  left  of  the  Sixth.  The  Fifth 
corps  now  became  the  right  of  the  Union  line,  and  its  intrench- 
ments  reached  across  the  Ny  River,  above  the  crossing  of  the 
Fredericksburg  Road.  This  road  was  the  Union  army's  main 
line  of  communication  with  its  base  at  Aquia  Creek. 

Grant  now  gave  up  all  further  hope  of  carrying  the  Con 
federate  works  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  prepared 
to  make  another  movement  by  his  left  flank.  Lee  anticipated 
this  movement,  and  on  the  19th  ordered  Ewell  to  make  a  dem 
onstration  in  his  front  to  see  if  the  enemy  had  gone.  As  the 
Federals  in  his  front  were  strongly  intrenched,  Ewell  got  leave 
to  move  round  their  right  toward  the  Fredericksburg  Road, 
which  he  thought  he  could  do  with  less  loss.  He  encountered 
the  extreme  right  of  Warren's  corps.  Other  troops  of  the 
Fifth  Corps  and  of  the  Second  were  hurried  to  this  point,  and 
a  Federal  regiment,  on  its  way  from  Fredericksburg  to  join 
the  army,  took  part  in  the  action.  The  upshot  was,  Ewell 
was  defeated  with  a  loss  of  900  men,  and  driven  back.  But 
he  found  out  that  the  Federal  army  had  not  yet  gone.  Han 
cock's  corps  had,  however,  actually  been  under  orders  to  start 
southward  on  the  afternoon  of  the  19th,  but  this  encounter 
with  Ewell  led  to  its  being  held  back  until  the  night  of  the 
20th.* 

In  the  battles  around  Spottsylvania  Court  House  the  Union 
losses  numbered  2,725  killed  and  13,416  wounded;  the  Con 
federate  losses  cannot  be  stated,  but  they  were  probably  much 
smaller  than  these. 

Grant  now  hoped  that,  by  starting  a  single  corps  off  one  or 
two  marches  ahead  of  the  main  army,  he  might  tempt  Lee  to 
move  the  bulk  of  his  forces  against  this  corps;  then  he  hoped 
to  get  a  chance  to  strike  the  Confederates  with  his  main  army 
in  open  country  before  they  should  have  time  to  intrench. 
(258)  It  was  with  this  object  that  Hancock  was  ordered  to 
march  on  the  19th.  Hancock  got  away  on  the  night  of  the 
20th  and  marched  to  Guiney's  Station ;  thence  he  was  to  go 
southward  toward  Hanover  Court  House. f 

*Humphreys. 

fin  the  Official  Atlas  all  the  maps  taken  from  reports  of  Union  com 
manders  show  Guiney's  Station  to  have  been  about  ten  miles  almost 
due  east  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       501  N 

Sheridan  with  the  bulk  of  the  Union  cavalry  was  still  absent 
upon  his  raid,  but  all  the  horsemen  that  could  be  got  together 
went  with  Hancock  under  Torbert.  The  Confederate  cavalry, 
now  commanded  by  Wade  Hampton,  observed  and  hindered 
the  Union  movement. 

Lee  was  no  longer  strong  enough  to  make  any  offensive 
movement;  all  he  could  now  hope  to  do  was  to  keep  his 
army  between  Grant  and  Richmond.  On  learning,  therefore, 
through  his  signal  stations  and  cavalry  patrols,  about  noon  on 
the  21st,  that  the  head  of  Hancock's  column  had  reached  the 
railway  near  Guiney's  Station,  he  started  Ewell's  corps  at 
once  for  Hanover  Junction.  He  supposed  Hancock's  march 
simply  meant  another  turning  movement  aimed  at  his  com 
munications  with  Richmond.*  At  10  a.  m.  on  the  21st  War 
ren's  corps  took  the  same  route  that  Hancock's  had  taken; 
later  Burnside's,  followed  by  Wright's,  took  up  the  march. 
Lee  now  moved  his  whole  army  to  the  neighborhood  of  Han 
over  Junction,  and  put  it  into  position  on  the  south  side  of  the 
North  Anna  River,  covering  Richmond  and  the  Virginia  Cen 
tral  Railway.  (266)  The  Confederate  position  here  was  a 
peculiar  one ;  it  was  convex,  or  rather  angular,  with  the  center 
or  apex  of  the  angle  resting  on  the  convex  side  of  a  bend  in 
the  river. 

Moving  southward  from  Guiney's  Station,  the  Union  army 
arrived  in  front  of  this  position  on  the  23rd  and  24th  of  May. 
\Varren's  [Fifth]  and  Wright's  [Sixth]  corps  crossed  above 
Ox  Ford  and  Hancock's  crossed  at  Chesterfield  Bridge.  Only 
one  of  Burnside's  divisions  got  across.  The  river  thus  split 
the  Union  army  into  three  pieces  and  would  have  had  to  be 
crossed  twice  before  one  wing  of  the  army  could  have  rein 
forced  the  other.  Both  armies  intrenched.  There  was  some 
fighting  on  the  23rd  and  24th,  but  Grant  decided  that  the  Con 
federate  position  was  too  strong  to  assault;  he  resolved,  there 
fore,  to  continue  the  movement  by  his  left  flank. 

(258)  Accordingly  the  army  was  again  set  in  motion  im 
mediately  after  dark  on  the  26th  of  May.  Its  objective  was 
Hanover  Town,  near  which  it  expected  to  cross  the  Pamunkey 
River.  Sheridan's  cavalry,  which  had  now  rejoined  the  army, 
preceded  the  infantry  columns,  and  cleared  the  way.  At  Haw's 
Shop  it  defeated  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  Wade  Hamp 
ton  in  a  fierce  combat,  which  lasted  a  whole  day.* 


*Alexander. 


502  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  topography  now  was  wholly  different  from  that  of  the 
Wilderness.  After  leaving  Spottsylvania  Court  House  the 
armies  found  themselves  in  a  rich  farming  country,  and  the 
farther  south  and  east  they  marched  the  broader  and  deeper 
they  found  the  streams,  the  flatter,  lower,  and  more  marshy  the 
country.  On  the  30th  of  May  the  Union  army  again  encoun 
tered  Lee's  forces  blocking  its  way  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Totopotomoy,  a  small  branch  of  the  Pamunkey.  The  Con 
federates  were  so  strongly  intrenched  that  Grant  decided  not 
to  assault. 

(267)  The  hostile  lines  then  shifted  toward  the  southeast, 
and  Cold  Harbor  became  the  central  point  of  a  great  battle. 
General  W.  F.  Smith  had  joined  Grant  with  about  10,000  men 
of  the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth  Corps  from  Butler's  army;*  and 
General  Lee  had  received  about  14,000  reinforcements,  con 
sisting  of  two  brigades  brought  by  Breckinridge  from  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  where  he  had  lately  defeated  Sigel;  Pick- 
ett's  division;  and  Hoke's  division,  which  had  come  over  from 
Drewry's  Bluff. f  Grant  assaulted  Lee's  strongly  intrenched 
position  on  the  3rd  of  June,  and,  in  one  hour,  lost  nearly 
6,000  men  killed  and  wounded.  "At  half-after  one  o'clock  the 
assault  was  suspended,  and  corps-commanders  were  directed 
to  intrench  the  positions  they  held,  and  make  reconnaissances 
with  a  view  to  moving  against  the  enemy's  works  by  regular 
approaches. "J  Cold  Harbor  was  within  six  miles  of  the  outer 
works  around  Richmond,  and  the  right  of  Lee's  line  on  the 
Chickahominy  was  only  three  miles  from  those  works.  An 
other  movement  by  the  left  flank  would  not  have  brought 
Grant  any  nearer  Richmond ;  but  could  he  have  broken  Lee's 
center  at  Cold  Harbor,  and  thrown  the  Confederate  army  back 
upon  the  Chickahominy,  he  might  have  destroyed  or  cap 
tured  it. 

Grant's  army  remained  in  position  in  front  of  Lee's  until 
the  night  of  the  12th  of  June,  and  a  more  trying  experience 
has  seldom  fallen  to  the  lot  of  soldiers  than  that  of  the  soldiers 
in  these  two  armies  during  this  time.  The  fire  of  the  sharp 
shooters  on  both  sides  was  terrible  and  incessant,  and  the 
country  was  so  flat  that  no  man  dared  rise  during  the  daylight 
from  his  cramped  position  in  the  shallow  trenches;  by  day 
the  heat  of  the  sun  was  terrific  and  at  night  the  mosquitoes 


*B.  &  L. 

fAlexander. 

^Humphreys. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       503 

and  insects  were  torture;  the  stench  of  the  dead  bodies  of 
men  and  animals  was  sickening;  cooking  could  scarcely  be 
done  at  all;  bathing  was  not  thought  of,  and  the  water  for 
drink  was  foul;  the  lines  were  in  the  midst  of  marshes,  and 
malarial  fever  and  other  sickness  increased  with  each  day.* 
On  the  night  of  the  12th  Grant  withdrew  his  army  to  cross 
the  James  River. 

The  Union  losses  from  June  1  to  June  12  numbered  1,905 
killed  and  10,570  wounded;  the  Confederate  losses  have  not 
been  determined,  but  they  were  much  smaller.  It  has  often 
been  stated  that  Grant's  losses  in  this  bloody  campaign  of 
"continuous  hammering"  exceeded  the  whole  number  of  men 
in  Lee's  army.  This  is  somewhat  an  exaggeration.  General 
Long,  Lee's  biographer,  says  Grant's  "losses  aggregated  the 
enormous  total  of  60,000  men — a  greater  number  than  the 
whole  of  Lee's  army  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign;  Lee's 
losses,  on  the  contrary,  were  not  more  than  20,000."  No  part 
of  this  statement  is  quite  accurate.  According  to  the  statistical 
table  given  in  Battles  and  Leaders,  Grant's  losses  from  the 
5th  of  May,  the  first  day  of  the  Wilderness,  to  the  12th  of 
June,  were  7,620  killed,  38,342  wounded,  8,967  missing;  a 
total  of  54,929.  Lee  began  the  campaign  with  an  army  of 
61,953  men,  and  received  before  the  end  of  it  14,400  reinforce 
ments;  Grant  began  it  with  105,145  men;  up  to  the  1st  of  June 
he  had  lost  42,192 ;  and  on  that  day  he  had  an  army  of  113,875. 
As  it  had  not  been  four  weeks  since  the  first  battle  (May  5), 
it  is  not  probable  that  many  of  the  wounded  had  returned  to 
duty.  If  we  suppose  that  5,000  of  them  were  included  in  the 
113,875  present  on  the  1st  of  June,  we  find  that  Grant  had 
received  45,922  reinforcements. 

COMMENTS. 

(258)  The  main  result  of  Grant's  operations  from  the  Rapi- 
dan  to  the  James  was  to  wear  out  Lee's  army,  to  a  greater 
or  less  degree,  by  the  policy  of  "continuous  hammering" ;  but 
Grant's  own  army  had  suffered  nearly  three  times  as  great  a 
loss  in  men  as  Lee's,  and  it  is  claimed  that  after  the  desperate 
assault  at  Cold  Harbor,  in  which  the  Federal  loss  was  very 
great  and  the  Confederate  loss  comparatively  small,  the  morale 


*Alexander. 


504  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  the  Confederate  soldiers  was  left  in  a  better  state  than  that 
of  the  Union  soldiers. 

Grant's  successive  strategic  turning  movements  had  all 
failed  to  reach  Lee's  communications — to  get  between  Lee's 
army  and  Richmond.  In  the  first  one  Lee  had  taken  the  offen 
sive  and  attacked  the  Union  army  in  flank  in  the  Wilderness. 
In  each  one  thereafter  Grant  had  found  Lee's  army  intrenched 
across  his  road;  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House;  at  the  North 
Anna ;  at  the  Totopotomoy ;  at  Cold  Harbor.  True,  with  each 
movement  the  Union  army  got  nearer  to  Richmond;  but  that 
was  not  the  object  of  the  campaign.  The  destruction  of  Lee's 
army  was  the  end  sought.  At  the  outset  of  the  operations 
General  Grant  had  said  to  General  Meade,  in  his  letter  of 
instructions :  "Lee's  army  will  be  your  objective  point.  Wher 
ever  Lee  goes,  there  you  will  go  also."*  If  Grant's  purpose 
had  been  merely  to  place  his  army  at  a  point  of  the  James 
River  near  Richmond,  he  would  have  transferred  it  thither  by 
water. 

Yet  Grant's  campaign  was  not  a  failure.  His  army  had 
kept  on  advancing  and  fighting;  that  was  much  in  itself.  It 
was  what  the  Union  army  had  not  done  in  Virginia  under  any 
other  commander.  This  result  was  not  due  to  a  greater  dis 
parity  of  numbers  in  the  two  hostile  armies  than  had  existed 
in  previous  campaigns.  In  the  Chancellorsville  campaign,  for 
instance,  Hooker  had  130,000  men,  and  Lee  only  60,000;  in 
this  campaign,  as  we  have  seen,  Grant  had  105,000  in  round 
numbers,  and  Lee  62,000,  at  the  start.  The  Confederate  com 
mander  was  the  same,  and  he  had  lost  none  of  his  cunning. 
The  success  of  the  campaign,  therefore,  for  the  Union  arms, 
as  compared  with  that  of  the  other  campaigns  in  Virginia, 
must  be  accredited  to  qualities  of  the  Union  commander-in- 
chief,  General  Grant. 

Yet,  if  the  student  looks  for  anything  brilliant  of  strategy 
or  tactics  in  General  Grant's  operations  in  this  campaign, 
he  will  look  in  vain.  Lee  anticipated  every  movement  the 
Union  army  made,  and  took  prompt  steps  to  meet  it.  Every 
battle  appeared  to  be  fought  without  any  real  plan  of  attack. 
At  Spottsylvania,  first  one  part  of  the  Confederate  intrench- 
ments  would  be  assaulted,  then  another;  and  the  corps  were 
kept  marching  from  one  side  to  another.  Hancock's  corps 
marched  round  the  Confederate  position  two  or  three  times. 

*Gr  ant's  Memoirs. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       505 

Orders  were  frequently  issued  and  countermanded ;  corps  were 
sent  to  places  only  to  be  at  once  recalled.  It  all  only  testifies 
to  Grant's  tenacity  of  purpose ;  he  would  not  give  up  and  quit 
while  there  was  another  thing  left  to  try;  while  there  was 
another  chance  left  of  succeeding.  He  never  lost  his  head,  and 
he  appeared  never  to  know  when  he  was  getting  the  worst  of 
it.  The  tenor  of  all  his  telegrams  and  letters  during  the  cam 
paign  was  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  was  suffering  more  than 
his  own  army. 

The  campaign  on  the  Union  side  had  several  distinctive 
features.  They  were:  first,  the  several  flank,  or  more  cor 
rectly,  turning  movements ;  second,  the  changing  of  the  base 
of  supplies  as  the  army  progressed.  The  base  was  at  first 
on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railway ;  then  at  Aquia  Creek ; 
then  at  Port  Royal  on  the  Rappahannock ;  then  at  White 
House  on  the  Pamunkey;  then  it  was  shifted  to  the  James. 
Another  distinctive  feature  was  the  night-marching.  A  large 
part  of  the  marching  was  done  at  night ;  more  than  in  any 
previous  operations.  Lee's  corps,  also,  made  several  night- 
marches.  Both  armies  made  greater  use  of  field-works  than 
they  had  ever  made  before ;  as  soon  as  troops  halted  they  began 
digging  trenches,  or  piling  logs  for  breastworks. 

The  theater  of  operations  was,  by  reason  of  the  forests  and 
the  bad  roads,  so  ill-adapted  to  the  use  of  artillery,  that,  at 
Spottsylvania,  Grant  did  away  with  the  Reserve  Artillery  as 
a  separate  corps.  Some  of  the  batteries  were  attached  to  the 
different  army-corps;  the  guns  of  others  were  sent  back  to  the 
base,  and  the  caissons  were  put  to  use  in  the  wagon-trains. 

This  was  the  first  campaign  in  which  Lee  was  reduced  to 
a  strictly  strategic  defensive.  After  the  battle  of  the  Wilder 
ness  he  never  felt  strong  enough  to  assume  the  strategic  of 
fensive.  Tactically,  however,  parts  of  his  army  acted  on  the 
offensive  in  every  battle  up  to  and  including  Cold  Harbor; 
and,  as  will  be  seen 'in  the  next  lecture,  almost  up  to  the  day 
of  his  surrender  at  Appomattox. 

It  was  more  the  necessity  of  guarding  the  seat  of  the  Con 
federate  government  from  capture  than  the  preservation  of 
his  communications  with  Richmond  that  compelled  Lee  re 
peatedly  to  throw  his  army  across  Grant's  path.  Lee  was 
tied  to  Richmond,  just  as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been 
tied  to  Washington  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign.  What  would 
have  happened  if  Lee  had  not  blocked  the  Union  army  at 
Spottsylvania  or  at  the  North  Anna?  If  Lee  had  simply  stayed 


506  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

at  the  Wilderness  battle-field  or  at  Spottsylvania,  and  let  the 
Union  army  move  on  unmolested?  Would  Grant  have  dared 
to  march  on  to  Richmond  and  leave  Lee  in  his  rear?  The 
distance  from  the  Wilderness  Tavern  to  Washington,  and  the 
distance  from  the  Tavern  to  Richmond,  are  almost  exactly 
the  same ;  and  the  ease  with  which  Early  marched  his  raiding 
column  into  the  suburbs  of  Washington  a  few  weeks  later 
might,  at  first  glance,  lead  one  to  ask  why  Lee,  by  letting 
Grant  pass,  and  then  making  a  bold  dash  to  the  north,  might 
not  have  captured  that  city?  The  answer  to  the  question  is, 
simply,  that  Grant  would  not  have  gone  far.  Grant  only 
wanted  to  place  his  army  upon  the  road  to  Richmond  a  very 
little  in  rear  of  Lee's  army.  He  was  in  no  hurry  to  reach 
Richmond.  Lee's  army  was  his  main  objective.  If  Lee  had 
started  toward  Washington,  Grant  would  have  been  close  upon 
his  heels  as  well  as  firm  upon  his  communications. 

Suppose,  then,  that  Lee,  instead  of  stopping  to  fight  at 
Spottsylvania  Court  House,  had  retreated  straight  to  the  south 
or  to  the  southwest,  what  would  Grant  have  done?  Grant  had 
announced  that  Lee  should  be  followed  wherever  he  went; 
furthermore,  the  "attractive  power  of  the  defender"  is  a  recog 
nized  principle  of  strategy.  "As  long  as  the  defender's  army 
is  not  thoroughly  defeated,  it  exerts  an  entirely  natural  power 
of  attraction  on  the  assailant.  .  *:.  The  assailant  will  arrive 
at  whatever  place  the  defender  may  have  chosen  for  his  posi 
tion."*  He  will  follow  the  retreating  enemy.  In  such  a 
movement  as  this  Lee  would  have  had  the  south  of  Virginia 
and  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia  to  fall  back  upon."  He  might 
possibly  have  succeeded  in  transferring  his  army,  or  a  large 
part  of  it,  by  way  of  the  Danville  Railway,  to  unite  with  John 
ston  in  northern  Georgia.  The  distance,  however,  was  more 
than  six  hundred  miles;  and  if  Lee  had  adopted  this  course, 
he  would  have  given  up  all  the  territory  as  far  southward  as 
he  retreated,  with  scant  chance  of  ever  getting  it  back.  It 
would  have  been  an  acknowledgment  to  the  world  that  the 
Confederacy  was  on  its  last  legs.  It  was  the  last  resort. 

In  the  position  at  the  Wilderness  "Grant's  left  (Hancock) 
was  two  miles  nearer  Spottsylvania  than  was  Lee's  right 
(Longstreet)."f  The  initiative  rested  with  Grant;  Lee  could 
not  move  until  he  saw  what  Grant  was  going  to  do.  Yet  Lee's 
army,  or  part  of  it,  beat  Grant's  in  the  race  for  Spottsylvania, 


*Von  der  Goltz. 

fLecture  of  Captain  Ferguson,  U.   S.  Corps  of  Engineers. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       507 

and  blocked  the  way  to  that  place.  Grant  withdrew  his  army 
from  the  Wilderness  battle-field  by  corps  from  his  right — 
the  flank  farthest  from  Spottsylvania ;  while  Lee  started  with 
his  right  corps,  also — the  flank  nearest  Spottsylvania.  As 
the  line  was  five  miles  long,  it  gave  Warren's  corps  three 
miles  .farther  to  go  than  Longstreet's  [under  Anderson]  had. 
This  circumstance,  however,  is  not  the  reason  why  Anderson 
beat  Warren  to  the  Court  House,  for  Warren  started  at  8.30 
p.  m.  and  Anderson  did  not  start  till  11  p.  m.  The  reason  is 
found  in  the  effective  hindrance  made  by  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cav 
alry  to  Warren's  progress.  Warren,  also,  stopped  to  rest  his 
corps  from  3.30  a.  m.  to  6.00  a.  m.  on  the  8th.  When  one 
remembers  that  General  Lawton's  division  at  El  Caney  and 
San  Juan,  in  1898,  marched  most  of  the  time  from  about  2 
p.  m.,  June  30,  till  daylight  July  1 ;  fought  all  day  July  1 ;  and 
marched  nearly  all  that  night  and  until  noon  July  2,  one  can 
not  understand  why  Warren's  corps  had  to  rest  two  hours  and 
a  half,  at  such  a  time  of  emergency,  after  marching  only  seven 
hours. 

(256)  It  was  a  great  mistake  not  to  have  Sheridan's  cav 
alry  blocking  the  road  against  Anderson's  column.  If  the 
bulk  of  this  cavalry  had  pushed  out  to  Todd's  Tavern,  and 
on  the  Catharpin  Road  by  way  of  Corbin's  Bridge  to  the 
Shady  Grove  Church — Spottsylvania  road,  it  could  have 
stopped  or  delayed  Anderson's  column.  Of  course  it  would 
have  had  to  defeat  and  drive  away  Stuart's  cavalry,  which 
was  guarding  Corbin's  Bridge  and  the  cross-roads  on  the 
flank  of  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road.  We  have  seen  that 
Wilson's  division  had  actually  driven  back  Rosser's  brigade  and 
got  possession  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House  on  the  morning 
of  the  8th  of  May,  before  the  arrival  of  the  leading  division 
[Kershaw]  of  Anderson's  [Longstreet's]  corps.  If  Wilson 
had  pushed  on  to  the  Po,  not  two  miles  from  the  court  house, 
seized  the  bridge  at  the  Blockhouse  (on  the  Shady  Grove 
Church  Road),  and  resolutely  held  it  against  Kershaw's  divi 
sion,  Warren  would  quickly  have  brushed  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cav 
alry  out  of  his  way,  and  been  in  secure  possession  of  Spottsyl 
vania  Court  House  ahead  of  Lee's  army. 

(258)  At  Spottsylvania  Grant  had  to  decide  again  whether 
to  turn  the  right  or  the  left  of  Lee's  army.  Undoubtedly  he 
continued  to  move  by  his  own  left,  because  it  kept  him  nearer 
his  base  and  kept  his  communications  covered  better.  If,  how 
ever,  without  stopping  to  fight  a  serious  battle  at  Spottsyl- 


508  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

vania,  Grant  had  turned  Lee's  left  flank  and  moved  toward 
Richmond,  Lee  would  promptly  have  fallen  back  behind  the 
North  Anna.  This  would  have  taken  him  out  of  the  Wilder 
ness  into  the  open  country.  If  Grant  had  made  such  a  move 
ment  as  this,  on  the  9th  or  10th,  it  would  greatly  have  embar 
rassed  Lee's  army,  for  it  would  have  cut  this  army  off  from 
its  immediate  base  of  supplies,  which,  at  this  time,  was  Louisa 
Court  House,  thirty  miles  southwest  of  Spottsyl vania,  on  the 
Virginia  Central  Railway.  It  was  fortunate  for  Lee  that  Han 
cock  was  recalled  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Po  on  the  10th 
of  May.  If,  instead  of  recalling  Hancock,  Grant  had  sent 
Warren's  corps  to  reinforce  him,  Hancock  would  have  turned 
Lee's  left  and  cut  him  off  from  his  depot  at  Louisa.* 

In  the  movement  from  Spottsylvania  Hancock's  corps  was 
sent  to  Guiney's  Station  with  the  hope  of  alluring  Lee's  army 
after  it.  This  hope  was  not  realized;  Lee  sent  a  corps  [Ewell] 
at  first  to  guard  the  crossing  of  the  North  Anna  on  the  Rich 
mond  Road;  he  marched  the  rest  of  his  army  to  Hanover 
Junction  as  soon  as  he  was  satisfied  that  Grant's  whole  army 
had  moved.  Hancock  started  more  than  twelve  hours  ahead 
of  Ewell ;  if  he  had  taken  the  direct  road  to  Hanover  Junction 
he  would  have  arrived  there  several  hours  ahead  of  Ewell.  In 
fact  Hancock's  leading  division  [Barlow]  was  at  Milford  Sta 
tion,*  eight  or  ten  miles  south  of  Guiney's  and  only  half  as  far 
from  Hanover  Junction  as  was  Spottsylvania  Court  House, 
before  Lee  knew  that  the  Union  movement  had  begun.  True, 
Hancock's  men  had  marched  all  night;  but  if  they  had  pushed 
on,  after  resting  three  or  four  hours,  they  would  still  have 
beaten  Ewell  in  the  race  for  Hanover  Junction;  while  War 
ren's  and  the  other  two  Union  corps,  by  taking  the  direct  road, 
could  have  gotten  there  ahead  of  Lee's  other  two  corps.  In 
stead  of  marching  on  to  Hanover  Junction,  Hancock's  corps 
halted  and  intrenched,  in  expectation  of  an  attack  by  Lee's 
army. 

As  soon  as  General  Grant  learned  that  Lee  had  not  taken 
his  bait,  but  had  started  for  Hanover  Junction,  he  made  for  the 
same  place ;  but  he  had  learned  it  too  late ;  Lee  got  there  first. 
And  the  reason  of  it  was,  the  "eyes  and  ears"  of  Grant's  army 
were  out  of  place,  like  those  of  Lee's  army  in  the  Gettysburg 
campaign.  Grant  appears  to  have  been  satisfied  with  the  re 
sult  of  Sheridan's  raid;  yet  there  is  hardly  any  doubt  that,  if 
Sheridan's  squadrons  had  been  with  the  army  at  this  time, 

^Alexander. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE.       509 

they  would  have  rendered  more  effective  service  to  the  cam 
paign  than  they  rendered  by  their  long  and  hazardous  raid. 
They  would  not  only  have  warned  Grant  promptly  of  Lee's 
movement,  but,  by  throwing  themselves  in  front  of  Lee's 
columns  and  upon  their  flanks,  could  have  retarded  their 
march  to  Hanover  Junction.  In  summing  up  the  results  of 
Sheridan's  raid  the  only  thing  General  Grant  mentions,  which 
had  any  material  effect  upon  the  campaign,  was  that  it  "freed 
us  from  annoyance  by  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  for  more  than 
two  weeks."  But  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  back  in  its  proper 
place  now,  and  gave  Lee  timely  warning  of  Grant's  movement. 
General  Alexander  says  Sheridan's  raid  "had  made  no  im 
pression  on  the  campaign."  Let  it  go  down,  then,  as  another 
perilous  and  useless  expenditure  of  horse-flesh,  as  were  most 
of  the  other  cavalry'raids  of  the  Civil  War. 


LECTURE  XXIV. 
SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG. 

(268)  In  the  early  days  of  June,  1864,  after  the  battle  of 
Cold  Harbor,  the  military  situation  in  the  general  theater  of 
war  in  the  United  States  was  about  as  follows : 

The  main  Union  army,  under  General  Grant,  consisting  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Meade,  and  certain  attached  troops,  was  behind  its  earthworks 
in  front  of  Lee's  main  army  at  Cold  Harbor.  Butler  with  the 
Army  of  the  James,  now  only  about  10,000  infantry  and  4,600 
cavalry  (Smith  with  part  of  the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth  Corps 
being  with  Grant),  was  held  within  his  intrenchments  at  Ber 
muda  Hundred  .by  Beauregard  with  about  9,000  Confederates. 
General  Hunter,  who  had  succeeded  Sigel  in  command  of  the 
Union  forces  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  had  defeated  the 
Confederate  detachment  in  that  quarter  and  was  moving  to 
ward  Lynchburg.  Sherman,  in  Georgia,  was  gradually  forcing 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  back  upon  Atlanta. 

It  was  partly  with  a  view  to  prevent  Lee  from  sending  re 
inforcements  against  Hunter  that  Grant  suspended  the  attacks 
at  Cold  Harbor.  "To  aid  the  expedition  under  Hunter,"  Grant 
said  to  Meade,  "it  was  necessary  to  detain  all  the  army  then 
with  Lee  until  Hunter  got  well  on  his  way  to  Lynchburg.  This 
would  be  more  effectually  done  by  keeping  the  enemy  out 
of  the  intrenchments  of  Richmond  than  by  forcing  him  into 
them."*f  However  this  might  be,  Grant  began  a  movement 
within  a  fortnight  to  transfer  his  army  to  the  south  side  of 
the  James,  for  the  purpose  of  shutting  Lee's  army  up  within 
the  intrenchments  of  Richmond. 

(269)  Further,  to  make  the  investment  effective,  Sheridan 
was  started  westward  with  his  cavalry  on  the  5th  of  June, 
under  orders  to  break  up  the  Virginia  Central  and  the  Fred- 
ericksburg   Railways.      This   was   Sheridan's   Trevilian    Raid. 
Sheridan  was  also  to  form  a  junction  with  Hunter  at  Char- 
lottesville.     He  bore  orders  that  he  was  to  deliver  to  Hunter 
directing   that  -commander   to   join   the   main   army   with   his 

*  Humphreys. 

fFrom  this  it  appears  that  General  Grant  had  come  to  the  opinion 
held  by  Rosecrans,  when  Grant  was  urging  him  to  drive  Bragg  out  of 
East  Tennessee. 

510 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  511 

forces.  This  part  of  his  task  Sheridan  was  unable  to  carry 
out,  for  the  reason  that  he  found  Wade  Hampton's  cavalry, 
which  Lee  had  dispatched  to  oppose  him,  intrenched  across  his 
path  at  Trevilian  Station.  In  the  dismounted  combat  that 
took  place  here  in  a  dense  wood,  Hampton  was  defeated ;  but 
he  kept  his  force  in  front  of  Sheridan.  On  account  of  the 
scarcity  of  ammunition,  and  for  other  reasons,  Sheridan  de 
cided  to  turn  back.  He  reached  White  House  on  the  21st  of 
June  and  from  there  escorted  a  train  of  900  wagons  to  Charles 
City  Court  House.  His  right  flank-guard  [Gregg]  was  at 
tacked  on  the  way  by  Hampton  and  it  "retired  in  some  con 
fusion"  ;  but  none  of  the  wagons  were  captured.  Thus  ended 
another  useless  cavalry  raid. 

Meantime  another  famous  raid  was  in  progress.  On  ac 
count  of  bad  health  Ewell  had  surrendered  the  command  of 
his  old  corps  to  Early,  who  was  started,  on  the  13th  of  June, 
toward  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  attack  Hunter  in  rear. 
Hunter  retreated  across  the  mountains  into  West  Virginia,  and 
Early,  pursuant  to  his  orders  from  Lee,  pushed  on  down  the 
Shenandoah,  crossed  into  Maryland,  and,  meeting  very  feeble 
resistance,  arrived  at  the  end  of  Seventh  Street,  near"  the 
edge  of  Washington,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  llth  of  July. 
There  were  already  troops  enough  in  Washington  to  repel 
Early,  but  Wright,  who  had  been  hurried  up  from  Virginia 
with  two  divisions  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  arrived  at  the  Capital 
on  the  12th  of  July,  and  General  Emory  also  arrived  with  a 
part  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  from  New  Orleans.  Early  con 
cluded  not  to  attack  the  city,  and  retreated  by  way  of  Lees- 
burg  into  Virginia.  Wright  followed  him.  The  sequel  to  this 
raid  was  the  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  in  which 
Sheridan,  who  was  sent  to  the  Valley  to  command  the  Union 
forces,  succeeded  in  expelling  Early,  and  in  so  thoroughly 
devastating  that  granary  of  the  Confederacy  that  "a  crow,"  as 
Sheridan  expressed  it,  "would  have  had  to  carry  its  rations 
if  it  had  flown  across  the  valley." 

(268)  At  this  time,  June,  1864,  Richmond  was  defended 
on  the  north  side  of  the  James  by  a  line  of  works  extending 
from  the  river-bank  above,  around  to  Chapin's  Bluff,  about 
seven  miles  by  road  below  the  town.  Halleck  proposed  to 
Grant,  a  few  days  after 'the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  to  invest 
Richmond  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  "This  would  give 
greater  security  to  Washington" ;  but  it  would  never  have 
accomplished  the  fall  of  the  city  or  the  surrender  of  Lee's 


512'  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

army,  because  it  would  not  have  cut  off  the  lines  of  supply 
from  the  south  and  west.  These  lines  were  the  Richmond 
and  Danville,  the  Southside  or  Lynchburg,  and  the  Weldon 
Railways.  So  Grant  decided  to  operate  by  the  south  bank  of 
the  James. 

On  that  side  of  the  river  was,  first,  Beauregard's  line  of 
works,  stretching  from  nearly  opposite  Chapin's  Bluff  down 
to  the  Appomattox  River  above  Port  Walthall,  "bottling  up" 
Butler's  army  at  Bermuda  Hundred;  and  south  of  the  Ap 
pomattox  a  circle  of  strong  works  had  been  erected  as  early 
as  1862,  some  two  miles  outside  of  Petersburg.*  In  June, 
1864,  Petersburg  was  garrisoned  only  by  General  Wise  with 
his  brigade  of  Confederates  and  some  local  troops.  On  the 
9th  of  June  Butler  sent  a  force  of  3,000  infantry,  under  Gen 
eral  Gillmore,  and  1,500  cavalry,  under  General  Kautz,  to 
"capture  the  city  and  destroy  the  bridge  across  the  Appomat 
tox."*  Gillmore  claimed  that  the  noise  made  by  Kautz's 
cavalry  in  crossing  the  bridge  at  Port  Walthall  "could  be 
heard  for  miles,"  and  "put  the  enemy  on  his  guard" ;  conse 
quently  he  found  the  earthworks  so  strongly  manned  that  he 
decided  not  to  assault.  He  waited  four  or  five  hours  to  hear 
something  from  Kautz ;  then,  failing  to  receive  any  news  from 
him,  withdrew. 

Kautz,  on  his  part,  at  about  noon  made  three  formal  attacks 
on  the  intrenchments  across  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road,  and 
was  repulsed.  He  then  turned  these  intrenchments  and  ad 
vanced  close  to  the  water-works  at  the  southeastern  edge  of 
the  town.  Here  he  came  upon  infantry  and  artillery  behind 
an  earthwork  and  stockade,  and  withdrew.  He  was  followed 
by  Bearing's  Confederate  cavalry  brigade. 

Grant  now  prepared  to  cross  his  forces  ta  the  south  bank  of 
the  James.  His  object  was  to  capture  Petersburg,  then  to  turn 
Beauregard's  intrenchments  in  front  of  Butler  and  move  on 
Richmond.  The  capture  of  Petersburg  would  leave  Richmond 
with  no  unbroken  railway  entering  it  except  the  Danville  Rail 
way.  This  road  Grant  purposed  seizing  later,  thus  completely 
cutting  off  the  means  of  supply  of  Richmond  and  Lee's  army. 
The  latter,  however,  might  abandon  Richmond  and  retreat 
toward  Danville  or  Lynchburg  to  escape  investment. 

The  movement  to  the  James  and  the  passage  of  the  river 
were  carefully  planned  to  keep  Lee  in  ignorance  of  them  as 
long  as  practicable.  Wilson's  cavalry  division  was  to  cover 

*Humphreys. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  513 

the  front  and  right  flank  of  the  columns,  as  well  as  to  bring 
up  the  rear  and  guard  the  trains.  A  pontoon-train  was  to 
accompany  each  column.  The  withdrawal  of  the  main  body 
from  Cold  Harbor  began  immediately  after  nightfall  on  the 
12th  of  June.  A  part  of  Wilson's  cavalry  crossed  the  Chicka- 
hominy  by  a  pontoon-bridge  at  Long's  Bridge  an  hour  or  two 
after  midnight,  and  marched  to  Riddell's  Shop,  encountering 
Confederate  cavalry  on  the  way.  It  was  soon  relieved  by 
Warren's  corps  [Fifth],  and  moved  on  to  Charles  City,  clear 
ing  the  roads  for  the  other  columns.  Warren  had  crossed  the 
Chickahominy  by  two  pontoon-bridges  near  Bottom's  Bridge. 

(270)  Warren  intrenched  his  corps  east  of  Riddell's  Shop, 
covering  the  flank  of  the  movement  upon  the  roads  leading 
from  Richmond.  The  Second  Corps  [Hancock]  crossed  the 
Chickahominy  by  the  bridges  used  by  the  Fifth  Corps,  and 
hurried  on  to  Wilcox's  Landing.  The  Sixth  [Wright]  and 
Ninth  [Burnside]  crossed  at  Jones's  Bridge.*  By  noon  of  the 
14th  these  four  corps  were  assembled  at  Wilcox's  Landing, 
in  a  bend,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James.  The  Eighteenth 
Corps  [Smith]  marched  to  White  House,  and  from  there  re 
turned  to  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred  by  water. 

By  midnight  of  the  14th  the  Federal  engineers  had  com 
pleted  a  pontoon-bridge  more  than  2,000  feet  longf  across  the 
James,  and  by  midnight  of  the  16th  the  army  with  all  of  its 
artillery  and  trains  was  on  the  south  bank.  Wright's  corps 
[Sixth]  covered  the  passage  on  the  north  side,  and  was  the 
last  to  cross.  Wilson's  cavalry  had  remained  upon  the  right 
and  rear,  at  Malvern  Hill  and  White  Oak  Swamp,  until  it 
was  called  in  by  Wright  and  sent  over  the  bridge  just  ahead 
of  the  Sixth  Corps.  "The  navy  assisted  with  its  armored 
ships  and  gunboats  in  covering  the  passage  of  the  river,"$  and 
in  obstructing  it  by  sinking  several  vessels  above  the  point  of 
crossing. 

On  the.  morning  of  June  the  13th  Lee  discovered  that  the 
Union  army  had  withdrawn  from  his  front,  and  he  was  in 
formed  that  it  was  moving  on  Richmond  by  way  of  Long's 
Bridge.  He  naturally  supposed  that  Grant  was  marching  his 


^Alexander. 

fGeneral  Alexander  says  this  was  "the  greatest  bridge  the  world  has 
seen  since  the  days  of  Xerxes.  At  the  point  selected  the  river  was 
2,100  feet  wide,  90  feet  deep,  and  had  a  rise  and  fall  of  tide  of  4  feet, 
giving  very  strong  currents.  A  draw  was  necessary  for  the  passage 
of  vessels."  The  bridge  was  built  in  eight  hours. 

^Humphreys. 


514  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

army  to  a  position  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  opposite 
Butler's  army  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  in  order  that  the  two 
forces,  with  the  cooperation  of  the  navy,  might  act  conjointly 
against  Richmond.*  Promptly,  therefore,  Lee  moved  his  two 
corps,  Anderson's  [Longstreet's]  and  Hill's,  to  the  south  side 
of  the  Chickahominy,  and  placed  them  in  position  from  Mal- 
vern  Hill  to  White  Oak  Swamp,  covering  the  roads  to  Rich 
mond.  They  had  some  skirmishing  with  Wilson's  cavalry, 
which  withdrew  in  the  night  to  St.  Mary's  Church.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  14th  and  morning  of  the  15th  the  Union  cav 
alry  reconnoitered  the  Confederate  position.  This  cavalry  was 
mistaken  for  the  advance  of  Grant's  army,  which  strengthened 
Lee's  conviction  that  this  army  designed  to  attack  the  Con 
federate  capital  by  the  north  bank  of  the  James,  and  induced 
him  to  hold  his  own  army  on  that  bank ;  while  the  Union  army,  . 
unopposed,  was  making  its  passage  to  the  south  bank.  The 
strategy  of  General  Grant's  movement  completely  deceived 
Lee,  and  its  well-managed  execution  kept  him  under  delusion 
for  three  days,  the  15th,  16th,  and  17th  of  June.  During  those 
three  days  Lee  retained  Longstreet's  and  Hill's  corps  on  the 
north  side  of  the  James,  while  Grant  was  massing  his  troops 
against  the  feeble  garrison  of  Petersburg  on  the  south  side.* 

The  Eighteenth  Corps  [Smith]  reached  Bermuda  Hundred 
by  way  of  the  James  on  the  14th  June,  and  Smith  received 
orders  through  Butler  to  move  at  daylight  of  the  15th  against 
Petersburg.  Besides  his  own  corps,  some  10,000  men,  Smith 
was  to  be  accompanied  by  Kautz's  cavalry  division,  2,400 
troopers,  and  a  part  of  Hinks's  negro  division,  3,700  men. 
Hancock,  whose  corps  was  to  be  the  first  one  to  cross  at  Wil- 
cox's  Landing,  would  join  him  from  that  point.  Hancock's 
corps  did  not  await  the  completion  of  the  bridge,  but  was 
ferried  over  the  river  by  the  transports  during  the  night  of  the 
14th,  and  might  have  started  for  Petersburg  before  sunrise  on 
the  15th;  but  General  Grant,  who  had  arranged  the  operation 
with  Butler,  had  failed  to  inform  Meade  of  the  hour  when. 
Smith  was  to  start.  Meade,  therefore,  ordered  Hancock  to 
await  the  arrival  of  his  rations,  which  delayed  his  march  until 
after  ten  o'clock.  Meade,  moreover,  did  not  inform  Hancock 
that  Petersburg  was  to  be  assaulted;  he  only  directed  him  to 
take  up  a  certain  position  near  the  town,  and  Hancock's  maps 
were  so  defective  that  he  lost  much  time  in  looking  for  the 


*Alexander. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  515 

position.*  It  was  night  before  his  corps  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Petersburg.! 

Kautz  was  to  cross  the  Appomattox  by  a  pontoon-bridge  at 
Point  of  Rocks,  near  the  left  of  Butler's  line,  at  1  a.  m.  the 
15th,  and  threaten  the  Confederate  intrenchments  near  the 
Norfolk  and  Petersburg  Railway.  Hinks  was  to  follow  Kautz 
and  take  position  across  the  Jordan's  Point  road ;  the 
Eighteenth  Corps  was  to  form  on  Hinks's  right.  The  only 
Confederate  troops  that  Beauregard  had  in  the  Petersburg 
works  at  this  time,  besides  artillery,  were  Wise's  infantry  bri 
gade  of  1,200  men,  some  militia,  and  Hearing's  cavalry  bri 
gade—not  3,000  men  all  told. 

Smith's  command  got  away  from  the  bridge  over  the 
Appomattox  about  daybreak,  and  then  had  five  or  six 
miles  to  march.  Smith  soon  encountered  a  dismounted  cav 
alry  regiment  and  a  battery  that  Beauregard  had  sent  out 
to  retard  him.  He  drove  the  cavalry  back  and  captured  one 
of  the  guns,  but  was  delayed  three  hours.  This  delay  was 
important  to  Beauregard,  as  he  expected  Hoke's  Confederate 
division  to  arrive  from  Drewry's  Bluff  about  dark.f  Another 
mile  and  a  half  of  marching  brought  Smith's  command  to  the 
line  of  felled  timber  in  front  of  the  Confederate  works.  Beau- 
regard  had  this  space  so  well  covered  by  artillery  that  Smith's 
columns  could  not  move  within  sight  of  the  works,  and  their 
march  was  so  much  obstructed  by  the  woods  and  broken 
ground  beyond  that  they  did  not  finish  their  deployment 
before  1.30  p.  m.  The  rest  of  the  afternoon  Smith  spent  in 
making  a  cautious  but  careful  reconnaissance.  He  discovered 
only  a  few  signs  of  infantry ;  yet  concluded,  erroneously,  that 
so  much  artillery  must  be  supported  by  a  strong  force  of  infan 
try.  At  length  he  was  ready  for  his  artillery  to  open  the  at 
tack  ;  but  the  battery  horses  had  gone  to  water !  This  caused 
another  hour's  wait,  and  probably  saved  Petersburg  from  cap 
ture.  (271)  In  the  meanwhile  Kautz's  cavalry  had  been 
engaged  all  day  with  Bearing's,  aided  by  the  fire  of  a  few  guns 
in  a  redan,  outside  of  the  works  between  the  Norfolk  Railway 
and  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road.  Having  heard  no  sound  of 
battle  from  Smith,  Kautz  withdrew  about  6  p.  m.,  and  went 
into  bivouac.f 

At  about  7  p.  m.  Smith's  artillery  opened  a  concentrated 
fire  upon  a  salient  of  the  works,  Redans  Nos.  5  and  6,  but 

*  Humphreys. 
^Alexander. 


516  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

evoked  no  reply.  The  Confederate  gunners  were  holding  their 
fire  for  the  assaulting  columns,  which  they  expected  to  follow, 
soon.  But  no  columns  charged.  Smith  sent  forward  Hinks's 
negro  division  in  a  swarm  of  skirmishers,  which  "overran  the 
works  and  captured  the  guns  still  loaded  with  double  canister 
and  defended  by  only  a  skirmish  line  of  infantry."  The  divi 
sion  lost  507  men,  but  captured  four  guns  and  250  prisoners.* 
By  nine  o'clock  Smith's  command  had  captured  five  more 
redans  toward  the  left,  including  No.  11,  and  a  mile  and  a  half 
of  the  Confederate  intrenchments ;  and  had  learned,  too  late, 
that  the  works  had  l>een  defended  by  a  very  small  force  of 
infantry.f 

(270)  About  4  p.  m.  Smith  received  word  that  Hancock 
with  the  Second  Corps  was  marching  to  join  him  by  the  road 
from  Windmill  Point,  but  it  was  after  seven  o'clock  when  the 
head  of  Hancock's  corps  came  up.  Having  learned  that  the 
Confederates  were  also  receiving  reinforcements,  Smith  had, 
in  the  meantime,  ordered  a  suspension  of  the  assault.  He  asked 
Hancock,  upon  his  arrival,  to  relieve  his  forces,  which  Han 
cock  did  with  the  Second  Corps.  It  took  till  11  p.  m.  to  com 
plete  the  relief,  and  it  was  then  too  late  and  too  dark,  in  Han 
cock's  judgment,  to  renew  the  attack. 

When  the  Union  army  withdrew  from  Cold  Harbor  Beaure- 
gard  was  fearful  that  Petersburg  was  to  be  its  objective.  He, 
therefore,  asked  Lee  to  send  him  troops  enough  to  defend  the 
town.  As  Lee  believed  that  Richmond  was  the  point  to  be 
assailed,  he  would  not,  as  we  have  seen,  withdraw  Hill  and 
Anderson  from  the  north  side  of  the  James,  but  consented, 
on  the  14th,  for  Hoke's  division  to  return  to  Beauregard  from 
Drewry's  Bluff.  This  division  reached  Petersburg  on  the 
evening  of  the  15th,  and  was  placed  in  the  works  between 
Wise's  left  and  the  Appomattox.  That  night  Beauregard 
also  withdrew  Bushrod  Johnson's  division,  3,500  men,  from 
the  Bermuda  Hundred  line  and  put  it  into  the  Petersburg 
works.  This  left  only  about  1,000  Confederates  in  the  trenches 
at  Bermuda  Hundred.  Taking  advantage  of  this  condition, 
Terry  advanced  from  Butler's  line,  before  daylight  on  the  16th, 
and  captured  these  trenches.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  17th 
they  were  retaken  by  Pickett's  Confederate  division,  which  had 
been  hurried  over  from  the  north  side  of  the  James.  (272) 
By  early  morning  on  the  16th  Beauregard  had  some  14,000 


*Alexander. 
•{•Humphreys. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  517 

men  in  the  intrenchments  in  front  of  Petersburg.  The  left  of 
his  line  rested  on  the  Appomattox;  but  its  right  did  not  reach 
"the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road  by  half  a  mile/'*  and  from  there 
to  the  Appomattox,  west  of  the  town,  four  miles  and  a  half, 
the  works  were  unoccupied.  Bearing's  cavalry  was  outside  of 
them  watching  the  left  of  the  Federal  forces. 

The  other  Union  army-corps  were  pushed  forward  to  Peters 
burg  as  fast  as  they  got  across  the  James.  The  Ninth  came  up 
at  10  a.  m.  on  the  16th  and  took  its  place  on  the  left  of  the 
Second;  the  Fifth  reached  Petersburg  at  midnight  (16th).  The 
Sixth  was  the  last  to  come  up.  During  the  forenoon  of  the 
16th  Hancock,  who  was  now  in  command  on  the  ground,  made 
reconnaissances  in  his  front  and  captured  Redan  No.  12.  At 
6  p.  m.  he  attacked  with  his  own  corps  and  parts  of  the 
Eighteenth  and  the  Ninth,  and,  after  suffering  severely,  cap 
tured  Redans  Nos.  4,  13,  and  14,  and  the  connecting  trenches. 
The  Confederates  were  driven  back  all  along  the  line.  During 
the  night  they  made  several  attempts  to  recover  their  works, 
but  failed.  They  now  occupied  a  temporary  intrenchment  just 
west  of  Harrison  Creek,  behind  the  captured  redans. 

At  dawn  on  the  17th  Potter's  division  [Ninth  Corps]  moved 
forward  silently,  and  captured  the  works  in  front  of  the  Shand 
house,  catching  the  Confederates  there  asleep  on  their  arms. 
Potter  then  advanced,  but  was  soon  stopped  by  troops  of  the 
enemy  in  intrenchments  on  the  west  bank  of  Harrison  Creek. 
Later  in  the  day  Willcox's  division  [Ninth  Corps]  attacked 
these  intrenchments  &nd  was  repulsed ;  still  later  Ledlie's  divi 
sion  [Ninth  Corps],  after  losing  heavily,  carried  a  part  of 
them,  but  was  soon  afterwards  driven  back.  Ledlie's  attack 
had  been  supported  on  the  left  by  Crawford's  division  [Fifth 
Corps],  and  on  the  right  by  Barlow's  division  [Second  Corps]. 
In  the  course  of  the  day  the  divisions  of  Gibbon  and  Birney 
[Second  Corps]  had  gained  a  position  close  to  the  Confederate 
intrenchment  west  of  Harrison  Creek. 

Up  to  midnight  of  the  17th  the  Confederates  still  held  Redan 
No.  3  and  the  intrenchments  along  the  high  ground  west  of 
Harrison  Creek  to  the  Norfolk  Railway.  (273)  After  that 
hour  Beauregard  withdrew  his  line  to  high  ground  across  a 
ravine,  where  he  intrenched  a  shorter  and  stronger  posi 
tion. 

All  this  while  Beauregard  had  been  reporting  to   General 

"•Humphreys. 


518  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Lee  that  Grant's  army  was  massing  at  Petersburg,  and  he  had 
been  begging  for  reinforcements;  but  Lee  could  not  be  di 
vested  of  the  belief  that  Grant  was  advancing  against  Rich 
mond  by  the  north  bank  of  the  James.  As  late  as  the  after 
noon  of  the  17th  he  had  ordered  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  at  Malvern 
Hill,  to  find  out  what  had  become  of  Grant's  army.  Between 
1  and  3  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  three  of  Beaure- 
gard's  staff-officers  came  to  Lee's  headquarters  in  quick  suc 
cession,  bringing  evidence  of  Grant's  presence  in  front  of 
Petersburg  and  of  the  urgency  of  the  situation  there;  but  not 
until  the  General  had  heard  the  third  messenger's  report  was 
he  convinced.  He  then  issued  orders  for  A.  P.  Hill's  corps 
and  the  rest  of  Longstreet's  to  hasten  to  Petersburg.  A  part 
of  Longstreet's  corps  had  already  started.* 

On  the  17th  the  bulk  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  had  been 
withdrawn  from  the  Union  line  in  front  of  Petersburg  and 
returned  to  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  That  night  Meade 
issued  orders  for  a  general  assault  to  be  made  on  the  Con 
federate  works  at  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  18th. 
In  advancing  to  this  assault  the  Federals  found  that  the  Con 
federates  had  withdrawn  from  the  intrenchments  they  had 
held  so  strongly  the  day  before.  Meade  ordered  his  line  to 
press  forward  against  the  new  position  taken  up  by  Beaure- 
gard,  hoping  to  carry  it  before  the  Confederates  could  complete 
the  intrenchments,  and  before  the  arrival  of  their  reinforce 
ments.  Meade  had  learned  by  this  time  how  weak  a  garrison 
Beauregard  had,  and,  also,  that  Lee  was  ©n  the  way  to  rein 
force  it  with  the  rest  of  the  Confederate  army.  Two  divisions 
of  the  Confederate  reinforcements  arrived  before  the  first  as 
sault  was  made,  however,  and  Hill's  corps  had  begun  to  come 
up  before  the  assault  of  the  afternoon. 

The  Confederate  position  was  noway  definitely  known  in 
the  morning.  The  Second  Corps  (now  under  Birney,  Han 
cock's  Gettysburg  wound  having  broken  out  afresh)  came 
upon  it  at  the  Hare  house,  within  three  hundred  yards  of  the 
old  position;  but  on.  the  left  the  Ninth  Corps  and  the  Fifth 
had  to  advance  a  mile  before  they  came  upon  the  new  Con 
federate  works.  Within  the  space,  however,  the  Ninth  and 
Fifth  Corps  encountered  hostile  troops  in  the  cut  of  the 
Norfolk  Railroad,  and  had  a  hard  fight  to  dislodge  them.  The 
ground  was  very  unfavorable  for  attack,  being  cut  up  by 
ravines  and  ditches,  and  swept  by  the  Confederate  artillery 


•^Alexander. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  519 

and  musketry  fire.  Where  there  were  woods  they  had  been 
prepared  by  slashing.  The  result  was,  the  earlier  attacks  of 
the  day  were  not  made  at  the  same  time;  late  in  the  after 
noon  the  attacks  were  repeated  and  were  better  timed.  But 
none  of  them  succeeded  in  carrying  the  Confederate  works, 
and  the  losses  on  the  Union  side  were  very  heavy.  The  Union 
corps,  however,  gained  positions  very  close  to  the  Confederate 
works.  There  they  intrenched,  and  the  lines  of  hostile  works 
on  that  side  of  Petersburg  were  not  materially  changed  in 
position  during  the  rest  of  the  siege. 

(274)  Grant  now  concluded  that  the  Petersburg  works  could 
not  be  carried  by  assault,  and  resolved  to  invest  the  place  as 
far  as  practicable ;  to  intercept  the  railways   leading  into  it ; 
and  to  watch  for  opportunities  to  "attack  Lee's  army  in  unex 
pected  quarters  south,  or  even  north,  of  the  James."*    Accord 
ingly,  orders  were  issued  on  the  21st  of  June  for  extending  the 
Union  lines  all  the  way   round   to   the  Appomattox  west   of 
Petersburg.      Intrenchments    were    already    occupied    by    the 
Eighteenth,  Ninth,  and  Fifth  Corps  extending  from  the  Appo 
mattox  east  of  the  town,  to  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road.     The 
Second  and  Sixth  Corps  were  ordered  to  prolong  the  line  to 
the  left.     In  moving  to  their  positions  on  the  22d  these  two 
corps  lost  connection  in  the  woods  and  gave  A.   P.   Hill  an 
opportunity  to  push  in   between  them.      Lee   had   learned   of 
the  movement  ordered  by  Grant,  and  had  sent  Hill  out  with 
two  divisions  of  his  own  corps  and  Bushrod  Johnson's  division 
to  resist  it.     Suddenly  Hill  fell  upon  the  left  flank  and  rear  of 
the  Second  Corps  and  drove  it  back,  capturing  1,700  prisoners, 
four  guns,  and  several  colors. 

The  Sixth  Corps  formed  on  the  left  of  the  Second,  about 
parallel  to  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road,  and  a  mile  west  of  it, 
and  the  two  corps  intrenched.  In  the  general  positions  now 
occupied  the  two  hostile  armies  remained  for  several  weeks. 
On  the  22nd  of  June  the  Ninth  and  the  Fifth  Corps  were  en 
gaged  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day  with  the  Confederate 
troops  in  their  front.  The  firing  continued  during  the  night 
also. 

(275)  In  pursuance  of  the  plan  to  cut  off  the  railway  lines 
into    Richmond   and    Petersburg,    Wilson   with   his   own   and 
Kautz's  cavalry  division  was  started  on  the  22nd  of  June  for 
the  railway  junction  of  Burkesville   [Burke's  Station].     Wil 
son's  orders  were  to  break  up  the  Danville  and  the  Southside 

"Humphreys. 


520  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

[Lynchburg]  Railways,  keeping  up  his  work  of  destruction 
until  driven  away  by  superior  forces  of  the  enemy. 

This  raid  ended  at  Light  House  Point  on  the  2nd  of  July. 
In  these  ten  days  Wilson  marched  more  than  300  miles,  rest 
ing  nowherjs  longer  than  six  hours,  and  during  his  last  four 
days  not  longer  than  four  hours  at  any  place.  He  was  fol 
lowed  almost  from  the  start  by  W.  H.  F.  Lee;  intercepted  at 
Stony  Creek  by  Hampton;  met  at  Reams's  Station  by  Ma- 
hone's  infantry ;  .attacked  in  flank  by  Fitzhugh  Lee ;  and  chased 
as  far  as  the  Blackwater  Creek.  He  had  to  double  on  his 
tracks  and  dodge  in  a  very  lively  manner,  for  he  was  sur 
rounded  and  cut  off  by  superior  numbers.  He  fought  several 
combats,  and  lost  240  men  killed  and  wounded  and  1,261  miss 
ing;  he  abandoned  a  dozen  guns,  and  had  to  burn  his  wagon- 
train  to  save  it  from  capture.  As  the  Confederates  promptly 
repaired  the  sixty  miles  of  railway  destroyed  by  his  command, 
this  cavalry  raid,  like  most  of  the  rest,  must  be  accounted  a 
dismal  failure. 

(276)  We  have  seen  that  the  Sixth  Corps  [Wright],  was 
withdrawn  from  the  left  of  the  Union  line  and  dispatched  to 
Washington  at  the  time  of  Early's  raid.  This  happened  be 
tween  the  6th  and  the  10th  of  July;  the  left  was  then  drawn 
back  to  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road  and  refused. 

Toward  the  end  of  June  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pleasants  of 
the  48th  Pennsylvania  Regiment  conceived  a  scheme  for  plac 
ing  a  mine  under  the  Confederate  work  known  as  Elliott's 
Salient.  It  was  at  a  point  in  front  of  Burnside's  part  of  the 
Union  line,  where  the  hostile  intrenchments  were  very  close 
together.  The  scheme  was  approved  and  Burnside's  corps 
was  ordered  to  carry  it  out.  The  48th  Pennsylvania,  a  regi 
ment  of  miners,  was  .charged  with  preparing  the  mine.  Fer- 
rero's  negro  division  was  selected  to  lead  the  assault,  and 
drilled  specially  for  it;  but  the  selection  was  not  approved  by 
General  Grant.  The  assignment  was  then  made  by  lot,  and 
fell  to  Ledlie's  division. 

(268)  In  order  to  aid  the  project  by  causing  the  withdrawal 
of  some  of  the  Confederate  troops  from  the  Petersburg  in 
trenchments,  as  well  as  with  some  hope  of  capturing  Rich 
mond  by  a  sudden  dash,  and  with  the  further  purpose  of  de 
stroying  the  railways  north  of  Richmond,  the  Second  Corps 
[Hancock]  and  Sheridan's  cavalry  were  sent  upon  an  expedi 
tion  to  the  north  of  the  James.  They  crossed  the  river  at 
Deep  Bottom  on  the  27th  of  July,  but  were  met  at  Bailey's 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  521 

Creek  by  three  divisions  of  Confederate  infantry  and  two  of 
cavalry  sent  over  by  Lee  to  oppose  them.  To  this  extent  only 
the  enterprise  succeeded.  Some  fighting  took  place  and  the 
Union  loss  numbered  about  300  men.  On  the  night  of  the 
29th  (July)  the  force  recrossed  the  James  in  order  to  co 
operate  with  Burnside's  assault,  which  was  set  for  the  morn 
ing  of  the  30th. 

(276)  A  detailed  order  of  more  than  500  words  was  issued 
on  the  29th  for  this  assault.  The  Union  parapets  and  abatis 
were  to  be  prepared  beforehand  so  that  the  assaulting  columns 
could  move  out  promptly;  the  mine  was  to  be  sprung  at  3.30 
a.  m. ;  all  the  available  artillery  was  then  to  open  on  points  of 
the  Confederate  works  from  which  fire  could  sweep  the  ground 
to  be  crossed  in  the  assault.  The  Ninth  Corps  was  to  charge  the 
breach  made  by  the  mine,  followed  by  the  Eighteenth,  now 
commanded  by  Ord ;  the  Fifth  Corps  was  to  support  the  Ninth 
on  its  left ;  the  Second  was  to  support  it  on  its  right ;  Sheridan 
was  to  cover  the  left  of  the  army  with  his  cavalry  and  move 
against  the  enemy  by  the  roads  from  the  southward  and  west 
ward  of  Petersburg. 

A  defect  in  the  fuse  delayed  the  firing  of  the  mine  until  near 
5  a.  m.  It  was  then  set  off  and  the  artillery  opened  and  kept 
down  the  Confederate  fire  everywhere  but  at  two  points ;  Led- 
lie's  division  charged  and  piled  helter-skelter  into  the  crater  of 
the  mine — all  save  Ledlie,  who  had  stayed  in  a  bomb-proof 
back  in  the  Union  lines.  The  Confederates  had  gotten  wind 
of  the  projected  mine  and  had  driven  nearly  400  feet  of  coun 
ter-mines;  but  they  had  not  succeeded  in  determining  where 
the  Union  mine  was  situated.  General  Long  says  that,  at  the 
moment  of  the  explosion,  the  defenders  "lay  in  peaceful  slum 
ber,  unconscious  of  the  terrible  storm  that  was  about  to  burst 
upon  them."  Two  hundred  men  were  killed  by  the  explosion, 
and  a  gap  was  torn  in  the  Confederate  lines  150  feet  long, 
ninety-seven  feet  wide,  and  thirty  feet  deep.* 

It  was  a  half-hour  after  the  explosion  before  the  Confed 
erates  had  recovered  from  their  shock  enough  to  open  fire  with 
musketry  upon  the  crater,  and  fully  an  hour  before  their  artil 
lery  began  to  fire.  But  Ledlie's  men  "could  not  be  got  for 
ward"  ;f  they  stayed  in  the  crater.  Potter's  and  Willcox's  divi 
sions  advanced  on  the  right  and  left,  and  finally,  after  more 
than  an  hour,  Ferrero's  dvision  went  forward — save  Ferrero. 


^Alexander. 
•^Humphreys. 


522  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

who  stayed  with  Ledlie  in  the  bomb-proof.  Most  of  the 
negroes  crowded  through  the  crater,  but  some  of  them  were  led 
off  to  the  right  and  captured  200  prisoners  and  a  color.* 

Confederate  troops  were  hurried  to  the  endangered  point. 
Mahone's  division  was  the  first  to  arrive.  By  ten  o'clock  the 
Union  attack  had  been  suspended ;  at  half-past  twelve  the 
troops  were  ordered  to  withdraw  to  the  Union  lines;  the 
order  was  sent  to  the  brigade  commanders,-  "leaving  them  to 
consult  and  decide  upon  the  time  and  manner  of  the  with 
drawal."*  Before  they  had  arrived  at  a  decision  the  Confed 
erates  attacked  and  drove  them  back.  Although  the  distance 
to  the  Union  intrenchments  was  only  a  hundred  yards  the 
troops  lost  heavily  in  retiring.  The  Federal  loss  in  this  fiasco 
was  4,400  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  The  negro  division 
suffered  most,  losing  176  killed,  688  wounded,  and  801  miss 
ing. 

The  adventure  ought  to  have  succeeded ;  the  Confederates 
were  taken  by  surprise,  and  there  was  time,  before  they  recov 
ered,  for  the  assaulting  columns  to  make  a  lodgment  in  the 
works.  The  assault  "failed  from  mismanagement  and  misbe 
havior  on  the  part  of  several  of  the  chief  actors."*  General 
Burnside,  for  instance,  had  been  ordered  to  prepare  his  para 
pets  and  abatis  for  the  passage  of  the  troops,  but  had  neglected 
to  do  so;  this  delayed  the  advance. 

"Between  this  time  and  the  month  of  March,  1865,  several 
movements  of  portions  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  of 
the  Army  of  the  James  were  made  to  the  right  and  to  the  left, 
which  resulted  in  the  extension  of"  the  Union  "lines  of  in 
trenchments  in  both  directions,  and  caused  a  corresponding  ex 
tension  of  the  Confederate  intrenchments"  to  the  right,  "and 
the  occupation  in  stronger  force  of  their  intrenchments  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  James."*  Each  of  these  movements  had  at 
the  time  some  special  purpose  besides  extending  the  lines. 
Toward  the  end  of  July,  for  example,  Hancock  was  again  sent 
to  the  north  bank  of  the  James  in  command  of  his  own  corps 
[Second]  and  the  Tenth  Corps  [Birney].  The  special  object 
of  this  expedition  was  to  prevent  General  Lee  from  detaching 
troops  to  Early  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and,  of  course,  to 
capture  Richmond  if  a  chance  offered  to  do  so.  Hancock's 
command  remained  on  the  north  bank  of  the  James,  where  it 
was  engaged  in  several  minor  actions,  until  the  night  of  the 


*Humphreys. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  523 

20th  of  August,  when  it  was  recalled.  The  two  corps  resumed 
their  places  in  the  trenches  at  Petersburg  and  Bermuda  Hun 
dred  respectively. 

Warren  was  ordered  to  withdraw  his  corps  from  its  in- 
trenchments  on  the  morning  of  August  18  and  to  move  it  to  the 
Weldon  Railway ;  he  was  to  make  a  lodgment  upon  the  railway 
near  Dr.  Gurley's,  and  destroy  it  as  far  south  as  possible.  He 
was  also  to  consider  his  movement  a  reconnaissance  in  force, 
"and  take  advantage  of  any  weakness  the  enemy  might  be 
tray/'  In  ordering  this  movement  General  Grant  said,  "I 
want,  if  possible,  to  make  such  demonstrations  as  will  force 
Lee  to  withdraw  a  portion  of  his  troops  from  the  Valley,  so 
that  Sheridan  can  strike  a  blow  against  the  balance."* 

Spear's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  assigned  to  Warren,  who 
later  was  also  given  three  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps.  War 
ren  found  nothing  but  Bearing's  Confederate  cavalry  brigade 
guarding  the  railway.  He  formed  his  corps  along  the  railway 
from  near  the  Globe  Tavern  to  a  point  north  of  the  junction  of 
the  Vaughan  Road,  and  began  tearing  up  the  track.  In  front 
of  his  right  wing  was  a  large  field  of  corn  which  hid  everything 
from  view.  Bearing  had  reported  the  arrival  of  Warren,  and 
Heth  had  been  sent  out  on  the  Vaughan  Road  with  two  bri 
gades  to  attack  him.  Concealed  by  the  corn,  Heth  fell  sud 
denly  upon  Warren's  right  wing  and  drove  one  of  his  brigades 
back.  Later  Heth  was  driven  back. 

(277)  On  the  morning  of  the  19th  Warren  extended  his 
right  through  dense  woods  and  underbrush  to  connect  by  a 
skirmish  line  with  the  left  of  the  Ninth  Corps  in  the  trenches. 
In  the  course  of  the  day  the  divisions  of  this  corps  were  sent  to 
reinforce  him.  That  afternoon  A.  P.  Hill,  with  Heth's  com 
mand  of  the  day  before,  reinforced  by  three  brigades  under 
Mahone,  and  some  cavalry  and  artillery,  moved  out  to  the 
Vaughan  Road.  About  half-past  four  o'clock  Mahone,  ad 
vancing  in  the  thicket,  broke  through  the  skirmish  line  on 
Warren's  right,  and  took  the  right  of  his  main  line  in  flank 
and  rear,  rolling  a  part  of  it  up  in  confusion,  while  Heth  at 
tacked  it  in  front.  Warren  managed,  however,  to  rally  his 
troops,  and  put  two  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps  into  the  ac 
tion;  then  he  drove  Mahone's  troops  "back  in  great  confusion 
to  their  intrenchments."* 

Warren's    loss    in    this    engagement    was    382    killed    and 


^Humphreys. 


524  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

wounded,  and  2,518  missing.  Satisfied  that  the  Confederates 
would  renew  the  attack  the  next  day,  and  feeling  himself  at  a 
great  disadvantage  in  the  dense  unknown  brush,  Warren  with 
drew  to  open  ground  about  a  mile  farther  back  and  intrenched. 
On  the  21st  Hill  attacked  him  in  his  new  position,  but  was  re 
pulsed,  and  thereafter  no  more  attacks  were  made  upon  War 
ren.  The  line  of  Union  earthworks  was  then  extended  by  the 
Ninth  Corps  from  the  Jerusalem  Plank  Road  to  connect  with 
Warren's  intrenchments  on  the  Wreldon  Railway. 

On  the  22nd  of  August  Hancock  was  sent  with  two  of  his 
divisions  and  Gregg's  cavalry  division  to  break  up  the  Wei- 
don  Railway  south  of  Reams's  Station.  At  Reams's  Station, 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  25th,  he  was  attacked  by  A.  P.  Hill's 
corps  and  Hampton's  cavalry  in  an  old  intrenchment  made  by 
troops  that  had  gone  out  to  Wilson's  relief.  Hancock  was  de 
feated  and  driven  out  of  the  intrenchment.  Miles's  division 
and  Gregg's  cavalry  fought  well,  but  Gibbon's  division  "could 
neither  be  made  to  go  forward  nor  to  fire" ;  the  division  acted 
disgracefully.  Hancock  "attributed  the  bad  conduct  of  some 
of  his  troops  to  their  great  fatigue  and  to  their  heavy  losses 
during  the  campaign,  especially  in  officers.  Besides,  there 
were  several  regiments  largely  made  up  of  recruits  and  sub 
stitutes."* 

(270)  The  next  movement  was  made  on  the  north  side  of 
the  James  by  a  part  of  Butler's  army,  and  it  resulted  in  the  cap 
ture  of  Fort  Harrison  near  Chapin's  Bluff,  but  in  nothing 
more.  (278)  About  the  same  time  Warren  with  the  Fifth 
Corps,  and  the  Ninth  (now  commanded  by  Parkef),  and 
Gregg's  cavalry,  made  a  movement  to  the  left,  which  resulted 
in  extending  the  Union  line  considerably  in  that  direction. 
The  intrenchments  reached  a  point  about  a  mile  and  a  quar 
ter  northwest  of  Poplar  Springs  Church,  and  from  there 
turned  sharply  back  toward  the  Vaughan  Road.  The  Confed 
erate  line  of  intrenchments  in  this  quarter  covered  the  Boydton 
Plank  Road  and  the  Southside  Railway;  it  ran  nearly  parallel 
to  the  Boydton  Plank  Road  and  ended  near  the  Crow  farm  at 
Hatcher's  Run. 

On  the  27th  of  October  Grant  made  another  movement  to 
the  left  with  the  purpose  of  turning  Lee's  right  and  seizing 

*Humphreys. 

fFor  his  conduct  in  connection  with  the  mine  fiasco  Burnside  was 
censured  by  a  court  of  inquiry,  and  on  the  15th  of  April,  1865,  he  re 
signed  from  the  service. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  525 

the  Southside  Railway.  Hancock  was  to  move  by  the  Vaughan 
— Dabney's  Mill — Boydton — White  Oak — Claiborne  roads  to 
the  railway,  while  the  Fifth  Corps  [Warren]  and  Ninth 
[Parke]  were  to  attack  and  turn  the  Confederate  right.  Han 
cock  encountered  hostile  artillery  at  Burgess's  Mill,  and  War 
ren  and  Parke  became  engaged  in  the  woods  on  both  sides  of 
Hatcher's  Run.  Meade  halted  Hancock  to  wait  for  Warren 
to  come  up  and  cooperate  with  him;  but  before  Warren 
joined  him  A.  P.  Hill  attacked  him,  sending  Mahone's  divi 
sion  through  the  woods  to  assail  his  right  flank.  The  flank- 
attack  had  come  near  succeeding,  when  Egan's  division  [Sec 
ond  Corps]  fell  upon  Mahone's  flank  and  drove  it  back  into 
the  woods  in  confusion.  Hill's  attack,  however,  had  stopped 
the  movement.  The  Union  troops  were  withdrawn  the  next 
day  to  their  former  positions. 

In  support  of  this  movement  against  the  right  of  the  Con 
federate  line,  Butler  had  been  directed  to  make  a  demonstra 
tion  against  Richmond  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  with  a 
part  of  his  command.  He  sent  a  column  of  the  Tenth  Corps 
under  Terry,  and  a  column  of  the  Eighteenth  under  Weitzel, 
which  were  met  and  repulsed  by  troops  under  Longstreet,  who 
had  recovered  from  his  wound  and  was  now  in  command  of 
the  Confederate  forces  north  of  the  James. 

In  December  Warren  made  another  expedition  down  the 
Weldon  Railway,  and  destroyed  eighteen  to  twenty  miles  of 
the  track,  much  to  Lee's  distress.  It  made  the  haul  by  wagon- 
train  longer  for  the  Confederates,  and  increased  the  difficulty 
of  supply'  by  so  much. 

(279)  In  the  early  days  of  February,  1865,  another  in 
effectual  movement  was  made  to  turn  the  Confederate  right 
and  seize  the  Southside  Railway.  The  Union  force  was  com 
posed  of  the  Second  Corps  (now  commanded  by  Hum 
phreys*),  the  Fifth  [Warren],  and  Gregg's  cavalry.  This 
movement,  also,  was  met  by  the  right  of  Lee's  army  and  check 
mated.  The  Confederate  intrenchments  now  reached  across 
Hatcher's  Run  at  the  Crow  farm,  and  from  Burgess's  Mill 
along  White  Oak  Road,  and  west  of  the  Claiborne  Road.  The 
Union  line-  had  been  prolonged  to  Hatcher's  Run  near  the 
crossing  of  the  Vaughan  Road. 

The  only  other  enterprise  of  special  interest  before  the 
end  of  the  siege  of  Petersburg  was  Gordon's  assault  upon 


Toward  the  end  of  November  General   Hancock  had  been  ordered 
to  Washington  to  organize  a  new  First  Corps. 


526  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Fort  Stedman  in  the  Union  line.  Gordon  now  commanded 
Early's  corps,  which  had  rejoined,  and  he  held  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  works  south  of  the  James.  Fort  Stedman  was  only 
about  200  yards  in  front  of  his  line.  The  column  of  assault 
formed  before  dawn  on  March  25;  it  was  3,000  to  4,000 
strong,  and  was  to  be  supported  by  another  column.  It  moved 
forward  silently,  surprised  the  Union  garrison,  and  captured 
the  fort;  but  the' supporting  column  had  failed  to  advance. 
The  cannon  of  Fort  Haskell  opened  fire  upon  the  victors  in 
the  fort,  a  heavy  column  of  infantry  fell  upon  them,  "and 
something  like  the  scene  which  followed  the  mine  explosion 
ensued."*  Many  of  Gordon's  men  were  made  prisoners,  while 
many  others  were  killed  or  wounded. 

Grant's  repeated  movements  against  Lee's  right  and  left 
had  caused  an  extension  of  the  Confederate  works  to  a 
length  of  more  than  thirty-five  miles.  It  was  plain  to  Lee  that 
soon  or  late  Grant  would  break  this  weak  line  somewhere,  or 
would  succeed  in  turning  it  and  cutting  off  his  railways ;  and 
that  his  only  chance  then  would  lie  in  making  his  escape  with 
his  army,  and  uniting  it  with  Joseph  E.  Johnston's,  now  in 
North  Carolina.  This  was  exactly  what  Grant  meant  to  pre 
vent  if  possible. 

Sheridan  had  rejoined  Grant  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
and  the  Sixth  Corps  had  also  returned.  The  Tenth  and  Eight 
eenth  Corps  had  been  done  away  with;  while  the  white  troops 
of  Butler's  army  had  been  organized  into  the  Twenty-fourth 
Corps  under  Ord,  and  the  negro  troops  of  that  army  had  been 
organized  into  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps  under  Weitzel.'  At  this 
time  Grant  had  101,000  infantry,  14,700  cavalry,  and  9,000  ar 
tillery;  Lee  had  46,000  infantry,  6,000  cavalry,  and  5,000  ar 
tillery.  On  the  29th  of  March  Grant's  last  movement  to  the 
left  began.  Sheridan  with  the  cavalry  went  by  way  of  Din- 
widdie  Court  House  to  strike  the  Southside  and  the  Richmond 
and  Danville  Railways,  which  intersect  at  Burkesville  [Burke's 
Station].  (275)  The  rest  of  the  army,  or  the  bulk  of  it, 
moved  to  envelop  the  Confederate  right.  (279)  Perceiving 
this  movement,  Lee  hurried  as  large  a  force  as  he  could  spare 
to  his  trenches  along  the  White  Oak  Road,  where -A.  P.  Hill 
was  in  command.  Then,  as  in  every  case  before,  Hill,  instead 
of  waiting  to  be  attacked,  moved  out  himself,  and  attacked  the 
Union  left  flank,  while  it  was  entangled  in  the  swampy  forest. 

*Long. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  527 

He  rolled  up  Warren's  left  flank  at  first,  but  later  was  driven 
back  to  his  trenches. 

Sheridan  advanced  toward  Five  Forks,  but  was  met  on  the 
way  by  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry,  supported  by  Pickett's  and 
Johnson's  divisions  of  infantry,  which  had  been  sent  out  to 
stop  him.  He  was  driven  back  to  Dinwiddie  Court  House. 
Pickett  then  fell  back  to  Five  Forks,  where  he  made  the  mis 
take  of  halting  and  intrenching,  instead  of  returning  to  the 
right  of  the  main  army  four  miles  away.  Here  he  was  as 
saulted  and  defeated,  on  the  1st  of  April,  by  Sheridan,  who  had 
been  reinforced  by  Warren  with  the  Fifth  Corps. 

On  the  2nd  of  April  Grant  renewed  his  assault  on  the  Con 
federate  right,  breaking  the  line  and  forcing  it  back.  The 
Federals  then  took  possession  of  the  Southside  Railway,  and 
the  Confederates  fell  back  toward  Petersburg,  pursued  by  the 
Federals.  The  pursuit  continued  until  it  was  arrested  by  the 
guns  of  Fort  Gregg.*  Here  Longstreet's  corps,  which  had 
been  called  in  all  haste  from  before  Richmond,  came  into  the 


(280)  That  night  Lee's  army  quitted  Petersburg  and  Rich 
mond  and  started  westward.  Grant  followed  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Appomattox.  Lee  hurried  toward  the  Danville  Rail 
way,  hoping  to  reach  either  Danville  or  Lynchburg  ahead  of 
the  Union  army,  and  to  unite  with  Johnston.  He  had  ar 
ranged  to  ration  his  army  at  Amelia  Court  House,  but  by 
some  blunder  his  provisions  were  not  stopped  there  but  were 
carried  on  to  Richmond,  "and  nearly  twenty-four  hours  were 
lost  in  endeavoring  to  collect,  in  the  country,  subsistence  for 
men  and  horses.  "J  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry  and  the  Second 
and  Sixth  Corps  led  in  the  pursuit.  Both  he  and  -Lee  made 
for  Burkesville  [Burke's  Station]  ;  he  beat  in  the  race. 

Lee  now  had  Union  columns  upon  his  flank  and  behind  him, 
and  Sheridan's  cavalry  was  riding  far  ahead  to  cut  off  his  re 
treat.  A  running  fight  was  kept  up  all  the  way.  At  Sailor's 
Creek,  on  the  6th  of  April,  Ewell's  corps,  which  formed  the 
rear  guard,  "was  cut  off,  surrounded  and  captured,  some  8,000 
men."§  For  four  days  the  Confederates  had  nothing  to  eat 


*Long. 

fin  this  last  day's  battle  A.  P.  Hill  was  slain;  he  had  borne  a  con 
spicuous  part  in  every  battle  the  Army .  of  Northern  Virginia  had 
fought,  except  Spottsylvania,  where  he  was  sick. 

$Lee's   letter  to  Jefferson   Davis. 

§  Dodge  in  B.  &  L. 


528  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

but  a  little  parched  corn.  At  Farmville  Lee  crossed  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Appomattox,  setting  fire  to  the  bridges.  The 
Second  Corps  [Humphreys]  came  up  in  time  to  save  one  of 
the  bridges.  It  attacked  the  Confederate  rear  and  was  re 
pulsed  with  a  loss  of  600  men.  At  Appomattox  Court  House 
Sheridan's  cavalry  stood  across  Lee's  path,  and  the  end  was 
at  hand.  There  Lee  surrendered  to  Grant  on  the  9th  of 
April,  and  some  28,000  hungry  Confederates  were  fed  and 
paroled. 

In  these  closing  operations  the  Union  army  had  lost  about 
10,000  men. 

COMMENTS. 

(268)  Grant's  movement  from  Cold  Harbor  to  the  south 
bank  of  the  James  belongs  to  a  class  of  strategical  operations 
which  are  considered  among  the  most  hazardous  and  difficult 
in  warfare.  It  was  a  flank  movement  involving  the  crossing 
of  close  and  wooded  country  by  narrow  roads,  and  the  passage 
of  two  difficult  streams,  the  Chickahominy  and  the  James, 
over  which  pontoon-bridges  had  to  be  laid.  Grant  appreci 
ated  the  hazard  of  the  undertaking,  but  he  says,  "The  move 
had  to  be  made,  and  I  relied  upon  Lee's  not  seeing  my  danger 
as  I  saw  it."  There  was  really  nothing  else  left  for  him  to  do. 
Lee's  army  was  intrenched  squarely  in  front  of  him,  and  his 
repulse  at  Cold  Harbor  had  convinced  him  that  it  could  not  be 
destroyed  or  driven  away  by  frontal  attacks.  v 

Grant  had  fifty-odd  miles  to  go,  and  Lee  was  in  possession 
of  the  bridges  of  the  Chickahominy,  better  roads,  and  a  better 
knowledge  of  the  country  to  aid  him  in  attacking  the  right 
flank  of  Grant's  columns.  The  movement  was  skilfully  car 
ried  out.  The  army  was  "got  out  of  a  position  but  a  few 
hundred  yards  from  the  enemy  in  the  widest  place"*  and  Wil 
son's  cavalry  and  the  Fifth  Corps  [Warren]  covered  its  right 
flank  so  effectively  as  to  induce  Lee  to  believe  that  it  was  mak 
ing  for  Richmond  by  the  north  bank  of  the  James,  and  to  keep 
him  in  ignorance  or  uncertainty  as  to  its  whereabouts  and  des 
tination,  from  the  time  when  Grant  withdrew,  the  night  of  the 
12th  of  June,  till  the  morning  of  the  18th,  when  he  had  com 
pleted  the  difficult  movement  and  concentrated  his  army  in 
front  of  Petersburg.  When  one  considers  how  unexpected  the 

*Grant. 


.          SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  529 

movement  was  to  General  Lee,  and  how  long  he  was  kept  in 
doubt  and  uncertainty;  how  skilfully  all  the  difficulties  of  logis 
tics  were  surmounted,  and  how  quickly  the  movement  was 
made,  one  must  reckon  it,  in  conception  and  execution,  among 
the  very  finest  achievements  of  strategy  to  be  found  in  our 
military  history. 

Grant's  failure  to  defeat  Lee's  army,  or  to  capture  Rich 
mond  by  operations  on  the  north  side  of  the  James,  and  his 
ultimate  success  by  way  of  the  south  side,  justify  the  belief 
that  McClellan  might  have  succeeded  in  a  similar  manner  in 
1862  if  he  had  not  been  stopped  by  General  Halleck.  Mc 
Clellan  might,  in  fact,  have  made  quicker  work  of  it  than 
Grant  did,  for  he  might  have  captured  Petersburg  before  the 
town  was  completely  intren'ched  and  defended  by  Lee's  army. 
Petersburg  was  the  key  to  the  situation;  if  it  could  have  been 
taken  at  the  start,  while  Lee  still  kept  the  bulk  of  his  forces 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  watching  for  Grant  to  advance 
on  that  bank,  the  fall  of  Richmond  and  the  surrender  of  Lee's 
army  would  probably  have  taken  place  many  weeks  earlier. 
General  Grant  took  measures  for  its  early  capture;  it  was  for 
this  that  Smith  was  hurried  back  by  water  to  Bermuda  Hun 
dred  by  way  of  White  House,  and  Hancock  was  hurried  across 
the  James  before  the  pontoon-bridge  was  laid.  Hancock's 
march  from  the  James  to  Petersburg  was  delayed  to  await  the 
arrival  of  his  rations,  but  Smith  arrived  in  front  of  Petersburg 
in  time.  Grant  says,  "I  believed  then,  and  still  believe,  that 
Petersburg  could  have  been  easily  captured  at  that  time.  It 
only  had  about  2,500  men  in  the  defenses,  besides  some  irregu 
lar  troops,  consisting  of  citizens  and  employees  in  the  city  who 
took  up  arms  in  case  of  emergency."  In  fact,  Butler  ought  to 
have  captured  Petersburg  weeks  before — early  in  May.  His 
corps-commanders  urged  him  to  let  them  do  so,  while  the 
town  was  practically  defenseless ;  but  Butler  refused. 

Hancock's  waiting  for  his  rations  on  the  morning  of  June 
the  15th  was  the  fatal  mistake  in  the  Federal  operations  of  this 
campaign.  Those  six  hours  of  delay  probably  prolonged  the 
life  of  the  Confederacy  several  months.  Smith,  having  frit 
tered  away  the  whole  day,  opened  his  assault  upon  the  scantily 
manned  works  of  Petersburg  at  7  p.  m.  If  Hancock  had  been 
there  then  with  the  whole,  or  a  large  part,  of  the  Second 
Corps,  it  is  hard  to  doubt  that  the  works  would  have  been 
carried  and  Petersburg  taken  that  evening;  but  if  Hancock 
had  started  at  sunrise,  instead  of  after  ten  o'clock,  he  would 


530  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

have  reached  Petersburg  several  hours  before  7  p.  m.  Yet 
no  blame  attaches  to  General  Hancock's  splendid  record;  the 
fault  was'  mainly  General  Grant's.  He  forgot,  or  otherwise 
failed,  either  to  name  the  hour  for  Hancock's  start,  or  to  in 
form  Hancock,  or  his  immediate  commander,  Meade,  when 
Smith  was  going  to  start;  and  Meade  even  failed  to  inform 
Hancock  that  there  was  to  be  an  assault  upon  Petersburg  in 
which  Hancock  was  expected  to  take  part. 

General  Alexander  says  the  omission  was  due  to  "the  polit 
ical  necessity  of  placing  Butler  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
James."  Smith  belonged  to  that  army,  and  General  Grant,  it 
appears,  felt  himself  under  the  necessity  of  going  to  the  head 
quarters  of  Butler  to  consult  that  incompetent,  but  politically 
powerful,  soldier  about  the  project,  and  thus  failed  to  attend 
to  a  vital  detail  at  his  own  headquarters.  If  American  youth 
could  be  taught  in  their  schools  how  much  the  "political  neces 
sity,"  which  gave  important  commands  to  Butler  and  Banks 
and  Patterson  and  Sigel  and  Shields  and  scores  of  others,  cost 
our  country  in  treasure  and  time  and  blood,  it  is  impossible  to 
believe  that  such  a  necessity  would  be  tolerated  in  a  future  war. 
But  the  weakest  thread  in  the  fabric  of  the  American  boy's 
education  is  his  knowledge  of  the  real  truth  of  his  own  coun 
try's  military  history. 

In  the  long  siege  of  Petersburg  Lee  had  the  advantage  of 
interior  lines  of  operation  and  of  a  better  knowledge  of  the 
intricate  wooded  country  and  cross-roads.  He  made  such  good 
use  of  his  advantages  as  to  meet  every  movement  of  his  enemy 
to  right  or  left,  up  to  the  very  last,  with  a  force  large  enough 
to  stop  him.  Not  until  Lee's  line  of  works  had  stretched  to 
more  than  thirty-five  miles,  with  only  about  1,000  men  to  the 
mile  to  hold  it,  and  Sheridan's  large  force  of  cavalry  was 
threatening  his  only  line  of  supply  and  retreat,  was. Lee  driven 
back  from  his  outer  line  of  intrenchments,  and  forced  to  flee 
with  his  army. 

Looking  only  to  a  prolongation  of  the  war,  Lee  ought  to  have 
withdrawn  his  army  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg  many 
weeks  sooner — before  his  troops  had  become  thoroughly  dis 
heartened  by  hardships  and  the  conviction  that  they  would 
have  to  lay  down  their  arms  in  the  end.  From  a  purely  mili 
tary  point  of  view  he  ought  not  to  have  stopped  with  his  army 
at  all  in  Richmond  and  Petersburg  after  Grant  crossed  the 
James.  There  were  political  reasons:  the  Presidential  elec- 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  531 

tion  in  the  United  States  would  take  place  in  November,  1864, 
and  there  was  a  chance  of  the  election  of  a  Democratic  Presi 
dent;  a  large  proportion  of  the. people  of  the  United  States 
were  heartily  tired  of  the  war ;  the  draft-law  and  the  high  war- 
taxes  were  very  much  disliked;  gold  had  risen  to  285  in  July, 
and  the  expenses  of  the  war  amounted  to  nearly  $4,000,000  a 
day;  Grant's  campaign  as  far  southward  as  the  Chickahominy 
had  been  one  of  tactical  defeats  with  heavy  losses,  which  car 
ried  sorrow  home  to  every  part  of  the  land;  the  last  battle, 
Cold  Harbor,  was  the  costliest  repulse  the  Union  army  had 
suffered;  {he  morale  of  Lee's  army  was  as  good  as  ever.  If 
Grant's  army  could  be  held  at  bay  until  after  the  election,  and 
the  Confederate  government  could  be  guarded  securely  in  its 
capital  until  the  same  time,  there  was  hope  that  terms  of  peace 
could  be  arranged  with  the  United  States,  in  case  the  election 
should  go  against  Mr.  Lincoln.  Whereas,  if  Lee  should  aban 
don  Richmond  before  November,  the  Confederate  government 
would  have  to  withdraw,  and  Grant  would  take  the  Confed 
erate  capital,  which  for  four  years  had  been  the  goal  of  the 
Union  army.  This  would  not  only  make  the  reelection  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  all  the  more  certain,  but  would  lessen  the  chances  of 
making  terms  of  peace  even  if  Mr.  Lincoln  should  by  any 
possibility  be  beaten  in  the  election. 

General  Alexander  believes  that  the  South  had  a  better 
chance  of  obtaining  favorable  terms  of  peace  in  the  summer 
and  fall  of  1864  than  at  any  other  time  of  the  war.  Nothing 
else  at  that  time  would  have  strengthened  the  Administration 
with  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  assured  its  reelec 
tion  in  November  like  ending  the  war  upon  terms  creditable  to 
the  United  States.  The  people  of  the  North,  as,  also,  the  peo 
ple  of  the  South,  were  sick  and  tired  of  war;  they  longed  for 
peace.  If  President  Lincoln  could  have  proclaimed  peace  in 
the  land  at  any  time  before  the  day  of  the  election  his  return 
to  the  White  House  would  have  been  assured.  The  Confed 
erate  authorities  failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity, 
and  soon  events  occurred  in  other  theaters  that  lifted  the  de 
spondency  of  the  North  and  made  the  reelection  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war  certain.  These  events 
were  the  successes  of  Farragut  in  Mobile  Bay;  of  Sherman 
against  Hood  at  Atlanta,  toward  the  end  of  August;  and  the 
victories  of  Sheridan  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  September. 

After  the  reelection  of  Mr.  Lincoln  there  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  any  political  reason  for  Lee's  remaining  at  Rich- 


532  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

mond.  He  knew,  and  the  Confederate  president  must  have 
known,  that  he  should  have  to  retreat  sooner  or  later.  Early 
in  March  it  was  agreed  between  him  and  Mr.  Davis  "that  as 
soon  as  the  roads  would  admit  of  movement"*  Lee  should 
withdraw  his  army  from  the  Richmond  and  Petersburg  lines 
and  hasten  to  unite  it  with  Joseph  E.  Johnston's  army  in  North 
Carolina  for  a  combined  attack  on  Sherman.  Grant  was  on 
the  watch  for  such  a  movement,  and  says  in  his  Memoirs,  "One 
of  the  most  anxious  periods  of  my  experience  during  the  re 
bellion  was  the  last  few  weeks  before  Petersburg.  I  felt  that 
the  situation  of  the  Confederate  army  was  such  that  they  would 
try  to  make  an  escape  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment,  and 
I  was  afraid,  every  morning,  that  I  would  wake  from  my  sleep 
to  hear  that  Lee  had  gone,  and  that  nothing  was  left  but  a 
picket  line.'* 

It  is  hard  to  see  what  real  good  Lee  hoped  to  accomplish 
by  the  assault  of  Fort  Stedman.  Some  historians  have  stated 
that  the  object  of  the  assault  was  to  induce  Grant  to  transfer 
troops  from  his  left  to  his  right,  which  would  make  it  easier 
for  Lee  to  withdraw  his  army  and  begin  his  retreat.  Lee's 
biographer,  General  Long,  says :  "It  was  one  of  those  military 
movements  whose  purpose  is  left  in  abeyance,  the  future  policy 
of  the  commander  being  dependent  upon  his  measure  of  suc 
cess  and  the  change  in  the  situation  thereby  occasioned."  The 
fewer  movements  a  commander  makes  with  such  indefinite 
objects  as  General  Long's  language  implies,  the  better  it  is 
for  the  cause  he  serves.  Every  military  operation  should  have 
a  definite  object.  General  Alexander  says  simply  that  before 
undertaking  to  evacuate  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  and  march 
to  North  Carolina  to  join  Johnston,  "which  was  felt  to  be  an 
almost  impossible  task,"  Lee  "determined  upon  one  last  effort 
to  break  up  Grant  in  his  immediate  front,  in  spite  of  all  his 
fortifications."  If  this  was  Lee's  purpose,  with  such  odds 
against  him,  despair  had  warped  his  judgment. 

It  was  the  two  railways,  the  Southside  [Lynchburg]  and  the 
Danville,  but  particularly  the  Danville  line,  that  enabled  Lee  to 
maintain  his  army  at  Richmond  and  Petersburg  for  so  many 
months.  Without  those  lines  of  supply  he  would  have  had  to 
retreat  or  surrender  many  weeks  sooner.  If  Petersburg  had 
been  taken  at  the  start,  Lee  would  undoubtedly  first  have  tried 
to  hold  the  line  of  the  Appomattox  River  and  also  to  guard 


^Humphreys. 


SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  533 

the  Danville  Railway.  When  turned  out  of  that  line,  if 
still  tied  to  Richmond,  he  would,  within  a  few  weeks,  have 
been  driven  across  the  James  into  Richmond,  or  shut  up  in  a 
line  of  earthworks  having  both  of  its  flanks  resting  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  James.  This,  however,  would  have  been  to 
surrender  the  Danville  Railway  to  the  enemy.  Nothing  but 
the  orders  of  President  Davis  would  have  induced  Lee  to  put 
his  army  into  such  a  trap.  He  would  rather  have  placed  his 
back  to  the  Richmond  and  Danville  Railway  and  defended  it 
as  long  as  practicable ;  then,  when  turned  or  driven  from  it,  he 
would  have  retreated  toward  Danville  or  Lynchburg. 

Richmond,  chosen  as  the  capital  only  as  a  sop  to  Virginia,  of 
course,  was  always  the  point  of  greatest  weakness  in  the*  South 
ern  Confederacy.  The  choice  really  was  the  worst  thing  that 
could  have  been  imposed  upon  Virginia,  for  it  subjected  her 
soil  to  four  years  of  steady  campaign.  Strategically  consid 
ered,  Chattanooga  should  have  been  made  the  seat  of  the  Con 
federate  government.  It  is  possible,  however,  that  a  newly 
established  government,  which  has  to  fight  for  its  existence, 
would  get  along  better  with  no  fixed  capital,  or  with  one  easily 
shifted,  like  that  of  our  forefathers  of  the  Revolution. 

As  the  primary  object  of  Grant's  campaign  was  to  get  pos 
session  of  the  two  railways  leading  into  Richmond  from  the 
south  and  southwest,  it  looks,  at  first  glance,  as  if  he  ought  to 
have  succeeded  in  less  than  nine  months.  It  looks  as  if  he 
could  have  left  a  comparatively  small  force  intrenched  in  front 
of  Petersburg,  and  moved  the  bulk  of  his  army  against  those 
railways.  He  might  have  done  this,  as  the  Japanese  did  with 
Port  Arthur,  if  Lee's  army  had  been  shut  up  within  limited  for 
tifications  at  Petersburg ;  but  Lee's  army  never  was  invested. 
This  army  was  so  favored  by  the  relative  positions  of  Rich 
mond  and  Petersburg,  and  the  conformation  of  the  James  and 
the  Appomattox,  that  Grant  could  not  shut  it  up  in  either  town. 
He  could  not  leave  a  small  force  in  front  of  Petersburg  and 
march  off  with  his  main  army  without  thereby  giving  Lee  an 
opportunity  to  turn  the  position  of  the  small  force  and  fall 
upon  his  base  on  the  James.  So  Grant  had  to  continue  his 
wearing-out  policy,  gradually  extending  his  left  all  the  while 
toward  the  railways. 

The  work  of  Sheridan's  cavalry  in  the  last  phase  of  this  final 
campaign  cannot  be  commended  too  highly;  instead  of  going 
off  upon  some  useless  raid,  as  it  had  done  on  a  former  occasion, 


534  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

it  stayed  with  the  main  army  and  did  most  effective  work.  It 
cut  off  Lee's  retreat  upon  Danville  and  turned  it  toward 
Lynchburg ;  and  then  blocked  the  way  to  that  town.  But  for 
the  Union  cavalry  Lee  might  have  reached  the  mountains  of 
Virginia. 

This  suggests  the  inquiry,  why  did  Lee  want  to  reach  the 
mountains  and  prolong  the  struggle  further?  He  knew,  and 
the  moribund  government  at  Richmond  knew,  that  the  war 
could  not  last  much  longer ;  why,  then,  did  he  not  end  the  hard 
ships  of  his  army,  and  the  further  shedding  of  blood,  by  sur 
rendering  in  front  of  Richmond?  It  was  the  hope  of  securing 
better  terms  of  peace  for  his  army  and  the  South  that  made 
him  retVeat.  He  could  scarcely  have  hoped  for  more  generous 
terms  than  those  granted  by  General  Grant  at  Appomattox. 


LECTURE  XXV. 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA. 

(281)  After  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  November  25,  1863, 
we  left  Bragg,  with  the  Confederate  army,  in  full  retreat 
along  his  line  of  communications  to  the  southeast.  He  was 
not  vigorously  and  persistently  pursued,  but  was  allowed  to 
halt  his  army  and  intrench  it  in  front  of  Dalton,  within  twenty- 
five  miles  of  the  field  of  his  retreat.  In  his  Memoirs  General 
Grant  says,  "Chattanooga  now  being  secure  to  the  National 
troops  beyond  any  doubt,  I  immediately  turned  my  attention 
to  relieve  Knoxville,  etc." 

The  Confederate  army  at  Dalton  was  not  further  molested 
during  the  winter.  In -response  to  the  dissatisfaction  publicly 
expressed  against  Bragg  at  the  South,  and  in  accordance  with 
his  own  request,  President  Davis  relieved  him  of  the  command, 
but  manifested  abiding  faith  in  his  ability,  by  calling  him  to 
Richmond  as  chief-of-staff.  Toward  the  end  of  December 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  transferred  from  Mississippi  to  take 
command  at  Dalton.  The  Richmond  authorities  were  anxious 
for  Johnston  to  assume  the  offensive  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
try  to  recover  Tennessee.  But  the  strength,  morale,  means  of 
transportation,  and  supplies  of  the  army  were  not  such  as  to 
let  Johnston  believe  that  he  should  succeed,  if  he  took  the 
initiative.  "I  can  see  no  other  mode  of  taking  the  offensive 
here,"  he  wrote  Mr.  Davis,  "than  to  beat  the  enemy  when  he 
advances,  and  then  move  forward."*  So  Johnston  remained 
on  the  defensive  at  Dalton,  doing  what  he  could  to  improve 
the  condition  of  his  command.  He  organized  it  into  two 
army-corps,  under  Hardee  and  Hood,  respectively.  A  few 
days  after  the  campaign  began,  in  May,  General  'Polk  joined 
him  with  another  corps,  raising  the  strength  of  his  command 
to  about  60,000.  Wheeler  commanded  his  cavalry,  organized 
as  a  corps,  which  numbered  at  the  start  less  than  2,000  horse 
men. 

The  Federal  forces  in  Tennessee  did  little  during  the  rest  of 
the  winter.  General  Grant  remained  in  command,  until  he 
was  made  lieutenant-general  and  commander-in-chief  of  all 
the  land  forces,  as  we  have  seen,  in  March,  1864.  He  was  suc- 

*Johnston's  Narrative. 

535 


536  .AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

ceeded  by  General  Sherman  in  Tennessee.  The  bad  condition 
of  the  roads  in  the  early  spring,  the  difficulty  of  transporting 
enough  supplies  by  the  single  line  of  railway  from  the  base  at 
Nashville,  and  the  temporary  depletion  of  the  ranks,  due  to 
the  so-called  "veteran  act,"  made  it  impracticable  for  Sherman 
to  take  the  offensive  against  Johnston  before  the  first  of  May.* 

Meantime  some  changes  were  made  in  the  organization  of 
Sherman's  forces.  The  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  were  con 
solidated  into  a  single  corps,  the  Twentieth,  and  placed  under 
command  of  Hooker;  and  Howard  replaced  Gordon  Granger 
in  command  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  McPherson  came  into 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  consisting  of  the 
Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth,  and  part  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps. 
Schofield  had  succeeded  Burnside  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio,  now  consisting  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  only. 
General  Thomas  still  commanded  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land,  now  composed  of  the  Fourth,  the  Fourteenth,  and  the 
Twentieth  Corps.  Some  other  changes  in  commanders  were 
made  before  the  end  of  the  campaign. 

As  finally  organized  the  army  was  distributed  as  follows 
just  before  the  campaign  opened :  the  army  of  the  Ohio 
[Schofield],  13,559,  near  Red  Clay,  on  the  railway  thirteen 
miles  north  of  Dalton;  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  [Thomas] , 
60,773,  near  Ringgold,  on  the  Chattanooga  railway,  twelve 
miles  northwest  of  Dalton;  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  [Mc 
Pherson],  24,465,  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  twenty  miles 
northwest  of  Dalton.f  The  Union  front,  from  Red  Clay  to 
Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  was  twenty  miles  long.  The  cavalry, 
though  nominally  attached  to  the  three  subordinate  armies, 
was,  during  the  campaign,  organized  in  four  divisions,  which 
were  assigned  to  duty  by  General  Sherman  as  circumstances 
required.  One  division  was  usually  on  each  flank,  and  one 
covering  the  line  of  communications,  whilst  the  fourth  was 
ready  for  expeditions  to  the  front.  The  nearest  subordinate 
army-commander  usually  exercised  authority  over  the  cavalry 
cooperating  with  him.$ 


*The  Veteran  Volunteer  Act  provided  that  all  men  that  should  re- 
enlist  for  the  period  of  the  war  should  receive  transportation  home,  a 
month's  furlough,  and  a  bounty  of  $400.  The  law  had  the  desired 
effect,  but  seriously  depleted  Sherman's  ranks  during  the  -absence  of 
the  veterans  on  their  furlough.  The  last  of  them  were  not  due  to  re 
turn  before  the  1st  of  May. 

tSherman  in  B.  &  L. 

$Bigelow's  Principles  of  Strategy. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  537 

We  learned  in  the  lecture  on  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness 
that  General  Grant's  instructions  to  Sherman  for  his  part  in 
the  general  plan  of  combined  operations,  in  the  spring  of  1864, 
directed  him  "to  move  against  Johnston's  army,  to  break  it 
up,  and  to  get  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as  far 
as  you  can,  inflicting  all  the  damage  you  can  against  their  war 
resources.  .  .  ."  Atlanta,  eighty-five  miles  from  Dai- 
ton,  was  Johnston's  base.  It  was  a  large  town  at  the  junc 
tion  of  several  railways  of  strategic  importance:  one  leading 
through  Dalton  to  Chattanooga,  was  the  line  of  communica 
tions  of  both  hostile  armies;  one  to  Virginia,  by  way  of  Dan 
ville,  was  the  line  of  communication  between  Johnston  and 
Lee;  one  through  the  heart  of  Georgia  to  the  coast;  and  one 
to  Montgomery,  Alabama.  After  Johnston's  army,  Atlanta 
was  obviously  Sherman's  next  most  important  objective,  and 
it  was  the  most  important  place  for  Johnston  to  guard.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  says,  "Atlanta  was  known  as  the  Gate-City  of 
the  South,  was  full  of  foundries,  arsenals,  and  machine-shops, 
and  I  knew  that  its  capture  would  be  the  death-knell  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy."* 

The  country  between  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  was  gener 
ally  wooded,  and  all  except  the  space  between  the  Oostanaula 
and  the  Etowah  rivers  was  rugged  and  hilly.  In  front  of 
Dalton  was  a  north-and-south  ridge  some  thirty  miles  long, 
that  could  be  crossed  by  an  army  at  two  places  only — at  the 
gap  where  the  railway  passed  through  it,  and  fourteen  miles 
farther  south,  at  Snake  Creek  Gap.  Just  south  of  the  Etowah 
the  railway  broke  through  another  rocky  barrier  by  way  of 
Allatoona  Pass.  Farther  south,  in  front  of  Marietta,  was 
another  line  of  rather  disconnected  hills,  the  principal  ones  of 
which  were  Brush  Mountain,  Kenesaw  Mountain,  and  Lost 
Mountain,  and  a  little  farther  to  the  north,  Pine  Mountain. 
Crossing  the  theater,  athwart  the  route  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta, 
were  the  Oostanaula,  the  Etowah,  and  the  Chattahoochee 
rivers  and  their  branches.  All  of  the  roads  were  of  the 
poorest  kind,  made  worse  by  weeks  of  rain  during  the  opera 
tions. 

Finding  Johnston's  position  at  Dalton  too  strong  to  attack, 
Sherman  resolved  to  turn  it.  The  operation  began  on  the  7th 
of  May.  McPherson,  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  pre 
ceded  by  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division,  made  the  turning- 


*  Sherman's  Memoirs. 


538  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

movement  by  way  of  Villanow  and  Snake  Creek  Gap.  Thom 
as,  with  tlje  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  supported  him  by  mak 
ing  a  strong  demonstration  against  Tunnel  Hill  and  Rocky 
Face  Ridge,  the  front  of  Johnston's  position.  On  the  9th 
Schofield,  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  moved  down  from 
the  north.  E.  M.  McCook's  cavalry  division  covered  Scho- 
field's  left,  and  was  worsted  in  a  dismounted  skirmish  with 
Wheeler's  cavalry  at  Varnell's  Station. 

Having  put  to  flight  a  Confederate  cavalry  brigade  about 
to  occupy  Snake  Creek  Gap,  McPherson,  by  the  afternoon 
of  the  9th  of  May,  was  close  upon  Resaca.  His  orders  were 
to  capture  the  railway,  in  order  to  compel  Johnston  either  to 
detach  a  large  force  for  its  recovery  or  to  evacuate  the  position 
altogether  at  Dalton.*  But  McPherson  considered  the  posi 
tion  at  Resaca  too  strong  to  assault;  so,  with  the  discretion 
allowed  him  in  his  order,  he  retired  to  the  southern  end  of 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  there  took  up  a  strong  position  in  order 
to  hold  the  Gap. 

Thereupon  Sherman  moved  his  whole  army  to  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  except  the  Fourth  Corps  [Howard]  and  Stoneman's 
cavalry  division,  which  were  left  to  cover  his  communications. 
By  the  12th  of  May  he  had  the  army  concentrated  at  McPher- 
son's  position.  Johnston  received  information  of  this  move 
ment  from  the  scouts  on  the  left  of  his  line.  Wheeler  moved 
his  cavalry  round  the  north  end  of  the  ridge,  and,  driving  back 
Sherman's  cavalry,  confirmed  the  information.  Thereupon 
Johnston,  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  (May),  withdrew  his 
army  to  Resaca.  There  he  was  joined  by  Folk's  corps. 

Johnston  took  up  a  position  behind  intrenchments,  on  an 
irregular  curve,  covering  Resaca,  the  bridges,  and  the  railway. 
His  right  and  left  flanks  rested  on  the  Connasauga  and  the 
Oostanaula  rivers,  respectively.  The  Fourth  Corps  [How 
ard]  and  Stoneman's  cavalry  followed  Johnston  through 
Dalton.  Sherman  deployed  his  army  against  the  position  at 
Resaca,  and  made  a  partial  attack  on  the  14th.  Pressing  the 
enemy's  front  and  right  on  the  15th,  Sherman  dispatched  a 
division  of  infantry  and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  to  cross  the  Oosta 
naula  by  pontoon-bridge  at  Lay's  Ferry,  five  miles  southwest 
of  Resaca.  The  cavalry  advanced  upon  Calhoun.  At  the 
same  time  Garrard's  cavalry  division  was  started  from  Villa 
now,  by  way  of  Rome,  to  break  up  the  railway  between  Cal- 

*  Sherman. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  539 

houn  and  Kingston.  These  operations  forced  Johnston  to 
withdraw  from  Resaca  during  the  night  of  the  15th  of  May. 
He  burned  the  railway  bridge  behind  him.  Johnston  hoped  to 
find  a  "favorable  position  near  Calhoun,"  but  there  was  none; 
so,  after  resting  his  army  for  eighteen  or  twenty  hours  at  that 
place,  he  resumed  his  retreat  to  Adairsville  on  the  17th.  Here 
his  army  was  increased  by  the  junction  of  a  force  of  3,700 
cavalry,  under  W.  H.  Jackson. 

On  the  16th  Sherman  took  up  the  pursuit.  Jeff.  C.  Davis's 
division  [Fourteenth  Corps]  marched  to  the  support  of 
Garrard's  cavalry  in  the  capture  of  Rome.  This  town  was 
important,  on  account  of  the  Confederate  machine-shops  and 
iron-works,  as  well  as  the  large  quantities  of  cotton  and  stores 
collected  there.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  [McPherson],  on 
the  right,  advanced  by  way  of  Lay's  Ferry;  Thomas,  in  the 
center,  followed  the  railway;  Schofield,  on  the  left,  crossed 
the  river  six  or  eight  miles  east  of  Resaca.*  The  cavalry  was 
out  on  both  flanks,  with  instructions  to  reach  the  enemy's  rear 
if  possible.  The  hostile  armies  were  now  in  comparatively 
open,  rolling  country,  where  Sherman's  superior  numbers 
would  have  a  better  chance  of  winning  a  decisive  victory,  in 
case  Johnston  could  be  brought  to  battle. f 

Johnston  had  expected  to  make  a  stand  at  Adairsville,  and 
to  place  his  line  across  the  valley  in  which  the  railway  lay, 
with  his  flanks  upon  the  heights  on  each  side.  Finding  the 
valley,  however,  too  wide  for  the  front  of  his  army,  in  order 
of  battle,  he  adopted  other  methods.  Two  roads  led  south 
ward  from  Adairsville,  one  directly  to  Cassville,  the  other  by 
way  of  Kingston.  These  two  places  were  about  seven  miles 
apart.  Johnston  retreated  with  Hardee's  corps  on  the  Kings 
ton  road,  and  those  of  Polk  and  Hood  on  the  Cassville  road. 
The  two  hostile  armies  were  now,  on  the  18th  of  May,  march 
ing  with  wider  fronts  than  at  any  time  bef ore.f  The  flanks  of 
the  Federal  army  were,  however,  farther  apart  than  those  of 
the  Confederate  army. 

Johnston  purposed  taking  advantage  of  this  situation,  by 
having  Folk's  corps  make  a  stand  on  the  Cassville  road,  while 
Hardee  should  guard  the  flank  toward  Kingston,  and  Hood 
should  fall  upon  the  left  of  Schofield,  as  Schofield  deployed  to 
attack  Polk.  The  project  failed  through  Hood's  fault.  Under 
the  belief  that  the  Federal  column  to  the  east  of  him  had 


*  Sherman. 
fBigelow. 


540  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

turned  his  own  right,  Hood  faced  his  corps  to  his  right  and 
rear.  "The  time  thus  lost  frustrated  Johnston's  design,  for 
success  depended  upon  timing  the  attack  properly."  Johnston 
then  took  up  a  strong  defensive  position  with  his  three  corps, 
on  a  ridge  immediately  south  of  Cassville.* 

On  the  19th  of  May  Schofield  from  the  north  and  Thomas 
by  way  of  Kingston  closed  upon  the  Confederates  at  Cass 
ville,  and  skirmished  with  them  until  dusk.  Johnston  meant 
to  give  battle  in  this  position,  but  that  night  Hood  and  Polk, 
who  were  on  the  right,  insisted  that  they  should  be  exposed  to 
enfilade  artillery  fire,  and  should  be  unable  to  hold  their  part  of 
the  line.*  Johnston,  consequently,  retired  before  daylight  of 
the  20th,  upon  a  strong  position  at  Allatoona  Pass.f  The 
position  at  Allatoona  was  too  strong  to  assail  in  front;  Sher 
man,  therefore,,  after  giving  his  army  three  days  of  rest,  set 
out  on  the  23rd  with  twenty  days'  supplies  in  his  wagons  to 
turn  the  position,  converging  his  columns,  including  Davis's 
division  from  Rome,  upon  Dallas.  Stoneman's  cavalry  divi 
sion  covered  his  left,  Garrard's  his  right,  and  McCook's  cleared 
the  front  for  his  center. f  Kilpatrick's  covered  the  rear  and 
guarded  the  crossings  of  the  Etowah.J 

Finding  his  position  at  Allatoona  about  to  be  turned,  John 
ston  withdrew  and  took  up  a  new  position  at  New  Hope 
Church.  Driving  back  the  Confederate  cavalry,  Sherman's 
army  appeared  before  this  position  on  the  26th  of  May,  with 
McPherson  at  Dallas,  Thomas  in  front  of  New  Hope  Church, 
and  Schofield  on  Thomas's  left.  Owing  to  the  rugged  and 
wooded  character  of  the  ground  it  took  several  days  of  skir 
mishing  for  the  Federals  to  develop  the  Confederate  position. 
On  the  1st  of  June  the  Union  army  shifted  bodily  to  the  left, 
bringing  McPherson  in  front  of  New  Hope  Church.  The 
Union  cavalry  [Stoneman  and  McCook]  seized  Allatoona.  By 
the  6th  of  June  Sherman's  army  was  again  across  the  railway 
at  Ackworth.  McPherson  and  Thomas  had  passed  by  the  rear 
of  Schofield,  reversing  the  order  in  line  of  the  subordinate 
armies.  In  the  new  line  Schofield  was  on  the  right,  McPherson 
on  the  left,  and  Thomas  in  the  center.  A  new  depot  was  at 
once  set  up  at  Allatoona.  Meantime  Johnston  had  shifted  his 
position  to  the  right,  and  his  line  now  reached  from  Lost 


"Johnston  in  B.  &  L. 

fBigelow. 

JLecture  by  Captain  Stuart,  C.  E. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  541 

Mountain  to  Brush  Mountain,  a  distance  of  about  twelve  miles. 
Pine  Mountain,  an  isolated  hill  in  front  of  this  line,  was  also 
occupied  at  first.  Wheeler's  cavalry  guarded  the  left  and 
Jackson's  the  right.  The  Confederate  corps  stood  in  line  from 
left  to  right  in  the  following  order :  Hardee's,  Folk's,  Hood's.* 
The  position  covered  Marietta,  the  railway  back  to  Atlanta, 
and  the  bridges  over  the  Chattahoochee  on  Johnston's  line  of 
retreat. 

(282)  By  the  llth  of  June  the  Federal  line  had  moved  up 
closer  to  that  of  the  Confederates,  the  left  of  which  had  been 
drawn  in  to  Gilgal  Church.  On  the  14th  Thomas  deployed 
before  Pine  Mountain.  General  Johnston,  with  Hardee  and 
Polk,  was  on  that  hill  observing,  when  a  shell  fired  from  a 
Union  battery  struck  General  Polk,  killing  him  instantly.  Lor- 
ing  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Polk's  corps.  That  night 
the  Confederate  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Pine  Mountain. 

The  Federal  line  moved  up  closer  to  the  Confederate  main 
line.  On  the  16th  the  Federals  continued  to  press  the  Con 
federate  line  until  Johnston  abandoned  the  position  at  Gilgal 
Church,  drawing  in  his  left  closer  about  Marietta.  (283) 
Before  daylight  of  the  19th  Johnston  had  still  further  con 
tracted  his  line  about  Marietta.  The  line  now  included  the 
crest  of  Kenesaw  Mountain,  from  end  to  end.f  Sherman  fol 
lowed  up  close  to  the  Confederate  trenches  with  his  line. 
These  operations  were  all  greatly  hindered  by  the  continual 
rains,  which  turned  brooks  into  torrents  and  roads  into  mires.* 

On  the  night  of  the  21st  Johnston,  becoming  concerned 
about  the  pressure  on  his  left,  shifted  Hood's  corps  from  the 
right  to  the  left  of  his  line.  In  this  quarter  two  of  Hood's 
divisions  engaged  one  of  Hooker's  divisions  and  one  of  Scho- 
field's  brigade,  and  suffered  a  heavy  loss  on  the  22nd.  Skir 
mishing  between  the  hostile  lines  went  on  for  three  or  four 
days  without  any  decisive  result.  At  length,  on  the  27th  of 
June,  Sherman  assaulted  the  strong  position  on  Kenesaw 
Mountain  with  the  Armies  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ten 
nessee,  while  Schofield  threatened  Johnston's  left.  The  as 
sault  fell  mainly  upon  the  corps  of  Hardee  and  Lor  ing,  and 
was  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  about  3,000  men.  The  entire  Con 
federate  loss  did  not  exceed  500.* 

(284)     Between   the  28th   of   June   and   the   3rd   of   July 

*Captain   Stuart.     "  * 

f  Johnston.  » 


542  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Thomas,  in  the  center,  extended  his  line  a  little  to  the  right; 
McPherson  moved  his  army  in  rear  of  Thomas  and  formed  it 
on  his  right;  Schofield,  with  the  right  wing,  moved  down  the 
Sandtown  Road,  and  intrenched  a  line  to  the  south  of  the 
Confederate  position;  Stoneman's  cavalry  reached  the  Chatta- 
hooche  near  Sandtown.  Johnston  withdrew  to  a  strong  posi 
tion  at  Smyrna,  resting  his  flanks  on  Nickajack  and  Rotten- 
wood  Creeks.*  Thomas  advanced  through  Marietta  and  de 
veloped  the  position  at  Smyrna,  while  McPherson  passed  be 
yond  Schofield  and  pushed  his  advance  down  the  Sandtown 
Road  to  the  Chattahooche.  Schofield  stayed  behind  in  reserve. 
On  the  4th  of  July  Johnston  retired  into  intrenchments  cover 
ing  the  railway  bridge. f  Besides  this  bridge,  Johnston  had 
several  pontoon-bridges  laid  in  his  rear,  and  above  all  these 
bridges  there  were  several  good  fords. $ 

Thomas,  supported  by  McPherson,  followed  up  Johnston's 
withdrawal,  while  Schofield  marched  by  the  rear  of  Thomas 
to  the  mouth  of  Soap  Creek.  On  the  7th  Stoneman's  cav 
alry  pushed  down  the  river,  and  Garrard's  seized  Roswell.  By 
the  9th  Schofield  had  made  a  lodgment  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  near  the  mouth  of  Soap  Creek.  (285)  On  this  day 
Johnston  withdrew  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  From  the 
line  of  the  Chattahooche  Sherman  wheeled  his  army  to  the 
right.  Thomas,  on  the  pivot,  took  the  shortest  road  to  At 
lanta  ;  McPherson,  on  the  left,  with  Garrard's  cavalry  on  his 
outer  flank,  moved  by  way  of  Roswell  on  Decatur;  Schofield, 
in  the  center,  also  moved  on  Decatur.f  At  the  beginning  of 
this  wheel  the  army  was  upon  a  front  of  fifteen  miles.  John 
ston  took  up  a  position  behind  Peachtree  Creek,  from  which 
he  "might  engage  the  enemy,  if  he  should  expose  himself  in 
the  passage  of  the  stream.":):  He  was  prevented  from  actively 
opposing  Sherman's  passage  of  the  Chattahooche  by  the 
width  and  difficult  character  of  Peachtree  Creek  near  its  mouth, 
which  his  army  would  have  had  to  straddle. 

(286)  Further  to  add  to  Johnston's  troubles,  about  this 
time  a  Union  cavalry  force,  under  General  Rousseau,  was  or 
ganized  at  Decatur,  Ala.,  for  a  raid.  This  force  destroyed 
about  twenty-five  miles  of  the  Montgomery  and  Atlanta  Rail- 

*Captain  Stuart. 

fBigelow. 

jjohnston  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  543 

way,  one  of  Johnston's  main  lines  of  supply,  and  marched  on  to 
Marietta,  where  it  arrived  on  the  22nd  of  July.* 

(285)  On  the  evening  of  July  17  Johnston  received  a  tele 
gram  from  Richmond,  directing  him  to  turn  over  the  command 
of  his  army  to  Hood.  The  reason  stated  in  the  telegram  for 
relieving  Johnston  was  that  he  had  failed  to  arrest  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  to  the  vicinity  of  Atlanta,  and  expressed  no  con 
fidence  that  he  could  defeat  or  repel  him.f  Cheatham  suc 
ceeded  to  the  command  of  Hood's  corps.  Loring  had  already 
been  succeeded  in  command  of  Folk's  old  corps  by  A.  P. 
Stewart.  At  the  time  of  his  accession  to  the  command  Hood 
claimed  that  the  army  numbered  only  48,750  effectives,  includ 
ing  1,500  Georgia  militia,  which  had  just  joined.* 

On  the  evening  of  July  19  the  Union  armies  had  reached  the 
following  positions :  Thomas  was  in  the  act  of  crossing 
Peachtree  Creek;  Schofield,  in  the  center,  was  also  about  to 
cross  this  creek  east  of  the  Buckhead  Road;  and  McPherson, 
on  the  left,  was  approaching  Decatur.  In  this  position  the 
flanks  of  the  army  were  fully  ten  miles  apart,  and  there  was  a 
wide  interval  between  Thomas's  left  and  Schofield's  right. 
To  close  this  interval  Thomas  ordered  Howard  with  two  divi 
sions  toward  the  left,  to  connect  with  Schofield.  This,  how 
ever,  left  an  interval  of  two  miles  between  Howard's  detach 
ment  and  the  left  of  Thomas's  line.  Hood  determined  to  take 
advantage  of  the  wide  dispersion  of  Sherman's  columns  to  at 
tack  Thomas  as  soon  as  he  should  get  across  Peachtree  Creek. 
He  placed  Cheatham's  corps,  and  a  force  of  Georgia  militia  un 
der  General  G.  W.  Smith,  on  the  20th,  to  hold  off  Schofield  and 
McPherson,  with  the  aid,  also,  of  Wheeler's  cavalry  on  the 
extreme  right ;  and,  in  the  afternoon,  assaulted  Thomas  in  flank 
through  the  interval  left  by  Howard.  The  attack  was  made 
through  dense  woods  and  was  well  concealed  up  to  the  moment 
of  the  onset;  but  it  was  repulsed  by  Thomas. J  This  was  the 
battle  of  Peachtree  Creek. 

On  the  21st  the  Federal  left  continued  its  wheel.  Garrard's 
cavalry  was  sent  to  destroy  the  railway  to  the  east,  and  Mc 
Pherson  was  ordered  to  destroy  the  track  thoroughly,  as  he 
passed  over  it,  from  Decatur  toward  Atlanta.  (287)  Hood 
withdrew  from  his  position  behind  Peachtree  Creek  into  in- 
trenchments  already  prepared  close  around  Atlanta.  Sher- 

*Captain  Stuart. 

fjohnston  in  B.  &  L. 

iBigelow.    Howard  and  Hood  in  B.  &  L. 


544  AMERICAN  CAMAIGNS. 

man  was  misled  by  this  withdrawal  into  the  belief  that  Hood 
had  evacuated  Atlanta;  Thomas  and  Schofield,  therefore, 
pushed  forward,  on  the  morning  of  the  22nd,  and  McPherson, 
on  the  left,  issued  orders  putting  his  army  "in  pursuit  to  the 
south  and  east  of  Atlanta."*  But  instead  of  retreating,  Hood 
had  projected  an  assault  upon  the  left  of  the  Union  line,  by 
Hardee's  corps  and  Wheeler's  cavalry,  supported  by  Cheat- 
ham's  corps.  By  a  night  march  of  fifteen  miles  Hardee 
gained  a  position  on  McPherson's  flank  and  rear,  which  were 
left  uncovered  by  the  departure  of  Garrard's  cavalry.  He  took 
McPherson  completely  by  surprise,  and  in  the  attack,  which  he 
began  at  noon  on  the  22nd,  rolled  up  part  of  the  Union  army 
and  got  possession  of  Decatur,  where  some  of  the  trains  were 
parked ;  he  was,  after  all,  checked  and  repulsed.  In  this  engage 
ment,  known  as  the  battle  of  Atlanta,  the  Confederate  loss 
aggregated  8,000,  and  the  Union  loss  3,500f,  including  Mc 
Pherson,  who  was  killed.  Howard  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. J 

Sherman  drew  in  his  lines  closer  about  the  Confederate 
works  around  Atlanta.  By  the  25th  of  July  the  Federal  army 
occupied  an  intrenched  line  stretching  from  a  point  south  of 
the  Georgia  Railroad  and  east  of  Atlanta  to  a  point  beyond 
Atlanta  to  the  northwest.  (281)  Hood's  main  line  of  sup 
ply  was  the  Macon  Railway.  Sherman's  next  objective  was  to 
be  that  railway.§  His  plan  was  to  move  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  [Howard]  to  the  right,  rapidly  and  boldly,  against 
the  railway  below  Atlanta,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  send  all 
the  cavalry  round  by  the  right  and  left  to  make  a  lodgment 
on  it  about  Jonesboro.fi  (288)  The  cavalry  was  assembled 
in  two  strong  divisions,  that  of  McCook,  including  Rousseau's 
brigade,  to  the  right  rear,  at  Turner's  Ferry;  that  of  Garrard 
and  Stoneman,  united  for  the  occasion  under  Stoneman.  to  the 
left  rear,  near  Decatur.fi 


*Sherman's  report  to  Halleck  August  15,  1864,  and  McPherson's  last 
recorded  order.  See  Sherman's  Historical  Raid — Boynton. 

fCaptain  Stuart. 

^Howard's  promotion  to  succeed  McPherson  overslaughed  Hooker 
who  ranked  Howard.  Hooker,  in  dudgeon,  resigned  command  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  and  was  succeeded  by  Slocum.  Palmer,  also,  a  little 
later,  took  offense  at  being  ordered  to  serve  under  Schofield,  whom  he 
claimed  to  rank,  and  resigned  command  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps.  He 
was  succeeded  by  Jeff.  C.  Davis. 

§Bigelow. 

fiSherman. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  545 

These  movements  began  on  the  morning  of  July  27.  How 
ard  marched  his  army  to  the  right  in  rear  of  Schofield  and 
Thomas.  To  oppose  these  movements  Hood  had  started  Ste 
phen  D.  Lee's  corps*  to  cover  the  roads  on  the  west  of  the 
railways.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  28th  Lee  came  unexpect 
edly  upon  Howard  at  Ezra  Church  already  upon  ground  that 
he  had  expected  to  occupy.  He  assaulted  Howard  and,  though 
reinforced  later  by  Stewart's  corps,  was  repulsed.f  (286) 
Stoneman,  who  appears  to  have  been  more  concerned  to  make 
a  "grandstand  play"  by  capturing  the  Confederate  prison  at 
Andersonville,  south  of  Macon,  .than  to  cooperate  with  the 
other  cavalry  column  in  making  a  lodgment  on  the  railway 
near  Jonesboro,  detached  Garrard's  cavalry  within  ten  miles  of 
Atlanta,  and,  with  his  own  command,  2,100  troopers,  hastened 
toward  Macon.  (His  orders  were  to  send  Garrard  back  from 
Jonesboro.)  He  attacked  Macon  on  the  30th  of  July,  but  was 
repulsed  by  the  militia.  He  now  found  himself  practically 
surrounded,  and  he  bent  all  his  efforts  to  make  his  escape,  but 
between  Clinton  and  Monticello  he  was  surrounded  and  cap 
tured.  About  500  of  his  horsemen  cut  their  way  out  and 
escaped. 1  McCook  fared  little  better.  At  Newnan,  on  the 
30th,  he  was  defeated  by  a  part  of  Wheeler's  cavalry,  losing 
500  men  and  his  artillery.  He  withdrew  to  the  rear  of  the 
army,  and  Kilpatrick's  division,  from  the  rear,  took  his  place 
on  the  right  of  the  army. 

(288)  Sherman  was  awaiting  the  result  of  these  cavalry 
operations  when  the  month  of  July  closed.  His  infantry  line 
was  strongly  intrenched,  but  was  "drawn  out  from  the  Augusta 
road  on  the  left  to  the  Sandtown  road  on  the  right,  a  distance 
of  full  ten  measured  miles. "§  During  the  first  three  or  four 
days  of  August  General  Sherman  received  full  reports  of  the 
failure  of  his  cavalry  raids.  "I  now  became  satisfied,"  he  says, 
"that  cavalry  could  not,  or  would  not,  make  a  sufficient  lodg 
ment  on  the  railroad  below  Atlanta,  and  that  nothing  would 
suffice  but  for  us  to  reach  it  with  the  main  army."§  The  Gen 
eral  ought  to  have  known  beforehand  that  cavalry  raids  can 
not  effectually  destroy  the  communications  of  an  army  in  its 
own  country. 

In   furtherance  of  the  plan  of  attacking  Hood's  communi- 


*Lee  had  succeeded  Cheatham  in  command  of  Hood's  old  corps  on 
the  26th  of  July. 

fHoward  and  Hood  in  B.  &  L. 

JCaptain  Stuart. 

§Sherman. 


546  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

cations  with  the  main  army,  Thomas  and  Schofield  moved 
by  Howard's  rear,  extending  the  Union  line  to  the  south. 
Schofield  was  ordered  to  make  a  bold  attack  on  the  railway 
about  Eastpoint.  This  attack,  made  August  5,  failed  on  ac 
count  of  the  insubordination  of  General  Palmer,  who  refused 
to  serve  under  Schofield,  whom  he  claimed  to  rank.*  The 
Union  lines  continued  their  extension  to  the  west  and  south 
until  August  18.f 

(281)  Meantime  Wheeler  had  been  raiding  the  Union 
communications  as  far  back  as  Dalton,  and  had  done  con 
siderable  damage.  Attracted  by  the  zeal  and  activity  of  Kil- 
patrick  as  a  cavalry  leader,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  ab 
sence  of  Wheeler's  cavalry,  Sherman  resolved  to  suspend  the 
general  movement  of  his  main  army,  and  again  to  try  cavalry 
against  Hood's  communications.  Accordingly  Kilpatrick  was 
dispatched  with  his  small  division  against  the  railway  at  Jones- 
boro,  inxthe  hope  that  the  operation  would  force  Hood  to 
evacuate  Atlanta,  and,  maybe,  expose  him  to  attack  in  the  con 
fusion  of  retreat.*  This  raid,  like  the  others,  achieved  very 
little.  Kilpatrick  got  off  on  the  night  of  the  18th,  and  returned 
on  the  22nd,  having  made  the  complete  circuit  of  Atlanta.  He 
brought  back  some  prisoners,  and  reported  having  destroyed 
three  miles  of  railway,  which  he  said  it  would  take  the  enemy 
ten  days  to  repair.  But  on  the  23rd  trains  were  seen  going 
into  Atlanta  from  the  south.*  Sherman  says  that  he  then 
"became  more  than  ever  convinced  that  the  cavalry  could  not, 
or  would  not,  work  hard  enough  to  disable  a  railroad  prop 
erly."  He  returned,  therefore,  to  the  plan  of  a  general  move 
ment  with  the  main  army. 

(288)  Accordingly  the  Twentieth  Corps  [Slocum]  was 
left  to  guard  the  bridge  at  the  Chattahoochee,  and  rations  to 
last  fifteen  days  were  issued  to  the  rest  of  the  army.  The 
movement  began  on  the  25th  of  August  and,  by  the  evening  of 
the  27th,  the  army* was  echeloned  along  the  Atlanta- Sandtown 
road,  Schofield  on  the  left,  facing  Eastpoint;  the  mass  of  the 
army  facing  south.  On  the  28th  the  army  began  a  general 
left  wheel,  pivoting  on  Schofield.  Howard,  on  the  right,  upon 
an  arc  with  a  radius  of  twenty-five  miles,  aimed  at  Jonesboro. 
Thomas  took  the  middle  course.  By  night  Howard  had  reached 
Fairburn,  and  Thomas  was  at  Redoak  Station,  on  the  Mont 
gomery  Railway.  Schofield  stood  fast  on  the  pivot  until  the 


*Sherman. 
fCaptain  Stuart. 


THE  CAMPAIGN   OF  ATLANTA.  547 

trains  were  well  on  their  way,  then  moved  his  corps  into  the 
line  a  mile  northeast  of  Mount  Gilead.  The  right  and  center 
spent  the  29th  of  August  in  destroying  some  twelve  miles  of 
the  Montgomery  Railway.  Schofield  moved  into  connection 
with  Thomas  at  Redoak. 

On  the  30th  of  August  Schofield  advanced  about  a  mile  and 
a  half  in  the  direction  of  Eastpoint,  and  again  covered  the 
army's  trains.  (281)  Howard  and  Thomas  continued  the 
wheel,  meeting  Confederate  cavalry.  This  cavalry  was  cover 
ing  Hardee,  who,  with  about  half  of  Hood's  army,  was  this 
day  dispatched  by  Hood  to  fall  upon  the  Union  army.  On 
the  31st  Hardee  attacked  Howard,  and  was  repulsed.  Scho 
field  advanced  and  seized  the  railway  at  Rough-and-Ready. 
Thomas  struck  the  railway  between  there  and  Jonesboro ;  he 
and  Howard  marched  for  Jonesboro,  tearing  up  the  track  on 
the  way. 

Finding  his  communications  in  possession  of  the  Federal 
army,  Hood  evacuated  Atlanta  on  the  1st  of  September,  and 
reunited  his  army  at  Lovejoy's  Station.*  Sherman  withdrew 
his  army  to  Atlanta  and  its  neighborhood,  to  rest  and  prepare 
for  further  operations.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
[Thomas]  occupied  the  city;  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
[Howard],  Eastpoint;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  [Schofield], 
Decatur.  The  cavalry  covered  the  flanks  and  rear  from  Ros- 
well  to  Sandtown. 

The  Confederate  army  was  prevented  from  making  any  im 
mediate  movement  by  the  necessity  of  covering  Anderson- 
ville,  ninety  miles  south  of  Lovejoy,  where  34,000  Union  pris 
oners  were  held  in  confinement.  The  Atlanta  Campaign  was 
at  an  end. 

COMMENTS. 

The  Atlanta  Campaign  began  on  the  5th  of  May,  1864,  and 
ended  with  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta  by  Hood,  on  the  1st  of 
September — four  months,  less  four  days.  By  skilful  maneu 
vering,  far  more  than  by  his  assaults  at  Dalton,  Resaca,  and 
Kenesaw,  Sherman  had  forced  the  Confederate  army  back 
ninety-odd  miles,  and  had  captured  the  important  city  of 
Atlanta. 

During  the  same  time  Grant,  in  Virginia,  had   forced  Lee 


"Captain   Stuart. 


548  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

back  from  the  line  of  the  Rapidan  to  the  works  in  front  of 
Petersburg  and  Richmond;  but  it  was  not  until  the  following 
April  that  the  Union  commander-in-chief  succeeded  in  captur 
ing  these  two  cities.  The  armies  of  Grant  and  Sherman  were 
of  practically  the  same  strength,  about  100,000  each;  those  of 
Lee  and  Johnston,  also,  were  about  equal  to  each  other,  num 
bering  some  60,000  each.  But  Grant,  by  this  time,  had  lost 
upwards  of  60,000  men,  while  Sherman  had  lost  not  many  more 
than  20,000.  Grant's  was  a  campaign  of  "hammering,"  while 
Sherman's  was  one  of  maneuvering.  Both  campaigns  were 
made  in  difficult  country ;  there  were  heavy  woods  in  both 
theaters ;  in  Georgia  the  topography  was  more  broken  by  ridges 
and  hills,  while  in  Virginia  the  rivers,  especially  the  James, 
were  more  difficult  to  cross;  the  incessant  rains  during  the 
Georgia  campaign  made  the  roads  as  bad  in  that  theater  as 
they  were  in  the  swamps  of  Virginia. 

Though  Sherman's  operations  were  of  the  same  general 
character  as  those  of  Rosecrans  in  the  Tullahoma  Campaign, 
and  the  results  achieved  were  similar,  far  greater  fame  has 
attached  to  the  Atlanta  Campaign  than  to  the  Tullahoma  Cam 
paign.  The  numbers  engaged  on  either  side  were  greater  in 
the  Atlanta  Campaign  and  its  outcome  was  a  far  heavier  blow 
to  the  Confederacy,  no  doubt,  than  was  that  of  the  Tullahoma 
Campaign.  Several  modern  American  and  foreign  writers  on 
the  subject  of  strategy  have  discussed  it  as  a  typical  campaign ; 
and  they  have  generally  found  little  to  criticize,  either  in  Sher 
man's  offensive  strategy  or  in  Johnston's  defensive  strategy. 
Hamley  says  of  it  with  approval:  "Except  in  attacking  the 
Kenesaw  Mountain  on  the  27th  of  June,  the  character  of 
Sherman's  operations  was,  throughout,  the  same.  To  protect 
his  main  line  from  a  counter-attack,  he  left  a  force  intrenched 
across  it.  He  then  reinforced  his  flanking  wing  to  a  strength 
sufficient  to  cope  with  the  whole  army  of  the  enemy,  and  di 
rected  it  by  a  circuit  off  trie  main  line,  upon  the  Confederate 
rear.  In  every  case  the  operation  was  successful,  obliging 
Johnston  forthwith  to  abandon  his  strongest  positions,  and  to 
retreat." 

The  only  two  mistakes  General  Sherman  has  usually  been 
taxed  with  were :  first,  his  not  sending  Thomas,  with  the  large 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  to  turn  Johnston's  position  by  way 
of  Snake  Creek  Gap,  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign;  and 
second,  his  assaulting  the  strong  position  at  Kenesaw  Moun 
tain,  instead  of  turning  it.  In  the  first  case,  however,  Me- 


THE   CAMPAIGN   OF  ATLANTA.  549 

Pherson's  command  was  large  enough  to  accomplish  the  task 
assigned  to  it  if  McPherson  had  not  made  the  mistake,  so 
often  made  by  commanders,  of  overestimating  the  strength  of 
the  enemy  in  front  of  him.  Sherman  criticizes  him  in  these 
words:  McPherson  "had  not  done  the  full  measure  of  his 
work.  He  had  in  hand  23,000  of  the  best  men  in  the  army, 
and  could  have  walked  into  Resaca  (then  held  only  by  a  small 
brigade),  or  he  could  have  placed  his  whole  force  astride  the 
railroad  above  Resaca,  and  there  have  easily  withstood  the 
attack  of  all  of  Johnston's  army,  with  the  knowledge  that 
Thomas  and  Schofield  were  on  his  [Johnston's]  heels/'*  Gen 
eral  Johnston  also  testifies  that  Resaca  was  held  by  a  very  small 
force  of  Confederates  at  that  time.f  The  two  commanders, 
however,  are  not  at  all  agreed  upon  what  would  have  been  the 
consequences  if  McPherson  had  taken  Resaca  and  made  a 
lodgment  upon  the  railway.  Sherman  says  it  would  have 
forced  Johnston  to  retreat  eastward,  "and  we  should  have  cap 
tured  half  his  army  and  all  his  artillery  and  wagons.  .  .  . " 
Johnston  says  all  his  army  "would  have  been  upon"  McPher 
son  "at  the  dawn  of  the  next  day  .  .  .  making  a  most 
auspicious  beginning  of  the  campaign  for  the  Confederates." 
The  student  is  not  obliged  to  accept  either  of  these  views 
wholly.  Judging  from  the  skill  Johnston  displayed  in  all  of  his 
withdrawals  in  this  campaign  one  can  believe  it  quite  possible 
he  might  have  escaped  without  great  loss;  but  he  would  have 
been  thrown  off  his  communications  with  Atlanta,  his  base. 
Judging,  however,  by  all  that  General  Johnston  did  in  the  Civil 
War,  both  before  and  after  this  time,  we  have  no  reason  to 
believe  that  he  would  have  inflicted  much  damage  upon  Mc 
Pherson.  General  Johnston  commanded  in  only  one  offensive 
battle  in  the  whole  war;  that  was  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines, 
which  was,  as  General  Alexander  remarks,  "phenomenally 
mismanaged." 

Sherman  apparently  had  an  opportunity  to  destroy  John 
ston's  army  at  Resaca,  but  neglected  to  take  advantage  of  it. 
In  the  first  place,  after  McPherson  failed  to  take  Resaca,  Sher 
man  marched  the  rest  of  his  army,  except  the  Fourth  Corps 
and  Stoneman's  Cavalry,  to  McPherson's  position  at  the  mouth 
of  Snake  Creek  Gap,  within  three  or  four  miles  of  Resaca. 
He  had  his  army  assembled  there  by  the  12th  of  May.  John 
ston  did  not  withdraw  from  Dalton  to  Resaca  until  the  13th. 

*Sherman. 

fjohnston  in  B.  6-  L.  > 


550  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Why  Sherman  did  not  attack  Resaca  at  once  himself  is  not 
understood.  He  does  not  appear  to  have  deployed  before  Re 
saca  until  the  14th,  and  then  he  let  Johnston  get  away  on  the 
night  of  the  15th  instead  of  destroying  him.  "When  two  armies 
are  in  order  of  battle,  and  one  has  to  retire  over  a  bridge, 
while  the  other  has  the  circumference  of  the  circle  open,  all  the 
advantages  are  in  favor  of  the  latter.  It  is  then  a  general 
should  show  boldness,  strike  a  decided  blow,  and  maneuver 
upon  the  flank  of  his  enemy.  The  victory  is  in  his  hands."* 
This  was  the  case  at  Resaca,  where  Johnston's  army  was  in  a 
plight  similar  to  that  of  Napoleon's  at  Leipzig.  If  Sherman 
had  shown  boldness  and  attacked  Johnston  with  the  whole 
strength  and  vigor  of  his  army  on  the  14th,  or  even  on  the  15th, 
he  must  have  captured  a  large  part  of  Johnston's  army  before 
it  could  have  gotten  across  the  river.  But,  instead  of  trying 
to  destroy  Johnston's  army,  Sherman  simply  maneuvered  it  out 
of  its  position.  That  he  made  no  real  fight  there  is  shown  by 
his  own  words:  "May  13th-16th  our  loss  was  2,747  and  his 
2,800"f — that  is,  Sherman's  loss  was  less'  than  three  per  cent, 
of  his  strength. 

Another  opportunity  that  Sherman  had  to  strike  the  Con 
federate  army  a  terrible  blow,  but  failed  to  take  advantage  of. 
occurred  during  Hood's  retreat  from  Atlanta  to  Love  joy. 
Hood  had  to  make  a  flank  march  by  the  heads  of  Sherman's 
three  armies,  and  he  was  allowed  to  do  so  unmolested.  The  only 
part  of  Hood's  army  that  was  attacked  during  this  hazardous 
march  was  Hardee's  corps  behind  intrenchments  near  Jones- 
boro.  Hood  says  himself,  in  his  account  of  this  campaign  in 
Battles  and  Leaders:  "I  have  often  thought  it  strange  Sher 
man  should  have  occupied  himself  with  attacking  Hardee's 
intrenched  position  instead  of  falling  upon  our  main  body  on 
the  march  round  to  his  rear." 

"The  attack  at  Kenesaw  has  been  much  criticized,  and  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  himself,  apologizes  for  it  in  his  report.  How 
ever,  circumstances  all  favored  it.  It  was  a  choice  between  an 
assault  and  a  turning  movement.  The  army  was  tired  of 
marching,  and  wanted  to  fight.  The  incessant  rains  had  pro 
duced  a  state  of  roads  and  stage  of  streams  that  would  make 
the  next  turning  movement  especially  hard.  If  the  assault  suc 
ceeded,  all  well  and  good;  if  it  failed,  hard  marching  would 

'Napoleon's  Maxim  XXV. 
fSherman  in./?.  &  L. 


THE   CAMPAIGN   OF  ATLANTA.  551 

not  appear  so  unattractive."*  The  assault  was  tactically  well 
made,  and  it  was  gallantly  delivered ;  but  the  position  proved 
to  be  too  strong. 

While  Johnston's  retreat  was  carried  out  with  the  greatest 
skill,  and  with  the  least  loss  of  men  and  materiel;  while  with 
an  army  of  60,000  he  kept  an  army  of  100,000  two  months 
and  a  half  (May  5  to  July  18)  making  eighty-five  miles,  hardly 
more  than  a  mile  a  day;  his  operations,  nevertheless,  amounted 
merely  to  a  passive  defense.  And  the  great  length  of  time 
taken  by  Sherman  in  gaining  the  distance  from  Dalton  to  the 
works  about  Atlanta  was  due  more  to  the  difficulty  of  the 
weather  arid  roads  and  transport  than  to  the  direct  resistance 
made  by  Johnston. 

(286)  If,  instead  of  falling  back  directly  upon  his  line  of 
communications,  from  one  position  to  another,  in  his  retreat 
from  Dalton,  Johnston,  having  made  arrangements  beforehand, 
had  taken  advantage  of  the  Oostanaula  River  to  cover  his 
flank,  and  had  retreated  to  Rome,  instead  of  Cassville,  he 
might  then  have  taken  up  a  flank-position,  facing  the  railway 
from  Dalton  to  Atlanta.  Near  Rome  he  could  have  taken  a 
position  behind  the  Etowah,  with  his  left  flank  protected  by  the 
Coosa,  and  with  the  whole  State  of  Alabama,  as  yet  untouched 
by  the  enemy,  as  his  base,  and  the  railway  from  Selma,  Ala 
bama,  to  Blue  Mountain  as  his  line  of  communications. f 

If  Johnston  had  done  this,  Sherman's  main  army  would  have 
had  to  turn  away  from  the  line  of  the  railway  and  the  geo 
graphical  and  political  objective  of  the  campaign,  Atlanta,  to 
follow  him.  For,  if  Sherman  had  continued  his  march  on  At 
lanta,  he  would  have  exposed  his  communications  to  attack  by 
Johnston.  In  the  meantime  the  Governor  of  Georgia  would 
have  had  to  assemble  all  the  State  militia  at  Atlanta,  in  order 
to  fortify  that  city  and  guard  it  against  capture  by  detach 
ments  from  Sherman's  army. 

The  adoption  of  a  flank  position  like  this  was  the  favorite 
mode  of  an  active  defense  advocated  by  Clausewitz,  and  it  was 
the  plan  proposed  by  Moltke  on  three  different  occasions,  to 
protect  Berlin,  in  case  of  an  invasion  of  Prussia.  It  is,  also, 
the  method  most  highly  recommended  by  von  der  Goltz,  for  an 
active  defense. 


*Captain  Stuart. 

fThis  railway,  which  now  goes  from  Selma  to  Chattanooga,  was 
completed  only  as  far  north  as  Blue  Mountain  in  1864.  Sherman's 
Memoirs. 


552  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

From  Rome  Johnston  could  have  continued  to  fall  back  to 
the  southwest,  toward  Montgomery,  150  miles  away,  drawing 
Sherman  after  him,  farther  and  farther  away  from  his  line  of 
railway.  Sherman  has  given  it  as  his  opinion  that  his  army 
could  not  have  operated  a  hundred  miles  distant  from  a  rail 
way.  In  all  this  retreat  Johnston  would  have  had  excellent 
ground  for  defensive  operations.  His  left  flank  would  have 
been  protected  all  the  way  by  the  Coosa,  a  very  formidable 
obstacle;  while  parallel  to  the  Coosa  and  just  thirty  miles  east 
of  it  was  the  Tallapoosa;  and  the  numerous  branches  of  these 
two  streams  traversed  the  wooded  space  between,  forming  at 
every  few  miles  good  lines  to  defend. 

As  we  have  learned,  Johnston  saw  "no  other  mode  of  taking 
the  offensive  than  to  beat  the  enemy  when  he  advances,  and 
then  move  forward."  This  he  might  possibly  have  done  if  his 
enemy  had  been  rash  enough  to  dash  himself  to  pieces  against 
his  impregnable  positions;  but  this  ought  not  to  have  been 
expected  of  so  cunning  a  soldier  as  Sherman. 

(281)  In  Sherman's  wide  turning  movements,  or  the  ire- 
quent  shifting  of  his  armies  from  one  flank  to  the  other,  it 
should  seem  that  Johnston  ought  to  have  found  some  chance 
to  strike  in  between  the  far-separated  Federal  columns,  or  to 
attack  them  at  a  disadvantage  while  moving  by  the  flank.  In 
the  advance  from  the  Etowah  to  Dallas  the  Union  columns 
started  upon  a  front  reaching  from  Cartersville  to  Rome,  six 
teen  miles  in  an  air-line;  the  country  was  thickly  wooded,  and 
the  roads  were  of  the  worst  kind,  and  wholly  unknown  to  the 
Union  commanders.  The  result  was  considerable  confusion. 
For  example,  Hooker  crossed  the  river  by  the  bridge  assigned 
to  Schofield,  and  later  got  into  the  road  in  front  of  Thomas 
and  blocked  his  column.*  The  Union  army  for  a  day  or  two 
was  simply  groping  in  an  unknown  wilderness.  Then,  if  ever, 
was  Johnston's  chance  to  take  advantage  of  the  better  knowl 
edge  of  the  roads  and  mountain  trails  that  many  of  the  men  of 
his  army  must  have  possessed,  to  strike  a  blow  at  his  enemy's 
columns;  but  he  only  took  up  positions  and  intrenched  to  stop 
them.  Indeed,  one  cannot  study  this  campaign  without  being 
persuaded  that  both  General  Sherman  and  General  Johnston 
were  trying  to  carry  on  war  with  as  little  fighting  as  possible. 
Yet  even  when  General  Johnston  would  make  up  his  mind  to 
fight,  as  he  says  he  did  at  Adairsville  and  at  Cassville,  he  would 

^Howard  in  B,  &  L. 


THE  CAMPAIGN   OF  ATLANTA.  553 

be  stopped   by  the  mistakes   or   the  arguments   of   his  corps- 
commanders. 

Had  Johnston  not  been  relieved  of  command,  he,  like  Lee 
at  Petersburg,  might  possibly  have  kept  Sherman  at 'bay  in 
front  of  Atlanta,  and  protected  his  communications  with  Ma- 
con  and  Montgomery,  for  many  months.  Hood,  however, 
"was  forced  to  an  aggressive  policy  by  the  mere  fact  of  his 
appointment."*  He  was  also,  like  Bragg,  naturally  aggres 
sive.  His  attacks  at  Peachtree  Creek  on  the  20th  of  July, 
and  in  the  battle  of  Atlanta  on  the  22nd,  were  both  well 
planned  and  promised  to  be  successful.  Hood  charges  the  fail 
ure  in  each  case  to  Hardee.  He  says  that  Hardee,  as  his  small 
losses  proved,  did  not  attack  vigorously  on  the  20th ;  and  that 
on  the  22nd  he  did  not  carry  his  turning  movement  far  enough 
round  to  reach  the  rear  of  McPher son's  line,  but  shattered  his 
command  against  Federal  intrenchments.  Hardee's  losses 
were  very  heavy.  General  Alexander  says,  to  trace  the  cause 
of  Hood's  failure  "further  would  bring  it  home  to  himself  for 
failure  to  supervise  the  execution  of  important  orders — a  sort 
of  failure  from  which  even  the  most  eminent  commanders  have 
never  been  exempt." 

Johnston  made  a  serious  mistake  at  the  outset  of  the  cam 
paign  in  not  occupying  and  fortifying  Snake  Creek  Gap. 
Had  he  taken  this  precaution,  "the  problem  confronting  Gen 
eral  Sherman  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  would  have 
been  more  difficult  than  any  he  had  to  face  later. 
There  would  have  been  nothing  left  but  a  dangerous  turning 
movement,  probably  north  of  Dalton,  to  open  the  campaign."* 
This  would  have  exposed  Sherman's  communications,  and  re 
quired  a  wide  circuit  to  reach  Johnston's,  which,  from  that 
side,  were  covered  by  the  Connasauga  River  and  its  branches. 

It  is  rather  curious  to  note  that  Johnston  made  no  effort  to 
defend  the  rivers  across  his  line  of  retreat,  by  taking  positions 
behind  them;  and  that  he  appeared  rather  to  prefer  having  a 
river  at  his  back,  as  at  Resaca  and  at  the  Chattahoochee.  He 
was  careful  to  provide  plenty  of  bridges  for  his  retreat,  and, 
by  destroying  them  at  the  right  time,  he  hindered  the  pursuit. 

Both  hostile  armies  in  this  campaign  made  constant  use  of 
fieldworks.  It  was  only  by  means  of  intrenching  that  Sher 
man  was  able  to  hold  Johnston  with  a  small  force  in  front, 
while  he  dispatched  the  bulk  of  his  command  upon  the  wide 

*Captain  Stuart. 


554  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

turning-movements.  Both  armies  marched,  and  maneuvered, 
and  fought  like  trained  soldiers;  and  such  they  were,  for,  in 
the  two  years  since  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  where  both  sides 
fought  like  raw  militia,  these  troops  had  passed  through  the 
best  of  training  schools. 


LECTURE  XXVI. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND 
NASHVILLE. 

AFTER  THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA. 

(289)  General  Sherman  admits  that  in  taking  Atlanta  he 
"had  not  accomplished  all,  for  Hood's  army,  the  chief  objec 
tive,  had  escaped."*  Yet  Hood's  demoralized  army  was  left 
unmolested  for  three  weeks  at  Love  joy's  Station,  only  thirty 
miles  from  Atlanta,  and  was  itself  the  first  to  resume  offensive 
operations.  The  Union  army  spent  this  time  of  truce  mainly 
in  resting  from  the  fatigues  of  the  three-month  campaign,  and 
in  making  itself  secure  and  comfortable  at  Atlanta,  General 
Sherman  says  in  his  Memoirs:  "All  the  army,  officers  and 
men,  seemed  to  relax  more  or  less,  and  sink  into  a  condition  of 
idleness.  .  .  .  Generals  Blair  and  Logan  went  home  to 
look  after  politics.  Many  of  the  regiments  were  entitled  to, 
and  claimed,  their  discharge,  by  reason  of  the  expiration  of 
their  term  of  service;  so  that  with  victory  and  success  came 
also  many  causes  of  disintegration."  Sherman  ejected  all  the 
inhabitants  from  the  city,  and  turned  it  into  a  military  camp, 
about  which  he  built  a  close  circle  of  fortifications. 

He  had  not  decided  what  to  do  next.  His  line  of  commu 
nications,  which  had  to  be  guarded  all  the  way  back  to  Louis 
ville,  was  already  400  miles  long.  To  pursue  Hood  farther 
southward  would  only  result  in  prolonging  the  Union  commu 
nications  without  destroying  the  Confederate  army.  Wheeler, 
who  had  gone  into  Tennessee  to  harass  those  communications, 
was  still  there,  and  Forrest  took  his  command  thither  from 
Mississippi  about  the  middle  of  September  for  the  same  pur 
pose.  To  oppose  these  forces,  and  to  prepare  for  "any  other 
emergency,"  Sherman  dispatched  Newton's  division  [Fourth 
Corps]  and  Morgan's  division  [Fourteenth  Corps]  to  Ten 
nessee^  and  Corse's  division  [Seventeenth  Corps]  to  Rome; 
and  he  instructed  Rousseau  at  Nashville,  Granger  at  Decatur, 
and  Steedman  at  Chattanooga,  to  employ  the  most  active  meas 
ures  to  protect  the  railway 4 

*Sherman  in  B.  &  L. 
fColonel  Stone  in  B.  &  L. 
^Sherman's  Memoirs. 

555 


556  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Meanwhile  several  letters  passed  between  Sherman  and 
Grant  concerning  Sherman's  future  operations.  At  this  time 
Grant  was  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  front  of  Lee  at 
Petersburg;  General  Canby,  at  New  Orleans,  was  preparing 
to  act  with  a  land  force  against  Mobile  in  conjunction  with 
Admiral  Farragut's  fleet ;  and  a  combined  land  and  naval  force 
was  preparing  for  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington, 
at  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River,  in  North  Carolina.  "What 
you  are  to  do  with  the  forces  at  your  command,"  General  Grant 
wrote  in  a  letter  to  Sherman  dated  September  12,  "I  do  not 
exactly  see."  In  his  reply,  dated  September  20;  General  Sher 
man,  after  suggesting  that  Savannah  should  be  captured  imme 
diately  after  Wilmington,  said:  "I  should  keep  Hood  em 
ployed  and  put  my  army  in  fine  order  for  a  march  on  Augusta, 
Columbia,  and  Charleston ;  and  start  as  soon  as  Wilmington  is 
sealed  to  commerce,  and  the  city  of  Savannah  is  in  our  pos- 


HOOD  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE. 

At  this  stage  of  the  correspondence  Hood  forced  Sherman 
to  a  decision  and  prompt  action  by  himself  taking  the  initiative. 
On  the  20th  of  September  he  shifted  his  army  to  Palmetto,  on 
the  Atlanta  and  Montgomery  Railway,  twenty-five  miles  south 
west  of  Atlanta.  He  had  already  sent  an  order  to  Wheeler 
recalling  him  from  Tennessee.  At  Palmetto  Hood  was  visited 
by  President  Davis,  and  a  plan  for  the  immediate  operations 
was  arranged.  According  to  this  plan  Hood  was  to  move 
against  Sherman's  communications  with  Chattanooga;  if  this 
caused  Sherman  to  fall  back  to  attack  him,  as  was  expected, 
Hood  would  take  up  a  strong  position  and  give  battle,  pro 
vided  the  morale  of  his  army  warranted  it ;  otherwise  he  would 
retreat  toward  Gadsden,  Alabama,  where  supplies  would  be 
collected.  There,  near  the  State-line,  a  large  auxiliary  force 
of  militia  and  home-guafds  from  both  Georgia  and  Alabama 
could  be  assembled  and,  if  Sherman  followed  so  far,  a  decisive 
battle  would  be  fought.  If  Sherman  should  not  pursue  as  far 
as  Gadsden,  but  should  return  to  Atlanta  and  march  toward 
the  sea,  he  was  to  be  pursued  by  Hood.* 

Hood  now  had  an  effective  force  of  about  40,000  men,  and 
its  morale,  which  he  had  reported  as  "greatly  impaired  by  the 

*The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government — Jefferson  Davis. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.        557 

recurrence  of  retreat,"  was  somewhat  improved.  He  hoped 
by  taking  the  aggressive  wholly  to  restore  it.  General  Har- 
dee,  whom  Hood  had  blamed  with  his  defeats,  had  been  trans 
ferred  from  the  army,  and  General  Cheatham  was  now  in  com 
mand  of  Hardee's  old  corps.  Beauregard  had  just  been  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  West, 
which  included  Hood's  army*  as  well  as  such  Confederate 
troops  as  were  in  Alabama  and  Mississippi,  under  the  territo 
rial  command  of  General  "Dick"  Taylor.  West  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  River  there  were  Confederate  forces  scattered  from 
Missouri  to  Texas,  all  included  in  Kirby  Smith's  territorial 
command,  known  as  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department.  The 
line  of  the  Mississippi  was,  however,  held  so  fast  by  the  Union 
forces  that  the  Confederates  in  the  West  were  effectually  cut 
off  from  all  cooperation  with  those  east  of  the  river. 

On  learning  of  Hood's  change  of  position  to  Palmetto,  and 
his  preparations  there  for  a  movement  against  the  Union  com 
munications,  General  Sherman  sent  Thomas  and  Schofield  back 
to  the  headquarters  of  their  departments  at  Nashville  and 
Knoxville,  respectively,  while  he  himself  remained  in  Atlanta 
to  await  Hood's  initiative. f  Sherman  had  not  long  to  wait, 
for  Hood's  army,  preceded  by  Jackson's  cavalry  division, 
crossed  the  Chattahoochee  River  on  the  1st  of  October.  The 
same  day  Jackson  sent  a  detachment  of  cavalry  forward  to 
operate  against  the  railway  between  the  Chattahoochee  and 
Marietta,  but  it  was  met  by  the  Union  cavalry  under  Kilpatrick 
and  Garrard,  which  was  on  the  lookout  for  Hood's  army. 
East  of  the  Chattahoochee  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  [How 
ard]  and  a  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  [ Schofield J^ 
had  been  sent  out  to  reconnoiter  and  to  seize  the  bridges  in 
rear  of  Hood's  army.  To  these  bridges,  however,  Hood  was 
wholly  indifferent,  as  he  expected  to  base  himself  upon  Ala 
bama,  and  would  have  the  Blue  Mountain-Selma  Railway  as 
a  line  of  communications.^  Selma  was  one  of  the  principal 
manufacturing  arsenals  of  the  Confederacy. 

On  the  3rd  of  October  Hood  dispatched  Stewart's  corps 
against  the  railway  north  of  Marietta  and  marched  his  main 
army  upon  Dallas,  where  he  arrived  on  the  6th  October. 

*B.  &  L.     Davis.     Hood  in  B.  &  L. 
fSherman  in  B.  &  L. 

$This  railway  is  shown  on  map  No.  289  as  the  Alabama  and  Ten 
nessee  Railroad. 


558  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Stewart  captured  the  small  Union  posts  at  Big  Shanty*  and 
Ackworth  and  rejoined  the  main  column  with  Lor  ing's  divi 
sion  before  it  reached  Dallas.  French's  division  [Stewart's 
corps]  had  moved  on  to  Allatoona.  This  place,  where  there 
was  a  large  depot  of  Federal  supplies,  had  been  occupied  by 
only  a  small  garrison;  but  General  Corse  had  been  ordered  to 
reinforce  the  garrison  with  his  division  from  Rome  in  case  the 
enemy  came  up  from  the  south.  Corse  reached  Allatoona  with 
a  few  regiments  on  the  4th.  French  assaulted  him  vigorously 
on  the  forenoon  of  the  5th.  Corse  made  a  very  gallant  de 
fense  and  repulsed  French  several  times.  Learning  that  heavy 
Union  reinforcements  were  coming  up  from  the  south,  French 
gave  up  the  effort  to  capture  the  place,  and  marched  away  to 
rejoin  the  main  Confederate  army. 

The  Union  reinforcements  that  French  heard  of  were  the 
leading  troops  of  General  Sherman's  main  army.  On  learn 
ing  that  Hood's  army  was  north  of  the  Chattahoochee  and  a 
part  of  it  upon  his  railway,  Sherman  started  the  Fourth  Corps 
[Stanley]  northward  on  the  2nd  of  October,  and  followed  it 
the  next  day  with  the  rest  of  his  army,  except  the  Twentieth 
Corps,  which  was  left  to  hold  Atlanta.  From  Kenesaw  Moun 
tain  Sherman  witnessed  Corse's  gallant  defense  of  Allatoona. 
while  signaling  him  that  reinforcements  were  hurrying  to 
him.f 

From  Dallas  Hood  continued  his  march  northward,  crossed 
the  Coosa  River  ten  miles  below  Rome  on  the  llth,  and,  ad 
vancing  on  Resaca,  destroyed  the  railway  between  that  place 
and  Tunnel  Hill,  and  captured  Dalton  on  the  13th.  French, 
whose  division  was  in  the  rear,  had  covered  the  column  so 
thoroughly  that  for  five  days,  from  the  5th  to  the  10th,  it  was 
not  known  at  Sherman's  headquarters  whether  Hood's  army 
was  marching  northward  or  westward.  In  the  vicinity  of 
Rome  Wheeler  had  rejoined  the  army  with  a  part  of  his  cav 
alry  on  its  way  back  from  Tennessee.  The  Union  garrison  at 
Resaca  had  been  reinforced  before  Hood  arrived  in  front  of  it, 
and  he  refrained  from  assaulting  it.  General  Hood  says:  "As 
the  road  between  Resaca  and  Tunnel  Hill  had  been  effectually 
destroyed,  the  army  was  put  in  motion  the  next  morning  (the 


*Big   Shanty  was  a   station  on  the  railway   between   Ackworth   and 
Kenesaw  Mountain. 
•^History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland — Van  Home. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.      559 

14th)  in  the  direction  of  Gadsden,  and  camped  that  night  near 
Villanow."* 

It  is  very  likely  that  the  advance  of  Sherman's  army  had 
something  to  do  with  hastening  Hood's  withdrawal  by  way 
of  Snake  Creek  Gap  to  Villanow.  Learning,  on  the  10th,  that 
Hood  was  marching  toward  Rome,  Sherman  concentrated  his 
columns  on  the  llth  at  Kingston  with  the  view  of  supporting 
Corse  at  Rome.  But,  as  we  already  know,  Hood  did  not  stop 
at  Rome;  and  again  the  Federal  cavalry  lost  touch  with  his 
main  body.  As  soon,  however,  as  Sherman  found  which  way 
Hood  had  gone,  he  started  after  him.  He  arrived  at  Resaca 
on  the  14th,  and,  finding  that  Hood  had  retreated,  undertook 
to  shut  him  up  in  Snake  Creek  Gap  by  sending  Stanley  with 
his  own  corps  [Fourth]  and  Davis's  [Fourteenth]  by  way  of 
Tilton  to  intercept  him  at  the  northern  end  of  the  gap,  while 
Howard  detained  him  at  its  southern  end.  But  Wheeler's  cav 
alry  alone  tarried  to  skirmish  with  Howard,  and  Stanley  was 
not  in  time  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  column. 

Hood  continued  his  retreat  to  Cross  Roads,  nine  miles  south 
of  Lafayette,  where  he  arrived  on  the  15th.  Here,  Hood  says, 
he  meant  to  select  a  position  and  give  battle,  as  he  had  lured 
Sherman  as  far  north  as  he  had  hoped  to.  He  was,  moreover, 
near  the  Alabama  line,  and  had  the  Blue  Mountain-Selma 
Railway  immediately  behind  him  to  fall  back  upon  if  defeated. 
Upon  consulting  his  corps-commanders,  however,  he  was  ad 
vised  that  the  morale  of  the  troops  did  not  warrant  risking 
battle  against  the  large  force  which,  according  to  Wheeler's 
report,  was  pursuing  him.  After  resting  two  days,  therefore, 
at  Cross  Roads,  he  directed  his  march  upon  Gadsden,*  where 
he  concentrated  his  entire  force  on  the  22nd.f 

Sherman  followed  Hood  no  farther  than  Gaylesville,  where 
he  halted  to  watch  his  movements.  From  this  time  forward 
these  two  commanders  marched  their  armies  in  opposite  direc 
tions — Sherman's  marched  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  Hood's 
toward  the  Ohio  River.  For  several  weeks  General  Sherman's 
mind  had  dwelt  upon  the  project  of  marching  his  army  through 
the  heart  of  Georgia  to  the  seacoast,  and  thence,  ultimately, 
northward  through  the  Carolinas  to  a  junction  with  Grant  in 
Virginia.  He  had  written  General  Grant  several  letters  upon 
the  subject,  but  had  not,  as  yet,  persuaded  him  that  it  was  not 
necessary  to  destroy  Hood's  army  before  undertaking  the 


*Hood  in  B.  &  L. 
fColonel  Stone  in  B.  &  L. 


560  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

march  to  the  sea.  But  now  Sherman  was  convinced  that  he 
could  not  catch  that  army,  and  that,  if  he  allowed  it  to  decoy 
him  out  of  Georgia  into  Tennessee,  he  should  do  precisely  what 
the  Confederate  authorities  wanted,  and  what  Hood  was  work 
ing  for ;  and  he  should  surrender  all  he  had  gained  by  his  cam 
paign  against  Atlanta.  On  a  sudden,  however,  Hood's  army 
appeared  in  front  of  Decatur,  on  the  Tennessee  River  seventy- 
five  miles  northwest  of  Gadsden,  and  General  Grant  gave  his 
consent.  On  the  2nd  of  November  he  wired  Sherman  to  go 
ahead  with  his  march  to  the  sea,  and  within  a  day  or  two 
Sherman  had  the  bulk  of  his  forces  assembled  at  Rome  and 
Kingston.* 

•HOOD'S  PLAN. 

While  General  Hopd  was  resting  with  his  army  at  Cross 
Roads  he  wrought  out,  in  his  mind,  a  plan  of  campaign  which, 
if  it  had  succeeded  as  he  hoped  it  would,  might  have  had  far- 
reaching  consequences.  It  was,  briefly,  as  follows :  to  cross 
the  Tennessee  River  at  or  near  Guntersville  and  destroy  the 
railway  bridge  at  Bridgeport,  and  the  Nashville  and  Chatta 
nooga  Railway;  to  attack  and,  if  possible,  defeat  the  troops  of 
Thomas  and  Schofield  in  Tennessee  before  they  could  concen 
trate  ;  then  to  capture  the  Federal  base  at  Nashville ;  and,  hav 
ing  crossed  the  Cumberland  River  at  some  point  where  the 
Union  gunboats  could  not  interfere  with  him,  to  march  on 
into  Kentucky  and  take  position  with  his  left  near  Richmond, 
and  his  right  toward  Hazel  Green. f  Here  he  would  threaten 
Cincinnati  and,  at  the  same  time,  recruit  his  army  from  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee.  He  hoped  to  do  all  this  while  Sherman 
was  making  up  his  mind  whether  to  follow  him  or  to  march 
through  Georgia  to  the  seashore.  If  Sherman  should  march  to 
the  coast,  as  Hood  believed  he  would,  Sherman  would  have  to 
make  a  long  journey  by  sea  and  land  to  go  to  the  defense  of 
Ohio  and  Kentucky;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  Sherman  should 
follow  Hood  into  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  Hood  hoped  to 
have  his  own  army  so  much  improved  in  morale  by  its  suc 
cesses,  and  so  much  strengthened  in  numbers  by  recruitment, 
as  to  be  able  to  offer  battle  with  every  chance  of  victory.  If 
victorious  he  would  then  send  reinforcements  to  Lee  in  Vir- 


*Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War — Jacob  D.  Cox. 

fRichmond  is  a  hundred  miles  south  of  Cincinnati  and  Hazel  Green 
is  fifty  miles  east  of  Richmond. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       561 

ginia,  or  march  through  the  gaps  of  the  Cumberland  Moun 
tains  and  attack  Grant's  army  in  rear.  He  reckoned  that  he 
could  take  the  latter  course  even  though  he  should  be  de 
feated.  If  Sherman  should  march  to  the  seacoast,  and  from 
there  northward  to  join  Grant,  Hood  calculated  that  he  could 
make  his  movement  through  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  and 
strike  Grant  in  rear  two  weeks  before  Sherman  could  reach 
Virginia.* 

At  Gadsden  Beauregard  visited  Hood,  and  Hood  unfolded 
the  plan  to  him.  Beauregard  approved  the -plan  but  stipulated 
that  all  of  Wheeler's  cavalry  must  be  left  to  hang  upon  Sher 
man's  army  and  harass  it  in  its  march  to  the  sea;  to  make  up 
for  this  loss,  however,  he  sent  an  order  to  Forrest  to  join 
Hood's  army  as  soon  as  it  should  cross  the  Tennessee. 

HOOD'S  ADVANCE  TO  THE  TENNESSEE. 

Hood  s'ays  the  order  to  advance  into  Tennessee  put  his 
troops  in  high  spirits.  With  twenty  days'  rations  in  their 
haversacks  and  wagons  they  set  out  for  Guntersville,  on  the 
22nd  of  October,  by  all  the  roads  leading  from  Gadsden  in 
that  direction;  but  before  the  army  had  marched  two  days 
Hood  received  word  that  Forrest,  who  was  then  at  Jackson, 
Tennessee,  would  be  unable  to  join  him  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Guntersville,  on  account  of  the  high  water  in  the  rivers 
he  would  have  to  ford.  Hood,  therefore,  turned  his  columns 
westward,  toward  Florence.  This  change  of  direction  elimi 
nated  at  once  the  destruction  of  the  railway  bridge  at  Bridge 
port  from  Hood's  plan. 

On  the  26th  Hood's  army  appeared  before  Decatur,  which 
was  held  by  a  single  Union  regiment.  By  the  close  of  the  day 
the  garrison  had  received  reinforcements.  Hood  contented 
himself  with  making  a  demonstration  against  the  town,  and 
pushed  on  to  Tuscumbia,  forty-five  miles  farther  west,  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river,  opposite  Florence.  By  the  last  day  of 
October  Hood  had  his  headquarters  at  Tuscumbia  with  one 
corps  [Lee]  at  Florence,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river. 
Here  Hood  had  expected  to  find  supplies  awaiting  him,  and  to 
be  joined  promptly  by  Forrest;  but  he  was  to  be  disappointed. 
The  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railway  needed  to  be  repaired 
from  Corinth  before  the  stores  could  be  hauled,  and  heavy 

*Hood  in  B.  &  L. 


562  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

rains  delayed  the  work  for  two  weeks.  So  it  was  not  until 
the  19th  of  November  that  Hood  was  ready  to  march  north 
ward  from  Florence.  Forrest  had  joined  him  there  on  the 
18th,*  having  been  much  delayed  in  his  march  by  mud  and 
high  water. 

Hood's  movement  northward  from  Georgia  had  "created  in 
tense  alarm  all  over  the  North/'  and  all  available  troops  had 
been  hurried  to  General  Thomas  in  Tennessee  in  order  to  en 
able  him  to  protect  Sherman's  communications  and  depots.f 
Notwithstanding  the  efforts  to  reinforce  Thomas,  when  Hood's 
army  first  appeared  on  the  Tennessee  there  were  only  about 
26,000  infantry  and  5,000  cavalry  within  the  whole  District  of 
Tennessee,  scattered  in  detachments  from  Chattanooga  nearly 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio,  guarding  railways  and  depots  and  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee  River .J§  Forrest  was  at  the  time  in 
the  western  part  of  the  State  attacking  Union  posts,  capturing 
gunboats  and  transports,  and  making  general  havoc.  Sher 
man  said  in  a  telegram  to  General  Grant:  "Forrest  seems  to 
be  scattered  from  Eastport  to  Jackson,  Paris,  and  the  lower 
Tennessee."]}  The  only  Federal  troops  at  hand  to  dispute 
Hood's  passage  of  the  Tennessee  River  were  Croxton's  brigade 
of  cavalry,  which  was  watching  the  river  at  that  point.  This 
brigade  could  make  little  hindrance,  and  fell  back  behind  Shoal 
Creek,  where  it  was  joined  by  Hatch  with  his  division  of  cav 
alry.  The  combined  cavalry  force  did  not  exceed  3,500  horse 
men;  it  could  offer  little  active  resistance  to  the  advance  of 
Hood's  army,  but  was  able  to  keep  the  Union  commanders  in 
rear  informed  of  its  movement  and  to  obstruct  the  roads  and 
fords  by  felling  trees  in  them.** 

As  soon  as  Sherman,  who  was  still  at  Gaylesville,  had  re 
ceived  word  that  Hood's  army  was  approaching  Decatur,  he 
dispatched  the  Fourth  Corps  [Stanley]  to  Thomas.  One  divi 
sion  reached  Pulaski,  on  the  railway  forty  miles  north  of  De 
catur,  on  the  1st  of  November,  and  was  joined  there  four  days 
later  by  the  other  two.tt  "Learning  from  Thomas  that  the  new 


*Life  of  Forrest — Wyeth.  In  his  account  of  this  campaign  in  Battles 
and  Leaders  General  Hood  says  Forrest  reported  on  the  14th  of 
November.  But  Hood  has  either  made  a  mistake  in  the  date  or  he 
meant  that  Forrest  reported  by  wire  or  letter. 

fVan  Home. 

jCox. 

§The  divisions  of  Morgan  and  Newton  had  returned  to  "Georgia. 

jfWyeth. 

**Cox.    General  Wilson  in  B.  &  L. 

ffColonel  Stone  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.      563 

troops  promised,  by  Grant  were  coming  forward  very  slowly," 
Sherman  also  ordered  the  Twenty-third  Corps  [Schofield]  to 
go  to  Tennessee  and  reinforce  Thomas.  A.  J.  Smith,  who  was 
in  the  western  part  of  Missouri  with  three  divisions  of  the 
Sixteenth  Corps  operating  against  Sterling  Price,  was  also  or 
dered  to  Tennessee,  but  he  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in 
any  operations  before  the  battle  of  Nashville.*  General  James 
H.  Wilson  had  been  sent  to  Thomas  to  command  his  cavalry; 
Wilson  reached  Nashville  on  the  6th  of  November  and  at  once 
set  about  organizing  a  cavalry  corps  and  procuring  mounts 
for  it. 

In  the  meanwhile  Forrest  was  keeping  up  great  activity  along 
the  Tennessee  River,  in  the  western  part  of  the  State,  on  his 
way  up  the  river  to  report  to  Hood.  On  the  4th  of  November 
he  bombarded  the  Union  post  at  Johnsonville,  an  important 
depot  eighty  miles  west  of  Nashville,  throwing  the  garrison 
into  a  panic  and  starting  it  in  flight  toward  Nashville.  "Three 
gunboats,  eight  transports,  and  some  barges  were  moored  to 
the  river-bank,  and  great  quantities  of  stores  in  warehouses 
at  the  landing.  All  these  were  abandoned  and  burned  by  the 
crews  and  garrison/'f  Schofield  reached  Nashville  that  day 
with  his  leading  brigade  and  was  hurried  on  to  Johnsonville  by 
Thomas.  He  found,  upon  his  arrival  at  the  town,  that  For 
rest  had  not  stayed  long  enough  to  cross  the  river.  Schofield 
returned  to  Nashville  and,  on  the  llth,  was  sent  to  Pulaski  to 
take  command  of  the  forces  assembling  there. J-  By  the  15th 
he  had  at  Pulaski  about  18,000  infantry  and  artillery,  consisting 
of  the  Fourth  Corps  and  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third, 
except  one  brigade  which  was  at  Columbia.  The  cavalry  un 
der  Hatch,  now  increased  by  Capron's  brigade  to  about  4,300 
troopers,  was  covering  the  front  and  right  toward  Florence 
and  Waynesboro.§ 

HOOD  ADVANCES  AGAINST  NASHVILLE. 

On  the  19th  of  November  Hood  began  his  movement  to 
ward  Nashville  by  starting  Forrest's  cavalry  forward;  his 


*A  small  part  of  this  corps  arrived  in  time  to  be  at  the  battle  of 
Franklin. 

fCox. 

^General  Stanley,  who  was  at  Pulaski,  ranked  Schofield,  but  the 
latter  took  command  over  him  by  virtue  of  being  a  department  com 
mander.  Stone  in.  B.  &  L.  » 

§Cox,  Stone,  and  Wilson  in  B.  &  L. 


564  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

whole  army  was  in  motion  at  daybreak  on  the  21st.  Stew 
art's  corps  marched  by  the  Lawrenceburg  road,  Cheatham's 
by  the  Waynesboro  road,  and  Lee's  by  an  intermediate  road. 
Hood  hoped  to  turn  the  position  of  SchofiekTs  force  at  Pu- 
laski  and  cut  off  its  retreat,  before  it  could  reach  Duck  River 
at  Columbia.*  Thomas  had  hoped  that  he  should  have  time 
to  concentrate  his  forces  to  stop  Hood  south  of  Duck  River, 
but  he  failed  to  do  so.  Smith  had  not  come  from  Missouri, 
new  regiments  had  not  joined  as  fast  as  old  ones  had  been 
discharged,  men  had  been  furloughed  to  go  home  to  vote, 
and  Wilson  had  not  gotten  horses  for  his  dismounted  cavalry. 
Thomas  could,  therefore,  do  nothing  but  order  Schofield  to 
fall  back  to  Columbia,  f 

COLUMBIA. 

Hatch's  cavalry  made  such  resistance  as  it  could  to  Forrest's 
superior  numbers,  but  it  was  driven  back ;  and  on  the  22nd 
Hood's  right-hand  column  was  at  Lawrenceburg,  sixteen  miles 
west  of  Pulaski.  Schofield  now  had  no  time  to  lose.  The 
two  divisions  of  Cox  [Twenty-third  Corps]  and  Wagner 
[Fourth  Corps]  J  were  at  once  started  back  toward  Columbia. 
Stanley  was  to  escort  the  trains  the  next  day  with  the  other 
two  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  Cox  arrived,  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th,  within  nine  miles  of  Columbia,  when  he 
heard  the  sound  of  firing  to  the  west.  He  marched  to  the 
sound  and  reached  the  ground  just  in  time  to  check  Forrest's 
cavalry,  which  was  driving  Capron's  cavalry  brigade  on  the 
Mount  Pleasant  Pike.  Within  an  hour,  but  for  Cox's  timely 
arrival,  Forrest  would  have  had  possession  of  the  bridge  at 
Columbia,  and  Schofield's  line  of  retreat  would  have  been 
blocked.  The  head  of  Stanley's  column  reached  Columbia  and 
connected  with  Cox's  line  in  front  of  the  town  at  9  a.  m.,  having 
marched  from  Pulaski,  thirty  miles,  since  2  p.  m.  the  day  be 
fore.  Stanley  had  halted  and  bivouacked  at  Lynneville;  but 
he  had  his  command  wakened  at  1  a.  m.  on  the  24th  and  re 
sumed  the  march. §  Hatch  with  his  own  division  and  Crox- 
ton's  brigade  of  cavalry  had  covered  the  retreat  from  Pulaski. 
As  fast  as  the  troops  arrived  at  Columbia  they  were  put  to 


*Hood  in  B.  &  L. 
fVan  Home.     Stone  in  B.  &  L. 
^Formerly  Newton's  division. 
§Stone  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       565 

throwing  up  earthworks,  covering  the  approaches  to  the  town 
from  the  south ;  the  trains  were  sent  across  the  river. 

There  had  been  rain  and  sleet  and  snow,  and  the  roads  were 
in  such  a  frightful  state  that  Hood's  army,  with  all  effort,  could 
make  no  more  than  ten  miles  a  day.  The  last  of  it  did  not, 
therefore,  arrive  in  front  of  Columbia  until  the  26th.  In  the 
meanwhile  Ruger  had  come  with  one  brigade  of  his  division 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  from  Johnsonville,  and  another  of 
his  brigades  had  been  sent  to  guard  the  crossing  of  Duck  River 
at  Williamsport.  Wilson  had  come  forward  from  Nashville 
and  taken  command  of  the  Union  cavalry  at  the  front,  and  it 
was  here  strengthened  to  about  7,000  horses  by  the  arrival  of 
several  regiments  from  the  remount  camp  at  Louisville.  Wil 
son  placed  it  along  the  north  bank  of  the  river  "to  watch  the 
enemy's  movements  either  to  the  right  or  to  the  left.* 

Pursuant  to  orders  previously  received  from  Thomas,  Gen 
eral  Granger,  on  the  day  that  Schofield  fell  back  from  Pulaski, 
withdrew  the  troops  from  Decatur,  Athens,  and  Huntsville,  to 
reinforce  the  garrisons  at  Stevenson  and  Murfreesboro  on  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway. 

SPRING  HILL. 

(290)  Being  anxious  to  preserve  the  railway  bridge  at  Co 
lumbia  for  future  use,  Thomas,  hoping  for  the  arrival  of  A.  J. 
Smith's  division,  urged  Schofield  to  hold  on  to  his  position 
there.  Hood  gave  no  signs  of  an  intention  to  attack,  but  Scho 
field  soon/  became  convinced  that  he  was  going  to  cross  the 
river  above  the  town  to  turn  the  position.  Schofield,  therefore, 
could  not  hazard  staying  longer  on  the  south  bank,  and  with 
drew  his  army  to  the  north  bank  on  the  night  of  the  27th.  On 
the  evening  of  the  28th  Forrest  forded  the  river  with  his  cav 
alry  between  Columbia  and  Huey's  Hill,  at  a  point  about  eight 
miles  above  the  town,  and  pushed  out  to  the  front  and  right. 
Wilson  had  collected  his  scattered  squadrons  as  quickly  as 
practicable  to  oppose  Forrest,  and  by  7  p.  m.  had  them  all  as 
sembled  at  Hurt's  Corner.  By  nightfall  he  had  learned  that 
Forrest  was  followed  by  Hood's  infantry,  which  had  a  pon 
toon-bridge  across  the  river  at  Huey's  Mill.  A  message  dis 
patched  to  Schofield  with  this  information  did  not  reach  him 
until  daylight  of  the  29th. 


*Wilson  in  B.  &  L. 


566  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Hood's  pontoon-bridge  was,  of  a  truth,  at  Davis's  Ford 
about  three  miles  above  Columbia,  and  his  infantry  did  not 
begin  to  cross  until  daybreak  on  the  29th.*  Cheatham's  corps 
was  in  the  lead,  followed  by  Stewart's.  Lee's  corps  and  the 
whole  of  the  artillery  were  left  at  Columbia  "with  orders  to 
make  strong  demonstrations  in  the  morning,  and  to  force  the 
crossing  of  the  river  later  in  the  day/'f 

At  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  [November  29]  Stanley 
started  for  Spring  Hill,  eleven  miles  back,  with  two  of  his 
divisions,  and  the  trains  and  reserve  artillery.  The  rest  of 
the  Union  forces  remained  temporarily  to  hold  the  river  cross 
ings.  Stanley's  leading  brigade  reached  Spring  Hill  just  in 
time  to  meet  and  repel  Forrest,  who  was  hurrying  by  the  Mount 
Carmel  road*  to  seize  that  important  point  and  block  the  re 
treat  of  the  Union  army.  Forrest  had  advanced  against  Wil 
son  early  in  the  morning,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  forenoon 
had  wholly  cut  him  off  from  Schofield's  main  body  and  driven 
him  beyond  Mount  Carmel  on  the  Franklin  turnpike.  For 
rest  then  left  a  covering  detachment  at  Mount  Carmel  and 
hastened  with  the  rest  of  his  command  to  Spring  Hill. 

(291)  At  Rutherford's  Creek,  seven  miles  from  Spring 
Hill,  Stanley  had  left  Kimball's  division  to  guard  the  cross 
ing  for  the  troops  in  rear ;  he  deployed  his  leading  division 
[Wagner]  to  hold  the  village,  where  the  trains  were  parking. 
At  this  point  several  important  roads  joined  the  main  highway 
to  Franklin  and  Nashville.  Stanley  placed  two  brigades  in  a 
semicircle  about  the  village,  from  the  railway  at  the  north  to 
the  pike  at  the  south,  and  a  third  [Bradley]  upon  a  knoll 
nearly  a  mile  farther  southeast,  covering  the  approaches  from 
that  side.  Scarcely  had  his  dispositions  been  made  when  For 
rest's  cavalry  appeared  north  of  the  village,  and  Cleburne's 
division  [Cheatham's  corps]  assaulted  Bradley's  brigade.  In 
advancing  to  the  attack  Cleburne's  division  turned  its  right 
flank  to  Bradley's  brigade  and  was  repulsed.  It  then  changed 
front  and  finally  drove  Bradley  back  upon  the  main  line. 
Brown  and  Bate  had,  in  the  meanwhile,  come  up  with  their 
divisions  of  Cheatham's  corps ;  but  before  they  had  gotten  well 
into  action,  night  was  falling  and  Hood  suspended  the  assault 
till  morning.  Stewart  had  been  ordered  to  form  his  corps  in 
line  of  battle  facing  west,  on  the  south  side  of  Rutherford's 
Creek,  and  was  left  there  until  after  dark.  Why  Stewart 

*Hood  in  B,  &  L. 
tCox. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       567 

was  ordered  to  form  line  of  battle  south  of  the  creek,  and  not 
employed  to  support  Cheatham  as  soon  as  possible,  has  not 
been  satisfactorily  explained.  General  Hood  does  not  admit 
that  he  gave  such  an  order.  After  dark  Stewart  was  ordered 
to  place  his  corps  on  Cheatham's  right  across  the  turnpike; 
but  he  bivouacked  east  of  the  pike.* 

Lee's  corps,  except  Johnson's  division  which  had  marched 
with  Stewart,  had  kept  up  a  demonstration  all  day  at  Colum 
bia,  but  had  not  been  able  to  force  a  crossing*  Schofield  had 
hastened  with  Ruger's  division  to  Stanley's  assistance,  arriving 
at  Spring  Hill  at  seven  o'clock.  Cox's  division  had  held  the 
crossing  at  Columbia,  and  Wood's  had  formed  on  the  turn 
pike  facing  to  the  east  between  Kimball  and  Cox.  Soon  after 
dark  the  line  of  outposts  near  the  river  was  strengthened, 
and  Cox's  division  started  for  Spring  Hill,  followed  in  turn 
by  Wood's  and  Kimball's  as  they  were  passed  on  the  road. 
The  outposts  were  withdrawn  at  midnight.  From  Spring 
Hill  General  Schofield  hurried  the  divisions  along  toward 
Franklin  twelve  miles  farther.  Wagner's  division  remained 
in  position  until  all  the  other  troops  and  the  trains  were  safe 
on  the  way.  Opdycke's  brigade  of  this  division,  which  was  to 
be  the  rear-guard,  did  not  quit  Spring  Hill  until  6  a.  m.  on  the 
30th. 

All  night  the  Federal  troops  were  marching  on  the  road 
within  gunshot  of  the  Confederate  bivouacs,  and  within  the 
light  of  their  fires,  yet  were  not  molested.  About  midnight 
Hood  learned  that  "stragglers"  were  passing  on  the  road,  and 
he  sent  Cheatham  an  order  to  have  them  fired  upon.  Cheatham 
then  ordered  Johnson,  whose  division  had  been  placed  under 
his  command  and  was  on  his  extreme  left  nearest  the  pike,  to 
investigate  the  matter,  "and  cut  off  anything  that  might  be 
passing."  About  2  a.  m.  Johnson  reported  to  Cheatham  that 
he  had  ridden  "close  up  to  the  turnpike,  where"  he  "found 
everything  quiet  and  no  one  passing."f  Thus  passed  the  last 
and  greatest  opportunity  of  Hood's  military  career. 

FRANKLIN. 

(289)  Finding,  at  dawn  on  the  30th,  that  Schofield's  army 
had  slipped  by  him,  Hood  set  his  own  upon  the  road  as  quickly 
as  possible.  His  only  hope  now  was  to  overtake  his  enemy  at 


*General  Cheatham  in  B.  &  L. 
f  Cheatham  and  Hood  in  B.  &  L. 


568  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Franklin  and  capture  or  destroy  him  before  he  could  cross 
the  Harpeth  River.  Lee's  corps,  which  had  crossed  Duck 
River  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Federals  in  the  night, 
reached  Spring  Hill  at  9  a.  m.,  and,  after  a  short  rest,  fol 
lowed  the  main  army. 

Schofield  had  not  expected  such  good  fortune  as  to  get 
safely  by  Hood  at  Spring  Hill.  He  had  hurried  a  staff-officer 
forward  to  Franklin  with  an  order  to  A.  J.  Smith,  whose 
corps  he  hoped  against  hope  might  have  arrived  there,  to 
hasten  on  toward  Spring  Hill.  The  officer  was  also  to  wire 
General  Thomas :  "The  general  says  he  will  not  be  able  to 
get  farther  than  Thompson's  Station  to-night.  .  .  ,  He 
regards  his  situation  as  extremely  perilous.  .  .  ."  Thomp 
son's  Station  was  only  three  miles  north  of  Spring  Hill ;  there, 
at  least,  Schofield  expected  to  find  his  path  blocked.  But  it 
was  not  so ;  the  way  was  clear,  and  the  Union  army  marched 
on  unchecked  to  Franklin.* 

(292)  The  pontoon-train  had  been  destroyed  at  Columbia 
to  prevent  it  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates; 
the  old  wagon  bridge  at  Franklin  was  in  pieces,  and  the  river, 
with  high  water  and  steep  banks,  could  barely  be  made  ford- 
able.  Schofield,  who  had  come  on  with  his  first  troops,  had 
work  begun  at  once  to  plank  the  railway  bridge  and  repair 
the  wagon  bridge.  By  noon  they  were  both  done.  In  the 
meantime  the  south  side  of  the  river  must  be  held  until  the 
trains  could  be  got  across. 

The  little  town  sat  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Harpeth 
River  in  a  bend  not  quite  a  mile  across  at  its  widest  part. 
Columbia  Pike  and  Carter's  Creek  Pike,  the  roads  by  which 
Hood's  army  was  to  be  expected,  left  the  town  by  the  same 
street,  but  forked  at  its  southern  outlet,  Columbia  Pike  run 
ning  for  some  distance  almost  due  south,  and  Carter's  Creek 
Pike  southwest.  About  a  mile  from  the  bridges  Columbia 
Pike  passed  over  a  low  hill,  upon  which  the  Carter  house 
stood,  five  hundred  yards  west  of  the  point  where  the  river 
began  to  curve  round  the  town.  Close  to  this  point,  between 
the  river-bank  and  another  low  hill,  the  Nashville  and  Decatur 
Railway  ran,  parallel  to  the  turnpike.  On  the  north  bank  of 
the  stream  an  earthwork,  Fort  Granger,  stood  upon  a  hill,  just 
a  mile  from  the  Carter  house  hill ;  it  commanded  the  bridges 
and  the  town,  and  had  a  fine  sweep  of  the  open  ground  south 


*Stone  in  B.  &  L.    Van  Home. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       569 

and  west  of  the  town.  Seven  hundred  yards  northwest  of  the 
Carter  house  hill  Carter's  Creek  Pike  crossed  another  low  hill. 

Cox's  division,  which  was  in  the  lead  of  the  Federal  col 
umn,  reached  the  outskirts  of  Franklin  about  the  hour  that 
the  rear-guard  was  quitting  Spring  Hill.  Spent  with  march 
ing  and  fighting  night  and  day  for  a  week,  the  men,  neverthe 
less,  did  not  lie  down  to  rest  until  they  had  thrown  up  a  line 
of  earthworks  in  their  front.  As  the  other  troops  came  up 
they  prolonged  the  line  to  right  and  left,  taking  in  the  three 
knolls  already  mentioned.  By  noon  the  line  was  finished ;  with 
its  flanks  resting  upon  the  river,  it  completely  covered  the  town, 
where  the  wagons  were  now  crowding  the  streets,  awaiting 
their  turns  to  cross.  Near  the  Carter  house  was  a  consid 
erable  thicket  of  young  locust  trees,  some  of  which  were  felled 
to  form  a  sort  of  abatis;  and  between  the  pike  and  the  rail 
way  the  works  were  partly  sheltered  by  a  stout  hedge  of  osage 
orange.  With  these  exceptions  the  ground  in  front  of  the  line 
was  free  from  fences  or  other  obstacles  and  every  part  of  it 
was  in  plain  sight.*  The  entire  line  of  intrenchments  was 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  long. 

Cox's  division  [Twenty-third  Corps]  occupied  the  line  from 
Columbia  Pike  to  the  river  southeast  of  the  town;  Ruger's 
division  [Twenty-third  Corps]  was  between  the  two  pikes ; 
and  Kimball's  division  [Fourth  Corps]  between  Carter's  Creek 
Pike  and  the  river  northwest  of  the  town.  Wood's  division 
[Fourth  Corps]  was«sent  to  the  north  bank  to  guard  the  trains 
as  they  passed  over,  as  well  as  to  be  on  the  lookout  for  any 
turning  movement  sthe  enemy  might  make.  Two  brigades  of 
Wagner's  division  [Fourth  Corps]  were  halted  across  Co 
lumbia  Pike  on  a  slope  a  half-mile  in  front  of  the  main  line. 
Opdycke's  brigade  of  this  division,  however,  which  was  the 
last  to  come  up,  massed  behind  the  Carter  house.  The  artil 
lery  of  the  Fourth  Corps  took  position  on. the  south  side  of 
the  stream,  and  that  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  sent  over 
to  the  north  side. 

Between  two  and  three  o'clock  the  head  of  Hood's  column 
arrived  in  front  of  Wagner's  line.  Stewart's  corps  deployed 
to  the  east  of  Columbia  Pike;  Cheatham's  corps  deployed  on 
the  left  with  Cleburne's  division-  east  of  the  turnpike,  Brown's 
next,  west  of  the  pike,  and  Bate's  on  the  extreme  left.  Of 
Lee's  corps  only  Johnson's  division  had  come  up,  and  it  was 


*Stone  in  B.  6-  L. 


570  .     AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

held  in  reserve.  Wagner  had  been  directed  to  hold  his  ad 
vanced  position  "in  observation  only  till  Hood  should  show  a 
disposition  to  advance  in  force,  and  then  to  retire  within  the 
lines  to  Opdycke's  position  to  act  as  a  general  reserve."*  But 
Wagner's  brigades  clung  to  their  faulty  position  until  Cle- 
burne's  and  Brown's  divisions  in  overwhelming  numbers 
charged  upon  them,  enveloped  their  flanks,  and  drove  them 
back  in  headlong  flight.  The  men  in  the  main  Union  line 
dared  not  fire  at  the  pursuing  enemy  lest  they  should  shoot 
down  their  friends,  "and  the  guns,  loaded  with  grape  and  can 
ister,  stood  silent  in  the  embrasures."  The  crowd  of  fugitives 
swept  over  the  parapets,  carrying  part  of  the  main  line  with 
them  "down  the  pike  past  the  Carter  house  toward  the  town." 
These  soldiers  abandoned  their  guns,  leaving  a  gap  in  the  line 
of  more  than  a  regiment's  front  on  each  side  of  the  pike.  With 
exultant  cheers  the  pursuers  seized  the  deserted  guns  and 
earthworks. 

(293)  Thus  Hood  broke  the  center  of  the  Union  line  and 
was  master  of  its  key-point.  It  looked  as  if  he  would  surely 
complete  his  work  by  rolling  one  or  the  other  wing  of  Scho- 
field's  line  into  the  river,  and  seal  the  fate  of  the  army  by  seiz 
ing  the  ford  and  bridges.  But  no  such  fortune  awaited  him. 
At  this  conjuncture  Opdycke  hurried  his  brigade  from  its 
position  in  reserve,  and  hurled  it  upon  the  victorious  Confed 
erates.  He  was  joined  by  two  regiments  of  Cox's  division 
which  had  been  in  an  intrenchment  in  rear  of  the  main  line. 
In  the  fierce  hand-to-hand  struggle  that  ensued  the  victorious 
Confederates  were  driven  out  of  the  works  they  had  taken, 
leaving  1,000  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Federals.  Just 
before  dark,  which  fell  early  on  this  winter's  day,  Johnson's 
division  went  to  Cheatham's  support  and  made  a  desperate 
charge,  but  was  unable  to  renew  the  breach  in  the  Union  line. 
Darkness  prevented  Hood  from  putting  Lee's  other  two  divi 
sions  into  the  battle.  The  contest,  however,  kept  up  with  more 
or  less  violence  until  nine  o'clock. 

The  left  of  Cheatham's  line,  Bate's  division,  had  advanced 
at  the  same  time  as  Brown  and  Cleburne.  It  reached  beyond 
Carter's  Creek  Pike,  but  the  Union  line  bent  back  so  far  in 
that  quarter  that  Bate's  assault  fell  considerably  later  than 
Brown's  and  Cleburne's.  Finding  the  works  before  him 
stoutly  defended,  Bate  did  not  push  his  assault.  At  the  oppo- 

*Cox. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       571 

site  flank  Stewart's  corps  had  kept  abreast  of  Cheatham's,  and 
had  assaulted  Cox's  division  desperately,  but  had  never  suc 
ceeded  in  crossing  the  parapets,  though  many  men  reached 
the  ditches  and  the  osage  orange  hedge,  there  to  die  or  sur 
render. 

The  battle  of  Franklin  was  one  of  the  most  fiercely  fought 
of  the  Civil  War,  and  more  general  officers  are  said  to  have 
been  killed  or  wounded  in  it  than  in  any  other.  General  Cle- 
burne  was  among  the  slain.  The  losses,  according  to  Van 
Home,  were  750  killed,  3,800  seriously  wounded,  and  702  miss 
ing  on  the  Confederate  side;  189  killed,  1,033  wounded,  and 
1,104  missing  on  the  Union  side.  Hood  states  that  ten  days 
after  the  battle  his  effective  strength  in  all  arms  was  only 
23,053,  and  that  he  had  lost  7,547  men  since  leaving  Florence.* 

While  the  infantry  combat  was  going  on  Forrest,  with  three 
of  his  brigades,  had  crossed  the  Harpeth  River  on  Hood's  right 
and  become  engaged  with  Wilson's  cavalry.  As  Wilson  out 
numbered  him,  he  was  forced  at  nightfall  to  withdraw  to  the 
south  bank.  Chalmers's  brigade  on  the  other  flank  attacked  a 
part  of  the  Union  line,  but  exerted  no  influence  upon  the  result 
of  the  battle. 

NASHVILLE. 

(289)  The  whole  front  being  quiet  by  midnight,  Schofield 
began  withdrawing  his  troops  from  the  field  to  resume  his 
retreat  toward  Nashville.  His  dead  and  many  of  his  wounded 
had  to  be  left  upon  the  field.  Wood's  division,  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  held  the  bridges  until  the  rest  of  the  infantry 
and  artillery  had  passed  over  and  gotten  on  the  way,  when  it 
took  up  the  march.  Wilson's  cavalry  did  not  start  until  day 
light;  it  covered  the  rear  and  flanks  of  the  retreating  column. 
(294)  The  little*  army  reached  Nashville  on  the  morning  of 
the  1st  of  December,  and  took  its  place  in  the  works  with  the 
other  forces  Thomas  had  assembled  there.  Wilson's  cavalry 
took  station  at  Edgefield  on  the.  opposite  bank  of  the  Cumber 
land  River. 

Hood  followed  Schofield  on  the  1st  of  December,  and,  ar 
riving  at  Nashville  on  the  2nd,  put  his  army  into  position  in 
front  of  the  Union  works  and  intrenched  it.  Lee's  corps  oc 
cupied  the  center  astride  the  Franklin  Pike,  Stewart's  the  left, 
and  Cheatham's  the  right.  The  bulk  of  Forrest's  cavalry 


*Hood  in  B.  &  L. 


572  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

took  its  place  between  Stewart's  left  flank  and  the  river  below 
Nashville. 

A.  J.  Smith  with  his  three  divisions  [Sixteenth  Corps],  some 
12,000  men,  had  at  last  reached  Nashville.  About  9,000  ar 
rived  on  November  30,  and  the  rest  the  next  day.  By  the  2nd 
of  December  Steedman  had  brought  a  provisional  division  of 
5,200  men  from  Chattanooga  made  up  largely  of  "casuals" 
from  Sherman's  army.  Before  the  battle  of  Nashville  took 
place  there  were  enough  other  "casuals"  and  new  regiments 
at  Nashville  to  form  a  second  provisional  division  of  more  than 
5,000  men,  which  was  put  under  General  Cruft;  and  the  em 
ployees  of  the  supply  departments  had  also  been  armed  and 
organized  into  a  division.  Most  of  the  Federal  detachments 
from  North  Alabama,  some  8,000  men,  had  been  concentrated 
at  Murfreesboro  to  guard  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Rail 
way.  They  remained  there  until  after  the  battle  of  Nashville. 

Thomas  put  his  forces  into  the  works  upon  a  line  of  hills 
around  Nashville — Smith's  division  on  the  right,  then  the 
Fourth  Corps,*  then  the  Twenty-third  [$chofield].  Steed- 
man's  division  prolonged  the  line  from  Schofield's  left  to  the 
Cumberland  River. 

(289)  On  the  2nd  of  December  Hood  sent  Bate's  division, 
reinforced  by  two  infantry  brigades,  to  cooperate  with  For 
rest  against  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway  and  Rous 
seau's  command  at  Murfreesboro.  Forrest  and  Bate  had  some 
success — they  captured  a  railway  train  and  destroyed  several 
bridges  and  block-houses, — and  advanced  upon  Murfreesboro. 
Here  Bate  was  attacked  and  defeated  by  a  part  of  Rousseau's 
command.  He  was  then  recalled  to  Nashville,  but  Forrest's 
cavalry,  except  Chalmers's  division,  was  still  absent  from 
Hood's  main  army  when  the  battle  of  Nashville  took  place. 

(294)  Having  gotten  his  forces  assembled  within  the  for 
tifications  at  Nashville,  General  Thomas  purposed  giving  Wil 
son  time  to  procure  horses  for  the  rest  of  his  dismounted  cav 
alry,  several  thousand,  before  taking  the  offensive  against 
Hood.  He  also  needed  time  to  prepare  his  trains  and  pon 
toons  in  order  to  pursue  after  attacking  and  defeating  the 
enemy.  But  Mr.  Stanton  became  impatient  at  once,  and  tele 
graphed  General  Grant  on  the  2nd  of  December  "to  consider 
the  matter,"  saying  that  Thomas's  purpose  looked  like  "the 

*This  corps  was  now  commanded  by  Wood,  Stanley  having  been 
shot  through  the  neck  while  charging  with  Opdycke's  brigade  in  its 
timely  counter- stroke  at  Franklin. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       573 

McClellan  and  Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing."*  Grant, 
thereupon,  began  sending  telegrams  to  Thomas  urging  him  to 
attack.  On  the  6th  Thomas  received  a  telgram  from  the 
Commanding  General  directing  him  to  "attack  Hood  at  once." 
Wilson  had  scoured  the  country  for  horses,  sparing  not  even 
those  of  Andrew  Johnson,  the  Vice-President-elect  of  the 
United  States,  but^  he  was  not  quite  ready.  So  necessary  did 
Thomas  consider  it  to  have  a  strong  mounted  force  that  he 
gave  Wilson  two  more  days  in  spite  of  General  Grant's  order. 
By  the  8th  Wilson  had  a  force  of  12,000  mounted  men — it 
would  require  a  stretch  of  the  term  to  say  that  he  had  a 
force  of  12,000  cavalry.  Thomas  was  now  ready  to  attack.  But 
on  the  8th  the  weather  suddenly  changed.  There  was  a  storm 
of  sleet  and  snow  that  covered  the  ground,  and  a  temperature 
that  turned  the  surface  into  a  sheet  of  ice,  and  made  walking 
upon  the  hillsides  and  slopes  almost  impossible  for  two  or 
three  days.  Thomas  called  his  corps-commanders  together 
and  asked  their  opinion  upon  the  advisability  of  trying  to 
attack.  They  were  unanimous  in  the  view  that  it  was  not 
practicable  to  attack  until  the  ice  should  melt.  On  the  14th  a 
warm  rain  cleared  the  ice  away,  and  an  order  was  issued  for 
an  attack  on  the  15th. 

In  the  meanwhile,  seeing  that  his  order  of  the  6th  had  not 
been  carried  out,  General  Grant  had  an  order  written  on  the 
9th  relieving  Thomas  and  appointing  Schofield  in  his  place. 
The  order  was,  however,  never  sent.  But  on  the  13th  General 
Logan,  who  was  still  absent  from  his  own  corps  [Fifteenth], 
was  ordered  to  Nashville  to  supersede  Thomas;  and  on  the 
15th  Grant  himself  reached  Washington  on  his  way  to  Nash 
ville.  By  ths  time,  however,  events  were  occurring  that 
quickly  showed  General  Grant  that  neither  he  nor  Logan  was 
needed  at  Nashville,  and  halted  them  in  their  journeys. 

According  to  Thomas's  plan  of  attack  as  finally  modified, 
Smith  and  Wood,  .supported  by  Wilson's  cavalry  upon  their 
right  flank,  were  to  make  the  main  attack  against  Hood's  left. 
Steedman  was  to  make  the  secondary  attack  against  Hood's 
right.  Schofield's  corps  was  to  be  the  general  reserve.  Cruft's 
provisional  division  was  to  occupy  the  works  that  Steedman 
should  vacate,  and  General  Donaldson's  armed  employees  were 
to  hold  the  rest  of  the  interior  line  of  works.f 

(295)     On  the  morning  of  the  15th  there  was  a  dense  fog 

*Van  Home. 
tCox. 


574  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

until  nine  o'clock  that  covered  the  troops  in  the  early  move 
ments  toward  their  positions  for  assault ;  but  the  mud  result 
ing  from  the  rain  and  thaw  made  the  movements  very  slow. 
Wood's  corps  marched  by  the  right  flank  until  its  left  rested 
upon  the  southernmost  angle  of  the  Union  works.  This  point 
was  to  be  the  pivot  upon  which  Wood  and  Smith  were  to 
wheel  to  the  left.  Smith  formed  on  the  right  of  Wood,  and 
Schofield  in  the  rear.  Wilson  moved  out  to  clear  the  Char 
lotte  and  Hardin  Pikes  of  the  enemy  and  to  sweep  the  ground 
beyond  Smith's  right. 

From  the  high  point  upon  which  the  southernmost  salient  of 
the  Union  works  rested  a  clear  view  could  be  had  of  the  coun 
try  round  about.  A  mile  to  the  east  was  the  valley  of  Brown's 
Creek,  and  two  miles  to  the  southwest,  that  of  Richland  Creek. 
These  two  streams  rose  within  a  mile  of  each  other  in  the 
high  Brentwood  Hills,  four  or  five  miles  south  of  Nashville, 
and  flowed  in  divergent  courses  to  the  Cumberland.  The 
Granny  White  Turnpike  ran  southward  upon  the  high  ridge 
between  them.  Eight  other  pikes  south  of  the  Cumberland 
River  radiated  from  Nashville.  The  ground  was  broken  and 
hilly,  with  knolls  and  ridges  rising  two  or  three  hundred  feet 
above  the  river;  but  it  was  "mostly  open,  with  groves  of  tim 
ber  he.re  and  there."* 

Hood's  main  line  was  more  than  five  miles  long.  It  stretched 
along  the  series  of  hills  east  of  the  valley  of  Brown's  Creek, 
from  the  Chattanooga  Railway  to  the  Franklin  Pike;  thence  it 
crossed  the  valley  of  Brown's  Creek  and  passed  over  the  ridge 
of  Granny  White  .Pike  to  a  high  knoll  near  the  Hillsboro  Pike ; 
here  it  made  a  sharp  turn,  and,  reaching  the  pike,  ran  along 
a  stone  wall  at  its  side.  Farther  to  the  southwest,  and  even 
across  Richland  Creek,  Hood  had  erected  some  detached  works 
upon  the  hills.  On  his  left,  half-way  between  his  main  line  and 
the  Union  line,  he  had  an  advanced  line  of  skirmishers  with 
its  left  strongly  posted  on  Montgomery  Hill,  at  the  Hillsboro 
Pike.* 

(296)  Steedman  moved  forward  on  the  Murfreesboro 
Pike,  and,  by  eight  o'clock,  had  opened  his  attack  on  the  Con 
federate  right  with  enough  vigor  to  occupy  the  attention  of 
Cheatham's  corps  on  that  flank.  Smith's  corps  and  Wilson's 
cavalry  pushed  steadily  forward  with  their  wide  wheel  from 
the  Union  right,  capturing  Hood's  detached  works  one  after 

*Cox. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       575 

another,  until  by  noon  they  were  within  striking  distance  of 
the  Confederate  works  on  the  Hillsboro  Pike.  With  a  view 
of  gaining  the  Confederate  rear,  if  possible,  Wilson  was  then 
ordered  to  move  farther  to  his  right,  and  Schofield  moved  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  to  take  Wilson's  place  on  Smith's  right. 

(297)  Smith  advanced  against  the  Confederate  left  behind 
the  stone  wall  on  the  Hillsboro  Pike,  and  drove  it  away.     Sam 
Beatty's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  had  already  taken  the 
strong  Confederate  outpost  position  on  Montgomery  Hill,  and 
General  Thomas  now  ordered  Wood  to  assault  the  salient  on 
the  hill  in  front  of  his  line.     Wood  made  the  assault  and  car 
ried  the  salient,  and  now  the  whole  of  the  Confederate  left 
wing  was  shattered  and  falling  back.     Schofield's  corps,  which 
had   come   forward   on   Smith's   right,   and   the   cavalry   were 
pushing  the  enemy's  extreme  left.     The  broken  line  did  not 
stop  until  it  passed  the  Granny  White  Pike;  the  extreme  left 
was  driven  back  to  two  hills  near  this  pike  fully  two  miles  south 
of  the  Confederate  works.     Darkness  stopped,  the  pursuit. 

(298)  After  dark  Hood  formed  a  new  line  and  intrenched 
it.    Early  in  the  day  he  had  started  one  division  of  Cheatham's 
corps  from  his  right  to  reinforce  his  left.     As  soon  as  it  was 
dusk  the  rest  of  this  corps  moved  to  the  left  of  the  new  line; 
Stewart's  corps  was  withdrawn  to  the  center  of  this  line;  and- 
Lee's,  which  had  scarcely  fired  a  shot  during  the  day,  took  its 
place  on  the  right.     The  new  line  was  a  little  more  than  two 
miles  long;  its  right  rested  on  Overton  Hill,  just  east  of  the 
Franklin   Pike,  and  its  left  on  the  two  hills  just  mentioned; 
its  middle  part  was  on  lower  ground  and  was  broken  by  sev 
eral  branches  of   Brown's  Creek.     The  line  covered  the  two 
roads  by  which  Hood's  army  might  retreat.     Chalmers's  cav 
alry  division,  which  had  been  too   weak  to  offer   much   hin- 
derance  to  Wilson's  squadrons  during  the  day,  took  post  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  new  line. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th  the  whole  Federal  line  moved 
up  close  to  the  Confederate  position.  Steedman  was  still  on 
the  extreme  left ;  Wood  was  next  in  the  line ;  then  Smith ;  then 
Schofield ;  and  Wilson's  cavalry  was  on  the  extreme  right. 
Johnson's  division  of  the  cavalry  was  several  miles  away  to 
the  southwest,  moving  across  country  to  strike  Hood's  line  of 
retreat.  About  noon  the  Federal  skirmishers  advanced  close 
to  the  Confederate  works,  "and  various  points  were  recon- 


576          .  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

noitered  to  determine  the  feasibility  of  an  assault."*  Wood's 
corps,  supported  by  Steedman's  division,  made  the  first  real  as 
sault;  it  assailed  the  Confederate  right,  and  was  repulsed  with 
severe  loss.  Meantime  Wilson's  cavalry  had  worked  its  way 
round  to  a  position  in  rear  of  the  Confederate  left.  About 
four  o'clock  Schofield  and  Smith  assaulted  this  part  of  the  line 
in  front  and  flank,  while  Wilson's  dismounted  troopers  charged 
it  from  behind.  The  result  was  decisive.  "The  whole  Con 
federate  left  was  crushed  in  like  an  egg-shell,"  and  the  rout 
quickly  spread  to  the  rest  of  the  line.  In  General  Hood's  own 
words,  he  "beheld  for  the  first  and  only  time  a  Confederate 
army  abandon  the  field  in  confusion. "f  The  actual  losses  in 
killed  and  wounded  had  been  very  light  on  each  side ;  General 
Hood  admits  that  he  lost  fifty-four  pieces  of  artillery;  his  loss 
of  prisoners  was  numbered  in  thousands. 

Wilson's  dismounted  troopers  had  made  the  fatal  mistake  of 
leaving  their  horses  too  far  behind  them.  This  delayed  their 
pursuit  until  night  was  upon  them;  arid  with  night  came  a 
drenching  rain.  Two  miles  from  the  battle-field  they  came 
upon  Chalmers's  cavalry  division,  which  was  covering  the  Con 
federate  retreat.  It  was  strongly  posted  across  the  Granny 
White  Pike  behind  a  barricade  of  fence-rails,  and  it  succeeded 
in  checking  the  Federal  cavalry  long  enough  "to  enable  the 
fleeing  Confederate  infantry  to  sweep  by  the  danger-point  that 
night,  to  improvise  a  rear-guard,  and  to  make  good  their  re 
treat  the  next  day."J  Wood's  corps  pursued  by  way  of  the 
Franklin  Pike.  Smith  and  Schofield  were  ordered  to  follow 
Wilson  the  next  day.  The  mass  of  the  fugitives  took  the 
Franklin  Pike.  (289)  The  next  day  Wilson's  cavalry  caught 
up  with  Hood's  rear -guard  four  miles  north  of  Franklin,  and, 
charging  it  in  front  and  flank,  carried  its  position,  capturing 
400  prisoners.  At  Columbia  Forrest  rejoined  Hood,  and  his 
cavalry,  with  an  infantry  rear-guard  under  Walthall,  covered 
the  retreat  to  the  Tennessee  River.  There  the  pursuit  was 
given  up,  and  by  the  10th  of  January,  1865,  the  remnant  of 
Hood's  army  was  at  Tupelo,  Mississippi.  On  the  13th  Hood 
telegraphed  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War :  "I  request  to 
be  relieved  from  command  of  this  army."§ 


*Cox. 

tHood  in  B.  &  L. 
JGeneral  Wilson  in  B.  &  L. 
§Cox.    Hood  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       577 
COMMENTS. 

For  the  military  student  the  Campaign  of  Franklin  and 
Nashville  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  and  instructive  cam 
paigns  of  the  Civil  War.  The  two  chief  actors  in  it,  Thomas 
and  Hood,  were  the  exact  opposites  of  each  other.  One  was 
slow,  apparently  timid  in  taking  the  initiative,  but  sure  in  exe 
cution  ;  the  other  was  quick  and  bold  to  act,  but  uncertain  as 
to  the  outcome.  One  apparently  weighed  the  odds  against  him 
too  carefully;  the  other  gave  no  heed  to  them  at  all.  If  the 
characters  and  talents  of  the  two  men  could  have  been  com 
bined  in  a  single  general,  it  would  be  hard  to  pick  his  better. 

Little  fault  can  be  found  with  Hood's  operations  from  the 
time  when  he  quitted  Lovejoy  on  the  20th  of  September  until 
he  arrived  with  his  army  at  Gadsden  a  month  later.  They  were 
bold  in  conception,  brilliant  in  execution,  and  resulted  in  draw 
ing  Sherman  with  his  army  all  the  way  back  to  Resaca,  seventy 
miles,  and  from  there  to  Gaylesville,  forty-odd  miles  farther 
and  away  from  his  railway ;  and  they  placed  Hood's  army  in 
such  a  position  that,  if  forced  to  continue  the  retreat,  it  could 
have  fallen  back  along  the  Blue  Mountain-Selma  Railway 
(shown  on  the  map  as  the  Alabama  and  Tenn.  R.  R.).  It 
was,  however,  practically  impossible  for  Sherman  to  follow 
Hood  much  farther ;  it  would  have  taken  Sherman  too  far  from 
his  own  base  and  railway.  General  Sherman,  therefore,  halted 
his  army  at  Gaylesville.  There  he  occupied  a  very  controlling 
strategic  position,  a  "position,"  as  he  wrote  General  Halleck, 
"very  good  to  watch  the  enemy."*  So  long  as  he  remained 
there  Hood  could  not  move  back  toward  Atlanta  into  Georgia; 
he  could  not, move  against  the  railway  between  Atlanta  and 
Chattanooga;  and  he  could  not  threaten  the  railway  bridge  at 
Bridgeport  or  cross  the  Tennessee  River  anywhere  east  of 
Guntersville  to  strike  at  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  or  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway;  for  Sherman  was  nearer 
all  of  those  objectives  than  Hood  was.  The  only  aggressive 
movement  that  Hood  could  make,  without  exposing  his  army 
to  attack  in  rear  or  flank  by  Sherman  from  his  central  strategic 
position  at  Gaylesville,  was  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at  a  point 
far  enough  west  to  be  beyond  Sherman's  reach.  That  is  pre 
cisely  what  Hood  did. 


"Colonel  Stone  in  B.  &  L. 


578  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  TENNESSEE. 

When  their  armies  reached  Gadsden  and  Gaylesville,  respect 
ively,  the  campaign  between  Hood  and  Sherman  came  to  a 
close.  From  those  points  a  new  series  of  operations  with  new 
purposes  and  new  objectives  was  te  begin  on  each  side.  Hood 
says  he  had  already  wrought  out  the  plan  of  his  operations; 
Sherman,  we  know,  had  made  up  his  mind  what  his  should 
be,  if  General  Grant  could  be  persuaded  to  give  his  consent. 
Hood's  movement  to  Decatur  decided  Grant  to  allow  Sherman 
to  carry  out  his  plan;  if  Grant  had  consented  before  Hood 
moved  from  Gadsden,  and  Sherman  had  started  back  to  At 
lanta  to  begin  his  march  to  the  sea,  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  Hood  would  have  been  required  by  the  Confederate  Presi 
dent  to  follow  him.  One  of  Hood's  arguments  in  favor  of  his 
invasion  of  Tennessee  was  that  Sherman  would  quit  Georgia  to 
follow  him ;  one  of  Sherman's  arguments  in  favor  of  his  march 
to  the  sea  was  that  Hood  would  turn  back  from  the  Tennessee 
to  follow  him.  Neither  general  prophesied  aright.  President 
Davis  objected  to  Hood's  movement  into  Tennessee,  but  yielded 
to  Hood  and  Beauregard;*  President  Lincoln  "was  anxious, 
if  not  fearful."  concerning  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  but 
refrained  from  interfering.!  That  the  strategy  of  Sherman's 
plan  was  good,  was  proved  by  its  success;  that  the  strategy 
of  Hood's  was  bad,  was  not  proved  by  its  failure.  The  best 
of  plans  may  fail  by  reason  of  a  bad  execution.  Even  though 
Hood  had  not  achieved  all  he  hoped  for,  if  he  had  succeeded 
in  capturing  Nashville  and  threatening  Louisville  and  Cincin 
nati,  the  consequences  would  have  been  very  serious;  such 
alarm  might  thus  have  been  caused  at  Washington  and 
throughout  the  North  as  to  stop  Sherman's  progress,  and  even 
to  interfere  with  Grant's  operations  at  Petersburg. 

General  Thomas  ought  to  have  stopped  Hood's  army  south 
of  Duck  River.  He  says  in  his  report  "that,  had  Hood  de 
layed  his  advance  from  Florence  ten  days  longer,  he  would 
have  met  him  at  Columbia  or  some  other  point  south  of  Duck 
River."  But  he  ought  to  have  done  so  anyhow;  he  would  not 
have  needed  ten  days'  delay  if  he  had  promptly  made  use  of 
the  troops  and  means  at  his  disposal.  His  tri-monthly  return 
of  November  20.  the  day  that  Hood  was  starting  from  Flor 
ence,  showed  a  force  in  Tennessee  of  59.534  officers  and  men 


*Davis. 
tCor. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.      579 

"present  and  equipped" ;  and  he  had  the  railways  to  use  in  con 
centrating  them.  If  we  allow  the  same  number  of  men  for  the 
smaller  garrisons  and  railway-guards  that  were  actually  left 
when  the  concentration  was  finally  made  at  Nashville,  we  shall 
find  that  Thomas  still  had  an  army  of  47,000  available  for 
active  operations.  On  the  1st  of  November  Granger  was  at 
Decatur  with  5,000  men,  and  Steedman  could  have  joined  him 
with  the  5,000  he  later  took  from  Chattanooga  to  Nashville. 
These  combined  forces  ought  to  have  gone  to  Schofield  at  Pu- 
laski.  Thomas  could  have  joined  Schofield  there  or  at  Colum 
bia  with  all  other  available  troops  from  Nashville,  and  would 
then  have  had  an  army  superior  in  numbers  to  Hood's  in  every 
thing  except  cavalry.  At  that  time  the  only  Confederate  troops 
in  the  theater  of  operations,  besides  Hood's  army,  were  Rod- 
dey's  division  of  cavalry  in  North  Alabama,  which  gave  no 
trouble  during  the  campaign,  and  a  small  force  under  Breckin- 
ridge  making  a  feeble  diversion  in  East  Tennessee.  The  troops 
in  that  part  of  Schofield's  department  were  able  to  take  care  of 
Hreckinridge's  command.  General  Thomas's  right  policy  was 
promptly  to  concentrate  all  his  available  forces  and  meet  Hood 
as  near  the  Tennessee  River  as  practicable.* 

On  the  other  hand,  Hood's  long  wait  at  Florence  was  fatal 
to  his  success.  He  stayed  there  three  weeks,  from  the  last  of 
October  until  the  21st  of  November,  thus  giving  time  for  the 
Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  to  go  from  Georgia  to  Pu- 
laski  to  oppose  his  march;  and  for  Wilson  to  organize  and 
mount  a  corps  of  cavalry,  A.  J.  Smith  to  bring  the  Sixteenth 
Corps  from  Missouri,  and  Thomas  to  concentrate  the  scat 
tered  Union  detachments  at  Nashville  and  organize  a  mass  of 
recruits  and  "casuals," — all  to  defeat  and  destroy  him.  The 
only  cause  that  Hood  assigns  for  his  delay  was  the  lack  of 
supplies  due  to  a  delay  in  repairing  the  railway  from  Corinth 
to  Tuscumbia.  There  is  no  doubt,  also,  that  he  waited  for 
Forrest  to  join  him  from  his  raid  in  West  Tennessee;  and  it 
is  very  probable,  too,  that  he  hoped  from  day  to  day  to  learn 
that  troops  were  on  the  way  from  the  Trans-Mississippi  De 
partment  to  reinforce  him.  This  was  a  vain  hope,  in  view 
of  the  close  guard  held  over  the  Mississippi  by  the  Union 
forces.  Yet,  even  after  his  defeat  at  Franklin,  Hood  says, 
"The  President  was  still  urgent  in  his  instructions  relative 
to  the  transference  of  troops  to  the  Army  of  Tennessee  from 

*Cox. 


580  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

Texas,  and  I  daily  hoped  to  receive  the  glad  tidings  of  their 
safe  passage  across  the  Mississippi."* 

Columbia  is  about  sixty-five  miles  from  Florence  and  fifty 
from  Nashville.  If  Hood  had  not  stopped  at  Florence,  but 
had  pushed  on  to  Columbia,  gathering  supplies  from  the  coun 
try,  he  could  have  reached  that  town  by  the  4th  of  November. 
Stanley  had  reached  Pulaski  on  the  1st  with  one  of  his  divi 
sions,  and  the  other  arrived  four  days  later.  On  the  4th  Scho- 
field  reached  Nashville  with  his  leading  brigade,  and  the  same 
day  Forrest  frightened  the  Union  garrison  away  from  John- 
sonville,  and  might  have  crossed  the  river  there,  if  he  had 
chosen  to  do  so,  and  marched  .toward  Franklin  or  Columbia. 
Johnsonville  is  seventy  miles  from  those  towns.  Schofield'was 
hurried  with  his  leading  troops  to  Johnsonville,  and  up  to  about 
the  10th  of  November  the  only  Federal  troops  between  Hood's 
army  and  Nashville  were  Stanley's  corps  and  a  few  regiments 
of  cavalry.  Stanley  would  have  had  to  fall  back,  and  by  the 
6th  Hood  could  have  been  at  Franklin,  where  he  might  have 
been  joined  by  Forrest  the  same  day.tj  Nashville  is  only 
thirty  miles  from  Franklin  and  neither  A.  J.  Smith  from  Mis 
souri  nor  Steedman  from  Chattanooga  got  there  before  the 
end  of  November,  and  Wilson's  cavalry  corps  was  not  organ 
ized  and  mounted  before  the  8th  of  December. 

Hood  would  thus  have  arrived  in  front  of  the  works  at  Nash 
ville  with  an  army  whose  numbers  had  not  been  reduced,  and 
whose  morale  had  not  been  extinguished,  by  the  terrible  en 
counter  and  defeat  at  Franklin.  To  defend  his  works  Thomas 
would  have  had,  in  addition  to  Stanley's  and  Schofield's  corps, 
and  Hatch's  cavalry,  ten  or  twelve  thousand  unorganized 
troops,  consisting  of  new  regiments,  dismounted  cavalry,  and 
"casuals,"  and  also  his  body  of  armed  employees  of  the  sup 
ply  departments.  If,  however,  Hood  was  unable  to  beat  Scho- 
field  with  only  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  at  Franklin, 
behind  very  hastily  constructed  earthworks,  it  is  hardly  to  be 
supposed  that  he  could  have  defeated  Thomas's  superior  force 


*Hood  in  B.  6-  L. 

fThis  supposes  that  Hood  could  have  communicated  promptly  with 
Forrest,  and  that  Forrest  could  have  crossed  the  Tennessee,  which  was 
probably  not  the  case.  Forrest  could  have  crossed  at  Johnsonville  by 
means  of  a  captured  gunboat,  but  when  he  tried  to  cross  at  another  point 
a  few  days  afterwards,  by  swimming  his  horses  and  ferrying  his  men 
upon  rafts,  he  was  prevented  from  doing  s6  by  the  swift  current  and 
drift-wood  resulting  from  the  swollen  condition  of  the  stream 

JWyeth. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.      581 

if  he  had  attacked  it  at  Nashville;  but  he  would  have  been  in 
better  condition  to  withstand  Thomas's  attack,  and  almost  cer-- 
tainly  would  have  brought  his  army  away  from  the  battle  of 
Nashville  in  better  shape. 

Hood's  stay  at  Florence,  however,  came  near  turning  out 
a  strategic  advantage  for  him.  By  giving  Schofield  and  Stan 
ley  time  to  reach  Pula$ki  with  their  commands,  it  gave  him  a 
chance  to  cut  them  off.  If  Hood  had  started  before  Schofield 
joined  Stanley,  the  latter,  being  too  weak  to  make  any  sort  of 
resistance,  would  have  fallen  back  very  promptly;  and  even  if 
he  could  have  been  cut  off  and  captured,  the  force  involved 
would  have  been  comparatively  small. 

From  the  time  when  Hood  quitted  Florence  until  he  reached 
Spring  Hill  he  made  his  maneuvers  very  skilfully.  By  turn 
ing  Schofield's  position  at  Pulaski  and  letting  Forrest  push 
ahead  with  his  cavalry,  he  came  very  near  getting  the  bridge 
at  Columbia,  and  cutting  off  the  Federal  retreat.  The  timely 
arrival  of  Cox's  division  was  all  that  saved  the  bridge.  At 
Columbia  Forrest  crossed  Duck  River  east  of  the  town,  drove 
back  Wilson's  cavalry,  and  cleared  the  way  for  Hood's  in 
fantry  columns  to  march  to  Spring  Hill.  Wilson  had  as  many 
troopers  as  Forrest  at  thjs  time,  yet  Forrest  succeeded,  by 
skilful  maneuvers,  in  forcing  him  back  on  the  Lewisburg- 
Franklin  road,  and  in  completely  cutting  him  off  from  Scho 
field's  main  column,  leaving  Schofield,  "during  the  whole  of 
the  critical  day  and  night  of  the  29th  (November),  without 
the  means  of  learning  Hood's  movements,  except  from  his  in 
fantry  reconnaissances."*  It  was  another  example  of  cav 
alry's  allowing  itself  to  be  cut  off  from  the  main  army  by  the 
enemy's  column.  The  moment  the  cavalry  of  an  army  be 
comes  separated  from  the  infantry  columns  by  the  enemy  it 
ceases  to  be  of  any  further  use  to  those  columns  until  it  regains 
touch  with  them.  • 

SPRING  HILL. 

As  soon  as  Forrest  drove  Wilson  out  of  the  way  he  hurried 
to  Spring  Hill  in  order  to  block  the  road  of  the  enemy's  col 
umn.  But  Stanley  reached  there  with  his  infantry  division 
just  in  time  to  meet  Forrest  and  drive  him  away. 

At   Spring  Hill   Hood  had,  by  skilful   maneuvering,  com- 

*Cox, 


582  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

pletely  turned  Schofield's  army  and  placed  his  own  where  it 
ought  to  have  been  able  to  capture  or  destroy  its  foe.  Then, 
like  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville,  he  seemed  to  let  go  all  hold, 
and  allow  his  opportunity  to  slip  from  his  grasp.  Stanley  was 
at  Spring  Hill  with  a  single  advanced  division,  only  one  bri 
gade  of  which  became  engaged.  Hood  had  two  full  corps 
[Cheatham  and  Stewart]  with  which  he  might  easily  have  at 
tacked  Stanley,  but,  by  his  bad  management,  Stewart's  corps 
was  halted  more  than  two  miles  from  the  battlefield,  and  by 
Cheatham's  bad  managment  only  one  of  Cheatham's  divi 
sions  went  into  the  fight  before  dark.  Yet,  in  spite  of  these 
mistakes,  Hood  still  had  the  chance  to  cut  off  and  destroy 
Schofield's  forces.  All  he  needed  to  do  to  stop  Schofield's 
march  was  to  place  his  troops  across  the  road  near  Spring  Hill ; 
but  that  is  what  he  failed  to  do.  His  troops  bivouacked  east 
of  the  road,  and  during- the  night  the  Federal  army  slipped 
safely  by,  within  600  yards  of  the  left  of  their  lines.*  Stewart 
had  been  placed  after  dark  on  Cheatham's  right,  with  orders 
to  extend  the  line  across  the  road ;  and  no  satisfactory  expla 
nation  has  been  made  for  his  failure  to  do  so. 

Primarily  Cheatham  was  to  blame  for  the  Confederate  fail 
ure  at  Spring  Hill,  inasmuch  as  he  failed  with  his  whole  corps 
to  drive  Stanley's  single  division  away  from  Spring  Hill  before 
dark.  But  Stanley  had  a  large  force  of  artillery  and  Cheatham 
had  none.  Hood,  withal,  was  on  the  ground — the  commanding 
officer  cannot  shift  responsibility  or  blame  to  the  shoulders  of 
a  subordinate  if  he  himself  is  present.  Hood's  greatest  mis 
take  was  his  suspending  the  attack  until  morning. f.  After 
Stewart's  corps  and  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  came  up,  about 
dark,  the  Confederates  so  outnumbered  Stanley's  force  that 
they  ought  easily  to  have  defeated  it  even  in  the  dark.  Dur 
ing  the  night,  moreover,  Confederate  sentinels  distinctly  heard 
conversation  in  the  passing  Federal  columns,  and  one  of  For 
rest's  brigades  struck  those  columns  on  the  road  three  or  four 
miles  north  of  Spring  Hill  at  11  p.  m.,  and  fought  them  until 
near  daylight.*  Yet  it  appears  that  Hood  was  only  informed 
that  there  were  "stragglers"  passing  in  the  road ;  and  Johnson, 
who  was  sent  to  stop  them,  reported  that  he  could  not  find  even 
"stragglers."  On  this  occasion  everybody  in  Hood's  army 
seems  to  have  been  remiss,  from  the  commanding  general  down 
to  the  sentries  on  post. 


*Wyeth. 

fCheatham  in  B.  &  L. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       583 
FRANKLIN. 

(292  and  293)  The  battle  of  Franklin  illustrates  more 
forcibly  than  any  other  engagement  of  the  Civil  War  the  mis 
take  of  placing  troops,  in  a  defensive  batt'le,  in  an  advanced 
position  before  the  main  line ;  it  also  illustrates  the  importance 
of  keeping  out  a  reserve,  but  more  especially  the  importance 
of  throwing  in  the  reserve  at  precisly  the  right  place  and 
moment.  By  holding  his  two  brigades  at  their  advanced  posi 
tion  in  front  of  the  main  line,  and  apparently  trying  to  stop 
Hood's  whole  force,  Wagner  very  nearly  caused  the  destruc 
tion  of  Schofield's  army;  by  throwing  his  reserve  into  the 
breach  Opdycke  saved  the  army  from  destruction. 

NASHVILLE. 

(289)  Having  failed  to  cut  on;  and  capture  or  destroy  the 
Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  having  suffered  disaster 
at  Franklin,  Hood  had  scant  chance  of  accomplishing  any 
thing  by  pushing  on  to  Nashville.  The  righting  spirit  of  his 
army  was  gone,  and  he  says  he  had  only  23,053  effectives  left, 
and  knew  that  he  should  receive  no  recruits  from  Tennessee  or 
Kentucky.  He  still,  however,  cherished  the  vain  hope  of  re 
ceiving  reinforcements  from  beyond  the  Mississippi.  He  did 
not  expect  to  attack  Thomas,  but  expected  to  be  attacked  by  him, 
and  hoped  to  repulse  him,  and,  in  a  counter-stroke,  to  follow 
upon  his  heels  into  Nashville.*  It  should  seem  that  Hood's 
better  plan  now  would  have  been  to  keep  away  from  Nashville 
and  to  maneuver  to  draw  Thomas  after  him,  with  a  view  to 
finding  an  opportunity  to  strike  some  part  of  the  Federal  army 
at  a  disadvantage. 

(294-298)  General  Thomas  was  very  slow  in  making  ready 
to  attack  Hood,  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  that  the  Washing 
ton  authorities,  General  Grant,  and  the  whole  people  of  the 
North  became  anxious  and  impatient ;  but  when  his  prepara 
tions  and  the  weather  were  such  that  he,  at  length,  felt  ready 
to  attack,  Thomas  gained  such  a  splendid  and  decisive  victory 
as  to  hush  censure  for  all  time.  The  victory  was  easily  won,  as 
was  shown  by  the  small  number  of  killed  and  wounded  on 
either  side;  but  that  fact  does  no* way  disparage  the  excellent 
conduct  of  the  assault.  Of  all  the  attacks  made  by  Union 
forces  in  the  course  of  the  war  none  other  was  as  free  from 

*Hood  in  B.  &  L. 


584  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

faults  as  this  one.  It  was  good  in  plan  and  in  execution.  By 
threatening  Hood's  right  flank  on  the  15th  of  December  with 
the  "secondary  attack,"  before  the  main  attack  reached  the  left 
of  the  Confederate  line,  Thomas  drew  Hood's  attention  to  the 
right  of  that  line,  and  kept  him  from  sending  support  to  its 
left  until  it  was  too  late.  Hood's  left  was  unquestionably  the 
proper  wing  for  Thomas's  main  attack  to  fall  upon.  Its  flank 
was  in  the  air,  and  it  had  no  natural  strength  in  front ;  whereas 
the  right  wing  had  the  valley  of  Brown's  Creek  in  front  of 
it.  On  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line  Thomas  had  unlimited 
space  in  which  to  maneuver  his  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  fine 
positions  for  his  artillery ;  while  on  the  opposite  flank  his  move 
ments  would  have  been  cramped  by  the  Cumberland  River,  his 
columns  would  have  found  no  cover  against  the  enemy's  view 
and  the  fire  of  his  artillery,  and  there  were  no  good  positions 
for  the  Union  artillery.  And  lastly,  by  attacking  the  left  of 
the  Confederates  Thomas  had  a  better  chance  of  seizing  their 
line  of  retreat  and  cutting  them  off.  The  attack  was  carried  out 
as  planned,  almost  without  a  hitch. 

The  cavalry  did  more  actual  fighting  on  the  Union  side  than 
was  done  by  cavalry  upon  any  other  battle-field  of  the  war ;  but 
it  fought  dismounted.  It  was  Wilson's  dismounted  squad 
rons  behind  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line  that  started  the 
rout.  And  yet  it  is  more  than  likely  that  the  fruits  of  the 
victory  would  have  been  greater  if  Wilson  had  kept  his  troopers 
near  their  horses,  ready  to  pursue  and  cut  off  the  beaten  army 
at  the  moment  when  its  flight  began ;  for  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  Hood's  army  would  soon  have  broken,  even  though 
Wilson's  cavalry  had  not  come  up  behind  it. 

Among  the  mistakes  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates  the 
first  to  be  noted  is  the  length  of  their  line  of  works.  It  was 
nearly  six  miles  long,  and  Hood  cannot  have  had  more  than 
30,000  men  to  hold  it — fewer  than  three  men  to  the  yard.  The 
general  trace  of  the  works  was  concave,  which  made  it  neces 
sary  to  move  troops  by  the  circumference,  instead  of  by  a 
chord,  in  transferring  them  from  one  part  to  another.  The 
right  wing  of  the  works,  instead  of  being  parallel  to  Brown's 
Creek,  ought  to  have  bent  southward  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Franklin  Pike,  in  the  direction  of  Overton  Hill;  and  the 
isolated  works  on  the  left  added  no  strength  whatever  to  the 
position.  They  were  easily  taken  one  after  another,  and  their 
guns  were  then  turned  upon  the  main  works.  But  Hood's  case 
was  hopeless,  no  matter  what  form  or  length  of  line  he  might 
have  adopted ;  Thomas  had  men  enough  to  contain  him  in  front 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       585 

and  turn  his  flank,  and  Hood's  troops  seemed  to  have  no  fight 
left  in  them.  While  Hood's  left  was  being  driven  back  and  his 
right  was  being  threatened  on  the  first  day,  his  center,  Lee's 
corps,  was  scarcely  firing  a  shot.  Why  Hood  did  not  draw 
troops  from  that  part  to  reinforce  his  left  has  not  been  ex 
plained.  Hood  had  no  general  reserve,  doubtless  on  account 
of  a  lack  of  troops.  He  had  sent  Forrest  away  to  raid  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway,  a  mistake  that,  General 
Cox  says,  "made  the  opportunity  which  resulted  so  gloriously 
for  our  arms."  If  Forrest  had  been  on  the  ground  with  his 
cavalry  he  would  certainly  have  made  the  wide  wheel  of  Wil 
son's  cavalry  and  Smith's  and  Schofield's  corps  more  difficult 
for  them  on  the  first  day ;  and  he  would  have  kept  Wilson  away 
from  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  line  on  the  second  day.  And 
if  he  had  been  present  at  the  beginning  of  the  retreat  he  would 
greatly  have  lessened  its  difficulties  for  the  infantry  columns. 

Considering  the  disorder  and  rout  in  which  Hood's  beaten 
troops  quitted  the  battle-field,  it  might  seem  that  they  ought 
to  have  been  cut  off  and  blocked  in  front  by  Wilson's  horse 
men,  12,000  strong,  and  captured  or  destroyed  by  the  pursu 
ing  infantry.  But  the  earthen  by-roads  over  which  the  cavalry 
had  to  march  were  in  such  deplorable  condition,-  the  streams 
with  their  bridges  destroyed  were  so  high,  and  forage  for  ani 
mals  was  so  scarce  in  the  country,  that  Wilson,  in  spite  of 
great  exertion,  was  unable  to  check  the  fugitive  column  before 
it  was  safe  across  the  Tennessee  River.  There  the  pursuit 
ended. 

SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

On  the  12th  of  November  Sherman,  with  about  62,000  men, 
and  rations  for  twenty  days  in  his  wagon-train,  started  on  his 
March  to  the  sea.  By  the  10th  of  December  he  was  in  front 
of  the  works  about  Savannah.  He  had  encountered  virtually 
no  opposition,  and  his  march  is  notable  mainly  as  an  example 
of  an  army's  cutting  loose  from  its  base  and  communications. 
Its  main  purpose  was  to  destroy  the  resources  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  which  it  did  effectually  over  a  wide  space.  Hardee  was 
in  command  of  the  Confederate  garrison  at  Savannah.  On 
the  20th  of  December  he  evacuated  the  place,  and  withdrew 
to  Charleston,  with  about  18,000  men. 

Fort  Fisher  was  captured  by  General  Terry  about  the  middle 
of  January,  1865,  and  toward  the  end  of  that  month  Sherman's 


586  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

army  started  northward,  by  way  of  Columbia,  South  Carolina, 
to  join  General  Grant  in  front  of  Petersburg.  Joseph  E.  John 
ston  had  been  sent  to  the  Carolinas  to  collect  the  scattered 
Confederate  forces  there,  and  to  oppose  Sherman's  advance. 
At  Averysboro  a  part  of  these  forces,  under  Hardee,  were 
encountered  on  the  16th  of  March,  and  the  bulk  of  them,  un 
der  Johnston,  were  engaged  from  the  19th  to  the  21st,  at  Ben- 
tonville.  The  Confederates  were  defeated  in  both  of  these 
actions,  and  Sherman  concentrated  his  columns  at  Goldsboro 
for  a  further  movement  to  the  north.  He  reached  Raleigh  on 
the  13th  of  April,  and  Johnston  surrendered  to  him  the  next 
day.* 

MINOR  OPERATIONS. 

All  the  main  operations  of  the  land  forces  in  our  great  con 
flict  have  now  been  discussed.  There  were,  besides,  a  number 
of  interesting  raids  conducted  by  such  cavalry  leaders  as  Mor 
gan  and  Forrest,  on  the  Confederate  side,  and  Stoneman,  Grier- 
son,  and  Wilson,  on  the  Union  side,  in  the  last  two  years  of 
the  war,  which  we  have  not  time  to  discuss ;  and  there  were 
other  minor  operations  of  a  mixed  character  in  Missouri,  Ar 
kansas,  and  Louisiana. 

Of  these  operations  the  most  important,  perhaps,  was  the 
one  known  as  the  Red  River  Campaign.  Up  to  1864  Texas, 
except  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  had  not  been  brought 
under  the  authority  of  the  United  States.  As  early  as  the 
summer  of  1863  Halleck  had  urged  Banks,  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Union  forces  in  Louisiana,  to  make  an  overland 
expedition  into  Texas,  telegraphing  him  "There  are  impor 
tant  (diplomatic)  reasons  why  our  flag  should  be  hoisted  at 
some  point  in  Texas  without  delay" ;  he  suggested  that  "the 
high  road  to  Texas  for  our  troops  was  via  Shreveport  and  the 
Red  River. "f  In  March,  1864,  Banks  undertook  such  an  ex 
pedition.  He  moved  up  the  Red  River,  and,  after  several 
minor  actions,  was  defeated  by  a  Confederate  force  under  Gen 
eral  "Dick"  Taylor,  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads,  April  8,  losing  his 
artillery  and  trains.  His  army  then  fell  back  to  Alexandria, 
and  remained  there  from  April  25  to  May  13,  guarding  its 
flotilla,  which  was  held  fast  by  low  water.  The  retreat  was  re 
sumed  on  the  14th  of  May,  and  by  the  26th  of  May  the  un- 


*  Lecture  by  Captain  Stuart.  C.  E. 
fLecture  by  General  C.  B.  Hall. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE.       587 

successful  expedition  had  reached  Donaldsonville.*  General 
Charles  B.  Hall,  in  a  descriptive  and  critical  account  of  this 
enterprise,  says :  "It  was  conceived  in  uncertainty,  it  was  born 
in  hope,  it  was,  for  a  time,  sustained  with  promises ;  and  its 
ending  was  so  disastrous,  because  military  precautions  were 
neglected,  and  rules  violated,  as  to  call  for  Congressional  in 
vestigation  and  the  censure  of  its  commanding  general." 

*  Captain   Stuart. 


LECTURE  XXVII. 
THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.* 

Hardly  had  a  month  passd  after  the  surrender  at  Appomat- 
tox  when  General  Sheridan  was  sent  to  Texas  with  orders  to 
concentrate  an  imposing  force  there,  and  with  confidential 
instructions  to  make  demonstrations  along  the  Rio  Grande 
border.  The  object  was  to  hasten  the  withdrawal  of  French 
troops  from  Mexico;  for,  taking  advantage  of  the  struggle 
going  on  in  the  United  States,  Napoleon  III.  had,  in  1863, 
made  use  of  a  flimsy  excuse  to  ignore  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
land  an  army  in  Mexico,  overthrow  the  Republic,  and  set  up 
an  Empire  in  its  place,  with  the  Archduke  Maximilian  of 
Austria  as  its  Emperor.  The  end  of  the  Civil  War  left  the 
American  Government  with  upwards  of  a  million  veteran  sol 
diers  at  its  disposal,  hence  in  the  best  possible  condition  to 
enforce  its  demand  for  the  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops  from 
its  neighbor's  soil.  Napoleon  III.  was,  therefore,  easily  per 
suaded  to  recall  his  forces,  and  Maximilian,  left  to  his  fate, 
was  taken  by  the  patriot  troops  of  Mexico  and  shot  to  death. 

The  hosts  of  veteran  volunteers  that  had  brought  the  Civil 
War  to  a  successful  close  were  promptly  mustered  out  to  re 
turn  to  their  homes,  and  the  few  thousands  of  regulars  were 
scattered  in  small  detachments  throughout  the  South  to  aid 
in  the  work  of  Reconstruction.  In  August,  1867,  the  enlisted 
strength  of  the  regular  army  numbered  53,962,  the  largest 
number  of  regular  troops  borne  upon  the  rolls  since  1814;  but 
the  cry  for  retrenchment  of  public  expense  had  set  in,  and 
the  army  became  its  chief,  if  not  its  only,  subject.  Within  two 
years  the  enlisted  strength  was  reduced  to  34,000;  in  1870  a 
maximum  strength  of  30,000  was  fixed  by  law,  and  this  was 
cut  down  by  an  act  of  Congress,  in  1874,  to  25,000.  This 
law  practically  remained  in  effect  until  the  eve  of  the  war  with 
Spain  in  1898. 


*In  the  preparation  of  this  lecture  practically  everything  concern 
ing  the  operations  in  Cuba  and  American  waters  has  been  taken 
from  Captain  Sargent's  excellent  work,  The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de 
Cuba,  which,  in  its  full  and  accurate  narrative,  and  its  intelligent  and 
scholarly  discussion,  leaves  nothing  further  to  be  said  to  the  military 
student  upon  this  subject.  Besides  being  the  only  history,  in  the  full 
sense  yet  written  of  the  campaign,  this  work  is  also  an  able  treatise 
upon  the  strategy  of  land  and  naval  operations. 

588 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  589 

The  United  States,  in  the  meanwhile,  had  several  times  been 
threatened  with  foreign  war, — once  with  Spain  herself  over 
the  Virginius  affair  in  1873.  At  that  time,  no  doubt,  it  would 
have  been  an  easy  matter  to  raise  a  large  force  composed  of 
veterans  of  the  Civil  War ;  but,  as  the  years  went  by,  this 
great  national  reserve  was  less  and  less  to  be  counted  upon. 
At  length,  when  war  actually  befell,  in  1898,  thirty-three  years 
after  the  last  shot  fired  in  the  Civil  War,  there  was,  of  course, 
hardly  a  veteran  of  this  war  able  to  shoulder  a  rifle. 

(299)  A  second  insurrection  had  broken  out  in  Cuba  in  the 
spring  of  1895,  and  had  dragged  along  until  the  winter  of 
1897.  The  insurgents  had  never  counted  more  than  25,000 
armed  men  in  the  field  at  one  time,  while  Spain  had  sent  as 
many  as  217,282  reinforcements  to  the  island;  hence  the  in 
surrection,  in  spite  of  the  inactive  and  badly-managed  meas 
ures  of  the  Spaniards,  never  had  a  chance  of  succeeding  with 
out  the  intervention  of  the  United  States.  The  hope  of  such 
intervention,  and  the  assistance  furnished  by  individual  Amer 
icans,  were  undoubtedly  all  that  had  kept  the  rebellion  alive. 
Finally  the  conditions  in  Cuba  became  so  dreadful,  under  the 
administration  of  General  Weyler,  that  the  United  States  did 
intervene,  and  demand  his  recall.  The  Spanish  government 
recalled  Weyler  in  October,  1897,  and  instituted  reforms  in  the 
administration  of  affairs  in  the  island.  But  the  reforms  had 
come  too  late ;  nothing  now  would  satisfy  the  Cubans  short  of 
independence,  for  they  knew  that  they  could  still  count  upon 
the  active  sympathy  and  support  of  the  American  people  in 
their  struggle  for  liberty. 

If  there  be  a  single  national  trait  or  quality  amongst  our 
people  stronger  than  all  others,  it  is  an  unreasoning  sentiment 
that  causes  them  always  to  sympathize  with  the  side  that  phys 
ically  appears  the  weaker ;  and  the  less  they  know  about  the 
real  conditions  of  difference  between  the  parties  to  a  quarrel 
the  stronger  is  their  sympathy.-  True,  the  preponderance  of 
right  has  not,  generally,  been  on  the  side  of  might;  but  there 
has  usually  been  some  right  and  some  wrong  on  each  side. 
Our  people  never  ask  to  see  the  right  on  the  stronger  side, 
nor  do  they  look  for  the  wrong  on  the  weaker  side.  It  was 
this  sentiment,  wrought  upon  by  the  "yellow"  part  of  our 
press,  or  taken  advantage  of  by  this  part  of  the  press,  that 
brought  us  into  war  with  Spain.  The  national  sentiment  was 
tense  with  sympathy  and  the  sense  of  outrage  when  the  de 
struction  of  the  battle- ship  Maine,  in  Havana  harbor,  on  the 


590  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

night  of  February  15,  1898,  added  a  climax  to  the  situation. 
Time  was  taken  to  investigate  the  circumstances ;  but  the  will 
of  the  American  people  could  not  long  be  held  in  check,  and  in 
response  to  it  Congress,  on  the  19th  of  April,  passed  a  resolu 
tion  declaring  "that  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and 
of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent,"  and  authorizing 
the  President  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  to  carry  the 
resolution  into  effect.  This  was  tantamount  to  a  declaration 
of  war,  and  evoked  a  formal  declaration  from  Spain  on  April 
24.  On  the  25th  Congress  passed  an  act  formally  declaring 
that  war  existed  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN. 

It  was  known  that  the  Spanish  forces  in  Cuba  were  widely 
scattered  over  the  island,  but  that  the  bulk  of  them  were  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Havana,  the  most  important  city  in  the 
island,  and  the  seat  of  Spanish  authority  there.  It  was  natu 
ral,  then,  and  right,  that  Havana  should  be  chosen  as  our  first 
objective.  But  two  things  were  necessary  before  we  could 
attempt  a  campaign  upon  Cuban  soil:  first,  control  of  the  sea; 
and,  second,  an  army.  With  our  Indian  country  still  to  guard 
we  could  not  think  of  withdrawing  more  than  15,000  of  our 
regular  troops  from  the  little  garrisons  in  the  West. '  Volun 
teers  must,  therefore,  be  counted  upon,  and  a  bill  was  promptly 
passed  under  which  the  President  issued  a  call  for  125,000.  A 
few  days  later  Congress  passed  an  act  authorizing  a  strength 
of  62,597  men  for  the  regular  army,  and,  on  the  llth  of  May, 
further  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  to  organize  a  volun 
teer  brigade  of  engineers,  and  an  additional  volunteer  force  of 
10,000  men  who  were  to  be  immune  "from  disease  incident  to 
tropical  climates."  On  the  25th  of  May  the  President  issued 
a  call  for  75,000  more  volunteers.  Thus  an  aggregate  of  more 
than  260,000  new  troops  was  authorized  by  Congress,  and  they 
were  promptly  raised.  But  these  raw  troops  must  be  armed 
and  equipped,  and  ought  to  be  trained,  before  they  could  be 
put  into  active  service.  Moreover,  the  sickly  summer-season 
was  near  at  hand  in  the  tropics. 

It  was,  therefore,  decided  to  concentrate  the  available  regu 
lars  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile,  and  Tampa,  the  most  convenient 
points  from  which  to  embark  for  Cuba,  and  to  assemble  the 
volunteers  in  large  camps  of  instruction.  One  such  camp  was 
established  at  Chickamauga  Park,  Georgia,  and  another  at 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  591 

Falls  Church,  Virginia.  The  bulk  of  the  forces  were  to  be 
organized  into  eight  army-corps.  Besides  these  eight  corps, 
about  12,000  volunteers  were  distributed  along  the  seacoast 
from  Maine  to  New  Jersey;  five  regiments  were  stationed  at 
different  points  in  the  South ;  and  one  regiment  of  regular 
infantry,  three  of  cavalry,  and  nearly  all  of  the  artillery  were 
left  to  guard  the  Indian  frontier  and  garrison  the  seacoast 
forts. 

Pending  the  preparations  for  the  main  expedition,  a  detach 
ment  of  5,000  regulars  was  to  be  organized  at  Tampa,  and 
dispatched  under  General  Shafter  to  the  coast  of  Cuba.  Its 
double  purpose  would  be  to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  force  in 
order  to  gain  information,  and  to  carry  supplies  of  arms  and 
ammunition  to  the  insurgents.  Before  this  expedition  was 
ready  to  set  out,  however,  events  had  occurred  at  sea  that 
changed  all  the  plans  of  the  land  forces. 

THE  HOSTILE  NAVIES. 

(300)  While  it  is  well  known  now  that  our  navy  was  supe 
rior  in  strength  and  quality  to  that  of  Spain  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  our  naval  authorities  then  believed  the  superiority 
to  be  so  slight  that  the  loss  of  a  single  battle-ship  might  turn 
the  scale.  On  our  side  of  the  Atlantic  Admiral  Sampson  had 
at  Key  West  "one  of  the  most  powerful  fleets  of  warships  that 
had  ever  floated  in  American  waters."  Key  West  had  been 
selected  as  a  base  of  naval  operations,  and  Sampson's  fleet 
there  was  in  a  good  position  from  which  to  blockade  the  north 
ern  coast  of  Cuba  or  to  aid  an  expedition  against  Havana; 
while,  at  the  same  time,  it  guarded  our  Gulf  ports,  and  was 
within  reach  of  our  Atlantic  ports.  The  Flying  Squadron, 
composed  of  two  battle-ships  and  three  cruisers,  under  Com 
modore  Schley,  was  held  at  Hampton  Roads  mainly  for  the 
purpose  of  "giving  a  feeling  of  security  to  the  people  of  the 
coast  cities'' ;  and  a  patrol  squadron,  hastily  organized,  was 
guarding  the  Atlantic  coast  northward  from  Hampton  Roads. 
The  battle-ship  Oregon  was  on  its  way  from  the  Pacific  coast. 
After  a  swift  and  remarkable  voyage  of  14,700  miles  it  joined 
Admiral  Sampson's  fleet,  off  the  coast  of  Florida,  near  the  end 
of  May. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  Spain  had  two  fleets;  the 
smaller  one,  commander  by  Admiral  Camara,  was  in  Spanish 
waters,  and  the  larger  one,  commanded  by  Admiral  Cervera, 


592  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

was  at  St.  Vincent  in  the  Cape  Verde  Islands.  Spain  also  had 
a  feeble  squadron  in  Manila  Bay,  while  Commodore  Dewey 
commanded  an  American  fleet  of  second-class  vessels  which 
was  then  in  Chinese  waters. 

Under  later  orders  from  the  Navy  Department,  and  in  order 
more  effectively  to  blockade  the  ports  of  Cuba,  Sampson  placed 
the  greater  part  of  his  vessels  to  cover  Havana  and  the  ports 
on  the  northern  shore  of  Cuba  connected  with  that  city  by  rail, 
while  Commander  McCalla  with  a  cruiser,  a  gunboat,  and  a 
converted  yacht,  blockaded  Cienfuegos,  on  the  southern  coast. 
There  were  at  this  time  three  inferior  Spanish  cruisers  and 
a  few  gunboats  in  Cuban  waters,  but  they  did  not  molest  the 
American  ships. 

On  April  29  word  was  forwarded  from  Washington  to  Ad 
miral  Sampson  that,  on  that  very  day,  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet 
had  started  westward  from  the  Cape  Verde  Islands.  The  fleet 
consisted  of  four  cruisers  and  three  torpedo-boat  destroyers. 
It  was  reckoned  that  the  Spanish  fleet,  if  it  made  for  the  West 
Indies,  would  reach  their  waters  on  the  8th  of  May,  and  would 
immediately  have  to  go  into  port  to  coal.  In  order  to  watch 
for  Cervera's  fleet  Sampson  sailed  with  all  his  vessels,  except 
a  few  small  ones,  toward  the  north  coasts  of  Haiti  and  Porto 
Rico.  By  the  12th  he  was  at  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  and  that 
day  bombarded  the  harbor  of  that  place  to  search  for  the  Span 
ish  fleet.  Finding  that  the  fleet  was  not  there  he  started  back 
to  resume  the  blockade  of  Havana.  On  the  way  he  was  met 
by  the  torpedo  boat  Porter  with  a  dispatch  from  the  Navy  De 
partment  informing  him  that  Cervera's  squadron  was  at  the 
Island  of  Curasao  (near  the  coast  of  Venezuela)  on  May  14, 
and  also,  that  Schley  with  the  Flying  Squadron  had  started 
from  Hampton  Roads  for  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Owing  to  the  foul  bottom  of  the  Viscaya,  and  the  necessity 
for  towing  his  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  Cervera  had  made  a 
slow  voyage.  He  touched  first  at  the  island  of  Martinique, 
where  he  learned  that  the  American  navy  was  blockading  the 
western  coasts  of  Cuba;  that  Sampson's  fleet  was  about  to  at 
tack  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico ;  and  that  Santiago  de  Cuba  was 
free  from  blockade.  His  coal  was  nearly  out,  the  governor  of 
Martinique  would  not  let  him  take  on  a  supply  there,  and  he 
learned  that  there  was  none  at  San  Juan,  and  probably  none  at 
Santiago.  He,  therefore,  decided  to  make  for  Curagao,  where 
he  expected  to  find  a  supply.  He  reached  Curagao  on  the 
14th,  but  the  colliers  he  had  expected  were  not. there.  The 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR,  593 

Dutch  governor  of  the  island,  bound  by  neutrality  regula 
tions,  could  let  him  take  on  only  a  small  quantity  of  coal.  In 
despair  he  sailed  for  Cuba,  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  19th 
of  May,  entered  the  harbor  of  Santiago. 

On  the  same  day  the  chief  signal  officer  of  the  army  in 
formed  the  Navy  Department  at  Washington  that  Cervera's 
squadron  was  in  the  harbor  of  Santiago.  This  information 
was  immediately  dispatched  to  Sampson,  who  was  now  at  Key 
West.  He  forwarded  it  to  Schley  who  had  gone  to  blockade 
Cienfuegos.  Neither  of  these  officers  credited  the  informa 
tion.  Schley  believed  that  he  had  the  Spanish  fleet  shut  up  in 
the  harbor  of  Cienfuegos,  as  he  expressed  it,  "almost  to  a  cer 
tainty."  At  length  Commander  McCalla  went  ashore  and 
learned  positively  from  insurgents  that  the  hostile  fleet  was  not 
at  Cienfuegos. 

On  receiving  this  information  Schley  set  out  for  Santiago 
with  the  Brooklyn,  Iowa,  Massachusetts,  Texas,  Marblehead, 
Vixen,  Eagle,  and  the  collier  Merrimac.  He  arrived  off  San 
tiago  on  the  evening  of  the  26th,  and  found  three  American 
auxiliary  ships  there  scouting  for  the  enemy.  None  of  them 
had  any  knowledge  of  Cervera's  whereabouts.  Schley  did  not 
believe  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  in  Santiago  Harbor,  and, 
being  unable  to  coal  from  the  Merrimac,  an  account  of  a  rough 
sea,  lie  started  for  Key  West  to  coal.  Almost  immediately  he 
was  overtaken  by  the  auxiliary  Harvard  bearing  an  urgent  dis 
patch  from  the  Navy  Department,  which  informed  him  that  all 
reports  indicated  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  at  Santiago,  and 
directed  him  to  secure  positive  information  on  the  subject. 
Schley  replied  that  he  could  "ascertain  nothing  concerning  the 
enemy,"  and,  for  lack  of  coal  in  his  bunkers,  it  was  "impossible 
to  remain  off  Santiago" ;  and  he  continued  on  his  way  to  Key 
West.  On  the  27th  and  28th,  however,  the  sea  was  calm 
enough  for  him  to  coal  his  ships  from  the  Merrimac,  and  he 
put  about  for  Santiago.  On  the  29th  he  reconnoitered  near 
the  entrance  of  the  harbor  and  discovered  therein  the  Colon, 
the  Maria  Teresa,  and  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  which  he 
promptly  reported  to  Washington.  In  the  meantime  Admiral 
Sampson,  having  become  well-nigh  convinced  that  the  hostile 
fleet  was  at  Santiago,  had  sailed  for  that  point,  also,  with  the 
New  York,  the  Oregon,  the  converted  yacht  Mayflower,  and 
the  torpedo-boat  Porter.  He  arrived  off  Santiago  on  June  1, 
and  took  command  of  the  blockade. 

On  their  arrival  at  Santiago  Cervera  and  his  officers  were 


594  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

disappointed  to  find  that  not  only  coal  but  all  other  sup 
plies  were  very  scarce.  They  had  expected  to  find  plenty  of 
provisions  at  this  port,  as  it  had  not  yet  been  closed  by  block 
ade.  They  were  now  sorry  they  had  come  to  Santiago,  and 
wanted  to  go  to  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  where  they  should  find 
supplies  more  plentiful.  There  was  coal  enough  to  carry  them 
thither,  but  before  they  got  away  they  learned  that  three 
American  vessels  had  arrived  in  front  of  the  harbor — they  were 
three  auxiliary  ships ;  and  the  weather  had  become  so  bad  that 
there  was  danger  of  the  Colon's  striking  bottom  upon  a  rock 
in  the  channel  leading  out  of  the  harbor.  After  assembling 
his  captains  two  or  three  times  to  discuss  the  question  of  going 
out,  Cervera  finally  decided,  on  May  26,  to  defer  the  sortie  "in 
hopes  that  the  sea  will*  calm  down  and  another  opportunity  will 
present  itself."*  Thus  Cervera  cast  away  his  last  chance  of 
saving  any  part  of  his  squadron,  for  Schley  came  to  blockade 
him  on  the  28th  of  May,  and  Sampson  arrived  with  more  ships 
on  June  the  1st. 

On  the  3rd  of  June  Sampson  got  reliable  information  that  all 
of  Cervera's  vessels,  except  the  destroyer  Terror,  were  in  San 
tiago  harbor ;  and  the  same  day  he  received  word  from  Wash 
ington  that  the  Terror,  which  had  been  left  at  Martinique,  had 
arrived  at  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  badly  crippled.  That  night 
Lieutenant  Hobson  with  a  crew  of  seven  sailors,  picked  from 
a  large  number  that  had  volunteered,  acting  under  the  Ad 
miral's  orders,  sank  the  collier  Merrimac  in  the  narrow  chan 
nel,  near  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  purpose  was  to  seal 
up  the  Spanish  fleet  inside  the  harbor,  in  order  that  a  division 
might  safely  be  detached  from  the  American  fleet  to  act  against 
Camara's  squadron  in  case  it  should  become  necessary;  but  the 
collier  did  not  go  down  athwart  the  channel,  hence  did  not  close 
it  effectually.  On  the  6th  of  June  Sampson's  fleet  bombarded 
the  forts  guarding  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  Nearly  2,000 
shells  were  fired,  killing  sixteen  Spaniards  and  wounding  130. 
As  there  were  only  a  few  modern  guns  in  the  fort,  they  could 
make  but  a  feeble  reply  to  the  American  fire. 

(299)  t  In  order  to  secure  a  safe  harbor  where  he  could  coal 
ship  in  rough  weather,  and  take  refuge  in  case  of  hurricane, 
Sampson  sent  the  Marblehead  and  the  auxiliary  cruiser 
Yankee,  on  the  7th  of  June,  to  capture  Guantanamo  Bay,  about 
forty  miles  east  of  Santiago  Bay.  The  place  was  defended  by 


*From  Cervera's  indorsement  upon  the  proceedings  of  the  council  of 
his  captains,  May  26,  1898. 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  595 

a  single  gunboat  and  a  few  block-houses,  and  was  easily  taken. 
The  harbor  was  then  garrisoned  by  a  detachment  of  marines. 

At  this  stage  of  the  general  campaign  the  active  work  of  the 
navy,  for  the  time  being,  was  at  an  end.  To  maintain  a  block 
ade  of  the  coasts,  and  to  watch  for  a  sortie  of  Cervera's  squad 
ron  at  the  mouth  of  Santiago  Bay,  were  now  all  that  the  navy 
could  do  alone.  It  had  scouted  for  the  hostile  fleet,  found  it, 
and  shut  it  up;  it  now  had  complete  command  of  the  sea  in  the 
theater  of  operations.  So  far  as  the  sea  was  concerned,  the 
American  army  could  proceed  with  its  operations  with  little 
risk ;  but  the  navy  could  do  nothing  more  without  the  assistance 
of  the  army.  (301)  Morro  Castle  at  the  mouth  of  Santiago 
harbor  was  a  medieval  structure  armed  with  guns  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  all  but  a  few  of  the  guns  in  the  forts 
guarding  the  harbor  were  of  obsolete  type ;  but  there  were 
some  modern  pieces,  the  narrow  channel  was  planted  with 
mines,  and  Cervera's  fleet  was  inside.  Altogether  the  risk 
was  far  too  great  for  Sampson  to  undertake  to  force  a  passage. 
At  this  time  our  relations  with  other  foreign  nations  were  such 
that  we  could  not  afford  to  lose  a  single  vessel,  and  Sampson 
had  received  special  instructions  from  the  Navy  Department 
not  to  expose  his  men-of-war  to  the  fire  of  land  batteries.  Yet, 
so  long  as  Cervera  could  get  provisions  from  the  interior,  the 
Spanish  fleet  might  hold  out  indefinitely.  It  was  necessary, 
therefore,  in  order  to  capture  or  destroy  it,  for  an  American 
army  to  cooperate  from  the  land  side  with  Sampson's  fleet. 

THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST   SANTIAGO. 

(299)  The  naval  events  briefly  related  in  the  last  few  pages 
were  what  changed  all  the  plans  of  our  land  forces,  and  led  to 
the  termination  of  the  war  without  a  campaign  against  the 
main  Spanish  army  in  Cuba,  and  the  capital  of  the  island.  It 
was  arranged  between  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  that  a 
force  of  troops  should  go  to  Cuba  to  cooperate  with  Samp 
son's  fleet  at  Santiago.  Accordingly,  on  the  30th  of  May, 
General  Shafter,  commanding  the  Fifth  Corps  at  Tampa,  re 
ceived  orders  to  take  his  command,  under  naval  escort,  to  San 
tiago  in  order  to  capture  the  garrison  of  that  place,  and  aid 
the  navy  in  capturing  the  Spanish  fleet  in  the  harbor. 

In  spite  of  great  confusion  in  the  military  arrangements  at 
Tampa,  all  the  troops  were  aboard  the  transports,  and  the  fleet 
was  actually  under  way,  by  the  8th  of  June,  "when  suddenly 


596  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

there  came  an  unexpected  delay."  Word  was  received  that 
two  Spanish  cruisers,  accompanied  by  torpedo-boat  destroy 
ers,  had  been  sighted,  on  the  night  of  the  7th,  near  Nicolas 
Channel.  As  this  channel  is  almost  directly  upon  the  route  to 
Santiago,  the  fleet  had  to  be  recalled  and  held  until  the  news 
could  be  investigated.  Within  a  few  days  positive  informa 
tion  was  received  from  Admiral  Sampson  that  all  of  Cervera's 
ships  were  still  in  Santiago  Harbor ;  and  the  transports  started 
again  on  June  14. 

Shafter's  command  was  organized  in  two  infantry  divisions 
under  Kent  and  Lawton,  respectively,  a  dismounted  cavalry 
division,  under  Wheeler,  and  an  independent  brigade  under 
Bates.  Each  infantry  division  consisted  of  three  small  bri 
gades  of  three  regiments  each ;  the  cavalry  division  consisted 
of  only  two  brigades,  and  each  cavalry  brigade  was  made  up  of 
two  squadrons  only  from  each  of  three  regiments ;  Bates's  bri 
gade  consisted  of  two  infantry  regiments,  and  had  Rafferty's 
squadron  of  the  2nd  Cavalry,  the  only  mounted  troops  with  the 
expedition,  attached  to  it.  Altogether  there  were  eighteen 
regiments  of  regular  infantry  and  two  of  volunteers ;  ten  squad 
rons  of  regular  cavalry  and  two  of  volunteers.  The  artillery 
consisted  of  four  light  batteries,  four  siege  guns,  four  howitz 
ers,  eight  field  mortars,  and  one  dynamite  gun ;  and  there  were 
four  Catling  guns  and  one  revolving  cannon.  A  battalion  of 
engineers,  a  detachment  of  the  signal  corps,  and  a  balloon 
detachment  also  accompanied  the  expedition.  The  whole  con 
voy  consisted  of  thirty-two  troop-ships,  two  water-tenders,  and 
three  lighters;  and  the  strength  of  the  force  on  board,  accord 
ing  to  General  Shafter's  report,  was  •  815  officers  and  16,072 
enlisted  men. 

,  (301)  Without  any  occurrence  of  importance,  except  the 
loss  of  one  lighter  that  broke  loose  at  sea,  the  convoy,  escorted 
by  the  battle-ship  Indiana  and  several  smaller  vessels,  sailed 
round  the  eastern  end  of  Cuba  and  reached  the  position  of 
Sampson's  blockading  fleet,  off  the  mouth  of  Santiago  harbor, 
on  the  20th  of  June.  Here  General  Shafter  had  a  conference 
with  Admiral  Sampson  and  his  chief  of  staff,  from  whom  he 
learned  the  situation  from  the  naval  point  of  view,  the  topog 
raphy  of  the  coast  line,  and  the  views  of  the  naval  officers  re 
garding  a  plan  of  operations  for  his  command.  He  then  went 
ashore  with  Sampson  to  confer  with  the  insurgent  General 
Garcia,  who  was  at  Aserraderos  with  some  5,000  of  his  sol 
diers.  From  Garcia  Shafter  obtained  information  concerning 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  597 

the  topography  and  condition  of  the  inland  country  about  San 
tiago,  and  the  number  and  position  of  the  Spanish  troops. 

GEOGRAPHY. 

(299)  The  province  of  Santiago  occupies  the  eastern  end 
of  the  Island  of  Cuba  and  is  about  200  miles  long  from  east 
to  west.  Its  most  important  towns  are  Holguin,  Sagua  de 
Tanamo,  and  Baracoa  on  the  northern,  Manzanillo,  Santiago, 
and  Guantanamo  on  the  southern  side  of  the  island.  All  of 
these  towns,  except  Holguin,  are  near  the  coast;  none  of  them 
were  connected  by  railways,  and  the  highways  throughout  the 
province  were  of  the  worst  kind.  None  of  them,  without  re 
pairs,  were  in  fit  condition  for  the  passage  of  artillery  or 
wagons.  (301)  In  the  vicinity  of  Santiago  the  coast  is 
rugged  and  mountainous ;  for  twenty  miles  on  either  side  of  the 
harbor  it  has  the  form  of  a  ridge  whose  sides  are  very  steep 
toward  the  sea.  At  some  points  they  rise  abruptly  out  of  the 
sea,  while  at  others  a  strand  of  three  or  four  hundred  yards  lies 
between  their  base  and  the  water's  edge.  The  ridge  varies  in 
height  from  150  to  250  feet,  and  is  broken  here  and  there  by 
ravines  through  which  short  streams  discharge  their  waters. 
The  longest  and  largest  of  these  streams  is  the  San  Juan  River, 
about  three  miles  east  of  Santiago  Bay.  Behind  the  ridge  is  a 
line  of  foot-hills,  and  beyond  them,  five  or  six  miles  from  the 
coast,  is  a  low  mountain-range  called  the  Sierra  Del  Cobre. 

Upon  the  shore  east  of  the  harbor  are  several  small  places, 
the  most  important  of  which  are  Aguadores,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  San  Juan  River;  Siboney,  eleven  miles  from  the  harbor; 
and  Daiquiri,  six  miles  farther  east.  West  of  the  harbor  are 
Cabanas  and  Guaicabon,  two  and  four  miles  distant  respec 
tively.  Radiating  from  the  harbor  were  two  short  railways. 
One  ran  from  Las  Cruces,  just  south  of  Santiago  on  the  bay,  to 
Aguadores,  and  thence  along  the  strand  to  Siboney.  From 
there  it  turned  back  to  Firmeza,  a  village  two  miles  from  the 
shore.  The  other  line  ran  northward  from  Santiago  fifteen 
miles  to  El  Cristo,  and  there  forked,  one  prong  leading  to  the 
village  of  Socorro,  and  the  other  by  way  of  Moron  and  Dos 
Caminos  to  San  Luis.* 

At  this  time  there  were  in  the  province  of  Santiago  36,582 
Spanish  troops,  distributed  as  follows :  in  the  town  of  San- 


*The  railway  shown  on  the  map  from  El  Cobre  to  the  western  shore 
of  the  bay  did  not  exist  at  the  time  of  the  war. 


600  AMERICAN   CAMPAIGNS. 

trail  from  Siboney  passes  over  the  high  ridge  west  of  Las 
Guasimas  valley,  and  joins  the  main  road  a  few  hundred  yards 
beyond  the  Spanish  position.  The  road  and  the  trail  both  ap 
proach  this  position  through  a  tangled  thicket  of  trees  and 
underbrush. 

Young  advanced  by  the  road  with  a  squadron  of  the  1st  Cav 
alry,  a  squadron  of  the  10th  Cavalry,  and  four  Hotchkiss  moun 
tain  guns,  464  men  in  all;  while  Colonel  Wood  with  the  two 
squadrons  of  the  1st  Volunteer  Cavalry,  about  500  men,  accom 
panied  by  two  rapid-fire  Colt  automatic  guns,  took  the  trail 
over  the  ridge.  The  advance-guards  of  the  two  columns  came 
upon  the  Spanish  outposts  at  the  same  time,  about  half-past 
seven  o'clock;  and  both  columns  quickly  deployed  and  en 
gaged  the  enemy. 

(301)  General  Rubin  was  in  immediate  command  of  the 
Spanish  troops  at  the  battle  of  Las  Guasimas,  Linares  having 
placed  his  own  headquarters  at  El  Pozo,  some  four  miles  far 
ther  toward   Santiago.      Linares   considered   it   probable   that 
the  Americans,  aided  by  the  guns  of  their  fleet,  might  force  a 
passage  of  the  San  Juan  River  at  Aguadores  and  advance  upon 
Santiago  from  that  direction.     He  had,  therefore,  decided  to 
make  no  determined  stand  at  Sevilla,  but  to  withdraw  his  forces 
to  the  intrenchments  close  about   Santiago,  and   had   ordered 
Rubin  to  retire  "by  echelons  with  the  precaution  and  delibera 
tion  necessary  effectually  to  repel  any  attack  of  the  enemy." 

(302)  Accordingly  Rubin  had  his  command,  which  num 
bered  about  2,000,  disposed  in  three  lines.     The  bulk  of  the 
troops  occupied  the  advanced  position  at  Las  Guasimas,  and 
the  rest  were  at  Sevilla  and  La  Redonda.     About  1,500  took 
part  in  the  combat. 

While  Young's  column  pushed  up  the  steep  slope,  through 
the  jungle,  against  the  front  of  Rubin's  position,  Wood's  ad 
vanced  against  its  right  flank.  The  Spaniards  received  them 
with  volleys,  and  the  fire  was  so  heavy  that  Wheeler  dispatched 
a  message  to  Lawton  for  reinforcements.  Before  the  rein 
forcements  arrived  the  Spaniards  had  quitted  their  intrench 
ments  and  started  in  retreat  upon  Santiago ;  not,  however, 
until  their  sick  and  baggage  had  gotten  safely  on  the  way.  In 
this  action  the  Americans  lost  one  officer  and  fifteen  men 
killed,  and  six  officers  and  forty-six  men  wounded;  the  Span 
iards  lost  three  officers  and  seven  men  killed,  and  eighteen  men 
wounded.  Owing  to  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  Ameri 
cans,  their  total  want  of  cavalry,  and  the  lack  of  an  infantry 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  601 

reserve,  no  attempt  was  made  to  pursue  the  Spanish.  The 
victors  bivouacked  upon  the  battle-field,  where  they  were  joined 
within  an  hour  or  two  by  the  9th  Cavalry  and  Chaffee's  brigade 
of  Lawton's  division. 

(301)  The  American  army  now  moved  forward  and  en 
camped  near  Sevilla.  Bates's  brigade  stayed  at  Siboney,  with 
orders  to  send  a  strong  detachment  along  the  railway  toward 
Aguadores,  and  to  repair  the  road  from  Siboney  to  Sevilla. 
General  Garcia's  forces,  which  had  been  brought  by  water  to 
Siboney,  made  their  camp  in  rear  of  the  Americans  on  the 
Siboney-Sevilla  road.  Shafter  remained  aboard  his  transport, 
the  Seguranga,  directing  the  unloading  of  the  supplies  and 
means  of  transportation.  Owing  to  the  confusion  and  lack  of 
order  and  system  with  which  the  ships  had  been  loaded  at 
Tampa,  the  total  want  of  wharves,  and  the  shortage  of  light 
ers,  this  was  a  tedious  and  slow  performance.  Meantime 
Wheeler,  now  the  senior  in  command  with  the  army  in  camp, 
received  positive  orders  from  Shafter  not  to  bring  on  another 
engagement. 

A  coastwise  cable  had  been  picked  up  and  cut,  and  its  end 
had  been  brought  to  Siboney.  By  this  means  Shafter  had  re 
ceived  word  that  General  Duffield  was  on  the  way  to  reinforce 
him  with  a  brigade  of  volunteers  from  Camp  Alger,  Falls 
Church,  Virginia.  Shafter  was  anxious  to  await  the  arrival 
of  this  brigade,  as  well  as  to  have  his  army's  supplies  and 
materiel  unloaded  and  sent  to  the  front  before  he  advanced  to 
attack  Santiago.  Only  part  of  the  brigade  had  arrived,  how 
ever,  and  his  troops,  owing  to  the  terrible  road  and  the  slow 
unloading,  were  still  living  from  hand  to  mouth,  when,  on  the 
28th  of  June,  he  received  information  that  8,000  Spanish  regu 
lars,  on  the  way  from  Manzanillo,  were  already  within  fifty- 
four  miles  of  Santiago,  and  were  advancing  at  the  rate  of 
twelve  miles  a  day.  Shafter  decided  that  he  could  wait  no 
longer;  he  must  attack  Santiago  before  the  arrival  of  this 
Spanish  column.  On  the  29th  he  joined  the  army  in  camp. 
On  this  day  Garcia  moved  his  command  to  the  front  of  the 
American  forces.  Under  the  direction  of  Colonel  Wagner 
several  young  officers,  graduates  of  the  Service  Schools  at 
Fort  Leavenworth,  had  already  reconnoitered  and  sketched  the 
Spanish  positions  about  Santiago,  and  the  roads  leading  to 
them;  and  Generals  Wheeler,  Lawton,  and  Chaffee  had  per 
sonally  examined  the  road  toward  El  Caney  and  the  main  road 
to  Santiago.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th  Shafter,  accom- 


604  AMERICAN   CAMPAIGNS. 

Lawton's  troops  quitted  their  bivouacs  between  four  and  five 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July  1.  Chaffee's  brigade,  composed 
of  the  7th,  12th,  and  17th  Infantry,  took  position  800  yards 
from  the  stone  fort,  on  the  east  side  of  the  village;  Ludlow's 
brigade,  composed  of  the  8th,  22nd,  and  the  2nd  Massachusetts 
Infantry,  marched  to  the  southwest  side  of  the  town  to  seize  the 
Santiago  road  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  garrison;  Miles's 
brigade  was  held  in  reserve;  two  of  its  regiments,  the  4th  and 
24th,  went  to  the  Ducoureau  House,  south  of  the  village,  while 
the  1st  Infantry  and  Troop  D,  2nd  Cavalry,  supported  Capron's 
battery. 

At  half -after  six  the  battle  was  begun  by  Capron's  battery 
from  a  hill  a  little  more  than  a  mile  south  of  El  Caney.  Then 
the  infantry,  which  had  approached  to  within  about  600  yards 
of  the  Spanish  lines,  opened  fire.  The  Spaniards  replied 
promptly.  From  this  hour  the  combat,  instead  of  ending  with 
the  capture  of  the  town  in  about  two  hours,  as  Generals  Lawton 
and  Chaffee  had  predicted,  lasted  until  nearly  5  p.  m.  Before 
noon  Bates's  brigade  arrived  to  reinforce  Lawton,  raising  his 
strength  to  6,653  officers  and  men,  without  counting,  out  those 
already  killed  or  wounded.  (305)  About  one  o'clock  the  bri 
gades  of  Miles  and  Bates  were  ordered  forward  into  the  space 
between  Chaffee  and  Ludlow.  About  two  o'clock  Capron's 
battery  advanced  to  within  1,000  yards  of  the  Spanish  position, 
and  its  fire  became  more  effective.  The  Americans  gradually, 
but  very  slowly,  worked  their  way  toward  the  Spanish  lines, 
creeping,  crawling,  dragging  themselves  through  the  grass,  un 
der  the  deadly  fire  from  the  enemy's  cover.  Being  equipped  with 
cartridges  of  black  powder,  whose  smoke  at  every  discharge 
of  its  rifles  made  the  regiment  a  conspicuous  target,  the  2nd 
Massachusetts  took  little  part  in  the  combat;  yet  it  suffered  a 
loss  of  five  per  cent. 

In  the  meantime  Wheeler's  and  Kent's  divisions  were  en 
gaged  in  the  main  assault  at  San  Juan  and  Kettle  Hills,  and 
Lawton's  assistance  was  needed  there.  About  2  p.  m.  Shafter 
sent  Lawton  a  message  saying  that  his  division  and  Bates's 
brigade  and  Garcia  "should  move  on  the  city  and  form  the 
right  of  the  line."  When  Lawton  received  this  message  he 
was  engaged  in  the  final  assault  upon  El  Caney,  and  could  not 
withdraw.  About  three  o'clock  Capron's  guns  began  to  breach 
the  walls  of  the  stone  fort,  and  Chaffee  at  last  ordered  the 
12th  Infantry  to  charge  it.  Closely  supported  by  regiments  of 
Miles's  and  Bates's  brigades,  this  regiment  carried  the  posi- 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  605 

tion.  Then  the  Spaniards  were  driven  back  from  one  posi 
tion  to  another,  and  at  last  the  few  that  were  left  alive  and 
able  withdrew  from  the  village.  About  120  of  them  were  cap 
tured,  and  235  had  fallen,  dead  or  wounded.  The  brave  Gen 
eral  Vara  de  Rey  was  among  the  slain.  The  Americans  had 
lost  four  officers  and  seventy-seven  men  killed,  twenty-five  offi 
cers  and  335  men  wounded;  total  441. 

As  soon  as  General  Linares  saw,  on  the  morning  of  July  1, 
that  the  Americans  had  begun  an  attack  at  El  Caney  and  were 
also  massing  troops  in  front  of  San  Juan  Heights,  he  reinforced 
the  single  company  at  Kettle  and  San  Juan  Hills  by  the  two 
companies  and  the  two  rapid-fire  Krupp  guns  that  were  near 
Fort  Canosa.  These  troops  were  put  into  position  on  San  Juan 
Hill,  and  along  the  heights  on  both  sides  of  the  Santiago-Pozo 
road.  Before  the  assault  on  San  Juan  Hill  the  Spaniards  at 
that  point  were  further  reinforced  by  sixty  volunteers  from 
the  city,  making  altogether  a  force  of  about  521  men  on  Kettle 
Hill  and  San  Juan  Heights.  Three  companies,  numbering 
about  411  men,  came  up  from  Forts  San  Antonio  and  Santa 
Ines  to  take  the  place  of  those  that  had  quitted  Fort  Canosa. 
These,  together  with  two  guns  that  had  been  mounted  there  on 
the  13th  of  June,  formed  the  second  Spanish  line.  A  force*  of 
140  mounted  guerrillas  took  post  behind  a  small  hill  back  of 
Fort  Canosa.  Within  the  city,  and  surrounding  it  from  the 
cemetery  on  the  northwest  to  Las  Cruces  on  the  southwest, 
there  were  some  4,352  regulars,  volunteers,  firemen,  and  sailors, 
of  whom  probably  800  to  1,000  were  sick  in  the  hospitals. 

(306)  The  combat  had  been  going  on  at  El  Caney  about 
two  hours  when  Grimes  was  ordered  to  open  fire  with  his  bat 
tery  from  the  hill  at  El  Pozo  on  the  Spanish  block-house  upon 
San  Juan  Hill.  The  range  was  about  2,500  yards  and  the  fire 
was  not  very  effective.  As  the  guns  were  using  black  powder 
their  position  was  quickly  found  by  the  two  Krupp  guns  on 
San  Juan  Hill,  which  were  firing  smokeless  powder.  Our 
battery,  however,  maintained  an  unequal  duel  with  the  enemy's 
guns  for  about  three-quarters  of  an  hour. 

Meantime  Wheeler's  division,  followed  by  Kent's,  had  started 
forward  from  El  Pozo  by  the  narrow  road  through  the  dense 
jungle.  The  cavalry  division  had  reached  the  ford  of  Agua- 
dores  River,  and  about  half  of  it  had  changed  direction  to  the 
right,  in  pursuance  of  its  orders  to  deploy  to  the  right  of  the 
road,  when  the  war  balloon  bearing  Lieutenant-Colonel  Derby, 
Shafter's  chief  engineer,  settled  immediately  above  the  troops. 


608  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

back ;  the  Americans  halted  upon  San  Juan  Heights,  and  firing 
continued  between  the  hostile  lines  until  after  dark.  Once 
only  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon  the  Spaniards  attempted  to 
recover  their  lost  ground;  they  were  promptly  driven  back  to 
the  cover  of  their  intrenchments.  The  Americans  intrenched 
their  position. 

(301)  In  accordance  with  Shafter's  plan,  General  DurBeld 
with  the  33rd  Michigan,  supported  by  the  fire  of  two  of  Samp 
son's  vessels,  had  attacked  the  Spaniards  at  Aguadores  in  order 
to  prevent  them  from  reinforcing  the  enemy  in  the  vicinity 
of  Santiago. 

(307)  The  combat  at  El  Caney  having  virtually  ended  at 
4.30  p.  m.,  Bates  withdrew  his  brigade  and  marched  it  to  San 
Juan  Heights.  He  arrived  there  about  midnight,  after  march 
ing  and  fighting  for  nearly  twenty-seven  hours,  and  took  up  a 
position  on  the  left  of  Kent's  division.  At  about  sunset  Law- 
ton  started  with  the  bulk  of  his  division,  also,  for  San  Juan 
Heights,  by  the  direct  road  from  El  Caney  to  Santiago.  In 
the  pitchy  darkness  his  advance-guard  was  fired  upon  by  hos 
tile  sentinels  in  the  road  a  few  hundred  yards  west  of  the  Du- 
coureau  House.  Thereupon  Lawton  halted,  then  retraced  his 
steps  by  way  of  Shafter's  headquarters.  After  marching 
nearly  all  night  his  weary  division  reached  the  line  on  San 
Juan  Heights  the  next  morning,  and  took  its  place  on  the  ex 
treme  right  across  the  Santiago-El  Caney  road,  only  a  few 
hundred  yards  west  of  where  it  had  been  stopped  by  the  Span 
ish  sentries.  Later  Lawton's  division  extended  its  intrench 
ments  to  the  right  until  they  reached  nearly  to  the  head  of 
Santiago  Bay,  covering  all  the  highways  into  the  city  from  the 
north.  Garcia  intrenched  his  command  of  Cubans  upon  heights 
northwest  of  the  city  covering  the  Cobre  Road. 

Firing  began  about  6  a.  m.  between  the  hostile  lines  on  July 
2,  and  kept  up  until  dark;  but  neither  army  advanced  from 
its  trenches.  The  casualties  were  considerable  *  on  both  sides, 
the  Americans  losing  about  150  in  killed  and  wounded.  About 
10  p.  m.  a  terrific  fusillade  suddenly  started  up  without  purpose 
or  reason.  Each  side  thought  the  other  was  about  to  make  an 
assault. 

In  spite  of  their  victories  General  Shafter's  troops  by  sun 
set  on  the  2nd  had  become  very  much  dispirited.  What  with 
fighting  for  two  days  and  working  on  their  trenches  at  night ; 
with  no  shelter  from  the  broiling  tropic  sun  part  of  the  time, 
and  from  pouring  rain  the  rest ;  with  scarcely  anything  to  eat ; 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  609 

and  with  squatting  the  whole  time  in  narrow  trenches,  their 
fatigue  and  nervous  strain  had  well-nigh  reached  the  breaking 
point.  So  strong  came  the  appeals  for  relief  from  the  regi 
mental  commanders  that  Shafter  held  a  conference  with  his 
division  commanders  and  considered  the  question  of  withdraw 
ing  to  Seville.  Heights.  It  was  decided,  however,  to  hold  the 
position  on  San  Juan  Heights. 

The  next  morning  General  Shafter  sent  a  demand  under  flag 
of  truce  to  the  Spanish  commander,  now  General  Toral,  for 
his  surrender.*  The  demand  was  not  complied  with,  but  it 
started  negotiations  that  ended  with  the  formal  surrender 
of  the  Spanish  commander,  and  the  occupation  of  the  town  by 
the  Americans,  on  the  17th  of  July.  The  total  number  of 
troops  surrendered  by  Toral  was  about  22,700,  of  which  about 
13,558  were  at  Santiago;  the  rest  were  at  other  towns  within 
the  territorial  military  division  of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

There  was  not  much  fighting  between  the  hostile  land  forces 
from  the  3rd  to  the  17th  of  July,  but  other  important  events 
occurred  on  the  3rd.  On  that  day  Colonel  Escario's  column 
of  some  3,500  Spanish  soldiers  marched  unopposed  into  San 
tiago  by  the  Cobre  Road,  notwithstanding  that  this  road  was 
supposed  to  be  guarded  by  Garcia's  force  of  insurgents.  This 
was  the  column  that  had  hastened  ^Shafter's  decision  to  attack 
the  town.  (299  and  301)  It  had  left  Manzahillo  on  the  22nd 
of  June,  and  had  made  a  very  trying  journey,  harassed  all  the 
way  by  small  bands  of  insurgents. 

On  the  3rd,  also,  occurred  the  decisive  event  of  the  war; 
namely,  the  total  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet.  Admiral  Cer- 
vera  and  his  captains  had  rightly  judged  that  a  sortie  of  his 
squadron  had  no  chance  of  succeeding.  The  Admiral  had 
sent  two  thirds  of  his  force  ashore  to  aid  Linares  in  the  defense 
of  the  city  against  Shafter's  army,  and  had  made  up  his  mind 
that  there  was  nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  to  destroy  his  own 
ships  in  the  harbor,  in  case  the  city  should  be  taken.  After 
the  exchange  of  sevepal  telegrams  with  the  Minister  of  Marine 
at  Madrid,  and  with  Captain-General  Blanco  at  Havana,  to 
whose  orders  he  was  subject,  Cervera  received  a  positive  com 
mand  from  the  latter  on  the  2nd  of  July,  sent  at  5.10  a.  m., 
directing  him  to  reembark  his  men  as  soon  as  possible  and  take 
his  squadron  out  immediately. 


*General  Jose  Velazquez  Toral  was  now  in  command  of  the  Spanish 
forces  at  Santiago,  Linares  having  been  wounded  on  the  1st  of  July.. 


612  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

was  seven  men  slightly  wounded.  Not  an  American  ship  was 
injured.  The  next  day  Dewey  took  possession  of  Cavite. 

Upon  receipt  of  the  news  of  Dewey's  victory  the  War  De 
partment  issued  orders  to  assemble  a  force  of  20,000  troops  at 
San  Francisco  for  an  expedition  to  Manila.  This  force  was  to 
be  organized  as  the  Eighth  Corps  under  General  Merritt.  Such 
was  the  difficulty  encountered  in  hiring  ships  that  the  corps 
had  to  be  transported  in  seven  detachments,  and  the  task  was 
not  finished  until  October.  Early  in  August,  however,  Mer 
ritt  was  on  the  shore  of  Luzon,  three  miles  south  of  Manila, 
with  a  force  of  about  8,500  men  in  position  to  attack  the  Span 
ish  works.  All  the  troops  were  untrained  volunteers,  except 
some  companies  of  the  14th,  the  18th,  and  the  23rd  regiments 
of  regular  infantry,  and  a  few  batteries  of  regular  artillery  act 
ing  as  infantry.  Within  the  defenses  of  Manila  there  were 
upwards  of  13,000  Spanish  troops. 

At  this  time  Manila,  on  the  land  side,  was  practically  be 
sieged  by  Filipino  insurgents  under  General  Emilio  Aguinaldo, 
while  it  was  closely  blockaded  on  its  sea  front  by  Dewey's 
fleet.  Since  the  treaty  of  Biac-na-bato,  in  which  the  Spanish 
authorities  virtually  agreed  to  pay  the  leaders  of  the  Tagalog 
insurrection  of  1896  a  large  sum  of  money  to  suspend  hostil 
ities,  Aguinaldo  had  been  absent  from  Luzon ;  but  about  the 
20th  of  May  Dewey  had  allowed  him  to  be  brought  from  Hong 
Kong  to  Cavite  in  an  American  war-ship;  Dewey  then  fur 
nished  him  arms,  and  allowed  him  to  organize  an  insurgent 
army.  Within  six  weeks  from  this  time  Aguinaldo  was  master 
of  at  least  seven  provinces,  and  had  set  up  a  provisional  govern 
ment.  About  the  only  Spanish  garrison  that  still  held  out 
against  him  was  that  of  Manila. 

(309)  General  Merritt,  in  order  to  avoid  any  entanglement 
with  Aguinaldo  and  his  insurgent  government,  held  no  inter 
course  whatever  with  them,  and  went  about  the  capture  of 
Manila  "without  reference  to  the  situation  of  the  insurgent 
forces."*  His  command  was  organized  as  the  2nd  Division, 
Eighth  Army  Corps,  and  consisted  of  two  brigades  under  Gen 
erals  Arthur  MacArthur  and  F.  V.  Greene,  respectively.  Gen 
eral  Thomas  M.  Anderson  was  the  division  commander. 
Greene's  brigade  was  intrenched  across  Calle  Real  with  its  left 
on  the  shore;  MacArthur's  took  position  across  the  Pasay- 
Singalon  road.  The  country  between  these  two  roads  was  an 

*General  Merritt's  report. 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  613 

almost  impassable  swamp.  At  first,  before  the  arrival  of  Mac- 
Arthur's  brigade,  an  insurgent  brigade  had  been  intrenched  in 
front  of  Greene's,  but  its  commander  had  allowed  Greene  to 
move  his  American  line  forward  and  intrench  it  in  front  of  the 
Filipino  brigade. 

The  Spanish  works  consisted  of  a  line  of  block-houses  con 
nected  by  a  more  or  less  continuous  intrenchment  all  around 
the  outskirts  of  the  city.  The  works  ended  at  the  south  with 
Fort  San  Antonio  Abad,  within  about  a  hundred  yards  of  the 
shore.  Block-house  No.  14  stood  at  the  southeast  corner  of 
the  works  upon  the  Pasay  Road. 

Greene  was  attacked  in  his  intrenchments  about  midnight  of 
July  31,  and  lost  ten  men  killed  and  forty-three  wounded. 
Upon  several  nights  after  this,  firing  took  place  between 
Greene's  brigade  and  the  Spaniards  in  its  front,  but  the  Ameri 
can  losses  were  small.  General  Merritt  asked  Dewey  to  let  his 
ships  shell  the  Spanish  line,  believing  that  it  would  stop  the 
night  firing.  But  Dewey  feared  such  action  might  bring  on  a 
general  engagement  before  the  arrival  of  the  Monterey,  which 
he  was  expecting.  He  therefore  declined  to  do  it  unless  Mer- 
ritt's  troops  were  in  danger  of  being  driven  back ;  but  they  were 
in  no  such  danger.  At  length,  however,  the  Monterey  arrived, 
and  MacArthur's  brigade  had  already  landed  and  taken  its 
position.  Thereupon  Merritt  and  Dewey  jointly  called  upon 
the  Spanish  Governor-General  to  surrender.  Their  demand 
having  been  declined  they  arranged  for  a  combined  attack. 

The  attack  took  place  on  the  13th  of  August.  Between  9 
and  10  a.  m.  Dewey's  guns  opened  fire  upon  Fort  San  Antonio 
Abad  and  the  right  of  the  Spanish  trenches.  The  bombard 
ment  ceased  at  10.25  a.  m.,  and  Merritt's  troops  advanced. 
Greene  found  Fort  San  Antonio  and  the  Spanish  trenches  in 
his  front  deserted,  but  he  encountered  a  second  line  of  the 
enemy  in  the  streets  of  Malate.  He  lost  some  men  in  carrying 
this  line,  but  pushed  on  through  Malate  and  Ermita,  and,  ac 
cording  to  the  plan  of  battle,  occupied  Binondo  and  San  Mi 
guel,  barrios  on  the  north  side  of  the  Pasig  River.  At  the 
same  time  MacArthur's  brigade  had  advanced  by  way  of  the 
Pasay  road.  It  captured  Block-house  No.  14  without  much 
trouble,  but  encountered  considerable  resistance  at  Singalon. 
With  a  loss  of  five  killed  and  forty-three  wounded  it  succeeded 
in  driving  the  enemy  before  it,  however,  and  reached  the 
Pasig  River. 

Practically  all  of  the  town,  except  the  walled  city,  was  now 


616  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

was  to  strike  the  Military  Road  at  Cayey.  .  All  these  col 
umns  had  marched  several  days,  and  each  had  encountered 
Spanish  detachments  at  strong  points  on  the  roads  and  de 
feated  them,  when  the  campaign  was  brought  to  an  abrupt 
close  by  the  receipt  of  news  that  all  hostilities  had  been  sus 
pended  betwen  the  United  States  and  Spain,  pending  negotia 
tions  for  peace. 

The  expedition  to  Porto  Rico  was  made  up  of  regular  and 
volunteer  troops.  It  consisted  altogether  of  the  llth  and  19th 
U.  S.  Infantry  and  nine  volunteer  infantry  regiments ;  three 
troops  of  regular  cavalry  and  the  Philadelphia  City  Troop ; 
four  batteries  of  regulars  and  four  of  volunteers.  Its  total 
losses  were  three  men  killed  and  forty  wounded. 

PEACE. 

On  July  26  Spain  made  overtures  for  peace  through  the 
French  Ambassador  at  Washington.  On  August  the  12th  the 
peace  protocol  and  preliminary  arrangements  were  concluded. 
It  was  provided  that  the  final  treaty  of  peace  should  be  made 
by  a  joint  commission  that  should  meet  at  Paris  not  later 
than  October  1.  After  a  prolonged  discussion  a  treaty  was 
finally  agreed  to  and  signed  by  this  commission  on  the  10th  of 
December.  It  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
on  February  6,  1899,  and  signed  by  the  Queen  Regent  of 
Spain  on  March  17.  By  the  terms  of  this  treaty  Spain  relin 
quished  all  right  and  sovereignty  over  Cuba,  and  ceded  to  the 
United  States  Porto  Rico,  Guam,  and  all  the  Philippine  Is 
lands.  On  their  part  the  United  States  agreed  to  pay  Spain 
$20,000,000. 

COMMENTS. 

This  is  the  only  war  within  the  history  of  the  United  States 
in  which  the  principal  operations  of  the  land  forces  were 
secondary  to  those  of  the  navy.  The  navy  dictated  its  plan  of 
campaign  to  the  army.  An  attack  by  land  upon  Manila  had 
never  been  thought  of  until  it  became  necessary  to  gather  the 
fruits  of  Dewey's  victory  in  Manila  Bay ;  and  the  land  cam 
paign  against  Santiago  was  undertaken  solely  for  the  purpose 
of  aiding  Sampson  to  destroy  Cervera's  fleet.  "  This  fact  alone, 
if  -there  were  not  much  else  besides,  would  place  these  opera 
tions  among  the  most  interesting  and  instructive  of  all  our 
campaigns  for  the  student  of  military  history. 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  617 

Our  army  authorities  at  Washington  were  planning  a  grand 
campaign  against  Havana,  the  political  capital  of  Cuba,  when 
Cervera's  hapless  entrance  into  the  harbor  of  Santiago  de 
Cuba  changed  everything.  At  the  time,  however,  that  General 
Shafter  was  hurriedly  ordered  to  go  with  his  "force  to  capture 
garrison  at  Santiago,  and  assist  in  capturing  harbor  and 
fleet,"*  it  had  never  occurred  to  the  War  Department  that  this 
expedition  might  decide  the  issue  of  hostilities.  It  does  not 
appear  that  our  War  Department  even  suspected  for  a  moment 
that  the  capture  or  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet,  which  would 
mean  the  destruction  of  Spain's  sea  power,  would  make  it  im 
possible  for  Spain  longer  to  maintain  her  army  or  her  sover 
eignty  in  the  West  Indies. 

The  navy  appears  to  have  understood  the  situation  better. 
Admiral  Sampson  clearly  set  forth  in  his  dispatches  that  the 
capture  of  the  Spanish  fleet  must  put  an  end  to  the  war.  The 
army  authorities  ought  to  have  seen  it  as  plainly.  Cervera's 
fleet  guarded  the  communications  of  the  Spanish  army  in  Cuba 
with  its  base  at  home.  The  minute  it  should  be  lost  those  com 
munications  would  be  lost,  and  Spain  would  no  longer  dare 
send  a  troop-ship  or  a  supply-ship  across  the  Atlantic. 

The  trouble  was,  our  combined  land  and  sea  problem  had 
not  been  worked  out  beforehand.  That  we  should  soon  have 
to  go  to  war  with  Spain  had  been  almost  certain  for  more  than 
a  twelvemonth.  The  Naval  War  College  appears  to  have 
worked  at  the  problem,  and  to  have  .made  a  solution  for  the 
navy;  but  there  was  no  Army  War  College  at  that  time,  no 
General  Staff,  no  body  of  intelligent  officers  whose  duty  it  was 
to  make  war  plans  against  a  future  need.  Consequently  there 
was  no  plan  already  worked  out.  Certainly  there  was  no  com 
bined  land  and  sea  plan.  Such  a  thing  can  hardly  happen 
again.  War  cannot  befall  so  suddenly  as  to  catch  us  without 
a  plan  already  worked  out,  which  will  make  use  of  all  avail 
able  means.  If  Congress  will  provide  the  means  beforehand, 
the  country  will  find  the  War  Department  ready  for  any 
emergency. 

It  does  not  even  appear  that  our  War  Department  would 
have  waited  for  the  navy  to  get  the  mastery  of  the  sea  if  it 
had  itself  been  ready  to  begin  its  campaign  against  Havana. 
It  was  known  that  Spain  had  upwards  of  100,000  effective 
troops  in  Cuba,  and  that  Havana  was  well  prepared  for  de- 

*Telegraphic  order  from  Headquarters  of  the  Army  to  General 
Shafter,  May  30,  1898. 


620  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

trying.  Far  better  would  it  have  been  to  risk  the  loss  of  a 
single  ship  than  surely  to  lose  the  whole  squadron. 

When  the  Spanish  government  learned  of  the  destruction 
of  Montojo's  squadron  in  Manila  Bay  it  started  Camara's 
fleet  for  those  waters.  But  by  the  time  the  fleet  had  reached 
the  Suez  Canal  Spain's  greater  disaster  had  befallen  at  the 
mouth  of  Santiago  Harbor.  If,  after  Cervera  became  "bot 
tled  up"  at  Santiago,  Camara's  squadron  had  gone,  with  a 
great  sounding  of  trumpets,  to  threaten  the  cities  along  our 
northern  Atlantic  coast,  instead  of  starting  to  the  Orient,  it 
would  have  created  such  a  panic  along  the  seaboard  of  the 
New  England  and  the  Eastern  States  as  almost  surely  to 
oblige  the  President  to  recall  Schley's  squadron,  and  maybe 
Sampson's,  also,  to  protect  their  seaports.  This  would  have 
released  Cervera's  ships.  Such  a  diversion  would  certainly 
have  been  worth  trying.  As  it  was,  while  every  American 
warship  was  brought  into  action,  Camara's  squadron  took  no 
part  in  the  conflict. 

There  is  not  space  here  to  discuss  the  unprepared  condition 
of  our  land  forces  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war;  and  it  is  too 
well  known  by  every  one  that  read  the  newspapers  of  the  coun 
try  to  need  discussion.  So,  also,  is  the  chaos  and  confusion,  the 
disease  and  death,  that  resulted  from  it ;  and  the  big  pension 
roll  that  has  followed  in  its  wake.  For  it  all,  however,  neither 
the  War  Department  nor  the  army  is  to  blame;  the  whole 
blame  rests  upon  the  military  policy  of  our  Government ;  upon 
the  Congress  that  failed  to  heed  Washington's  injunction; 
upon  the  people  themselves.  Would  that  General  Upton's 
great  work,  Military  Policy  of  the  United  States,  which  is 
packed  from  cover  to  cover  with  indisputable  and  convincing 
truths,  might  be  read  by  every  lawmaker  in  the  land  and  taught 
in  every  school!  The  Nation  might  thus  be  saved  from  a 
future  disaster  and  humiliation  in  case  it  shall  quarrel  with  a 
power  having  a  first-class  army. 

One  of  the  lessons  taught  by  the  war  concerns  the  quickness 
with  which  events  pass.  Our  War  Department  was  not  even 
hoping  to  begin  its  main  campaign  until  October  and  the 
healthy  season  should  arrive;  it  never  for  a  moment  expected 
to  put  a  large  army  on  Cuban  soil  in  the  fever  summer-season. 
Spain,  also,  counted  upon  hostilities  lasting  for  months.  J3ut 
within  ten  weeks  of  the  declaration  of  war  the  battle  of  Manila 
Bay  had  taken  place;  the  victory  of  El  Caney-San  Juan  had 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  621 

been  won ;  Cervera's  "fleet  had  been  destroyed ;  and  the  waf 
was  practically  over. 

The  performance  of  Sampson's  fleet  at  Santiago,  and  the 
small  effect  of  its  fire  upon  the  Spanish  works  at  the  entrance 
of  the  harbor,  show  how  nearly  impossible  it  is  for  warships  to 
damage  a  seaport  city  whose  harbor  is  protected  by  mines  and 
modern  fortifications.  At  the  mouth  of  this  harbor  the  Span 
iards  had  an  old  stone  castle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  armed 
with  a  few  small  guns  of  the  same  period,  and  three  or  four 
earthen  forts  inadequately  armed ;  and  the  channel  was  laid 
with  mines.  Sampson's  guns  fired  several  thousand  rounds, 
with  no  other  effect  than  to  knock  a  few  rocks  out  of  the  old 
castle  walls,  and  to  disable  two  guns ;  and  the  Admiral  did  not 
dare  to  force  a  passage  into  the  harbor.  A  modern  battle-ship 
is  too  expensive  a  machine,  its  building  takes  too  long,  and  it 
is  too  vulnerable,  to  risk  close  range  of  the  enemy's  fortress 
guns,  or  passage  over  his  mines. 

LAND  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  SANTIAGO. 

Daiquiri  and  Siboney  taken  together  made  the  best  landing 
places  and  base  of  operations  for  Shafter's  army ;  but  no  good 
reason  can  be  seen  why  the  first  troops  were  not  put  ashore 
at  Siboney  rather  than  at  Daiquiri.  With  any  effort  worthy 
of  the  name,  however,  the  Spaniards  could  have  made  the  land 
ing  very  hard,  if  not  altogether  impossible,  at  either  place. 

Guantanamo  Bay,  forty  miles  east  of  Santiago,  would  have 
been  a  far  better  place  to  land  troops  and  supplies,  and  it  was 
in  the  possession  of  our  marines.  But  to  land  here  and  make 
it  his  base  Shafter  would  have  had  forty-odd  miles  of  miser 
able  road  for  his  line  of  communications,  with  inadequate 
trains  of  wagons  and  pack-mules,  and  a  force  of  some  6,000 
Spanish  troops  at  Guantanamo,  twelve  miles  inland,  to  defeat 
before  he  could  have  reached  his  objective,  Santiago.  And 
when  defeated  the  force  at  Guantanamo  would  have  been 
driven  to  a  junction  with  those  at  Santiago.  If  Shafter  had 
chosen  this  route,  it  is  more  than  likely  he  would  have  been 
retarded  on  the  way  long  enough  for  the  fevers  to  destroy  his 
army;  as  they  did  destroy  the  British  army  that  undertook 
such  an  operation  in  1741. 

If  Shafter  had  landed  at  Guaicabon  and  Cabanas,  on  the 
west  side  of  the  harbor,  his  line  of  communications  would  have 
lain  so  close  to  the  Bay  of  Santiago  as  to  be  exposed  to  attack 


624  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

position  was  a  strong  one,  and  a  Spanish  force  intrenched 
there  would  have  blocked  the  direct  road  to  Santiago,  and 
it  would  have  been  in  a  position  to  attack  Shafter's  flank  and 
communications  if  he  had  undertaken  to  turn  it  by  taking  a 
route  more  to  the  north  or  the  south.  And  despite  his  failure 
to  concentrate  the  troops  in  his  province,  Linares  had,  never 
theless,  more  than  2,000  men  he  could  have  brought  upon  the 
field  at  Las  Guasimas.  Tactically  the  position  could  undoubt 
edly  have  been  turned,  just  as  Santa  Anna's  was  turned  at 
Cerro  Gordo;  but  it  was,  none  the  less,  probably  the  strongest 
position  between  Siboney  and  Santiago,  and  called  for  no  such 
wide  dispersion  of  his  command  as  Linares  felt  obliged  to  make 
upon  the  defensive  line  he  had  selected  nearer  the  city,  from 
El  Caney  on  the  left  to  Morro  Castle  on  the  right. 

EL  CANEY. 

Strategically  the  attack  at  El  Caney  was  a  mistake  and  tac 
tically  it  was  badly  conducted.  Shafter's  objective  was  San 
tiago  and  the  main  Spanish  force  defending  the  town.  The 
detachment  intrenched  at  El  Caney  was  a  mere  outpost  three 
miles  away  from  the  main  position.  Instead  of  containing  this 
detachment  with  about  one  regiment,  and  concentrating  the 
rest  of  his  army  against  the  main  position,  Shafter  divided  his 
army  and  sent  nearly  half  of  it  against  the  outpost.  Even  if 
Lawton  had  captured  the  village  within  an  hour  or  two,  as  he 
expected  to  do,  it  would  have  had  little  effect  upon  the  main 
issue;  whereas  the  capture  of  the  main  position  at  San  Juan 
Heights  would  have  left  the  little  post  at  El  Caney  in  helpless 
isolation. 

The  great  tactical  mistake  of  the  attack  was  the  tardiness  of 
the  Americans  in  charging  the  enemy's  position.  An  in 
trenched  position  cannot  be  taken  by  fire  action  alor^e.  After 
a  preponderance  of  fire  has  been* brought  to  bear  upon  it  the 
assault  must  follow  in  order  to  carry  it.  Knowing  the  peril  of 
turning  their  backs  upon  an  enemy  and  fleeing  under  fire,  men 
will  not  quit  a  trench  and  run  away  until  they  see  their  foe 
charging  them.  Creeping  and  crawling  through  the  grass  and 
overwhelming  the  intrenchment  with  fire  will  not  put  the 
defenders  to  flight;  it  will  rather  make  them  stick  closer  to 
their  cover. 

Of  course  our  artillery  ought  to  have  taken  a  position  at  the 
start  close  enough  to  have  enabled  it  to  batter  down  the  little 


THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR.  625 

stone  fort.  It  opened  fire  at  6.30  a.  m.,  but  not  until  2  p.  m. 
did  it  move  up  close  enough  to  be  effective.  At- 3  p.  m.  it  had 
got  the  range  and  begun  to  breach  the  walls  of  the  little  struc 
ture.  Not  until  then,  after  a  small-arm  duel  of  nearly  eight 
hours,  did  General  Chaff ee  order  the  12th  Infantry  to  charge. 
Other  regiments  joined  in  the  charge,  and  the  few  defenders 
remaining  alive  fled  from  their  trenches.  It  took  about  two 
hours  more  to  drive  them  "from  position  to  position,  and  from 
house  to  house,"  and  capture  the  village.  We  had  lost  441 
officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded — exactly  seventy-nine 
fewer  than  General  Vara  de  Rey  had  in  his  command  at  the 
beginning  of  the  combat.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that,  if 
General  Lawton  had  made  his  assault  as  soon  as  he  gained  the 
mastery  of  fire,  he  would  have  driven  the  Spaniards  from  their 
trenches  just  the  same,  but  with  probably  no  more  than  one 
tenth  of  his  own  actual  loss. 

SAN  JUAN  AND-  KETTLE  HILLS. 

The  combat  at  Kettle  and  San  Juan  Hills  was  started  by  the 
appearance  of  Colonel  Derby's  balloon,  before  the  Americans 
had  made  their  deployment.  But  for  this  unfortunate  inci 
dent  the  deployment  might  possibly  have  been  completed  with 
out  drawing  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  As  it  happened,  however, 
the  troops,  crowded  together  in  the  narrow  road  and  hindered 
by  the  thick  jungle,  suffered  heavily.  As  at  El  Caney,  most 
of  our  losses  took  place  before  the  assault;  as  soon  as  our 
lines  charged,  the  Spaniards  quitted  their  intrenchments  and 
ran  away. 

Proper  reconnaissance  had  not  been  made  of  the  Spanish 
position;  nothing  was  known  concerning  the  strength  of  the 
force,  and,  as  usually  happens,  it  was  greatly  overestimated ; 
the  attack  was  made  without  form  or  tactical  method;  no  re 
serve  was  held  in  hand;  no  attempt  was  made  to  envelop  the 
enemy's  flank ;  in  fact,  no  positive  direction  or  control  appeared 
to  be  exercised  over  the  command  as  a  whole.  The  conduct 
of  the  attack  apparently  passed  into  the  control  of  company 
and  battalion  commanders.  General-officers  there  were  on 
the  field,  exposing  themselves  recklessly  and  fearlessly  to  the 
enemy's  fire,  leading  and  inspiring  by  example  such  troops  as 
could  see  them  or  could  hear  their  voices,  but  not  directing  or 
controlling  the  attack.  As  was  the  case  at  the  battle  of  the 
Wilderness,  however,  most  of  the  tactical  faults  of  this  attack 
may  be  charged  to  the  dense  jungle. 


628  AMERICAN  CAMPAIGNS. 

was  for  the  double  purpose  of  expelling  Spanish  sovereignty 
wholly  from  American  soil,  and  of  having  actual  possession 
of  that  island  when  the  time  should  come  to  arrange  terms 
of  peace. 

General  Miles  may  be  criticized  for  landing  his  troops  in  de 
tachments  at  several  points,  and  starting  across  the  island  in 
four  columns  too  widely  separated  to  support  one  another. 
Apparently  this  would  have  given  a  quick-witted  and  active 
Spanish  commander  the  opportunity  to  unite  his  forces  and 
destroy  at  least  one  of  the  American  columns  before  the  others 
could  go  to  its  assistance.  But  in  advising  the  War  Depart 
ment  that  he  was  going  to  land  his  expedition  at  Point  Fajardo, 
and  not  informing  it  otherwise  until  he  had  actually  landed  it 
at  a  point  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  island,  General  Miles 
showed  a  fine  appreciation  of  the  great  strategic  principle  of 
secrecy.  He  doubtless  knew  that  if  he  should  tell  the  depart 
ment  beforehand  where  he  really  meant  to  land,  the  informa 
tion  would  leak  out  and  be  published  to  the  world  by  the  news 
papers.  By  keeping  the  secret,  and  landing  where  he  was  not 
expected  by  the  Spanish  commander,  he  avoided  a  battle.  The 
Spanish  commander  had  prepared  to  oppose  his  landing  at 
Point  Fajardo.  But  while  Miles  purposely  neglected  to  wire 
the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  had  changed  his  destination,  he 
did  not  fail  to  leave  naval  vessels  to  direct  and  guard  the  troop 
ships  that  were  to  follow  those  of  his  first  detachment. 


APPENDIX. 

Union  and  Confederate  Commanders  in  some  of  the  prin 
cipal  campaigns  and  battles  of  the  Civil  War.* 

FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  OR  MANASSAS. 

July  21,  1861. 
Union  Forces,  IRVIN  McDOWELL,   Brig.-Gen.,  U.   S.  A. 

First  Division,  DANIEL  TYLER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Erasmus  Keyes,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  llth  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  R.  C.  Schenck,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  W.  T.  Sherman,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Fourth  Brigade,  I.  B.  Richardson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  DAVID  HUNTER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  3d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  Andrew  Porter,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  16th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  A.  E.  Burnside,  Col.  1st  R.  I. 
Third  Division,  S.  P.  HEINTZELMAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  W.  B.  Franklin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  O.  B.  Willcox,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  O.  O.  Howard,  Col.  3d  Maine. 
Fourth  Division,  THEODORE  RUNYON,  Brig.-Gen.  N.  J.  Militia. 

Nine  Regiments  not  brigaded. 
Fifth  Division,  D.  S.  MILES,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  Louis  Blenker,  Col.  8th  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  A.  Davies,  Col.  16th  N.  Y. 

Confederate  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  ].  E.  JOHNSTON,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  T.  J.    (Stonewall)   Jackson,  Col. 
Second  Brigade,  F.  S.  Bartow,  Col. 
Third  Brigade,  B.   E.  Bee,   Brig.-Gen. 
Fourth  Brigade,  A.   Elzey,    Col. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  M.  S.  Bonham,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Brigade,  R.  S.  Ewell,  Brig.-Gen. 
Third  Brigade.  D.  R.  Jones,  Brig.-Gen. 
Fourth  Brigade,  James  Longstreet,  Brig.-Gen. 
Fifth  Brigade,  P.  St.  G.  Cocke,  Coh 
Sixth  Brigade,  J.  A.  Early,  Col. 
Holmes's  Brigade,  T.  H.  Holmes,  Brig.-Gen. 


*Taken  from  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  and  Heitman' 
Historical  Register  and  Dictionary  of  the  United  States  Army. 

629 


630  APPENDIX. 

FORT  DONELSON. 

February  13-15,  1862. 

Union  Forces,  U.  S.  GRANT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  J.  A.  MCCLERNAND,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  R.  T.  Oglesby,  Col.  8th  111. 

Second  Brigade,  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  Col.  llth  111. 

Third  Brigade,  W.  R.  Morrison,  Col.  Vols. 

L.  F.  Ross,  Col.  17th  111. 
Second  Division,  C.  F.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  John  McArthur,  Col.  12th  111. 

Third  Brigade,  John  Cook,  Col.  7th  111. 

Fourth  Brigade,  J.  G.  Lauman,  Col.  7th  Iowa. 

Fifth  Brigade,  M.  L.  Smith,  Col.  8th  Mo. 
Third  Division,  LEW  WALLACE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Cruft,  Col.  31st  Ind. 

Second  Brigade  (attached  to  the  Third  Brigade). 

Third  Brigade,  J.  M.  Thayer,  Col.  1st  Neb. 

Confederate  Forces,  JOHN  B.  FLOYD,  Brig.-Gen. 

GIDEON  J.  PILLOW,  Brig.-Gen. 
SIMON  B.  BUCKNER,  Brig.-Gen. 

Buckner's  Division,  SIMON  B.  BUCKNER,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  W.  E.  Baldwin,  Col. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  C.  Brown,  Col. 
Johnson's  Command,  B.  R.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen. 

Heiman's  Brigade,  A.  Heiman,  Col. 

Davidson's  Brigade,  T.  J.  Davidson,  Col. 

Drake's  Brigade,  Joseph  Drake,  Col. 
Floyd's  Division. 

First  Brigade,  G.  C.  Wharton,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  John  McCausland,  Col. 

Garrison  Forces,  J.  W.  Head,  Col. 

Cavalry,  N.  B.  Forrest,  Col. 

BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

April  6-7,  1862. 

Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  U.  S.  GRANT,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  J.  A.  MCCLERNAND.  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  A.  M.  Hare,  Col.  Vols. 

M.  M.  Crocker,  Col.   13th  Iowa. 

Second  Brigade,  C.  C.  Marsh,  Col.  llth  111. 

Third  Brigade,  Julius  Raith,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  W.  H.  L.  WALLACE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  M.  Tuttle,  Col.  2d  Iowa. 

Second  Brigade.  John  McArthur.  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  T.  W.  Sweeny,  Col.  52d  111. 


APPENDIX  631 

Third  Division,  LEW  WALLACE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  M.  L.  Smith,  Col.  8th  Mo. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  M.  Thayer,  Col.  1st  Neb. 

Third  Brigade,  Charles  Whittlesey,  Col.  20th  Ohio. 
Fourth  Division,  S.  A.  HURLBUT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  N.  G.  Williams,  Col.  3d  Iowa. 
I.  C.  Pugh,  Col.  41st  111. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  C.  Veatch,  Col.  25th  Ind. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  G.  Lauman,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Fifth  Division,  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  J.  A.  McDowell,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  David  Stuart,  Col.  55th  111. 

Third  Brigade,  Jesse  Hildebrand,  Col.  Vols. 

Fourth  Brigade,  R.  P.  Buckland,  Col.  72nd  Ohio. 
Sixth  Division,  B.  M.  PRENTISS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Everett  Peabody,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  Madison  Miller,  Col.  18th  Mo. 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  D.  C.  BUELL,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Col.  A.  A.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 

Second  Division,  A.  McD.  McCooK.  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 

Fourth  Brigade,  L.  H.  Rousseau,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fifth  Brigade,  E.  N.  Kirk,  Col.  34th  111. 

Sixth  Brigade,  W.  H.  Gibson,  Col.  49th  Ohio. 
Fourth  Division,  WILLIAM  NELSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lieut.  U.  S.  Navy. 

Tenth  Brigade,  Jacob  Ammen,  Col.  24th  Ohio. 

Nineteenth  Brigade,  W.  B.  Hazen,  Col.  41st  Ohio, 

Capt.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Twenty-second  Brigade,  S.  D.  Bruce,  Col.  Vols. 
Fifth  Division,  T.  L.  CRITTENDEN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Eleventh  Brigade,  J.  T.  Boyle,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fourteenth  Brigade,  W.  Sooy  Smith,  Col.  13th  Ohio. 
Sixth  Division,  T.  J.  WOOD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 

Twentieth  Brigade,  J.  A.  Garfield,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Twenty-first  Brigade,  G.  D.  Wagner,  Col.  15th  Ind. 

Confederate  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Mississippi,  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General. 
Second  in  Command,  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  General. 

First  Corps,  LEONIDAS  POLK,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Division,  CHARLES  CLARK,  Brig.-Gen. 

A.  P.  STEWART,  Brig.Gen. 
First  Brigade,  R.  M.  Russell,  Col. 
Second  Brigade,  A.  P.  Stewart,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Division,  B.  F.  CHEATHAM,  Maj.-Gen. 
First  Brigade,  B.  R.  Johnson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Preston  Smith,  Col. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  H.  Stephens,  Col. 


632  APPENDIX. 

Second  Corps,  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  Maj.-Gen. 
First  Division,  DANIEL  RUGGLES,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  R.  L.  Gibson,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  Patton  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Preston  Pond,  Jr.,  Col. 
Second  Division,  J.  M.  WITHERS,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  A.  H.  Gladden,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  ].  R.  Chalmers,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  K.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Third  Corps,  W.  J.  HARDER,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  T.  C.  Hindman,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  P.  R.  Cleburne,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  S.  A.  M.  Wood,  Brig.-Gen. 
Reserve  Corps,  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  R.  P.  Trabue,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  S.  Bowen,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  W.  S.  Statham,  Col. 

BATTLE  OF  SEVEN  PINES  OR  FAIR  OAKS. 

May  31 -June  1,  1862. 
Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 
Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Second  Corps,  E.  V.  SUMNER,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

First  Division,  I.  B.  RICHARDSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  O.  O.  Howard,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  F.  Meagher,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  W.  H.  French,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 
Second  Division,  JOHN  SEDGWICK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  W.  A.  Gorman,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  W.  Burns,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  J.  T.  Dana,  Brig.-Gen.,  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 
Third  Corps,  S.  P.  HEINTZELMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.   17th  U.   S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  D.  E.  Sickles,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  F.  E.  Patterson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  PHILIP  KEARNY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  C.  D.  Jameson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  D.  B.  Birney,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  H.  G.  Berry,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fourth  Corps,  E.   D.  KEYES,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,   Col.   llth   U.   S.   Inf. 
First  Division,  D.  N.  COUCH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  J.  Peck,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  J.  Abercrombie,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  7th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  Charles  Devens,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


APPENDIX.  633 

Second  Division,  SILAS  CASEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  4th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  H.  M.  Naglee,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  H.  W.  Wessells,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  I.  N.  Palmer,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 

Confederate  Forces. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General. 

G.  W.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen. 
R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

Right  Wing,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Maj.-Gen. 

Longstreet's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Brig.-Gen. 

Kemper's  Brigade,  J.  L.  Kemper,  Col. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  Micah  Jenkins,  Col. 

Pickett's  Brigade,  G.  E.  Pickett,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  C.  M.  Wilcox,  Brig.-Gen. 

Colston's  Brigade,  R.  E.  Colston,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pryor's  Brigade,  R.  A.  Pryor,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hill's  Division,  D.  H.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

Garland's  Brigade,  Samuel  Garland,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen. 

Rodes's  Brigade,  R.  E.  Rodes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Rains's  Brigade,  G.  R.  Rains,  Brig.-Gen. 

Feather -ston's  Brigade,  G.  B.  Anderson,  Col. 
Huger's  Division,  BENJAMIN  HUGER,  Brig.-Gen. 

Armistead's  Brigade,  L.  A.  Armistead,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  William  Mahone,  Brig.-Gen. 

Blanchard's  Brigade,  A.  G.  Blanchard,  Brig.-Gen. 
Left  Wing,  G.  W.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen. 

Smith's  Division,  W.  H.  C.  WHITING,  Brig.-Gen. 

Whiting's  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  Law,  Col. 

Hood's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Hood,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hampton's  Brigade,  Wade  Hampton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Ration's  Brigade,  Robert  Hatton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pettigrew's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Pettigrew,  Brig.-Gen. 

SEVEN  DAYS'  BATTLE. 

June25-July  1,  1862. 
Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 
Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Second  Corps,  E.  V.  SUMNER,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

First  Division,  I.  B.  RICHARDSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  C.  Caldwell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  F.  Meagher,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  W.  H.  French,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.   S.  Art. 
Second  Division,  JOHN  SEDGWICK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  Alfred  Sully,  Col.  1st  Minn., 

Maj.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 


634  APPENDIX. 

Second  Brigade,  W.  W.  Burns,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  J.  T.  Dana,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 
Third  Corps,  S.  P.  HEINTZELMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,   ' 

Col.  17th  U.-  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Cuvier  Grover,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  10th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  D.  E.  Sickles,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  ].  B.  Carr,  Col.  2d  N.  Y. 
Third  Division,  PHILIP  KEARNY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  C.  Robinson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  D.  B.  Birney,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  H.  G.  Berry,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fourth  Corps,  E.  D.  KEYES.  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  llth  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  D.   N.   COUCH,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 

First  Brigade,  A.  P.  Howe,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  J.  Abercrombie,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  7th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  I.  N.  Palmer,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Second  Division,  J.  J.  PECK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  H.  M.  Naglee,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  H.  W.  Wessells,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Fifth  Corps,  FITZ-JOHN   PORTER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  G.  W.  MORELL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  H.  Martindale,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Charles  Griffin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Brigade,  Daniel  Butterfield,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  GEORGE  SYKES,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  R.  C.  Buchanan,  Lt.-Col.  4th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  William  Chapman,  Lt.-Col.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  K.  Warren,  Col.  5th  N.  Y., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
Third  Division,  G.  A.  McCALL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  F.  Reynolds,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  G.  Meade,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
Third  Brigade,  Truman  Seymour,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Sixth  Corps,  W.  B.  FRANKLIN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  G.  W.  Taylor,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  J.  Bartlett,  Col.  27th  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  John  Newton,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 


APPENDIX.  635 

Second  Division,  WM.  F.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.. 

Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  W.  S.  Hancock,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  T.  H.  Brooks,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  ].  W.  Davidson,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 

Cavalry  Reserve,  P.  ST.  G.  COOKE,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
First  Brigade,  R.  H.  Rush,  Col.  6th  Pa.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  A.  H.  Blake,  Col.  1st  U.  S.  Cav. 
Artillery  Reserve,  H.  J.  HUNT,  Col.  A.  A.  D.  C.,  Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  Wm.  Hays,  Lt.-Col.  A.  A.  D.  C., 

Capt.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  W.  Getty,  Lt.-Col.  A.  A.  D.  C., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Third  Brigade,  Albert  Arndt,  Maj.  1st  Battalion  N.  Y.  Art. 
Fourth  Brigade,  E.   R.  Petherbridge,  Maj.  Md.  Art. 
Fifth  Brigade,  J.  H.  Carlisle,  Capt.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

Jackson's  Command,  T.  J.    (Stonewall)    JACKSON,  Maj. -Gen. 
Whiting's  Division,  W.  H.  C.  WHITING,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  J.  B.   Hood,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  Law,  Col. 
Jackson's  Division. 

First  Brigade,  C.  S.  Winder,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  R.  H.  Cunningham,  Lt.-Col. 

Third  Brigade,  S.  V.  Fulkerson,  Col. 
E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Col. 
Wade  Hampton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade.  A.  R.  Lawton,  Brig.-Gen. 
Eu'dl's  Division,  R.  S.  EWELL,  Maj. -Gen. 

Fourth  Briaade,  Arnold  Elzey,   Brig.-Gen. 

Seventh  Brigade,  I.  R.  Trimble,  Brig.-Gen. 

Eighth  Brigade,  Richard  Taylor,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hill's  Division,  D.  H.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  R.  E.  Rodes,  Brig.-Gen. 
J.  B.  Gordon,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  G.   B.  Anderson,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Samuel  Garland,   Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  A.  H.  Colquitt,  Col. 

Fifth  Brigade,  R.  S.  Ripley,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mayrudcr's  Command,  J.  B.  MAGRUDER,  Maj.  Gen. 
Jones's  Division,  D.  R.  JONES,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  Robert  Toombs,  Brig-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Col. 
McLaws's  Division,  LAFAYETTE  McLAWs.  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  P.  J.  Semmes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen. 
Magruder's  Division. 

Second  Brigade,  Howell   Cobb,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Richard  Griffith,   Brig.-Gen. 


636  APPENDIX. 

Longstreet's  Command,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Maj.-Gen. 
Longstreet's  Division. 

First  Brigade,  J.  L.  Kemper,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  R.  H.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  G.  E.  Pickett,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  C.  M.  Wilcox,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fifth  Brigade,  R.  A.  Pryor,  Brig.-Gen. 

Sixth  Brigade,  W.  S.  Featherston,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hill's  Division,  A.  P.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  C.  W.  Field,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  Maxcy  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  R.   Anderson,   Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  L.  O'B.  Branch,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fifth  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 

Sixth  Brigade,  W.  D.  Fender,  Brig.-Gen. 
Holmes' s  Division,  T.  H.  HOLMES,  Maj.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  Robert  Ransom,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Junius  Daniel,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  J.  G.  Walker,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cavalry,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  Brig.-Gen. 

Reserve  Artillery,  WM.  N.  PENDLETON,  Brig.-Gen. 

SECOND  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN  OR  MANASSAS. 

August  29-30,  1862. 

Union  Forces. 

Army  of  Virginia,  JOHM  POPE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols-. 
Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 

First  Corps,  FRANZ  SIGEL,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  R.  C.  SCHENCK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Julius  Stahel,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  N.  C.  McLean,  Col.  75th  Ohio. 
Second  Division,  A.  VON  STEINWEHR,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  A.  Koltes,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  CARL    SCHURZ,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Henry  Bohlen,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  Vladimir  Krzyzanowski,  Col.   58th  N.   Y. 

Independent  Brigade,  R.  H.  Milroy,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Cavalry  Brigade,  John  Beardsley,  Col.  9th  N.  Y.  Cav. 

Second  Corps,  N.  P.  BANKS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
(This  Corps  was  with  wagon-train.) 

First  Division,  A.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 

First  Brigade,  S.  W.   Crawford,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  H.  Gordon,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  G.  S.  GREENE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Candy,  Col.  66th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  Matthew   Schlaudecker,   Col.    Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  A.  Tait,  Col.  Vols. 
Cavalry  Brigade,  John  Buford,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  I.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 


APPENDIX.  637 

Third  Corps,  IRVIN  McDOWELL,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
First  Division,  RUFUS  KING,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  P.  Hatch,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.     S.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  Abner  Doubleday,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  M.  R.  Patrick,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  2nd  U.  S.  Inf. 
Fourth  Brigade,  John  Gibbon,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 
Second  Division,  J.  B.  RICKETTS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.   1st  U.   S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  Abram  Duryea,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Z.  B.  Tower,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
Third   Brigade,  G.   L.   Hartsuff,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols., 

Maj.  A.  A.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 
Fourth  Brigade,  Joseph  Thoburn,  Col.  Vols. 
Cavalry  Brigade,  G.  D.   Bayard,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

Reynolds's  Division,  J.  F.  REYNOLDS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  G.  G.  Meade,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
Second  Brigade,  Truman  Seymour,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  F.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Third  Corps,  S.  P.  HEINTZELMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  PHILIP  KEARNY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  C.  Robinson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  D.  B.  Birney,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  O.  M.  Poe,  Col.  2d  Mich., 

1st  Lt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
Second  Division,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Cuvier  Grover,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  10th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  Nelson  Taylor,  Col.  72d  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  B.  Carr,  Col.  2d  N.  Y. 

Fifth  Corps,  F.  J.  PORTER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  G.  W.  MORELL,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  C.  W.  Roberts,  Col.  2d  Me. 
Second  Brigade,  Charles  Griffin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Brigade,  Daniel  Butter  field,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt-Col.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  GEORGE   SYKES,   Brig*.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  R.  C.  Buchanan,  Lt.-Col.  4th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  Wm.  Chapman,  Lt.-Col.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  K.  Warren,  Col.  5th  N.  Y., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 


638  APPENDIX. 

Ninth  Corps,  J.  L.  RENO,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  U.  S.  Ordnance 
First  Division,  I.  I.  STEVENS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  B.  C.  Christ,  Col.  50th  Pa. 

Second  Brigade,  Daniel  Leasure,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  Addison  Farnsworth,  Col.  79th  N.  Y. 
Second  Division. 

First  Brigade,  James  Nagle,  Col.  48th  Pa. 

Second  Brigade,  Edward  Ferrero,  Col.  51st  N.  Y. 

Confederate  Forces. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

Right  Wing,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Maj.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

Armistead's  Brigade,  L.  A.  Armistead,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  Wm.   Mahone,   Brig.-Gen. 
'    Wright's  Brigade,  A.  R.  Wright,  Brig.-Gen. 
Jones's  Division,  D.  R.  JONES,  Brig.-Gen. 

Toombs's   Brigade,   Robert    Toombs,    Brig.-Gen. 

Drayton's  Brigade,   T.   F.    Drayton,   Brig.-Gen. 

Jones's  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Col. 
Wilcox's  Division,  C.  M.  WILCOX,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  C.   M.  Wilcox,   Brig.-Gen. 

Pryor's  Brigade,  R.  A.  Pryor,  Brig.-Gen. 

Featherston's  Brigade,  W.   S.   Featherston,   Brig.-Gen. 
Hood's  Division,  J.  B.  HOOD,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hood's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Hood,  Brig.-Gen. 

Whiting's  Brigade,  E.   M.  Law,   Col. 
Kemper's  Division,  J.  L.  KEMPER,  Brig.-Gen. 

Kemper's  Brigade,  M.  D.  Corse,  Col. 

Jenkins's  Brigade,   Micah  Jenkins,    Brig.-Gen. 

Pickett's  Brigade,  Eppa  Hunton,  Col. 

Evans's  Independent  Brigade,  N.  G.  Evans,  Brig.-Gen. 
Left  Wing,  T.  J.   (Stonewall)   JACKSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
First  Division,  WM.  B.  TALIAFERRO,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  W.  S.  H.  Baylor,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  John  Seddon,  Maj. 

Third  Brigade,  A.  G.  Taliaferro,  Col. 

Fourth  Brigade,  W.  E.  Starke,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Division,  A.  P.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

Branch's  Brigade,  L.  O'B.  Branch,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fender's  Brigade,  W.  D.  Pender,  Brig.-Gen. 

Thomas's  Brigade,   E.   L.   Thomas,   Col. 

Gregg's  Brigade,  Maxcy  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen. 

Archer's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 

Field's  Brigade,  C.  W.  Field,  Brig.-Gen. 
Third  Division,  R.  S.  EWELL,  Maj.-Gen. 

Lawton's  Brigade,  A.   R.  Lawton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Trimble's  Brigade.  I.  R.  Trimble,  Brig.-Gen. 

Early' s  Brigade,  J.  A.  Early,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hays's  Brigade,  Henry  Forno,  Col. 
Cavalry  Division,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  Maj.-Gen. 

Robertson's  Brigade,  B.   H.   Robertson,   Brig.-Gen. 

Lee's  Brigade,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 


APPENDIX.  639 

BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM  OR  SHARPSBURG. 

Sept.  17,  1862. 
Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 
Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

First  Corps,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  17th  U.  S.  In! 

First  Brigade,  Walter   Phelps,  Jr.,  Col.  22d  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  W.   P.  Wainwright,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  M.  R.  Patrick,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.. 

Capt.  2d  U.  S.  Inf 
Fourth  Brigade,  John  Gibbon,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 
Second  Division,  J.  B.  RICKETTS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art 

First  Brigade,  Abram  Duryea,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  A.   Christian,   Col.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  L.  Hartsuff,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  A.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 
Third  Division,  G.  G.  MEADE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  Truman  Seymour,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  A.  L.  Magilton,  Col.  4th  Pa.  Reserve. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  F.  Gallagher,  Col.  llth  Pa.  Reserve. 
Second  Corps,  E.  V.  SUMNER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
First  Division,  I.  B.  RICHARDSON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  C.  Caldwell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  F.  Meagher,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  R.  Brooke,  Col.  53d  Pa. 
Second  Division,  JOHN    SEDGWICK,   Maj.-Gen.   Vols., 

Col.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  W.  A.  Gorman,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  O.  O.  Howard,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  J.  T.  Dana,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  W.  H.  FRENCH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  Nathan  Kimball,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Dwight  Morris,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  Max  Weber,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fourth  Corps. 

First  Division,  D.  N.  COUCH,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Devens,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  A.  P.  Howe,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 

Third  Brigade,  John  Cochrane,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fifth  Corps,  F.  J.  PORTER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.   15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  G.  W.  MORELL,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  James  Barnes,  Col.   18th  Mass. 
Second  Brigade,  Charles  Griffin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.. 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  B.  W.  Stockton,  Col.  16th  Mich. 


640  APPENDIX. 

Second  Division,  GEORGE  SYKES,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  R.  C.  Buchanan,  Lt.-Col.  4th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  C.  S.  Lovell,  Maj.  10th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  K.  Warren,  Col.  5th  N.  Y., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 

Sixth  Corps,  W.  B.  FRANKLIN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  Col.  1st  N.  J., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  J.  Bartlett,  Col.  27th  N.  Y. 
Third   Brigade,   John   Newton,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
Second  Division,  WM.  F.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  W.   S.  Hancock,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  T.  H.  Brooks,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  W.  H.  Irwin,  Col.  49th  Pa. 
Ninth  Corps,  A.  E.  BURNSIDE,  Ma>.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  O.  B.  WILLCOX,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  B.  C.  Christ,  Col.  50th  Pa. 
Second  Brigade,  Thomas  Welsh,   Col.  45th  Pa. 
Second  Division,  S.  D.  STURGIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  James  Nagle,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Edward  Ferrero,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  I.  P.  RODMAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  H.  S.  Fairchild,  Col.  89th  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  Edward  Harland,  Col.  8th  Conn. 
Kanawha  Division,  J.  D.  Cox,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  E.  P.  Scammon,  Col.  23d  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  August  Moor,  Col.  28th  Ohio. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

Longstr eel's  Command,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Maj.-Gen. 
McLaws's  Division,  LAFAYETTE  McLAws,  Maj.-Gen. 

Kershaw's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cobb's  Brigade,  Howell  Cobb,  Brig.-Gen. 

Semmes's  Brigade,  P.  J.  Semmes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Barksdale's  Brigade,  William  Barksdale,  Brig.-Gen. 
Anderson's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  Alfred  Cumming,  Col. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  W.  A.  Parham,  Col. 

Featherston's  Brigade,  Carnot  Posey,  Col. 

Armistead's  Brigade,  L.  A.  Armistead,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pry  or' s  Brigade,  R.  A.  Pryor,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wright's   Brigade,  A.   R.   Wright,   Brig.-Gen. 
Jones's  Division,  D.  R.  JONES,  Brig.-Gen. 

Toombs's  Brigade,  Robert  Toombs,  Brig.-Gen. 

Drayton's  Brigade,  T.  F.  Drayton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pickett's  Brigade,  R.  B.  Garnett,  Brig.-Gen. 


APPENDIX.  641 

Kemper's  Brigade,  J.  L.  Kemper,  Brig.-Gen. 

Jenkins's  Brigade,  Joseph  Walker,   Col. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Col. 
Walker's  Division,  J.  G.  WALKER,  Brig.-Gen. 

Walker's  Brigade,  Van  H.  Manning,  Col. 

Ransom's  Brigade,  Robert  Ransom,   Brig.-Gen. 
Hood's  Division,  J.  B.  HOOD,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hood's  Brigade,  W.  T.  Wofford,  Col. 

Law's  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  Law,  Col. 

Jackson's  Command,  T.  J.  (Stonewall)   JACKSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
Ewell's  Division,  A.  R.  LAWTON,  Brig.-Gen. 

Lawton's  Brigade,  M.  Douglass,  Col. 

Early's  Brigade,  J.  A.  Early,  Brig.-Gen. 

Trimble's  Brigade,  J.  A.  Walker,  Col. 

Hays's  Brigade,  H.  T.  Hays,  Brig.-Gen. 
Light  Division,  A.  P.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

Branch's  Brigade,  L.  O'B.  Branch,  Brig.-Gen. 

Gregg's  Brigade,  Maxcy  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen. 

Field's  Brigade,  J.  M.  Brockenbrough,  Col. 

Archer's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fender's  Brigade,  W.  D.   Fender,   Brig.-Gen. 

Thomas's  Brigade,  E.   L.   Thomas,   Col. 
Jackson's  Division,  J.  R.  JONES,  Brig.-Gen. 

Winder's  Brigade,  A.  J.  Grigsby,  Col. 

Taliaferro's  Brigade,  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Col. 

Jones's  Brigade,  B.  T.  Johnson,  Col. 

Starke's  Brigade,  Wm.  E.  Starke,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hill's  Division,  D.  H.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

Riplcy's  Brigade,  R.   S.    Ripley,   Brig.-Gen. 

Rode's's  Brigade,  R.  E.  Rodes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Garland's  Brigade,   Samuel   Garland,   Brig.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  G.  B.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Colquitt's  Brigade,  A.  H.  Colquitt,  Col. 
Cavalry,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  Maj.-Gen. 

Hampton's  Brigade,  Wade  Hampton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Lee's  Brigade,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 

Robertson's  Brigade,  T.  T.  Munford,  Col. 
Reserve  Artillery,  W.  N.  PENDLETON,  Brig.-Gen. 

BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

December  13,  1862. 

Union  Forces. 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  A.  E.  BURNSIDE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

Right  Grand  Division,  E.  V.  SUMNER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.   S.  A. 

Second  Corps,  D.  N.  COUCH,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  W.  S.  HANCOCK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Brigade,  J.  C.  Caldwell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  F.  Meagher,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  K.  Zook,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 


642  APPENDIX. 

Second  Division,  O.  O.  HOWARD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First   Brigade,  Alfred    Sully,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols., 

Maj.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  T.   Owen,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  J.  Hall,  Col.  7th  Mich., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Division,  W.  H.  FRENCH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  Nathan  Kimball,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  O.  H.  Palmer,  Col.  108th  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  ].  W.  Andrews,  Col.  Vols. 
Ninth  Corps,  O.  B.  WILLCOX,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Division,  W.  W.   BURNS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  C.  S.,  U.  S.  A. 
First  Brigade,  O.  M.  Poe,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

1st  Lt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 

Second  Brigade,  B.  C.  Christ,  Col.  50th  Pa. 

Third  Brigade,  Daniel   Leasure,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Division,  S.  D.  STURGIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  James  Nagle,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Edward  Ferrero,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  G.  W.  GETTY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  R.  C.  Hawkins,  Col.  9th  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  Edward  Harland,  Col.  8th  Conn. 
Cavalry  Division,  ALFRED   PLEASONTON,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  J.  F.  Farnsworth,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  D.  McM.  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Cav 

Center  Grand  Diznsion,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols. 

Third  Corps,  GEORGE  STONEMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  D.  B.  BIRNEY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  ].  C.  Robinson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  H.  H.  Ward,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  H.   G.  Berry,   Maj.-Gen.    Vols. 
Second  Division,  D.  E.  SICKLES,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Carr,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  B.  Hall,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  W.  Revere,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  A.  W.  WHIPPLE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  A.  S.  Piatt,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  S.  S.  Carroll,  Col.  8th  Ohio. 

Capt.  10th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Fifth  Corps,  DANIEL  BUTTERFIELD,   Maj.-Gen.   Vols., 

Lt.-Col.    12th   U.   S.   Inf. 
First  Division,  CHARLES  GRIFFIN.  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

First   Brigade,   James    Barnes,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  B.  Sweitzer,  Col.  62d  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  B.  W.  Stockton,  Col.  16th  Mich. 


APPENDIX.  643 

Second  Division,  GEORGE  SYKES,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  R.  C.  Buchanan,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  4th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  G.   L.  Andrews,   Maj.   17th   U.   S.   Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  K.  Warren,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
Third  Division,  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  E.  B.  Tyler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  P.  H.  Allabach,  Col.  Vols. 
Cavalry  Brigade,  W.  W.  AVERELL,  .Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Cav. 

Left  Grand  Division,  W.  B.  FRANKLIN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
Col.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Corps,  J.  F.  REYNOLDS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  Walter  Phelps,  Col.  22d  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  James  Gavin,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  W.  F.  Rogers,  Col.  21st  N.  Y. 
Fourth   Brigade,   Solomon   Meredith,   Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
Second  Division,  JOHN  GIBBON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  A.  R.  Root,  Col.  94th  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  Peter  Lyle,  Col.  90th  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  Nelson  Taylor,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  Maj.-Gen:  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  William  Sinclair,  Col.  6th  Pa., 

1st  Lt.  3d  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  A.  L.   Magilton,  Col.  4th  Pa.  Reserve. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  F.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Si.rth  Corps,  W.  F.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  U.  S.  Top.  Eng. 
First  Division,  W.  T.  H.  BROOKS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  18th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  H.  L.  Cake,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  D.  A.  Russell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  A.  P.  HOWE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  C.  E.  Pratt,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Henry  Whiting,  Col.  2d  Vt. 
Third  Brigade,  F.  L.  Vinton,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  16th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Division,  JOHN  NEWTON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  John  Cochrane,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Charles  Devens,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  A.  Rowley,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Cavalry  Brigade,  G.  B.  BAYARD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 


644  APPENDIX. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

First  Corps,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,   Lieut.-Gen. 

McLaws's  Division,  LAFAYETTE  McLAws,  Maj.-Gen. 

Kershaw's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen. 

Barksdale's  Brigade,  William  Barksdale,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cobb's  Brigade,  T.   R.  R.  Cobb,   Brig.-Gen. 

Semmes's  Brigade,  P.  J.  Semmes,  Brig.-Gen. 
Anderson's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

IVilcox's  Brigade,  C.   M.   Wilcox,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  William  Mahone,  Brig.-Gen. 

Featherston's  Brigade,  W.   S.   Featherston,   Brig.-Gen. 

Wright's  Brigade,  A.   R.   Wright,   Brig.-Gen. 

Perry's  Brigade,  E.  A.  Perry,  Brig.-Gen. 
Pickett's  Division,  G.  E.  PICKETT,  Maj.-Gen. 

Garnett's  Brigade,  R.  B.  Garnett,  Brig.-Gen. 

Armistead's  Brigade,  L.  A.  Armistead,  Brig.-Gen. 

Kemper's  Brigade,  J.  L.  Kemper,  Brig.-Gen. 

Jenkins's  Brigade,  Micah  Jenkins,  Brig.-Gen. 

Corse's  Brigade,  M.  D.  Corse,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hood's  Division,  J.  B.  HOOD,  Maj.-Gen. 

Law's  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  Law,  Brig.-Gen. 

Robertson's  Brigade,  J.   B.   Robertson,   Brig.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Toombs's  Brigade,  H.  L.  Benning,  Col. 
Ransom's  Division,  ROBERT  RANSOM,  Brig.-Gen. 

Ransom's  Brigade,  Robert  Ransom,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cooke's  Brigade,  J.  R.  Cooke,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Corps,  T.  J.  (Stonewall)   JACKSON,  Lieut.-Gen. 
Hill's  Division,  D.  H.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  R.  E.  Rodes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  George  Doles,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  A.  H.  Colquitt,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Alfred  Iverson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fifth  Brigade,  Bryan   Grimes,  Col. 
Light  Diznsion,  A.  P.  HILL,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  J.  M.  Brockenbrough,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  Maxcy  Gregg,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  E.  L.  Thomas,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  J.  H.  Lane,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fifth  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 

Sixth  Brigade,  W.  D.  Fender,  Brig.-Gen. 
Swell's  Division,  J.  A.  EARLY,  Brig.-Gen. 

Lawton's  Brigade,  E.  N.  Atkinson,  Col. 

Trimble's  Brigade,  R.  F.  Hoke,  Col. 

Early' s  Brigade,  J.  A.  Walker,  Col. 

Hays's  Brigade,  H.  T.  Hays,  Brig.-Gen. 
Jackson's  Division,  W.  B.  TALIAFERRO,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  E.  F.  Paxton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  R.  Jones,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Col. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Edmund  Pendleton,  Col. 
Reserve  Artillery,  W.  N.  PENDLETON,  Brig.-Gen. 


APPENDIX.  645 

Cavalry,  J.  E.  B.   STUART,   Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  Wade  Hampton,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Brigade,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 
Third  Brigade,  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 

BATTLE  OF  STONES  RIVER 

December  31,  1862— January  2,  1863. 
Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  W.  S.  ROSECRANS, 
Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Right  Wing,  A.  McD.  McCOOK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  J.  C.  DAVIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  W.  P.  Carlin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  W.  E.  Woodruff,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  R.  W.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  Sth  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  August  Willich,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  E.  N.  Kirk,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  P.  P.  Baldwin,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  J.  W.  Sill,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  Frederick  Schaefer,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  G.  W.  Roberts,  Col.  Vols. 

Center,  G.  H.  THOMAS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  Sth  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  L.  H.  ROUSSEAU,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  B.  F.  Scribner,  Col.  38th  Ind. 

Second  Brigade,  John  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  C.  Starkweather,  Col.  1st  Wis. 

Fourth  Brigade,  O.  L.  Shepherd,  Lt.-Col.  18th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  J.  S.  NEGLEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  G.  Spears,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  T.  R.  Stanley,  Col.  18th  Ohio. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  F.  Miller,  Col.  29th  Ind. 
Third  Division. 

First  Brigade,  M.  B.  Walker,  Col.  31st  Ohio. 
Left  Wing,  T.  L.  CRITTENDEN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  T.  J.  WOOD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  M.  S.  Hascall,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  G.  D.  Wagner,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  C.  G.  Harker,  Col.  65th  Ohio. 
Second  Division,  J.  M.  PALMER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Cruft,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  W.  B.  Hazen,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  Sth  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  William  Grose,  Col.  36th  Ind. 
Third  Division,  H.  P.  VAN  CLEVE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Sam.  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  P.  Fyffe,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  S.  W.  Price,  Col.  21st  Ky. 


646  APPENDIX. 

Cavalry,  D.  S.  STANLEY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  4th  U.   S.   Cav. 
Cavalry  Division,  JOHN  KENNETT,  Col.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  Col.  4th  Mich.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  Lewis  Zahm,  Col.  3d  Ohio  Cav. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Tennessee,  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  General. 

folk's  Corps,  LEONIDAS  POLK,  Lieut.-Gen. 

First  Division,  B.  F.  CHEATHAM,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  D.  S.  Donelson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  A.   P.    Stewart,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  George  Maney,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  A.  J.  Vaughan,  Jr.,  Col. 
Second  Diznsion,  J.  M.  WITHERS,  Maj.-Gen. 

First    Brigade,   J.    Q.    Loomis,    Col. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  R.  Chalmers,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  P.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  A.  M.  Manigault,  Col. 
Hardee's  Corps,  W.  J.  HARDER,  Lieut.-Gen. 

First  Division,  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  D.  W.  Adams,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  B.  Palmer,  Col. 

Third  Brigade,  William   Preston,   Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  R.  W.  Hanson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Jackson's  Brigade,  J.  K.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Division,  P.  R.  CLEBURNE,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  L.  E.  Polk,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  St.  J.   R.   Liddell,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  B.   R.  Johnson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  S.  A.  M.  Wood,  Brig.-Gen. 
McCown's  Division,  J.  P.  McCowN,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  M.  D.  Ector,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  E.  Rains,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Evander  McNair,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cavalry,  JOSEPH  WHEELER,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wheeler's  Brigade,  Joseph  Wheeler,   Brig.-Gen. 

Buford's  Brigade,  Abraham  Buford,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pe gram's  Brigade,  John  Pegram,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wharton'.s   Brigade,  J.   A.   Wharton,   Brig.-Gen. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN. 

April  29—  May  6,  1863. 
Battle  of  Chancellorsville. 

May  2-3. 
Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
First  Corps,  J.  F.  REYNOLDS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  J.  S.  WADSWORTH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Walter  Phelps,  Jr.,  Col.  22d  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  Lysander  Cutler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


APPENDIX.  647 

Third  Brigade,  G.   R.   Paul,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Col.  8th   U.   S.   Inf. 

Fourth   Brigade,   Solomon    Meredith,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
Second  Division,  J.   C.   ROBINSON,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  A.  R.  Root,  Col.  94th  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  Henry   Baxter,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  H.  Leonard,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  T.  A.   Rowley,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Roy  Stone,  Col.  149th  Pa. 
Second  Corps,  D.  N.  COUCH,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  W.  S.  HANCOCK,  Maj  .-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Brigade,  ].   C.   Caldwell,   Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.   F.  Meagher,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols.. 
Third  Brigade,  S.   K.  Zook,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Fourth  Brigade,  J.  R.   Brooke,  Col.  53d   Pa. 
Second  Division,  JOHN  GIBBON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.   S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  Alfred  Sully,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  8th  U.   S.   Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  T.  Owen,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

1st  Lt.   5th   U.   S.  Art. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  J.  Hall,  Col.  7th  Mich., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Division,  W.  H.  FRENCH,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,   S.    S.   Carroll,   Col.   8th   Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  William   Hays,  Brig.-Gen.    Vols., 

Capt.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  D.  MacGregor,  Col.  4th  N.  Y. 
Third  Corps,  D.  E.  SICKLES,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,   D.   B.   BIRNEY,   Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 

First  Brigade,  C.  K.  Graham,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  H.  H.  Ward,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  B.  Hayman,  Col.  37th  N.  Y., 

Maj.   10th  U.   S.  Inf. 

Second  Division,  H.  G.  BERRY,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Carr,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  W.  Revere,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  Gershom  Mott,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,*^.  W.  WHIPPLE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  Emlen  Franklin,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  S.  M.  Bowman,  Col.  84th  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  Hiram  Berdan,  Col.  1st  U.  S.  Sharpshooters. 
Fifth  Corps,  G.  G.  MEADE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Division,  CHARLES  GRIFFIN,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  James   Barnes,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  James  McQuade,  Col.  14th  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  B.  W.  Stockton.  Col.  16th  Mich. 
Second  Division,  GEORGE   SYKES.  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  14th 'U.  S.  Inf. 


648  APPENDIX. 

First  Brigade,  R.  B.  Ayres,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  Sidney  Burbank,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  P.  H.  O'Rorke,  Col.  140th  N.  Y., 

1st  Lt.  U.  S.  Eng. 
Third  Division,  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  E.  B.  Tyler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  P.  H.  Allabach,  Col.  Vols. 

Sixth  Corps,  JOHN  SEDGWICK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  W.  T.  H.  BROOKS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  18th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  H.  W.   Brown,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  J.  Bartlett,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  D.  A.  Russell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  A.  P.  HOWE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  L.  A.  Grant,  Col.  5th  Vermont. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  H.  Neill,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Division,  JOHN  NEWTON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  Alexander  Shaler,  Col.  65th  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  H.  Browne,  Col.  36th  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  Frank  Wheaton,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.   S.  Cav. 

Light  Division,  HIRAM   BURNHAM,  Col.  6th   Me. 
Eleventh  Corps,  O.  O.  HOWARD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  CHARLES  DEVENS,  JR.,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Leopold  von  Gilsa,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  N.  C.  McLean,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  ADOLPH  VON   STEINWEHR,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Adolphus  Buschbeck,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  F.  C.  Barlow,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  CARL  SCHURZ,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Alex.  Schimmelfennig,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Wladimir  Krzyzanowski,  Col.  58th  N.  Y. 
Twelfth  Corps,  H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  A.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  F.  Knipe,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Samuel  Ross,  Col.  20th  Conn., 

Capt.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  T.  H.  Ruger,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  J.  W.  GEARY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Candy,  Col.  66th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  L.  Kane,  Brig.  Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  G.   S.  Greene,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Cavalry  Corps,  GEORGE  STONEMAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  ALFRED   PLEASONTON,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  B.  F.  Davis,  Col.  8th  N.  Y.  Cav., 

Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Cav. 

Second  Brigade,  T.  C.  Devin,  Col.  6th  N.  Y.  Cav. 
Second  Division,  W.  W.  AVERELL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Cav. 


APPENDIX.  649 

First  Brigade,  H.  B.  Sargent,  Col.  1st  Mass.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  B.  Mclntosh,  Col.  3d  Pa.  Cav., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Third  Division,  D.  McM.  GREGG,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  Judson  Kilpatrick,  Col.  2d  N.  Y.  Cav., 

1st  Lt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  Percy  Wyndham,  Col.  Vols. 
Reserve  Brigade,  John  Buford,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  I.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 
Artillery,  H.  J.  HUNT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

First  Corps  (Longstreet  with  divisions  of  Hood  and  Pickett  absent  in 
Southeastern  Virginia) . 

McLaws's  Division,  LAFAYETTE  McLAws,  Maj. -Gen. 

Wofford's  Brigade,  W.  T.  Wofford,  Brig.-Gen. 

Semmes's  Brigade,  P.  J.   Semmes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Kershaw's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen. 

Barksdale's  Brigade,  William  Barksdale,  Brig.-Gen. 
Anderson's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj. -Gen. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  C.  M.  Wilcox,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wright's  Brigade,  A.  R.  Wright,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  William   Mahone,  Brig.-Gen. 

Posey's  Brigade,  Carnot  Posey,  Brig.-Gen. 

Perry's  Brigade,  E.  A.   Perry,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Corps,  T.  J.   (Stonewall)   JACKSON,  Lieut.-Gen. 
Light  Division,  A.  P.  HILL,  Maj. -Gen. 

Heth's  Brigade,  Henry  Heth,  Brig.-Gen. 

Thomas's  Brigade,  E.  L.  Thomas,  Brig.-Gen. 

Lane's  Brigade,  J.  H.  Lane,  Brig.-Gen. 

McGowan's  Brigade,  Samuel  McGowan,  Brig.-Gen. 

Archer's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fender's  Brigade,  W.  D.  Pender,  Brig.-Gen. 
D.  H.  Hill's  Division,  R.  E.  RODES,  Brig.-Gen. 

Rodes's  Brigade,  R.  E.  Rodes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Colquitt's  Brigade,  A.  H.  Colquitt,  Brig.-Gen. 

Ramsenr's  Brigade,  S.  D.  Ramseur,  Brig.-Gen. 

Doles's  Brigade,  George  Doles,  Brig.-Gen. 

Iverson's  Brigade,  Alfred  Iverson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Early' s  Division,  J.  A.  EARLY,  Maj. -Gen. 

Gordon's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Gordon,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hoke's  Brigade,  R.  F.  Hoke,  Brig.-Gen. 

Smith's  Brigade,  William  Smith,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hays's  Brigade,  H.  T.  Hays,  Brig.-Gen. 
Trimble's  Division,  R.  E.  COLSTON,  Brig.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  E.  F.  Paxton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  J.   R.  Jones,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Col. 

Fourth  Brigade,  F.  T.  Nicholls,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cavalry,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  Maj. -Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  Fitzhugh  Lee,   Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 


650  APPENDIX. 

BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG. 

July  1-3,   1863. 

Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  G.  G.  MEADE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 

First  Corps,  ].  F.  REYNOLDS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  17th  U.  S.  Inf. 

JOHN  NEWTON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols..,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Division,  J.  S.  WADSWORTH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Solomon  Meredith,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Lysander  Cutler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  ].  C.  ROBINSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  G.  R.  Paul,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  Henry  Baxter,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  T.  A.  ROWLEY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Chapman  Biddle,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Roy  Stone,  Col.  149th  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  J.  Stannard,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Corps,  W.  S.  HANCOCK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  A.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 

JOHN  GIBBON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Division,  J.  C.  CALDWELL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade.  E.  E.  Cross,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Patrick  Kelly,  Col.  88th  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  K.  Zook,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Fourth  Brigade,  J.  R.  Brooke,  Col.  53d  Pa. 
Second  Division,  JOHN  GIBBON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  William  Harrow,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  A.  S.  Webb,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  llth  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  J.  Hall,  Col.  7th  Mich., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Division,  ALEXANDER  HAYS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  16th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  S.  S.  Carroll,  Col.  8th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  T..  A.  Smyth,  Col.  1st  Del. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  L.  Willard,  Col.  125th  N.  Y. 
Third  Corps.  D.  E.  SICKLES,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  D.  B.  BIRNEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  C.  K.  Graham,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  H.  H.  Ward,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  P.  R.  de  Trobriand,  Col.  38th  N.  Y. 
Second  Division,  A.  A.  HUMPHREYS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Carr,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  R.  Brewster,  Col.  73d  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  C.  Burling,  Col.  6th  N.  J. 


APPENDIX.  651 

4 

Fifth  Corps,  GEORGE  SYKES,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  JAMES  BARNES,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  W.  S.  Tilton,  Col.  22d  Mass. 
Second  Brigade,  ].  B.  Sweitzer,  Col.  62d  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  Strong  Vincent,  Col.  83d  Pa. 
Second  Division,  R.  B.  AYRES,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  Hannibal  Day,  Col.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  Sidney  Burbank,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  H.  Weed,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Division,  S.  W.  CRAWFORD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  William  McCandless,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  W.  Fisher,  Col.  5th  Pa. 

Sixth  Corps,  JOHN  SEDGWICK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  H.  G.  WRIGHT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Brigade.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  J.  Bartlett,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  D.  A.  Russell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  A.  P.  HOWE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  L.  A.  Grant,  Col.  5th  Vermont. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  H.  Neill,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Division,  JOHN  NEWTON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  Alexander  Shaler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  H.  L.  Eustis,  Col.  10th  Mass. 
Third  Brigade,  Frank  Wheaton,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

Eleventh  Corps,  O.  O.  HOWARD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Division,  F.  C.  BARLOW,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Leopold  von  Gilsa,  Col.  Vols., 
Second  Brigade.  Adelbert  Ames,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Division,  ADOLPH  VON  STEINWEHR,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  C.  R.  Coster,  Col.  134th  N.  Y., 

Capt.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  Orland  Smith,  Col.  73d  Ohio. 
Third  Division,  CARL  SCHURZ,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Alex.  Schimmelfennig,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Wladimir  Krzyzanowski,  Col.  58th  N.  Y. 
Twelfth  Corps,  H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  A.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  A.  L.  McDougall,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  H.  H.  Lockwood,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  H.  Ruger,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  J.  W.  GEARY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Candy,  Col.  66th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  A.  Cobham,  Col.  lllth  Pa. 
Cavalry  Corps,  ALFRED  PLEASONTON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  JOHN  BUFORD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  I.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Brigade,  William  Gamble,  Col.  8th  111.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  C.  Devin,  Col.  6th  N.  Y.  Cav. 


652  APPENDIX. 

h 

Reserve  Brigade,  Wesley  Merritt,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
Second  Division,  D.  McM.  GREGG,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Mclntosh,  Col.  3rd  Pa.  Cav., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  Pennock  Huey,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  I.  Gregg,  Col.  16th  Pa.  Cav., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Third  Division,  JUDSON  KILPATRICK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

1st  Lt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  E.  J.  Farnsworth,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  A.  Custer,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Artillery,  H.  J.  HUNT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

First  Corps,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Lieut.-Gen. 

McLaws's  Division,  LAFAYETTE  McLAWS,  Maj. -Gen. 

Kershaw's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen. 

Semmes's  Brigade,  P.  J.  Semmes,  Brig.-Gen. 

Barksdale's  Brigade,  William  Barksdale,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wofford's  Brigade,  W.  T.  WTofford,  Brig.-Gen. 
Pickett's  Division,  G.  E.  PICKETT,  Maj  .-Gen. 

Garnett's  Brigade,  R.  B.  Garnett,  Brig.-Gen. 

Armistead's  Brigade,  L.  A.  Armistead,  Brig.-Gen. 

Kemper's  Brigade,  J.  L.  Kemper,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hood's  Division,  J.  B.  HOOD,  Maj  .-Gen. 

Law's  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  Law,  Brig.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Robertson's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Robertson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Benning's  Brigade,  H.  L.  Benning,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Corps,  R.  S.  EWELL,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Early' s  Division,  J.  A.  EARLY,  Maj. -Gen. 

Hays's  Brigade,  H.  T.  Hays,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hoke's  Brigade,  I.  E.  Avery,  Col. 

Smith's  Brigade,  William  Smith,  Brig.-Gen. 

Gordon's  Brigade,  John  B.  Gordon,  Brig.-Gen. 
Johnson's  Division,  EDWARD  JOHNSON,  Maj  .-Gen. 

Steuart's  Brigade,  G.  H.  Steuart,  Brig.-Gen. 

Nicholl's  Brigade,  J.  M.  Williams,  Col. 

Stonewall  Brigade,  J.  A.  Walker,  Brig.-Gen. 

Jones's  Brigade,  J.  M.  Jones,  Brig.-Gen. 
Rodes's  Division,  R.  E.  RODES,  Maj  .-Gen. 

Daniel's  Brigade,  Junius  Daniel,  Brig.-Gen. 

Iverson's  Brigade,  Alfred  Iverson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Doles's  Brigade,  George  Doles,  Brig.-Gen. 

Ramseur's  Brigade,  S.  D.  Ramseur,  Brig.-Gen. 

O'Neal's  Brigade,  E.  A.  O'Neal,  Col. 
Third  Corps,  A.  P.  HILL,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj. -Gen. 

Wilcox's  Brigade,  C.  M.  Wilcox,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  William  Mahone,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wright's  Brigade,  A.  R.  Wright,  Brig.-Gen. 

Perry's  Brigade,  David  Lang,  Col. 

Posey's  Brigade,  Carnot  Posey,  Brig.-Gen. 


APPENDIX.  653 

Heth's  Division,  HENRY  HETH,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  J.  J.  Pettigrew,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  M.  Brockenbrough,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  J.  R.  Davis,  Brig.-Gen. 
Fender's  Division,  W.  D.  FENDER,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  Abner  Perrin,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  H.  Lane,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  E.  L.  Thomas,  Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  A.  M.  Scales,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cavalry,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  Maj.-Gen. 

Fitzhugh  Lee's  Brigade,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 

Hampton's  Brigade,  Wade  Hampton,  Brig.-Gen. 

W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade,  J.  R.  Chambliss,  Col. 

Jenkins's  Brigade,  A.  G.  Jenkins,  Brig.-Gen. 

Robertson's  Brigade,  B.  H.  Robertson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Imboden's  Brigade,  J.  D.  Imboden,  Brig.-Gen. 

THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 

May  1— July  4,  1863. 

Union  Forces. 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  U.  S.  GRANT,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

Ninth  Corps  (joined  June  14-17),  J.  G.  PARKE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Division,  THOMAS  WELSH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Henry  Bowman,  Col.  36th  Mass. 
Third  Brigade,  Daniel  Leasure,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  R.  B.  POTTER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  S.  G.  Griffin,  Col.  6th  N.  H. 
Second  Brigade,  Edward  Ferrero,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  B.  C.  Christ,  Col..  50th  Pa. 
Thirteenth  Corps,  J.  A.  McCLERNAND,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

E.  O.  C.  ORD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols,  Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Art. 
Ninth  Division,  P.  J.  OSTERHAUS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols, 

A.  L.  LEE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,^.  T.  Garrard,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
A.  L.  Lee,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
James  Keigwin,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  L.  A.  Sheldon,  Col.  42d  Ohio. 

D.  W.  Lindsey,  Col.  Vols. 

Tenth  Division,  A.  J.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols,  Maj.  1st  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  S.  G.  Burbridge,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  J.  Landram,  Col.  19th  Ky. 
Twelfth  Division,  A.  P.  HOVEY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  G.  F.  McGinnis,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  R.  Slack,  Col.  47th  Ind. 
Fourteenth  Division.  E.  .A.  CARR,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols, 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  W.  P.  Benton,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
H.  D.  Washburn,  Col.  18th  Ind. 
David  Shunk,  Col.  8th  Ind. 
Second  Brigade,  C.  L.  Harris,  Col.  llth  Wis. 
W.  M.  Stone,  Col.  22nd  Iowa. 
M.  K.  Lawler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


654  APPENDIX. 

Fifteenth  Corps,  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  FREDERICK  STEELE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.    llth  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  F.  H.  Manter,  Col.  Vols. 

B.  G.  Farrar,  Col.  30th  Mo. 
Second  Brigade,  C.  R.  Woods,  Col.  76th  Ohio, 

Capt.  9th  U.   S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  M.  Thayer,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  F.  P.  BLAIR,  JR.,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  G.  A.  Smith,  Col.  Vols. 

J.  A.  G.  Lightburn,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  K.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  Hugh  Ewing,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  J.  M.  TUTTLE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  R.   P.   Buckland,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 

W.  L.  McMillen,  Col.  95th  Ohio. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  A.  Mower,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.   1st  U.   S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  L.  Matthies,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

J.  J.  Woods,  Col.  Vols. 

Sixteenth  Corps,  C.  C.  WASHBURN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Division,  W.  S.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  M.  Loomis,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  S.  G.  Hicks,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  R.  Cockerill,  Col.  70th  Ohio. 
Fourth  Brigade,  W.  W.  Sanford,  Col.  Vols. 
Fourth  Division,  J.  C.  LAUMAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  I.  C.  Pugh,  Col.  41st  111. 
Second  Brigade,  Cyrus  Hall,  Col.  14th  111. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  E.  Bryant,  Col.  Vols. 

A.  K.  Johnson,  Col.  Vols. 

Provisional  Division,  NATHAN  KIMBALL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Engelman's  Brigade,  Adolph  Engelman,  Col.  43d  111. 
Richmond's  Brigade,  Jonathan  Richmond,  Col.  Vols. 
Montgomery's  Brigade,  Milton  Montgomery,  Col.  25th  Wis. 
Seventeenth  Corps,  J.  B.  McPHERSON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Eng. 
Third  Division,  J.  A.  LOGAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  E.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

M.  D.  Leggett,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Elias  S.  Dennis,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

M.  F.  Force,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  J.  D.  Stevenson,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Sixth  Division,  JOHN  McARTHUR,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  H.  T.  Reed,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  E.  G.  Ransom,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  William  Hall,  Col.  Vols. 

John  Shane,  Col.  Vols. 

Seventh  Division,  M.  M.  CROCKER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
I.  F.  QUINBY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
J.  E.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Sanborn,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  S.  A.  Holmes,  Col.  Vols. 
G.  B.  Raum,  Col.  56th  111. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  B.  Boomer,  Col.  Vols. 
Holden  Putnam.  Col.  Vols. 

C.  L.  Matthies,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


APPENDIX.  655 

Ilerron's  Division,  F.  J.  HERRON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  William  Vandever,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  W.  Orme,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Confederate  Forces. 
J.  C.  PEMBERTON,  Lieut.-Gen. 

First  Division,  W.  W.  LORING,  Maj.-Gen. 

First   Brigade,  Lloyd   Tilghman,   Brig.-Gen. 
A.  E.  Reynolds,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  W.  S.  Featherston,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Abram  Buford,   Brig.-Gen. 
Stevenson's  Division,  C.  L.  STEVENSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  S.  M.  Barton,  Brig.-Gen. 

Second  Brigade,  E.   D.  Tracy,   Brig.-Gen. 
I.  W.  Garrott,  Col. 
S.   D.   Lee,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  Alfred  Cummjng,   Brig.-Gen. 

Fourth  Brigade,  A.  W.  Reynolds,  Col. 

Texas  Legion,  T.  Waul,  Col. 
Forney's  Division,  ].  H.  FORNEY,  Maj.-Gen. 

Herbert's  Brigade,  Louis  Herbert,  Brig.-Gen. 

Moore's  Brigade,  J.  C.  Moore,  Brig.-Gen. 
Smith's  Division,  M.  L.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  W.  E.  Baldwin,  Brig.-Gen. 

Vaughn's  Brigade,  J.  C.  Vaughn,  Brig.-Gen. 

Third  Brigade,  F.  A.  Shoup,  Brig.-Gen. 
Bowen's  Division,  J.  S.  BOWEN,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  F.  M.  Cockrell,  Col. 

Second  Brigade,  M.  E.  Green,  Brig.-Gen. 
T.  P.  Dockery,  Col. 

Johnston's  Forces. 

JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON,  General. 
(Engaged  at  Raymond  and  Jackson  only.) 

Gregg's  Brigade,  John  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen. 

Crist' s  Brigade,  P.  H.  Colquitt,  Col. 

Walker's  Brigade,  W.  H.  T.  Walker,  Brig.-Gen. 

BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA. 

September  19-20,  1863. 
Union  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  W.  S.  ROSECRANS, 
Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

G.  H.  THOMAS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  ABSALOM  BAIRD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  I.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Brigade,  B.  F.   Scribner,  Col.  38th   Ind. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  C.  Starkweather,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  H.  King,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


656  APPENDIX. 

Second  Division,  J.  S.  NEGLEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  John  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  R.  Stanley,  Col.  18th  Ohio. 

W.  L.   Stoughton,  Col.   llth  Mich. 
Third  Brigade,  William  Sirwell,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  J.  M.  BRANNAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  J.  M.  Connell,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  T.  Croxton,  Col.  4th  Ky.  M't'd  Inf. 

W.  H.  Hays,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  F.  Van  Derveer,  Col.  35th  Ohio. 
Fourth  Division,  J.  J.  REYNOLDS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  T.  Wilder,  Col.  17th  Ind. 

(Mounted  and  detached.) 
Second  Brigade,  E.  A.  King,  Col.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 

M.  S.  Robinson,  Col.  75th  Ind. 
Third  Brigade,-].  B.  Turchin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Twentieth  Corps,  A.  McD.  McCOOK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Division,  J.  C.  DAVIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  P.  Carlin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  H.  C.  Heg,  Col.  Vols. 

J.  A.  Martin,  Col.  8th  Kans. 
Second  Division,  R.  W.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  August  Willich,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  B.  Dodge,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  P.  P.  Baldwin,  Col.  Vols. 

W.  W.  Berry,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  W.  H.  Lytle,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Silas  Miller,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  Bernard  Laiboldt,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  L.  P.  Bradley,  Col.  51st  111. 
N.  H.  Walworth,  Col.  Vols. 
Twenty-first  Corps,  T.  L.  CRITTENDEN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  T.  J.  WOOD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  G.  P.  Buell,  Col.  58th  Ind. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  G.  Marker,  Col.  65th  Ohio, 

Capt.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Division,  J.  M.  PALMER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Cruft,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  B.  Hazen,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  William  Grose,  Col.  36th  Ind. 
Third  Division,  H.  P.  VAN  CLEVE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Samuel  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  F.  Dick,  Col.  86th  Ind. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  M.  Barnes,  Col.  Vols. 
Reserve  Corps,  GORDON  GRANGER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  J.  B.  STEEDMAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  W.  C.  Whitaker,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  G.  Mitchell,  Col.  113th  Ohio. 


APPENDIX.  657 

Second  Division. 

Second  Brigade,  Daniel  McCook,  Col.  52d  Ohio. 
Cavalry  Corps,  R.  B.  MITCHELL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  E.  M.  McCooK,  Col.  2d  Ind.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  A.  P.  Campbell,  Col.  Vols. 
.  .  Second  Brigade,  D.  M.  Ray,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  L.  D.  Watkins,  Col.  6th  Ky.  Cav., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Second  Division,  GEORGE  CROOK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  Col.  4th  Mich.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  Eli  Long,  Col.  4th  Ohio  Cav., 

Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Cav. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Tennessee,  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  General. 

Right  Wing,  LEONIDAS  POLK,  Lieut-Gen. 

(Folk's  Corps.) 

Cheatham's  Division,  B.  F.  CHEATHAM,  Maj.-Gen. 
Jackson's  Brigade,  J.  K.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Maney's  Brigade,  George  Maney,  Brig.-Gen. 
Smith's  Brigade,  Preston  Smith,  Brig.-Gen. 

A.  J.  Vaughan,  Jr.,  Col. 
Wright's  Brigade,  M.  J.  Wright,  Brig.-Gen. 
Strahl's  Brigade,  O.  F.  Strahl,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hill's  Corps,  D.  H.  HILL,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Cleburne's  Division,  P.  R.  CLEBURNE,  Maj.-Gen. 

Wood's  Brigade,  S.  A.  M.  Wood,  Brig.-Gen. 
Folk's  Brigade,  L.  E.  Polk,  Brig.-Gen. 
Deshler's  Brigade,  James  Deshler,  Brig.-Gen. 

R.  Q.  Mills,  Col. 

Breckinridge's  Division,  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  Maj.-Gen. 
Helm's  Brigade,  B.  H.  Helm,  Brig.-Gen. 

J.  H.  Lewis,  Col. 
Adams's  Brigade,  D.  W.  Adams,  Brig.-Gen. 

R.  L.  Gibson,  Col. 

Stovall's  Brigade,  M.  A.  Stovall,  Brig.-Gen. 
Reserve  Corps,  W.  H.  T.  WALKER,  Maj.-Gen. 
Walker's  Division,  S.  R.  GIST,  Brig.-Gen. 
Gist's  Brigade,  S.  R.  Gist,  Brig.-Gen. 
P.  H.  Colquitt,  Col. 
L.  Napier,  Lt.-Col. 

Rotor's  Brigade,  M.  D.  Ector,  Brig.-Gen. 
Wilson's  Brigade,  C.  C.  Wilson,  Col. 
Liddell's  Division,  ST.  J.  R.  LTDDELL,  Brig.-Gen. 
Liddell's  Brigade,  D.  C.  Govan, 
Walthall's  Brigade,  E.  C.  Walthall,  Brig.-Gen. 

Left  Wing,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Lieut.-Gen. 

(Folk's  Corps.) 

Hindman's  Division,  T.  C.  HINDMAN,  Maj.-Gen. 

J.   P.  ANDERSON,   Brig.-Gen. 
Anderson's  Brigade,  J.  P.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

J.  H.  Sharp,  Col. 

Deas's  Brigade,  Z.  C.  Deas,  Brig.-Gen. 
Manigault's  Brigade,  A.  M.  Manigault,  Brig.-Gen. 


658  APPENDIX. 

Buckner's  Corps,  S.  B.  BUCKNER,  Maj.-Gen. 

Stewart's  Division,  A.  P.  STEWART,  Maj.-Gen. 

Johnson's  Brigade,  B.  R.  Johnson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Brozvn's  Brigade,  J.  C.  Brown,  Brig.-Gen. 

E.  C.  Cook,  Col. 

Bate's  Brigade,  W.  B.  Bate,  Brig.-Gen. 
Clayton's  Brigade,  H.  D.  Clayton,  Brig.-Gen. 
Preston's  Division,  WM.  PRESTON,  Brig.-Gen. 

Grade's  Brigade,  Archibald  Gracie,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen. 
Trigg's  Brigade,  R.  C.  Trigg,  Brig.-Gen. 
Kelly's  Brigade,  J.  H.  Kelly,  Col. 
Johnson's  Division,  B.  R.  JOHNSON. 

Gregg's  Brigade,  John  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen. 

C.  A.  Sugg,  Col. 
McN air's  Brigade,  E.  McNair,  Brig.-Gen. 

D.  Coleman,  Col. 
Longstreet's  Corps,  J.  B.  HOOD,  Maj.-Gen. 

McLaws's  Division,  LAFAYETTE  McLAws,  Maj.-Gen. 
Kershaw's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Kershaw,  Brig.-Gen. 
Humphrey s's  Brigade,  B.  G.  Humphreys,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hood's  Division,  J.  B.  HOOD,  Maj.-Gen. 

E.  Mel.  LAW,  Brig.-Gen. 
Jenkins's  Brigade,  Micah  Jenkins.  Brig.-Gen. 
Law's  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  LAW,  Brig.-Gen. 

J.  L.  Sheffield,  Col. 
Robertson's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Robertson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Van  H.  Manning,  Col. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Benning's  Brigade,  H.  L.  Benning,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cavalry. 

Wheeler's  Corps,  JOSEPH  WHEELER,  Maj.-Gen. 
Wharton's  Division,  J.  A.  WHARTON,  Brig.-Gen. 
First  Brigade,  C.  C.  Crews,  Col. 
Second  Brigade,  Thomas  Harrison,  Col. 
Martin's  Division,  W.  T.  MARTIN,  Brig.-Gen. 
First  Brigade,  J.  T.  Morgan,  Col. 
Second  Brigade,  A.  A.  Russell,  Col. 
Roddey's  Brigade,  P.  D.  Roddey,  Brig.-Gen. 
Forrest's  Corps,  N.  B.  FORREST,  Brig.-Gen. 

Armstrong's  Division,  F.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  Brig.-Gen. 
Armstrong's  Brigade,  J.  T.  Wheeler,  Col. 
Forrest's  Brigade,  G.  G.  Dibrell,  Col. 
Pegram's  Division,  JOHN  PEGRAM,  Brig.-Gen. 

Davidson's  Brigade,  H.  B.  Davidson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Scott's  Brigade,  J.  S.  Scott,  Col. 

THE  BATTLES  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA. 

November  23-27,   1863. 
Union  Forces,  U.  S.  GRANT,  Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  G.  H.  THOMAS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Fourth  Corps,  GORDON  GRANGER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  3d  U.  S.  Cav 
First  Division,  CHARLES  CRUFT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


APPENDIX.  .      659 

Second  Brigade,  W.  C.  Whitaker,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  William  Grose,  Col.  36th  Ind. 
Second  Division,  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  F.  T.  Sherman,  Col.  88th  111. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  D.  Wagner,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  G.  Harker,  Col.  65th  Ohio, 

Capt.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Division,  T.  J.  WOOD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  August   Willich,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  B.  Hazen,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  Samuel  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
fourteenth  Corps,  J.  M.  PALMER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  R.  W.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  W.  P.  Carlin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  M.  F.  Moore,  Col.  69th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  C.   Starkweather,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Division,  J.  C.  DAVIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  J.  D.  Morgan,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  John  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  Daniel  McCook,  Col.  52d  Ohio. 
Third  Division,  ABSALOM  BAIRD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  I.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Turchin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  F.  Van  Derveer,  Col.  35th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  E.  H.  Phelps,  Col.  Vols. 
W.  H.  Hays,  Col.  Vols. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee',  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.. 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Fifteenth  Corps,  F.  P.  BLAIR,  JR.,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  P.  J.  OSTERHAUS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  C.  R.  Woods,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  9th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  A.  Williamson,  Col.  4th  Iowa. 
Second  Division,  M.  L.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  G.  A.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

N.  W.  Tupper,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  A.  J.  Lightburn,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Fourth  Division,  HUGH  EWING,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  M.  Loomis,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  M.  Corse,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.    . 
C.  C.  Walcutt,  Col.  46th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  R.  Cockerill,  Col.  70th  Ohio. 
Seventeenth  Corps. 

Second  Division,  J.  E.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  I.  Alexander,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  B.  Raum,  Col.  56th  111. 
F.  C.  Deimling,  Col. 
C.  R.  Wever,  Col.  17th  Iowa. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  L.  Matthies.  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
B.  D.  Dean,  Col.  Vols. 
Jabez  Banbury,  Col.  Vols. 


660  APPENDIX. 

Army  of  the  Potomac. 


Eleventh  Corps,  O.  O.  HOWARD,  Maj.-Gen. 

Second  Division,  A.  VON  STEINWEHR,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Adolphus  Buschbeck,  Col. 
Second  Brigade,  Orland  Smith,  Col.  73d  Ohio. 
Third  Division,  CARL  SCHURZ,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Hector   Tyndale,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Wladimir  Krzyzanowski,  Col.  58th  N.  Y. 
Third  Brigade,  Frederick  Hecker,  Col.  Vols. 
Twelfth  Corps,  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  J.  W.  GEARY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Candy,  Col.  66th  Ohio. 
W.  R.  Creighton,  Col.  Vols. 
T.  J.  Ahl,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  G.  A.  Cobham,  Jr.,  Col.  lllth  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  David  Ireland,  Col.  137th  N.  Y. 
Cavalry,  Second  Brigade  (Second  Division),  ELI  LONG, 

Col.  4th  Ohio  Cav.,  Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Artillery  Reserve,  J.  M.  BRANNAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
Engineers,  W.  F.  SMITH,  Brig,  Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 

Confederate  Forces,  BRAXTON  BRAGG,  General. 

Hardee's  Corps,  W.  J.  HARDEE,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Cheatham's  Division,  J.  K.  JACKSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Jackson's  Brigade,  C.  J.  Wilkinson,  Col. 

Walthall's  Brigade,  E.  C.  Walthall,  Brig.-Gen. 

Moore's  Brigade,  J.  C.  Moore,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wright's  Brigade,  M.  J.  Wright,  Brig.-Gen. 

J.  H.  Anderson,  Col. 
Stevenson's  Division,  C.  L.  STEVENSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

Brown's  Brigade,  J.  C.  Brown,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pettus's  Brigade,  E.  W.  Pettus,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cumming's  Brigade,  Alfred  Gumming,  Brig.-Gen. 

Reynolds's  Brigade,  A.  W.  Reynolds,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cleburne's  Division,  P.  R.  CLEBURNE,  Maj.-Gen. 

Lowrey's  Brigade,  M.  P.  Lowrey,  Brig.-Gen. 

Folk's'  Brigade,  L.  E.  Polk,  Brig.-Gen. 

Liddell's  Brigade,  D.  C.  Govan,  Col. 

Smith's  Brigade,  H.  A.  Granburry,  Col. 
Walker's  Division,  S.  R.  GIST,  Brig.-Gen. 

Gist's  Brigade. 

Wilson's  Brigade,  C.  C.  Wilson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Maney's  Brigade,  G.  E.  Maney,  Brig.-Gen. 
Breckinridge's  Corps,  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE,  Maj.-Gen. 
Hindman's  Division,  J.  P.  ANDERSON,  Brig.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Brigade,  W.  F.  Tucker,  Col. 

Manigault's  Brigade,  A.  M.  Manigault,  Brig.-Gen. 

Deas's  Brigade,  Z.  C.  Deas,   Brig.-Gen. 

Vaughan's  Brigade,  A.  J.  Vaughan,  Brig.-Gen. 
Breckinridge's  Division,  W.  B.  BATE,  Brig.-Gen. 

Bate's  Brigade,  R.  C.  Tyler,  Col. 

A.  F.  Rudler,  Col.    . 
J.  J.  Turner,  Lt.-Col. 


APPENDIX.  661 

Lewis's  Brigade,  J.  H.  Lewis,  Brig.-Gen. 

Finley's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Finley,  Brig.-Gen. 

Stewart's  Division,  A.   P.   STEWART,  Maj.-Gen. 

Stovall's  Brigade,  M.  A.   Stovall,  Brig.-Gen. 
Strahl's  Brigade,  O.  F.  Strahl,  Brig.-Gen. 
Clayton's  Brigade,  J.  T.  Holtzclaw,  Col. 
Adams's  Brigade,  R.  L.  Gibson,  Col. 


BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

May  5-6,  1864,  and 

SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE 

May  8-21,  1864. 
Union  Forces,  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  G.  G.  MEADE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Second  Corps,  W.  S.  HANCOCK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 
First  Division,  F.  C.  BARLOW,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  N.  A.  Miles,  Col.  61st  N.  Y. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  A.  Smyth,  Col.  1st  Del. 
Third  Brigade,  Paul  Frank,  Col.  52d  N.  Y. 
Fourth  Brigade,  J.  R.  Brooke,  Col.  53d  Pa. 
Second  Division,  JOHN  GIBBON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  4th  U.   S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  A.  S.  Webb,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  llth  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  T.  Owen,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  S.  Carroll,  Col.  8th  Ohio, 

Capt.  10th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Division,  D.  B.  BIRNEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  H.  H.  Ward,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Alexander  Hays,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  16th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Fourth  Division,  GERSHOM  MOTT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Robert  McAllister,  Col.  llth  N.  J. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  R.  Brewster,  Col.  73d  N.  Y. 
Fifth  Corps,  G.  K.  WARREN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  U.  S.  Eng.      - 
First  Division,  CHARLES  GRIFFIN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  R.  B.  Ayres,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  B.  Sweitzer,  Col.  62d  Pa. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  J.  Bartlett,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  J.  C.  ROBINSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  2d  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  S.  H.  Leonard,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Henry  Baxter,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  A.  W.  Denison,  Col.  8th  Md. 


662  APPENDIX. 

Third  Division,  S.  W.  CRAWFORD,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade,  Wm.   McCandless,  Col.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  W.  Fisher,  Col.  5th  Pa. 
Fourth  Division,  J.  S.  WADSWORTH,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Lysander  Cutler,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.   C.   Rice,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  Roy  Stone,  Col.   149th  Pa. 
Sirth  Corps,  JOHN  SEDGWICK,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

H.  G.  WRIGHT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Division,  H.  G.  WRIGHT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  H.  W.  Brown,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Emory  Upton,  Col.  121st  N.  Y., 

1st  Lt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Third  Brigade,  D.  A.  Russell,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Alexander   Shaler,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  G.  W.  GETTY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Brigade,  Frank  Wheaton,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.. 

Maj.  2d  U.   S.   Cav. 

Second  Brigade,  L.  A.  Grant,  Col.  5th  Vermont. 
Third  Brigade,  T.  H.  Neill,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  llth  U.  S.  Inf. 

Fourth  Brigade,  H.  L.  Eustis,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  J.  B.  RICKETTS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 

First  Brigade,  W.  H.  Morris,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  Truman   Seymour,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Art. 
Ninth  Corps,  A.  E.  BURNSIDE,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  T.  G.  STEVENSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Division,  Sumner  Carruth,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  Daniel  Leasure,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  R.  B.  POTTER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Z.  R.  Bliss,  Col.  7th  R.  L, 

Capt.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Second  Brigade,  S.  G.  Griffin,  Col.  6th  N.  H. 
Third  Division,  O.  B.  WILLCOX,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  F.  Hartranft,  Col.  51st   Pa. 
Second  Brigade,  B.  C.  Christ,  Col.  50th  Pa. 
Fourth  Division,  EDWARD  FERRERO,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  K.  Sigfried,  Col.  48th  Pa. 
Second  Brigade,  H.  G.  Thomas,  Col.  79th  U.  S.  Col.  Inf. 
Cavalrv  Corps,  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  13th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Division,  A.  T.  A.  TORBERT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,   G.   A.   Custer,   Brig.-Gen.    Vols., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 

Second  Brigade,  T.  C.  Devin,  Col.  6th  N.  Y.  Cav. 
Reserve  Brigade,  Wesley  Merritt,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Capt.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
Second  Division,  D.   McM.   GREGG,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  H.  E.  Davies,  Jr.,  Brig.  Gen.  Vols. 


APPENDIX.  663 

Second  Brigade,  J.  I.  Gregg,  Col.  16th  Pa.  Cav., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Cav. 
Third  Division,  J.  H.  WILSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  U.  S.  Eng. 

First  Brigade,  T.  M.  Bryan,  Jr.,  Col.  18th  Pa.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  H.  Chapman,  Col.  3d  Ind.  Cav. 
Artillery,  H.  J.  HUNT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Lt.-Col.  3d  U.  S.  Art. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

First  Corps,  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Lieut.-Gen. 

R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
Kershaiv's  Division,  J.  B.  KERSHAW,  Brig.-Gen. 

K-ershaiv's  Brigade,  J.  W.  Henagan,  Col. 

Humphrey s's  Brigade,  B.   G.   Humphreys,   Brig.-Gen. 

Wofford's  Brigade,  W.  T.  Wofford,  Brig.-Gen. 

Bryan's  Brigade,  Goode  Bryan,  Brig.-Gen. 
Field's  Division,  C.  W.  FIELD,  Maj.-Gen. 

Jenkins's  Brigade,  Micah  Jenkins,  Brig.-Gen. 
(Killed  at  the  Wilderness.) 

Anderson's  Brigade,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Law's  Brigade,  E.  Mel.  Law,   Brig.-Gen. 

Gregg's  Brigade,  John  Gregg,  Brig.-Gen. 

Benning's  Brigade,  H.  L.  Benning,  Brig.-Gen. 
Artillery,  E.  P.  ALEXANDER,  Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Corps,  R.  S.  EWELL,  Lieut.-Gen. 

J.  A.  EARLY,  Maj.-Gen. 
Early' s  Division,  J.  A.  EARLY,  Maj.-Gen. 

Hays's  Brigade,  H.  T.  Hays,  Brig.-Gen. 

Pe gram's  Brigade,  John  Pegram,  Brig.-Gen. 

Gordon's  Brigade,  John  B.  Gordon,  Brig.-Gen. 
Johnson's  Division,  EDWARD  JOHNSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

Stonewall  Brigade,  J.  A.  Walker,   Brig.-Gen. 

Steuart's  Brigade,  G.  H.  Steuart,  Brig.-Gen. 

Jones's  Brigade,  J.  M.  Jones,  Brig.-Gen. 

Stafford's  Brigade,  L.  A.   Stafford,  Brig.-Gen. 
Rodes's  Division,  R.  E.  RODES,  Maj.-Gen. 

Daniel's  Brigade,  Junius   Daniel,  Brig.-Gen. 

Ramseur's  Brigade,  S.  D.  Ramseur,  Brig.-Gen. 

Doles' s  Brigade,  George  Doles,  Brig.-Gen. 

Battle's  Brigade,  C.  A.  Battle,  Brig.-Gen. 

Johnston's  Brigade,  R.  D.  Johnston,  Brig.-Gen. 
Artillery,  A.  L.  LONG,  Brig.-Gen. 
Third  Corps,  A.  P.  HILL,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Anderson's  Division,  R.  H.  ANDERSON,  Maj.-Gen. 

Perrin's  Brigade,  Abner  Perrin,  Brig.-Gen. 

Mahone's  Brigade,  William  Mahone,  Brig.-Gen. 

Harris's  Brigade,  N.  H.  Harris,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wright's  Brigade,  A.  R.  Wright,  Brig.-Gen. 

Perry's  Brigade,  E.  A.  Perry,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hcth's  Division,  HENRY  HETH,  Maj.-Gen. 

Davis's  Brigade,  J.  R.  Davis,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cooke's  Brigade,  J.  R.  Cooke,  Brig.-Gen. 


664  APPENDIX. 

Kirkland's  Brigade,  W.  W.  Kirkland,  Brig.-Gen. 

Walker's  Brigade,  H.  W.  Walker,  Brig.-Gen. 

Archer's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Archer,  Brig.-Gen. 
Wilcox's  Division,  C.  M.  WILCOX,  Maj.-Gen. 

Lane's  Brigade,  J.  H.  Lane,  Brig.-Gen. 

Scales's  Brigade,  A.  M.   Scales,  Brig.-Gen. 

McGowan's  Brigade,  Samuel  McGowan,  Brig.-Gen. 

Thomas's  Brigade,  E.  L.  Thomas,  Brig.-Gen. 
Artillery,  R.  L.  WALKER,  Col. 
Cavalry  Corps,  J.  E.  B.  STUART,  Maj.-Gen. 
Hampton's  Division,  WADE  HAMPTON. 

Young's  Brigade,  P.  M.  B.  Young,  Brig.-Gen. 

Rosser's  Brigade,  T.  L.  Rosser,  Brig.-Gen. 

Butler's  Brigade,  M.  C.  Butler,  Brig.-Gen. 
Fits-Lee's  Division,  FITZHUGH  LEE,  Maj.-Gen. 

Lomax's  Brigade,  L.  L.  Lomax,  Brig.-Gen. 

Wickham's  Brigade,  W.  C.  Wickham,  Brig.-Gen. 
W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Division,  W.  H.  F.  LEE,  Maj.-Gen. 

Chambliss's  Brigade,  ].  R.  Chambliss,  Brig.-Gen. 

Gordon's  Brigade,  James  B.  Gordon,  Brig.-Gen. 

ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN. 

May  3— September  8,  1864. 

Union  Forces,  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  G.  H.  THOMAS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Fourth  Corps,  O.  O.  HOWARD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

D.  S.  STANLEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  D.  S.  STANLEY,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
WILLIAM  GROSE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
NATHAN   KIMBALL,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Charles  Cruft,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

I.  M.  Kirby,  Col.  101st  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  C.  Whitaker,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

J.  E.  Taylor,  Col.  40th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  Wm.  Grose,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
P.  S.  Post,  Col.  59th  111. 
J.  E.  Bennett,  Col.  75th  111. 

Second  Division,  JOHN  NEWTON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Brigade,  F.  T.  Sherman,  Col.  88th  111. 

Nathan  Kimball,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Emerson  Opdycke,  Col.  125th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  D.  Wagner,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  G.  Harker,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
L.   P.   Bradley,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Third  Division,  T.  J.  WOOD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  August  Willich,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
W.  H.  Gibson,  Col.  49th  Ohio. 
R.  H.  Nodine,  Col.  Vols. 
C.  T.  Hotchkiss,  Col.  89th  111. 


APPENDIX.  665 

Second  Brigade,  W.  B.  Hazen,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 
O.  H.   Payne,  Col.   124th  Ohio. 
P.  S.  Post,  Col.  59th  111. 

Third  Brigade,  Samuel  Beatty,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Frederick  Knefler,  Col.  79th  Ind. 
Fourteenth  Corps,  ].  M.  PALMER,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

R.  W.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

•      J.  C.  DAVIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
First  Division,  R.  W.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
J.  H.  KING,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
W.  P.  CARLIN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  16th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  W.  P.  Carlin,  Brig.-Gen.,  Vols. 

Maj.  16th  U.  S.  Inf. 
A.  G.  McCook,  Col.  2d  Ohio. 
M.  C.  Taylor,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  H.  King,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
W.  L.  Stoughton,  Col.  llth  Mich. 
M.  F.  Moore,  Col.  69th  Ohio. 
J.  R.  Edie,  Maj.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  B.  F.  Scribner,  Col.  38th  Ind. 
Josiah  Given,  Col.  74th  Ohio. 
M.  F.  Moore,  Col.  69th  Ohio. 
Second  Division,  J.  C.  DAVIS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 

J.  D.  MORGAN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  D.  Morgan,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
R.  F.  Smith,  Col.  16th  111. 
C.  M.  Lum,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  G.  Mitchell,  Col.  113th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  Daniel  McCook,  Col.  52d  Ohio. 
O.  F.  Harmon,  Col.  Vols. 
C.  J.  Dilworth,  Col.  85th  111. 
J.  W.  Langley,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  ABSALOM  BAIRD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  A.  I.  G.,  U.  S.  A. 

First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Turchin,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
M.  B.  Walker,  Col.  31st  Ohio, 

Capt.  12th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Second  Brigade,  F.  Van  Derveer,  Col.  35th  Ohio. 

Newell  Gleason,  Col.  87th  Ind. 
Third  Brigade,  G.  P.  Este,  Col.  14th  Ohio. 
Twentieth  Corps,  JOSEPH  HOOKER.  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
A.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
H.  W.  SLOCUM,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Division,  A.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

J.  F.  KNIPE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  J.  F.  Knipe,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

W.  W.  Packer,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  T.  H.  Ruger,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  S.  Robinson,  Col.  82d  Ohio. 

Horace  Boughton,  Col.  143d  N.  Y. 


666  APPENDIX. 

Second  Division,  J.  W.  GEARY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  Charles  Candy,  Col.  66th  Ohio. 

Ario  Pardee,  Col.  147th  Pa. 

Second  Brigade,  Adolphus  Buschbeck,  Col.  Vols. 
J.  T.  Lockman,  Col.  119th  N.  Y. 
P.  H.  Jones,  Col.  154th  N.  Y. 
G.  W.  Mindil,  Col.  33d  N.  J. 
Third  Brigade,  David  Ireland,  Col.  137th  N.  Y. 
Wm.  Rickards,  Col.  Vols. 
G.  A.  Cobham,  Col.  lllth  Pa. 
Third  Division,  DANIEL  BUTTERFIELD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Col.  5th  U.  S.  Inf. 
W.  T.  WARD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  W.  T.  Ward,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Benjamin  Harrison,  Col.  70th  Ind. 
Second  Brigade,  Samuel  Ross,  Col.  20th  Conn., 

Capt.  14th  U.  S.  Inf. 
John  Coburn,  Col.  33d  Ind. 

Third  Brigade,  James  Wood,  Jr.,  Col.  136th  N.  Y. 
Cavalry  Corps,  W.  D.  ELLIOTT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Division,  E.  M.  McCooK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

1st  Lt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  J.  B.  Door,  Col.  Vols. 

J.  T.  Croxton,  Col.  4th  Ky.  M't'd  Inf. 
J.  P.  Brownlow,  Lt.-Col.  1st  Tenn.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  O.  H.  LaGrange,  Col.  1st  Wis.  Cav. 
J.  S.  Stewart,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 
H.  P.  Lamson,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 
W.  H.  Torrey,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  KENNER  GARRARD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  3d  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  Col.  4th  Mich.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  Eli  Long,  Col.  4th  Ohio  Cav., 

Capt.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 
B.  B.  Eggleston,  Col.  1st  Ohio.  Cav. 

Third  Brigade  (mounted  inf.),  J.  T.  Wilder,  Col.  17th  Ind. 

A.  O.  Miller,  Col.  72d  Ind. 
Third  Division,  JUDSON  KILPATRICK,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

1st  Lt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
E.  H.  MURRAY,  Col.  3d  Ky.  Cav. 
W.  W.  LOWE,  Col.   5th  Iowa  Cav., 

Capt.  5th  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Brigade,  Robert  Klein,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 

M.  T.  Patrick,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  C.  C.  Smith,  Col.  Vols. 

T.  W.  Sanderson,  Maj.  10th  Ohio  Cav. 
F.  A.  Jones,  Lt.-Col.  8th  Ind.  Cav. 
Third  Brigade,  E.  H.  Murray,  Col.  3d  Ky.  Cav. 
S.  D.  Atkins,  Col.  92d  111. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  J.  B.  MCPHERSON,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 
Brig.-Gen.  U.   S.  A. 

J.  A.  LOGAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
O.  O.  HOWARD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

Fifteenth  Corps,  J.  A.  LOGAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 
M.  L.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 


APPENDIX.  667 

First  Division,  P.  J.  OSTERHAUS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

C.  R.  WOODS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Maj.  18th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  R.  WOODS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  18th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Milo  Smith,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  J.  A.  Williamson,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  Hugo  Wangelin,  Col.  12th  Mo. 
Second  Division,  M.  L.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

J.  A.  J.  LIGHTBURN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
W.  B.  HAZEN,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  8th  U.  S.  Inf. 

First  Brigade^  G.  A.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
J.  S.  Martin,  Col.  lllth  111. 
Theodore  Jones,  Col.  30th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  A.  J.  Lightburn,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

W.  S.  Jones,  Col.  53d  Ohio. 
Fourth  Division,  WM.  HARROW,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Reuben  Williams,  Col.  Vols. 

J.  M.  Oliver,  Col.  15th  Mich. 
Second  Brigade,  C.  C.  Walcutt,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  J.  M.  Oliver,  Col.  15th  Mich. 
Sixteenth  Corps,  G.  M.  DODGE,  Maj. -Gen.  Vols. 

T.  E.  G.  RANSOM,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  T.  W.  SWEENEY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
E.  W.  RICE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
J.  M.  CORSE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  E.  W.  Rice,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  P.  E.  Burke,  Col.  66th  111. 

R.  N.  Adams,  Lt.-Col.  81st  Ohio. 
August  Mersy,  Col.  9th  111. 
J.  J.  Philips,  Lt.-Col.  9th  111. 
Third  Brigade,  M.  M.  Bane,  Col.  yols. 

Wm.   Vandever,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
H.  J.  B.  Cummings,  Col.  Vols. 
Richard   Rowett,   Col.   7th  111. 
Fourth  Division,  J.  C.   VEATCH,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
J.  W.  FULLER,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
T.  E.  G.  RANSOM,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,].   W.    Fuller,    Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
John   Morrill,  Col.  64th  111. 
H.  T.  McDowell,  Lt.-Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  W.   Sprague,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  W.  T.  C.  Grower,  Col.  Vols. 
John  Tillson,  Col.   10th  111. 

Seventeenth  Corps,  F.  P.  BLAIR,  JR..  Maj. -Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Division,  M.  D.  LEGGETT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
C.  R.  WOODS,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  18th  U.  S.  Inf. 
First  Brigade,  M.  F.  Force,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

G.  E.  Bryant,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  R.  K.  Scott,  Col.  68th  Ohio. 

G.  F.  Wiles,  Lt.-Col.  78th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  A.  G.  .Malloy,  Col.  17th  Wis. 
Fourth  Division,  W.  Q.  GRESHAM,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
WM.   HALL.  Col.   Vols. 
G.  A.   SMITH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  W.   L.   Sanderson,   Col.   Vols. 
B.  F.  Potts,  Col.  32d  Ohio. 


668  APPENDIX. 

Second  Brigade,  G.  C.  Rogers,  Col.  15th  111. 
I.  C.  Pugh,  Col.  41st  111. 
John  Logan,  Col.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  William  Hall,  Col.  Vols. 
John  Shane,  Col.  Vols. 
W.  W.   Belknap,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  J.  M.  SCHOFJELD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Capt.  1st  U.  S.  Art. 
Twenty-third  Corps. 

First  Division,  A.  P.  HOVEY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  N.  C.   McLean,   Brig.-Gen.    Vols. 
J.  A.  Cooper,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
A.    D.   Owen,   Lt.-Col.    Vols. 
J.   W.   Tucker,   Maj.   Vols. 
Jacob  Ragle,  Capt.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  M.  S.  Hascall,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
J.  R.  Bond,  Col.  lllth  Ohio. 
W.  E.  Hobson,  Col.  Vols. 

Third  Brigade,  S.  A.  Strickland,  Col.  50th  Ohio. 
Third  Division,  J.   D.  Cox,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.   W.   Reilly,   Col.    104th   Ohio. 

J.  W.  Gault,  Col.  Vols. 

Second  Brigade,  M.   D.   Manson,   Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
J.  S.  Hurt,  Col.  Vols. 
M.  S.  Hascall,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
J.   S.   Casement,  Col.   103d   Ohio. 
Daniel  Cameron,  Col.  65th  111. 
Third  Brigade,  N.  C.  McLean,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
R.    K.    Byrd,    Col.    Vols. 
I.  N.  Stiles,  Col.  63d  Ind. 
Cavalry  Division,  GEORGE   STONEMAN,  Maj.-Gen.   Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.   S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  Israel  Garrard,   Col.   7th   Ohio  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  James  Biddle,  Col.  6th  Ind.  Cav. 
T.  H.  Butler,  Col.  5th  Ind.  Cav. 
Third  Brigade,  Horace  Capron,  Col.  14th  111.  Cav. 

Confederate  Forces. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General. 

J.  B.  HOOD,  General. 

Hardec's  Corps,  W.  J.   HARDEE,   Lieut.-Gen. 

P.  R.  CLEBURNE,  Maj.-Gen. 
Cheatham's  Division,  B.  F.  CHEATHAM.  Maj.-Gen. 
GEORGE  MANEY,  Brig.-Gen. 
J.  C.  CARTER,.  Brig. -Gen. 
Money's  Brigade,  George    Maney,    Brig.-Gen. 

G.    C.    Porter,    Col. 

Wright's  Brigade,  J.  C.  Carter,  Brig.-Gen. 
Strahl's  Brigade,  O.    F.   Strahl,    Brig.-Gen. 
Vaughan's  Brigade,  A.  J.  Vaughan,  Jr.,  Brig.-Gen. 
M.    Magevney,    Col. 
G. 'W.  Gordon,   Brig.-Gen. 
Cleburne's  Division,  P.   R.  CLEBURNE,  Maj.-Gen. 

M.  P.  LOVVREY,  Brig.-Gen. 
P oiks' s  Brigade,  L.  E.  Polk,  Brig.-Gen. 
Lowrey's  Brigade,  M.    P.    Lowrey,   Brig.-Gen. 
John  Weir,  Col. 


APPENDIX.  669 

Govan's  Brigade,  D.   C.    Govan,   Brig.-Gen. 

P.  V.  Green,  Col. 

Granbury*s  Brigade,  H.   B.   Granbury,   Brig.-Gen. 
J.  A.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen. 
R.  B.  Young,  Lt.-Col. 
Walker's  Division,  W.  H.  T.  WALKER,  Maj.-Gen. 

H.  W.  MERCER,  Brig.-Gen. 
Jackson's  Brigade,  J.   R.  Jackson,   Brig.-Gen. 
Gist's  Brigade,  S.    R.   Gist,    Brig.-Gen. 

James   McCullough,   Col. 
St evens' s  Brigade,  C.  H.  Stevens,  Brig.-Gen. 
.H.  R.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen. 
W.   D.   Mitchell,  Col. 

Mercer's  Brigade,  H.   W.   Mercer,    Brig.-Gen. 
W.  Barkuloo,  Col. 
M.  Rawls,  Lt.-Col. 
C.   S.  Guyton,  Col. 
C.  H.  Olmstead,  Col. 
Bate's  Division,  W.  B.  BATE,  Maj.-Gen. 
J.  C.  BROWN,  Maj.-Gen. 
Lewis's  Brigade,  J.   H.  Lewis,  Brig.-Gen. 
Tyler's  (or  Smith's)  Brigade,  T.  B.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen. 
Finley's  Brigade,  J.  J.  Finley,  Brig.-Gen. 

R.    Bullock,   Col. 
H ood's  (or  Lee's)  Corps,  J.  B.   HOOD,  Lieut.-Gen. 

C.  L.  STEVENSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
B.  F.  CHEATHAM,  Maj.-Gen. 
S.  D.  LEE,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Hindman's  Division,  T.   C.   HINDMAN,   Maj.-Gen. 
J.  C.  BROWN,  Brig.-Gen. 
PATTON  ANDERSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
EDWARD  JOHNSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
Deas's  Brigade,  Z.  C.  Deas,  Brig.-Gen. 
J.  G.  Coltart,  Col. 
G.   D.  Johnston,   Brig.-Gen. 
H.  T.  Toulmin,  Lt.-Col. 

Manigault's  Brigade,  A.  M.  Manigault,  Brig.-Gen. 
Tucker's  (or  Sharp's)  Brigade,  W.  F.  Tucker,  Brig.-Gen. 

J.  H.   Sharp,  Brig.-Gen. 
Walthall's  (or  Brantley's)  Brigade,  E.  C.  Walthall, 

Brig.-Gen. 

Samuel  Benton,  Col. 
W.   F.   Braritley, 

Brig.-Gen. 

Stevenson's  Division,  C.  L.  STEVENSON,  Maj.-Gen. 
Broivn's  Brigade,  J.    C.    Brown,   Brig.-Gen. 
E.  C.  Cook,  Col. 
J.   B.   Palmer,   Col. 
Cuinnring's  Brigade,  Alfred   Cumming,    Brig.-Gen. 

C.  M.  Shelley,  Col. 

Reynolds' s  Brigade,  A.  W.  Reynolds,  Brig.-Gen. 
R.  C.  Trigg,  Col. 
J.  B.  Palmer,  Col. 

Pettns's  Brigade,  E.  W.  Pettus,  Brig.-Gen. 
Steivart's  Division,  A.   P.    STEWART,   Maj.-Gen. 
H.  D.  CLAYTON,  Maj.-Gen. 
Stovall's  Brigade,  M.    A.    Stoyall,    Brig.-Gen. 

Abda    Johnson,    Col. 

Clayton's  Brigade,  H.  D.  Clayton,  Brig.-Gen. 
J.  T.  Holt/claw,  Brig.-Gen. 
Bushrod  Jones,  Col, 


670  APPENDIX. 

Baker's  Brigade,  Alpheus  Baker,  Brig.-Gen. 
Gibsons  Brigade,  R.   L.   Gibson,   Brig.-Gen. 
Cavalry  Corps,  JOSEPH  WHEELER,  Maj.-Gen.* 
Martin's  Division,  W.  T.  MARTIN,  Maj.-Gen. 

Morgan's  (or  Allen's)  Brigade,].  T.   Morgan,  Brig.-Gen. 

W.  W.  Allen,  Brig.-Gen. 

Iverson's  Brigade,  Alfred  Iverson,   Brig.-Gen. 
Kelly's  Division,  ].  H.  KELLY,  Brig.-Gen. 

Allen's  (or  Anderson's)  Brigade,  W.    W.    Allen,    Brig.-Gen. 

R.    H.    Anderson, 

Brig.-Gen. 

Edward    Bird,    Col. 

Dibr ell's  Brigade,  G.  G.  Dibrell,  Brig.-Gen. 
Hannon's  Brigade,  M.  W.  Hannon,  Col. 
Hutnes's  Division,  W.   Y.  C.   HUMES,  Brig.-Gen. 
Humes'*  Brigade,  J.  T.  Wheeler,  Col. 
H.   M.   Ashby,    Col. 

Harrison's  Brigade,  Thomas  Harrison,  Col. 
Grigsby  (or  Williams's)  Brigade,  J.   W.  Grigsby,   Col. 

J.    S.   Williams,   Brig.-Gen. 
Roddey's  Command,  P.  D.  RODDEY,  Brig.-Gen. 

Army  of  Mississippi. 

Folk's  Corps,  LEONIDAS   POLK,   Lieut.-Gen. 
W.  W.  LORING,  Maj.-Gen. 

A.  P.  STEWART,  Lieut.-Gen. 

B.  F.  CHEATHAM,   Maj.-Gen. 
Loring's  Division,  W.  W.  LORING,  Maj.-Gen. 

W.  S.  FEATHERSTON,  Brig.-Gen. 
Feathcrston's  Brigade,  W.   S.   Featherston,   Brig.-Gen 

Robert  Lowry,  Col. 

Adams's  Brigade,  John  Adams,  Brig.-Gen. 
Scott's  Brigade,  T.   M.    Scott,   Brig.-Gen. 
French's  Division,  S.  G.  FRENCH,  Maj.-Gen. 

Ector's  Brigade,  M.   D.  Ector,   Brig.-Gen. 
W.  H.  Young,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cockrell's  Brigade,  F.   M.   Cockrell,   Brig.-Gen. 

Elijah   Gates,    Col. 
Sears's  Brigade,  W.  S.  Barry,  Col. 

C.   W.   Sears,   Brig.-Gen. 
Cantey's  (or  Walthall's)  Division,  JAMES    CANTEY,    Brig.-Gen. 

E.  C.  WALTHALL,  Maj.-Gen. 
Quarles's  Brigade,  W.  A.  Quarles,  Brig.-Gen. 
Reynolds's  Brigade,  D.  H.  Reynolds,   Brig.-Gen. 
Cantey's  Brigade,  V.   S.   Murphy,  Col. 
E.  A.  O'Neal,  Col. 
Cavalry  Division,  W.  H.  JACKSON,  Brig.-Gen. 

Armstrong's  Brigade,  F.  C.  Armstrong,  Brig.-Gen. 
Ross's  Brigade,  L.  S.  Ross,  Brig.-Gen. 
Ferguson's  Brigade,  S.  W.  Ferguson,   Brig.-Gen. 
W.  Boyles,  Col. 

Georgia  Militia. 

First  Division,  G.  W.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen. 

First  Brigade,  R.   W.   Carswell,   Brig.-Gen. 
Second  Brigade,  P.  J.  Philips,  Brig.-Gen. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  D.  Anderson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Fourth  Brigade,  H.  K.  McCay,  Brig.-Gen. 


APPENDIX.  671 

BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE. 

December  15-16,  1864. 
Union  Forces,  G.  H.  THOMAS,  Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

Fourth Corps,  T.  J.  WOOD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Col.  2d  U.  S.  Cav. 
First  Division,  NATHAN  KIMBALL,  Brig.-Gen.   Vols. 
First  Brigade,  I.  M.  Kirby,  Col.  101st  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  W.  C.  Whitakejr,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Third  Brigade,  William  Grose,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Division,  W.  L.  ELLIOTT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  1st  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  Emerson  Opdycke,  Col.   125th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  John  Q.  Lane,  Col.  92d  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  Joseph  Conrad,  Col.   15th  Mo. 
Third  Division,  SAMUEL   BEATTY,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  A.  D.  Streight,  Col.  51st  Ind. 
Second  Brigade,  P.  S.  Post,  Col.  59th  111. 
Third  Brigade,  Frederick  Knefler,  Col.  79th  Ind. 
Twenty-third  Corps,  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Brig.-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
Second  Division,  D.  N.  COUCH,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  A.  Cooper,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  O.  H.  Moore,  Col.  25th  Mich., 

Capt.  6th  U.  S.  Inf. 

Third  Brigade,  John  Mehringer,  Col.  91st  Ind. 
Third  Division,  J.   D.   Cox,   Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  C.  C.  Doolittle,  Col.  18th  Mich. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  S.  Casement,  Col.  103d  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  I.  N.  Stiles,  Col.  63d  Ind. 
Detachment  Armv  of  the  Tennessee,  A.  J.  SMITH,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols., 

Lt.-Col.  5th  Cav. 
First  Division,  JOHN  McARTflUR,   Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  W.  L.  McMillen,  Col.  95th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade,  L.  F.  Hubbard,  Col.  5th  Minn. 
Third  Brigade,  S.  G.  Hill,  Col.  35th  Iowa. 
Second  Division,  KENNER  GARRARD,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  3d  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  David  Moore,  Col.  51st  Mo. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  I.  Gilbert,  Col.  27th  Iowa. 
Third  Brigade,  E.  H.  Wolfe,  Col.  52d  Ind. 
Third  Division,  J.  B.  MOORE,  Col.  33d  Wis. 

First  Brigade,  L.  M.  Ward,  Col.   14th  Wis. 
Second  Brigade,  Leander  Blanden,  Col.  95th  111. 
Provisional  Detachment,  J.  B.  STEEDMAN,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols. 

Provisional  Division,  CHARLES  CRUFT,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  Benjamin  Harrison,  Col.  70th  Ind. 
Second  Brigade,  J.  G.  Mitchell,  Col.  113th  Ohio. 
Third  Brigade,  C.  H.  Grosvenor,  Col.  18th  Ohio. 
Second  Brigade  {Army  Tenn.),  A.  G.  Malloy, 

Col.  17th  Wis. 
First  Colored  Brigade,  T.  J.   Morgan, 

Col.   14th  U.  S.  Col.  Inf. 
Second  Colored  Brigade,  C.   R.   Thompson, 

Col.  12th  U.  S.  Col.  Inf. 

Garrison  of  Nashville,  J.  F.   MILLER.  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Fourth  Division,  Tiventieth  Corps. 

Second  Brigade,  E.  C.  Mason,  Col.  176th  Ohio. 
Quartermaster's  Division,  J.  L.  DONALDSON,  Col.  Q.  M.,  U.  S.  A. 
(Composed  of  Quartermaster's  employees.) 


672  APPENDIX. 

Cavalry  Corps,  J.  H.  WILSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols.,  Capt.  U.  S.  Eng. 
First  Division. 

First  Brigade,  J.  T.  Croxton,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
Fifth  Division,  EDWARD  HATCH,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 
First  Brigade,  R.  R.   Stewart,  Col.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  D.  E.  Coon,  Col.  2d  Iowa  Cav. 
Sixth  Division,  R.  W.  JOHNSON,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols., 

Maj.  4th  U.  S.  Cav. 

First  Brigade,  T.  J.  Harrison,  Col.  8th  Ind.  Cav. 
Second  Brigade,  James  Biddle,  Col.  6th  Ind.  Cav., 

Capt.  15th  U.  S.  Inf. 
Seventh  Division,  J.  F.  KNIPE,  Brig.-Gen.  Vols. 

First  Brigade,  J.  H.  Hammond,  Lt.-Col.  A.  A.  G.  Vols. 
Second  Brigade,  G.  M.  L.  Johnson,  Col.  13th  Ind.  Cav. 

Confederate  Forces. 
Army  of  Tennessee,  J.  B.  HOOD,  General. 

Lee's  Corps,  S.  D.  LEE,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Johnson's  Division,  EDWARD  JOHNSON,  Maj. -Gen. 

Deas's  Brigade,  Z.  C.  Deas,  Brig.-Gen. 

Manigault's  Brigade,  W.  L.  Butler,  Lt.-Col. 

Sharp's  Brigade,  J.  H.  Sharp,   Brig.-Gen. 

Brantly's  Brigade,  W.  F.  Brantly,  Brig.-Gen. 
Stevenson's  Division,  C.  L.  STEVENSON,  Maj. -Gen. 

Cumming's  Brigade,  E.  P.  Watkins.  Col. 

Pettus's  Brigade,  E.  W.  Pettus,  Brig.-Gen. 
Clayton's  Division,  H.  D.  CLAYTON,  Maj. -Gen. 

Stovall's  Brigade,  M.  A.   Stovall,   Brig.-Gen. 

Gibson's  Brigade,  R.  L.  Gibson,  Brig.-Gen. 

Holtsclaw's  Brigade,  J.   T.   Holtzclaw,   Brig.-Gen. 
Stewart's  Corps,  A.  P.  STEWART,  Lieut.-Gen. 

Loring's  Division,  W.  W.  LORING,  Maj. -Gen. 

Featherston's  Brigade,  W.   S.  Featherston,  Brig.-Gen.  ^ 

Adams's  Brigade,  Robert  Lowry,  Col. 

Scott's  Brigade,  John  Snodgrass,  Col. 
French's  Division   (attached  to  Walthall's). 

Sears's  Brigade,  C.  W.   Sears,  Brig.-Gen. 

Ector's  Brigade,  Daniel  Coleman,  Col. 
Walthall's  Division,  E.  C.  WALTHALL,  Maj. -Gen. 

Quarles's  Brigade,  G.  D.  Johnston,  Brig.-Gen. 

Cantey's  Brigade,  C.  M.   Shelley,  Brig.-Gen. 

Reynolds's  Brigade,  D.  H.  Reynolds,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cheatham's  Corps,  B.  F.  CHEATHAM,  Lieut.-Gen. 
Brown's  Division. 

Gist's  Brigade,  Z.  L.  Walters,  Lt.-Col. 

Money's  Brigade,  H.  R.  Field,  Col. 

S  Iraki's  Brigade,  A.  J.  Kellar,  Col. 

Vaughan's  Brigade,  W.  M.  Watkins,  Col. 
Cleburne's  Division,  J.  A.  SMITH,  Brig.-Gen. 

Lowrey's  Brigade,  M.  P.  Lowrey,  Brig.-Gen. 

Govan's  Brigade,  D.  C.  Govan,  Brig.-Gen. 

Granbury's  Brigade,  E.  T.  Broughton,  Capt. 
Bate's  Division,  W.  B.  BATE,  Maj. -Gen. 

Tyler's  Brigade,  T.  B.  Smith,  Brig.-Gen. 

Finley's  Brigade,  G.  A.  Ball,  Maj. 

Jackson's  Brigade,  H.  R.  Jackson,  Brig.-Gen. 
Cavalrv  Division,  J.  R.  CHALMERS.  Brig.-Gen. 

Rucker's  Brigade,  E.  W.  Rucker.  Col. 

Bi ffle's  Brigade,  J.  B.  Biffle,  Col. 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  I. 

ABERCROMBIE,  has  army  at  head  of  Lake  George,  11;  attacks  French  at 
Ticonderoga — disgusts  Americans,  12. 

ABRAHAM,  Plains  of,  Wolfe  discovers  trail  to,  17;  description  of — 
battle  of,  18. 

ACADIA,  conquest  of,  2;  expedition  to,  in  1755,  8. 

ADAIRSVILLE,  Johnston  at,  539. 

ADAMS,  SAM,  gets  up  Tea  Party,  22;  at  Concord,  24. 

ADVANCED  POSITION,  Wagner's,  at  Franklin,  583. 

AGU ADORES,  combat  at,  608. 

AGUA  NUEVA,  Taylor  advances  to,  91. 

AGUINALDO,  EMILIO,  612;  at  capture  of  Manila  and  after,  614. 

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE,  Treaty  of,  6. 

ALDIE,  cavalry  combat  at,  359. 

ALEXANDER,  E.  P.,  comments  on  Union  retreat  from  first  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  141 ;  in  Jackson's  turning  movement  at  Chancellorsville,  339 ; 
at  Gettysburg,  381 ;  supports  Pickett's  charge,  382 ;  in  Chickamauga 
campaign,  430 ;  at  Knoxville,  452 ;  opinion  as  to  terms  of  peace, 
531 ;  criticizes  Hood,  553. 

ALEXANDER,  WILLIAM,  sec. Lord  Stirling. 

ALEXANDRIA,  seized  by  Federal  troops,  130. 

ALGONQUINS,  4. 

ALLATOONA,  captured,  540. 

ALLEN,  ETHAN,  and  ARNOLD  capture  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point,  24. 

ALVAREZ,  General,  commands  Mexican  cavalry  at  Molino  del  Rey,   116. 

AMERICAN  boy's  ignorance  of  military  history,  530. 

AMERICAN  REVOLUTION,  THE,  see  Revolutionary  War. 

AMERICANS,  their  plan  in  Revolutionary  War,  27. 

AMES,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  377. 

AMHERST,  General  JEFFREY,  commands  British  at  Halifax — captures 
Louisburg,  11;  to  cooperate  with  Wolfe  by  way  of  Ticonderoga 
and  Crown  Point,  15;  his  slow  movements,  16;  plans  combined 
movements  to  capture  Canada — concentrates  forces  about  Montreal 
— captures  Montreal  and  all  Canada,  20. 

AMPUDIA,  General,  commands  Mexican  forces — orders  Taylor  to  with 
draw — superseded  by  Arista,  84;  attacks  Fort  Brown,  85;  at 
Monterey,  89 ;  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

ANDERSON,  Major,  at  Fort  Sumter,  129. 

ANDERSON,  General  PATTON,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  458. 

ANDERSON,  General  J.  R.,  in  front  of  McDowell,  199 ;  defeated  by 
Porter,  200. 

ANDERSON,  General  R.  H.,  at  Fredericksburg,  296;  dispatched  to  Chan 
cellorsville — falls    back — at    Tabernacle    Church,    333 ;    his    position 
there,  336;  aids  Jackson's  movement — resists   Sickles's  attack,  339; 
attacks    Federal    center — connects     with     Stuart,     343 ;      at     Salem 
Church,  346 ;   at   Chambersburg,  363 ;   reaches   Gettysburg,  369 ;   in 
the   attack,   374 ;   his   position,   375 ;    his   division    attacks,   376 ;    his 
position   in  morning  July  3,   379;   at   Wilderness,   May   6,  479;   at 
Spottsylvania,    480 ;    first    position,    493 ;    occupies    Union    intrench- 
ments — prolongs  line  to   Po,  499;   movement  to   Spottsylvania  dis 
cussed,  506;  ought  to  have  been  blocked  by  cavalry,  507;  position 
south  of   Chickahominy,   514;   at  Petersburg,   518. 
ANDERSON,  THOMAS  M.,  in  Philippine  expedition,  612. 
ANDRADE,  General,  his  cavalry  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 
ANGLE,  BLOODY,  497. 
ANNAPOLIS,  see  PORT  ROYAL. 

673 


t>74  -INDEX. 

ANNAPOLIS  ROYAL,  see  PORT  ROYAL. 

ANNE'S,  QUEEN,  War,  2. 

ANTIETAM,  battle  of — field  of  battle,  267;  Confederate  line,  268;  Mc- 
Clellan's  plan,  269 ;  Lee  withdraws — strength  and  losses,  273 ; 
bloodiest  battle  of  the  war— comments,  274. 

ANTIETAM,  battle  of.  Lee's  position  bad  strategically,  279;  tactics  of — 
battle-field  of,  280;  no  intrenchments — McClellan  and  Lee  com 
pared,  281 ;  Union  artillery  in,  283 ;  events  immediately  after — 
condition,  organization,  etc.,  of  hostile  armies  after,  284. 

ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN,  260 ;  geography  of  theater  of,  261 ;  operations — 
Union  army  at  beginning  of,  262 ;  position  of  Union  army  Sep 
tember  13,  265;  objective  of,  274;  cause  of  McClellan's  slow  ad 
vance,  276 ;  what  might  have  been  outcome  of,  280. 

APPOMATTOX,  Lee  surrenders  at,   528. 

ARCHER,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  296;  at  Gettysburg,  366. 

ARISTA,  General,  supersedes  Ampudia — at  battle  of  Palo  Alto,  84;  at 
Resaca  de  la  Palma,  86 ;  requests  armistice,  87 ;  withdraws  toward 
Linares — ordered  before  court-martial,  88. 

ARKANSAS,  joins  Confederacy,  129;  hostile  forces  in,  169. 

ARKANSAS  POST,  captured,  399. 

ARLINGTON,  seized  by  Federal  troops,   130. 

ARMY,  beaten,  see  beaten  army. 

ARMY,  regular,  increased  in  1812-13,  65 ;  increased  in  1814,  70 ;  victory 
at  Chippewa,  71 ;  difficulty  of  recruiting  in  War  of  1812,  76 ;  num 
bers  in  War  of  1812,  77;  under  Taylor,  81;  need  of,  at  outbreak 
of  Civil  War,  143 ;  at  close  of  Civil  War — reduction — use,  588 ;  in 
1898,  590;  in  Santiago  campaign,  596. 

ARMY,  standing,  see  army,  regular. 

ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  reorganized,  423 ;  at  end  of  Tullahonra 
campaign,  425 ;  advances  to  the  Tennessee,  427 ;  advances,  427-8 ; 
withdraws  to  Chattanooga,  445 ;  condition  serious,  446 ;  measures  for 
relief — reorganized,  447;  Thomas  succeeds  Rosecrans,  448;  never 
wholly  invested,  263;  occupies  Atlanta,  547. 

ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  concentrated  at  Chantilly,  260. 

ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO,  organized,  423 ;  under  Schofield,  536 ;  occupies 
Decatur,  547. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  organization  of,  194;  merged  with  Army  of 
Virginia — McClellan  in  command,  260 ;  at  beginning  of  Antietam 
campaign — corps  commanders  in  Antietam  campaign,  262 ;  its 
position,  Sept.  13,  1862 — Lee's  army  Sept.  13,  265 ;  after  Fredericks- 
burg,  329;  its  organization  under  Hooker,  330;  not  defeated  at 
Chancellorsville,  350;  after  Chancellorsville,  353;  defective  organ 
ization — strength  in  June,  1863,  354;  disposition  June  30,  1863,  363. 

ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE,' under  McPherson,  536;  moves  via  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  537 ;  Howard  commands,  544 ;  moves  against  Hood's 
communications,  544-6;  occupies  Eastpoint,  547. 

ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  strength  of,  in  1812,  57. 

ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA,  organized,  239;  merged  into  Army  of  Potomac,  260. 

ARNOLD,  BENEDICT,  and  ETHAN  ALLEN,  capture  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point,  24 ;  expedition  to  Canada,  27 ;  defeats  St.  Leger,  32 ;  at 
Bemis  Heights,  33 ;  in  British  service  in  Virginia,  46. 

ARTILLERY,  at  Shiloh,  189;  Union,  at  Antietam,  283;  Hunt's,  at  Freder 
icksburg,  294;  defeats  Bragg  at  Stones  River,  320;  at  Stones 
River,  328;  Confederate,  battalion  organization,  354;  at  Gettys 
burg,  374 ;  supporting  Pickett's  charge,  380 ;  Union  batteries,  381 ; 
at  Wilderness,  478 ;  at  Spottsylvania,  493 ;  at  the  salient  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  496-7 ;  in  Grant's  overland  campaign,  505 ;  at  Franklin,  569 ; 
in  Santiago  campaign,  596 ;  none  at  El  Caney — at  Santiago,  603 ; 
in  Philippine  expedition,  612;  at  El  Caney,  criticized,  624,  625. 


INDEX.  675 

ASHBY,  at  Winchester,  221 ;  masks  Jackson's  march  from  Swift  Run 
Gap,  225;  covers  Jackson's  withdrawal  from  Franklin,  226;  his 
cavalry  wastes  time  looting — at  battle  of  Winchester,  227;  checks 
Fremont  at  Cedar  Creek,  229;  covers  Jackson's  retreat,  230;  an 
appreciation  of  his  cavalry,  238. 

ASHE,  General,  invades  Georgia,  44. 

ATLANTA,  campaign  of,  see  Campaign  of  Atlanta. 

ATLANTA,  Johnston's  base — railways — Gate  City,  537. 

ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN,  see  Campaign  of  Atlanta. 

ATLANTA,  battle  of — siege  of — line  of  supply,  544  ;  occupied — evacu 
ated  by  Hood,  547;  after  capture,  555. 

ATTRACTION,  power  of,  see  "power  of  attraction" ;  in  operation  from 
Rapidan  to  James,  506. 

AUGUSTA,  surrenders  to  "Light  Horse  Harry"  Lee,  49. 

AVERELL,  General,  in  pursuit  of  Stuart  in  Maryland,  285 ;  to  command 
cavalry  division,  329 ;  operations  during  Chancellorsville  campaign, 
346;  relieved  by  Hooker,  347. 

BAILEY'S  CREEK,  combat  at,  520-1. 

BAIRD,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  432;  at  Chattanooga,  454;  at  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  458,  459. 

BAKER,  Colonel,  killed  at  Ball's  Bluff,   193. 

BALLOONS,  a  wretched  substitute  for  cavalry,  305. 

BALL'S  BLUFF,  battle  of,  193. 

Baltimore,  in  Dewey's  fleet,  611. 

BANKS,  General,  operations  against  Jackson  in  March,  1862 — com 
mands  Fifth  Corps  in  A.  P.,  foot-note,  194;  commands  Union  forces 
in  the  valley,  219 ;  withdraws  from  valley,  221 ;  returns  to  Stras- 
burg,  222 ;  remains  idle  at  Strasburg — advances  southward,  223 ; 
advances  to  New  Market,  224 ;  fights  Jackson  at  Winchester — 
awaits  Jackson  at  Strasburg,  226;  retreats  across  Potomac — re 
treats  down  valley,  227;  commands  corps  under  Pope,  239;  at 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  242;  fails  to  cooperate  with  Sherman, 
399 ;  fails  to  cooperate  with  Grant,  406 ;  Pemberton's  dispositions, 
408 ;  takes  Port  Hudson,  416 ;  fails  in  his  part  of  Grant's  plan, 
470;  in  command  by  "political  necessity,"  530;  at  Sabine  Cross 
Roads,  586. 

BARBER'S  CROSS  ROADS,  combat  at,  288. 

BARKSDALE,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  294;  in  Chancellorsville  cam 
paign,  344;  at  Gettysburg— killed,  376. 

BARLOW,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  339;  at  Wilderness,  477;  attacks, 
478;  at  Spottsylvania,  494;  at  the  salient,  496;  at  Petersburg,  517. 

BARNEY,  Captain  JOSHUA,  at  battle  of  Bladensburg,  73. 

BARTOW,  General,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138. 

BASE  OF  OPERATIONS,  Shafter's,  discussed,  621. 

BASE  OF  SUPPLIES,  examples  of  cutting  loose  from,  323;  Grant  cuts 
loose  from  his,  407;  Grant's  abandonment  of,  discussed,  416;  the 
risk  of  abandoning,  417. 

BATE,  General,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  458;  at  Spring  Hill,  566;  at  Frank 
lin,  569,  570;  at  Murfreesboro,  572. 

BATES,  General  JOHN  C,  commands  independent  brigade  in  Santiago 
campaign,  596 ;  in  advance  to  Siboney,  599 ;  at  Siboney,  601 ;  or 
dered  forward,  603 ;  at  El  Caney,  604 ;  marches  to  San  Juan 
Heights,  608. 

BATH,  seized  by  Jackson,  219. 

BATON  ROUGE,  taken  by  Farragut,  394. 

BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS,  see  Wilderness,  battle  of. 

BATTLE,  line  of,  see  line  of  battle. 


676  INDEX. 

BATTLES  around  Chattanooga — disposition,  445  ;  Wheeler's  raid — sup 
plies,  446;  little  fighting  at  first — Bragg's  line,  449;  Grant's  plan  of 
attack,  452 ;  Missionary  Ridge— battle  of  Mt.  Lookout,  454 ;  strength 
and  losses,  460;  comments — cause  of  defeat — Bragg's  report — why 
Thomas  was  ordered  to  assault,  461 ;  in  a  sense  decisive — effect  on 
Confederacy,  462. 

BEATTY,  General  SAM,  at  Nashville,  575. 

BEAUREGARD,  G.  T.,  in  Scott's  campaign,  122;  at  Fort  Sumter,  129; 
in  command  at  Manassas,  130;  reports  advance  of  Union  army 
on  Manassas,  134;  his  dispositions  before  first  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
135;  fails  to  pursue  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  141;  his  bad  man 
agement  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  147 ;  A.  S.  Johnston's  "second  in 
command,"  171;  orders  attack  suspended  at  Shiloh,  179;  and  John 
ston's  plans  at  Shiloh,  187 ;  should  not  have  fought  second  day, 
189;  retreats  to  Tupelo,  308;  has  Butler  "bottled  up,"  510;  at 
Petersburg,  515-16;  intrenches  shorter  line,  517;  begs  for  rein 
forcements,  518;  commands  Military  Division  of  the  West,  557; 
visits  Hood,  561. 

BEATEN  ARMY,  must  rally  sufficiently  in  rear,  183. 

BEAVER  DAM  CREEK,  see  Mechanicsville,  battle  of,  204. 

BEE,  General,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138;  gives  Jackson  nick 
name  "Stonewall" — killed,  139. 

BEMIS  HEIGHTS,  battle  of,  33. 

BENNINGTON,  battle  of,  32;  battle  of,  comment  on,  41. 

BENTON,  Senator,  a  bill  to  make  him  lieutenant-general,  103. 

BERMUDA  HUNDRED,  fortifications,  512;  Terry's  combat,  516. 

BERRY,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  342. 

BERLIN  and  MILAN  decrees,  56. 

BIAONA-BATO,  treaty  of,  612. 

BIG  BLACK,  battle  of  the,  412. 

BIRNEY,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  298;  at  Chancellorsville,  337;  re 
ports  Jackson's  movement — -'attacks  at  Catherine  Furnace,  339 ; 
attacks  Union  line  by  mistake  in  the  dark,  342;  at  Gettysburg,  374; 
at  Wilderness,  477 ;  May  6,  479 ;  at  Spottsylvania,  495 ;  covers  Burn- 
side,  499 ;  at  Petersburg,  517 ;  commands  Second  Corps — assault, 
June  18,  518 ;  siege  of  Petersburg,  519 ;  with  Hancock,  522. 

BLACBKURN'S  FORD,  combat  at,  136. 

BLACKSTOCK  HILL,  battle  of,  46. 

BLACK  ROCK,  burnt  by  British,  69. 

BLAIR,  F.  P.,  at  Chattanooga,  452 ;  goes  home,  555. 

BLANCO,  General,  at  Buena  Vista,  94. 

BLANCO,  Captain  General,  orders  Cervera  to  make  sortie,  609. 

BLENKER,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133 ; 
commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194 ;  dispatched  to  Fremont,  195. 

BLOODY  LANE,  271 ;  its  defensive  strength,  281. 

BLOODY  ANGLE,  '497. 

BOERSTLER,  Colonel,  surrenders  to  British  lieutenant,  68. 

BONHAM,  General,  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  136;  at  first  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  141. 

Bonhomme    Richard,  41. 

BOONVILLE,  effect  of  Union  victory  there,  130. 

BOSCAWEN,  Admiral,  fleet  sails  for  Louisburg,  11. 

BOSTON,  port  closed,  23;  besieged  by  patriots,  24;  evacuated  by  Howe, 
25. 

BOUGAINVILLE,  sent  with  1,500  French  to  Cap-Rouge,  17. 

BOWEN,  General,  at  Champion's  Hill,  411. 

BOWLING  GREEN,  Ky.,  Johnston's  headquarters,  150;  evacuated  by  John 
ston,  155. 


INDEX.  677 

BRADDOCK,   General,    arrives    in    Virginia — his    plan    of    campaign — leads 

force  against  Fort  Duquesne — ambuscade  at  Monongahela,  7. 
BRADLEY,  General,  at  Spring  Hill,  566. 

BRADSTREET,  Colonel  JOHN,  captures  Fort  Frontenac  and  French  fleet,  12. 
BRAGG,  BRAXTON,  his  battery  at  Buena  Vista,  94;  takes  force  from 
Pensacola  to  Corinth,  169 ;  commands  division  in  A.  S.  Johns 
ton's  army  and  chief  of  staff,  171 ;  prepares  for  final  assault  at 
Shiloh,  178 ;  succeeds  Beauregard — transfers  army  to  Chattanooga — 
arranges  to  invade  Kentucky,  309 ;  geography  of  his  line  of  ad 
vance  to  Kentucky — advances  to  Kentucky,  310;  captures  Mun- 
fordville — moves  to  Bardstown — movements  before  battle  of  Perry- 
ville — at  Perryville — withdraws  to  Tennessee,  312;  withdraws  to 
Chattanooga  and  Murf  reesboro — cavalry  screens  his  army,  313  ;  occu 
pies  "position  in  readiness"  at  Murfreesboro— disposition  of  forces, 
315;  prepares  to  attack — his  plan,  316;  gets  the  initiative,  317;  his 
orders  to  Breckinridge — his  left  on  the  defensive,  319;  attributes 
defeat  to  Union  artillery — attacks  on  January  2,  and  is  repulsed, 
320 ;  withdraws  to  Tullahoma,  321 ;  why  he  advanced  into  Ken 
tucky,  323 ;  advantage  of  his  position  at  Munf  ordville,  324 ;  why 
he  quitted  it — his  invasion  a  failure — result  of  his  invasion  a  dis 
appointment  to  North  and  South — Joseph  E.  Johnston  sent  to  re 
lieve  him,  325 ;  his  position  at  Stones  River — why  he  attacked  at 
Stones  River — his  "personal  equation" — his  plan  of  battle,  327;  his 
plan  of  battle  nearly  carried  out,  328;  after  Stones  River — opera 
tions  of  his  cavalry,  422 ;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  423 ;  withdraws 
to  Chattanooga,  424 ;  dispositions  at  end  of  Tullahoma  campaign, 
425;  withdraws  Buckner  from  Knoxville,  427;  withdraws  from 
Chattanooga — position  May  10 — concentrates  on  the  Chickamauga — 
orders  an  attack — subordinates  do  not  obey,  429;  Polk  fails  to 
attack,  430;  plan  at  Chickamauga,  431;  position  of  forces  morning 
September  19,  432;  renews  battle — dispositions,  434;  line  of  com 
munication  at  Shelbyville,  438;  advantage  of  topography — objec 
tive — invasion  of  Kentucky  compared  with  Chickamauga  cam 
paign — outmaneuvered,  439 ;  strategy,  440 ;  advantage  of  position — 
cause  of  failures — relations  with  subordinates,  441 ;  effect  of  with 
drawal  from  Chattanooga — what  he  ought  to  have  done,  442; 
tactics  criticised,  443 ;  advances  to  Chattanooga — dispositions,  445 ; 
at  loggerheads  with  generals — reorganization,  447 ;  sees  Hooker's 
column  from  Mt.  Lookout,  451 ;  puts  army  on  Missionary  Ridge, 
456;  faulty  position,  458;  routed — retreats  to  Dalton — resigns,  459; 
cause  of  rout,  461 ;  mistakes,  463 ;  plan  ordered  by  President  Davis — 
Longstreet's  plan,  464 ;  considered  his  position  impregnable — 
sent  Longstreet  to  Knoxville  too  late,  465 ;  after  Chattanooga — re 
lieved  of  command — chief  of  staff,  535. 

BRANDY  STATION,  battle  of,  357;  first  real  cavalry  combat,  358. 

BRANDYWINE,  battle  of,  34. 

BRANNAN,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  432. 

BRECKINRIDGE,  General,  commands  reserve  in  A.  S.  Johnston's  army, 
171 ;  commands  Confederate  rear  guard  after  Shiloh,  181 ;  besieges 
Negley  at  Nashville,  312;  at  Stones  River,  315;  fails  to  obey  Bragg's 
order,  319;  slow  in  sending  troops  across  river — attacks  on  Jan 
uary  2,  and  is  repulsed,  320 ;  failed  to  obey  Bragg's  order,  328 ; 
garrisons  Port  Hudson,  395;  at  Chickamauga,  432;  begins  battle 
second  day,  435;  at  Chattanooga,  447;  in  center,  449;  at  Mission 
ary  Ridge,  456 ;  at  Cold  Harbor,  502 ;  in  East  Tennessee,  579. 

BREED'S  HILL,  occupied  by  Americans,  24. 

BRIAR  CREEK,  battle  of,  44. 


678  INDEX. 

BRITISH,  discoveries  in  America,  1 ;  strengthen  position  in  America  after 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  6;  navy,  active  on  French  Coast,  11;  under  Wolfe 
defeat  French  under  Montcalm,  18 ;  capture  Montreal,  20 ;  evacu 
ate  Boston,  25;  their  plans— their  strategy,  26;  plans  for  1777,  32; 
hold  Charleston  till  end  of  war,  50;  West  Indies  fleet  sails  to  New 
York,  52;  forces  in  America  in  1812,  64;  burn  Buffalo  and  Black 
Rock,  69 ;  numbers  in  War  of  1812— in  South  African  War,  77. 

BROCK,  General,  demands  and  receives  surrender  of  Hull,  61 ;  trans 
fers  forces  to  Niagara — killed  at  Queenstown,  62. 

BROOKE,  General,  at  Spottsylvania,  494;  at  the  salient,  496;  in  Porto 
Rican  expedition,  615. 

Brooklyn,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593 ;  at  battle  of   Santiago,  610. 

BROWN,  General  JACOB,  repulses  British  at  Sacketts  Harbor,  68 ;  crosses 
into  Canada — his  forces,  71 ;  wounded  at  Lundy's  Lane,  72. 

BROWN,  General  JOHN  C.,  at  Spring  Hill,  566;  at  Franklin,  569,  570 

BROWN,  Major  JACOB,  commands  American  camp,  84;  killed,  86;  Fort 
Brown  named  after,  86. 

BROWN'S  GAP,  Jackson's  army  at,  232. 

BROWN'S  FERRY,  combat  at,  451 ;  importance  of  road  to  Kelly's  Ferry, 
464. 

BRUINSBURG,  Grant  crosses   Mississippi  at,  404. 

BRUSH  MOUNTAIN,  Johnston's  position  at,  541. 

BUCHANAN,  President,  his  attitude  toward  secession,  128. 

BUCKLAND'S  brigade  at  Shiloh,  174. 

BUCKNER,  General,  commands  Confederate  right  at  Fort  Donelson,  156; 
checks  Smith's  charge  at  Fort  Donelson — left  in  command  at  Fort 
Donelson,  160 ;  surrenders  to  Grant,  161 ;  after  Stones  River,  423 ; 
withdraws  from  Knoxville,  427;  fails  to  attack — in  Chickamauga 
campaign,  429 ;  at  Chickamauga,  431 ;  bivouacs  at  Tedford's  Ford, 
432;  quits  Bragg,  447. 

BUELL,  General,  commands  Union  forces  in  Kentucky,  150;  his  and 
Halleck's  plans  against  Johnston,  152;  dispatches  Nelson's  divi 
sion  to  Grant  and  advances,  161 ;  proposes  plan  against  Johnston, 
170;  and  troops  reach  Shiloh — march  from  Nashville  to  Shiloh. 
179;  meets  Grant  at  Shiloh — determines  to  renew  battle.  180;  starts 
for  Chattanooga — ordered  to  repair  M.  &  C.  Railway,  308;  adopts 
N.  &  C.  Railway  as  line  of  communications — advance  stopped  by- 
Forrest,  309;  concentrates  at  Murfreesboro,  310;  reaches  Bowling 
Green — withdraws  to  Louisville — resumes  offensive — at  Perry vi lie. 
311;  suspends  pursuit  of  Bragg — relieved  from  command,  312; 
why  sent  to  Chattanooga — given  orders  impossible  to  execute,  322; 
why  he  fell  back  to  Kentucky,  323 ;  his  operations  against  Bragg 
disappoint  North — Ropes's  estimate  of,  325. 

BUENA  VISTA,  battle  of — description  of  battle-field,  92;  strength  and 
losses — comments,  95 ;  Taylor's  chances  there,  101 ;  Santa  Anna's 
mistakes,  102. 

BUFORD,  General,  in  second  Bull  Run  campaign,  256;  to  command  re 
serve  cavalry  brigade,  329 ;  operations  during  Chancellorsville  cam 
paign,  346 ;  covers  left  of  Meade's  army,  360 ;  at  Gettysburg,  363, 
364 ;  stops  Hill,  365 ;  reports  Ewell's  approach,  367 ;  ordered  to 
Westminster,  374;  in  pursuit  after  Gettysburg,  384;  dead,  470. 

BUFFALO,  burnt  by  British,  69. 

BULL  RUN,  as  a  military  obstacle,  132. 

BULL  RUN,  first  battle,  127;  disposition  of  Confederates  before  the  bat 
tle — Union  concentration  before  the  battle,  135 ;  McDowell's  plan, 
136 ;  battle  begins — Beauregard's  orders  and  dispositions,  137 ;  losses 
and  casualties — comments,  142;  part  played  by  Johnston's  forces — 
Federal  mistakes,  145;  its  effect  on  North  and  South.  191. 


INDEX.  679 

BULL  RUN,  second  battle  of,  239;  on  August  28,  246;  on  August  29, 
248;  on  August  30,  249;  losses,  251. 

BUNKER  HILL,  battle  of,  24. 

BURGESS'S  MILL,  combat  at,  525. 

BURGOYNK,  General,  arrives  at  Boston,  24;  commands  expedition  from 
Canada  to  Hudson  Valley — captures  Ticonderoga,  32 ;  not  sup 
ported  by  Howe — defeat  and  surrender,  33. 

BURNSIDE,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133;  at 
first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138;  brings  army  from  North  Carolina,  241 ; 
commands  Ninth  Corps,  262;  commands  right  wing,  264;  at  An- 
tietam,  272 ;  effect  of  his  slowness  in  crossing  Antietam  Creek, 
283 ;  succeeds  McClellan  in  command  of  Army  of  the  Potomac — 
submits  plan — reorganizes  army,  289;  moves  army  to  Falmouth, 
290;  plans  to  attack  at  Fredericksburg,  292;  his  army  crosses 
Rappahannock,  293 ;  discusses  plan  of  battle  with  Franklin — his 
vague  orders,  295 ;  distribution  of  his  troops  at  Fredericksburg. 
296;  personally  directs  attack  on  Confederate  left,  298;  sends 
Franklin  order  to  charge — orders  Hooker  to  attack  stone  wall, 
299 ;  when  his  order  to  Franklin  was  delivered — withdraws  to  left 
bank  of  Rappahannock,  300 ;  how  critics  view  his  movement  to 
Falmouth,  302;  had  opportunity  to  strike  Lee's  separated  wings — 
his  foremost  mistake,  303 ;  why  he  fought  at  Fredericksburg,  305 ; 
cause  of  army's  despondency — his  order  dismissing  and  relieving 
generals — relieved  of  command,  329 ;  resumes  command  of  Ninth 
Corps — withdraws  it  from  Army  of  the  Potomac,  330;  organizes 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  423 ;  enters  East  Tennessee,  427 ;  ordered  to  aid 
Rosecrans,  447;  at  Knoxville,  460;  under  Grant,  470;  at  Wilder 
ness,  474 ;  not  in  battle  May  5 — orders  for  May  6,  478 ;  May  6, 
481 ;  small  part  in  battle,  487 ;  movement  to  Spottsylvania,  488 ; 
bivouacs  at  Aldrich's,  490;  at  Spottsylvania,  492;  first  position,  493; 
close  to  hostile  line,  495 ;  attack  of  salient,  496 ;  accomplished  little, 
498 ;  attacks  May  18,  499 ;  at  North  Anna — in  movement  after 
Spottsylvania,  501;  in  movement  to  James,  513;  at  Petersburg,  517; 
assault  June  18,  518;  siege  of  Petersburg,  519;  the  mine,  520-22; 
censured  and  resigns,  foot-note,  524 ;  succeeded  by  Schofield,  536. 

BURN  SIDE  BRIDGE,  combat  at,  272. 

BUSCHBECK,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  340;  holds  his  rifle  pits — re 
tires,  341. 

BUTLER,  General,  commands  Taylor's  volunteer  division,  88. 

BUTLER,  BENJAMIN  F.,  at  Fort  Monroe,  131;  "bottled  up,"  470,  510; 
capture  of  Fort  Harrison,  524;  demonstration  against  Richmond, 
525 ;  his  failure  to  capture  Petersburg,  529 ;  in  command  by  "politi 
cal  necessity,"  530. 

BUTTERFIELD,  General,  commands  Fifth  Corps,  289. 

CABOT,  JOHN,  gave  England  claim  to  America,  1. 

CALHOUN,  JOHN  C.,  and  others  force  declaration  of  war,  56. 

CAMARA,  Admiral,  commands  Spanish  fleet,  591 ;  what  his  fleet  might 
have  done,  620. 

CAMARGO,  Taylor's  base,  88;  why  Taylor's  base,  97. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA,  535 ;  distribution  and  strength  of  troops,  536 ; 
geography,  537 ;  Peachtree  Creek,  543 ;  battle  of  Atlanta,  544 ;  Sher 
man's  position,  July  31 — battle  of  Ezra  Church,  545;  raids,  Stone- 
man's,  Wheeler's,  Kilpatrick's — Sherman  continues  general  move 
ment,  546 ;  operations  south  of  Atlanta,  546,  547 ;  comments,  547 : 
compared  with  Grant's  campaign,  547,  548;  strategy — like  Tulla 
homa  campaign,  548;  use  of  fieldworks,  553;  character  of  troops, 
554. 


680  INDEX. 

CAMPAIGN  OF  FRANKLIN  and  NASHVILLE — after  capture  of  Atlanta,  555; 
comments,  577. 

CAMPBELL,  Colonel,  invades  Georgia,  43. 

CANADA,  battle  ground  of  French  and  English,  1 ;  "Jack  Hill's"  expe 
dition  against — English  colonists  resolve  to  capture,  2 ;  failure  of 
last  effort  against,  in  Queen  Anne's  War — linked  to  Louisiana  by 
settlements,  3 ;  geography  of — routes  of  invasion,  4 ;  refuge  of 
Tories — her  leading  men  descendants  of  American  Tories,  23  ;  ex 
pedition  of  Arnold  and  Montgomery — invasion  by  Arnold  and 
Montgomery,  27 ;  plan  of  campaign  by  U.  S.  in  1812,  57. 

CANADIANS,  in  War  of  1812,  77. 

CAPITAL,  why  Richmond  chosen,  by  Confederacy — of  a  new  govern 
ment,  533. 

CANEY,  EL,  sec  El  Caney. 

CAPRON,  General  HORACE,  reinforces  Hatch,  563 ;  at  Columbia,  564. 

CAPRON,  Captain,  commands  battery,  602 ;   at  El  Caney,  604. 

CARLETON,  in  command  at  Quebec,  28. 

CARLIN,  General,  at  Mt.  Lookout,  456. 

CAROLINA,  SOUTH,  see  South  Carolina. 

CAROLINA,  NORTH,  sec  North  Carolina. 

CARRICK'S  FORD,  battle  of,  130. 

CARTER  HOUSE,  568. 

C ARTIER,  JACQUES,  carries  French  flag  up  the  St.  Lawrence,  1. 

CASEY,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194. 

CASS,  Colonel,  informs  Hull  militia  would  desert,  60;  in  expedition  to 
Raisin  River,  61. 

CASSVILLE,  combat  at,  540. 

CASTILLO,  General,  in  Santiago  campaign,  598 ;   action  at   Siboney,   599. 

CAVALRY,  Confederate,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  148;  Eighth  Penn 
sylvania,  see  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry;  raids,  see  raids,  cav- 
•  airy;  Union,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  148;  lack  of,  at  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  148 ;  in  campaign  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson, 
166;  Union,  at  Shiloh — Confederate,  advancing  on  Shiloh,  174; 
at  Shiloh,  189 ;  Jackson's  lack  of,  at  Winchester,  228 ;  Ashby's.  238 ; 
Pope's  worn  out — Buf ord's  in  second  Bull  Run  campaign,  257 :  in 
second  Bull  Run  campaign,  258 ;  in  Antietam  campaign,  263,  279 ; 
Colonel  B.  F.  Davis's  escape  from  Harper's  Ferry,  266;  in  the 
battle  of  Antietam,  281 ;  portion  of  Union,  at  Antietam,  283 ;  in 
movement  southward  after  Antietam,  288 ;  balloons  a  wretched 
substitute  for,  305 ;  Stuart's,  at  Fredericksburg,  307 ;  of  Bragg's 
army  screens  movements — delays  Rosecrans's  advance,  313;  Union; 
during  Rosecrans's  advance  to  Murfreesborp,  314;  Wheeler's, 
during  battle  of  Stones  River,  321 ;  its  work  in  the  Stones  River 
campaign,  326 ;  corps,  organized — Stoneman  commands,  329 ;  on 
raid,  331  ;  corps,  during  Chancellorsville  campaign,  346 ;  its  in 
fluence — its  losses,  347j  effect  of  operations  before  battle  of 
Chancellorsville,  348;  needed  at  Chancellorsville — the  Union,  needed 
in  right  place  at  Chancellorsville,  350 ;  after  Chancellorsville,  353 ; 
at  Brandy  Station,  357;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  358;  combats 
between,  of  Pleasonton  and  Stuart,  359 ;  Union,  its  position  at 
Gettysburg,  374 ;  Confederate,  at  Gettysburg,  375 ;  at  Gettysburg, 
382;  Federal,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  392;  the  Confederate,  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  393 ;  lack  of,  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign, 
421;  Confederate,  after  Stones  River,  422;  in  Chickamauga  cam 
paign,  440 ;  in  siege  of  Chattanooga,  445 ;  at  Wilderness,  472.  484 ; 
Confederate,  at  Wilderness,  474 ;  little  chance  in  woods,  487 ;  in 
movement  after  Spottsylvania,  501 ;  Union,  criticised,  507,  508 ;  Con 
federate,  509 ;  in  Appomattox  campaign,  533 ;  Union,  in  Atlanta 


INDEX.  681 

CAVALRY — Continued. 

campaign — Wheeler's,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  535 ;  Union,  in  pursuit 
from  Resaca,  539 ;  Union,  captures  Allatoona,  540 ;  Sherjnan's, 
operates  against  Hood's  communications,  544-6 ;  useless  when  cut 
off— Wilson's  at  Spring  Hill,  581;  Wilson's,  at  Nashville,  584;  in 
Santiago  campaign,  596;  1st,  at  Las  Guasimas — 10th,  at  Las 
Guasimas — 1st  volunteer,  at  Las  Guasimas,  600;  9th,  at  Las 
GuasimaS,  601 ;  Troop  D,  2d,  at  El  Caney,  604 ;  at  San  Juan,  607. 

CAVITE,  naval  battle  at — casualties,  611;  taken  by  Dewey,  612. 

CEDAR  MOUNTAIN,  battle  of,  242. 

CEMETERY  HILL,  365 ;  why  chosen — its  possession  decisive  of  victory — 
result  of  Lee's  failure  to  carry,  387 ;  weakest  part  of  Federal  hne, 
388. 

CENTREVILLE,  McDowell's  army  at,   135. 

CERRALVO,  Taylor's  depot,  88. 

CERRO  GORDO,  108 ;  Santa  Anna  occupies  it — battle  of — troops  and 
losses  at,  109;  defects  of  position — why  chosen — result  of  American 
victory,  121. 

CERVERA,  Admiral,  his  voyage — at  St.  Vincent — at  Curasao,  592;  at 
Santiago — blockaded  at  Santiago,  593 ;  at  battle  of  Santiago,  609 ; 
loss  at  Santiago — captured,  610;  Sampson  foresaw  effect  of  de 
struction  of  his  fleet,  617;  his  mistakes,  619;  if  Santiago  had  been 
taken  July  1,  626. 

CHADD'S  FORD,  34. 

CHAFFEE,  General,  reinforces  Wheeler  at  Las  Guasimas,  601 ;  recon- 
noiters,  601,  602;  orders  12th  Infantry  to  charge— at  El  Caney,  604. 

CHALMERS,  General,  at  Shiloh,  178;  at  Franklin,  571;  on  Confederate 
left,  575 ;  in  Hood's  retreat,  576. 

CHAMBLISS,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  383 ;  attacks  Upton,  499. 

CHAMPLAIN,  establishes  trading  post  at  Quebec,  1, 

CHANTILLY,  battle  of,  251. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE,  battle  of,  329 ;  Hooker's  plan-,  331 ;  operations — 
concentration  at,  332;  battle-field,  334;  operations  on  May  1,  335; 
Union  line  withdrawn  by  Hooker — Union  position  and  distribu 
tion  of  troops,  337;  Confederate  line — field-works — dense  woods 
— Jackson's  turning  movement,  338;  who  suggested  it?  339; 
Howard's  corps  at,  340 ;  Howard's  men  warned  by  flight  of  wild 
animals — Lee  engages  Hooker's  entire  line,  341 ;  fighting  in  the 
dark,  342;  Union  line  falls  back — Anderson  and  McLaws  attack — 
Anderson  and  Stuart  connect — Sunday,  May  3 — Stuart  re 
news  attack  at  daybreak — Federal  line  rearranged  during  night 
— Lee  advances  and  captures,  343;  Union  line  withdraws  to 
new  position,  344;  losses,  346;  comments — Hooker's  operations 
first  masterly  then  faulty,  347;  Union  army  not  defeated,  350;  field- 
works  first  used,  352 ;  distribution  of  Southern  forces  after,  356. 

CHAPULTEPEC,  117;  battle  of,   118. 

CHARLESTON,  held  by  British  till  end  of   war,  50. 

CHARLOTTE,  American  forces  concentrate  there,  46. 

CHATTANOOGA,  battles  around,  see  Battles  around  Chattanooga;  best 
place  for  Southern  capital,  533;  objective  in  Chickamauga  cam 
paign — singular  turn  of  events,  439 ;  effect  of  Bragg's  withdrawal, 
441 ;  situation,  449 ;  siege  raised,  459 ;  Union  army  never  wholly 
invested,  463. 

CHESTER,  Washington  retreats  to,  34. 

CHERRY  VALLEY,  massacre,  43. 

CHEATHAM,  General,  at  Stones  River,  315;  at  Chickamauga,  433;  at 
Missionary  Ridge,  458 ;  at  Peachtree  Creek — succeeds  Hood, 
543 ;  battle  of  Atlanta,  544 ;  succeeded  by  S.  D.  Lee,  foot-note,  545 ; 


682  INDEX. 

CHEATHAM,  General — Continued. 

succeeds  Hardee,  557 ;  in  Hood's  advance,  564 ;  at  Columbia,  566 ; 
at  Spring  Hill,  567 ;  at  Franklin,  569 ;  supported  by  Johnson,  570 ; 
at  Nashville,  571;  Steedman's  attack,  574;  goes  to  the  left,  575; 
action  at  Spring  Hill  criticised,  582. 

CHIPPEWA,  battle  of,  71. 

CHICKAHOMINY  RIVER,  its  character,  200. 

CHICKAMAUGA,  campaign — after  Stones  River,  422;  geography,  426: 
Rosecrans  advances  to  the  Tennessee,  427 ;  Rosecrans  crosses  and 
advances,  428;  situation  of  forces  May  10,  427-8;  operations  be 
fore  the  battle — battle  of,  430;  disposition  of  Union  forces. 
431;  position  of  forces  morning  September  19,  432;  comments — 
lines  of  communication,  438;  objective — compared  with  Bragg's 
invasion  of  Kentucky,  439 ;  Pyrrhic  victory — Alexander's  critical 
summary,  443;  Longstreet's  suggestion  to  Secretary  of  War,  442; 
tactics,  433;  Longstreet's  proposed  plan  after  battle,  464;  battle  of, 
comments.  438;  battle  of,  details  of,  first  day,  432-4;  second  day. 
434-8;  strength  and  losses,  438. 

CHICKAMAUGA  PARK,  camp  of  instruction,  590. 

CHICKASAW  BLUFFS,  398;  battle  of,  399. 

CHRYSTLER'S  FARM,  battle  of,  69. 

CHURUBU$CO,  battle  of,  114. 

CIVIL  WAR,  our  purpose  in  studying  it — its  interest  to  students  of 
military  history — as  compared  with  other  civil  wars — view  of 
Southern  people,  127;  main  theater,  how  determined,  130. 

CLAUSEWITZ,  advocated  flank  positions,   551. 

CLAY,  General  GREEN,  tries  to  relieve  Fort  Meigs,  66. 

CLAY,  HENRY,  and  others  force  declaration  of  war,  56. 

CLEBURNE,  General,  at  Stones  River,  315;  falls  on  McCook's  right,  317; 
at  Chickamauga,  432 ;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  456 ;  withstands  Sher 
man's  assaults,  457 ;  at  Spring  Hill,  566 ;  at  Franklin,  570. 

CLINTON,  HENRY,  arrives  at  Boston,  24 ;  goes  to  relieve  Burgoyne,  34 ; 
succeeds  Howe — determines  to  move  army  by  land  to  New  York — 
evacuates  Philadelphia — at  battle  of  Monmouth — withdraws  army  to 
Sandy  Hook  and  New  York,  35 ;  concentrates  forces  at  New 
York — has  not  enough  troops,  42 ;  combines  with  Admiral  Parker 
for  attack  on  Charleston — adopts  "wearing  out  policy,"  43 ;  sends 
raiding  parties  to  Virginia  and  Connecticut — captures  Charleston. 
44 ;  his  reasons  for  the  "wearing  out"  policy,  54. 

COBB,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  296. 

COCKBURN,  Rear-Admiral,  plunders  shores  of  Chesapeake,  70. 

COLD  HARBOR,  battle  of — hardships,  502 ;  Grant  withdraws — losses,  503 ; 
strength  and  losses  from  Wilderness  to,  503 ;  general  situation 
after,  510;  Grant's  withdrawal,  512. 

Colon,  at  Santiago,  593 ;  at  battle  of  Santiago,  610. 

COLONIAL  WARS,  1. 

COLONIES,  the  thirteen,  their  geography.  26. 

COLSTON,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  339. 

COLUMBIA,  operations  at,  564-5. 

COLUMBUS,  KY.,  occupied  by  Polk,  150. 

COMMAND,  at  Saratoga,  51 ;  undivided,  482. 

COMMANDER,  his  qualifications,  259. 

COMMENTS,  Revolutionary  War,  northern  campaigns,  35;  Revolution 
ary  War,  southern  campaigns,  53 ;  War  of  1812,  75 ;  Taylor's  cam 
paign,  95;  Scott's  campaign,  120;  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  142; 
capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.  162;  campaign  of  Shiloh, 
182 ;  Peninsular  campaign,  209 ;  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  233 ;  the 
second  Bull  Run,  252 ;  battle  of  Antietam,  274 ;  battle  of  Fredericks- 


INDEX.  683 

COMMENTS — Continued. 

burg,  300;  Stones  River  campaign,  321;  battle  of  Stones  River,  327; 
battle  of  Chancellorsville,  347;  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  385;  Vicks- 
burg  campaign,  416;  Chickamauga,  438;  battles  around  Chatta 
nooga,  461 ;  Wilderness,  482 ;  Spottsylvania,  503 ;  siege  of  Peters 
burg,  528;  campaign  of  Atlanta,  547;  Franklin  and  Nashville,  577; 
Spring  Hill,  581-2  >  battle  of  Franklin,  583;  Nashville— Hood's 
mistake  in  advancing,  583 ;  Spanish-American  War — navy  dictates 
plan,  616 ;  El  Caney,  624,  625 ;  Santiago  campaign,  naval  opera 
tions,  617-21;  land  operations,  621-6;  San  Juan — Kettle  Hill. 
625-6 ;  capture  of  Manila,  627 ;  capture  of  Porto  Rico,  627-8. 

COMMISSIONERS,  Confederate,  at  Washington,  129. 

COMMUNICATIONS,  line  of,  see  line  of  communications;  Grant  operates 
without,  407;  Grant's  abandonment  of,  discussed,  416;  the  risk  of 
abandoning,  417 ;  cannot  be  permanently  destroyed  by  cavalry.  545  ; 
Hood's,  557. 

CONCENTRATION,  importance  of,  for  battle,  185 ;  difficulties  of,  186. 

CONFEDERACY,  States  join,  129;  makes  mistake  in  bombarding  Fort 
Sumter — its  right  policy,  142 ;  end  in  sight — strategic  front  sur 
rendered,  462;  policy  like  that  of  U.  S.,  468. 

CONGRESS,  Continental,  see  Continental  Congress;  declares  war  against 
Great  Britain,  56;  causes  of  declaration,  56;  responsible  for  fail 
ures  in  War  of  1812,  and  prolongation  of  Civil  War,  75 ;  fails  to 
authorize  volunteers  for  Scott,  105 ;  declares  war  on  Spain— pre 
pares  for  war,  590. 

CONNECTICUT  RIVER,  as  line  of  invasion,  5. 

CONNOR,  Commodore,  commands  squadron  at  mouth  of  Rio  Grande,  87. 

CONOCOCHEAGUE  CREEK,  Lee's  position  on,  385. 

CONTINENTAL  CONGRESS,  meets  at  Philadelphia,  23 ;  resolutions  and 
petitions  to  the  King,  23;  raises  rifle  companies,  25,;  would  not 
let  Washington  withdraw  from  New  York,  29. 

CONTRERAS,  battle  of,   113;  forces  and  losses,   114. 

COOKE,  P.  ST.  G.,  commands  cavalry  in  A.  P.,  194. 

CORINTH,  Halleck's  objective,  322;  battle  of,  396. 

CORNWALLIS,  General,  advances  on  Newark — pursues  Washington,  30; 
his  operations  against  Washington  after  Trenton,  31 ;  at  battle  of 
Brandywine,  34;  left  in  command  of  South  Carolina,  44;  at  bat 
tle  of  Camden,  45 ;  his  operations  against  Greene,  47 ;  at  battle  of 
Guilford  C.  H.,  48;  retreats  to  Virginia,  50;  withdraws  to  York- 
town,  51 ;  surrenders,  53  ;  comment  on  his  conduct,  53. 

CORPUS  CHRISTI,  camp  of  Taylor's  forces,  81. 

CORRAL  FALSO,  better  position  than  Cerro  Gordo,  121. 

CORSE,  General,  at  Rome,  555 ;  at  Allatoona,  558. 

CORTEZ,  his  route  to  City  of  Mexico,  107. 

COUCH,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194;  commands  Second  Corps, 
289,  330 ;  at  Chancellorsville,  335 ;  superintends  withdrawal  of 
Union  line,  344. 

COUNCIL  OF  WAR,  see  War,  council  of,  410. 

COWPENS,  THE,  battle  of,  47. 

Cox,  General  JACOB  D.,  at  South  Mountain,  265 ;  assaults  Confederate 
right  at  Antietam,  273;  at  Pulaski,  563;  at  Columbia,  564;  at 
Spring  Hill,  567;  at  Franklin,  569-70;  timely  arrival  at  Columbia, 
581. 

CRAMPTON'S  GAP,  battle  of,  discussion,  277. 

CRATER,  the,  520-2. 

CRAVEN'S  FARM,  combat,  455. 

CRAWFORD,  General,  at  Wilderness.  476 ;  at  Spottsylvania,  489 ;  at 
Petersburg,  517. 


684  INDEX. 

CRITTENDEN,  General  G.  B.,  defeated  at  Mill  Springs,  154. 

CRITTENDEN,  General  T.  L.,  commands  Twenty-first  Corps — commands 
"left  wing"  tot  Rosecrans's  army,  313;  deploys  in  front  of  Bragg, 
315;  forms  line  of  battle,  320;  at  Chickamauga,  431;  morning  Sep 
tember  19,  432 ;  driven  from  field,  436 ;  court  of  inquiry,  447. 

CROCKER,  General,  at  Champion's  Hill,  411. 

CR^GHAN,  Major,  repulses  Proctor  at  Fort  Stephenson,  66. 

CROOK,  General,  at  Antietam,  273;  stops  Wheeler's  raid,  446. 

CROSS  KEYS,  battle  of,  232. 

CROXTON,  General,  opposes  Hood,  562;  at  Columbia,  564. 

CROW  FARM,  end  of  Confederate  intrenchments,  525. 

CROWN  POINT,  expedition  against,  in  1755,  8;  captured  by  Arnold  and 
Allen,  24. 

CRUFT,  General,  at  Chattanooga,  453 ;  at  Mt.  Lookout,  455 ;  at  Nash 
ville,  572 ;  in  Thomas's  plan,  573. 

CUBA,  outbreak  of  second  insurrection — sympathy  and  support  of 
Americans,  589;  War  Department's  plan  of  invasion,  617. 

GULP'S  HILL,  365. 

CUMBERLAND,  Army  of  the,  see  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

CUMBERLAND  GAP,  fortified  by  Confederates,  150. 

CURTAIN,  Governor,  calls  out  Pennsylvania  militia,  359. 

CURTIS,  General,  has  command  in  Arkansas,  169. 

CUSTBR,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  383. 

DAHLGREN,  Colonel,  raid  on  Richmond,  468. 

DAIQUIRI,  landing  place  of  Shafter's  army,  598. 

DALTON,  Bragg's  army  there,  535 ;  Union  army  in  front  of,  536. 

DANA,  C.  A.,  at  Chattanooga,  448.        : 

DAVIES,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133. 

DAVIS,  Colonel  B.  F.,  escapes  with  cavalry,  266. 

DAVIS,  JEFFERSON,  commands  Mississippi  Rifles  at  Buena  Vista,  93,  94; 
chosen  provisional  president  of  Confederacy,  128 ;  directs  South 
ern  operations,  132 ;  orders  Johnston  and  Holmes  to  reinforce 
Beauregard,  134 ;  his  experience  of  military  affairs — compared  with 
Lincoln,  143;  could  not  reinforce  Johnston  at  Centreville,  211;  did 
not  organize  army  urged  by  Lee  at  Culpeper,  355 ;  visited  Con 
federate  armies,  463 ;  orders  to  Bragg,  464 ;  arranges  with  Lee  for 
latter's  retreat,  531 ;  appoints  Bragg  chief  of  staff,  535 ;  visits 
Hood,  556. 

DAVIS,  General  J.  C.,  at  Stones  River,  315;  forced  to  withdraw,  317; 
at  Chickamauga,  433 ;  driven  from  field,  436 ;  his  mistake,  444 ; 
with  Sherman,  456 ;  in  Atlanta  campaign,  539 ;  commands  Four 
teenth  Corps,  foot-note,  544;  in  pursuit  of  Hood,  559. 

DAVIS,  Commodore,  pushes  down  Mississippi  River,  394. 

DAVIS,  Commander,  in  Porto  Rican  expedition,  615. 

DEARBORN,  FORT,  see  Fort  Dearborn. 

DEARBORN,  General  HENRY,  commands  in  the  East — his  incompetence. 
62;  marches  to  Canadian  boundary,  64;  command  in  1813,  67;  re 
placed  by  General  James  Wilkinson,  68. 

DEARING,  General,  at  Petersburg,  512,  515-17;  reports  arrival  of  War 
ren,  523. 

DECATUR,  GA.,  occupied,  547. 

DE  GRASSE,  brings  fleet  to  America,  51 ;  its  influence  on  result  of  war, 
55. 

DELAWARE  RIVER,  Washington  retreats  across,  30. 

DEFENSIVE  position,  high  ground,  391. 

DERBY,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  in  balloon  at  San  Juan,  605 ;  his  balloon 
starts  battle  prematurely,  625. 


INDEX.  685 

D'ESTAING,  Count,  arrives  with  fleet — he  and  Washington  plan  to  At 
tack  British  at  New  York,  42. 

DEVENS,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  340;  surprised  and  driven  back, 
341. 

DEVIL'S  DEN,  372 ;  captured,  376. 

DEWEY,  in  Chinese  waters,  592 ;  at  Hong  Kong — preparations — battle 
of  Manila  Bay,  611;  takes  Cavite,  612;  battle  of  Manila,  613; 
Montojo's  fleet  no  match,  618;  supposed  to  have  arranged  before- 
.  hand  with  governor-general  for  capitulation,  627. 

DIESKAU,  Baron,  commands  French  against  William  Johnson — ad 
vances  against  Fort  Lyman,  8 ;  prepares  -dfe  ambush— attacks  Fort 
Lyman — defeated  and  captured,  9. 

DINWIDDIE,  Governor,  dispatches  Washington  to  French  commander,  6. 

DINWIDDIE  COURT  HOUSE,  combat  at,  527. 

DISCIPLINE,  its  effect  as  shown  by  Scott  and  Ripley,  76. 

DIVERSION,  naval,  use  of  Camara's  fleet,  619. 

DIVERSION,  strategic,  see  Strategic  Diversion. 

DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  created,  448 ;  effect  of  order  creating,  462 ; 
Sherman  in  command,  469. 

DIVISION,  MILITARY,  of  the  West,  557. 

Dixie,  in  Porto  Rican  expedition,  615. 

DONALDSON,  General,  at  Nashville,  573. 

DONELSON,  FORT,  see  Fort  Donelson. 

DOUBLEDAY,  General,  at  Antietam,  269;  at  Fredericksburg,  296;  at 
Gettysburg,  366;  withdraws  to  Cemetery  Hill,  368. 

DREWRY'S  BLUFF,  attacked  by  Union  fleet,  198. 

DUFFIELD,  General,  expected,  601;  in  plan  of  attack,  602;  attacks  Agua- 
dores,  608. 

DUNCAN'S  BATTERY,  at  Palo  Alto,  85. 

DUNKER  CHURCH,  at  Antietam,  270. 

DUQUESNE,  FORT,  captured  by  Brigadier  John  Forbes — name  changed — 
Major  Grant  defeated,  13. 

EAGLE,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593. 

EARLY,  General,  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  136;  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
140;  at  Antietam,  269;  at  Skinker's  Neck,  293;  recalled  to  Fred 
ericksburg — at  Fredericksburg,  296;  not  supported  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  306;  left  to  hold  Marye's  Heights,  335;  holds  Marye's  Hill, 
344 ;  retreats,  345 ;  retakes  Marye's  Hill — at  Salem  Church,  346 ; 
advances  on  York,  359;  position  at  Gettysburg,  second  day,  374,; 
attacks  Cemetery  Hill,  377;  reinforces  Johnson,  378;  on  third  day. 
380;  at  Wilderness,  475;  in  movement  to  Spottsylvania,  490;  com 
mands  Ewell's  corps — his  raid,  511;  operations  to  prevent  rein 
forcing  him,  522. 

EASTPOINT,  combat  at,  546 ;  occupied,  547. 

EARTHWORKS,  at  Fredericksburg,  292. 

EAST  TENNESSEE,  under  control  of  Union  Army,  460. 

EAST  WOOD,  at  Antietam,  269. 

EGAN,  General,  at  Burgess's  Mill,  525. 

EIGHTH  CORPS,  expedition  to  Philippine  Islands,  612. 

EIGHTH  KENTUCKY,  at  Mt.  Lookout,  456. 

EIGHTH  PENNSYLVANIA  CAVALRY,  at  Chancellorsville,  338;  checks  Jack 
son's  pursuit,  341. 

EIGHTEENTH  CORPS,  in  movement  to  James,  513 ;  ordered  to  capture 
Petersburg,  514;  in  attack  on  Petersburg,  515-16;  siege'of  Peters 
burg,  519;  the  Mine,  521;  repulsed  by  Longstreet,  525;  discon 
tinued,  526. 


686  INDEX. 

ELEVENTH  CORPS,  effect  of  its  disaster  at  Chancellorsville,  350;  sent  to 
Rosecrans,  447;  consolidated,  536. 

ELLIOTT'S  salient,  the  Mine,  520. 

EL  CAXEY,  Shatter's  plan,  602;  topography — defenses,  603;  battle  of. 
604 ;  losses,  605 ;  comments,  624 ;  compared  with  battle  of  Manila. 
627. 

EMBARGO,  issued,  56. 

EMORY,  General,  with  Nineteenth  Corps  at  Washington,  511. 

ENGINEERING,  military,  Bragg's  lines  at  Missionary  Ridge,  458. 

ENGINEERS,  their  work  in  Scott's  campaign,  122. 

ENGLAND,  declares  war  against  France,  1756,  10;  declares  war  against 
Holland,  42 ;  her  enemies,  54 ;  darkest  period  of  her  history — ene 
mies  abroad  and  at  home,  55 ;  her  "Orders  in  Council" — claims 
right  of  search — Congress  declares  war  against,  56. 

ENGLISH,  see  British. 

ENTRENCHMENTS,  see  intrenchments. 

ERIE.  FORT,  see  Fort  Erie. 

ESCARIO.  Colonel,  marches  to  Santiago,  609. 

EVANS,  General,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  137,  145. 

EWELL,  General,  sent  to  Despatch  Station,  206;  left  to  cooperate  with 
Jackson,  223 ;  left  at  Swift  Run  Gap,  225 ;  at  battle  of  Winches 
ter,  227;  at  battle  of  Cross  Keys,  231:  at  Bristol  Station — with 
draws  from  Manassas.  245 ;  commands  a  corps.  353  ;  in  Gettysburg 
campaign;  357;  captures  Winchester — crosses  Potomac  into  Mary 
land,  358 ;  advances  on  Harrisburg,  359 ;  at  Heidlersburg,  363 ;  at 
Gettysburg,  367 ;  fails  to  take  Cemetery  Hill.  368 ;  second  day.  374 : 
his  attack — fails  to  cooperate,  377;  reinforces  Johnson,  378;  to  hold 
his  position,  379;  forms  rear-guard,  384;  his  failure  to  take  Ceme 
tery  Hill,  387 ;  at  Wilderness,  473 ;  May  5,  475 ;  May  6,  479 ;  in 
movement  to  Spottsylvania,  490 :  at  Spottsylvania,  493 ;  repulsed 
May  19,  500;  absent  sick,  511;  at  Sailor's  Creek,  527. 

EWERS.  Lieutenant-Colonel,  at  San  Juan,  606;  assault  of  San  Juan 
Hill,  607. 

EZRA  CHURCH,  battle  of,  545. 

FAIR  OAKS,  battle  of.  see  Seven  Pines;  Johnston's  only  offensive  bat 
tle,  549. 

FAIR   VIEW,  key-point   at   Chancellorsville,   342 ;    taken   by    Stuart.   343. 

FAIRFIED  PASS,  Sedgwick's  pursuit  stopped  at.  384. 

FALLS  CHURCH,  camp  at,  590. 

FARMVILLE,  combat  at,  527. 

FARNSWORTH,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  381 ;  charges  and  is  killed,  383. 

FARRAGUT,  Admiral,  captures  New  Orleans — moves  up  the  Mississippi. 
394 ;  tries  to  take  Vicksburg.  395 ;  political  effect  of  his  successes 
at  Mobile,  531. 

FERGUSON,  Major,  at  battle  of  Kings  Mountain,  46. 

FERRERO,  General,  in  movement  to  Spottsylvania,  492 ;  the  Mine.  520-22. 

FIELD,  General,  at  Wilderness,  480;  at  Spottsylvania,  489. 

FIELD  TELEGRAPH,  used  in  battle  of  Manila,  626. 

FIELD-WORKS,  at  Fredericksburg.  292;  at  Chancellorsville,  338;  first 
used  at  Chancellorsville,  352 ;  in  Atlanta  campaign,  553. 

FIFTH  CORPS,  at  Wilderness,  472;  in  movement  to  James,  513;  at 
Petersburg,  517;  assault  June  18,  518;  siege  of  Petersburg,  519;  the 
Mine,  521 ;  movement  to  the  left,  524 ;  in  movement  October  27. 
525;  movement  February,  1865.  525;  at  Five  Forks,  527;  in  Grant's 
movement  to  the  James,  528;  in  Santiago  campaign,  595;  organi 
zation  of,  596;  withdraws  from  Cuba,  610. 


INDEX.  687 

FIFTEENTH  CORPS,  in  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  536. 

FINANCIAL  policy  of  United  States  compared  with  that  of  Philippine 
insurgent  government,  40. 

FIRE  action  alone  cannot  carry  a  position,  624. 

FIRE  ZOUAVES,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.  140. 

FISHER,  FORT,  see  Fort  Fisher. 

FISHERIES  BILL,  24. 

FIVE  FORKS,  527. 

FIVE  NATIONS,  under  Colonel  Nicholson,  2;  tribes  included  in,  4. 

FLANK  MARCHES,  Jackson's,  at  Chancellorsville,  338;  from  the  Rapidan 
to  the  James,  505;  Grant's,  to  the  James,  528;  Sherman's,  548; 
Hood's,  to  Lovejoy,  550;  Sherman's  risks,  552. 

FLANK  POSITION,  Washington's,  at  Morristown,  31 ;  Santa  Anna's,  at 
Orizaba,  125 ;  Meade's,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  363 ;  plan  J.  E. 
Johnston  might  have  adopted,  551-2;  favorite  method  of  Clause- 
witz  and  von  Moltke,  551. 

FLANKS,  security  of,  measures  strength  of  a  position,  338. 

FLOURNOY,  Colonel,  charges  at  Front  Royal,  227. 

FLOYD,  General,  sent  with  force  to  Fort  Donelson,  155 ;  in  command  at, 
156;  blunders  at,  159;  escapes  from,  160;  his  incapacity,  164. 

FLYING  SQUADRON,  the,  591 ;  sails  for  Cuban  waters,  592 ;  detained  at 
Hampton  Roads — sent  to  Sampson,  618. 

FOOTE,  Commodore,  has  Union  fleet  at  Cairo,  111.,  151 ;  ordered  to  Fort 
Henry,  154;  attacks  Fort  Henry,  155;  sends  gunboats  up  Tennes 
see  River,  155;  attacks  Fort  Donelson — repulsed — wounded,  157; 
assists  in  capturing  Island  No.  10,  182. 

FORBES,  Brigadier  JOHN,  captures  Fort  Duquesne — wins  Indians  to 
English  side,  13. 

FORGE,  VALLEY,  see  Valley  Forge. 

FORREST,  N.  B.,  charges  McClernand's  line  at  Fort  Donelson,  159; 
escapes  with  his  command  from  Fort  Donelson,  161 ;  his  work  in 
campaign  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  166 ;  stops  Federal  pur 
suit  with  a  charge  after  Shiloh,  181 ;  at  Shiloh,  189 ;  stops  Buell's 
advance,  309;  besieges  Negley  at  Nashville,  312;  raids  railway 
from  Corinth  to  Columbus,  Ky.,  313;  breaks  up  Grant's  railway, 
398;  after  Stones  River,  422;  at  Chickamauga,  431;  starts  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  432 ;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  440 ;  goes  to 
Tennessee,  555 ;  assigned  to  Hood,  561 ;  in  West  Tennessee — 
joins  Hood,  562;  at  Johnsonville — in  Hood's  advance,  563;  at 
Columbia.  564,  56S  ;  at  Spring  Hill,  566 :  at  Franklin — at  Nashville, 
571 ;  during  operations  at  Nashville,  572 ;  covers  Hood's,  retreat, 
576;  outgenerals  Wilson,  581;  at  Spring  Hill,  581-2;  if  present  at 
Nashville,  585. 

FORT  DEARBORN,  captured  by  Indians,  61. 

FORT  DONELSON,  why  its  position  was  chosen,  152;  reinforced  with 
troops  under  Floyd  and  troops  from  Columbus,  155;  why  Grant 
delayed  attacking  it — description  of,  156;  Union  line  there — 
repulses  attack  of  Foote's  gunboats,  157;  Confederates  plan 
and  make  sortie,  158;  Confederate  mistakes  and  failure,  159;  sur 
renders  to  Grant — prisoners  and  guns  taken  there — strategical  con 
sequences  of  its  fall,  161 ;  incapacity  of  Confederate  commanders 
there,  163 ;  should  not  have  been  surrendered,  164 ;  how  it  should 
have  been  defended,  165. 

FORT  DUQUESNE,  see  Duquesne,  Fort. 

FORT  ERIE,  British  defeated  at,  72. 

FORT  FISHER,  captured,  585. 

FORT  FRONTENAC.  captured  by  Colonel  Bradstreet,  12. 

FORT  GRANGER.  568. 


688  INDEX. 

FORT  HARRISON,  capture  of,  524. 

FORT  HASKELL,  defends  Fort  Stedman,  526. 

FORT  HEIMAN,  154. 

FORT  HINDMAN,  see  Arkansas  Post. 

FORT  HENRY,  why  its  position  was  chosen,  152;  Grant's  expedition 
against— description,  154;  captured,  155;  hazard  of  Grant's  move 
ment  on,  162. 

FORTS  HENRY  and  DONELSON,  lecture  on,  149 ;  Union  operations  against, 
153;  comments — effect  of  their  capture — evil  effects  of  two  inde 
pendent  commanders  in  one  theater  of  operations,  162 ;  the  use  of 
interior  lines,  164;  effect  of  ignorance  concerning  enemy — cavalry 
work,  166 ;  effect  of  bad  roads,  166 ;  effect  of  their  fall  upon  South 
ern  people,  167. 

FORT  LEE,  captured  by  British,  30. 

FORT  LYMAN,  attacked  by  Dieskau,  9. 

FORT  MACKINAC,  surrenders,  59. 

FORT  MEIGS,   besieged,    65.  ? 

FORT  MONROE^  to  be  Union  base  of  operations,  194. 

FORT  NECESSITY,  7. 

FORT  NIAGARA,  built,  1 ;  expedition  commanded  by  Governor  Shirley. 
9 ;  given  up,  10 ;  captured  by  English,  16 ;  captured,  69. 

FORT  PEMBERTON,  built,  401. 

FORT  PITT,  name  of  Fort  Duquesne  changed  to,  13. 

FORT  SANDERS,  assault  of,  460. 

FORT  STANVVIX,  besieged  by  British,  32. 

FORT  STEDMAN,  assaulted,  526;   why  assaulted,  532. 

FORT  SUMTER,  among  forts  not  given  up  to  seceding  States,  128;  taken, 
129;  bombardment  of,  a  mistake,  142;  effect  of  bombardment.  143. 

FORT  WASHINGTON,  captured  by  British,  30. 

FORT  WATSON,  captured  by  Marion,  49. 

Foi*  WILLIAM  HENRY,  10;  captured,  11;  Abercrombie's  army  camps 
there,  12. 

FOURTH  CORPS,  organized — under  Granger,  447 ;  remains  at  Dalton — 
follows  Johnston,  538 ;  under  Stanley,  559 ;  sent  to  Thomas,  562 ; 
at  Pulaski,  563 ;  at  Franklin,  569 ;  position  at  Nashville,  572. 

FOURTEENTH  CORPS,  commanded  by  Jeff  C.  Davis,  foot-note,  544;  in 
pursuit  of  Hood,  559. 

FOWLER,  Colonel,  at  Gettysburg,  366. 

Fox,  CHARLES,  remarks  on  the  war  with  American  Colonies,  55. 

FRANCE,  declares  war  against  England,  1756,  10;  forms  alliance  with 
United  States,  42. 

FRANKLIN  and  NASHVILLE  CAMPAIGN,  see  campaign  of  Franklin  and 
Nashville. 

FRANKLIN,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133; 
commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194;  driven  back  at  West  Point,  198; 
commands  Sixth  Corps,  199;  stops  Jackson  at  White  Oak  Swamp 
Creek,  207 ;  commands  Sixth  Corps,  262 ;  commands  left  wing. 
264 ;  at  Crampton's  Gap,  266 ;  at  Antietam,  272 ;  at  Crampton's 
Gap,  criticised,  277;  not  ordered  to  rejoin  from  Crampton's  Gap. 
278 ;  commands  "left  grand  division,"  290 ;  at  Fredericksburg.  293  ; 
.  receives  vague  orders  from  Burnside.  295 ;  when  he  received 
Burnside's  order  to  charge,  300;  relieved  by  Burnside,  329;  retires 
from  Army  of  the  Potomac.  330. 

FRANKLIN,  battle  of,  567;  situation  of,  568;  intrenched — artillery,  569; 
Opdycke's  charge — Union  line  broken,  570 ;  fierce — losses,  571  ; 
comments — Warner's  advanced  position — the  reserve,  583. 

FRAYSER'S  FARM,  battle  of,  see  Glendale. 


INDEX.  689 

FREDERICKSBURG,  campaign,  284 ;  battle-field  of,  291 ;  Confederate  earth 
works,  292 ;  battle  of,  293  ;  crossing  the  river,  294 ;  hostile  lines  at 
beginning  of,  296;  on  the  left,  298;  losses — comments,  300;  distribu 
tion  of  Confederate  troops,  304 ;  best  flank  for  Burnside's  attack, 
304;  why  fought — how  Confederate  left  should  have  been  assailed — 
attack  without  plan — fifteen  separate  assaults,  305 ;  little  opposition 
to  passage  of  stream— no  counter-attack  by  Confederates,  306; 
Army  of  the  Potomac  after,  329 ;  distribution  of  Union  forces 
in  theater  of,  305. 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT,  stops  Hessians'  entering  British  service,  42. 

FREMONT,  General,  his  scheme  of  relieving  East  Tennessee,  224;  or 
dered  to  intercept  Jackson,  228;  lets  Jackson  escape  at  Strasburg, 
229;  pursues  Jackson,  230;  at  battle  of  Cross  Keys.  232;  resigns, 
239. 

FRENCH,  discoveries  in  America,  1;  extend  dominion  to  West  and 
Valley  of  Mississippi,  3 ;  posts  control  waterways  from  Canada 
to  the  Mississippi,  4;  establish  new  line  of  forts  after  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  6. 

FRENCH  and  INDIAN  WAR,  6. 

FRENCH,  W.  H.,  at  Antietam,  271;  at  Fredericksburg,  298;  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  335 ;  ordered  to  hinder  Lee's  retreat  from  Gettysburg, 
384. 

FRENCH,  S.  G.,  at  Allatoona,  558. 

FRENCHTOWN,  captured,  65. 

FRONT  ROYAL,  battle  of,  226. 

FRONTENAC,  Count  de,  built  posts  at  Niagara,  Michilimackinac,  and  in 
Illinois — attacks  English  posts — repulses  Sir  William  Phips,  1. 

Furor,  at  battle  of  Santiago,  610. 

GADSDEN,  Hood  concentrates  there,  559. 

GAGE,  sends  troops  to  Concord,  24. 

GAINES'S  MILL,  battle  of,  204;  strength  and  losses,  205. 

GARDNER,   General,   commands   at    Port   Hudson,   403. 

GARCIA,  in  Santiago  campaign,  596;  joins  forces  with  Americans,  601; 
in  plan  of  attack,  602 ;  his  position  at  siege  of  Santiago,  608 ;  fails 
to  stop  Escario,  609. 

GARRARD,  General,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  538;  covers  Sherman's  right, 
540 ;  sent  to  destroy  railway,  543 ;  with  Stoneman,  544-5 ;  meets 
Jackson's  cavalry,  557. 

GATES,  General,  in  northern  New  Jersey,  31  ;  commands  Americans 
against  Burgoyne,  33 ;  takes  command  in  the  South — defeat  at 
Camden,  45. 

GAYLESVILLE,  Sherman's  strategeic  position,  577. 

GEARY,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  378;  attacks  Johnson,  379;  at  Wau- 
hatchie,  451 ;  at  Mt.  Lookout,  455. 

GEOGRAPHY,  early  Canadian — colonial,  of  America,  4;  of  frontier  of 
U.  S.  and  Canada,  1812,  58 ;  between  Vera  Cruz  and  City  of 
Mexico,.  107;  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  151;  of  Pope's  theater 
of  operations,  240 ;  of  theater  of  Antietam  campaign,  261 ;  of  thea 
ter  of  Bragg's  operations  in  Kentucky,  310;  theater  of  Vicksburg 
campaign,  400 ;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  426 ;  below  Spottsyl- 
vania,  502 ;  Atlanta  campaign,  537 ;  of  theater  of  Santiago  cam 
paign,  597. 

GEORGE'S,  King,  war,  6. 

GEORGIA,  invaded  by  British,  43 ;  again  invaded  by  General  Ashe  and 
General  Lincoln,  44 ;  and  other  States  secede,  128. 

GERMANTOWN,  Howe's   headquarters — battle  of,   35. 


690  INDEX. 

GETT.Y,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  299 ;  at  Wilderness,  476 ;  intrenches 
—attacks,  477 ;  May  6,  479. 

GETTYSBURG,  first  day — position  of  hostile  forces  at  beginning  of,  353 ; 
Lee's  plans,  and  objects,  354;  his  military  reasons,  355;  distribu 
tion  of  Southern  forces  just  before,  356;  operations  begun,  357; 
disposition  of  forces  June  30,  1863,  363 ;  battle-field — strategic 
position  of,  364;  first  day,  366;  second  day,  371;  field  of  second 
and  third  days — Union  line,  371 ;  Meade  orders  troops  into  posi 
tion,  372 ;  second  day — attack  delayed,  375 ;  Confederate  attack 
badly  managed,  377;  summary  of  battle,  378;  third  day — Lee  re 
solves  to  renew  assault — position  of  the  troops,  378 ;  battle  be 
gun,  379  ;  third  day — Pickett's  charge,  380  ;  Union  line — artillery 
duel,  381;  the  charge,  382;  cavalry  combats — Lee  retreats,  383; 
retreat  and  pursuit,  384;  losses — comments — Lee's  achievement, 
385 ;  why  ground  was  chosen — how  brought  on,  387 ;  ill-managed 
attack,  388 ;  Meade  makes  no  counter-attack,  391 ;  tactics  of  the 
attack — Longstreet's  tardiness,  389;  Lee's  chances — Sickles's  faulty 
line,  390 ;  other  faults  in  Meade's  dispositions,  391 ;  Meade's  pur 
suit  criticised — the  cavalry,  392;  autumn  and  winter  after,  466. 

GH^NT,  Treaty  of,  75. 

GIBBON,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  296;  supports  Meade's  assault,  297; 
with  Sedgwick  at  Marye's  Hill,  344;  at  Wilderness,  477;  expects 
Longstreet— May  6,  479;  effect  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  487;  at 
Spottsylvania,  494;  at  Petersburg,  517;  at  Reams's  station,  524. 

GILLMORE,  General,  failure  at  Petersburg,  512. 

GLENDALE,  battle  of,  207. 

GLOUCESTER,  evacuated  by  Confederates,  198. 

GORDON,  General  JOHN  B.,  helps  put  out  fire  at  Wrightsville,  359;  at 
Gettysburg,  377 ;  at  Wilderness,  481 ;  at  Spottsylvania,  493 ;  opposes 
Upton,  495 ;  assaults  Fort  Stedman,  525,  526. 

GRAND  GULF,  fortified,  395;  shelled  by  Admiral  Porter,  404. 

GRANGER,  General  GORDON,  commands  Reserve  Corps,  423 ;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  431;  morning  Sept.  19,  432;  timely  arrival,  437;  commands 
Fourth  Corps,  447;  pursues  Longstreet — started  for  Knoxville,  460; 
succeeded  by  Howard,  536 ;  at  Decatur,  Ala.,  555 ;  withdraws 
troops,  565. 

GRANT,  Major,  defeated  at  Fort  Duquesne,  13. 

GRANT,  General,  comments  upon  Scott's  operations,  123 ;  occupies 
Paducah,  Ky.,  150;  moves  against  Fort  Henry,  154;  captures  Fort 
Henry,  155;  why  he  delayed  attacking  Fort  Donelson — moves 
against  Fort  Donelson,  156;  expects  to  besiege  Fort  Donelson,  157; 
his  conduct  at  Fort  Donelson,  159;  his  anxiety,  160;  the  hazard 
of  his  movements  on  Fort  Henry,  162 ;  relieved  from  command, 
170;  his  camp  not  properly  protected  at  Shiloh,  173;  expects  no 
attack  at  Shiloh — expects  assault  on  Lew  Wallace's  camp,  175 ; 
at  battle  of  Shiloh — issues  no  orders  to  renew  battle,  180 ;  gives 
reasons  for  not  pursuing  after  Shiloh,  182;  did  not  appreciate 
danger  of  position  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  184;  his  conduct  at  Shiloh, 
187 ;  one  of  four  full  generals  in  U.  S.  Army,  354 ;  left  in  com 
mand  at  Corinth — disposition  of  his  forces,  395 ;  correspondence 
with  Halleck — operations,  397 ;  plans  expedition  by  land  and 
river  against  Vicksburg — railway  broken  by  Forrest — depot  cap 
tured  by  Van  Dorn — falls  back,  398;  goes  to  Vicksburg — organizes 
four  corps — orders  canal  dug,  399 ;  tries  other  routes,  401 ;  his  first 
operations  against  Vicksburg  fail — final  plan — concentrates  army 
below  Vicksburg,  402 ;  crosses  at  Bruinsburg,  404 ;  has  entire  army 
across  the  Mississippi — why  he  did  not  cooperate  with  Banks,  406; 
lacks  cavalry — moves  against  railway — adopts  Napoleon's  fa 
vorite  movement — cuts  loose  from  base — his  forces  Mav  11.  407; 


INDEX.  691 

GRANT,  General — Continued. 

moves  on  Jackson,  408;  moves  on  Edwards's  Station,  410;  at 
Champion's  Hill,  411;  at  the  Big  Black,  412;  lives  off  the  coun 
try — base  at  Steele's  Bayou — why  he  assaulted  Vicksburg  second 
time,  413;  the  second  assault — besieges  Vicksburg,  414;  Pemberton 
surrenders,  415;  the  crisis  of  his  career — failed  in  five  efforts 
against  Vicksburg — declared  a  failure  by  newspapers — sum 
mary  of  Vicksburg  campaign — abandonment  of  base  and  com 
munications  discussed,  416;  brilliant  operations,  417;  urges  Rose- 
crans  to  move  against  Bragg,  422 ;  to  command  Division  of  the 
Mississippi — meets  Stanton  at  Louisville — ordered  to  send  troops 
to  Rosecrans,  447;  arrives  at  Chattanooga,  449;  ordered  to  aid 
Burnside — plan  of  battle,  452 ;  orders  for  Nov.  25 — orders  Thomas 
to  advance,  457 ;  decisive  victory — pursuit,  459 ;  relief  to  Burnside, 
460 ;  why  he  ordered  Thomas  to  assault,  461 ;  effect  of  victory,  462 ; 
appointed  lieutenant-general  and  general-in-chief — concerted  plan, 
468;  letter  to  Sherman,  469;  Culpeper,  470;  plan,  471;  advances — 
crosses  Rapidan,  472;  orders  for  May  5,  474;  joins  Meade,  475; 
at  Wilderness — orders  for  May  6,  478;  May  7 — comments  on  fight 
ing,  481 ;  comment  on  appointment  as  general-in-chief — not 
trammeled — his  combined  plan — his  forces,  482;  objective — plan 
discussed — did  not  expect  battle  in  Wilderness,  483 ;  starts  army 
May  7,  488 ;  at  Spottsylvania — orders  reconnaissance,  493 ;  supports 
Upton,  495 ;  attacks  salient,  496 ;  orders  for  May  14,  498 ;  prepares 
second  attack  on  salient,  499;  base  at  Aquia  Creek — moves  from 
Spottsylvania,  500 ;  moves  on  Hanover  Town — at  North  Anna,  501 ; 
at  Totopotomoy — at  Cold  Harbor,  502 ;  effect  of  "continuous  ham 
mering" — strength  and  losses  from  Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor, 
503 ;  summary  of  operations  from  Rapidan  to  James — his  qualities, 
504 ;  distinctive  features  of  overland  campaign,  505 ;  movement  to 
Spottsylvania  discussed,  506;  why  he  moved  by  the  left  from  Spott 
sylvania,  507;  movement  to  North  Anna  criticised,  508;  army 
at  Cold  Harbor — begins  movement  to  the  James,  510;  adopts 
Rosecrans's  views,  foot-note,  510;  rejects  Halleck's  plan — plans 
capture  of  Petersburg — movement  to  the  James,  512 ;  assisted  by  . 
navy  in  crossing  the  James,  513;  fools  Lee— defects  in  orders 
for  Hancock,  514;  concentrates  on  Petersburg,  517;  begins  siege 
of.  Petersburg,  519 ;  movement  Oct.  27,  1864,  524 ;  movement  against 
Lee's  right  February,  1865,  525 ;  strength  of  army  in  final  opera 
tions — last  movement  to  the  left,  526 ;  breaks  Lee's  line — captures 
Richmond,  527 ;  Appomattox — losses  in  final  operations,  528 ; 
march  to  the  James  discussed,  528-9;  operations  compared  with 
McClellan's,  529 ;  to  blame  for  Hancock's  delay — disadvantages  in 
siege  of  Petersburg,  530 ;  watches  for  Lee  to  start  to  unite  with 
Johnston,  531;  could  not  invest  Lee  at  Petersburg,  533;  imme 
diately  after  Chattanooga,  535 ;  succeeded  by  Sherman,  536 ;  in 
structions  to  Sherman,  537 ;  Virginia  campaign  compared  with 
Sherman's,  547-8 ;  correspondence  with  Sherman,  556 ;  consents  to 
Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  560;  telegraphs  Thomas — starts  to 
Nashville,  573. 

GRAVES,  Admiral,  commands  British  fleet  at  Yorktown,  52. 

GREAT  BRITAIN,  sec  England. 

GREAT  MEADOWS,  7. 

GREENE,  General  NATHANIEL,  commands  Eort  Lee,  30;  takes  com 
mand  at  Charlotte — divides  his  forces,  46;  campaign  against  Corn- 
wallis,  47,  48 ;  at  Guilford  C.  H. — returns  to  South  Carolina,  48 ; 
defeated  at  Hobkirks  Hill — at  battle  of  Eutaw  Springs,  49;  his 
strategy — use  of  the  "power  of  attraction,"  54. 


692  INDEX. 

f 

GREENE,  General  GEO.  S.,  at  Antietam,  270. 

GREENE,  F.  V.,  in  Philippine  expedition,  612;  in  battle  of  Manila — at 
tacked,  613. 

GREGG,  D.  I.,  in  pursuit  of  Lee's  army,  384. 

GREGG,  D.  McM.,  to  command  cavalry  division,  329 ;  covers  right  of 
Meade's  army,  360 ;  at  Westminster,  363 ;  at  Gettysburg,  374 ;  com 
bat  with  Stuart,  383;  with  Hancock,  472;  May  5,  474;  against 
Stuart,  478;  in  Trevilian  raid,  511;  with  Warren — with  Hancock, 
524;  movement  February,  1865 — movement  October  27,  525. 

GREGG,  JOHN,  at  Raymond,  408;  at  Jackson,  409. 

GREGG,  MAXCY,  at  Fredericksburg,  296. 

GRIFFIN,  CHARLES,  his  battery  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  139 ;  at 
Chancellorsville,  335 ;  at  Wilderness,  475 ;  at  Spottsylvania,  489. 

GRIMES,  Captain,  commands  battery,  602;  opens  fire,  605. 

GUADALUPE  HIDALGO,  treaty  of,  119. 

GUANTANAMO,  captured,  593 ;  as  a  base,  discussed,  621. 

GUASIMAS,  LAS,  see  Las  Guasimas. 

GRIERSON'S  RAID,  403. 

GUILFORD  COURT  HOUSE,  battle  of,  48. 

HACKENSACK,  Washington  establishes  camp  there,  30. 

HALIFAX,  founded,  6;  Loudon's  forces  at,  10;  British  fleet  and  army 
there,  11. 

HALLECK,  General,  in  command  at  St.  Louis,  151 ;  his  and  Buell's  plans 
against  Johnston,  152;  orders  Grant  to  move  against  Fort  Henry, 
154;  his  action  immediately  after  capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  162; 
had  no  arrangement  with  Buell  for  cooperation  against  Fort  Henry. 
163;  exemplified  remark  of  General  Sherman,  166;  his  plans  after 
Henry  and  Donelson,  170;  orders  expedition  under  C.  F.  Smith. 
170;  placed  in  command  of  all  troops  and  territory  from  Knox- 
ville  to  the  Missouri — orders  Buell  to  Savannah — proposes  plan  to 
Buell  for  cutting  Johnston's  communications.  171 ;  expected  to 
take  command  in  person  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  175 ;  has  no  plan 
after  capture  of  Donelson,  183 ;  "must  have  command  of  armies 
in  the  West" — plans  to  move  against  Johnston  at  Corinth — did 
nothing  for  ten  days  after  capture  of  Donelson,  184 ;  had  written 
book,  235 ;  appointed  commander-in-chief  —  orders  McClellan  to 
withdraw  from  the  James.  241  :  his  appointment  as  general-in- 
chief — his  mistake  in  recalling  McClellan,  253 ;  his  fears  for  Wash 
ington  during  Antietam  campaign.  276 ;  orders  McClellan  to  give 
battle.  285 ;  suggests  plans,  286 :  takes  command  at  Pittsburg  Land 
ing — advances  to  Corinth — splits  up  his  army,  308 ;  violates  first 
principle  of  modern  war — why  he  broke  up  his  army  at  Corinth — 
gives  Buell  order  impossible  to  execute.  322:  correspondence  with 
Rosecrans.  326 ;  does  not  approve  Hooker's  plans,  357 ;  had  decided 
with  President  and  Stanton  to  relieve  Hooker,  360;  Lee  judges 
him  aright,  386 :  orders  Rr\secrans  to  advance  against  Bragg.  425 ; 
his  injustice,  448;  says  Sigel  does  nothing  but  retreat,  470;  pro 
poses  plan  to  Grant,  511. 

HAMLEY,  on  Sherman's  operations.  548. 

HAMPTON,  General  WADE,  his  relations  with  Wilkinson,  68;  his  opera 
tions,  69. 

HAMPTON.  General  WADE,  guards  the  Rapoahannock,  293;  in  Gettys 
burg  campaign.  362 ;  at  Gettysburg.  383 ;  fights  Miles,  490 ;  at 
Haw's  Shop.  501:  at  Trevilian,  511;  intercepts  Wilson,  520;*  at 
Reams's  Station,  524. 

HANCOCK.  JOHN.  24. 

HANCOCK,   General,   at   Williamsburg,    197;    at   Fredericksburg.   298;    at 


INDEX.  693- 

HANCOCK,  General — Continued. 

Chancellorsville,  335 ;  at  Uniontown,  363 ;  at  Gettysburg,  368 ; 
recommends  position  at  Gettysburg,  373 ;  bivouacs  at  Chancellors 
ville,  472;  orders  May  5,  474;  halted,  475;  ordered  back,  476; 
forms  on  Brock  Road — his  attack — fierce  fighting,  477 ;  May  6, 
— orders  Gibbon  forward,  479 ;  driven  back,  480 ;  movement  to 
Spottsylvania,  488;  bivouacs  at  Todd's  Tavern,  490;  at  Spottsyl- 
vania — reconnoiters,  493;  commands  attack,  494;  renews  assault, 
495;  attacks  salient,  496;  losses,  498;  moves— attacks  May  18, 
499 ;  starts  south,  500 ;  at  North  Anna,  501 ;  movement  to  North 
Anna  criticised,  508;  in  movement  to  the  James,  513;  moves  against 
Petersburg — delay,  514;  at  Petersburg,  516;  captures  redans,  517; 
disabled  by  old  wound,  518;  operations  north  of  James,  520;  the 
Mine,  521 ;  operations  north  of  James,  522 ;  operations  at  Reams's 
Station,  524;  in  movement  October  27,  525;  his  delay  fatal,  529; 
how  caused,  530. 

HARD  TIMES,   Grant   concentrates   at,   402. 

HARDEE,  General,  commands  division  in  A.  S.  Johnston's  army,  171 ;  at 
Stones  River,  315;  opens  the  attack,  317;  detached  from  Bragg,  428; 
his  resistance  at  Hoover's  Gap,  440;  rejoins  Bragg,  447;  on  right, 
449;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  456;  withdraws,  459;  in  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  535 ;  in  retreat  from  Resaca,  539 ;  at  Kenesaw  Mountain — 
in  front  of  Marietta,  541 ;  battle  of  Atlanta,  544 ;  operations  south 
of  Atlanta,  547;  blamed  by  Hood,  553;  transferred,  557;  at  Savan 
nah,  585. 

HARLEM   HEIGHTS,  Washington  repulses  British  there,  29. 

HARNEY,  Colonel,  at  Churubusco,   115. 

HARPER'S  FERRY,  Lee's  plan  to  capture,  264;  was  Lee  right  in  sending 
Jackson  to  capture? — what  Jackson  captured  there,  275;  its  impor 
tance  and  weakness,  276;  evacuated  by  Union  garrison,  358. 

HARRISBURG,  Lee's  objective,  359. 

HARRISON,  FORT,  see  Fort  Harrison,  524. 

HARRISON,  WILLIAM  HENRY,  organizes  an  army  to  recapture  Detroit, 
64;  his  operations  in  1813,  65;  receives  Perry's  dispatch — moves 
on  Detroit,  66. 

HARRISON'S   LANDING,   McClellan's   withdrawal  to,   206. 

Harvard,  bears  dispatches,  593. 

HASKELL,  FORT,  see  Fort  Haskell. 

HATCH,  JOHN  P.,  beaten  to  Gordonsville  by  Jackson,  241. 

HATCH,  EDWARD,  opposes  Hood,  562 ;  operations,  563,  564. 

HAVILAND,  commands  one  of  Amherst's  columns,  20. 

HAWKINS,  General,  at  San  Juan,  606. 

HAW'S  SHOP,  combat  at,  501. 

HAYNES'S  BLUFF,  398. 

HAYS,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  342 ;  in  Chancellorsville  campaign, 
344. 

HAZEL  GROVE,  342. 

HAZEN,  General,  at  Stones  River,  318;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  427; 
at  Chattanooga,  450. 

HEATH,  General,  left  to  command  West  Point,  51. 

HEIMAN,  FORT,  -see  Fort  Heiman. 

HEINTZELMAN,  General,  commands  McDowell's  third  division,  133 ; 
at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138;  commands  Third  Corps  in  A.  P., 
194;  ordered  to  support  McDowell,  245;  commands  Third  Corps, 
262. 

HENRY,  FORT,  see  Fort  Henry. 

HENRY,  GUY  V.,  in  Porto  Rican  expedition,  615. 

HENRY  and  DONELSON,  see  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson. 

HENRY  HOUSE  HILL,  in  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138;  Confederate  as 
sault,  139 ;  the  combat  upon,  140 ;  in  second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  250. 


694  INDEX. 

HERKIMER,  NICHOLAS,  at  battle  of  Oriskany,  32. 

HETH,  General  HENRY,  brings  on  battle  of  Gettysburg,  364;  at  Gettys 
burg,  365;  second  day,  375,  377;  third  day,  380;  at  Wilderness, 
473;  on  Plank  Road,  476;  takes  position  facing  Getty,  477;  May 
6 — position  changed,  479;  at  Spottsylvania,  494;  returns  to  his 
position,  496 ;  attacks  Warren — second  attack,  523. 

HIGHLAND  PASSES,  their  strategical  importance,  28. 

HILL,  A.  P.,  at  Seven  Pines,  201;  at  battle  of  Mechanicsville,  204;  at 
Gaines's  Mill,  205;  at  Malvern  Hill,  208;  his  attack  at  Beaver  Dam 
Creek  criticised,  215;  at  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  242;  with 
draws  from  Manassas,  246 ;  his  timely  assault  at  Antietam,  273 ; 
covers  Lee's  withdrawal  after  Antietam,  284 ;  at  Fredericksburg, 
296 ;  at  Chancellorsville,  339 ;  deploys  his  troops — wounded,  342 ; 
commands  a  corps,  353;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  357;  moves 
toward  the  valley — reaches  Shepherdstown,  359 ;  at  Cashtown,  363 ; 
marches  to  Gettysburg,  365 ;  second  day,  375 ;  fails  to  cooperate, 
377;  attacks  Union  center,  379;  third  day,  380;  guards  trains  in 
retreat,  384;  at  Wilderness,  473;  May  6,  479;  position  at  Spottsyl 
vania,  493;  position  south  of  Chickahominy,  514;  at  Petersburg, 
518;  attacks  Second  Corps,  519;  attacks  Warren,  523;  second 
attack — at  Reams's  Station,  524 ;  attacks  at  Burgess's  Mill,  525 ; 
final  operations,  526;  slain,  foot-note,  527. 

HILL,  D.  H.,  at  Williamsburg,  197  ;  at  Seven  Pines,  201 ;  at  Mechanics 
ville,  204;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  205;  stopped  with  Jackson  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  Creek,  207;  at  Malvern  Hill,  208;  at  battle  of  South 
Mountain,  265;  at  Antietam,  267,  269;  at  Port  Royal,  293;  recalled 
to  Fredericksburg,  296;  joins  Bragg,  428;  at  Chickamauga,  431; 
assaults  Thomas's  left,  437 ;  quits  Bragg,  447. 

HILL,  General  JOHN,  expedition  against  Canada,  2;  expedition  wrecked 
in  St.  Lawrence,  3. 

HINDMAN,  FORT,  see  Arkansas  Post. 

HINDMAN,  General,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  429;  at  Chickamauga. 
434. 

HINKS,  General,  in  attack  of  Petersburg.  515,  516. 

HISTORY,  MILITARY,  see  Military  History,  530. 

HOBKIRK'S  HILL,  battle  of,  49. 

HOBSON,  Lieutenant,   sinks  Merrimac,  594. 

HOKE,  General,  at 'Cold  Harbor,  502;  at  Petersburg,  516. 

HOLLY  SPRINGS,  captured  by  Van  Dorn,  398. 

HOLMES,  General,  at  Aquia  Creek,  131 ;  not  at  Glendale,  207. 

HOOD.  General,  at  Antietam.  267,  269;  at  Fredericksburg,  296;  not  at 
Chancellorsville,  330;  at  Gettysburg,  369;  in  the  attack,  374;  his 
position — attacks,  375 ;  wounded.  376 ;  third  day,  380 ;  in  Chicka 
mauga  campaign,  430;  at  Chickamauga,  431;.  bivouacs.  432;  in 
Atlanta  campaign,  535 ;  at  Cassville.  540 ;  in  retreat  from  Resaca — 
frustrates  Johnston's  plan,  539 ;  in  front  of  Marietta — repulsed, 
541 ;  succeeds  Johnston — strength  of  his  army — at  Peachtree  Creek 
— withdraws  into  Atlanta,  543;  line  of  supply — battle  of  Atlanta, 
544;  Sherman  operates  against  his  communications,  544-6;  evacuates 
Atlanta — withdraws  to  Lovejoy's  Station,  547;  forced  to  aggres 
sive  policy — discussed — blames  Hardee,  553  ;  at  Lovejoy's  Station, 
555;  takes  offensive — visited  by  President  Davis — plan  arranged — 
strength  of  army,  556 ;  begins  operations,  557 ;  captures  Dalton — 
moves  westward,  558 ;  concentrates  at  Gadsden,  559 ;  comprehensive 
plan,  560-1 ;  visited  by  Beauregard — advances  to  the  Tennessee — 
turns  west — at  Decatur — at  Tuscumbia,  561 ;  delay — Forrest  joins — 
invasion  of  Tennessee  alarms  North — Thomas's  forces,  562;  ad 
vances  against  Nashville,  563 ;  at  Columbia,  564-6 ;  delayed 
by  weather,  565;  at  Spring  Hill,  566-7;  pursues,  567;  at  Frank 
lin,  569 ;  breaks  Union  line,  570 ;  states  his  strength — follows  Scho- 


INDEX.  695 

HOOD,  General — Continued. 

field  to  Nashville,  571;  his  line  at  Nashville,  574;  line  shattered— 
forms  new  line,  575  ;  routed — losses — reaches  Tupelo — resigns, 
576;  compared  with  Thomas — operations  against  Sherman  criti 
cised,  577 ;  campaign  in  Tennessee  reviewed,  578-81 ;  his  purposes — 
his  forces,  578-9;  wait  at  Florence,  579;  action  at  Spring  Hill 
criticised,  581-2;  mistake  in  advancing  to  Nashville — expectation-, 
583 ;  mistakes,  584 ;  why  his  army  escaped,  585. 

HOVEY,  General,  at  Champion's  Hill,  411. 

HOOKER,  General,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194;  at  Williamsburg, 
107;  ordered  to  Manassas — at  Bristoe  Station,  245;  commands 
First  Corps,  262;  at  Antietam,  269;  effect  of  his  crossing  Antie- 
tam  Creek,  Sept.  16,  1862,  278;  commands  "center  grand  division," 
290;  at  Fredericksburg,  293;  his  order  from  Burnside,  296;  attacks 
stone  wall,  299;  dismissed  by  Burnside — appointed  to  relieve  Burn- 
side — his  reputation — effect  of  appointment — reforms — reports  ab 
sentees,  329 ;  organization  of  his  army — "the  finest  army  on  the 
planet,"  330;  his  plan  of  operations,  331;  concentration  at  Chan 
cellorsville,  332;  vents  his  elation  at  Chancellorsville — not  well 
informed — what  he  expected  Lee  to  do— bad  use  of  his  cavalry, 
334 ;  withdraws  Union  line — his  defensive  position,  337 ;  learns 
of  Jackson's  flank  movement  and  warns  Howard,  339 ;  believes 
Lee  is  retreating — orders  up  First  Corps  and  recalls  Averell's  cav 
alry — orders  Sedgwick  to  pursue,  341 ;  orders"  Sickles  to  attack  at 
night,  342 ;  his  line  falls  back,  343 ;  disabled — his  orders  to  Sedg 
wick,  344;  withdraws  from  Chancellorsville — his  losses,  346; 
puts  Pleasanton  in  Averell's  place — operations  in  Chancellorsville 
campaign  first  masterly,  then  faulty,  347;  his  mistakes,  348;  his 
offensive  strategy  and  defensive  tactics,  349;  believed  Jackson's 
column  was  Lee's  army  retreating,  350;  held  in  intrenchments  by 
inferior  numbers — his  reserves  not  employed — his  withdrawal  saves 
Lee  from  bloody  repulse — charges  his  defeat  to  Sedgwick,  351 ; 
position  and  condition  of  army  after  Chancellorsville,  353 ;  de 
fective  organization  of  his  army,  354 ;  gets  wind  of  Lee's  plans — 
proposes  plans  which  are  not  approved  at  Washington,  356;  his 
operations  subordinated  to  Lee's — orders  Sedgwick  to  recon- 
noiter — sends  cavalry  to  Culpeper,  357;  extends  his  right — starts 
toward  Manassas,  358 ;  conforms  to  Lee's  movements — enters 
Maryland,  359;  relieved — succeeded  by  Meade,  360;  effect  of  oper 
ating  against  Lee's  communications,  386;  sent  to  aid  Rosecrans, 
447 ;  to  cooperate  with  W.  F.  Smith,  450 ;  in  plan  of  attack,  453 ; 
at  Mount  Lookout,  454 ;  advances  against  Missionary  Ridge,  457-9 ; 
commands  Twentieth  Corps,  536 ;  combat  with  Hood,  541 ;  resigns, 
543 ;  blocked  Thomas's  way,  552. 

HOPKINS,  General,  deserted  by  his  militia,  64. 

HORNET'S  NEST,  177;  held  by  Union  troops,  178. 

HOWARD,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133;  at 
Fredericksburg,  299 ;  commands  Eleventh  Corps,  330 ;  at  Chan 
cellorsville,  335 ;  warned  of  Jackson's  flank  movement,  339 ;  his  line 
not  aware  of  Jackson's  approach — his  line,  340;  his  line  warned  by 
flight  of  wild  animals — his  troops  flee,  341 ;  knew  Jackson's  column 
was  marching,  349;  effect  of  his  disaster  at  Chancellorsville,  350; 
at  Emmitsburg,  363 ;  assumes  command — at  Gettysburg,  366 ;  sent 
to  aid  Rosecrans,  447;  at  Chattanooga — attacks  Law,  451;  in  plan 
of  attack,  453;  supports  Thomas,  453-4;  supports  Sherman,  457; 
commands  Fourth  Corps,  536;  remains  at  Dalton — follows  John 
ston,  538;  at  Peachtree  Creek,  543;  commands  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  544 ;  at  Ezra  Church,  545 ;  moves  against  Hood's  commu 
nications,  544-6;  operations  south  of  Atlanta,  546-7;  occupies 
Eastpoint,  547;  in  pursuit  of  Hood,  559. 


696  INDEX. 

HOWE,  Admiral,  commands  British  fleet,  29 ;  captures  Forts  Mifflin 
and  Mercer,  35. 

HOWE,  LORD,  with  Abercrombie — killed,  12. 

HOWE,  General  Sir  WILLIAM,  arrives  at  Boston — at  Bunker  Hill,  24; 
evacuates  Boston — comment  on  his  evacuation  and  subsequent  con 
duct,  25 ;  lands  army  on  Staten  Island,  28 ;  routs  Putnam  at 
Brooklyn  Heights — repulsed  at  Harlem  Heights — divides  his  army — 
attacks  Washington  at  White  Plains,  29 ;  transfers  army  to  Dobbs 
Ferry — joins  Cprnwallis  at  New  Brunswick — posts  army  in  winter 
quarters,  30;  issues  proclamations,  31;  does  not  support  Bur- 
goyne — his  campaign  at  Philadelphia — instructions  from  the  Min 
istry,  33 ;  concentrates  forces  at  New  Brunswick — maneuvers 
against  Washington  in  New  Jersey — embarks  for  Philadelphia — 
at  battle  of  Brandywine,  34 ;  captures  Philadelphia — at  battle  of 
Germantown — puts  headquarters  at  Germantown — his  army  win 
ters  at  Philadelphia — resigns,  35 ;  comment  on  his  conduct — his  qual 
ities,  reputation,  etc.,  36;  summary  of  his  operations — explanation  of 
his  conduct — a  Whig — promise  to  his  Whig  constituents,  37 ;  why 
tolerated — his  instructions  from  Ministry,  38. 

HUDSON,  PORT,  see  Port  Hudson. 

HUDSON  RIVER,  as  line  of  invasion,  5 ;  strategic  importance,  28. 

HUGER,  General,  opposed  to  Butler,  131;  at  Seven  Pines,  201;  not  at 
Glendale,  207;  at  Malvern  Hill,  208. 

Hugh  McCulloch,  in  Dewey's  fleet,  611. 

HULL,  General,  his  operations  in  1812 — advances  to  Detroit,  58 ;  occu 
pies  Sandwich,  59 ;  withdraws  across  the  Detroit  river — his  vacilla 
tions,  60;  surrenders — tried  for  cowardice,  61. 

HUMPHREYS,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  300 ;  at  Ghancellorsville,  335 ; 
at  Gettysburg,  374;  commands  Second  Corps,  525;  pursuit  to 
Appomattox — at  Farmville,  528. 

HUNT,  General  H.  J.,  commands  artillery  of  A.  P.,  194 ;  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  293 ;  at  Gettysburg,  373 ;  withholds  his  artillery  fire,  381 ; 
reopens  fire,  382. 

HUNTER,  General,  commands  McDowell's  second  division,  133 ;  re 
treats  before  Early,  511;  moving  on  Lynchburg,  510. 

HURLBUT,  General,  his  dispositions  at  Shiloh,  176;  pushed  back,  177; 
at  the  Hornet's  Nest — rallies  on  Webster's  batteries,  178 ;  com 
mands  Sixteenth  Corps,  399. 

HURON,  LAKE,  as  line  of  invasion,  5. 

HUTCHINSON,  Governor,  refuses  to  let  tea  return  to  England,  22. 

IGNORANCE,  concerning  enemy,   its  effect,    166. 

ILLINOIS,  early  French  Posts,  1. 

IMBODEN,  JOHN  D.,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  358,  363;  escorts  trains  in 
retreat,  384. 

IMMUNE  REGIMENTS,  in  Cuba,  611. 

Indiana,  escorts  Shafter's  transports,  596. 

INDIANS,  in  War  of  1812,  77. 

INFANTRY,  Eighteenth,  Philippine  expedition,  612;  First  at  El  Caney, 
604;  Fourteenth,  Philippine  expedition,  612;  Fourth,  at  El  Caney — 
Seventeenth,  at  El  Caney — Seventh,  at  El  Caney,  604;  Sixteenth, 
at  San  Juan,  607;  Sixth,  at  San  Juan,  606,  607;  Twelfth,  at  El 
Caney — Twenty- fourth,  at  El  Caney,  604 ;  Twenty-third,  Philippine 
expedition,  612. 

INSURGENTS,  Philippine,  see  Philippine  insurgents. 

INTERIOR  LINES,  in  the  campaign  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  164 ; 
fine  example  of  use  of,  233 ;  possessed  by  Southern  armies,  356 ; 
of  Confederacy  broken,  462;  in  siege  of  Petersburg,  530. 


INDEX.  697 

INTRENCH  MENTS,  not  used  at  Antietam,  281;   at   Fredericksburg,  292; 

use  in  Atlanta  campaign,  553. 
loiva,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593. 
IROQUOIS,  4 

ISABEL.  POINT,  see  Point  Isabel. 
ISLAND  No.  10,  surrendered,  182. 
IUKA,  battle  of,  396. 
IZARD,  General,  succeeds  Wilkinson,  71. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  commands  Americans  at  New  Orleans,  74. 

JACKSON,  JOHN  K.,  at  Shiloh,  178;  at  Stones  River,  315. 

JACKSON,  STONEWALL,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run — Bee  gives  him  im 
mortal  nickname,  139 ;  and  Sherman  only  generals  show  tactical 
knowledge  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  147;  joins  Lee  from  the 
valley — fails  to  reach  battle  of  Mechanicsville,  204;  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  205;  not  at  Savage's  Station— stops  at  White  Oaks  Swamp 
Creek,  207 ;  at  Malvern  Hill,  208 ;  his  conduct  in  the  Seven  Days' 
Battles  criticised,  215;  his  valley  campaign,  217;  early  operations 
in  the  valley,  218 ;  operations  in  the  valley  after  first  Bull  Run, 
219;  his  expedition  against  Romney  and  Bath,  219;  object  of  ex 
pedition — sends  in  his  resignation,  220;  operations  against  Banks 
in  March,  1862 — effect  of  his  combat  at  Kernstown,  222;  with 
draws  to  Swift  Run  Gap,  224 ;  begins  operations  against  Fremont 
and  Banks — at  battle  of  McDowell,  225 ;  returns  to  Valley — be 
tween  Banks  and  Fremont,  226;  in  pursuit  of  Banks — at  battle  of 
Winchester,  227;  no  cavalry  to  pursue  after  victory — pursues  to 
Potomac,  228 ;  eludes  Fremont,  Banks  and  Shields,  229 ;  retreats 
to  Port  Republic,  "230 ;  plans  to  defeat  Fremont  and  Shields  sep 
arately,  231 ;  nearly  captured — at  battle  of  Port  Republic — with 
draws  to  Brown's  Gap,  232;  goes  from  valley  to  join  Lee — 
causes  orders  from  Washington  to  be  revoked,  233 ;  the  strategy 
of  his  operations — his  operations  merely  a  strategic  diversion. 
234 ;  had  studied  military  science — books  carried  in  saddle  pockets, 
235 ;  his  operations  like  Napoleon's — his  maxims — summary  of  his 
operations  in  the  valley,  236 ;  sent  to  Gordonsville,  241 ;  at  battle 
of  Cedar  Mountain,  242 ;  falls  back  to  Gordonsville,  243 ;  starts 
to  turn  Pope's  army,  244 ;  withdraws  from  Manassas — takes  posi 
tion  near  Groveton,  246 ;  at  second  Bull  Run,  250 ;  at  battle  of 
Chantilly,  251;  his  turning  movement  criticised,  254;  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  266;  at  Antietam,  268;  advised  fighting  at  Antietam,  279; 
left  in  valley,  290;  rejoins  Lee  at  Fredericksburg,  291;  his  position 
at  Fredericksburg,  292;  makes  no  counter-attack  at  Fredericks 
burg,  306;  marches  to  Chancellorsville — at  Tabernacle  Church,  333; 
his  turning  movement  at  Chancellorsville,  338;  direction  of  his 
march — movement  discovered,  339 ;  shown  Federal  right  by  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee — forms  line  for  attack,  340 ;  orders  Rodes  forward,  341 ; 
pursues  Howard's  troops— his  lines  stopped — prepares  to  cut 
Hooker's  retreat — killed,  342;  risk  in  his  flank  march,  349;  its 
chief  danger,  350. 

JACKSON,  Miss.,  Confederate  base  in  Mississippi,  400;  battle  of,  409. 

JACKSON,  General  W.  H.,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  539 ;  guards  Johnston's 
right,  541 ;  precedes  Hood's  army,  557. 

JAMES  RIVER,  open  to  Union  fleets,  198. 

JAMES,  ARMY  OF,  Butler  commanded,  by  "political  necessity,"  530. 

JEFFERSON,  THOMAS,  issued  embargo,  56;  tells  how  to  invade  Canada, 
57;  his  remark  about  militia,  76. 

JENKINS,  A.  G.,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  358,  363 ;  at  Chambersburg, 
358. 

JENKINS,  MICAH,  at  Wauhatchie,  451;  killed,  480. 


698  INDEX. 

JOHNSON,  BUSHROD  R.,  at  Chickamauga,  431;  delayed  by  Minty,  432;  at 
Petersburg,  516;  attacks  with  A.  P.  Hill,  519. 

JOHNSON,  EDWARD,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  359;  at  Gettysburg,  368; 
position,  second  day,  375;  attacks  Gulp's  Hill,  377;  reinforced,  378: 
inside  Union  trenches — attacked  and  driven  out,  379 ;  on  third 
day,  380 ;  his  division  of  little  use  at  Gettysburg,  389 ;  at  Wilder 
ness,  475 ;  captured  at  Spottsylvania,  496 ;  at  Spring  Hill,  567,  582 : 
supports  Cheatham.  570. 

JOHNSON,   Sir  JOHN,  commands  Indians  and  Tories,  32. 

JOHNSON,  Colonel  RICHARD  M.,  commands  mounted  regiment  at  battle 
of  the  Thames,  66. 

JOHNSON,  RICHARD  W.,  at  Stones  River,  315;  driven  "from  field,  317: 
at  Chickamauga,  432;  at  Chattanooga,  454;  at  Missionary  Ridge, 
458;  at  Nashville,  575. 

JOHNSON,  WILLIAM,  commands  expedition  against  Crown  Point  in 
1755— his  character — builds  Fort  Lyman,  8;  defeats  Dieskau,  9. 

JOHNSONVILLE,  attacked  by  Forrest,  563. 

JOHNSTON,  ALBERT  SIDNEY,  placed  in  command  of  Confederate  forces  in 
West — his  forces,  150;  his  plan  and  means  of  opposing  Halleck 
and  Buell,  153;  falls  back  from  Bowling  Green  to  Nashville,  155; 
retreats  to  Murf reesboro,  161 ;  fails  to  make  use  of  his  only 
chance,  162-3 ;  why  he  fell  back  from  Bowling  Green,  164 ;  what 
he  expected  at  Fort  Donelson,  165 ;  his  situation  after  Henry  and 
Donelson — moves  army  to  Corinth,  169 ;  'reaches  Corinth — his  army 
concentrated  at  Corinth — organization  of  his  army — his  command 
ers,  171 ;  advances  on  Shiloh — blunders  in  his  concentration,  173  ; 
his  army  the  night  before  Shiloh — his  army  encounters  Union  out 
posts,  176;  killed,  178;  should  have  reunited  his  divided  army — 
influenced  by  public  opinion — decried  by  newspapers,  183 ;  his  con 
centration  at  Shiloh,  186;  his  conduct  at  Shiloh — his  plan  of  battle, 
187. 

JOHNSTON,  JOSEPH  E.,  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  131 ;  ordered  to  reinforce 
Beauregard — his  operations  against  Patterson,  134;  at  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  138;  camps  army  at  Centreville,  142;  his  troops  at 
first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  145 ;  his  army  remains  at  Centreville,  192 ; 
withdraws  from  Centreville,  194 ;  marches  army  to  Yorktown,  196 ; 
withdraws  from  Yorktown,  197 ;  on  south  side  of  Chickahominy, 
199:  within  Richmond  intrenchments — organization  of  his  army 
at  Richmond — issues  order  to  attack  McClellan's  army,  200;  at 
Seven  Pines,  201 ;  wounded,  202 ;  asks  for  reinforcements  in  order 
to  cross  Potomac,  211;  his  operations  against  McClellan  reviewed. 
214;  conceived  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  234;  sent  to  relieve 
Bragg  after  failure  in  Kentucky,  325 ;  telegraphs  Pemberton,  408 : 
goes  to  Mississippi — wires  Richmond,  "I  am  too  late,"  409;  orders 
Pemberton  to  attack  Grant's  rear,  410 ;  in  Mississippi  during  siege 
of  Vicksburg — advances  to  relieve  Pemberton — retreats  to  Jack 
son,  415;  his  management  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign  criticised, 
421 ;  nominal  command  included  Bragg's  army,  463  ;  commands  con 
solidated  forces,  468 ;  takes  command  at  Dalton — organization  of 
forces,  535 ;  position  turned  at  Dalton,  537-8 ;  withdraws  to  Resaca, 
538;  plans  attack — withdraws  from  Resaca,  539;  at  Cassville — re 
tires  to  Allatoona  Pass — withdraws  to  New  Hope  Church,  540 ; 
at  Lost  and  Bush  Mountains — withdraws  troops  from  Pine 
Mountain — at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  541 ;  withdraws  to  Smyrna — re 
tires  into  intrenchments  at  bridge — withdraws  to  Peachtree  Creek, 
542 ;  relieved  of  command,  543 ;  view  of  McPherson's  action  at 
Resaca — his  skill — Seven  Pines  his  only  offensive  battle,  549;  his 
escape  from  Resaca  discussed,  550 ;  his  defensive  operations  criti- 


INDEX.  699 

JOHNSTON,  JOSEPH  E. — Continued. 

cised — plan  of  flank  position,  551-2;  opportunities  to  attack  Sher 
man — wanted  to  make  war  without  fighting,  552;  might  have  held 
Atlanta — his  failure  to  fortify  Snake  Creek  Gap — positions  taken 
at  river  crossings,  533  ;  in  North  Carolina — surrenders,  586. 

JONES,  General  D.  R.,  at  Antietam,  267,  272. 

JONES,  JOHN  PAUL,  41. 

JONES,  WM.  E.,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  362. 

KAUTZ,  General,  at  Petersburg,  512;  in  attack  of  Petersburg,  514; 
Wilson's  raid,  519-20. 

KEARNY,  General,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194;  at  Williamsburg, 
197 ;  at  Seven  Pines.  201 ;  ordered  to  support  McDowell — ordered  to 
Bristoe  Station,  245;  killed  at  Chantilly,  251. 

KELLY'S  FERRY,  importance  of  road  to  Brown's  Ferry,  464. 

KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  battle  of,  541 ;   Sherman's  attack  criticised,   550 

KENLY,  Colonel,  at  Front  Royal,  226. 

KENT,  General,  commands  division  in  Santiago  campaign,  596 ;  in  ad 
vance  to  Siboney,  599;  in  plan  of  attack,  602;  night  before  San 
Juan,  603 ;  at  San  Juan,  604,  606. 

KENTUCKY,  the  Eighth,  see  Eighth  Kentucky. 

KENTUCKY,  tries  to  stand  neutral.  129 ;  her  attitude  at  outbreak  of 
Civil  War — her  neutrality  recognized — her  neutrality  violated — Union 
troops  therein  commanded  by  Buell,  150;  military  geography — 
railways,  151 ;  Bragg's  invasion  compared,  439. 

KER,  Captain,  at  battle  of  Palo  Alto,  85. 

KERNSTOWN,  battle  of,  221 ;  its  effect,  222. 

KERSHAW,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  376;  at  Spottsylvania,  489;  first  po 
sition,  493. 

KETTLE  HILL,  602 ;  combat  at.  604 ;  Spanish  force,  605  ;  combat  begins — 
battle  of,  606;  carried  by  assault,  607;  comments,  625-6. 

KEYES,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133 ;  com 
mands  Fourth  Corps  in  A.  P.,  194. 

KEY  WEST,  naval  base,  591. 

KILPATRICK,  General,  put  in  front  of  Meade's  army,  360;  combat  with 
Stuart  at  Hanover,  362 ;  at  Hanover,  363 ;  at  Gettysburg,  374 ;  on 
third  day,  381 ;  sacrifices  Farnsworth's  brigade,  383 ;  in  pursuit 
of  Lee's  army,  384,  385 ;  raid  on  Richmond,  468 ;  transferred  to 
Sherman,.  470;  in  Atlanta  campaign,  537;  moves  on  Calhoun,  538; 
covers  Sherman's  rear,  540 ;  covers  right  of  army,  545 ;  raid  in 
Georgia,  546;  meets  Jackson's  cavalry,  557. 

KIMBALL,  General  NATHAN,  at  Spring  Hill,  566,  567;  at  Franklin,  569. 

KING  WILLIAM'S  WAR,  1. 

KING  GEORGE'S  WAR,  6. 

KING,  General  RUFUS,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194 ;  at  second 
Bull  Run,  246 ;  starts  for  Manassas,  247 ;  at  second  Bull  Run, 
August  29,  249. 

KINGS  MOUNTAIN,  battle  of,  46. 

KIRK,  Admiral,  captures  Quebec,  1. 

KITCHENER,  Lord,  his  reply,  441. 

KNYPHAUSEN,  General,   at  battle  of  Brandywine,  34. 

LACOLLE  CREEK,  battle  of,  71. 

LACY  FARM,  headquarters  of  Grant  and  Meade  at  Wilderness,  475. 

LAFAYETTE,    in    command    in    Virginia — operations    against    Cornwallis, 

50;  closes  on  Yorktown,  52. 

LANE,  General  JAMES  H.,  at  Fredericksburg,  296. 
LANE,  General  JOE,  defeats  Santa  Anna,  119. 
LAS    GUASIMAS,    combat    at — losses,    600;    comments — Rubin's    orders, 

623. 


700  INDEX. 

LAW,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  375 ;  captures  Devil's  Den,  376 ;  at  Chat 
tanooga,  449;  attacked  by  Howard,  451. 

Lawrence,  the  brig,  blockades  Rio  Grande,  84. 

LAWTON,  General  A.  R.,  his  brigade  at  Fredericksburg,  298. 

LAWTON,  General  H.  W.,  his  march  compared  with  Warren's,  507; 
commands  division  in  Santiago  campaign,  596 ;  advances  to  Sibo- 
ney,  598;  in  advance  to  Siboney,  599;  reconnoiters,  601-2;  in  plan 
of  attack,  602 ;  night  before  El  Caney,  603 ;  at  El  Caney — ordered 
to  San  Juan,  604;  marches  to  San  Juan — his  position,  608;  El 
Caney  criticised,  624-5. 

LEDLIE,  General,  at  Petersburg,  517;  the  Mine,  520-2. 

LEE,  FORT,  see  Fort  Lee. 

LEE,  General  CHARLES,  left  in  command  at  North  Castle,  30;  captured, 
31 ;  at  battle  of  Monmouth,  35. 

LEE,  FITZHUGH,  his  failure  to  execute  an  order  frustrates  General 
Lee's  plan,  243;  at  Chancellorsville,  336;  covers  Jackson's  turning 
movement,  339;  shows  Jackson  Federal  right,  340;  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  362 ;  at  Gettysburg,  383 ;  delays  Federal  column,  489 ; 
supports  Rosser,  490 ;  in  movement  to  Spottsylvania  discussed, 
506. 

LEE,  "LIGHT  HORSE  HARRY,"  and  Marion  capture  Fort  Motte  and  Fort 
Granby — captures  Augusta,  49. 

LEE,  ROBERT  E.,  in  Scott's  campaign,  122;  President  Davis's  military 
adviser,  132 ;  arranges  plan  with  Jackson  to  divert  Mc 
Dowell,  199;  assumes  command  of  army  —  withdraws  army 
to  Richmond,  202 ;  plans  offensive  movement — withdraws  Jack 
son  from  Valley,  203 ;  his  order  for  attack,  204 ;  his  plans 
to  intercept  McClellan — after  Gaines's  Mill,  206;  at  Glen- 
dale,  207;  at  Malvern  Hill,  208;  his  operations  in  the  Penin 
sular  campaign  reviewed,  214 ;  conceived  Jackson's  Valley  cam 
paign,  234 ;  credit  due  him  for  Confederate  successes  of  1862,  235  ; 
marches  army  to  Gordonsville,  243;  resolves  to  attack  Pope — his 
plan,  243 ;  advances  to  the  Rappahannock — starts  Jackson  to  turn 
Pope's  army — follows  Jackson,  244 ;  reaches  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
246 ;  resolves  to  turn  Pope's  right — after  Second  Bull  Run,  250 ; 
criticised  for  Jackson's  turning  movement,  254 ;  his  mistakes  at 
second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  258;  prepares  to  invade  Maryland — 
condition  of  his  army,  260 ;  purpose  of  invasion,  261 ;  crosses  Poto 
mac,  262;  concentrates  at  Frederick  City — issues  "  S.  O.  No.  191," 
263  ;  copy  found  by  Federals,  264 ;  position  of  his  army  September 
13,  1862— at  battle  of  South  Mountain,  265 ;  his  anxiety  after  South 
Mountain — retreats — stops  at  Sharpsburg,  267;  withdraws  from 
Antietam,  273;  obiective  of  invasion  of  Maryland,  274;  why  he  or 
dered  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry.  275 ;  his  best  plan — why  he  took 
risks,  276 :  McClellan  fails  to  take  full  advantage  of  "lost  order," 
277 ;  should  not  have  fought  at  Antietam,  278 ;  his  good  management 
at  battle  of  Antietam,  281 ;  his  army  after  Antietam — organizes  army 
into  corps,  etc.,  284;  moves  to  oppose  McClellan's  advance,  287; 
position  and  strength  of  forces,  November  7,  1862,  288;  not  sur 
prised  by  Burnside's  movement — advances  Longstreet  to  Freder 
icksburg,  290;  joined  by  Jackson's  corps,  291;  his  line  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  292 ;  prepares  for  battle — distribution  of  his  troops. 
296 ;  his  plan  to  oppose  McClellan,  301  ;  why  he  decided  to  defend 
the  Rappahannock,  302 ;  divided  his  army — understood  his 
opponents,  303 ;  distribution  of  his  troops  at  Fredericksburg,  304 : 
makes  no  counter-attack  at  Fredericksburg,  306;  condition  and 
position  of  army  after  Fredericksburg,  330;  plans  offensive  cam- 


INDEX.  701 

LEE,  ROBERT  E. — Continued. 

paign,  332 ;  learns  of  Hooker's  movement — dispatches  Anderson's 
division  to  Chancellorsville — discerns  Hooper's  plan — makes  dis 
positions,  333 ;  kept  informed  of  Hooker's  movements,  334 ;  moves- 
against  Hooker  at  Chancellorsville,  335;  pursues  cautiously,  337: 
his  line — plans  turning  movement,  338;  makes  feints  to  aid  Jack 
son's  movement,  339 ;  engages  Hooker's  entire  line,  341 ;  advances 
and  captures  Chancellorsville,  343  ;  prevented  from  assaulting  Fed 
erals  in  new  position  by  reports  from  Fredericksburg,  344;  finds 
Hooker's  army  has  withdrawn — losses,  346;  sends  McLaws  to 
meet  Sedgwick — sends  rest  of  Anderson's  division,  345 ;  resolve? 
to  make  final  assault  at  Chancellorsville,  346;  at  first  fooled  by 
Hooker,  348;  saved  from  bloody  repulse  by  Hooker's  withdrawal, 
351 ;  position,  strength  and  condition  of  army  after  Chancellors 
ville — reorganizes  army — a  full  general — army  organization- - 
artillery  organization,  353;  his  plans  and  objectives  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  354 ;  military  reasons  for  Gettysburg  campaign — influ 
ence  of  Vicksburg,  etc. — line  of  operations  and  communications — 
urges  army  be  organized  under  Beauregard  at  Culpeper,  355 ; 
does  not  adopt  plan  suggested  by  Longstreet,  356;  starts  north 
ward,  357;  ignorant  of  whereabouts  of  Union  army,  360;  letter 
published  by  Colonel  Mosby,  foot-note,  361 ;  had  planned  concentra 
tion  near  Cashtown — orders  concentration,  361  ;  in  need  of  Stuart's 
cavalry,  362 ;  disposition  of  forces  June  30,  1863,  363 ;  strategic  posi 
tion  at  Gettysburg,  364;  reaches  Gettysburg — defective  orders  to 
Ewell,  368 ;  how  he  had  learned  of  battle,  369 ;  orders  attack  for  next 
morning,  370;  purposed  attacking  early  July  2 — order  for  attack, 
374 ;  his  attack  on  second  day  badly  managed,  377 ;  resolve  to  assault 
July  3 — his  army  all  present,  378;  ground  held  by  his  troops  in 
morning  July  3 — his  plan — changes  his  plan — selects  point  of  attack, 
379;  directs  Longstreet  to  make  assault,  380;  expects  counter-attack 
— retreats,  384;  l^akes  position  pending  fall  of  Potomac — recrosses 
river,  385;  judges  Halleck  and  President  Lincoln  aright,  386;  why 
he  ordered  concentration  at  Cashtown — result  of  failure  to  take 
Cemetery  Hill,  387;  his  attacks  at  Gettysburg  ill-managed,  388; 
his  chances  of  victory,  390;  after  retreat  from  Gettysburg — at  Cul 
peper — troops  detached — campaign  of  maneuvers,  466;  not  deceived 
— moves, to  oppose  Grant,  473;  orders  to  Ewell  and  Hill,  474;  pur 
sues  to  Bull  Run — fails  to  intercept  Meade — returns  to  Culpeper — 
and  the  Rapidan,  467 ;  at  Mine  Run,  468 ;  position  of  troops  at  be 
ginning  of  Wilderness  operations,  471 ;  with  A.  P.  Hill  on  Plank 
Road,  477;  May  6,  479;  delays  attack,  480;  May  7— orders  Gordon 
to  attack,  481;  forced  to  defensive,  482;  his  boldness — his  plan 
discussed,  485 ;  movement  to  Spottsylvania,  488 ;  line  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  492;  anticipates  Grant,  500;  at  North  Anna— starts  Ewell 
for  Hanover,  501 ;  at  Cold  Harbor — at  Totopotomoy,  502 ; 
strength  and  losses  from  Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor — effect 
of  Grant's  "continuous  hammering,"  503 ;  distinctive  features  of 
operations  from  Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbor — reduced  to  the  de 
fensive,  505;  movement  to  Spottsylvania  discussed,  506;  if  Grant 
had  turned  his  left  at  Spottsylvania,  508;  position  at  Cold  Harbor, 
510;  discovers  Grant's  withdrawal — takes  position  south  of  Chick  - 
ahominy,  513;  fooled  by  Grant's  strategy,  514;  slow  reinforcing 
Petersburg,  516;  orders  army  to  Petersburg,  518;  Grant's  move 
ment  October  27,  1864,  524;  final  operations,  526;  thinks  of  uniting 
with  Johnston,  526;  right  forced — withdraws  from  Richmond  and 
Petersburg — retreat,  527;  surrenders — number  of  men,  528;  ad 
vantages  in  siege  of  Petersburg,  530;  why  forced  to  flee — why  he 


702  INDEX. 

LEE,  ROBERT  E. — Continued. 

let  himself  be  besieged,  530-1;  agreed  with  Mr.  Davis  to  try  to 
join  Johnston,  531;  if  Petersburg  had  been  taken  at  the  start, 
;  32-3 ;  could  not  be  invested — cut  off  by  cavalry,  533 ;  campaign 
against  Grant  compared  with  Johnston's  in  Georgia,  547-8. 

LEE,  S.  D.,  commands  Hood's  old  corps,  foot-note,  545;  at  Ezra  Church, 
545;  in  Hood's  advance,  564;  at  Columbia,  566;  at  Spring  Hill, 
567;  in  pursuit,  568;  at  Franklin,  569;  at  Nashville,  571,  575. 

LEE,  W.  H.  F.,  with  D.  H.  Hill,  293 ;  operations  during  Chancellors- 
ville  campaign,  347;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  362;  ordered  to  find 
Grant's  army,  518;  pursues  Wilson,  520. 

LEESBURG,  Confederate  detachment  there,   131. 

LEVI,  POINT,  see  Point  Levi. 

LEVIS,  General,  besieges  Quebec,  20. 

LEXINGTON,  battle  of,  24. 

LIDDELL,  General,  at  Chickarrrauga,  433. 

LINARES,  General,  at  Santiago,  597 ;  withdraws  detachments  to  San 
tiago,  599 ;  at  Las  Guasimas,  600 ;  force  July  1 — armament,  603 ; 
reinforces  San  Juan  and  Kettle  Hills — his  forces,  605;  wounded. 
foot-note,  609 ;  why  he  stayed  at  Santiago — criticised,  622-3 ;  his 
mistake  at  Las  Guasimas,  623. 

LINCOLN,  General,  sent  to  oppose  British  in  South  Carolina,  43  ;  again 
invades  Georgia — besieges  Savannah — surrenders  Charleston,  44. 

LINCOLN,  ABRAHAM,  succeeds  Buchanan — his  administration  takes  no 
steps  to  reduce  seceded  States,  128;  notifies  Confederate  authori 
ties  he  will  supply  Fort  Sumter — calls  out  militia,  129 ;  issues  sec 
ond  call  for  troops — orders  McDowell  to  advance,  131 ;  no  experi 
ence  of  military  affairs — compared  with  Jefferson  Davis,  143 ;  his 
mistake  concerning  Patterson,  144;  proposes  a  plan  to  Buell,  153; 
effect  of  order  placing  Halleck  in  supreme  command  in  West,  185  ; 
issues  "war  orders,"  193 ;  breaks  up  McClellan's  command — organ 
izes  several  territorial  departments,  222;  issues  call  for  troops, 
228 ;  appoints  Pope  to  command  Army  of  Virginia,  239 ;  did  wisely 
in  consolidating  armies  of  Fremont,  Banks  and  McDowell,  252; 
his  mistake  in  selecting  Halleck,  253 ;  relieves  Burnside  and  ap 
points  Hooker,  329;  does  not  approve  Hooker's  plans,  357;  re 
places  Hooker  with  Meade,  360;  Lee  judges  him  aright — why  Lee 
stretched  army  from  Fredericksburg  to  Williamsport,  386 ;  assures 
Grant — suggests  plan,  482;  chances  of  his  reelection  discussed — as 
affected  by  events  of  the  war,  531. 

LINE  OF  BATTLE,  importance  of  direction,  498 ;  at  North  Anna,  501 ; 
Hood's  at  Nashville,  584. 

LINE  OF  COMMUNICATIONS,  use  of  a  river  as,  167;  should  be  perpen 
dicular  to  army's  front,  254;  an  army's  dependence  upon — com 
manders  sometimes  abandon — when  threatened,  323 ;  Lee's,  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  355;  best  position  for,  illustrated,  438;  Rose- 
crans's,  at  Chattanooga,  446;  Hood's,  544-6;  Shafter's,  discussed. 
621. 

LINES,  INTERIOR,  see  interior  lines,  233. 

LINE  OF  OPERATIONS,  use  of  a  river  as,  167;  Lee's,  in  Gettysburg  cam 
paign,  355 ;  Shafter's,  discussed,  621-2. 

LINE  OF  SUPPLY,  Rosecrans's  project  at  Chattanooga,  450;  Brown's 
Ferry— Kelly's  Ferry  road,  464;  Lee's,  at  Petersburg,  532;  Hood's, 
544-6. 

LISCUM,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  wounded  at  San  Juan,  606. 

LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  the  battle  for,  376. 

LOBOS,  island  of,  Scott's  base,   105. 


INDEX.  703 

LOGAN,  General,  at  Raymond,  408;  at  Champion's  Hill,  411;  goes  home, 
555 ;  ordered  to  supersede  Thomas,  573. 

LOMBARDINI,  General,  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

LONG,  General,  tells  how  Lee  heard  firing  at  Gettysburg — reconnoiters 
and  reports,  369. 

LONGSTREET,  General,  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  136;  at  first  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  141 ;  at  Williamsburg,  197 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  201 ;  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  205 ;  at  Malvern  Hill,  208 ;  marches  from  Richmond  to  Gor- 
donsville,  243 ;  reaches  Thoroughfare  Gap,  246 ;  at  second  Bull 
Run,  250;  his  mistakes  at  second  Bull  Run,  258;  at  battle 
of  South  Mountain,  265 ;  opposed  fighting  at  Antietam,  278 ;  his 
position  at  Fredericksburg,  292 ;  his  corps  at  Fredericksburg,  296 ; 
•absent  with  two  divisions,  330;  rejoins  Lee  from  Suffolk — com 
mands  first  corps,  353 ;  suggests  extensive  plan  of  campaign,  355 ; 
in  Gettysburg  campaign,  357 ;  marches  on  eastern  side  of  Blue 
Ridge — crosses  Potomac  and  unites  with  Hill  at  Hagerstown,  359 ; 
scout  brings  word  that  Union  army  is  north  of  Potomac,  361 ;  at 
Fayetteville,  363;  joins  Lee  on  Seminary  Ridge,  369;  Lee's  order 
for  attack,  374;  causes  of  his  delay — his  column  seen  by  Sickles's 
scouts — attacks,  375 ;  piecemeal  attack,  376 ;  ground  held  in  morn 
ing  July  3 — to  attack  again,  379;  his  line  charged  by  Farnsworth's 
cavalry,  383 ;  cause  of  his  tardiness — the  lessons  it  teaches,  389 ; 
opposed  to  attacking,  390;  starts  to  reinforce  Bragg,  428;  arrives 
at  Chickamauga,  431,  434;  commands  right  wing,  434;  his  charge, 
436 ;  assaults  Thomas's  line,  437 ;  his  suggestion  to  Secretary  of 
War  not  carried  out  in  time,  442 ;  his  charge,  443  ;  at  Chattanooga, 
447;  on  left,  449;  sees  Hooker's  column  from  Mt.  Lookout,  451; 
sent  to  Knoxville,  452 ;  at  Knoxville — withdraws  to  Virginia,  460 ; 
proposes  plan,  464;  sent  to  Knoxville  too  late,  465;  sent  to  Bragg, 
466;  rejoins  Lee,  471;  at  Wilderness,  473;  May  5,  475;  arrives  May 
6— expected  by  way  of  Brock  Road,  479;  Mahone's  attack — 
wounded,  480 ;  why  late  and  the  result,  485 ;  his  corps  at  Peters 
burg,  518;  repulses  Terry,  525. 

LOOKOUT,  MOUNT,  battle  of,  454;  description,  455. 

LORING,  General,  withdrawn  from  Romney  by  Secretary  of  War,  220; 
builds  Fort  Pemberton,  401  ;  commands  at  Grenada  and  Fort  Pem- 
berton,  403;  at  Champion's  Hill/ 411 ;  succeeds  Polk — at  Kenesaw 
Mountain,  541. 

LOST  MOUNTAIN,  Johnston's  position  at,  541. 

LOUDON,  EARL,  at  Fort  William  Henry — commands  British  forces ;  with 
forces  at  Halifax — abandons  expedition  against  Louisburg,  10;  re 
called,  11. 

LOUISBURGJ  captured — restored  by  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  6 ;  cap 
tured,  1757,  10;  expedition  in  1758 — captured  by  Amherst,  11. 

LOVEJOY'S  STATION,  Hood's  concentration  at,  547. 

LOYALISTS,  see  Tories. 

LUDLOW,  General,  at  El  Caney,  604. 

LUNDY'S  LANE,  battle  of,  72. 

LYMAN,  FORT,  see  Fort  Lyman. 

LYON,  General,  holds  Missouri  in  the  Union,   130. 

MACARTHUR,  General,  in  Philippine  expedition,  612;  battle  of  Ma 
nila,  613. 

McARTHUR,  Colonel,  commands  expedition  to  Raisin  River,  60;  cut  off 
by  Tecumthe,  61. 

McCALL,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194 ;  commands  division  of  Fifth 
Corps,  199. 


704  INDEX. 

McCALLA,  Commander,  at  Cienfuegos,  592;  learns  Cervera  is  not  at 
Cienfuegos,  593. 

MCCLELLAN,  GEORGE  B.,  in  Scott's  campaign,  122;  in  West  Virginia, 
130;  placed  in  command  of  Federal  Forces — his  previous  record, 
191 ;  his  task  now — succeeds  Scott  as  commander-in-chief — 
his  plans — loses  favor  by  inaction,  192 ;  decides  to  move  on  Rich 
mond  by  way  of  Urbana — sick,  193 ;  decides  to  make  Fort  Mon 
roe  his  base — marches  to  Centreville — relieved  as  commander-in- 
chief — organization  of  his  army,  194;  troops  withdrawn  by  Presi 
dent — not  aided  by  navy,  195 ;  his  advance  stopped  at  Yorktown — 
besieges  Confederate  works,  196 ;  establishes  base  at  White  House, 
— not  at  battle  of  Williamsburg — establishes  headquarters  at 
White  House,  198;  resumes  advance  from  White  House — organ 
izes  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps,  199 ;  position  of  his  army  when  at 
tacked  by  Johnson — his  line  of  communication,  200;  puts  army 
astride  the  Chickahominy,  200;  at  Seven  Pines,  202;  position  of 
army  after  Seven  Pines,  203 ;  on  the  defensive,  205 ;  begins  move 
ment  to  Harrison's  Landing,  206;  his  army  falls  back  to  Malvern 
Hill,  208 ;  wished  to  organize  and  train  his  army,  209 ;  lacked  tact, 
210;  things  he  ought  to  have  done — risks  he  took,  210;  took  risk 
in  going  to  Fort  Monroe,  211;  his  disappointments — his  genius  for 
organization — a  failure  as  commander,  212;  his  mistake  at  York- 
town — astride  the  Chickahominy,  213 ;  his  change  of  base  to  the 
James,  214 ;  warned  that  he  might  have  to  take  army  to  protect 
Washington,  228 ;  withdrawn  from  the  James,  241 ;  commands 
combined  Union  army  after  second  Bull  Run,  260;  position  of  his 
corps  at  beginning  of  Antietam  campaign,  262;  advances  cautiously 
— divides  army  into  wings  and  center — gets  Lee's  "lost  order,"  264 ; 
position  of  army  September  13,  1862,  265;  advances  after  South 
Mountain,  268;  his  plan  of  battle  at  Antietam,  269;  cause  of  his 
slow  advance  in  Maryland,  276;  fails  to  take  full  advantage  of 
Lee's  "lost  order,"  277 ;  what  he  should  have  done — his  mistake 
after  South  Mountain,  278;  his  mismanagement  at  battle  of  Antie 
tam,  281 ;  his  pursuit  after  Antietam — his  army  after  Antietam, 
284;  his  inactivity,  285;  plans  after  Antietam*  286;  crosses  Poto 
mac  at  Berlin — states  plan — advances  southward,  287 ;  position  of 
forces  November  7,  1862,  288 ;  relieved  from  command,  289 ;  his 
plan  discussed,  301 ;  his  tardiness  in  taking  offensive  after  Antietam, 
300 ;  why  removed  from  command,  301 ;  his  change  of  base  com 
pared  with  Grant's  Vicksburg  campaign,  416 ;  operations  compared 
with  Grant's,  529. 

MCCLERNAND,  General,  commands  a  division  at  Forts  Henry  and  Don 
elson,  156;  attacks  Confederate  battery  at  Fort  Donelson,  157; 
driven  back  at  Fort  Donelson,  159;  recovers  position  at  Fort 
Donelson,  160;  commands  division  in  Smith's  expedition,  170;  falls 
back  at  Shiloh — makes  ninth  stand,  177;  his  scheme  to  capture 
Vicksburg,  397;  takes  command  of  Sherman's  forces  near  Vicks 
burg — captures  Arkansas  Post — commands  Thirteenth  Corps,  399 ; 
at  Port  Gibson,  404;  at  Champion's  Hill,  411;  in  assault  of  Vicks 
burg,  413 ;  in  the  second  assault,  414. 

McCooK,  A.  McD.,  relieves  Negley  at  Nashville,  312;  commands  "right 
wing"  of  Rosecrans's  army,  313;  forms  line  at  Stones  River,  315; 
faulty  position  of  his  line  at  Stones  River,  328 ;  commands  Twen 
tieth  Corps,  423;  at  Chickamauga,  431;  morning  September  19, 
432 ;  driven  from  field,  436 ;  court  of  inquiry,.  447. 

McCooK,  E.  M.,  at  Varnell's  Station,  538;  in  front  of  army — at  Alla- 
toona,  540;  in  Atlanta  campaign,  538;  at  Newnan,  545. 


INDEX.  705 

McCowN,  General,  at  Stones  River,  315;  falls  on  McCook's  right,  317. 

McCulloch,  Hugh,  in  Dewey's  fleet,  611. 

McCuLLOUGH,  General,  has  command  in  Arkansas,  169. 

MCDOWELL,  General,  at  outbreak  of  Civil  War,  130;  placed  in  com 
mand  of  Union  forces,  131 ;  submits  plan — the  organization  of  his 
forces,  133;  his  plan  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  136;  assaults 
Henry  House  Hill — his  troops,  139;  his  mistakes  at  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run — his  stay  at  Centreville  fatal,  145 ;  commands  First 
Corps  in  A.  P.,  194 ;  held  at  Washington,  195 ;  advances  to  Fred- 
ericksburg,  198 ;  ordered  to  Valley,  199 ;  withheld  from  McClellan 
on  account  of  battle  of  Kernstown,  222;  under  orders  to  join  Mc 
Clellan,  226;  ordered  to  .suspend  movement  on  Richmond,  228; 
commands  corps  under  Pope,  239 ;  ordered  to  Gainesville — to 
Manassas,  245. 

MCDOWELL,  battle  of,  225;  battle  of,  lightly  considered  at  Washing 
ton,  226. 

MclNTOSH,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  383 ;  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  384. 

McLAWs,  General,  at  Crampton's  Gap,  266 ;  at  Antietam,  270 ;  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  296;  reinforces  Anderson  at  Chancellorsville,  333;  aids 
Jackson's  movement,  339 ;  attacks  Federal  left,  343 ;  sent  to  meet 
Sedgwick — at  Salem  Church,  345 ;  at  Gettysburg,  369 ;  in  the  at 
tack,  374;  his  position,  375;  stands  idle,  376;  on  third  day,  380; 
at  Chickamauga,  434. 

McPnERSON,  J.  B.,  at  Shiloh,  175;  commands  Seventeenth  Corps,  399; 
at  Port  Gibson,  405 ;  at  Raymond,  408 ;  at  Jackson,  409 ;  at  Cham 
pion's  Hill,  411;  in  assault  of  Vicksburg,  413;  commands  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  536;  moves  by  way  of  Snake  Creek  Gap,  537;  at 
Resaca,  538 ;  in  pursuit  from  Resaca,  539 ;  at  Dallas,  540 ;  moves 
in  rear  of  Thomas,  542;  advances  to  the  Chattahoochee — supports 
Thomas,  542;  at  Decatur,  543;  battle  of  Atlanta— killed,  544;  mis 
take  at  Resaca — Sherman's  criticism — Johnston's  view,  549. 

MCPHERSON'S  WOODS,  365. 

MACDONOUGH,  Lieutenant,  his  victory  on  Lake  Champlain,  72. 

MACKINAC,  FORT,  see  Fort  Mackinac. 

MADISON,  President,  issues  embargo,  56. 

MAGRUDER,  General,  opposed  to  Butler,  131 ;  has  field-works  at  York- 
town,  196 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  201 ;  contains  McClellan  south  of  Chick- 
ahominy,  205 ;  watches  Federal  movements  south  of  Chickahominy 
— at  Savage's  Station,  206 ;  not  at  Glendale,  207. 

MAHONE,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  377;  at  Wilderness,  480;  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  493 ;  attacks  Upton,  499 ;  meets  Wilson  at  Reams's  Station, 
520;  the  Mine,  522;  flanks  Warren,  523;  at  Burgess's  Mill,  525. 

Maine,  destruction  of,  589. 

MALVERN  HILL,  battle  of,  208;  losses,  209. 

MANASSAS,  first  battle,  see  Bull  Run,  first  battle;  Southern  troops  as 
semble  there,  130;  its  strategic  importance,  132;  'captured  by  Stu 
art,  244. 

MANILA  BAY,  battle  of — casualties,  611. 

MANILA,  Dewey's  victory,  611 ;  Merritt's  expedition — besieged  by  in 
surgents,  612 ;  Spanish  works — battle  of,  613 ;  captured — prize  of 
war,  614;  capture  of,  discussed,  626;  capitulation,  supposed  ar 
rangements  for — battle  of,  compared  with  San  Juan — El  Caney,  627. 

MANSFIELD,  General,  commands  Twelfth  Corps,  262;  at  Antietam — 
killed,  269. 

Marblehead,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593 ;  at  Guantanamo,  594. 

MARCHES,  FLANK,  see  flank  marches. 

Maria  Teresa,  at  Santiago,  593;  at  battle  of  Santiago,  610. 


706  INDEX. 

MARION,  General,  his  operations,  45;  captures  Fort  Watson,  49;  and 
Light  Horse  Harry  Lee  capture  Forts  Motte  and  Granby,  49. 

MARYE'S  HEIGHTS,  291. 

MARYE'S  HILL,  291. 

MARYLAND,  her  attitude  toward  secession,   130. 

Massachusetts,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593. 

MASSACHUSETTS,  Eighth,  at  El  Caney — Second,  at  El  Caney — Twenty- 
second,  at  El  Caney,  604. 

MASSANUTTEN  MOUNTAIN,  its  influence  on  Banks's  movements,  223. 

MAXIMILIAN,  Archduke,  his  empire  in  Mexico — death,  588. 

MAY,  Captain,  at  battle  of  Palo  Alto — at  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  85 ; 
brings  information  of  Santa  Anna's  advance,  92. 

Mayfloiver,  at  Santiago,  593. 

MEADE,  General,  at  Antietam,  269 ;  at  Fredericksburg,  296 ;  his  assault, 
297;  commands  Fifth  Corps,  330;  at  Chancellorsville,  335;  succeeds 
Hooker  in  command  of  army — drops  Hooker's  plan — selects  line 
for  army  to  occupy,  360 ;  disposition  of  army,  June  30,  1863 — 
awaits  development — in  flank  position,  363;  his  line  at  Gettysburg, 
371 ;  accepts  battle  at  Gettysburg,  372 ;  his  troops,  and  dispositions, 
373 ;  reinforces  Sickles,  377 ;  in  pursuit,  384 ;  reaches  Turner's  Gap 
— moves  to  Antietam  Creek — lets  Lee  escape,  385;  his  plan  criti 
cised,  387 ;  his  position  and  dispositions  criticised,  390 ;  failed  to 
reap  full  fruits  of  victory,  391;  his  pursuit  criticised,  392;  after 
Lee's  withdrawal  to  Virginia — on  Rappahannock — troops  detached — 
campaign  of  maneuvers,  466 ;  withdraws  to  Centreville — advances 
and  crosses  Rappahannock,  467 ;  at  Mine  Run,  468 ;  at  Wilderness, 
474 ;  orders  Warren  to  attack — his  remark  about  enemy — issues 
orders,  475;  at  Wilderness — orders  for  May  6,  478;  defect  in 
orders  to  Hancock,  514;  at  Petersburg,  518;  failure  to  advise  Han 
cock  to  attack  Petersburg,  530. 

MECHANICSVILLE,  battle  of,  204. 

MEIGS,  FORT,  see  Fort  Meigs. 

MEJIA,  General,  attacks  Fort  Brown,  85 ;  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

MEMPHIS,  surrendered  to  Commodore  Davis,  394. 

Merrimac,  destroys  Union  vessels,  195 ;  destroyed,  198 ;  in  Schley's 
squadron,  593 ;  sunk,  594. 

MERRITT,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  381 ;  in  movement  to  Spottsylvania, 
489;  commands  expedition  to  Philippines,  612;  battle  of  Manila, 
613 ;  Spanish  surrender  Manila — trophies  of  capture — trouble  with 
insurgents,  614 ;  supposed  to  have  arranged  with  governor-general 
beforehand  for  capitulation,  627. 

MEXICAN  ARMY,  its  lack  of  a  commander,  125. 

MEXICAN  WAR,  Taylor's  campaign — causes — troops  on  each  side,  81 ; 
geography,  82;  Taylor's  campaign — Taylor's  instructions  and  plans 
— Mexico's  plan — operations,  83 ;  exemplifies  advantage  of  drill  and 
training,  102 ;  politics  of,  mixed  with  operations — opposition  to,  in 
United  States,  103;  Scott's  campaign,  105;  ended,  119;  navy  in — 
Scott's  campaign — comments,  120 ;  absence  of  militia,  124. 

MEXICO,  her  war  with  U.  S.,  see  Mexican  War;  geography,  82;  her 
plan,  83 ;  effect  of  weak  government  on  conduct  of  war — muddle 
of  its  political  parties — comment  on  capture  of  capital,  124 ;  Maxi 
milian's  empire,  588. 

MEXICO,  CITY  OF,  preparations  for  defense  of,  111;  captured,  118;  the 
necessity  for  capturing  it,  125. 

MICHIGAN,  Thirty-third,  attacks  Aguadores,  608. 

MlCHILIMACKINAC  built,    1. 

MICKEY'S,  Johnston's  concentration  at,  186. 

MIDDLEBURG,  cavalry  combat  at,  359. 


INDEX.  707 

MILAN  and  Berlin  decrees,  56. 

MILES,  DIXON  S.,  commands  McDowell's  fifth  division,  133;  at  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  141 ;  killed  at  Harper's  Ferry,  foot-note,  266. 

MILES,  EVAN,  at  El  Caney,  604. 

MILES,  N.  A.,  fights  Wade  Hampton,  490;  at  Spottsylvania,  496;  at 
Reams's  Station,  524 ;  commands  Porto  Rican  expedition — plan — 
forces — diverted  to  Santiago,  614;  at  Guantanamo — strength  of  de 
tachment — lands  at  Guanica,  615 ;  operations  in  Porto  Rico,  615, 
616 ;  operations  in  Porto  Rico  criticised — his  appreciation  of 
strategic  principle  of  secrecy,  628. 

MILITARY  DIVISION,  of  the  West,  557. 

MILITARY  HISTORY,  American  boy's  ignorance  of,  530. 

MILITARY  POLICIES,  sec  policies,  military. 

MILITIA,  refuses  to  cross  Canadian  boundary — deserts  General  Hopkins, 
64 ;  burns  Newark  and  withdraws  to  U.  S.,  69 ;  at  battle  of  Bladens- 
burg,  73 ;  burden  of  Washington's  complaint,  75 ;  Jefferson's  opin 
ion — lesson  taught  by  War  of  1812,  76 ;  troops  called  out  in  War 
of  1812,  77 ;  absence  of,  in  Mexican  war,  124 ;  Pennsylvania,  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  359;  Georgia,  in  Hood's  army,  543. 

MILL  SPRINGS,  battle  of,  154. 

MILROY,  General,  at  battle  of  McDowell,  225 ;  at  Winchester,  358. 

MINE,  the  Petersburg,  520-1. 

MINON,  General,  his  cavalry  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

MINOR  OPERATIONS,  Red  River  campaign,  586. 

MINTY,  General,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  428,  440;  at  Chickamauga, 
431;  delays  Bragg,  432. 

MISSIONARY  RIDGE,  battle  of,  454-9;  comments,  see  battles  around  Chat 
tanooga,  comments ;  Confederates'  faulty  position,  458. 

MISSISSIPPI,  Army  of  the,  Johnston's,  171. 

MISSISSIPPI,  the  Division  of,  see  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

MISSISSIPPI,  Confederate  forces  there  in  autumn  1862,  396. 

MISSISSIPPI,  Trans.  Department,  557. 

MISSISSIPPI  RIVER,  Confederate  forts  on,  150;  object  of  Vicksburg  cam 
paign — its  importance,  394 ;  Confederate  defenses — situation  along, 
in  September,  1862,  395;  held  fast  by  Federals,  557. 

MISSOURI,  held  in  the  Union,  130. 

MITCHELL.  General  R.  B.,  commands  Union  cavalry  in  Chickamauga 
campaign,  431. 

MOLINO  DFL  REY,  battle  of,  116. 

Monitor,  fights  Merrimac,  195. 

MONMOUTH,  battle  of,  35. 

MONONGAHELA  RIVER,  battle  of,  7. 

MONROE  DOCTRINE,  violation  of,  by  Napoleon  III,  588. 

MONROE,  FORT,  see  Fort  Monroe. 

MONROE,  JAMES,  scouts  for  British,  72 ;   at  battle  of   Bladensburg,   73. 

MONTCALM,  commands  the  French  forces — captures  Oswego — at  Ticon- 
deroga,  10;  captures  Fort  William  Henry,  11 ;  at  Ticonderoga,  12; 
his  preparations  to  meet  Wolfe's  army,  and  his  difficulties — his 
dispositions,  14 ;  fights  Wolfe  on  Plains  of  Abraham — is  defeated 
and  killed,  18. 

MONTEREY,  the  battle  of,  88;  Taylor  advances  on — its  position  and  de 
fenses — captured,  89;  terms  of  capitulation — forces  and  losses,  90; 
why  Taylor's  objective,  97. 

Monterey,  in  Dewey's  fleet,  612. 

MONTGOMERY,  General,  expedition  to  Canada,  27 ;  killed;  28. 

MONTGOMERY,  ALA.,  Confederate  provisional  government  organized 
there,  128. 


708  INDEX. 

MONTMORENCI,    HEIGHTS    OF,    Wolfe's    repulse,    15. 

MONTOJO,  at  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  611;  fleet  no  match  for  Dewey's,  618. 

MONTREAL,  Nicholson's  expedition  against,  3 ;  captured  by  English,  20. 

MORELL,  General,  commands  division  of  Fifth  Corps,  199;  crosses  Po 
tomac  after  Antietam,  284. 

MORGAN,  General,  at  Bemis  Heights,  33 ;  at  The  Cowpens,  47. 

MORGAN,  G.  W.,  in  Vicksburg  expedition,  398. 

MORGAN,  JAS.  D.,  sent  to  Tennessee,  555 ;  returns  to  Georgia,  562. 

MORGAN,  JOHN  H.,  in  campaign  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  167; 
interrupts  Union  line  of  communications,  309 ;  breaks  L.  &  N.  Rail 
way  a  second  time,  313 ;  after  Stones  River,  422. 

MORRIS,  ROBERT,  raises  funds  for  support  of  army,  41. 

MORRO  CASTLE,  armament,  595. 

MOSBY,  Colonel  JOHN  S.,  prints  letter  of  General  Lee  concerning  con 
centration  at  Gettysburg,  foot-note,  361. 

MOTT,  General,  at  Wilderness,  477 ;  at  Spottsylvania,  493 ;  with  War 
ren's  attack,  494;  fails  to  support  Upton,  495;  discovers  salient, 
496. 

MOVEMENT,  FLANK,  sec  flank  movement. 

MOVEMENT,  TURNING,  see  turning  movement. 

MUNFORD,  T.  T.,  at  Antietam,  267. 

MUNFORDVILLE,  effect  of  Bragg's  seizure,  324. 

MURFREESBORO,  battle  of,  see  Stones  River,  battle  of ;  campaign,  see 
Stones  River  campaign ;  evacuated  by  Bragg  and  occupied  by  Rose- 
crans,  320;  Bragg  takes  position  to  protect,  327;  troops  at,  during 
Nashville  campaign,  572. 

MURRAY,  General,  left  in  command  at  Quebec — commands  column  from 
Quebec  against  Montreal,  20. 

NAPOLEON,  his  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees,  56 ;  his  Maxim  XXVII,  183 ; 
on  a  "cool  head,"  256;  Maxim  LXXVII,  foot-note,  275;  his  Maxim 
XXIX  violated  in  Fredericksburg  campaign,  305 ;  his  Maxim  LXJS 
on  councils  of  war,  foot-note,  410;  Maxim  LXIV ',  482;  Maxim 
XXV,  550. 

NAPOLEON  III,  sets  up  empire  in  Mexico,  588. 

NASHVILLE,  Franklin  and,  campaign,  see  campaign  of  Franklin  and 
Nashville;  Hood's  advance  to,  563. 

NASHVILLE,  battle  of — Schofield's  arrival,  571 ;  Cruft's  "casuals" — 
troops  at  Murf reesboro — Federal  dispositions  before,  572 ;  delayed 
by  storm — Thomas's  plan,  573 ;  battle-field,  574 ;  Union  line,  second 
day,  575 ;  Confederates  routed — losses — Hood's  retreat,  576 ;  com 
ments,  583 ;  strategy  and  tactics,  584 ;  Hood's  mistakes,  584 ;  For 
rest's  absence — why  Hood's  army  escaped,  585. 

NATCHEZ,  taken  by  Farragut,  395. 

NAVAL  DIVERSION,  use  of,  Camara's  fleet,  619. 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS,  of   Spanish-American  war  discussed,   617-21. 

NAVY,  cooperates  with  army  in  Mexican  war,  99;  at  siege  of  Vera 
Cruz,  106;  its  aid  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign,  421;  assists  in  cross 
ing  the  James,  513 ;  aids  Shafter's  army  to  land,  598 ;  cannot  fight 
land  batteries,  621 ;  in  battle  of  Manila,  627 ;  American,  in  the 
Revolutionary  War,  41 ;  at  outbreak  of  Civil  War,  128 ;  need  of, 
at  outbreak  of  Civil  War,  143 ;  in  1898,  591 ;  compared  with  Span 
ish,  618. 

NAVY,  BRITISH,  active  on  French  coast,  11. 

NAVY,  SPANISH,  in  1898,  591. 

NAVIES,  HOSTILE,  in  Spanish-American  War,  591,  592. 

NECESSITY,  FORT,  see  Fort  Necessity. 

NECESSITY,  POLITICAL,  see  "political  necessity." 


INDEX.  709 

NEGLEY,   General,   besieged   at   Nashville   by   Forrest — relieved   by    Mc- 

Cook,  312;  at  Stones  River,  315;  driven  back,  317;  withdraws  from 

dangerous  position,  429;  at  Chickamauga,  432. 
NELSON'S  FARM,  see  Glendale. 
NELSON,  General,  his  division  reaches  Shiloh,   179 ;  begins  second  day's 

engagement  at  Shiloh,  181. 

NEWARK,  Washington  marches  to — Cornwallis  advances  on,  30. 
NEW  ENGLAND,  opposition  to  War  of  1812,  62;  its  attitude  in  War  of 

1812,  77. 

NEWFOUNDLAND,  touched  by  John  Cabot,   1. 
NEW  HOPE  CHURCH,  battle  of,  540. 

NEW  JERSEY,  campaign  between  Washington  and  Clinton  in,  35. 
NEWNAN,  combat  at,  545. 
NEW  ORLEANS,   British  operations  against — battle  of,   74;  captured  by 

Farragut,  394. 
NEWSPAPERS,  cry  for  advance  on  Manassas,  131;  of  South  decry  A.  S. 

Johnston,  183. 

NEWTON,  General,  sent  to  Tennessee,  555 ;  returns  to  Georgia,  562. 
NEW  YORK,  Clinton's  army  withdraws  to,  35 ;  British  purchase  supplies 

in,  77. 

New  York,  at  Santiago,  593. 
NEW  YORK,  Seventy-first,  at  San  Juan,  606. 
NIAGARA,  FORT,  see  Fort  Niagara. 
NICHOLSON,    Colonel,    organizes    expedition    against    Canada — commands 

expedition  against  Port  Royal — captures  Port  Royal,  2 ;  commands 

land  forces  against  Montreal,  3. 

NIGHT  ATTACKS,   Wauhatchie  criticised — General   Alexander  on,  451. 
NINTH   CORPS,  in  Army  of   the  Potomac,  470;   at  Wilderness,  474;   in 

movement  to  James,  513;  at  Petersburg,  517;  assault  June  18,  518; 

siege  of  Petersburg,  519 ;  the  Mine,  521 ;  part  assigned  to  Warren, 

523 ;  in  movement  October  27,  525. 
NORFOLK,  evacuated  by  Confederates,  198. 
NORTH  ANNA,  Confederate  position,  501. 
NORTH  CAROLINA,  joins  Confederacy,  129. 
NORTH  and  SOUTH,  .similar  policies,  463. 
NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  Army  of,  see  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

OAK  HILL,  364. 

OBJECTIVE,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  354;  in  Chickamauga  campaign, 
439;  every  operation  should  have  definite  object,  532. 

O'BRIEN,  Lieutenant,  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

OHIO,  Army  of  the,  see  Army  of  the  Ohio. 

Olympia,  Dewey's  flagship,  611. 

ONTARIO,  LAKE,  as  line  of  invasion,  5. 

OPDYCKE,  General,  at  Spring  Hill,  567;  at  Franklin,  569,  583;  his 
charge,  570. 

OPERATIONS,  line  of,  sec  line  of  operations. 

OPERATIONS,  MINOR,  see  minor  operations. 

OPERATIONS,  of  1756— of  1757,  10;  of  1758,  11;  in  1812,  58;  in  the 
East  in  1812,  62;  in  1813,  65;  in  1814,  70;  at  New  Orleans,  74; 
Scott's,  in  Mexico,  106;  after  Vera  Cruz,  107;  in  vicinity  of  City 
of  Mexico,  113;  in  campaign  against  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson, 
153;  Antietam  campaign,  262;  Bragg's,  in  Kentucky,  310;  concen 
tration  at  Chancellorsville — battle  of  Chancellorsville,  332;  Sedg- 
wick's,  344 ;  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  357 ;  Grant's,  against  Vicks- 
burg,  401 ;  Chickamauga  campaign,  427 ;  theater  of,  see  theater  of 
operations ;  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  470. 

Oquendo,  at  battle  of   Santiago,  610. 


710  INDEX. 

ORANGEBURG,  captured  by  Sumter,  49. 

ORCHARD  KNOB,  assault,  453. 

ORD,  General,  at   luka — at   Corinth,   376;   commands   Eighteenth   Corps, 

521 ;  commands  Twenty- fourth  Corps,  526. 
ORDERS,  Sedgwick's  method  of   making  his  understandable,    149 ;   defect 

in  those  of    President   Davis  to  Joseph   E.   Johnston — Beauregard's 

at   first   battle   of    Bull    Run   not   understood,    149;    war,    sec    "war 

orders,"  193. 
Oregon,  her  long  voyage,  591 ;  at  Santiago,  593 ;  at  battle  of   Santiago, 

610. 

ORISKANY,  battle  of,  32. 

ORLEANS,  Island  of — Wolfe's  army  lands,  14. 
ORTEGA,  General,  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 
OSTERHAUS,  General,  at  Champion's  Hill,  411;  at  Chattanooga,  453;  at 

Mt.  Lookout,  455. 

OUTPOST  DUTY,  badly  done  at  Stones  River.  328. 
Ox  HILL,  battle  of,  see  Chantilly. 

PACHECO,  General,  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

PADIERNA.  see  Contreras,  113. 

PADUCAH,  KY.,  occupied  by  Grant,  150. 

PAKENHAM,  Sir  EDWARD,  commands  expedition  against  New  Orleans. 
74. 

PALMA,  Resaca  de  la,  see  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 

PALMER'S  SQUADRON,  covers  retreat  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  140. 

PALMER,  General,  at  Stones  River,  316;  at  Chickamauga,  433 ;  at  Chat 
tanooga,  450;  resigns,  foot-note,  544;  insubordination,  546. 

PALO  ALTO,  battle  of — prairie  set  on  fire,  85 ;  losses,  87 ;  its  effect,  88 ; 
criticised,  96,  100. 

PAPERS,  NEWS,  see  newspapers. 

PARAS,  its  situation,  91. 

PAREDES,  General,  heads  a  revolution,  81. 

PAREDES,  Captain,  captured  at  Santiago,   10. 

PARIS,  Treaty  of  1763,  20. 

PARKE,  General,  commands  Ninth  Corps,  524;  in  movement.  October 
27,  525. 

PARKER,  Admiral,  combines  with  Clinton  to  attack  Charleston,  43. 

PARKER,  Lieutenant,  at  San  Juan,  607. 

PATTERSON,  General,  selected  to  command  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz. 
103;  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  131;  his  operations  against  Johnston. 
134 ;  his  mismanagement  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  144 ;  in  command 
by  "political  necessity,"  530. 

PEACH  ORCHARD,  372,  376. 

PEACHTREE  CREEK,  battle  of,  543. 

PEARSON,  Colonel,  at  San  Juan,  606 ;  assault  of   San  Juan  Hill,  607. 

PELHAM,  Major  JOHN,  at  Fredericksburg,  297. 

PEMBERTON,  FORT,  see  Fort  Pemberton. 

PEMBERTON,  General,  sent  to  command  Southern  forces  in  Mississippi, 
397 ;  his  forces  in  Mississippi — has  no  cavalry — deceived  by  Grant, 
403;  his  forces.  May  11,  407;  telegram  to  Johnston  and  reply — 
measures  to  resist  Grant,  408 ;  at  Edwards's  Station — shilly-shal 
lies — at  Champion's  Hill,  410;  at  the  Big  Black — fails  to  obey 
Johnston's  orders  to  evacuate  Vicksburg— dispositions  to  hold 
Vicksburg,  412;  besieged,  414;  surrenders.  415;  his  difficulties  and 
blunders  discussed,  418 ;  scatters  his  forces,  419 ;  what  he  should 
have  done — consequences  of  his  failure  to  obey  orders,  420. 

PENDUR,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  296 ;  at  Gettysburg,  365 ;  second 
day,  375;  third  day,  380. 


INDEX.  711 

PENETRATION,  strategic,  sec  strategic  penetration. 

PENINSULA,  the,  geography  of,   195. 

PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN,  closely  related  to  Jackson's  Valley  cam 
paign,  191 ;  strength  and  losses  in  Seven  Days'  Battles — comments, 
209. 

PENNSYLVANIA,  Eighth,  Cavalry,  see  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry;  the 
Forty-eighth,  prepares  the  Mine,  520. 

PENOBSCOT  RIVER,  as  line  of  invasion,  5. 

PEPPERELL,  WILLIAM,  captures  Louisburg,  6. 

PERRY,  Commodore,  wins  victory  of  Lake  Erie,  66;  captures  Tam- 
pico,  91. 

PERRYVILLE,  battle  of,  312;  a  rencounter,  325. 

PETERSBURG,  siege  of,  sec  siege  of  Petersburg;  Grant  plans  capture, 
— fortifications — garrison — Butler's  attempt  to  capture,  512;  at 
tacked  by  W.  F.  Smith,  515-16;  Federal  assaults — Confederate 
army  concentrates — assault,  June  18,  518;  siege  begins,  519;  the 
Mine,  520-22 ;  lines  extended,  522 ;  Grant's  movement,  February 
— Warren's  operations — operations  at  Reams's  Station,  524 ; 
Warren  destroys  Weldon  Railway,  525;  operations,  February,  1865, 
525 ;  final  operations,  526 ;  siege  ends,  527 ;  key  to  Richmond — 
Grant's  measures  to  capture — Smith's  failure — Butler's  failure — 
Hancock's  delay  fatal,  529;  political  effect  of  its  fall,  531;  could 
not  be  invested,  533. 

PETTIGREW,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  364;  third  day,  380. 

PHILADELPHIA,  Howe's  campaign  at,  33;  captured  by  Howe — Corn- 
wallis's  headquarters — Howe's  army  winters  there — effect  of  its 
capture,  etc.,  35. 

PHILIPPINE  INSURGENTS,  encouraged  by  certain  class  of  Americans,  23. 

PHILIPPINE  INSURRECTION,  its  resemblance  to  our  Revolution — the  dif 
ference,  23. 

PHILIPPINE   ISLANDS,   Dewey's  victory,   611;    Merritt's   expedition,   612. 

PHIPS,  Sir  WILLIAM,  captures   Port  Royal — repulsed  by  Frontenac,    1. 

PICKENS,  General,  his  operations,  45. 

PICKETT,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  296;  not  at  Chancellorsville,  330; 
at  Chambersburg,  363 ;  had  come  up,  377 ;  at  Gettysburg,  third  day 
— troops  in  his  charge,  380 ;  charges,  382 ;  detached  from  Lee,  466 ; 
at  Cold  Harbor,  502;  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  516. 

PIERCE,  FRANKLIN,  commands  brigade  at  Churubusco,  114. 

PIGOTT,  General,  at  Bunker  Hill,  24. 

PILLOW,  General,  commands  volunteer  division  in  Scott's  army — at 
Churubusco,  114;  at  Chapultepec,  118;  commands  Confederate  left 
at  Fort  Donelson,  156;  sends  telegram  to  Johnston  announcing 
victory  at  Fort  Donelson,  158;  blunders,  159;  escapes  from  Fort 
Donelson,  160. 

PINE  MOUNTAIN,  Johnston's  position — troops  withdrawn •  from,  541. 

PIPE  CREEK,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  363. 

PITT,  the  great,  becomes  Premier — recalls  Loudon  from  America — fits 
out  expedition  against  Louisburg  and  Quebec — asks  colonies  for 
4,000  men,  11. 

PITT,  WILLIAM,  younger,  remarks  on  the  war,  55. 

PITT,  FORT,  see  Fort  Pitt. 

PITTSBURG  LANDING,  General  C.  F.  Smith's  force  camps  there,  172;  as 
camp  of  an  army,  184;  its  peril  not  appreciated  by  Union  com 
manders — Union  camps  not  intrenched,  184. 

PLATTSBURG,  battle  of,  72. 

PLEASANTON,  General,  commands  Union  cavalry,  263 ;  at  South  Moun 
tain,  265;  at  Antietam,  272;  in  pursuit  of  Stuart  in  Maryland,  285; 
to  command  cavalry  division,  329;  precedes  infantry  march  on 


712  INDEX. 

PLEASANTON,  General — Continued. 

Chancellorsville,  332 ;  reinforces  Sickles,  339 ;  put  in  Averell's  place, 
347 ;  at  Brandy  Station,  357 ;  succeeds  Stoneman  in  command 
of  cavalry  corps — in  Gettysburg  campaign,  358 ;  fights  Stuart,  359 ; 
transferred  to  Missouri,  470. 

PLEASANTS,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  proposes  the  Mine,  520. 

PLUM  RUN,  372. 

Pluton,  at  battle  of  Santiago,  610. 

POINT  ISABEL,  Taylor's  base,  84. 

POINT  LEVI,  seized  by  Wolfe's  troops,  15. 

POLICIES,  MILITARY.  Northern  and  Southern,  similar,  463. 

POLITICAL  NECESSITY,  discussed,  530. 

POLITICAL  STRATEGY,  sec  strategy,  'political. 

POLITICS,  in  Mexican  War,  103 ;  their  relation  to  war,  323. 

POLK,  JAMES  K.,  disapproves  Taylor's  terms  with  Ampudia,  90. 

POLK,  LEONIDAS,  occupies  Columbus,  Ky.,  150;  commands  division  in 
A.  S.  Johnston's  army,  171;  at  Stones  River,  315;  attacks  and  is 
repulsed,  320 ;  his  mistake  at  Stones  River,  328 ;  in  Chickamauga 
campaign,  429;  fails  to  attack,  430;  at  Chickamauga,  431;  bivouacs 
at  Lee  and  Gordon's,  432 ;  commands  left  wing — <ioes  not  obey 
Bragg's  order,  435 ;  tried  for  disobedience,  447 ;  in  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  535;  joins  Johnston  at  Resaca,  538;  in  retreat  from  Resaca, 
539;  at  Cassville,  540;  in  front  of  Marietta— killed,  541. 

POPE,  General,  commands  at  Commerce,  169 ;  captures  Island  No.  10, 
182;  should  have  been  at  Shiloh  with  forces,  185;  to  command 
Army  of  Virginia,  239 ;  his  threefold  task — position  of  his  different 
corps,  239 ;  his  theater  of  operations — concentrates  his  army,  240 ; 
joins  army,  242;  stops  with  army  behind  the  Rapidan,  243;  with 
draws  behind  the  Rappahannock — sees  Jackson's  column  but  orders 
no  movement,  244;  his  preliminary  orders  to  oppose  Jackson's 
turning  movement — orders  concentration  at  Manassas,  245;  or 
ders  concentration  on  Centreville,  246 ;  orders  assembly  on  War- 
renton  Pike — his  army  scattered,  247;  his  order  to  Porter,  248; 
a  later  order  to  Porter — orders  pursuit  on  August  30,  249 ;  with 
draws  to  Centreville,  where  other  troops  join  him,  250;  with 
draws  to  Washington,  251 ;  three  phases  of  his  campaign,  253 ; 
his  mistake  in  holding  the  Rapidan — handicapped  by  Halleck's  or 
ders,  254 ;  might  have  marched  on  Richmond — his  first  movements 
judicious — his  opportunity  to  attack  the  wings  of  Lee's  army 
separately,  255;  had  not  a  cool  head — his  fatal  mistake — jumped 
to  false  conclusions,  256;  issued  contradictory  orders — never  un 
derstood  the  situation — his  mistake  in  attacking  August  30— his 
mistake  in  withdrawing,  257;  relieved,  260;  joins  Halleck  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  308. 

POPLAR  SPRINGS  CHURCH,  end  of  intrenchments,  525. 

PORTER.  Admiral,  shells  Grand  Gulf,  404;  aids  assault  of  Vicksburg, 
413;  his  aid  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign.  421. 

PORTER,  ANDREW,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133;  at 
first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138;  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194. 

PORTER,  FITZ-JOHN,  commands  Fifth  Corps  of  A.  P.,  199;  defeats  An 
derson,  200 ;  withdraws  from  Beaver  Dam  Creek  to  Gaines's  Mill — 
at  Gaines's  Mill,  204;  ordered  to  Bristoe  Station,  245;  receives 
Pope's  order — encounters  Longstreet  at  Dawkins  Branch,  248; 
on  August  30,  at  second  Bull  Run,  250;  his  trial,  251;  commands 
Fifth  Corps,  262;  at  Antietam,  272;  pursues  after  Antietam,  284; 
bears  dispatch  to  Sampson,  592;  at  Santiago,  593. 

PORT  GIBSON,  battle  of,  404. 

PORT  HUDSON,  garrisoned  by  Breckinridge,  395 ;  commanded  by  General 
Gardner,  403 ;  surrenders  to  Banks,  416. 


INDEX.  713 

PORTO  RICAN  EXPEDITION,  614-616;  comments,  627-8. 

PORTO  Rico,  capture  of — discussed,  627-8 ;  expedition  to,  see  Porto  Rican 
expedition. 

PORT  REPUBLIC,  battle  of,  232. 

PORT  ROYAL,  captured,  1 ;  name  changed  to  Annapolis  Royal,  2. 

POSEY,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  377. 

POSITION,  flank,  see  flank  position,  31. 

POSITION  in  readiness,  Bragg's,  at  Stones  River,  315,  327. 

POTOMAC,  ARMY  OF,  see  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

POTTER,  General,  at  Wilderness,  474;  May  6,  481;  at  Petersburg.  517; 
the  Mine,  521. 

"POWER  OF  ATTRACTION,"  its  definition,  40;  as  illustrated  by  Greene's 
operations,  54. 

PRENTISS,  General,  commands  division  in  Smith's  expedition,  170;  his 
division  gives  way  at  Shiloh,  177;  at  the  Hornets  Nest,  178. 

PRESCOTT,  General,  at  Breed's  Hill,  24. 

PRESTON,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  434. 

PREVOST,  General,  invades  Georgia,  43. 

PREVOST,  SIR  GEORGE,  defends  Canada,  57;  repulsed  at  Sacketts  Har 
bor,  68;  at  battle  of  Plattsburg,  72. 

PRICE,  STERLING,  commands  in  Mississippi,  309 ;  in  Mississippi — at 
luka — at  Corinth,  396 ;  in  Missouri,  563. 

PROCTOR,  General,  captures  Americans  at  Frenchtown — operations  against 
Harrison,  65;  repulsed  at  Fort  Stephenson — defeat  of  the 
Thames,  66. 

PUEBLA,  occupied  by  Scott,  110. 

PUTNAM,  ISRAEL,"  at  Breed's  Hill,  24;  routed  at  Brooklyn  Heights,  29; 
occupies  Princeton,  31. 

QUALIFICATIONS,  of  a  commander,  259. 

QUEBEC,  established  by  Champlain — captured  by  Kirk — reserved  to 
France  at  peace  of  St.  Germain-en-Laye,  1 ;  strategic  importance, 
4 ;  its  defensive  strength,  14 ;  Wolfe's  operations  against,  15 ;  sur 
rendered  to  British — besieged  by  French  under  Levis,  20;  besieged 
by  Arnold  and  Montgomery,  27. 

QUEEN  ANNE'S  WAR,  2 ;  closed,  3. 

QUITMAN,  General,  commands  volunteer  division  in  Scott's  army,  114; 
at  Chapultepec,  118;  appointed  military  governor  of  City  of  Mexico, 
119. 

RABI,  General,  in  Santiago  campaign,  598. 

RADFORD'S  SQUADRON,  pursues  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  141. 

RAFFERTY,  Major,  commands  only  mounted  squadron  in  Santiago  cam 
paign,  596. 

RAID,  cavalry,  when  successful  and  when  a  failure — examples  of  each 
kind,  323;  Sheridan's,  criticised,  508;  Trevilian  Raid,  510;  Wilson's, 
in  Virginia,  520;  cavalry,  in  Georgia,  545;  Wheeler's,  in  Georgia, 
546. 

RAILWAYS,  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  151 ;  advantage  of,  possessed 
by  Southern  armies,  356;  Sherman's  dependence  upon,  552. 

RAISIN  RIVER,  battle  of,  see  Frenchtown. 

RAPIDAN,  to  James — summary  of  operations,  504;  distinctive  features, 
505. 

RAW  TROOPS,  at  Shiloh,  190;  unfit  for  offensive  operations,  209. 

RAWDON,  Lord,  at  Camden,  45;  defeats  Greene  at  Hobkirk's  Hill — re 
treats  to  Monk's  Corners,  49. 

RAYMOND,  combat  at — effect  on  Grant's  plans,  408. 

READINESS,  position  in — Bragg's,  at  Stones  River,  327. 

REAMS'S  STATION,  combat  at,  524. 


714  INDEX. 

RECONNAISSANCE,  lack  of,  at  San  Juan,  625. 

RECONSTRUCTION,  army  used  to  aid  in,  588. 

RECRUITING,  difficulty  in  war,  76. 

RED  RIVER  CAMPAIGN,  586. 

REGULAR  ARMY,  see  Army,  Regular. 

REGULARS,  compared  with  volunteers,  103 ;  in  Mexican  War,  124. 

RENO,  General,  ordered  to  support  McDowell — to  Manassas,  245 ;  at 
South  Mountain,  265. 

RESACA,  McPherson  approaches,  538;  Johnston  retreats,  538,  539;  Sher 
man's  failure  criticised — Napoleon's  Maxim  XXV ,  550. 

RESACA  DE  LA  PALMA,  battle  of,  85;  losses,  87;  its  effect,  88;  effect 
of  American  victory  there,  100. 

RESERVE,  its  use  at  Franklin,  583 ;  an  army  not  beaten  so  long  as  it 
has  a,  351. 

REVERE,  PAUL,  24. 

REVOLUTIONARY  WAR,  THE,  comments  on  Northern  Campaigns,  sec 
Comments;  the  English  laws  ignored  by  colonists — colonial  gov 
ernors — customs  and  other  laws — events  leading  up  to  the  billeting 
of  troops — arrogance  of  British  officers,  21;  the  stamp  tax — 
smuggling — duty  on  tea — billeting  of  troops — the  Boston  mas 
sacre—the  Tea  Party,  22;  the  difference  between  it  and  the  Philip 
pine  insurrection — its  resemblance,  23 ;  civil  government  ceases  in 
Massachusetts — preparing  for  war — Massachusetts  declared  in  re 
bellion — Fisheries  Bill  passed,  24 ;  British  plans  and  strategy — 
American  plan,  26;  lessons  taught  by,  38;  American  navy  in,  41; 
southern  campaigns,  42;  comments,  53;  influence  of  de  Grasse's 
fleet,  55. 

REY,  General  VARA  DE,  killed,  605. 

REYNOLDS,  J.  F.,  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  204 ;  ordered  to  Gainesville — 
to  Manassas,  245 ;  at  second  Bull  Run,  250 ;  commands  First  Corps, 
290;  holds  railway  at  Fredericksburg,  298;  commands  First  Corps, 
330 ;  occupies  South  Mountain  passes,  359 ;  at  Marsh  Run,  363  ;  at 
Gettysburg— killed,  366. 

REYNOLDS,  J.  J.,  at  Chickamauga,  432. 

RIALL,  General,  commands  British  opposed  to  Brown,  71. 

RICHARDSON,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194;  at  Antietam,  271. 

RICHMOND,  Duke  of,  remarks  on  the  war — the  colonies,  55. 

RICHMOND,  Va.,  Confederate  troops  there,  131;  its  peril  at  beginning  of 
Peninsular  campaign,  199;  defenses  in  June,  1864,  511;  lines  of 
supply,  512;  why  Southern  capital — weak  point,  533. 

RICH  MOUNTAIN,  battle  of,  130. 

RICKETTS,  JAMES  B.,  his  battery  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  139;  at 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  242 ;  at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  245 ;  marches 
on  Bristoe,  247;  at  Antietam,  269. 

Rio  GRANDE,  Sheridan's  expedition,  588. 

RIVER,  as  line  of  operations  and  communications,  167. 

RIVER  LINE,  attack  and  defense  of,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  424;  at 
tack  and  defense  of,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  418;  positions  taken 
by  J.  E.  Johnston,  553. 

ROADS,  bad  in  campaign  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  166. 

ROBERTSON,  BEVERLY  H.,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  362. 

ROBINSON  HOUSE,  in  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138. 

ROBINSON,  JOHN  C.,  at  Gettysburg,  366;  in  movement  to  Spottsylvania — 
wounded,  489. 

ROBLES,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  his  opinion  of  Cerro  Gordo,  121. 

ROCHAMBEAU,  Count,  commands  French  troops  with  Washington,  51. 

RODDEY,  General,  579. 


INDEX.  715 

RODES,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  339;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  358; 
at  Carlisle,  359 ;  position  second  day,  375 ;  does  not  support  Early, 
377;  reinforces  Johnson,  378;  third  day,  380;  at  Wilderness,  475. 

RODGERS,  Commodore,  attacks   fort  at   Drewry's   Bluff,   198. 

RODMAN,  General,  at  Antietam,  272. 

ROME,  captured,  539. 

ROMNEY,  seized  by  Jackson,  219. 

ROSECRANS,  General,  succeeds  Buell — concentrates  at  Nashville,  312; 
collects  supplies  at  Nashville — advances  on  Murfreesboro — army 
in  three  columns,  313;  poor  work  of  his  cavalry,  314;  his  army 
the  night  befpre  Stones  River,  315 ;  plans  to  attack  Bragg — 
his  plan,  316;  on  the  defensive,  317;  forms  new  line — assaulted, 
319;  occupies  Murfreesboro,  321;  his  reply  to  Halleck's  threatening 
letter,  326;  his  plan  of  battle  at  Stones  River — faulty  position  of 
his  right,  327;  at  luka— at  Corinth,  396;  after  Stones  River- 
lacked  cavalry — urged  by  War  Dept. — army  reorganized — in  Tulla- 
homa  campaign,  423 ;  plan  for  capture  of  Chattanooga,  424 ;  dis 
positions  at  end  of  Tullahoma  campaign — ordered  to  advance,  425  ; 
advances  to  the  Tennessee,  427;  crosses  the  Tennessee  and  ad 
vances — his  columns  far  apart — their  position  May  10,  428;  con 
centrates  at  Chickamauga,  430;  takes  defensive  position,  431; 
guesses  Bragg's  plan — makes  dispositions,  431 ;  dispositions,  morn 
ing  September  19,  432;  dispositions  for  second  day,  434;  driven 
from  field,  436;  line  of  communications  at  Murfreesboro,  438; 
advantage  of  numbers — objective — summary  of  Tullahoma  cam 
paign,  439 ;  first  use  of  turning  movements — strategy,  440 ;  peril 
ous  situation,  441 ;  withdraws  to  Chattanooga,  445 ;  line  of  sup 
ply,  serious  condition,  446;  measures  for  relief — army  reorganized, 
447;  succeeded  by  Thomas — Dana's  report,  448;  projected  short 
line  of  supply,  449 ;  never  wholly  invested,  463 ;  operations  like 
Sherman's,  548. 

Ross,  General  ROBERT,  marches  on  Washington — at  battle  of  Bladens- 
burg — takes  Washington  and  burns  Capitol,  etc. — moves  against 
Baltimore,  73. 

ROSSER,  General,  at  Spottsylvania,  490. 

"ROUND  ROBIN,"  the,  610. 

ROUND  TOP,  LITTLE,  sec  Little  Round  Top. 

ROUND  TOPS,  371. 

ROUSSEAU,  General,  at  Stones  River,  316;  driven  back,  318;  cavalry 
raid  in  Alabama,  543 ;  in  Atlanta  campaign,  544 ;  at  Nashville,  555 ; 
defeats  Bate,  572. 

RUBIN,  General,  withdraws  toward  Santiago,  599;  at  Las  Guasimas, 
600 ;  his  orders  at  Las  Guasimas,  623. 

RUGER,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  379 ;  at  Columbia,  565 ;  at  Spring  Hill, 
567;  at  Franklin,  569. 

RULES  OF  WAR,  point  out  dangers,  348. 

RUM  MEL  HOUSE,  cavalry  combat  near,  383. 

RUNYON,  General,  commands  McDowell's   fourth  division,   133. 

SABINE  CROSS  ROADS,  battle  of,  586. 
SACKETTS  HARBOR,  repulse  of  British,  68. 
SAILOR'S  CREEK,  combat  at,  527. 


716  INDEX. 

ST.  GERMAIN-EN-LAYE,  peace  at,  1. 

ST.  JOHN  RIVER,  as  line  of  invasion,  5. 

ST.  LAWRENCE  RIVER,  French  flag  planted  by  Verrazzano — French  flag 
carried  up  by  Jacques  Cartier,  1 ;  as  line  of  invasion,  5. 

ST.  LEGER,  General,  commands  a  British  column — fights  Nicholas  Her- 
kimer  at  Oriskany,  32. 

SALEM  CHURCH,  battle  of,  345. 

SALIENT,  at  Spottsylvania,  495 ;  attacked,  496 ;  losses — criticised— Lee 
withdraws,  498. 

SALTILLO,  Taylor  advances  to — its  strategic  importance,  90. 

SAMPSON,  Admiral,  at  Key  West,  591 ;  searches  k>r  Cervera's  fleet, 
592 ;  in  doubt  about  Cervera's  whereabouts — at  Santiago,  593 ; 
blockades  Cervera — bombards  forts,  594 ;  in  Shaf ter's  attack,  602 ; 
shells  Aguadores,  608 ;  foresaw  effect  of  destruction  of  Cervera's 
fleet,  617. 

SANDERS,  FORT,  see  Fort  Sanders. 

SANDY  HOOK,  Clinton's  army  withdraws  to,  35. 

SAN  JUAN  HILL,  battle  of,  Shafter's  plan — topography,  602;  battle  of. 
604 ;  Derby's  balloon  starts  battle — Spanish  force,  605  ;  battle  of, 
606-8;  battle  of,  July  2,  608;  battle  of— comments,  624;  compared 
with  battle  of  Manila,  627. 

SAN  PATRICIO,  companies,  115. 

SANTA  ANNA,  takes  command  of  Mexican  army,  90;  threatens  to  ad 
vance,  91 ;  gets  possession  of  Scott's  dispatch  to  Taylor — advances 
against  Taylor,  92 ;  at  Buena  Vista,  93 ;  retreats  to  San  Luis 
Potosi,  95 ;  his  mistakes  at  Buena  Vista,  102 ;  his  movements  after 
Buena  Vista — goes  to  Cerro  Gordo,  108 ;  after  Cerro  Gordo,  109 ; 
at  Contreras,  114;  proclaims  victory  at  Molino  del  Rey,  117;  re 
signs  presidency  of  Mexico — defeated  by  General  Joe  Lane — death, 
119;  his  mistakes  at  Cerro  Gordo,  121;  did  not  anticipate  direction 
of  Scott's  advance — his  failure  to  defend  road,  123 ;  his  qualities — 
his  mistake  in  quitting  Orizaba,  125. 

SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA,  campaign  of,  see  Santiago  campaign. 

"SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA,  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF,"  Captain  Sargent's,  foot-note, 
588. 

SANTIAGO  CAMPAIGN — after  Sampson  shut  up  Cervera,  505 ;  Shafter's 
army  embarks — organization  and  strength  of  American  army — 
army  reaches  Cuba.  596;  geography  of  theater — Spanish  troops. 
597 ;  Americans  land — Lawton's  advance  to  Siboney,  598 ;  Shafter's 
orders  for  June  24,  599 ;  army  at  Sevilla — confusion  on  transports. 
601 ;  Shafter's  plan  of  attack — battle-field — topography,  602 ;  force 
and  armament  July  1,  603;  Spanish  forces,  605;  capitulation  of 
Spanish — Escario's  column  enters — rtaval  battle,  609 ;  losses — health 
of  army — "Round  Robin" — army  withdraws,  610 ;  Miles  diverted 
to  Santiago,  614 ;  comments — naval  operations,  617-21 ;  land  opera 
tions,  621-6;  if  Santiago  had  been  taken  July  1,  626. 

SARATOGA,  Burgoyne's  defeat  and  surrender  at,  33. 

SARGENT,  Captain,  "The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,"  foot-note,  588. 

SAVAGE'S  STATION,  battle  of,  206. 

SAVANNAH,  besieged  by  General  Lincoln,  44;   captured,  585. 

SCHENCK,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133 ;  at 
battle  of  McDowell,  225. 


INDEX.  717 

SCHLEY,  Admiral,  commands  Flying  Squadron,  591 ;  sails  for  Gulf  o( 
Mexico,  592;  thinks  Cervera  is  at  Cienfuegos,  593;  at  Santiago — 
discovers  Cervera's  fleet,  593 ;  Flying  Squadron  detained  at  Hamp 
ton  Roads — sent  to  join  Sampson,  618. 

SCHOFIELD,  General,  succeeds  Burnside  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  536;  at  Dalton,  538;  in  pursuit  from  Resaca,  539;  at  New 
Hope  Church — at  Cassville,  540 ;  moves  to  Soap  Creek — moves 
down  Sandtown  Road,  542 ;  at  Peachtree  Creek,  543 ;  battle  of 
Atlanta,  544;  at  Eastpoint,  546;  operations  south  of  Atlanta. 
546-7;  occupies  Decatur,  547;  sent  to  Knoxville,  557;  at  Johnson- 
ville — at  Pulaski — sent  .to  Thomas,  563;  at  Columbia,  564-5;  re 
treats  to  Franklin — at  Spring  Hill,  567 ;  in  retreat — wires  Thomas 
— at  Franklin,  568 ;  retreats  from  Franklin — leaves  dead  and 
wounded,  571 ;  position  at  Nashville,  572 ;  in  Thomas's  plan — order 
written  for  him  to  supplant  Thomas,  573 ;  preliminary  movements, 
574;  takes  Wilson's  place — second  day,  575;  in  pursuit,  576;  peril 
at  Spring  Hill,  582. 

SCHURZ,  CARL,  at  Chancellorsville,  340;  driven  back,  341;  at  Gettys 
burg,  366. 

SCHUYLER,  PHILIP  JOHN,  commands  Americans  against  Burgoyne,  32; 
relieved  from  command,  33. 

SCHWAN,  General  THEODORE,  in  Porto  Rican  expedition,  615. 

SCOTT,  WINFIELD,  captured  at  Queenstown,  63 ;  commands  brigade — at 
battle  of  Chippewa,  71 ;  at  Lundy's  Lane,  72 ;  advises  Taylor  to 
withdraw  to  Monterey,  99 ;  goes  to  Mexico  to  command — his  plan — 
takes  troops  from  Taylor — makes  preparations — selects  Island  of 
Lobos  as  base,  105;  begins  operations — lands  in  Mexico,  106; 'at 
Cerro  Gordo — marches  on  Puebla,  109 ;  abandons  communications 
and  advances  on  City  of  Mexico,  110;  in  the  Valley  of  Mexico, 
111;  takes  City  of  Mexico,  118;  establishes  provisional  government 
in  Mexico — his  campaign  over,  119;  comment  on  his  campaign — 
cause  and  effect  of  his  delay,  120 ;  his  lack  of  transportation,  121 ; 
Wellington's  criticism  of — relies  on  his  engineers,  122;  handicapped 
by  lack  of  funds  and  supplies,  123;  his  campaign  shows  benefit 
of  training,  124 ;  ordered  before  court  of  inquiry — comment  of 
Mexican  historian,  126 ;  at  outbreak  of  Civil  War,  130 ;  directs 
Federal  forces,  132 ;  calls  on  McDowell  for  plan,  133  ;  his  mistake 
concerning  Patterson's  force,  144;  retires,  192;  too  old  for  active 
command,  235 ;  his  Mexican  campaign  compared  with  Grant's 
Vicksburg  campaign,  416. 

SEA,  command  of,  its  importance,  211,  618. 

SEARCH,  right  to,  England's  claim  of,  56. 

SECESSION,  States  pass  ordinance  of — struggle  in  border   States,   129. 

SECOND  CORPS,  at  Wilderness,  472;  in  movement  to  James,  513;  assault 
June  18,  518;  siege  of  Petersburg,  519;  operations  north  of  James, 
520 ;  the  Mine,  521 ;  commanded  by  Humphreys,  525  ;  in  movement 
October  27,  525 ;  pursuit  to  Appomattox,  527 ;  at  Farmville,  528. 

SEDGWICK,  General,  has  dunce  to  read  his  orders,  149 ;  commands  divi 
sion  in  A.  P.,  194;  at  Antietam,  270;  commands  Sixth  Corps,  330; 
to  make  demonstration,  331;  crosses  Rappahannock,  332;  his  opera 
tions  in  Chancellorsville  campaign — his  orders  from  Hooker — as- 


718  INDEX. 

SEDGWICK,  General — Continued. 

saults  Marye's  Hill,  344 ;  carries  it — at  Salem  Church,  345 ; 
withdraws  across  Rappahannock,  346 ;  his  operations  criticised, 
351 ;  better  to  have  held  Marye's  Heights — well  he  was  stopped  at 
Salem  Church,  352 ;  ordered  to  reconnoiter  Confederate  position 
at  Fredericksburg — reports  army  in  position,  357;  at  Manchester, 
363  ;  marches  from  Manchester,  373 ;  in  pursuit  of  Lee's  army,  384 ; 
at  Germanna  Ford,  472 ;  orders  May  5,  474 ;  ordered  to  attack, 
475 ;  May  6,  479 ;  right  rolled  up,  481 ;  movement  to  Spottsylvania, 
488;  at  Spottsylvania,  490;  killed,  492. 

SELMA,  Confederate  arsenal,  557. 

SEMINARY  RIDGE,  364. 

SEMMES,  General,  at  Gettysburg — mortally  wounded,  376. 

SEVEN  DAYS'  BATTLES,  204;  strength  and  losses,  209. 

SEVEN  PINES,  battle  of,  201 ;  Confederate  losses — result  of  Confederate 
defeat,  202 ;  Johnston's  only  offensive  battle,  549. 

SEVENTEENTH  CORPS,  in  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  536. 

SEVEN  YEARS  WAR,  11. 

SEVIER,  JOHN,  at  battle  of  Kings  Mountain,  46. 

SEYMOUR,  General,  at  Wilderness,  481. 

SH AFTER,  General,  commands  Fifth  Corps — ordered  to  Santiago,  595 ; 
starts,  596;  organization  of  army — reaches  Cuba — confers  with 
naval  officers  and  Garcia,  596;  gets  information  from  Garcia — de 
barks,  598 ;  orders  for  June  24,  599 ;  remains  on  Seguranqa — awaits 
unloading — joins  army  ashore,  601;  plan  of  attack,  602;  observes 
from  El  Poso,  602;  orders  Lawton  to  San  Juan,  604;  troops  dis- 
spirited,  608 ;  considers  withdrawing  to  Sevilla— demands  surren 
der,  609 ;  health  of  army — the  "Round  Robin" — army  withdraws 
from  Cuba,  610;  his  choice  of  a  base  and  line  of  operations  dis 
cussed,  621 ;  mistake  at  El  Caney,  624,  625. 

SHALER,  General,  at  Wilderness,  481. 

SHARPSBURG,  battle  of,  see  Antietam. 

SHELBY,  ISAAC,  at  battle  of  Kings  Mountain,  46. 

SHENANDOAH  VALLEY,  its  strategic  importance,  132;  its  importance — 
situation,  etc.,  216 ;  not  a  good  line  of  operations  for  Northern 
army,  218 ;  cleared  of  Union  troops,  358. 

SHEPHERD'S  BRIGADE  OF  REGULARS,  at  Stones  River,  318. 

SHERIDAN,  General,  at  Stones  River,  315;  wheels  and  charges,  317; 
forced  back,  318;  one  of  four  full  generals  in  U.  S.  Army,  354; 
at  Chickamauga,  433 ;  driven  from  field,  436 ;  his  mistake,  444 ; 
at  Chattanooga,  454;  at  Missionary  -Ridge,  458-9;  to  command 
Grant's  cavalry,  470;  leads  Grant's  advance,  472;  at  Wilderness, 
May  5,  474 ;  combats  Stuart,  480 ;  poor  cavalry  work — had  not 
learned  lesson,  484 ;  movement  to  Spottsylvania,  488 ;  first  raid,  490 ; 
in  movement  after  North  Anna — at  Haw's  Shop — absent  on  raid, 
501 ;  cavalry  ought  to  have  blocked  Anderson,  507 ;  raid  criticised, 
508;  his  Trevilian  raid,  510;  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  511;  with 
Hancock  north  of  James,  520;  the  Mine,  521;  rejoins  from  the 
valley — in  Appomattox  campaign,  526;  at  Dinwiddie  C.  H. — Five 
Forks — in  pursuit  to  Appomattox,  527 ;  stops  Lee's  retreat.  528 ; 
political  effect  of  his  success  in  the  valley,  531 ;  in  pursuit  to  Appo 
mattox,  533 ;  expedition  to  Rio  Grande  border,  588. 


INDEX.  719 

SHERMAN,  W.  T.,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133; 
at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  138;  and  Jackson  only  general  shows 
tactical  knowledge  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  147;  commands 
division  in  Smith's  expedition,  170;  takes  detachment  to  Eastport, 
171;  reports  all  quiet  at  Shiloh,  175;  forms  for  battle,  176;  falls 
back — his  right  turned,  177 ;  commands  pursuit  after  Shiloh,  181 ; 
one  of  four  full  generals  in  U.  S.  Army,  354;  operations  against 
Vicksburg  by  the  Mississippi,  398 ;  his  failure  at  Chickasaw  Bluffs 
— commands  Fifteenth  Corps,  399;  at  Jackson,  409;  at  the  Big 
Black,  412 ;  covers  siege  of  Vicksburg — pursues  Johnston  to  Jack 
son,  415;  at  Chattanooga,  452;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  457;  assaults 
Nov.  25 — fails,  457;  at  Knoxville — returns  to  Chattanooga,  460; 
succeeds  to  command  of  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  469 ;  in 
Georgia,  510;  political  effect  of  his  successes  over  Hood,  531;  suc 
ceeds  Grant  in  Tennessee — causes  of  delay — organization  of  his 
forces — distribution  and  strength  of  forces,  536;  instructions  from 
Grant — turns  Dalton  position — Atlanta  his  objective,  537;  at 
Resaca,  538 ;  pursues  Johnston,  539 ;  turns  Allatoona  Pass — at 
New  Hope  Church,  540 ;  assaults  Kenesaw  Mountain — closes 
on  Johnston,  541 ;  at  Smyrna — crosses  Chattahoochee  in  pur 
suit,  542 ;  Peachtree  Creek,  543 ;  battle  of  Atlanta,  544 ;  position 
July  31 — his  opinion  of  cavalry,  545 ;  operates  against  Hood's  com 
munications,  544-6;  disappointed  by  Kilpatrick — continues  general 
movement,  546;  takes  Atlanta,  547;  campaign  compared  with 
Grant's,  547-8 ;  operations  like  Rosecrans's,  548 ;  mistakes,  548-50 ; 
criticises  McPherson,  549 ;  his  failure  at  Resaca  criticised — failure 
to  attack  Hood  en  route  to  Lovejoy,  550;  opportunities  for  John 
ston  to  attack — wanted  to  make  war  without  fighting — could  not 
operate  far  from  the  railways,  552 ;  if  Johnston  had  fortified  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  553 ;  occupies  Atlanta — conditions  in  army — ejects  in 
habitants — not  decided  what  to  do — communications  interrupted, 
555 ;  correspondence  with  Grant,  556 ;  prepares  for  Hood,  557 ; 
moves  to  oppose  Hood,  558 ;  pursues  Hood — halts  at  Gaylesville — 
turns  back  and  prepares  for  march  to  sea — correspondence  with 
Grant,  559 ;  assembles  his  forces,  560 ;  dispatches  Fourth  Corps  to 
Thomas,  562 ;  dispatches  Twenty-third.  Corps,  563 ;  pursuit  of 
Hood  reviewed — strategic  position  at  Gaylesville,  577;  suspension 
of  pursuit  of  Hood  discussed,  578 ;  his  advance  to  the  sea,  585 ; 
advances  into  North  Carolina — at  Goldsboro — Johnston  surrenders, 
586. 

SHIELDS,  General,  garrisons  Tampico,  91;  at  Contreras,  113;  at  Churu- 
busco,  114;  ordered  to  quit  Valley  and  join  McDowell,  199;  at 
Kernstown,  221 ;  lets  Jackson  escape  at  Strasburg,  229 ;  pursues, 
230 ;  at  battle  of  Port  Republic,  232 ;  in  command  by  "politcal 
necessity,"  530. 

SHILOH,  danger  of  Union  position  at,  see  Pittsburg  Landing;  not  in 
trenched,  see  Pittsburg  Landing. 

SHILOH,  the  campaign  of — Confederate  troops  concentrated  for — 
distribution  of  troops  in  theater,  169;  battle-field  described,  172; 
camps  of  Union  army  at — Union  camp  there  without  intrench- 
ments  or  outposts,  173 ;  Confederate  advance  on,  175 ;  battle  of, 
begins,  176-8;  battle  of,  Union  left  turned,  177;  battle  of,  end  of 


720  INDEX.  ' 

S  H  ILOH — Continued. 

first  day — Union  troops  bivouac  after,  179 ;  Confederates  occupy 
Union  camps — condition  of  Confederate  and  Union  armies  on 
second  day,  180;  second  day — battle  of,  Union  line  on  second  day, 
181 ;  strength  and  losses — comments — difficult  to  get  the  truth  of, 
182;  effect  of  Confederate  defeat — Johnston's  concentration — tactics 
of — neither  army  commanded,  186 ;  Confederate  plan — faults  in 
Union  encampment,  187 ;  faults  of  Confederate  attack — conduct 
of  the  troops,  188;  Beauregard  should  have  withdrawn — cavalry 
at— artillery  at,  189. 

SHIRLEY,  Governor,  commands  expedition  against  Niagara,  9. 

SIBONEY,  Lawton  advances  on,  598 ;  Spaniards  withdraw — action  with 
Castillo,  599 ;  American  army  at,  601. 

SICKLES,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  298;  commands  Third  Corps,  330; 
at  Chancellorsville,  335;  attacks  Jackson  at  Catherine  Furnace, 
339;  orders  Birney  to  attack  at  night,  342;  at  Bridgeport,  363;  at 
Gettysburg,  367 ;  his  advanced  position,  373 ;  attacked,  375 ;  forced 
back,  376;  his  faulty  line  at  Gettysburg,  390. 

SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG — after  Cold  Harbor,  510;  begins,  519;  the  Mine, 
520-1;  lines  extended,  522;  Grant's  movement,  Oct.  27 — War 
ren's  operations — operations  at  Reams's  Station,  524 ;  Warren's 
operations — extent  of  intrenchments,  525 ;  Warren  destroys  Wei- 
don  Ry. — operations  February,  1865 — Warren's  operations — ex 
tent  of  intrenchments,  525;  final  operations,  526;  ends,  527;  com 
ments,  528 ;  Grant's  and  Lee's  advantages,  530 ;  compared  with 
Port  Arthur,  533 ;  compared  with  Atlanta  campaign,  547,  548. 

SIEGES,  the  lesson  of,  421. 

SIERRA  MADRE,  Mexican  line  of  defense,  88. 

SIGEL,  General,  commands  corps  under  Pope,  239;  ordered  to  Gaines 
ville — to  Manassas,  245 ;  on  August  30,  at  second  Bull  Run,  250 ; 
commands  Eleventh  Corps,  262 ;  commands  Reserve  Corps 
(Eleventh  Corps),  290;  does  nothing  but  retreat,  470. 

Six  NATIONS,  4. 

SIXTEENTH  CORPS,  part  in  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  536;  part  sent  to 
Tho.mas,  563 ;  reaches  Nashville,  572. 

SIXTH  CORPS,  at  Wilderness,  472;  May  14,  499;  in  movement  to  James, 
513;  at  Petersburg,  517;  siege  of  Petersburg,  519;  dispatched  to 
Washington,  520;  rejoins,  526;  pursuit  to  Appomattox,  527. 

SLAUGHTER  MOUNTAIN,  sec  Cedar  Mountain. 

SLOCUM,  General,  commands  division  of  Sixth  Corps,  199;  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  205;  commands  Twelfth  Corps,  330;  at  Chancellorsville,  335 ; 
near  Harper's  Ferry,  359 ;  ordered  to  cut  Lee's  communications, 
360 ;  at  Littlestown,  363 ;  at  Gettysburg,  367 ;  sent  to  aid  Rose- 
crans,  447;  commands  Twentieth  Corps,  foot-note,  544;  guards 
Chattahoochee  bridge,  546. 

SMITH,  A.  J.,  in  Vicksburg  expedition,  398:  at  Champion's  Hill,  411; 
ordered  from  Missouri  to  Tennessee,  563 ;  reaches  Nashville — posi 
tion,  572 ;  in  Thomas's  plan.  573 ;  preliminary  movements — advances, 
574 ;  drives  Confederate  left — second  day,  575 ;  in  pursuit,  576. 

SMITH,  C.  F.,  commands  a  division  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  156; 
carries  Confederate  works  at  Fort  Donelson,  160;  commands  ex 
pedition,  170;  camps  forces  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  172. 


INDEX.  721 

SMITH,  G.  W,  defeats  Franklin  at  West  Point,  198;  at  Seven  Pines, 
201 ;  retires  from  duty,  202 ;  at  Peachtree  Creek,  543. 

SMITH,  JOHN  E.,  at  Chattanooga,  452. 

SMITH,  KIRBY,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  140;  has  forces  at  Knox- 
ville — arranges  to  invade  Kentucky,  309 ;  advances  to  Kentucky — 
fights  at  Richmond — captures  Lexington,  310;  commands  Trans- 
Mississippi  Department,  557. 

SMITH,  M.  L.,  in  Vicksburg  expedition,  398. 

SMITH,  PERSIFOR  F.,  at  Contreras,  113. 

SMITH,  W.  F.,  commands  division  in  A.  P.,  194;  commands  division 
of  Sixth  Corps,  199 ;  commands  Sixth  Corps,  290 ;  at  Chattanooga, 
450;  at  Cold  Harbor,  502;  in  movement  to  James,  513;  ordered  to 
capture  Petersburg,  514;  attacks  Petersburg,  515-16;  siege  of 
Petersburg,  519. 

SMYRNA,  operations  near,  542. 

SMYTH,  General  ALEXANDER,  succeeds  Van  Rensselaer — his  operations 
— dropped  from  rolls  of  army,  63. 

SNAKE  CREEK  GAP,  Johnston's  failure  to  fortify,  553. 

SOUTH,  its  newspapers  decry  A.  S.  Johnston,  183. 

SOUTH  and  NORTH,  similar  policies,  463. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA,  fears  a  revolt  of  slaves,  43 ;  reduced  by  Clinton — 
frightful  condition  under  Cornwallis,  44 ;  passes  ordinance  of  seces 
sion,  128. 

SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY,  sec  Confederacy. 

SOUTH  MOUNTAIN,  battle  of,  265 ;  battle  of,  discussion,  277. 

SPAIN,  declares  war  against  England,  42 ;  causes  of  war,  589 ;  declares 
war,  590;  makes  overtures  for  peace,  616;  divides  her  fleet — 
her  navy  compared  with  ours,  618. 

SPANGLER'S  SPRING,  365. 

SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR,  588 ;  causes,  589 ;  declarations  of  war — plan — 
preparations,  590 ;  navies,  591 ;  fleets,  592 ;  Cervera  blockaded  at 
Santiago — Sampson  shells  forts,  594;  situation  after  Sampson 
shuts  up  Spanish  fleet,  595;  Santiago  campaign,  589-611;  operations 
in  the  Philippines,  611-14;  Porto  Rican  expedition,  614-16;  peace — 
comments,  616-28;  navy  dictates  plan,  616;  plan  of  War  Depart 
ment — no  combined  plan  beforehand,  617;  importance  of  sea  con 
trol — comparison  of  hostile  fleets,  618;  our  unpreparedness,  619; 
quick  passage  of  events,  620;  naval  operations  discussed,  617-21; 
El  Caney  discussed,  624;  San  Juan  and  Kettle  Hill  discussed,  625, 
626;  comments — land  operations  against  Santiago,  621-6;  capture 
of  Manila  discussed,  626 ;  cooperation  of  army  and  navy,  627 ; 
battles  of  Manila  and  San  Juan — El  Caney  compared,  627. 

SPEAR,  General,  with  Warren,  523. 

SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE,  battle  of — armies  move,  May  7,  488 ;  why 
a  strategic  point — battle,  why  fought — battle  begins,  489;  no  bat 
tle  May  9 — troops  intrench — Confederate  position,  492 ;  no  battle 
May  11 — attack  May  12,  496 — losses  at  salient — position  at  salient 
criticised — line  withdrawn — no  battle  May  13 — orders  for  May  14, 
498;  no  fighting  May  15-17,  499;  May  18— May  19— losses,  500 ; 
comments,  503 ;  movement  from  Wilderness  discussed,  506. 

SPRING  HILL,  battle  of,  565 ;  battle  of,  comments,  581. 

SQUADRON,  the  Flying,  591. 


722  INDEX. 

STANDING  ARMY,  sec  army,  regular. 

STANLEY,  General,  commands  Fourth  Corps,  559 ;  sent  to  Thomas,  562 ; 
under  Schofield,  foot-note,  563;  at  Columbia,  564;  at  Spring  Hill. 
566,  567,  581 ;  wounded,  foot-note,  572. 

STANNARD'S    BRIGADE,   at   Gettysburg,   382. 

STANTON,  Secretary  of  War,  directs  military  operations,  223 :  writes 
to  governor  of  Massachusetts — pays  no  attention  to  protests  of 
McClellan  and  McDowell,  228 ;  ill  effect  of  his  lack  of  military 
knowledge,  233  ;  not  to  blame  for  selecting  Halleck,  253  ;  had  de 
cided  with  President  and  Halleck  to  relieve  Hooker,  360 ;  meets 
Grant  at  Louisville,  447;  his  injustice,  448;  impatient  at  Thomas's 
delay,  572. 

STANWIX,  FORT,  see  Fort  Stanwix. 

STAR  OF  THE  WEST,  at  Fort  Sumter,  128. 

STARK,  JOHN,  at  Breed's  Hill,  24;  at  Bennington,  32;  contributes 
money  for  support  of  army,  41. 

STATEN  ISLAND,  Howe's  army  lands  at,  29. 

STEEDMAN,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  437;  at  Chattanooga,  555;  at 
Nashville — position,  572 ;  in  Thomas's  plan,  573 ;  opens  attack,  574 ; 
second  way,  575 ;  supports  Wood,  576. 

STEELE,  General,  in  Vicksburg  expedition,  398. 

STEINWEHR,  General,  at  Chancellorsville,  340;  at  Gettysburg,  368. 

STEUART,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  377;  captured,  496. 

STEUBEN,  Baron,  effect  of  his  instruction,  35;  in  Virginia,  46. 

STEVENS,  General  I.  I.,  killed  at  Chantilly,  251. 

STEVENSON,  C.  L.,  commands  along  the  Mississippi,  403 ;  at  Champion's 
Hill,  411;  at  the  Big  Black,  412. 

STEVENSON,  T.  G.,  at  Wilderness,  474;  reinforces  Hancock,  479;  May 
6,  479. 

STEWART,  A.  P..  at  Chickamauga,  433  ;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  458 ;  suc 
ceeds  Loring.  543 ;  at  Ezra  Church,  545 ;  on  Hood's  advance.  557 : 
564;  at  Spring  Hill,  566,  567;  at  Franklin.  569,  570;  at  Nashville, 
571,  575:  action  at  Spring  Hill  crticised,  582. 

STONEMAN,  General,  pursues  Johnston  from  Yorktown  with  Union  cav 
alry,  197;  commands  Third  Corps,  289;  to  command  Cavalry 
Corps,  329;  on  raid.  331;  his  raid  during  Chancellorsville  cam 
paign,  346 :  effect  of  operations  before  battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
348 ;  his  cavalry  needed  at  Chancellorsville,  350 ;  replaced  by 
Pleasanton  in  command  of  cavalry  corps,  358 ;  in  Atlanta  cam 
paign.  538:  seizes  Allatoona — covers  Sherman's  left.  540;  reaches 
the  Chattahoochee,  542 :  raid  in  Georgia.  544-5. 

STONFS  RIVKR.  308;  the  right  spelling  of  name,  font-note,  308;  battle 
of — battle-field.  314;  Union  and  Confederate  plans  identical — Con 
federates  get  the  initiative.  317:  their  final  assault.  320;  hostile 
lines  bivouac  night  of  December  31.  1862 — no  fighting  January  1, 
320 :  comments.  321  ;  Breckinridge's  attack  on  January  2  repulsed — 
little  fighting  on  January  3.  320 ;  Bragg  withdraws — action  of 
Wheeler's  cavalry,  321 ;  comments — why  Bragg  attacked — plans  of 
hostile  commanders  identical,  327 ;  bad  outpost  duty — Ropes's  opin 
ion  of  the  fighting — tactics — artillery,  328 :  after  the  battle,  422. 

STRATEGIC  DIVERSION,  Jackson's  campaign  a,  234. 


INDEX.  723 

STRATEGIC  PENETRATION,  campaign  against  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson 
an  example  of,  162. 

STRATEGY,  its  province  to  dishearten  hostile  people,  167 ;  the,  of  Jack 
son's  operations  against  Banks,  228;  effect  of  Jackson's  operations 
against  Fremont  and  Shields,  233 ;  in  campaign  of  Shiloh,  sec 
comments ;  the,  of  Jackson's  operations,  234 ;  political,  an  example 
of,  274 ;  forces  must  be  kept  united,  foot-note,  275 ;  the,  of  Bragg's 
invasion  of  Kentucky,  322 ;  Hooker  combines  offensive  with  de 
fensive  tactics,  349 ;  how  Southern  railways  could  have  been  used 
to  advantage,  356;  strategic  position  of  Gettysburg,  364;  Lee's 
concentration  at  Cashtown,  387 ;  of  Grant's  Vicksburg  campaign, 
417;  attack  and  defense  of  a  river-line,  418;  Pemberton's  failure  to 
keep  army  united,  419;  objective  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  439; 
examples  of  attack  of  wing  and  turning  movement,  439;  its  chief 
end — Tullahoma  campaign,  439  ;  Rosecrans's  flank  movements — of 
Rosecrans  and  Bragg,  440;  effect  of  Grant's  victory  at  Chatta 
nooga — Confederacy  deprived  of  interior  lines,  462;  Union  and 
Confederate  similar,  463 ;  in  operations  from  Rapidan  to  James, 
506;  Grant's,  fools  Lee,  514;  Grant's  movement  to  the  James  fine 
example,  529 ;  of  Sherman  and  Rosecrans  alike,  548 ;  Sherman's 
position  at  Gaylesville,  577 ;  Hood's  invasion  of  Tennessee,  578-81 ; 
attack  at  Nashville,  584;  at  El  Caney,  624. 

STRENGTH  OF  A  POSITION,  measured  by  security  of  its  flanks,  338. 

STUART,  Colonel,  succeeds  Rawdon  in  South  Carolina — at  battle  of 
Eutaw  Springs,  49. 

STUART,  DAVID,  his  camp  at  Shiloh,  173. 

STUART,  J.%  E.  B.,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  140;  pursues,  141;  covers 
Johnston's  withdrawal  from  Yorktown,  197;  m's  raid  round  Mc- 
Clellan's  army — its  effect,  203;  sent  to  White  House,  206;  marches 
to  Gordonsville,  243 ;  raids  rear  of  Pope's  army,  244 ;  on  Jackson's 
turning  movement — captures  Manassas,  244 ;  after  second  Bull 
Run,  250;  in  campaign  of  second  Bull  Run,  259;  in  Antietam  cam 
paign,  263;  informs  Lee  that  McClellan  has  "S.  O.  191,"  265;  at 
Antietam,  267,  269 ;  his  raid  after  Antietam,  285 ;  •  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  296;  keeps  Doubleday  out  of  fight  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  307 ;  reports  Hooker's  advance,  332 ;  takes  command  after  Jack 
son  is  wounded,  342 ;  renews  attack  at  daybreak — captures  Fair- 
view — connects  with  Anderson,  343 ;  in  Gettysburg  campaign 
— at  Brandy  Station,  357;  covers  Lee's  army — fights  with 
Pleasanton,  359 ;  raid  during  Gettysburg  campaign — fights  Kil- 
patrick,  362;  rejoins  Lee  at  Gettysburg,  363;  brush  with  Federal 
cavalry,  July  3,  374;  had  arrived,  378;  combat  with  Union  cavalry, 
382 ;  his  work  in  Gettysburg  campaign  criticised,  393 ;  cause  of 
Lee's  failure  to  cut  off  Meade's  retreat  to  Centreville,  467 ;  warns 
Lee  of  Meade's  turning  movement,  468 ;  at  Wilderness,  May  5,  475 ; 
drawn  in,  478;  fights  Sheridan,  480;  excuse  at  Wilderness,  484; 
on  Union  flank,  487;  warns  Lee  of  Union  movement,  488;  follows 
Sheridan — Yellow  Tavern — mortally  wounded,  491 ;  guards  Cor- 
bin's  Bridge,  507. 

"STUART'S  CAVALRY  IN  THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN/'  by  Colonel  Mosby, 
foot-note,  361. 

STURGIS,  General,  at  Antietam,  273;  at  Fredericksburg,  299. 

SUMNER,  E.  V.,  at  Churubusco,  114;  at  Molino  del  Rey,  117;  commands 
Second  Corps  in  A.  P.,  194 ;  at  Savage's  Station,  206 ;  commands 
Second  Corps,  262 ;  commands  center,  264 ;  at  Antietam,  270 ;  com 
mands  right  Grand  Division,  289 ;  marches  to  Falmouth,  290 ;  at 
Fredericksburg,  293 ;  his  order  from  Burnside,  295 ;  retires  from 
army  of  the  Potomac,  330. 


724  INDEX. 

SUMNER,  S.  S.,  at  San  Juan— assaults  Kettle  Hill,  607. 

SUMTER,  FORT,  see  Fort  Sumter. 

SUMTER,    General,    his    operations,    45 ;    captures    British    train — defeats 

Tarleton  at  Blackstock  Hill,  46 ;  captures  Orangeburg,  49. 
SUNKEN  ROAD,  at  Marye's  Hill,  299 ;  its  defensive  strength,  304. 
SUPERIOR,  LAKE,  French  reach,  1. 
SUPPLIES,  base  of,  see  base  of  supplies. 
SWAMPS,  the,  400. 

SWINTON,  describes  artillery  fire  at  Fredericksburg,  294. 
SYKES,  GEORGE,  commands  regular  battalion  in  McDowell's  army,   134 ; 

covers  retreat  at  first  Bull  Run,  140;  his  regular  battalion  not  de- 
.    moralized    at    first    Bull    Run,    141 ;    commands    regular    brigade    in 

A.  P.,   194 ;  commands  division  of   Fifth  Corps,   199 ;   at  Antietam, 

272 ;  crosses  Potomac  after  Antietam,  284 ;  at  Chancellorsville,  335 ; 

at  Union  Mills,  363. 

TACTICS,  at  Shiloh,  188;  at  Antietam,  280;  at  Stones  River,  328; 
Hooker  combines  defensive  with  offensive  strategy — defensive  sel 
dom  decisive,  349 ;  an  army  not  defeated  which  has  reserves  un 
employed,  351 ;  advantages  and  defects  of  Union  line  at  Gettys 
burg,  371 ;  progressive  attack  at  Gettysburg — concave  order  of 
attack  at  Gettysburg — Sickles's  faulty  position,  390 ;  effect  of  high 
ground,  391 ;  at  Chickamauga,  443 ;  Bragg's  lines  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  458 ;  at  Wilderness — affected  by  dense  woods,  485 ;  no  plan 
— no  cooperation,  486 ;  advanced  position  at  Franklin,  583 ;  attack 
at  Nashville,  584;  at  El  Caney,  624,  625;  battle  of  Manila,  626; 
at  San  Juan  and  Kettle  Hill,  625,  626. 

TALIAFERRO,  Genera4,  at  Fredericksburg,  296. 

TAMAULIPAS,  to  be  occupied,  91. 

TAMPICO,  captured  by  Commodore  Perry — garrisoned  by  Shields — 
base  of  operations,  91. 

TARLETON,  defeated  at  Blackstock  Hill,  46 ;  defeated  at  The  Cowpens, 
47 ;  his  raid  toward  Charlottesville,  50. 

TAYLOR,  "Dicx."  at  battle  of  Port  Republic,  232;  commands  in  Mis 
sissippi  and  Alabama,  557;  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads,  586. 

TAYLOR'S  CAMPAIGN,  81 ;  see  Mexican  War,  Taylor's  campaign. 

TAYLOR,  ZACHARY,  sent  with  troops  to  Texas  border,  81 ;  his  plans  and 
instructions — advances  to  the  Rio  Grande,  83 ;  calls  on  governors 
for  troops — marches  to  Point  Isabel,  84;  at  battle  of  Palo  Alto — 
at  battle  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  85;  after  Resaca  de  la  Palma — 
establishes  depot  at  Cerralvo,  88 ;  advances  on  Monterey,  89 ;  cap 
tures  Monterey — his  terms  with  Ampudia  disapproved — ad 
vances  to  Saltillo,  90;  expedition  to  Victoria — receives  orders  de 
taching  large  force  to  Scott — returns  to  Saltillo,  91 ;  advances  to 
Agua  Nueva — at  Buena  Vista,  92 ;  falls  back  to  Monterey — his 
strategy  and  tactics,  95 ;  his  difficulties  of  supply  and  transport,  96 ; 
his  reasons  for  holding  Saltillo,  99 ;  his  chances  at  Buena  Vista, 
101 ;  troops  taken  by  Scott,  105. 

TECUMSEH,  see  Tecumthe. 

TECUMTHE,  incites  Indians,  57;  cuts  off  McArthur's  detachment,  61; 
killed  at  battle  of  Thames,  67. 

TELEGRAPH,  field,  used  in  battle  of  Manila,  626. 

TENNESSEE,  joins  Confederacy,  129;  its  military  geography — its  rail 
ways,  151 ;  Thomas's  forces,  when  invaded  by  Hood,  562. 

TENNESSEE,  ARMY  OF  THE,  see  Army  of  Tennessee. 

TENNESSEE,  EAST,  see  East  Tennessee. 

TENNESSEE  RIVER,  controlled  by  Union  gunboats,  169 ;  at  Chattanooga, 
449. 

TENTH  CORPS,  repulsed  by  Longstreet,  525;  discontinued,  526. 


INDEX.  725 

Teresa,  Maria,  see  Maria  Teresa 


TERRY'S  TEXAS  RANGERS,  167. 
TEXAS,  attains  independence—  annexation  of,  81;  geography  82-  Banks's 

11 


7V.r<w,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593. 
THAMES,  the  battle  of,  66 


,  , 

HEmTande?s  Rla™**'  ^  effect  °f   havi"g  tw°  independent  com- 

TH°oMfARo?'  rf"  '^  victor?1,at  Mil1  SPrin^s'  154;  commands  "center" 
of    Rosecranss   army,   313;    commands    Fourteenth    Corps    423  •    at 
Chickamauga,  431;  morning  September  19,  432;  left  in  command 
t^es    new    position,    436;     withdraws,    438;     succeeds     ScranT 

No4mrbdere^to4^ttack'^2;.in  plan  of  »ttai^KL5^!!: 

November  23,  453;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  458;  why  ordered  to  as 
sault,   461;   m  Atlanta  campaign,   536;    at   Dalton,   538  •   in  pursu  t 
from    Resaca     539;    at    Cassville-at    New    Hope    Church     540 
before    Pine    Mountain,   541;    at    Smyrna-extends    to    righUfol 
ows  up  Johnston,  542;  at  Peachtree  Creek,  543;  battle  c  f  Atlanta 
544;    operations    south    of    Atlanta,    546-7;    occupies    Atlanta     W-' 
sent  to  Nashville,  557;  his  forces  to  oppose  K'     invasion    562- 
lacks   forces-orders   Schofield   to   fall  back,   564-    preliminarv  dis' 


THOMAS,  E.  L.,  at  Fredericksburg,  296. 

THORNTON,  Captain,  his  dragoons  captured,  84 

1  HROGS  NECK,  Howe's  army  lands  there   29 

TICONDEROGA,  FORT,  see  Fort  Ticonderoga 

TICONDEROGA    Montcalm  at,  10;  attacked  by  Abercrombie    12-  captured 

by  Arnold  and  Allen,  24;  captured  by  Burgoyne,  32  P 

IILGHMAN    General,  commands  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson    ISO-  at 

Fort  Henry-builds  Fort  Heiman,   154;  does  right  at  For't  Henry! 

TOOMBS,  defends  Burnside  Bridge.  272. 
TORAL,  General,  at  Santiago    609 


lesson,  484;  m  movement  from  Spottsylvania    501 
)RiK,  fl      the  country-their  descendants  the  leading  men  of  Canada, 


Thornton's  dr^°°^,  84;   at  bat- 
TOTOPOTOMOY,  Confederate  intrenchments,   502 
IRAINING,  its  advantages  shown  in  Peninsular  campaign,  216 
TRANS-MISSISSIPPI  DEPARTMENT    557 
TREATIES,  Aix-la-Chapelle,  6. 
TREATY  OF  UTRECHT,  3. 

TRENTON,  Washington's  victory—  its  effect    31 
TREVILIAN  RAID,  510. 

TROOPS,  called  into  service  in  1812,  64;  employed  in  1813   70 
TULLAHOMA,  Bragg  withdraws  to  321 
TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN,  423;  summary  of,  424;  Union  and  Confederate 

S 


726  INDEX. 

T  URCHIN,  General,  at  Chattanooga,  450. 

TURNER'S  GAP,  battle  of,  see  South  Mountain,  battle  of. 

TURNING   MOVEMENT,   Jackson's,  244 ;    Pope's   orders   to  meet   it,   245 ; 

Jackson's,     criticised,     254 ;     Jackson's,     at     Chancellorsville,     338 ; 

Grant's,  505 ;  Sherman's,  548 ;  Sherman's  risks,  552. 
TWELFTH  CORPS,  sent  to  Rosecrans,  447;  consolidated,  536. 
TWENTIETH    CORPS,    consolidated,    447;    formed,    536;    commanded    by 

Slocum,  foot-note,  544;  guards  Chattahoochee  bridge,  546;   left  at 

Atlanta,  558. 

TWENTY-FIFTH  CORPS,  organized,  526. 
TWENTY-FIRST  CORPS,  consolidated,  447. 
TWENTY-FOURTH  CORPS,  organized,  526. 
TWENTY-THIRD  CORPS,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  536;   sent  to  Thomas,  563; 

.at   Franklin,   569 ;   position   at   Nashville,    572. 
TWIGGS,  General,   commands   one  of    Taylor's   divisions,   88;    commands 

one    of    Scott's    divisions,    106;    starts    for    Talapa,    107;    at    Cerro 

Gordo,  108 ;  surrenders  to  Texas  militia,   128. 
TYLER,  DANIEL,  commands  McDowell's  first  division,   133 ;  defeated  at 

Blackburn's  Ford,  136. 
TYLER,  S.  B.,  at  battle  of  Port  Republic,  232. 

UNION,  combat  at,  288. 

UNITED   STATES,   lacks  means   to   reduce  seceded    States — navy   in    1861, 

128;  policy  like  that  of  Confederacy,  463. 
UNPREPAREDNESS,  for  Spanish-American  War,  619. 
UPPERVILLE,  combat  at,  288 ;  cavalry  combat  at,  359. 
UPTON,  EMORY,  his  remarks  on  a  standing  army,  76 ;   at  Spottsylvania, 

495 ;  attacked,  499 ;  his  "Military  Policy  of  the  U.  S.,"  620. 
UTRECHT,  Treaty  of,  3. 

VALENCIA.  General,  occupies  Contreras,  112;  at  battle  of  Contreras, 
113;  his  mistakes  at  Contreras,  123. 

VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  see  Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  217. 

VALLEY  FORGE,  Washington's  army  at,  35.  " 

VALLEY  OF  VIRGINIA,  see  Shenandoah  Valley. 

VAN  CLEVE,  General,  at  Stones  River,  318;  at  Chickamauga,  433. 

VAN  DORN,  General,  ordered  from  Arkansas  to  Corinth,  169 ;  has 
command  in  Arkansas,  169  ;  commands  in  Mississippi,  309 ;  in  Mis 
sissippi — at  Corinth,  396;  captures  Grant's  depot  at  Holly  Springs, 
398;  joins  Bragg,  422. 

VAN  RENSSELAER,  General  STEPHEN,  commands  on  New  York  frontier 
— attacks  Queenstown,  62;  resigns,  63. 

VARNELL'S  STATION,  cavalry,  combat  at,  538. 

VAUDREUIL,  takes  charge  of  French  army  after  death  of  Wolfe,  19 ; 
surrenders  .  at  Montreal,  20. 

VARA  DE  REY,  General,  killed,  605. 

VERA  CRUZ,  siege  and  capture  of,  106;  roads  to  City  of  Mexico,  107; 
its  strategic  importance,  125. 

VERRAZZANO,  plants  French  flag  on  St.  Lawrence  River,   1. 

VETERAN  ACT,  536. 

VICKSBURG,  conditions  influence  Lee  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  354 ;  Far- 
ragut  tries  to  take — garrisoned  by  Confederates,  395 ;  its  situation, 
398 ;  Confederate  efforts  to  save — Grant's  operations  against,  401  ; 
plans  for  capture,  402 ;  defenses,  412 ;  Grant's  first  assault  fails — why 
Grant's  second  assault,  413 ;  the  second  assault — hostile  forces  in 
second  assault — besieged.  414;  Pemberton  surrenders.  415;  Grant's 
five  failures  against,  416;  summary  of  Grant's  campaign,  417;  les 
son  of  the  siege,  421. 


INDEX.  727 

VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN,  394;  failure  of  first  operations — Banks  fails  to 
cooperate — Grant  takes  command  at  Vicksburg — canal  started,  399  ; 
geography — Jackson  the  Confederate  base,  400;  operations,  401; 
Confederate  efforts  to  save  Vicksburg — Grant's  final  plan — Grant 
concentrates  at  Hard  Times,  402;  Confederate  forces  in  Missis 
sippi — Pemberton  puzzled,  403 ;  Grant's  army  across  the  Missis 
sippi,  406 ;  Grant  moves  against  railway — cuts  loose  from  base — 
hostile  forces,  May  11,  407;  combat  at  Raymond — Grant  moves  on 
Jackson,  408;  battle  of  Champion's  Hill,  410;  battle  of  the  Big 
Black — position  and  defenses  of  Vicksburg,  412;  Grant's  first  as 
sault  fails — Grant  lives  off  the  country — base  at  Steele's  Bayou — 
why  Grant  assaulted  Vicksburg  second  time,  413 ;  the  second 
assault — hostile  forces  in  second  assault — siege  begun,  414 ;  com 
ments — Grant's  five  failures,  416;  summary  of,  417;  Johnston  criti 
cised — Admiral  Porter's  aid  in — lack  of  cavalry,  421 ;  attack  and 
defense  of  a  river-line,  418 ;  Pemberton  scatters  forces,  419 ;  what 
Pemberton  should  have  done,  420;  lesson  of  the  siege,  421. 

VIRGINIA,  joins  Confederacy,  129. 

VIRGINIA,  the  Thirty-third,  at  first  battle  of  Bull  Run,  140. 

VIRGINIA,  ARMY  OF,  see  Army  of  Virginia. 

Virginius,  the,  affair,  589. 

Vixen,  in  Schley's  squadron,  593. 

Vizcaya,  at  battle  of  Santiago,  610. 

VOLUNTEERS,  compared  with  regulars,  103  ;  in  Mexican  War,  124. 

VON  MOLTKE,  advocated  flank  positions,  551. 

WADSWORTH,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  366;  on  Gulp's  Hill,  368;  at  Wil 
derness,  475,  478 ;  May  6,  479 ;  killed,  480. 

WAGNER,  ARTHUR  L.,  organizes  reconnaissance,  601. 

WAGNER,  GEO.  D.,  at  Columbia,  564;  at  Spring  Hill,  566;  at  Franklin, 
569,  570 ;  advanced  position  at  Franklin,  583. 

WALKER,  Admiral  Sir  HOVENDEN,  2;  fleet  wrecked  in  St.  Lawrence,  3. 

WALKER,  JOHN  G.,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  266;  at  Antietam,  270. 

WALKER,  W.  H.  T.,  at  Jackson,  409;'  joins  Bragg,  428;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  431;  delayed  by  Wilder — bivouacs,  432;  at  Chattanooga, 
454. 

WALLACE,  LEW,  commands  a  division  at  Fort  Donelson,  156;  commands 
division  in  Smith's  expedition,  170. 

WALLACE,  W.  H.  L.,  commands  division  in  Smith's  expedition,  170;  his 
dispositions  at  Shiloh,  177;  at  the  Hornets  Nest — killed,  178. 

WALTHALL,  General,  at  Mt.  Lookout,  454;  covers  Hood's  retreat,  576. 

WAR,  THE  CIVIL,  sec  Civil  War. 

WAR  COUNCIL  OF,  Napoleon's  MAXIM  LXV ',  foot-note,  410. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  its  plan  against  Spanish  in  Cuba — will  be  ready  in 
future,  617. 

WAR  ORDERS,  President   Lincoln's,   193. 

WAR,  rules  of,  point  out  dangers,  348. 

WAR  OF  1812,  comments  on — its  lessons,  75 ;  troops  engaged — strategy 
and  tactics  of,  77. 

WARS,  the  war  of  the  Austrian  succession,  6 ;  Colonial,  1 ;  French  and 
Indian — King  George's,  6 ;  King  William's,  1  ;  Queen  Anne's,  2 ; 
Queen  Anne's  closed,  3;  Seven  Years  War,  11;  the  War  of  1812, 
56. 

WARREN,  G.  K.,  at  Gettysburg,  368;  saves  Little  Round  Top,  376;  com 
mands  Fifth  Corps,  471;  at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  472;  orders. 
May  5,  474 ;  reports  enemy — ordered  to  attack — begins  battle,  475  ; 
May  6,  479 ;  movement  to  Spottsylvania,  488 ;  fired  on — delayed  by 
Fitzhugh  Lee,  489;  attacks,  490;  first  position,  493;  attacks  and  is 


728  INDEX. 

WARREN,  G.  K. — Continued. 

.  repulsed,  494 ;  renews  assault,  495 ;  repulsed — slow,  497 ;  to  co 
operate  with  Hancock,  496;  ordered  to  assault,  May  14,  498;  May 
18,  499 ;  in  movement  after  Spottsylvania — at  North  Anna,  501 ; 
movement  to  Spottsylvania  discussed,  506;  his  march  compared 
with  Lawton's,  507;  in  movement  to  James,  513;  at  Petersburg, 
517;  assault,  June  18,  518;  siege  of  Petersburg,  519;  the  Mine, 
521 ;  operations  against  Weldon  Railway,  523 ;  withdraws  and  in 
trenches — movement  to  the  left,  524;  movement  February,  1865 — 
second  operations  against  Weldon  Railway — in  movement,  October 
27,  525 ;  attacked  by  Hill,  526 ;  at  Five  Forks,  527 ;  covers  Grant's 
movement  to  the  James,  528. 

WASHINGTON,  FORT,  see  Fort  Washington. 

WASHINGTON,  GEORGE,  dispatched  to  French  commander,  6;  commands 
expedition  to  Monongahela  River — encounters  French  at  Great 
Meadows,  7 ;  takes  command  at  Cambridge,  24 ;  occupies  Dor 
chester  Heights  and  Nooks  Hill,  25 ;  transfers  army  to  New  York 
— unable'  to  oppose  Howe's  landing,  28 ;  divides  army  between  New 
York  and  Brooklyn  Heights — withdraws  to  Harlem  Heights — re 
pulses  British,  29;  attacked  at  White  Plains,  29;  withdraws  to 
North  Castle— divides  his  army — establishes  camp  at  Hackensack 
— marches  to  Newark — retreats — crosses  the  Delaware — his  army 
ceases  to  exert  "power  of  attraction,"  30 ;  defeats  Hessians  at 
Trenton — called  "Fabius  Cunctator" — withdraws  to  Morristown, 
31 ;  moves  from  Morristown — his  operations  against  Howe 
in  New  Jersey — movements  after  Howe's  withdrawal — at  battle  of 
Brandy  wine — retreats  to  Chester,  34 ;  at  battle  of  Germantown — 
at  Valley  Forge — at  battle  of  Monmouth — transfers  army  from 
New  Jersey  to  White  Plains,  35;  his  qualities — his  mistakes,  39; 
pledges  his  fortune  to  support  army,  41 ;  remains  three  years 
near  New  York — transfers  army  to  Yorktown — has  French  troops, 
51 ;  arrives  near  Yorktown — reaches  Lafayette's  headquarters — 
besieges  Yorktown — receives  surrender  of  Cornwallis,  53 ;  com 
plains  of  -militia — his  warning  to  the  people,  75 ;  one  of  four  full 
generals  in  U.  S.  army,  354. 

WASHINGTON,  Captain,  at  Buena  Vista,  93. 

WASHINGTON,  Colonel,  at  The  Cowpens,  47. 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  its  safety  first  consideration,  130;  what  its  capture 
would  have  done,  211;  fears  general  movement  of  Confederates; 
228 ;  alarm  there  after  second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  260. 

WATER  CURE,  employed  by  our  ancestors,  22. 

WATSON,  FORT,  see  Fort  Watson. 

"WEARING-OUT"  POLICY,  adopted  by  Clinton,  43 ;  its  effect,  44 ;  why 
adopted  by  Clinton,  54. 

WEBSTER,  Colonel,  puts  batteries  in  position  at  Shiloh,    178. 

WEBSTER,  DANIEL,  his  speech  on  General  Scott,  126. 

WEITZEL,  General,  with  Terry,  525 ;  commands  Twenty-fifth  Corps,  526. 

WELDON  RAILWAY,  Warren  operates  against,  523;  Warren's  second 
operations  against,  525. 

WELLINGTON,  Duke  of,  criticises  Scott,  122. 

WEST  INDIES  FLEET,  BRITISH,  see  British  West  Indies  fleet. 

WEST,  Military  Division  of,  557. 

WEST  POINT,  its  strategical  importance,  28. 

WEST  VIRGINIA,  established  as  loyal  State,  130;  opposing  troops 
there,  131. 

WEST  WOODS,  at  Antietam,  269. 

WEYLER,  General,  in  Cuba,  589. 

WHARTON,  General,  covers  Bragg's  army,  312. 

WHEAT  FIELD,  the  fight  for,  376. 


INDEX.  729 

WHEELER,  JOSEPH,  covers  Bragg's  army,  312;  reports  Rosecrans's  ad 
vance  from  Nashville — opposes  Rosecrans's  columns,  313;  at  Stones 
River,  315;  work  of  his  cavalry  during  battle  of  Stones  River,  321; 
after  Stones  River,  422 ;  excellent  work  of  his  cavalry  during 
Bragg's  invasion  of  Kentucky,  326;  a*  Chickamauga,  431;  in 
Chickamauga  campaign,  440 ;  siege  of  Chattanooga — raid,  445 ;  with 
Longstreet,  452 ;  effect  of  his  raid,  464 ;  in  Atlanta  campaign,  535 ; 
at  Dalton— at  Varnell's  Station,  538;  guards  Johnston's  left,  541; 
at  Peachtree  Creek,  543;  battle  of  Atlanta,  544;  at  Newnan,  545; 
raids  Sherman's  communications,  546;  in  Tennessee,  555;  rejoins 
Hood,  558 ;  at  Snake  Creek  Gap,  559 ;  to  harass  Sherman,  561 ;  com 
mands  cavalry  division  in  Santiago  campaign,  596 ;  at  Siboney,  599 ; 
at  Las  Guasimas,  600 ;  reconnoiters — ordered  not  to  bring  on  fight, 
601 ;  in  plan  of  attack,  602 ;  night  before  San  Juan,  603 ;  at  San 
Juan  and  Kettle  Hills,  604,  607;  sick,  foot-note,  607. 

WHIGS,  encourage  colonists,  23. 

WHIPPLE,  General,   attacks   Jackson  at   Catherine   Furnace,  339. 

WHITE  HOUSE,  McClellan's  headquarters  and  base,  198;  McClellan 
withdraws  stores  from,  206. 

WHITE  OAK  SWAMP,  McClellan's  army  passes,  206. 

WHITE  PLAINS,  Washington's  army  returns  to,  35. 

WHITING,  General,  at  Seven  Pines,  202;  dispatched  with  division  to 
Jackson,  203. 

WIKOFF,  Colonel,  at  San  Juan — killed,  606. 

WILCOX,  CADMUS,  at  Chancellorsville,  337;  sent  to  guard  Banks's  Ford, 
338 ;  occupies  Taylor's  Hill — falls  back — at  Salem  Church,  345 ;  on 
third  day,  380;  not  in  the  charge,  382;  joins  Heth,  477;  May  6, 
479. 

WILDER,  J.  T.,  mounts  brigade,  422;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  428; 
delays  Bragg — at  Chickamauga,  431;  driven  from  field,  436;  in 
Chickamauga  campaign,  440. 

WILDERNESS,  the  description  of,  325 ;  battle  of — autumn  and  winter  after 
Gettysburg,  466;  operations,  470;  strength  of  forces — Lee's,  posi 
tion  at  beginning  of  operations — Grant's  plan,  471 ;  Union  troops 
May  4 — trains  slow,  472 ;  Confederates  May  4 — battle-field,  473 ; 
first  day  begins,  475 ;  fierce  fighting  first  day,  477 ;  fighting  in  after 
noon — artillery — orders  for  May  6 — gap  in  line,  478;  battle  re 
newed,  479;  Mahone's  attack — Hancock  driven  back,  480;  Confed 
erate  success  and  repulse — battle  ends — May  7 — losses  and  strength, 
481 ;  comments,  482 ;  plan  discussed,  483  ;  armies  bivouac  close  to 
gether — pof>r  cavalry  work,  484 ;  tactics  affected  by  dense  woods, 
485 ;  no  plan — a  rencounter — no  concerted  action,  486 ;  Confed 
erate  center  might  have  been  pierced,  486;  Burnside  slow — inde 
cisive,  487 ;  strength  and  losses  -to  Cold  Harbor,  503 ;  to  Cold 
Harbor — distinctive  features  of  campaign,  505 ;  discussion  of 
operation  from,  to  the  James — movement  to  Spottsylvania  dis 
cussed,  506. 

WILKINSON,  JAMES,  replaces  General  Dearborn,  68;  wrangles  with 
Secretary  of  War — moves  down  St.  Lawrence — flees  to  French 
Mills,  69;  repulsed  at  Lacolle  Creek,  71. 

WILLCOX,  ORLANDO  B.,  commands  a  brigade  in  McDowell's  army,  133 ; 
at  Antietam,  273 ;  commands  Ninth  Corps,  289 ;  at  Wilderness,  474 ; 
May  6,  481;  at  Spottsylvania,  492;  at  Petersburg,  517;  the  Mine, 
521. 

WILLIAM  HENRY,  FORT,  sec  Fort  William  Henry. 

WILLIAMS,  General,  his  operations,  45;  at  battle  of  Kings  Mountain, 
46. 

WILLIAMS,  A.  S.,  at  Antietam,  269. 


730  INDEX. 

WILLIAMSBURG,  battle  of,  197;  losses  at,  198. 
WILLIAM  SPORT,  Lee's  position  at,  385. 

WlLLOUGHBY     RUN,    365. 

WILSON,  J.  H.,  to  command  cavalry  division,  470;  with  Warren  at 
Parker's  Store,  472;* May  5,  474";  combat,  476;  encounters  Stuart, 
478;  had  not  learned  cavalry  lesson,  484;  at  Spottsylvania,  490; 
should  have  held  Po  bridge,  507;  in  movement  to  James,  512; 
skirmishes — covers  right  of  army,  513;  raid  in  Virginia,  519-20; 
in  Grant's  movement  to  the  James,  528 ;  commands  Thomas's  cav 
alry,  563 ;  at  Columbia,  565 ;  driven  by  Forrest,  566 ;  covers  Scho- 
field's  retreat — at  Franklin — at  Edgefield,  571 ;  in  Thomas's  plan, 
573 ;  advances — preliminary  movements,  574 ;  moves  to  the  right — 
second  day,  575 ;  charges  Confederate  rear — in  pursuit,  576 ;  out 
generaled  by  Forrest,  581 ;  at  Nashville,  584 ;  unable  to  check  Hood's 
retreat,  585 ;  in  Porto  Rican  expedition,  615. 

WINCHESTER,  General,  captured  at  Frenchtown,  65. 

WINCHESTER,  battle  of,  between  Banks  and  Jackson,  227. 

WINDER,  General,  attacked  and  captured  at  Stoney  Creek,  68;  charged 
with  defense  of  Washington,  72;  retreats  on  approach  of  British — 
at  battle  of  Bladensburg,  73. 

WINTHROP,   General,   expedition   under,    1. 

WISE,  H.  A.,  at  Petersburg,  515. 

WITHERS,  JONES  M.,  at  Stones  River,  315. 

WOLFE,  General  JAMES,  with  British  forces  at  Halifax,  11  ;  commands 
expedition  against  Quebec — lands  at  Island  of  Orleans — his  opera 
tions  against  Quebec,  14;  his  army  in  four  camps — repulsed  at  the 
Montmorenci,  15;  continues  efforts  to  capture  Quebec.  16-17;  aban 
dons  camp  on  the  Montmorenci — discovers  trail  to  Plains  of  Abra 
ham,  17 ;  fights  Montcalm  on  Plains  of  Abraham — is  killed,  18. 

WOLF  HILL,  372. 

WOLSELEY,  Lord,  his  opinion  of  Jackson's  operations,  235. 

WOOD,  LEONARD,  at  Las  Guasimas.  600. 

WOOD.  T.  J.,  at  Chickamauga,  433 ;  at  Chattanooga,  454 ;  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  458-9;  at  Spring  Hill,  567;  at  Franklin,  569;  holds  bridges 
at  Franklin,  571;  commands  Fourth  Corps,  foot-note,  572;  in 
Thomas's  plan,  573 ;  preliminary  movements,  574 ;  breaks  Confed 
erate  line — second  day,  575  ;  repulsed — in  pursuit,  576. 

WOOL,  General,  marches  column  of  troops  into  Mexico — joins  Worth, 
91. 

WORKS,  field,  see  field-works. 

WORTH,  General,  commands  one  of  Taylor's  divisions,  88;  at  Monterey, 
89 ;  detached  from  Taylor  to  Scott,  91 ;  commands  one  of  Scott's 
divisions,  106;  at  Churubusco,  114;  at  Molino  del  Rey,  116;  at 
Chapultepec,  118. 

WORTH,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  wounded  at   San  Juan,  606. 

WRIGHT,  A.  R.,  at  Gettysburg,  377. 

WTRIGHT,  H.  G.,  at  Wilderness,  476;  commands  Sixth  Corps,  492;  first 
position,  493 ;  attacked  and  repulsed,  494 ;  renews  assault,  495 ; 
to  cooperate  with  Hancock,  496 ;  at  Bloody  Angle,  497 ;  attacks,  May 
18 — May  14,  499;  in  movement  after  Spottsylvania — at  North  Anna. 
501;  hurried  to  Washington,  511:  in  movement  to  the  James,  513; 
at  Petersburg,  517;  dispatched  to  Washington,  520;  rejoins  with 
Sixth  Corps,  526. 

WRIGHTSVILLE,   militia   destroys   bridge   and   town   catches    fire,    359. 

WYOMING  VALLEY,  massacre,  43. 

Yankee,  at  Guantanamo,  594. 

"YELLOW"  JOURNALISM,  its  influence  for  war,  589. 


INDEX.  731 

YELLOW  TAVERN,  combat  at,  491. 

YORKTOWN,    entered    by    Cornwallis,    51;    besieged    by    Americans,    52; 
evacuated,  54 ;  held  by  Confederates — stops  McClellan's  advance,  196. 
YOUNG,  S.  B.  M.,  at  Siboney,  599;  at  Las  Guasitnas,  600. 

ZOLLICOFFER,  defeated  at  Mill  Springs,  154. 
ZOUAVES,  FIRE,  see  Fire  Zouaves. 


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